

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET NIGHT FIGHTING SQUADRON FIFTY-THREE

VF(N)-53/F15/00 (AND: mbd)

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

24 February 1945

IN IN To:

Commanding Officer, VF(N)-5). Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via:

1) Commandor, CVC(N)-53.

2) Commanding Officer, USS SARATOGA.

3) Commander, Tank Group 58.5 4) Commender, Task Force 58 5) Commender, Firth Figur.

(6) Commander-in-Chief, U. Facific Fleet.

Subjects

Action Report - Forwarding of.

Roference:

(a) Cominch Restr. ltr. F71/A16-3/A9. Sorial 5005, of 2 suguet 1943.

(b) First Car Tri-1A, Pore. 6400.

Spolosuro:

(A) Alrerett Action Report (Form ACA-1), No. 1 for VV(N)-53.

Pursuant to references (a) and (b), anclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

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A. H. MAIN

Comingh se (3) Joint Intelligence Center, P.O.A., Porrl Herbor, I. ... Comingh U.S. Floot Conair ac lilo

Form ACA-1 Sheet 1 of 5

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

(Reclassify when filled out)

CONFIDENTIAL

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Mission	Zipper	Patrol e	ver airfi	elds on	Honshu,	Japa	n	f) Time of	f Return_	2145 X	(Zone
II. OW	N AIRCRA	FT OFFICIA	LLY COVER	ED BY TH	HIS REPOR	T .					•
TYPE	SQUADRON (b)	TAKING OFF (c)	NUMBER ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)			ND TORPEDOE (PER PLANE)			FUZE, SETTIN	G
	TP(N)-5 3		None		6 Mr. 7	Moto	r, Mt. 1	Head	A11 #	157 bas	fuse
				the state of the s	rockets	per	plane (z		.02 6	ec. del	ay.
							•				
III O	THER U.S.	OR ALLIED	AIRCRAFT	EMPLOYE	IN THIS	OPER	ATION.				
TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE		TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE	
ione											
									<u></u>		
IV. EN	(b)	(c)	RVED OR EN		(e)		(f)		(g)	
TYPE	OBSERVED	NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	ENCOUNTERED	LOCA	TION OF OUNTER		BOMBS, TORPE GUNS C	BSERVED); ————————————————————————————————————	CAMOUFLA	GE AND NG
one			(ZONE)							
			(ZONE)			1.3				
			(ZONE			F 12-14					
	nt Fnemy M	Aission(s)		,							
Did An Encour Time o of Sun	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrence of Day and Broon	illiance	(YES OR NO)	T MOON; DAY	, OVERCAST;	ETC.)			ibility		3)
Did An Encour Time o of Sun	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Broon	RAFT DESTI	(NIGHT, BRIGH ROYED OR D	AMAGED	, OVERCAST;	erc.) Sy Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MILE:	DAMAC
Did An Encour Time o of Sun	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Broon	RAFT DESTI	(NIGHT, BRIGH ROYED OR D	T MOON; DAY	, OVERCAST;	ETC.)	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	only).	(MILE:	(d)
Did An Encour Time of Sun (a) TYPE	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Broon	RAFT DESTI	(NIGHT, BRIGH ROYED OR D	AMAGED	, OVERCAST;	erc.) Sy Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MILE:	(d) DAMA
Did An Encour Time of Sun (a) TYPE	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Broon	RAFT DESTI	(NIGHT, BRIGH ROYED OR D	AMAGED	, OVERCAST;	erc.) Sy Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MILE:	(d) DAMA
Did An Encour Time of Sun (a) TYPE	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Broon	RAFT DESTI	(NIGHT, BRIGH ROYED OR D	AMAGED	, OVERCAST;	erc.) Sy Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MILE:	(d) DAMA
Did An Encour Time of Sun (a) TYPE	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Broon	RAFT DESTI	(NIGHT, BRIGH ROYED OR D	AMAGED	, OVERCAST;	erc.) Sy Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MILE:	(d) DAMA
Did An Encour Time of Sun V. EN	y Part of Iter(s) Occurrent of Day and Broon	RAFT DESTI	(NIGHT, BRIGH ROYED OR D	AMAGED	, OVERCAST;	erc.) Sy Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MILE:	DAMA



filled out)

(Reclassify when CONFIDENTIAL

VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only). REPORT No. CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C.
TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE (b) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, TYPE OWN A/C SQUADRON (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed) self-sealing tanks, equipment hit) VF(N)-53 Presumably ran out of F6F_5M Plane ditched; total less: gas. Bu. No. 72739 VF(N)-53 Berrier crash en land-3 767-5N Propeller and speed ring ing. damaged, pessible engine change. Bu. Ne. 72292. 8 . 9 13 14 VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left). (a) (c) NAME, RANK OR RATING SQUADRON (e) CAUSE CONDITION OR STATUS VF(E)-53 Stewart E. DOTY, Lt., USER. Lest, Fan out of gas; believed to have Made Missing in action. forced landing; net located. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING (a) (b) (c) MILES RETURN AV. HOURS AV. FUEL MILES (g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED AV. FUEL NO. OF PLANES IN AIR LOADED CONSUMED 20MM MM RETURNING 76F-5E 5 hrs. 35 400 gals, 371 gals. 3250 (See note below) min. IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line). CALIBER NONE MEAGER MODERATE HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over INTENSE MEDIUM - Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

· SPEED, CLIMB, at various altitudes

LIGHT -- Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm

TURNS DIVES

CEILINGS RANGE

PROTECTION ARMAMENT

No aerial combat.

Mote to VIII above, items (b), (c) and (d): "Miles out" and "Miles return" as given represent airline miles from launch to target and from target back to pesit. of carrier at landing. Actually, due to evasive action on route te target and navigational difficulties upon return, mentioned in narrative hereafter, distance actually flown was considerably greater,



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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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	Mangare.	amamatou Airfi	VES (By Own Aircraft Listed) Id. Homshu(b) Time Ovening Attack)	er Target(s)_	1815 X (Zone
Target(s) and Location	On (S) (FOR SHIPS	INCLUDE ALL IN AREA U	VDER ATTACK		
Clouds Over Target_	Hone	(BASE IN FEET.	TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)		
Visibility of Target	CLEAR, HAZ	Y. PARTIALLY OBSCURED E	34 CLOGES, -		
Bombing Tactics: Ty	No bombs	Carrion	Donie Signi		The state of the s
Bombs Dropped per F	300 F3	Spacing	(FEET)		
Number of Enemy A			Probably Destroyed		Damaged Mone
	(i)	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING	(1)		DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk
	TIME TO THE TENT OF THE TENT O		EXPENDED ENCIT ATTENDED	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	
AIMING POINT	TONNAGE	(k) SQUADRON		18 - 20	
AIMING POINT	TONNAGE	8	29 H. B. rockets 3250 rds50 cal.		Not observed
AIMING POINT	TONNAGE	6	20 H. B. rockets	18 - 20	Not observed
AIMING POINT	TONNAGE	6	20 H. B. rockets	18 - 20	Not observed
AIMING POINT	TONNAGE	6 7F(B)-53	20 H. B. rockets	18 - 20	
AIMING POINT	TONNAGE	6 7F(B)-53	29 H. B. rockets 3250 rds50 cal.	18 - 20 rookets	
AIMING POINT	TONNAGE	6 7F(B)-53	29 E. S. rockets 3250 rds50 cal.	18 - 20 rookets	
AIMING POINT	TONNAGE	6 77(X)-53	29 M. M. rockets 3250 rds50 cal.	18 - 20 rookets	

Hangars hit by 18 to 20 H. B. reckets. See Para. XII.

			Distagraphs	0
n) Were	Photographs Ta	aken?	Photographs	O

⁽O) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

(Reclassify when filled out)

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT No. 1

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance


Besignated as a Sipper flight, this operation was designed to patrol and cover certain airfields on Monshu during the period of duck fellowing a day of fighter sweeps on aircraft and airfields in the Tokyo area. The primary mission was to provent the enemy from staging a counter strike against our forces at the time they were taking the last daylight strikes abourd. The specific fields assigned were Mamamatsu and Mikatagahara.

Although might fighters were employed, the entire period to and ever the target was one of daylight, the return alene being made at aight. Might planes were scheduled for the flight, but one experienced engine trouble after becoming airborne, a second found its radio communications out, and both returned to base. The remaining six aircraft flow to the target without incident and without encountering any enemy aircraft. Hene of the vilots were able to see any aireraft on the ground at sither Hamamatsu or Mikategahara. Hangars to the Bast of Hamanatsu were observed to be burning from previous strikes. Approaching from the West at about 10,000 feet, down wind and down sun, the flight made a recket and strafing run on other hangars to the South of the field. The attack was made in sections in loose formation roughly abreast, firing in an average glide of 40° to 45°. Four planes fired reckets in salve, a fifth fired five reckets singly (the sixth recket failing to fire), and the sixth plane was unable to fire on edjective, and later jettisomed its reckets at sea. Altitude at release averaged about 3000 feet, air speed 325-350 knets indicated. A minimum of 18 to 20 hits by reckets were observed, of 29 fired, and a substantial perties of the .50 cal. rounds fired are believed to have struck the hangers.

On return, two planes strafed two small ships (estimated 100 feet ever all, lugger type) in the mouth of the Tanryu River. One was already beached and apparently damaged from previous strikes. Results were not observed.

Sew coiling, icing conditions, inability of all planes to intercept NS consistently or satisfactorily, a vector erreneous by 70°, given by the Radar Patrel Line-controlling BD, failure by forty-three miles of the parent task group to meet point option, and a close margin as to sufficiency of gasoline supply, all complicated the return to base. The flight became separated, and Lieutenant Stewart E. BOTY, USNR, failed to return, and is reported as missing. Lieutenants (V.S.E.R.) Alvin E. MAIN, William G. PARROTT, jr., and William C. REINHARDT, and Ensigns Lee V. ANDRECET and Leenard T. SKREBA completed the flight and all returned to base. Two of the planes had less than 10 gallons of gaseline upon return to dock. Lt. MAIN's plane had no hydraulic fluid, having sprung a leak in the cockpit, and its radio receiver and 28 both went out of commission after leaving the target. This plane engaged a barrier on landing, damaging the propeller and speed ring and possibly necessitating an engine change.

Evasive action, in the form of substantial changes of altitude and/or such changes of course as would not unduly reduce airspeed, was taken during the approach and on retirement, and may have contributed to the freedem from damage by antiaircraft. Antiaircraft positions were substantially as plotted by flak intelligence, particularly a large concentration of heavy, measure. Southeast of Hamamatsu Airfield near the town of Hamamatsu. (continued on next page)



REPORT No.

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition Altitudes -Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness Distance of Opening Fire Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses Enemy Weaknesses Offensive Tactics, Own " Enemy Defensive Tactics, Own ", Enemy Flexible Gunnery, Own Escort Tactics Fighter Direction Use of Radar Night Fighting Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target Approach to Target Altitudes, Speeds Approach Dive Pull-Out Dive Angle Strafing Retirement Defensive Tactics Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics Torpedo Tactics Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes Selection of Targets Fuzing Strafing Tactics Defensive Tactics Use of Radar Reconnaissance Photography Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation Homing Rendezvous Recognition, Ships Communications Flight Operations Search and Tracking Base Operations Maintenance

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

> This flight demonstrated the bazard incident to operations which extend the F6F-5N to its maximum range, and then require its return to base from beyond fighter director control and under conditions of reduced visibility and darkness. Homing devices do not appear sufficiently reliable to assure consistently prompt return under these conditions without reliance on some aspect of lest plane precedures, with incident delays in landing. Had airborns enemy fighters been encountered it is doubtful that any of the planes would have had sufficient gasoline for return to base.

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights Turrets Ammunition Bombs, Torpedoes Bomb Sights Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes Life Belts, Life Rafts Safety Belts Emergency Kits Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses Driftsights Octants Automatic Pilots Charts Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe Control Surfaces Control System Dive Flaps Landing Gear Heating System Flight Characteristics At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines Engine Accessories Propellers Lubricating System Starters Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

In this mission the only substantial material failure common to more than one plane invelved the ZB. None of the planes could receive YE signals consistently or with normal strength. Some falled altegether to receive them. The ZB equipment of the five planes which returned was checked and found to be performing satisfactorily in every instance. It is presently believed that the THE on the carrier which was guarding The for the Task Group at the time was not functioning with full efficiency.

APPROVED BY: