

昭和十年倫敦海軍會議豫備交渉代表海軍中將
山本 五十六

復命書

謹以昭如十年海軍軍縮會議、豫備交渉ニ関シ、昨年十月以降、経過ニ就キ奏上致シマス
臣 五十六

帝國政府ノ命ヲ承ケ、昨年九月本邦ヲ出發致シ、十月下旬ヨリ倫敦ニ於キ、英、國駐劄特命全權大使松平恒雄ト共ニ帝國代表トシテ、昭和十年海軍軍縮會議、豫備交渉長列致シ、シテ、今同情況報告、為歸朝ヲ命セラレタリ、御座リマス。今同豫備交渉ハ、昨年十月ニ至リ、再開セシ、日英米三國間ノ交渉ニ終始シタリ、御座リマス。主トシテ、二國會日議ノ形式ヲ執リ、海軍軍縮問題ニ關シ、討議ヲ行フタリ、御座リマス。交渉再開ノ辟カ頭ニ於キ、ミレテ帝國側ハ、英米ニ対シ、次ニ申シ上ケマス。帝國政府、根本方針ヲ提示致シ、マス。ト共ニ、新九軍縮協定ニ到達シ、以テ國際平和ノ確立ニ維持ニ貢獻セントス。我方ノ眞執ナク、希望ヲ披瀝致シ、タテ、御座リマス。尙右根本方針ニ鑑ミ、差等比率主義ニ依ル、華府海軍軍備制限條約ハ、之ヲ廢止スルノ要アリ、トモ、説明致シ、タテ、御座リマス。

英米側ニ提示致シ、ミタル、帝國政府ノ根本方針ハ、次ノ通り、御座リマス。
國家安全、為必要トスル限度ノ軍備ヲ有スル、權利ハ、各國ノ齊シク、之ヲ享有スル所ニシテ、軍縮協定ハ、此ノ義ヲ尊重シ、テ、各國國防ノ安全感ヲ害スルコトナク、不脅威不侵略ノ原則ノ下ニ、為サレ、ガルハ、カラス、之ガ實現ノ具體的方策トシ、ハ、先テ、我等大海軍國

間ニ於テ軍縮ノ方式トシテ各國ノ保有シ得ベキ兵力量ノ共通
 最大限度ヲ規定スルヲ根本義トシ右限度内ニ於テ各國國防上
 必要トスル軍備ヲ整理シ得ル如ク為スル最モ適當トス
 而シテ之カ協定ニ當リテ右限度ヲ去未得ル限リナラシメ且攻撃
 的兵力ハ極力縮減シ防禦的兵力ハ之ヲ整備シ以テ各國ヲ
 シテ改ムルニ難ク守ルニ不安ナカラシムルヲ基礎トセカレバカラス
 右我オノ主張ニ對シテ英國側ハ

各國ハ各國防ノ脆弱性ヲ要スルヲ以テ其ノ兵力ニ差等アルハキ
 ハ當然ナリ然ルモ拘ラス一律ニ共通最大限度ヲ定ムルハ右限
 度迄兵力ヲ必要トセカレ國ハ兵力ノ整備上伸縮ノ自由ヲ有スル
 モ之ヲ必要トスル國ハ右伸縮性ヲ有スル特ニ歐洲諸國ヲ近ク
 ニ控ヘ居ル英國トシテハ常ニ他國ノ建艦ニ對應シ得ル如ク為
 スノ要アリト趣旨ヲ強硬ニ主張シテ御座リマス
 又英國側ハ

華府海軍軍備制限條約ハ海軍軍備ノミナラス萬般軍事
 情ヲ検討シ各國共大ナル犠牲ヲ拂ヒ締結シタルモノニシテ建艦競
 争ヲ防止シ各國ニ安全ノ平等ヲ與ヘ爾來數年間最モ有效ニ
 働キ来シルモノニシテ其ノ後更ニ倫敦海軍條約成立シテ之ト相俟テ
 茲ニ吾界ノ平和ト安全トヲ維持スル機構ヲ建設セリ然ルニ今固ノ
 日本ノ主張ハ現存ノ海軍軍備制限條約ノ基礎タル安全ノ
 平等ト要ナル觀念ヨリ出資セルモノナルヲ以テ之カ討議ニハ問題
 ノ根本ニ之ヲ歸リ政治的其ノ他一切ノ事情ヲ再検討スルノ
 要アルニミナラス折角建設シタル平和機構ヲ破壊セントスルモノ
 ニシテ是ニ不韋ナリ尚又日米ノ兵力ヲ均等トシバ地理的ニ優位

ヲ享有スル日本ハ米國ヨリ優勢ト爲ルハ且日本提案ニ依
ルキハ共通最大限度迄建造セントスル建艦競争ヲ若起
スヤレトノ趣旨ヲ以テ友誼ニ倫敦條約ハ之ヲ修正シ華府條
約ハ之ヲ存続スルニトテ以テ今後ノ軍縮協定ノ基礎ヲラシメ
トテ強硬ニ主張シタカ御座リマス

是等ノ英米ノ主張ニ對シテハ海上兵力ノ移動性ニ鑑ミ
各國ノ保有スベキ兵力ニ何等ノ差等ヲ附スベキニ非カルト帝
國ノ主張スル不脅威ニ得略ノ原則カ實現セハ國防ハ脆
弱性ハ考慮ノ要ナキニ至ルニキコト 假令國防ハ脆弱性ハ問
題トスルニモ帝國ノ脆弱性ハ米國ニ比シテハ大ナルニト華府
條約ハ締結以來十數年ヲ閱シ國際情勢ノ變化、艦船
兵器ノ進歩等ニ依リ今日ノ情勢ニ適應セザルニ至リタルニト、
比等ヲ以テ兵力ニ差等ヲ附ストハ國民ニ不平等感ヲ與ヘ肉
體國間ニ感情上面白カラカル影響ヲ與ルニト等ノ趣旨ヲ以テ
マシテ反駁ヲ加ヘテ御座リマスルカ英米共ニ其ノ主張ヲ固持シ
テ我方ノ主張ヲ容認スルニ至ラザカクテ御座リマス

尚華府條約廢止ニ因リテハ英米ニ對シ中國政府ハ該
條約ヲ其ノ有効期間タル一九三六年後ニ之ヲ存続セシメ得
カルトヲ明ニ致シマスル共ニ友誼的空氣ノ裡ニ之カ廢止
ヲ實現セシカ爲各國共同シテ華府條約ノ廢止通テラ致
シ度旨申入レシメタカ英米共之ヲ承諾致サカクテ御座リマ
スナル情勢カニ於キマシテ英國側ハ交渉ノ行詰リヲ打聞スル
策トシテ一ノテ妥安ヲ提テ致シシメカ其ノ要莫ハ

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Key Note 1904-16

各國ハ條約ニ依リ平等的主張ヲ有スルコト
各國ハ一九三六年後數年間ノ建造計畫ヲ協議シ之ヲ
自發的一方的ニ宣言スルコト

ト言フノヲ御座リヨス

此ノ手摺案ハ表面上我方ノ主張ヲ加味シテ御座リスルカ
實質ニ於テハ大凡現比率ヲ維持セズルモノト認マラルルヲ御
座リシテ我方ト致シマスル邊ニ應答諾シ難キモノヲ御座リマ
ス其ノ後英國側ハ自發的且一方的宣言ハ之ヲ却大體的
基礎ニ依ラカトスルモ可ナリトノ意ノ及メカシ更ニ今後數
ケ年間ノ造艦計畫ヲ示シ合ヒ之ニ依リ何等カ協定ニ
到達スニシテ希望スル旨繰返シ申出サレテ自國ノ建艦
計畫ヲモ内示シテ御座リスルカ之ニ依リ見マスルニ英國
保有セヨスル兵力量ハ各種ノ條件ニ依リテカクノ變化カ
アリスルカ大休百ニ拾萬噸程度ヲ御座リシテ現存海軍
軍備制限條約規定兵力量ト殆ト差カアリマセヌノミナ
乙級巡洋艦等ニ於キシテハ却テ増加シテ居ル情況
アリマシヤ

以下 次頁

Ref New 1904-16

勿モ之ヲ以テ絶対的所要量トシテ之ガ依下ラ至難ナリト
主張致シテ御座リマスルカラ大軍縮ヲ為サントスル帝國
政府ノ主張ト相隔ルコト遠ク我方ト致シマシテハ之ヲ承認スル
ニテモ成立セシメ度旨申出テテ御座リマスルガ之ハ最少軍費

尚英國側ハ量的制限ノ協定カ不可能ナルニ於テハ建艦競
争ヲ緩和スル為單艦噸數及備砲ノ大等ノ質關ニル協定ヲ
以テ国防ノ安固ヲ期シ得ル軍備ヲ整ヘントスル我方ニ執リマシテ
大イニ不利トスル所デアリマスル爲此ノ英國ノ提案ハ之ヲ拒否シテ
次オデ御座リマス

米國側ハ英國ノ示唆案ニハ餘リ興味ヲ有シテカワツテ様觀
察ヒレ依然トシテ現存條約ノ存續ヲ固執シ現比率ヲ維持シツ
ツ兵力量ノ一律ニ削減ヲ為サントヲ主張シテ御座リマス
右ノ様オ次オデ御座リマシテ之以上交渉ノ進展ハ望ミ難キ情況
ト爲リ且米國側ハ帝國ガ華府條約ヲ廢止スル於テハ根本
ニ遡リ各種ノ問題ヲ再檢討スル爲米國政府ト協議スル
要アルヲ以テ一應帝國ノ態度意ヲ表不致シマシテハ三國
ノ代表協議ノ結果一旦交渉ヲ休止シ各國共互ニ其ノ主張ニ関シ
再考慮シ交渉再開ノ機運ガ熟シ次オ成ルベク連ニ英國政
府ハ適當ナル處置ヲ講ズルコトニ申合ヲ致シマシテ十一月三日休
會ト致シテ御座リマス

尚佛伊兩國ハ此ノ度豫備交渉ニハ直接関與スルニ至ラカワツ
ノデアリマシテ日英米三國交渉ノ経過ニ就キマシテハ英國側ヨリ
之ヲ佛伊兩國ニ臨機通報致シテ次オデ御座リマス

No 6

Ref Doc 1704-16

No 7

本豫備交渉ニ於キマシキハ各國代表共ニ終始友好的ナル務
 圍氣裡腹藏ナク率直ナル意見ノ交換ヲ行ヒ何等カ協
 定ノ基礎ヲ登見スル様ニ與摯ナル努力ヲ致シテ御座リシニ或ル
 ニ因ケ提携シテ他ノ一國ヲ壓迫スルトカ或ハ之ヲ疎外スルトカノ如キコト
 全然見受ケラレカハシク御座リマス行ニ英國側ハ招請國タル関
 係モアツク存トハ存シマスルガ軍縮協定ニ成立ヲ熱望シ交渉ヲ円滑
 ニ進行セシムル如ク終始最も熱心ニ斡旋致シタリテ御座リマス
 而シテ英米共ニ我方ノ主張ヲ最も大ナル関心ヲ以テ聽取致シマ
 シタリテ我方ト致シマシテハ充分ニ帝國政府ノ根本方針ヲ闡
 明シ得タリテ御座リマシテ之ト共ニ英米ノ主張ノ大體之ヲ了知
 シ得タリテ御座リマスルカ各國共ニ其ノ立場ヲ異ニシテ居
 リマスルノデモ各回意見ノ一致ヲ見ルニ至ラナクワタリテ御座
 リマス

英米側ヲシテ帝國政府ノ主張ヲ容認セシムルニ至ラナカツ
 タコトハ誠ニ遺憾ニ存スルカチ御座リマシテ之ガ母貫徹ニハ
 更ニ今後一層ノ努力ヲ俟ツノ要アルモト信ズルノ御座リマス
 謹ミテ奏上ヲ終リマス

昭和十年二月十九日

Studies through Questions and Answers Concerning the
Notification of Abolishing the Washington Treaty.

Ans : Is there any way of modifying the Washington Treaty?

Ques : In the Treaty the following three different cases are
provided.

(1) During the period this Treaty is in effect, if in case either of the contracting powers considers the requisite for its own national security concerning defense by naval strength gravely affected by changes in surrounding circumstances, the respective signatories shall reconsider the provisions of this Treaty in compliance with the request of the nation concerned and through mutual agreement a conference shall be convened for the purpose of its modification.

(Article 21, Clause 1.)

On this case, reconsideration of the Treaty provisions in general will be made and therefore discussions should also be made on such important clauses as capacity of military strength in possession.

Of course the above clause refers to the discussion of alterations to be made which is based on the provisions of this Treaty and needless to say it could not possibly alter the objective of this Treaty. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether it is possible or not to lodge a radical protest against such

matters as admitting difference in military strength possessed by the respective powers, which constitutes the basis of this Treaty. In either case at the conference convened in accordance to the foregoing clause and item, all nations will feel a strong inconvenience for them to take unrestricted actions from a free standpoint.

(2) With the object of discussing what changes will be necessary in the Treaty to meet the developments both technically and scientifically, a conference attended by all contracting powers shall be held 8 years after this Treaty takes effect.

(Article 21, Clause 2.)

In this case, the object of the conference is to only meet technical and scientific developments, and not the kind of conference to discuss such important problems as the reciprocal relation of military strength in possession.

Further, the above conference was fixed to be held 8 years after this Treaty took effect (that is, in 1931) but as a result of the London Conference of 1930, it became unnecessary. Therefore at the 6th General Meeting held on 22 April 1930 the conference scheduled for 1931 was postponed and an understanding was reached to transfer its disposal to the conference to be held in 1935.

(3) The case when either of the signatory powers involves in a war which is considered as affecting the defense of national security by naval strength.

The case when the remaining contracting powers may make a temporary modification in this Treaty.

The case when an amendment conference is held attended by all contracting powers subsequent to the cessation of hostile activities.

(Article 22.)

Ques: The reason for not taking steps to revise the Washington Treaty.

Ans : (1) Measures which can be considered in the steps to revise the Washington Treaty are restricted to provisions set forth in Article 21 Clause I and Clause 2.

Of the above clauses the measure provided in item two deals with the joint agreement on revisions to meet the developments in both technical and scientific fields. The scope of its revision is very limited and cannot ration.

(N.B.) This conference should have been held in 1931 but due to the London Conference it was postponed and an understanding was reached to transfer it to the 1935 conference.

But circumstances are not too clear on how things stand.

Therefore, there is some doubt as to whether or not to discuss items for which purpose the conference was opened on the occasion of the 1935 conference.

In either case, the purpose of the conference is extremely limited. It is interpreted to be intolerable to make discussion on a radical revision of this Treaty.

(N.B.) In January 1922 at the plenipotentiary delegate's conference to draft the Washington Naval Treaty, the British delegate Mr. Palfors proposed to declare the inability of demanding alterations in ratio at a conference opened according to Article 21 Clause 2.

2. He spoke as follows.

"The gathering of eight years later shall be limited to only technical and scientific matters and should not discuss serious issues such as the question of ratio brought about as a result of political changes. For instance, the limitation of 35,000 ton may require a slight alteration according to scientific changes but the ratio of strength should not be changed."

Furthermore, at the same conference, the French delegate stated that it was unnecessary to limit the items for discussion at the next conference but the U.S. delegate Mr. Hughes replied, "as long as item one of this Treaty provides that discussions may be made on general subjects according to political developments, is it not sufficient as it is?" and to Mr. Palfors stated

that, "This Treaty cannot be revised unless unanimously agreed upon. If a single nation opposes it would not only be unable to discuss the problem of ratio but also impossible to fix the date of discussion. In the future, when the conference is held again and the ratio problem is discussed, it would be necessary to exchange diplomatic papers before hand. Whether to discuss or not can be decided then and therefore would not require discussing deeply into the matter." Thereby, dissuading Mr. Palfors' assertion.

In view of the above circumstances and the provision of item one in the Treaty which provides that a conference will be held which may even demand the revision of ratio, it is considered reasonable to interpret that items for discussion at the conference held in conformity with the clause and item of this Treaty will be extremely limited.

(2) The measure provided in Clause One is to be adopted to meet political or any other serious changes in case it possesses a certain condition. Therefore, there is no restriction on items for discussion as the measure provided in Clause Two and free to discuss the provisions of the Washington Treaty in general. But ultimately its object would be the revision of the Washington Treaty and the basis of deliberations would be no other than the Washington Treaty itself. Consequently it would be difficult for the respective powers to take an unrestrained action from a free standpoint.

Especially in the case of our assertion, not adhering to circumstances of the past and seeking to establish a disarmament agreement on an entirely new basis, it is apparent that it will incur extreme inconvenience. Therefore, it is considered an unadaptable step to call for a revision conference according to the above measure.

(3) In short, the provisions set forth in the Washington Treaty on revision, are in both cases unadaptable in concluding a disarmament agreement desired by our Empire and we deem it necessary to choose a different measure.

Ques: Reasons why the Washington Treaty has to be abolished.

Ans : (1) A long period of time has elapsed since the Washington was concluded and it has become difficult to adapt itself to drastic changes in international situation and radical changes in technical and scientific achievements.

(2) The object of the Washington Treaty has already been achieved. Its term of validity will expire as of 1936 and it appears there are no reasons for further continuation.

(3) The Washington Treaty was based on recognition of possessing graded strength among the respective powers, and there is a radical divergence compared to our present disarmament policy. As it is impossible to reach a reconciliation it is considered advisable to abolish the Washington Treaty and form an agreement on a new foundation.

(4) The Washington Treaty fixed the ratio of military strength to be possessed of capital ships as of 12 December 1921. There is a regret that it did not take into deep consideration the question of national security. Therefore, the prolonged continuation of this Treaty will not be the way to establishment of national security for all nations and to maintain peace.

It is especially so in the case of our Empire, which could not even full accomplish the assertions on the possession of minimum limit for national defense at the time.

(5) The replacement construction of capital ships which can be recognized as the most important factor of the Washington Treaty provision was postponed six years as a result of the London Treaty. The above period of postponement expired as of 1936 and all contracting powers have access to immediately commence building replacements from 1937.

However, the London Treaty only postponed the shipbuilding for 6 years and did not fix any arrangements thereafter so unless a new agreement is formed it will lead to the construction of capital ships simultaneously by all the signatory powers at once. Because they could not build them for 6 years. Their capacity will reach a colossal figure and would actually be the same as if no treaty existed.

Farther, any limitation in quality would practically bear no significance in view of existing circumstances because they are as extremely restricted. Ultimately, from both angles, in quality or quantity, it may be said that the provisions of the Washington Treaty are ineffective.

The grounds for demanding the continuation of the Washington Treaty, may be acceptable perhaps from a political viewpoint but from the standpoint of actual armament limitation it may be said that it is of practically no value.

Ques: are there no other nation besides our Empire which sent a notification of renunciation?

Ans : (1) The French Government had been advocating dissatisfaction against the Washington Treaty ever since it was concluded. Thence after, she has been cherishing almost the same feeling but it is unknown whether or not she holds any intention of announcing its abolition right away.

(2) The British Government desired the permanency of this Treaty when it was concluded and even showed reluctance in inserting clauses and items (such as stipulations on revising the Treaty) which tend to lessen the effect of the Treaty. It is believed she adheres to principles of roughly the same significance hence after, but it is worth noting that recently there are some who advocate the abolition of the Treaty.

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(3) The U.S. Government takes pride in being the originator in drawing up the Washington Treaty and desires the permanency of this Treaty. The U.S. especially seeks to fix definitely and unchangeable the naval power ratio decided by the Treaty. Therefore, even if a criticism was made on the provisions of defense armament limitation it could not alter the above powerful influence.

It is surveyed that the U.S. Government would oppose to the abolition of this Treaty.

(4) It is believed that the Italian Government will follow the attitude of the U.S. Government. However, the principle of balanced strength for France and Italy as fixed in the Washington Treaty complies with the desires of Italy and considering her peculiar position she will desire the continuation of this Treaty.

(5) To sum it up, under present circumstances it is difficult to conclude that any other nation except our Empire would willingly take the procedures to renounce the Treaty.

Ques: What are the formalities for sending a notification?

Ans: It is provided in Article 23 of the Washington Treaty.

That is, to send a notification in documental form to the U.S. Government. The notification takes effect as of the day above document is received by the U.S. Government.

The notification does not require any adding of reasons.

Ques: The reason why it is necessary to send the notification within the year.

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Ans : To nullify the validity of the Washington Treaty as of 31 December 1936, when the term of validity expires, it is necessary to notify the intentions of renunciation two years before the above date. (Washington Treaty Article 23 Clause 1.)

(2) When the renunciation notification is sent, a conference (Article 23 Clause 2) is to be held by all contracting powers within one year after it takes effect, but should the notification not be sent within the year, there is fear of the conference not being able to open within the next year.

A conference according to the London Treaty is scheduled to be held next year. (London Treaty Article 23 Clause 2.) It is earnestly hoped that these two conferences be held jointly to discuss the general problems on naval armament limitation.

With a view to attain the object of our proposal on disarmament, we particularly feel the necessity to do so.

Ques: During the investigation of the Washington Treaty, the Government explained to the effect that even if our strength was not equal to that of the U.S. the security of national defense can be established. Does the same circumstances prevail today?

Ans : Owing to progress in technical and scientific fields and the changes in international situation, it has become

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difficult to rely upon the security of national defense today with the inferior strength fixed by the Washington Treaty. Furthermore, fixing graded strength as in the Washington Treaty gives the impression of admitting gradings between nations and cannot be considered to be fair.

It is necessary to start out from the basic idea of not attaching mechanically any gradings, at least among major powers.

Ques: Is there any difference between our assertions made hitherto at a disarmament conference and our assertions to be made at the conference next year? If there is give reasons.

Ans : They agree completely on the point that the security of national defense is the principal object. However, there are differences in concrete expressions and demands to meet the needs of the time, which is owing to unavoidable circumstances.

Ques: To when does it indicate where it says, "Two years prior to the above term," in Article 23 Clause I of the Washington Treaty.

Ans : Two years before 31 December 1936, that is, prior to 1 January 1935 and it is understood that any time before that time would be justified.

The renunciation of the Washington Treaty will cause considerable grave influence on disarmament.

It will be necessary for all nations to take counter-measures. That is the reason why a minimum two years advance notice period is provided.

It is stipulated in the second clause of the same article to open a conference to work out a remedial measure during this period.

Ques: What are the effects of the notification of renunciation.

Ans : (1) After the lapse of two years from the date the notification takes effect (In case the notification was made within this year it would be 31 December 1936) the Treaty definitely loses its effect.

(II)

However, in case a special arrangement is made at the conference it could bring about a different result.

(2) A conference should be held by all the signatory powers within one year after the renunciation notification takes effect. This conference does not require any special formalities such as sending invitations, and should as a matter of course be held in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty.

Ques: The relation between the conference to be held as a result of the abolition notification and the conference

to be opened in conformity with the provisions of the London Treaty.

Ans : (1) Both conferences will be held for separate reasons but not only do their objectives and matters for discussion bear similarity but almost in an indivisible relation with one another. (2) On Article 23 Clause 2 of the London Treaty it is provided that, "a conference shall be held in 1935 with a view to form a new treaty which will replace this Treaty and moreover accomplish the objectives of this Treaty."

Further, it is stated in the foregoing paragraph to the following effect, "to prevent the dangers entailing competitive armamenting and desire to reduce the burden as well as develop the enterprise entered upon by the Washington Naval Conference."

The conference to be held as a result of renouncing the Washington Treaty will doubtlessly discuss on matters set forth in the Washington Treaty whereby it should be clear that there are common points in the objectives of the two conferences.

(3) Participant nations obliged to participate at the conference to be held in conformity with the London Treaty are the three countries of Japan, the U.S. and Britain. However, it was anticipated at the time of treaty signing as five nations, inclusive of Italy and France. Again it is apparent that without the participation by all five nations it will be difficult to form an effective treaty. Therefore, it may be said that

the participant nations in both conferences shall be the same.

(4) It is evident that matters for discussion will chiefly be on items provided in the Washington Treaty on one hand and on items set forth in the provisions of the London Treaty on the other. But if examined into details, there are provisions in the Washington Treaty besides limitation of capital ships and aircraft-carriers, those one exempt vessels (Article 11), types of auxiliary vessels (Article 12) notification on warship construction (Article 16), prohibition of using warships being constructed for third powers (Article 17), prohibition of alienating warships (Article 18) etc.

Again in Article 1 of the London Treaty, a stipulation is made on the postponement of capital ship replacement. Also in Article Two a provision is set forth on the abolition of capital ships.

In Article Three there is a provision on aircraft-carriers, and in Article 8 there is a provision on exempt vessels.

From what has already been stated we learn that some portions of the items in both treaties correlate with one another. Therefore, the items to be discussed at both conferences should also bear mutual correlation.

(5) In view of the fact that the circumstances and naval disarmament situation stand as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, an exhaustive and impartial conclusion will be difficult to reach without an extensive investigation on naval

armament. Thereby it is considered vital to hold both conference jointly.

Ques: On the nature etc. of the preparatory negotiations.

Ans : (1) Preparatory negotiations have always been made in conferences up to date, for the purpose of deciding the place and subjects for discussion at the conference, and with a aim to pave the way for smooth progress of the conference.

(2) In view of the conference to be held next year expected to be important and complicated, and also deemed necessary to clarify our basic points on disarmament, the Empire attaches much importance on the preparatory talks and has arranged for sufficient preparation.

(3) The preparatory negotiations will not restrain the respective powers from a legal point of view, but will undoubtedly show real effect from a moral standpoint. Consequently, the words or action made by the respective government representatives at the preparatory negotiations will bear effect at the regular conference.

(4) It is difficult to forecast the preparatory conference outcomes, or definite items for negotiation at the present.

Ques: Nations to be invited.

Ans : In both, the conference to be held in accordance with

the London Treaty and the conference to be held due to the abolition notification of the Washington Treaty, do not stipulate any provisions in the Treaties as regards the invitation of nations.

It is something which needs to be decided at the preparatory negotiation. The conference to be held as a result of the Washington Treaty abolition obligates all signatory powers to participate and therefore it is understood that there is no need for sending invitations. The conference to be held in accordance with the London Treaty we believe requires the taking of some steps against Italy and France. Therefore, it is probable that it will be necessary for a certain nation, or a few nations, jointly send invitations to the above countries.

In case, the above two conferences are held jointly it will follow the case of the conference to be held due to the Washington Treaty abolition notification.

Ques: Do you intend to retain the Four Power Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty etc, as they are?

Ans : Both, the Four Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty do have direct connection with the Washington Treaty.

Again, as it cannot be thought to be an obstacle in concluding a new agreement on disarmament we shall not any steps at the present dealing with them.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the 2nd Demobilization Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 26 pages and entitled "Studies through Questions and Answers concerning the Notification of Abolishing the Washington Treaty" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section Office).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三號)

自分吉井道教ハ第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セ
レタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレニ六頁ヨリ成ル「華府條約廢止通告ニ關ス
ル研究」ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ
拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

吉井道教

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 奥山 八郎

(附屬書第十七)

華府條約廢止通告ニ關スル研究

(問) 華府條約改訂ノ方法アリヤ

(答) 同條約ニハ左ノ三種ノ場合ヲ決定シアリ

(一) 本條約有効期間中何レカノ締約國未於テ其軍力ニ依ル防衛ニ關スル
 自國安全ノ要件ガ四國ノ狀況ノ變化ニ依リ重大ナル影響ヲ受ケタリ
 ト認めタル場合ニ於テハ締約國ハ該國ノ要求ニ基キ本條約ノ規定ヲ
 再議シ且相互ノ協定ニ依リ之カ修正ノ目的ヲ以テ會議ヲ開催スル場
 合(第二十一條第一項)

此ノ場合ハ條約規定全體ニ付テ再議スルモノナルヲ以テ保有兵力量
 ノ如キ重要事項ニ付テモ審議ノ得ベキナリ、尤モ右ハ本條約ノ規定
 ヲ基礎トシ之ニ如何ナル改變ヲ加フベキヤヲ審議スルモノナレバ本
 條約ノ目的ヲ變改スルヲ許サレザルベキハ勿論本條約ノ根底ヲ爲ス
 件例セバ各國保有兵力ニ差等ヲ認ムルガ如キモノニ付テ根本的異論
 ヲ立ツルコト可能ナリヤ否ヤニ付テモ疑議ナキ能ハズ

孰レニスルモ此ノ條項ニ依ル會議ニ於テハ各國共自由ノ立場ニ於テ不羈
ノ行動ヲ孰ルニハ甚ダシク不自由ヲ感ズベシ。

(二) 技術上及科學上ノ發達ニ適應スル爲本條約中如何ナル變更ヲ必要トスベ
キカヲ審議スルノ目的ヲ以テ本條約實施ノ時ヨリ八年ヲ經過シタル後、
締約國全部ノ會議ヲ開催スル場合(第二十一條第二項)

此ノ場合ハ單ニ技術上及科學上ノ發達ニ適應スルヲ目的トスルモノナ
ルヲ以テ保有兵力ノ相對關係ノ如キ重要問題ヲ審議スル性質ノモノニ
非ズ

尙ホ、右會議ハ本條約實施後八年ヲ經過シタル後、即チ一九三一年ニ
於テ(開催スベキ旨ヲ定メフリアル所、一九三〇年「ロンドン」會議
ノ結果其ノ開催ヲ必要トセザルニ至リタルヲ以テ昭和五年四月二十二
日第六回總會ニ於テ一九三一年ノ會議ニ移讓スルコトノ了解成レリ。

(三) 何レカノ締約國ガ海軍力ニ依ル自國安全ノ防衛ニ影響ヲ及ボスト認ム
ル際ニ從事スルニ至リタル場合兩餘ノ締約國ガ本條約ニ對シ爲スコ
トアルベキ一時的修正ヲ爲ス場合及敵對行爲終了後締約國全部參加ス
ル修正會議開催ノ場合(第二十二條)

(問) 華府條約改訂ノ手續ヲ孰クサル理由

(答)

一 華府條約手續中、考慮シ得ベキ方法ハ第二十一條第一項及同第二項ニ規定セフレタルモノニ限ラル

右ノ中第二項ニ規定セラルル方法ハ技術上及科學上ノ發達ニ適應スル改訂ヲ同約トスルモノニシテ其ノ改訂ノ範圍ハ極クテ限局セフレ比率ノ變更ノ如キ重大問題ヲ強シ得ザルモノナリ(註)加之此ノ會議ハ一九三一年ニ開催セラルベキモノヲ「ロンドン」會議ノ結果延期セラレ一九三五年會議ニ移讓セフルノ了係アリタルモノノ間ノ消息余リ明確ニ非ズ從テ一九三五年會議ノ際當然此ノ會議ノ目的トスル事項モ審議セラルベキモノナリヤ否ヤハ多少ノ疑義アリ孰レニスルモ此ノ會議ハ其ノ目的ガ程度ニ限局セラレアリ本條約ニ對シ大改訂ヲ加フル討議ヲ爲スコトハ許容セラレザルモノト解ス

(註)

大正十一年一月華府海軍條約起草ニ關スル全權會議ニ於テ英國全權「バルフォア」ハ第二十一條第二項中ニ本條項ニ依ル會議ニ於テハ比率變更ヲ求メ得サル旨ヲ明言センコトヲ提議シ左ノ如ク述べタリ

「八年後ノ會合ハ單ニ技術的科學的專項ニ限ルモノニシテ政治的變化ヨリ來ル比率問題ノ如キ重大事項ヲ議スベキニ非ズ例セバ三萬五千噸ノ制限ノ如キハ科學的變化ニ應シテ若干増減ノ必要生スベキモ之方爲ニ勢力比ヲ動カスベキニ非ズ」

尙同會議ニ於テ佛國全權「サロー」ハ次同ノ會議ニ議スベキ專項ヲ制限スルノ必要ナキ旨ヲ述べタルガ米國全權「ヒューズ」ハ之ニ對シ

「本條第一項カ政治的變遷ノ必要ニ基ツキ一般事項ノ討議ヲ爲シ得ルコトヲ規定セル以上夫レニテ充分ナリ」トシ「バルフォア」ニ對シテハ

「本條約ハ滿場一致ニ非ザレハ改定スルヲ得ズ一國反對セバ比率問題

ヲ詳スル能ハザルハ勿論之ガ討論ノ時期ヲ定ムルコトモ不可能ナ
リ將來會議再開ニ際シ比率問題ヲ議セントスル場合ニハ前以テ外
交文書ノ交換ヲ必要トスベク之ヲ議スルト否トハ斯カル際ニ決定
シ得ルヲ以テ今日深ク立入りテ討論スルニ及バザルベシト
述ベ「バルフォア」ノ明言要求ヲ思ヒ止マフシメタリ。

以上ノ經濟及同條第一項ニ比率決定ヲモ求メ得ベキ會議開催ヲ決定シ
居ルニ鑑ミ本條項ニ依ル會議ニ於ケル審議事項ハ若シク限局セフレタ
ルモノト解スルヲ至當トス。

(二) 第一項ニ規定セフルル方法ハ一定條件ヲ具備シタル場合ニ政治的其ノ
他重大ナル變動ニ對應スル爲ニ行ハルルモノナレバ第一項ニ規定セフ
ル方法ノ如ク審議事項ニ制限ナク軍府條約ノ決定全般ニ付討論ヲ行シ
待ベキモ結局軍府條約ノ改訂ヲ目的トスルモノナレバ討論ノ基礎ト爲
ルモノハ軍府條約其ノモノニ外ナラズ各國ハ自由ノ立場ニ於テ不獨ノ
行動ヲ執ルコト困難ナリ特ニ帝國主張ノ如ク過去ノ經濟ニ影響セズ全
然新シキ基礎ノ下ニ軍府條約ヲ寫サントスルニハ甚シキ支障ヲ來スコ

ト明瞭ナリ。從ツテ

右方法ニ依リ既訂會議ヲ要求スルコトハ適當ノ措置ト言フベカラズ
(三) 要スルニ華府條約ニ決定セララル規定ハ其ノ何レニ依ルモ帝國ノ所期
スル軍備協定ヲ締結スルニハ不適當ノモノナルヲ以テ別途ノ手段ニ出
ズルコトヲ必要トス。

(問) 華府條約ヲ廢止セザルベカラサル理由

(答)
(一) 華府條約ハ締結後長期間ヲ經過シ國際情勢ノ著シキ變化及急激ナル技
術上科學上ノ進歩ニ顧慮シ難キニ至レリ。
(二) 華府條約ハ既ニ其ノ目的ヲ達成シ昭和十一年ヲ以テ有效期間満了スベ
キモノニシテ更ニ之ヲ延長セザルベカラサル程ノ事由ナキガ如シ
(三) 華府條約ハ各國間ニ差等勢力ノ保有ヲ認ムルコトヲ基礎トシタルモノ
ナルヲ以テ今次帝國ノ軍備方針ト根本的ノ相違アリテ其ノ間調和點ヲ
見出スコト不可能ナルヲ以テ華府條約ハ之ヲ廢止シ新シキ基礎ノ下ニ

協定ヲ締結スルニ努ムルヲ可トス。

(四) 華府條約ハ大正十年十一月十二日ニ於ケル各國主力艦ノ現有勢力ヲ以テ各國ノ將來ノ保有兵力ノ比率ヲ定メタルモノニシテ國ノ安全ノ如キハ梁ク考慮セラレザリシ憾アリ從テ此ノ條約ヲ長ク繼續スルコトハ各國ノ國家安全ヲ確保シ平和ヲ維持スル所以ニ非ズ殊ニ帝國ノ如ク當時ニ於テ國防上ノ最底限度ノ保有兵力主張ヲモ十分貫徹シ居ラザル國ニ付テ然リトス。

(五) 華府條約簽定中最重要ト認メラルル主力艦ノ代艦建造ハ「ロンドン」條約ノ結果六年間延期セラレタルガ右延期期間昭和十一年ヲ以テ滿了シ締約國ハ昭和十二年ヨリ直チニ代艦建造ニ着手シ得ル次第ナリ然ルニ「ロンドン」條約ハ唯單ニ六年間建造ヲ延期シタルニ止マリ爾後ノ處置ヲ定メ居ラサルヲ以テ新協定ヲ取結バザル限り各締約國ハ六一年間ニ建造シ得ベカリシ主力艦ヲ一時ニ起工シ得ル譯ニシテ其ノ量ハ莫大ノ數ニ上リ事實上無條約ノ場合ト擇ブ所ナシ

加之質的制限ノ如キモ今日ノ狀況ヨリ見テ其ノ制限ハ殆ンド無意義ニ
近キ程高度ノ制限ヲ示セルモノナルヲ以テ究極スル所質的量的ノ兩方
面ヨリ見テ華府條約ノ規定ハ實際ナキモノト見ルヲ得ベシ
華府條約ノ存置ヲ必要トスルノ根據ハ政治的方面ヨリハ或ハ之ヲ認め
得ベケシモ實際ノ實情制限ノ上ヨリ見レバ殆ンド無價值ニ等シキモノ
ト言フヲ得ベシ

(問) 帝國以外ニ廢止通告ヲ爲ス國ナキヤ

(答)

(一) 佛國政府ハ華府條約ニ對シ其ノ締結當時ヨリ不滿ヲ唱ヘ爾後モ同様
ノ感想ヲ懷キ居ルモ今直チニ廢止ノ通告ヲ爲ス意思ヲ有スルヤ否ヤ不

明ナリ

(二) 英國政府ハ條約締結ニ方リ本條約ノ永續ヲ希望シ本條約中ニ其ノ效果

ヲ減殺スルガ如キ條項（條約訂修項等）ノ挿入サヘ悦バサル態度ヲ示シタル程ニシテ爾後ニ於テモ大体同趣旨ノ方針ヲ持スルモノト思ハルルモ最近ニ於テ二、三同條約ヲ廢止スベシトノ意見ヲ唱フルモノヲ生ジタルハ注目ニ價ス

三 米國政府ハ華府條約ノ作成主動者タルコトヲ矜リ居リ本條約ノ永續ヲ希望シ殊ニ本條約ニ定メタル海軍勢力比率ヲ確定不變ノモノト爲サンコトヲ努メ居レルヲ以テ防備制限條項ニ關シ時ニ非議ヲ加フル者アルモ素ヨリ右大勢ヲ動カスニ足ラズ從テ米國政府ハ本條約ノ廢止ニハ反對スベシト觀測セララル

四 伊國政府ハ米國政府ノ態度ニ追隨スベシト思ハル尤モ華府條約定ムル佛伊勢力均等ノ主義ハ伊國政府ノ所望ニ合スルヲ以テ本條約ノ存廢ハ其ノ獨自ノ立場ヨリ見ルモ希望スベシ

五 要スルニ現下ノ狀勢ニ於テハ帝國以外ニ進ンデ華府條約廢止ノ手續ヲ孰ル國アリト推斷スルコト困難ナリ

(問) 通告手續如何

(答) 華府條約第二十三條ニ規定シアリ即チ合衆國政府ニ對シ書面ヲ以テ

テ通告スルコトト爲リ居レリ

通告ノ效力ハ右書面ガ合衆國政府ニ依リ受領セラレタル日ヨリ生
スルモノトス

通告ニハ別段理由ヲ附スルノ必要ナキモノトス

(問) 本年中ニ通告ヲ爲スヲ要スル理由

(答)

一 華府條約ヲ其ノ有効期間タル一九三六年十二月三十一日ヲ以テ效力
ヲ喪ハシムル爲ニハ右期日ノ二年前ニ廢止ノ意思ヲ通告スルコトヲ要
ス(華府條約第二十三條第一項)

(二) 廢止通告アリタルトキ其ノ效力ヲ生ジタル日ヨリ一年內ニ締約國全
部ノ會議ヲ開催スルコト爲ル(第二十三條第二項)處本年中ニ通告
ヲ爲サザルトキハ右會議ガ明年中ニ開催シ得ザルニ至ル虞アリ
明年ハ「ロンドン」條約ニ依ル會議開催ニ「ロンドン」條約第二十

三條第二項）セラルル豫定ナルニ付此ノ兩會議ハ是非共合併シテ
開催シ海軍軍備制限ニ關スル全般的問題ヲ討議スルノ必要アリ帝
國ノ懷抱スル軍備案ヲ徹底セシムル上ニ於テ特ニ其ノ要ヲ感ズ

（問） 華府條約審査ノ際政府當局ハ對米勢力ガ必ズシモ同等ナラズト
モ國防ノ安全ヲ確保シ得ル旨ヲ説明シタリ

今日ニ於テモ同様ノ事情存スルヤ

（答） 技術、科學ノ進歩、國際情勢ノ變化ニ依リ華府條約ニ定ムル
ガ如キ劣勢ヲ以テシテハ今日ニ於テハ國防ノ安全ヲ期シ難キニ
至トリ

尙又華府條約ノ如ク差等勢力ヲ定ムルコトハ國家間ニ差等ヲ認
ムルガ如キ印象ヲ與ヘ公平ト言フベカラズ少クトモ大國間ニ於
テハ機械的ニ差等ヲ附セズトノ基礎紀念ヲ出發點トスルヲ要ス

（問） 帝國ガ從來軍備會議ニ於テ爲シタル主張ト明年會議ニ於テスベ

(問) キ主張トノ間ニ差違アリヤ、差違アリトセバ其ノ理由ヲ如何
國防ヲ安固ニスルヲ主眼トスル點ニ於テ全ク一致シ居レリ、但
シ時代ノ要求ニ應シ具體的表現及要求ニ於テ異同アルモ之ハ已
ヲ得ザルコトナリ

(問) 華府條約第二十三條第一項中「右期間ノ二年前」トアルハ何時
ヲ指スモノナリヤ

(答) 一九三六年十二月三十一日ノ二年前即チ昭和十年一月一日前ノ
義ニシテ夫レ以前ナラバ何時ニテモ差支ナキモノト了解シ居レ
リ
華府條約ノ廢止ハ軍備上相當重要アルニ依リ最短二年間ノ予告
期間ヲ置キタルモノナリ此ノ期間中ニ於キテ善後措置ヲ講スル
會議ヲ開催スベキコトハ同條第二項ニ規定スル所ナリ

(問) 廢止通告ノ效果如何

(答)

(一) 通告効力發生ノ日ヨリ二年經過後(今年中ニ通告ヲ爲シタル場合ニハ一九三六年十二月三十一日限り)條約ハ強定的ニ効力ヲ喪フ尤モ會議ニ於テ別段ノ取極ヲ爲シタル場合ニハ之ト異ナル結果トナルコトアルベシ

(二) 通告効力發生後一年內ニ締約國全部ノ會議ヲ開催スルヲ要ス此ノ會議ハ招請等ノ特別ノ手續ヲ俟タズ條約規定ノ結果、當然開催ノコトト爲ル

(問) 廢止通告ニ因ル會議ト「ロンドン」條約ノ規定ニ依ル會議トノ關係

(答)

(一) 兩會議ハ各別ノ根據ニ因リ開催セラルルモノナレモ其ノ目的、審議事項ハ相似スルモノミナラズ殆ンド不可分ノ關係ニ在リ

(二) 「ロンドン」條約第二十三條第二項ニハ「本條約ニ代リ且本條約

ノ目的ヲ遂行スル新條約ヲ作成スル爲一九三五年ニ會議ヲ開催スベシ。。。。。。」ト規定ス而シテ同條約前文ニハ「競争的軍備ニ常ニ伴フ危険ヲ防止シ且負擔ヲ軽減セシムコトヲ希望シ並ニ「ワシントン」海軍會議ニ依リ開始セラレタル事業ヲ進展セシメ。。。。。。」ト掲記シアリ」

而シテ華府條約ノ廢止ニ因ル會議ハ華府條約ニ規定セララルル事項ニ關シ審議ヲ行フモノニ外ナラサルヲ以テ兩會議ノ目的ニ共通點アルヲ知ルベシ

(三) 參加國ハ「ロンドン」條約ニ依ル會議ニ於テハ參加義務ヲ有スルモノハ日、英、米ノ三國ナリト雖モ條約締結當時予想シタルハ佛、伊ヲモ加ヘタル五國ニシテ又實際五國全部ノ參加ガナケレバ有效ナル協定ヲ成立セシメ難キコト明ナリ

即チ兩會議ノ參加國ハ同一國ナリト見テ差支ナシ
(四) 審議事項ハ一ハ華府條約ニ規定セララルル事項ヲ主トシ一ハ「ロンドン」

條約ニ規定セラレル事項ヲ主トスベキコト明ナルモ仔細ニ検討スレバ
華府條約中ニハ主力艦航空母艦ノ外制限外艦船（第十一條）補助艦ノ
艦型（第十二條）軍艦ノ建造通知（第十六條）他國ノ爲ニ建造中ノ軍
艦ノ使用禁止（第十七條）、軍艦讓渡禁止（第十八條）等各種艦型ニ
付テモ規定シアリ

又「ロンドン」條約第一條ニハ主力艦代換延期ニ付、同第二條ニハ主力
艦廢止ニ付規定シ同第三條以下ニハ航空母艦ノ規定ヲ設ケ又同第八條
ニハ制限外艦艇ノ規定ヲ設ケタリ

右ニ依リテ兩條約ノ規定事項ハ相錯綜セル部分アルヲ知り得ベク從テ
兩會議ニ於テ審議スベキ事項モ自ラ相互關聯ヲ有スルニ至ルベキナリ
(五) 如上ノ事情及海軍軍縮ハ海軍軍備ヲ全般的ニ檢討セザレバ徹底的ニシ
テ公平ナル結論ニ達シ難キニ鑑ミ兩會議ハ合併シテ行フコト肝要ナリ
トス

(問) 予備交渉ノ性質等

(答)

(一) 予備交渉ハ從來ノ會議ニ於テモ常ニ行ハレタル所ニシテ會議地議題等ヲ決定スルノ外能フ限リ本會議ノ進行ヲ圓滿ナラシメンスル爲ニ行ハル

(二) 來年ノ會議ノ重要複雑ナルニ鑑ミ又帝國ノ抱懷スル軍縮ニ對スル根本ヲ闡明スルコト必要ト認メラルルニミ帝國トシテハ予備交渉ヲ重視シ十全ノ準備ヲ整ヘタリ

(三) 予備交渉ハ法律上各國政府ヲ拘束スルモノニ非ザルモ道德的方面ヨリ見テ實效ヲ有スルコト勿論ナリ從テ予備交渉ニ於ケル各國政府代表ノ言動ハ結局本會議ニ作用スルコトト爲ルベシ

(四) 予備交渉ノ見込、具体的交渉事項ノ如キコトハ今ヨリ確言シ難シ

(問) 招請國

(答) 「ロンドン」條約ニ基ク會議及華府條約廢止通告ニ因ル會議共ニ條約ニハ招請國ニ關シ規定ヲ存セズ

予備交渉ニ於テ決定スルヲ要スル事項ナリ
華府條約廢止通告ニ因ル會議ハ締約國全部ガ義務トシテ參加スルコ
トト爲ルヲ以テ特ニ會議招請ノ必要ナキモノト解セラル「ロンドン」
條約ニ基ク會議ハ佛伊兩國ニ對シ何等カノ手段ヲ講ズル必要アリト
思ハルルヲ以テ特定ノ一國又ハ數國連合シテ右三國ニ對シ招請ヲ爲
スノ必要ヲ生ズルコトアルベシ
右兩會議合同シタル場合ニハ華府條約廢止通告ニ因ル會議ノ場合ニ
準ズルコトト爲ルベシ

(問) 四國條約九國條約等ハ其ノ儘存置スル趣旨ナリヤ

(答) 四國條約九國條約ハ直接華府海軍條約ト關係ヲ有スルモノニ非ズ又
軍縮新協定ヲ締結スルニ方リ障害ヲ與フルモノトモ思考セラレザル
ニ依リ今直ニ之ヲ處理スルノ手段ハ執ラズ

A Study of War Expenditures of Various
Nations Based On Past Records.

-- Excerpt from the Report submitted (August 15th
1934) by the Committee to investigate the
matters concerning the Conference for the
Reduction of Naval Armaments, 1935.

1. Japan.

(2) The percentage of military expenditures against national income just before the Washington Treaty (not including expenditures for interim cases) were from 1917 to 1921, an average of 7.72% for the 5 years. Applying this to the national income for the year 1930 which was 10,400,000,000 yen it would amount to 790,000,000 yen.

(b)

(1) The average percentage of military expenditures against the annual expenditure for general accounts before the Russo-Japanese War from 1897 to 1903, a period of 7 years was 41.77%.

(2) The percentage of military expenditures (not including any contingent outlays) against the annual expenditures from General accounts were for the 5 year period from 1917 to 1921 an average 43.54 percent.

The average annual military expenditure during the above 5 year period (not including contingent outlays) was little less than 516,000,000 yen.

(During the above 5 year period, the average price index as of July 1914 based on a research conducted by the Bank of Japan was 217.7).

Vessels completed during the 5 year period from January 1, 1917 to end of 1921.

Battleships (From YAMASHIRO to MUTSU)	5 ships
154,750 tons	
B Class Cruisers	7 ships
31,960 tons	
Destroyers	43 ships
40,645 tons	
Submarines	17 ships
12,899 tons	
Total	72 ships
240,254 tons	
Average yearly	48,051 tons
Exempted ships	9 ships
85,300 tons	
Grand total	81 ships
325,554 tons	
Average yearly	65,111 tons

(3) Average percentage of military expenses against the annual expenditure from general accounts during the 9 year period from 1925 to 1933 was 30.3%.

The annual average expenditure of military expenses during the above 9 years was 527,000,000 yen. (The average price index as of July 1914 based on a survey made by the Bank of Japan was 163.2).

To step up the above annual average to the percentage at the time immediately prior to the Washington Conference would be 760,000,000 yen.

Ships completed during the 9 years period from January 1, 1925 to the end of 1933.

Aircraft carriers 3 vessels

60,900 tons

A Class Cruisers 12 vessels

107,800 tons

B Class Cruisers 3 vessels

15,560 tons

Destroyers 41 vessels

63,126 tons

Submarines 31 vessels

45,826 tons

Total 90 vessels

293,248 tons

Average 32,532 tons

Exempted ships 9 vessels

6,600 tons

Grand Total 99 vessels

299,908 tons

Annual Average 33,524 tons

(4) 41.77% of the estimated annual revenue for 1937 at 1,800,000,000 yen would be 750,000,000 yen and 43.55% of 1,800,000,000 yen would be 785,000,000 yen.

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(c) The percentage of military expenses for the 3 year period from 1932 to 1934 against the national income for 1930 was 8.68 percent.

The percentage of military expenses for 1934 against the annual expenditure from general accounts (including public loans to fill the deficits amounting to approximately 810,000,000 yen) was approximately 44 percent and, reaches the percentage in the foregoing items of (1), (2) of (a) of (b).

2. The United States.

(a) Percentage and outlines of naval vessel construction of military expenses immediately before the Washington Conference and recent 9 year period against total annual expenditures.

(1) From 1919 to 1922.

Average for 4 Year period 297%.

(Average price index based on standard of July 1914 was 173.8)

Vessels completed in the 4 year period from January 1, 1919 to 1922.

Battleships	4 vessels	127,500 tons
Destroyers	210 vessels	236,366 tons
Submarines	43 vessels	29,360 tons
Total	257 ships	392,926 tons
Average annually		98,231 tons

(2) Average for 9 year period from 1925 to 1933 was 17%.

Annual average of military expenses during the above period of 9 years.

Approximately 770,000,000 dollars. (Average price index in the

above 9 year period as based on standard of July 1914 was 127.1).

23 percent of the national expenditure (percentage of military expenses just before the Washington Treaty) for the recent 9 year period and based upon figures presented above, would be roughly 1,110,000,000 dollars.

Vessels completed in 9 year period from January 1, 1925 to end of

Aircraft Carriers 2 vessels 66,000 tons

A Class Cruisers 10 vessels 92,550 tons

B Class Cruisers 1 vessels 7,950 tons

Submarines 10 vessels 17,110 tons

Total 182,810 tons

Annual Average 20,312 tons

(b) The percentage of military expenses against national income in the period immediately prior to the Washington Treaty and recent 3 years.

From 1919 to 1922. The average of 4 years. 2.26%.

From 1931 to 1933. The average of 3 years. 2.05%.

And the 2.26% of the recent national income is approximately 900,000,000 dollars.

(c) If the percentage of war expenditures at the time just before the Washington Treaty is regarded as tolerable in peacetime by the U.S. people under present circumstances the military expenses would be estimated to be approximately 8,000,000,000 dollars.

And in the U.S., Military expenditures for the army and navy are roughly the same.

The projected neval estimates for 1935 of approximately 455,000,000 dollars (including expenditures for rehabilitation of industries) and yearly tonnage for ship-construction in 1934 at approximately 62,300 tons (as investigated by Section Five, Navy General Staff) can be regarded as approaching the limit mark in peacetime.

Moreover, it should be noted that deficit in the 1934 year annual revenue was approximately 4,000,000,000 dollars.

3. Britain.

(a) Percentage and outlines of ship-constructions of past war expenditures against total annual revenue.

(1) Average for the 9 year period (Shipbuilding competition period between Britain and Germany) from 1906 to 1914 was 38.2%. War expenditures for the above 9 year period. Average annual expenditure was little over 67,000,000 pounds.

(2) From 1919 to 1922. Average for the 4 year period (immediately before the Washington Treaty) 22.6%.

The average annual war expenditures during the above 4 years period was little over 289,000,000 pounds. (Average price index during the above 4 year period as based on the standard of 1914 was 250.4).

Vessels completed in the 4 year period from January 1, 1919 to end of 1922.

Battleships	1 Vessel	42,100 tons
Cruisers	11 vessels	55,950 tons

Destroyer	46 vessels	46,040 tons
Submarines	22 vessels	14,830 tons
Total	80 vessels	158,920 tons
Annual average		39,720 tons.

(3) From 1925 to 1933.

Average for 9 year period 14.3%.

Annual average of war expenditures during the above 9 year period.

Approximately 113,000,000 pounds. (Average price index during

the above 9 year period, taking the standard of 1914 was 129.9).

Vessels completed during the period of 9 years from January

1, 1925 to end of 1933.

Battleships	2 vessels	67,400 tons
A Class Cruisers	15 vessels	143,970 tons
B Class Cruisers	5 vessels	39,070 tons
Destroyers	38 vessels	52,064 tons
Submarines	28 vessels	36,794 tons
Total	88 vessels	339,298 tons

Annual average

(b) Percentage of armament expense against national income in the past.

1913 3.3%

1924 - 1925 average 3.6%

1931 - 1932 average 3.4%

(c) The general economic world was still in a state of depression but recently it recovered a little to make some margin in the yearly budget.

(d) Judging from the foregoing facts it can be observed that it is considerably difficult to effect any ship construction which is beyond the

present standards.

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Anex 13

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 11 pages and entitled "A Study of War Expenditures of Various Nations Based on Past Records" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau)

Certified at Tokyo, on this 8th day of August, 1947

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

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附屬書第十六

昭和十年海軍及陸軍會議軍備制限研究委員會報告
（昭和九年八月十五日）抜萃

過去ノ記録ヲ整理トスル各國ノ軍費ニ關スル考察

一 帝國

（一）華府會議直前ノ軍費（臨時事件費ヲ含マズ）ノ國民所得ニ對スル割合

ハ

自大正六年（一九一七年）度

五年間平均 七〇・七二%

至大正十年（一九二一年）度

之ヲ昭和五年國民所得百二億四千萬圓ニ當テ嵌ムレバ

七億九千萬圓

（ロ）

（一）日露戰爭前（明治三〇年（一八九七年）度至明治三十六年（一九〇三

年）度）七年間ノ軍費ノ一般會計歳出ニ對スル割合ノ平均

四一・七七%

（二）華府會議直前ノ軍費（臨時事件費ヲ含マズ）ノ一般會計歳出ニ對ス

ル割合ハ

自大正六年（一九一七年）度
至大正十年（一九二一年）度
五年間平均 四三、五四%

石五年間ニ於ケル單費（臨時事件費ヲ含マズ）年額平均

五億一千六百萬圓弱

（右五年間ニ於ケル大正三年（一九一四年）七月基準日本銀行調
物價指數平均二一七。七）

自大正六年（一九一七年）一月一日至大正十年（一九二一年）末
日五年間ニ竣工セルモノ

戰艦	五隻	一五四、七五〇噸
乙級巡洋艦	七隻	三一、九六〇噸
驅逐艦	四三隻	四〇、六四五噸
潛水艦	一七隻	一二、八九九噸
計	七二隻	二四〇、二五四噸
外ニ制限外艦船	九隻	四八、〇五一噸
總計	八一隻	八五、三〇〇噸
年平均		三二五、五五四噸
年平均		六五、一一一噸

(三) 自大正十四年（一九二五年）度至昭和八年（一九三三年）度九
年間ノ軍費ノ一般會計歳出ニ對スル割合平均

三〇。三%

右九年間ニ於ケル軍費ノ年額平均 五億二千七百萬圓

（右九年間ニ於ケル大正三年（一九一四年）七月基準日本銀行

調物價指數平均一六三。二）

右年額平均ヲ軍府會謁直前當時ノ割合ニ達セシムレバ

七億六千萬圓

自大正十四年（一九二五年）一月一日至昭和八年（一九三三年）

末九年間ニ竣工セルモノ

航空母艦	三隻	六〇、九〇〇噸
甲級巡洋艦	一二隻	一〇七、八〇〇噸
乙級巡洋艦	三隻	一五、五六〇噸
驅逐艦	四一隻	六三、一二六噸
潛水艦	三一隻	四五、八二六噸
計	九〇隻	二九三、二四八噸

ニ米 國		年 平均		外ニ制限外艦船		年 平均	
(イ) 華府會議直前及最近九年間ノ軍費ノ總歲出ニ對スル割合及建造艦船概要	ニシテ前掲(イ)及(ロ)ノ(一)(二)ノ割合ニ違シ居レリ	昭和九年	軍費ノ一般會計歲出	歲入不足補填公債約八億一千萬圓ヲ含ム	ニ對スル割合	約四四%	
		昭和七年	一八九三二年	度至昭和九年	一八九三四年	度三年間ノ軍費ノ昭和五年	一八九三〇年
		昭和十二年	一八九三七年	歲入豫想十八億圓ノ			
		四一・七七%	七億五千萬圓				
		四三・五五%	七億八千五百萬圓				
		總計	九九隻	二九九、九〇八噸			
		年平均		三三、三二四噸			
		外ニ制限外艦船	九隻	六、六六〇噸			
		年平均		三二、五八三噸			

(一) 自一九一九年度
至一九二二年度

四年間平均

二三%

(右四年間ニ於ケル一九一四年七月基準物價指數平均一七三。八)
自一九一九年一月一日至一九二二年末日四年間ニ竣工セルモノ

戰艦

四隻

一二七、二〇〇噸

驅逐艦

二一〇隻

二三六、三六六噸

潛水艦

四三隻

二九、三六〇噸

計

二五七隻

三九二、九二六噸

年平均

九八、二三一噸

(二) 自一九二五年度
至一九三三年度

九年間平均

一七%

右九年間ニ於ケル軍費ノ年額平均 約七億七千萬弗

(右九年間ニ於ケル一九一四年七月基準物價指數平均一二七。一)

前掲ノ數字ヲ基礎トシテ最近九年間ノ國費ノ二三% (華府會議直

前ノ軍費ノ割合)ヲ求ムレバ約十一億弗ト爲ル

自一九二五年一月一日至一九三三年末日九年間ニ竣工セルモノ

航空母艦

二隻

六六、〇〇〇噸

甲級巡洋艦	一〇隻	九二、六五〇噸
乙級巡洋艦	一隻	七、〇五〇噸
潛水艦	一〇隻	一七、一一〇噸
平均		一八二、八一〇噸
平均		二〇、三一二噸

(ロ) 華府會議直前及最近三年間ノ國民所得ニ對スル軍費ノ割合ハ

自一九一九年度	四年間平均	二〇、二六%
自一九二二年度	三年間平均	二〇、〇五%
自一九三三年度		

ニシテ最近ノ國民所得ノ二〇、二六%ハ約九億磅ナリ

(ハ) 華府會議直前ノ軍費ノ割合ガ概ネ平時米國民ガ我慢シ得ル限度ト見
 做セバ現在ノ情況ニ於テ米國ノ軍費ノ限度ハ概ネ十億磅見當ナルベ
 シ而シテ米國ニ於ケル軍費ハ陸海軍略同額ニシテ一九三三年度ノ海
 軍費提出豫算約四億五千五百萬磅(産業復興費ヲ含ム)及一九三四
 年ニ於ケル建造年量約六萬二千三百噸(軍令部第五課調査)ハ平時
 ニ於ケル限度附近ニ達セルモノト考ヘ得ベシ

英 國

尙一九三四年度ノ歳入不足約四〇億弗ナリシコトニ注意スルヲ要ス

(1) 過去ニ於ケル軍費ノ總歳出ニ對スル割合及建造艦船概要

(一) 自一九〇六年度 至一九一四年度 九年間平均 (英獨建艦) 三・八〇二%

右九年間ニ於ケル軍費ノ平均年額 六千七百萬磅強

(二) 自一九一九年度 至一九二二年度 四年間平均 (華府會議) 二二・六%

(右四年間ニ於ケル一九一四年基準物價指數平均二五〇・四)

自一九一九年一月一日至一九二二年末日四年間ニ竣工セルモノ

戰艦	一隻	四二、一〇〇噸
巡洋艦	一・一隻	五五、九五〇噸
驅逐艦	四六隻	四六、〇四〇噸
潛水艦	二二隻	一四、八三〇噸
計	八〇隻	一五八、九二〇噸
年平均		三九、七二〇噸
(三) 自一九二五年度 至一九三三年度 九年間平均		一四・三%

右九年間ニ於ケル軍費年額平均 約一億一千三百萬磅

(右九年間ニ於ケル一九一四年基準物價指數平均一二九。九)

自一九二五年一月一日至一九三三年末日九年間ニ竣工セルモノ

戰艦	二隻	六七、四〇〇噸
甲級巡洋艦	一五隻	一四三、九七〇噸
乙級巡洋艦	五隻	三九、〇七〇噸
驅逐艦	三八隻	五二、〇六四噸
潛水艦	二八隻	三六、七九四噸
計	八八隻	三三九、二九八噸
年平均		三七、七〇〇噸

(ロ) 過去ニ於ケル國民所得ニ對スル軍備ノ割合

一九一三年	三。三%
一九二四、一九二五年平均	三。六%
一九三一、一九三二年平均	三。四%

(ハ) 一般經濟界ハ尙不況タルヲ免レザルモ近來稍景氣恢復シ其ノ歲計ハ若干餘裕ヲ生ズルニ至リタリ

ニ以上ヲ綜合スルニ現程度以上ノ建艦ヲ行フコトハ相當ノ困難トスル所ナリト觀察セラル

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分吉井道教ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ十一頁ヨリ成ル過去ノ記録ヲ基礎トスル各國ノ軍備ニ關スル考察ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(復員廳第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル爲シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月八日 於東京

吉井通教

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎

To Foreign Minister Hirota From Disarmament

Delegate Message No. 54 Part 1.

We have first discussed the problem of quantitative disarmament and urged the consolidation of a basis for a disarmament agreement. You are doubtless already informed on the procedure of the conference having progressed as we desired. However, after the recess the Conference turned its attention from declaration of shipbuilding program to construction notification as reported in telegram No. 49.

As the situation thus showed a tendency to drift away from the problem of quantitative disarmament, our delegation considered it important to prevent it at an early stage, and on the 8th strongly emphasized the necessity of first discussing the quantitative problem and to leave the notification problem to a later date.

However, as you have already been informed by telegram No. 52, it was suggested by the British delegation that if our contentions were to be recognized it would mean that a decision would have to be made on our proposal before all the other proposals; in which event,

- (1) If the Japanese proposal were rejected, would the Japanese delegation be prepared to remain in the Conference and to discuss the other proposals; and
- (2) if the Japanese delegation withdrew from the Conference and the other four powers continued with the Conference, would our delegation be willing to send an observer?

Telegram 54 Part 2.

We, the members of the Japanese delegation have endeavored to our utmost since our arrival in London, both in and out of the Conference chambers in observance of the purport of your instructions to achieve the basic principles advocated by Japan. It is deeply regrettable that we could not convince the powers concerned. However, as the situation was as previously stated, we shall, after making further detailed explanation of our contention at the committee meeting to be held for the discussion of our empire's proposal on the 13th at 1730 hours, ask for definite expressions of opinion by all the powers. And after it has thus been ascertained that they are all opposed to our proposal, we believe that there will be no alternative for us but to withdraw from the conference with an explanation of the reasons for our inability to remain. Should the four powers continue the conference after our withdrawal, we can see no objection to the presence of a mere observer, since such a step should not work to our disadvantage.

Will you, therefore, give your careful consideration to situation in the conference, and then inform us as soon as possible of your opinion on the steps we propose to take, as abovementioned, and on the advisability of taking part in the discussion of the question of restrictions on the use of submarines.

If there is no prospect of your instructions reaching us in time for the meeting on the 13th, we propose to ask for a postponement of the said meeting. Will you, therefore, inform us also as to the date on which we may expect your instructions to reach us.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of 2nd Demobilization office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "To Foreign Minister Hirota from Disarmament Delegate Message No. 54 Part 1" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Office).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30 day of July, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

文附屬書第十九

昭和11、四六三 暗

倫敦 十日發
本省 一月十一日前着

廣田外務大臣

軍縮全權

縮第五四號ノ一（大至急、極秘、館長符號扱）

當方ニ於テ量的問題ヲ先議シ軍縮協定ノ基礎確立ヲ主張シ會議モ我方希
望通り經過シ來リタル次第ハ既ニ御了知ノ趣ナル處休會明ケノ會議ハ往
電縮第四九號報告ノ通建艦計畫宣言ヨリ建造通報ニ轉化セリ斯テ量ノ問
題ヨリ脫離セントスル形勢ヲ呈シ來リタルヲ以テ本委員等ハ早キニ及ン
テ之ヲ阻止スルヲ緊要ト認メ八日委員會ノ席上通報問題ヲ繰廻ハントシ
量的問題ヲ先議スベキコトヲ極力主張セリ
然ルニ往電縮第五二號ニテ御了承相成ルヘキ通り英國側ノ措置トシテハ
右我方ノ主張ニハ從ヘハ目下提出ノ諸案中先ツ帝國提案ニ關シ決定ヲ爲
ス事トトナルヘキ處

- (一) 若シ帝國提案否決ノ場合我方ハ尙會議ニ殘留シ他ノ案ヲ計議スル意思アリヤ及
- (二) 我方カ會議ヲ脱退シ他ノ四國カ會議ヲ續行スル場合我方ヨリ「オヴザーパー」ヲ參加セシメ得サルヤヲ承知シタシト申出テタリ

(續ク)

報アリタシ

縮第五四號ノ二（大至急 極秘 館長符號扱）
 本委員等倫敦到着以來御訓令ノ趣旨ヲ體シ會議ノ内外ニ於テ帝國ノ根本主張貫徹ノ爲極力努メタルモ遂ニ關係國ヲ説得シ得サルハ寔ニ遺憾トスル所ナリ然レトモ情勢右ノ如クナルヲ以テ我方トシテハ十三日午後五時半帝國案ヲ議題トシテ開カルヘキ委員會ニ於テ我主張ヲ更ニ詳細説明シ各國ノ決定的意響表明ヲ求メ反對ナルコトヲ明カニシタル上會議ニ留マリ得サル理由ヲ明カニシ會議ヨリ脫退スルノ外ナカルヘシト思考シ居レリ尙帝國ノ會議脫退後四國會議續行セラルル場合我方ヨリ單ナル「オヴザーパー」ヲ參列シシムルコトハ裕別不利ヲ招來セサルヘキヲ以テ之ニ應シ差支ナシト認メ居レリ

就テハ會議ノ形勢篤ト御賢察ノ上本委員等ノ左措置擬竝ニ潜水艦使用制限問題討議ニ應スルノ可否ニ對スル御意見大至急御回示アリタシ追テ十三日ノ會合ニ間ニ合フ様御回訓ノ運トナラサル御見込ナルニ於テハ同日ノ會合ヲ更ニ延期方申入レ度キニ付其ノ旨御回訓日取ノ御見込ト共ニ折返シ御電

（終）

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三號)

自分吉井道教ハ第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ四頁ヨリ成ル廣田外務大臣宛軍縮全權發賣ハ日本政府(第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

吉井道教

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎

Def. Doc. #1904
Annex 20

Date of dispatch: (P.M.) 12th January 1936
To : Plenipotentiary, Disarmament Conference.
From : Foreign Minister HIROTA
Subject : Instructions in response to request made
by the Plenipotentiary at the Disarmament
Conference.

(Code) Disarmament. No. 13
(Secret:)

On response to your telegram No. 54 Thanking every member of the
delegation for your efforts.

1. You are to explain exhaustively our previous assertions at the
next committee meeting and at other occasions that the basic
policy of the Imperial Government is to establish a common
maximum limitation as well as reducing offensive military
strength both in quantity and quality thereby establishing a
principle of non-intimidation and non-aggression, and also our
assertions on a complete disarmament plan, that is, the complete
abolition or extreme (drastic) reduction of aircraft carriers,
capital ships and A-class cruisers which may be classed as
offensive strength, which is in an inseparable connection with
the common maximum limitation plan. Clearly explain that the

Def. Doc. #1904
Annex 20

Imperial Government cherishes no other intentions and earnestly hopes for the conclusion of an impartial and fair disarmament agreement based on the above basic policy. Endeavour to express our sincerity towards the disarmament project. And still if our basic assertions are not recognized the Imperial Government does not hold any intention of remaining in conference to discuss over a shipbuilding notification plan or the plan on restricting quality. Consequently, cession from the conference would be inevitable.

2. In conformity with the above, endeavor to persuade other plenipotentiaries (delegates) to reconsider our proposal, but without pressing for its adoption. While on the other hand make it clear that there are no objections in settling restrictions on ----- and submarines, thereby concluding between the five nations concerned any possible agreements such as the restriction on using submarines at an early possible date. Moreover, lead the conference so it would be closed by announcing a joint statement to the effect that there would be no competitive armamenting among the participant nations. As for the other problems, in case it should be the request of the other powers, it is considered advisable if it took the form of transferring it to another new conference when the Imperial Government will not participate.

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3. The British side cherishes the opinion of retaining Clause 22, Chapter 4 of the London Treaty, concerning the restriction on employing submarines, as an independent agreement. The Imperial Government also does not have any objection towards the same provision becoming an independent agreement. If needs be, we have no objections in continuing the various clauses in the Washington Treaty, such as Clause 14 (restriction on arming merchant ships), Clause 17 (prohibition of using a warship under construction for another power, during war.), Clause 18 (agreements on disposition of warships). There are no objections in proceeding with negotiations, with the representatives of nations concerned, in adjusting such clauses and forming a new agreement.
4. In the case a conference should be held with our Government excluded, there is no objection in sending an observer to the conference. However, as to the selection of the observer you will wait for instructions.

Def. Doc. #1904
Annex 20

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Instructions in response to request made by the Plenipotentiary at the Disarmament Conference" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of July, 1947

(signed) YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

4

Ref Doc 1107 20

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書（三號）

自分吉井道致ハ復員廳第二ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ二頁ヨリ成ル「軍縮會議全權ニ對スル回訓」ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（復員廳第二復員局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

吉井道致印

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎印

（附屬書第二〇）

發電昭和十一年一月二十二日 後

軍 縮 全 權 廣田外務大臣

軍縮會議全權ニ對スル回訓

（暗）縮第一三號（極秘館長符號扱）

貴殿第五四號ニ關シ

貴全權等ノ御努力ヲ深謝ス

一次回ノ委員會其ノ他ニ於テ貴全權ハ帝國政府ノ根本方針ハ共通最大限度ヲ設定スルト共ニ攻撃的兵力ハ量質兩方面ニ亘リ之ヲ縮減シ以テ不脅威不侵略ノ原則ヲ確立スルニ在ルコト竝ニ共通最大限度案ト不離ノ關係ニ在ル我徹底的縮少案即チ航空母艦、主力艦及甲級巡洋艦等攻撃的艦船ノ全廢若クハ極度ノ縮減ニ關スル豫テノ主張ヲ懇切ニ説明シ帝國政府ハ右根本方針ニ基ク公正妥當ナル軍縮條約ノ締結ヲ熱望スル以外他意ナキコトヲ闡明シテ我方ノ軍縮事業ニ對スル誠意ヲ披瀝スルノ方法ヲ盡サレ度シ而モ猶我ガ根本主張貫徹セザル場合ニハ帝國政府ハ會議ニ殘留シテ建艦通報案、質的制限案ヲ討議スベキ意思ナク窮極ノトコロ會議脫退ハ已ムヲ得ザル所ナリ

ニ右ニ依リ帝國提案ニ對シ篤ト各國全權ノ再考ヲ促スト共ニ之ガ採決ヲ強フルコトナク他方後願三、潜水艦使用制限等ノ取極ニハ異存ナキコトヲ明ニ

Ref D-1904-20

2

シ以テ成ル可ク早目ニ關係五國間ニ潜水艦使用制限等協定可能ナルモノヲ取決メ尙關係國間ニ競争ヲ爲サズト言フガ如キ共同宣言ヲ爲シテ交渉ヲ終了セシムル様誘導シ爾餘ノ問題ニ付キ各ニ希望スル場合ニハ帝國ノ参加セザル新ナル會議ニ讓ルガ如キ形式ヲ採ラシムルニ於テハ局面收斂上得策ナリト思考セララル

三英國側ニ於テハ倫敦條約第四編第二十二條ノ潜水艦使用制限ニ關スル條項ヲ獨立ノ協定トシテ存置セシメタキ意圖ヲ有スル處同條ノ規定ハ我方ニ於テモ之ヲ獨立ノ協定トナスニ異議ナク又要スレバ華府條約中第十四條(商船ノ武装ニ關スル制限第十七條(戰爭中他國ノ爲ニ建造中ノ軍艦使用禁止)第十八條(軍艦ノ處分方法ニ關スル約定)ノ諸條項ハ其ノ趣旨ヲ存續スルコトニ我方トシテ異議ナキ處ナルヲ以テ之等諸條項ヲ整理シ新ナル協定トナスコトニ付キ關係國代表ト折衝ヲ續クルコト差支ナシ

四帝國ヲ除ク會議ヲ開催スルニ於テハ之ニ對シ帝國ヨリ「オプザーバー」ヲ出スコトニハ同意セラレ差支ナシ但シ人選ニ關シテハ追テ指示スベシ

JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON UPPER LIMIT
OF NAVAL TONNAGE.

- L.N.C. (35)(1st Committee)
10th Meeting on Wednesday,
15th January 1936.

1. Although I have tried at past meetings of this Committee to explain our proposal at considerable length and in sufficient detail to clarify its purport as well as to point out its implications, it does not appear that I have succeeded in my task to the extent of removing all doubts from the minds of the other Delegations. I wish to be permitted to-day, therefore, to undertake a further elaboration of our plan by supplementing the explanations already given and, in order to assure a more complete understanding of our proposals, to offer our views on certain of the observations which the other Delegations have been good enough to make with reference thereto.

If any part of what I am about to say appears to you to be in the nature of repetition of statements I have already made, I can only ask your indulgence, for I feel that a certain measure of repetition is inevitable if I am to present the Japanese plan to you in the clearest possible light.

I wish further to state-with all due deference to the lofty aims of the other Powers-that Japan is second to no country in her sincere and zealous desire for world peace. It is our guiding principle in international politics that all nations should mutual understanding, that it should be made possible for all peoples, happily free from anxieties concerning their national security, to work out their respective destinies in an atmosphere of happiness and contentment that can only come as a blessing of peace among nations.

In considering possible measures for attaining agreement upon disarmament, therefore, we have taken as our primary objective the elimination of the menace of war, and the assurance of an equality of security for all Powers concerned. A plan of disarmament, to be adopted, must, of course, be one which does not give rise to the fallacious notion that there can be any justification for discriminatory treatment between nations, and we have taken great care to assure that the plan should moreover be a practical one.

Having devised our plan with due consideration and careful thought to the three points I have just mentioned, I believe that the Japanese proposal is at once fair, just and practical, and is characterised by a high degree of elasticity. So that if the Delegations will examine our proposal carefully and with sympathy, I feel that no serious difficulty will be encountered in

discovering therein a reasonable basis for a new agreement on disarmament.

As we are now about to enter on the final examination of the Japanese proposal, I venture to express the hope that the Delegations will find it possible, without undue attachment to existing facts or past circumstances, to approach the task in hand with a firm determination to draft a new and the very best possible plan, and, to that end, to study and discuss the Japanese proposal from every possible angle and with a sympathetic understanding of its spirit and purpose.

II. If any Power were to put forward a claim for a very large naval force in anticipation of a need therefore arising simultaneously in various parts of the world, such a claim might, in effect, amount to a demand for a naval force sufficient to deal with two or more Powers. Such a demand might tend to militate against the chances of reaching agreement on the disarmament question, which should, in any case, be considered on the basis of a "one Power versus one Power" relationship.

If two Powers are to conclude such an agreement on the strength of their naval forces as will give them equal standing and guarantee their mutual security, the most rational principle to be applied is that of equality of armaments. We believe, in fact, that there is no other method which would at once be fair and just, and this is especially true as between two Powers which are separated by oceans and whose defence is wholly dependent on their navies.

Moreover, when we consider the high degree of mobility of naval armaments and the peculiar character of naval warfare, the need of defensive equality for all Powers demands that there shall be equality of naval forces and especially of those categories which form the backbone of the fleet. It is for this reason that the Japanese proposal provides for equality, category by category, in "A" class cruisers and all larger types. But as regards categories whose use is exclusively defensive, suitable adjustments should be made to meet the special circumstances of each Power; hence the provision of the Japanese proposals that, as regards "B" class cruisers and all lesser types, limitation shall be effected globally. It is a peculiar characteristic of naval forces that they can be moved about at will with great facility; and it goes without saying that this characteristic will become more and more pronounced in the future as improvements in the technique of naval construction continue. It is, moreover, a fundamental rule of naval strategy that forces which are scattered over several seas shall be concentrated in a single area whenever necessary for technical reasons. That this can be done—and, what is more, that a Power can concentrate its forces in a particular area so as to constitute a mortal threat to another Power—is borne out by numerous instances in naval history. Consequently, when discussing naval relations between two countries, it is only reasonable that at least all the vessels

capable of participating in naval engagements shall be taken into consideration, and, if the total of such vessels of one Power is superior to that of the other, the only possible consequence is that the inferior Power will have its sense of security impaired, while the superior naval Power will be in a position to exceed the actual needs of its national defence, even to the point of becoming a menace to others.

Moreover, in order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments. To explain more fully, we advocate the abolition of aircraft-carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and "A" class cruisers. But if there were a general general sentiment in favour of the abolition of capital ships also, we should be ready to give our support thereto.

As regards armaments which are essentially defensive in character and purpose, we believe that each Power should be permitted to equip itself in the manner best suited to its conditions and circumstances.

If this feature of the Japanese proposal were to be put into effect, we believe that naval forces would be largely deprived of their capacity for menacing other Powers. The complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments would not only result directly in a very substantial measure of reduction, but it would also have the indirect effect of producing still further reductions all round because the strengthening of the sense of security consequent on the disappearance of offensive types is bound to give rise to a general tendency on the part of the naval Powers to reduce further the sizes of their navies.

III. In order to bring once more to the minds of the Delegations the principal features of the Japanese proposal, I would now undertake to set forth the framework of our formula, somewhat as follows:-

(1) There would first of all be fixed a maximum global tonnage which none of the Powers concerned might exceed. This maximum global tonnage must not only be a suitable one for practical purposes, but it must be fixed at as low a level as possible so as not to be contrary to the spirit of disarmament.

(2) Simultaneously with the determination of the global tonnage, there would be fixed for those categories which are generally recognized to be predominantly offensive in character-namely, capital ships, aircraft-carriers (in the event of their non-abolition), and "A" class cruisers-a common maximum tonnage and a common number of units to be allowed to each Power in respect of each of the three categories separately.

(3) As regards "B" class cruisers and vessels of lesser type, which are generally recognized to be essentially defensive, it should be sufficient to fix a common maximum global tonnage for all of the said categories, so as to make it possible for each Power to determine,

in accordance with its own needs, the tonnage which it may deem appropriate in each of those categories.

(4) Any Power which may deem it necessary to do so for reasons of its special circumstances, may voluntarily reduce its tonnage in "A" class cruisers, and increase its tonnage in any of the defensive categories mentioned in paragraph (3). Although there may conceivably be numerous ways of effecting the above-mentioned reduction and increase, we believe it should be made the subject of technical examination.

This provision, together with the provision of paragraph (3), would give to each Power a very wide scope for making adjustments so as to compensate for its vulnerability.

(5) Since the powers concerned would be left to work out their naval problems according to their own free will within the scope of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the Japan plan would not necessarily preclude the adoption of such a formula, for instance, as a declaration of naval building programmes.

(6) If there should be any Power which claims the necessity of effecting modifications even beyond the adjustments contemplated in the foregoing paragraphs, such claim would be carefully examined by the Powers concerned, and, if it were proved to be reasonable and well-founded, Japan would not refuse its recognition. But since, as I have repeatedly explained, the establishment of a state of non-aggression and non-menace is at the very basis of our proposal, I think it can be readily understood that, while we might be able to recognise a claim for additional adjustment based on purely defensive needs arising from the special circumstances of the Power concerned, we could in no circumstances consent to an increase in the combatant strength of a navy such as would jeopardise the state of non-aggression and non-menace.

Moreover, it is not intended that, a common upper limit having once been set, all Powers must build up to it. It goes without saying that each should restrict its navy to the smallest size with which its defensive needs can be adequately met. In this regard, goodwill and mutual trust among the various Powers are absolutely indispensable, and I believe the Committee will agree with us that, without such goodwill and mutual trust, agreement on any kind of a disarmament treaty is impossible, no matter by what formula or on what principles the attempt may be made.

If, on the other hand, it should be possible to derive naval armaments of their capacity to menace other Powers, as is contemplated by the Japanese proposal, the various Powers would not feel the necessity of extensive naval construction; in fact, there would probably be no Power that would even contemplate huge naval programmes. We believe, in other words, that there is no ground for apprehension that the establishment of a common upper limit will give impetus to a general movement for larger navies

IV. May I be permitted at this stage to consider in the light of the basic conception underlying the Japanese proposal, which I have just explained, a few of the points raised by the other Delegations in the course of their observations upon our plan, for I feel that the explanation of our plan will be facilitated by my so doing.

The view that a nation, by reason of its being also a Pacific Power, should be entitled to possess in the Pacific a naval strength equal to that of the other Powers in the same waters, in addition to other naval forces which it claims to be necessary in European waters or in the Atlantic Ocean, appears to us tantamount, in effect, to a claim to the right to possess a navy equal in strength to the combined strengths of the navies of two or more countries. Such a claim, it appears to us, may be said to be hardly commendable as a basis for an agreement on disarmament. And, as I have pointed out already, it would not be possible for us to support such a claim, in view of the highly mobile character of Naval armaments.

We can readily understand that the possession of greater and more numerous overseas territories and lines of communication may well justify a demand for a greater strength than other Powers in small and purely defensive types of vessels which have no combatant capacity at sea, but which are suitable for coast patrol, defence of harbours and other similar purposes. But, if for the same reason, a Power should demand superiority in naval force as a whole, the sense of security of other Powers would thereby be disturbed. In any case, I believe it is a well-known fact that the condition of nations whose naval forces are now on a basis of parity are not the same as regards their overseas possessions and lines of communication.

Frequent references have been made to the defensive needs of certain outlying possessions. But we find it difficult to see the reasonableness of a claim for superior forces for the defence of such outlying possessions if, as a consequence, the very heart of another Power will be menaced thereby.

It appears to us quite clear that a nation's ability to protect its overseas possessions and sea routes depends wholly upon whether or not it can control the seas.

Considering the question of overseas possessions and colonies from another angle, it would seem clear that, through the possession of such interests overseas, a nation enjoys the advantage of having bases and sources of supplies located in widely scattered parts of the world. That, we believe, may be an incalculable advantage, not only as regards the protection of lines of communication, but also in facilitating the movement and concentration of naval forces.

If we were to subscribe to the view that has been expressed, that a nation which is dependent on the sea requires a large naval force, it could be said for Japan that she too is wholly dependent on the sea. What is more, she is poor in natural resources and, with her population exceeding in density that of any other country in the world, is forced to look to countries beyond the seas for the greater part of the supplies necessary to her existence as well as for the raw materials for her industries. There is thus a vast difference between Japan and the countries which, though obtaining part of their supplies from abroad, can nevertheless have most of their needs supplied by their own territorial possessions; and this difference becomes even more pronounced when comparison is made with a country which has an abundance of resources at home and which is for the most part self-supporting and self-sufficient. Considered in that light, it is difficult to see how a country, so situated as Japan is, can be expected to feel secure with a naval force inferior to that of another whose circumstances are far more favourable.

V. By way of conclusion, I desire to say that, while Japan will never cease to hope for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament, that is not to say that she is going to insist on attaining the impossible.

The plan which the Japanese Delegation has submitted to this Conference was prepared in the light of the experience and results of past disarmament conferences, with due attention to the actualities of the international situation of the day and with careful consideration of the various relevant problems from every possible angle. And it is our conviction that through the adoption of the principles embodied in the Japanese proposal, the Conference would succeed in achieving a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament without serious difficulties.

Once the Japanese proposal is adopted by the Conference, the way could be found for incorporating therein the important features of the other proposals with such modifications as may be deemed suitable. For the Japanese proposal, as a formula for disarmament, is neither rigid nor academic. It is a practical one, marked by its comprehensive character and flexibility.

The Japanese Delegation, in submitting its proposal, was anxious that it should thereby be able to give satisfaction to all the Powers concerned in equal measure. It is only after the most careful study and mature consideration, prompted by our recognition of the urgent world-wide desire for effective measures of disarmament, that we have brought ourselves to place our proposal before this Conference.

I therefore desire finally to urge that all the Delegates be good enough to give their most mature consideration to our plan sympathetically and with an open mind.

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Japanese Proposal for a Common Upper Limit of Naval Tonnage" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} London Naval Conference, 1935" as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

文書の出所並に公正に関する證明

本證明書に添附した英語に依つて書かれ六葉
からなる「Japanese Proposal for a Common Upper
Limit of Naval Tonnages」
と題する文書（附屬書第二十二）は私が一九三五年
ロンドン海軍會議に専門委員として出席した
際配布を受け現に私が所持して居る會議議
事録の寫であることと證明する

Def Doc #1904-21

昭和二十二年七月三十日於東京

榎本重治 (榎本)

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て為された

同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎 (奥山)

No. 1

Ref Doc # 1904-21

一月十五日第丁回委員會ニ於ケル
永野全權委員陳述

(L.N.C. (33))

第一

本日再び帝國提案ノ審議ノ機會ヲ得タルコトハ
余ノ欣幸トスル所ナリ時向ヲ節約スル爲メ日本
代表ノ陳述ハ翻譯文ヲ朗讀セシムベシ

我方提案ニ付テハ今日迄累次説明シ其ノ趣旨
ハ充分述べタル次第ナルガ尙或點ニ付テハ幾分
疑義ヲ有セラルル向モアルマニ察セラルルニ付更ニ
茲ニ説明ヲ補足スルト共ニ了解ノ捷徑トシテ曩
ニ我才提案ニ對シ提起セラレタル諸意見ニ對スル
見解ヲモ開陳スル豫定ナリ或ハ或部分ニ付テハ
重複ニ亘ルヤモ知レザルモ我方提案ノ趣旨ヲ最モ
明瞭ニスル爲メ必要已ムヲ得ザルニ出ズルモノナルヲ以
テ豫メ御寛恕アラントヲ乞フ

尚豫メ御了承ヲ得置キタキ一點ハ日本帝國
ハ世界平和ヲ欲スルコトニ於テ何國ニモ讓ルモ
ノニ非ズ其ノ信條トスル所ハ各國共ニ相互了解
ノ下ニ友好關係ヲ最モ敦厚ニシ各國民ハ各自其
ノ國家ノ安全ノ慶澤ニ浴シ平和ノ間ニ各自ノ
運命ヲ開拓シ人類ノ幸福ヲ期スルニ存スルコト
之ナリ

政ニ軍縮協定ニ當リテハ戰爭ノ脅威ヲ除去

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シ各國ニ齊シク國防、安全ヲ賦與スルコトヲ主
 眼トシ又之ガ協定、方法ニ付テモ各國家間ニ差別
 アリト、謬想ヲ誘致スルガ如キコト、トキ案ヲ採用
 シ尙軍縮協定ハ最モ實際的ナルヲ要スルト認ム
 ルニ付此點ニ付テモ最モ考慮ヲ拂ヒテ、即チ日本
 案ハ公平ニシテ無理ナク且實際的ナル柔軟性ニ
 富ナルモノト認ムルヲ以テ各國ニ於テ篤ト研究シ
 同情ヲ以テ検討セラルルニ於テハ必ズ、右案ガ軍
 縮協定、基礎トシテ妥當ナルモノナルコトヲ容易
 ニ發見シ得ムベシト信ズルモノナリ

茲ニ日本案、審議ニ當リ更ニ各國全權ニ於テ
 既存事實又ハ從來、經緯等ニ拘泥スルコトナク
 新ニ最善ノ方策ヲ案出セントスルノ大決心、下ニ
 最モ同情アル態度ヲ以テ日本案、精神、存ス
 ル所ヲ了解シテ審議ヲ盡サレシコトヲ切望スルモノ
 ナリ

第二

一 某國ガ世界各方面ニ於ケル同時需要ヲ生
 ズルコトアルベキヲ豫想シテ多量兵力ヲ要求ス
 ルコトアリトセバ見様ニ依リテハ二國以上ニ對應
 スル兵力ヲ要求スルノ結果トモナリ一國對一國
 ノ關係ヲ基礎トシテ論スベキ軍縮協定ヲ
 不可能ナラシムルモノト謂フベシ

二 二國ガ平等ノ立場ニ在リテ互ニ其ノ安全ヲ期

シ得ル爲ノ海軍兵力ヲ協定セシトセバ均等兵力主義ニ依ルヲ最モ合理的トシテ此非ニ公正ナル方途ナシ

大洋ヲ以テ相隔テ相互ノ國防ガ專ラ海軍力ニ依存スル國家間ニ於ケル海軍協定ニ於テハ特ニ然リ

三他面ニ於テ海軍兵力ノ移動性並ニ海上戰爭ノ特質ヨリ論ズルモ國防ノ均衡ヲ得ル爲ニハ兵力ハ均等ナルヲ要ス艦隊兵力ノ骨幹トナルモノニ於テ特ニ然リ

此ノ見地ヨリ帝國提案ハ甲巡以上ヲ艦種別ニ各國均等トセリ

然レドモ專ラ防禦ニ使用スベキ艦種ハ各國ノ特殊ノ事情等ニ應ジ適當ナル調節ヲ行フコト可然

此ノ見地ヨリ帝國提案ハ乙巡以下ヲ一括共通ノ總噸數ニテ制限セリ海軍兵力ハ隨時隨處ニ集散離合スルコト極メテ容易ニシテ且右ノ特性ハ將來益々大トナルノ傾向ヲ有スルハ論ヲ俟タズ而シテ數個ノ海面ニ分散セル兵力ヲ用兵上ノ必要ニ應ジ之ヲ所要ノ時所要ノ地ニ集中スルハ兵術上ノ原則ニシテ其實行可能ナルコト特ニ其ノ集中ガ一國ノ致命的地點ニ對シテ行ヒ得ルコトハ過云

現在ヲ通シ幾多ノ事實ヲ以テ證明シ得ル所
 ナリ故ニ二國ノ海軍兵力ヲ論ズルニハ苟クモ海上
 戦闘ニ參加シ得ル凡テノ艦艇ヲ一括シテ之ヲ
 比較スルカ最モ合理的ナルモノニシテ此ノ比較ニ於
 テ一國カ他國ニ比シ其ノ兵力量ニ於テ優勢ナ
 ル場合ニハ當然ノ歸結トシテ劣勢海軍國ハ
 國防ノ不安ヲ感ジ優勢海軍國ハ自國ノ國
 防ノ安全ヲ超ヘテ他國ヲ侵略シ得ルノ可能性
 ナリトス

四 尚帝國ハ不脅威不侵略ヲ最モ徹底的ニラシ
 ムル爲攻撃的兵力ヲ全廢若ハ大縮減ニ防禦
 的兵力ハ之ヲ國情ニ應ジ整備シ得ル如ク爲
 ストスルモノナリ

即チ帝國ハ航空母艦ヲ全廢シ主力艦・甲
 級巡洋艦ノ大縮減ヲ主張スルモノニシテ尚主
 力艦ニ付テハ一般の同意ヲ條件トシテ各國
 ト共ニ之ヲ全廢スルノ用意ヲ有ス

石ガ實現スレバ海軍兵力ノ他國ヲ脅威スル
 性質ハ殆ド除去セラルベシ攻撃的兵力ノ全
 廢若ハ大縮減ハ之ニ依リ直接ニ一大軍縮ヲ
 實現シ得ルノミナラス之ニ由來スル安全感ノ
 増大ハ各國海軍ヲ縮減セシムルノ傾向ヲ必然
 的ニ生ゼシムベキヲ以テ實ニ直接的ト同時ニ
 間接的ニモ軍備ヲ縮減スルノ效果ヲ有ス

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第三

日本案ニ付各國全權ノ記憶ヲ新ニスル爲茲ニ更ニ其ノ方式ノ骨子ヲ示セバ左ノ如クナルベシ

(1) 關係各國ノ海軍軍備ノ其ノ孰レモ超ユベカラザル最大總噸數ヲ定ム

此ノ最大總噸數ハ實際的ニ適當ノモノニシテ而モ軍縮ノ精神ニ則リ出來得ル限り低下セラルベキハ勿論ナリ

(2) 右ト同時ニ攻撃的ノ性能ヲ多ク分ニ有スル一般ニ認ムラルル主力艦、航空母艦（全廢ノ協定成ラザル場合）甲級巡洋艦ハ各艦種ニ母ニ更ニ共通ノ最大保有隻數及噸數ヲ定ム

(一) 防禦的の性能ヲ有スト認ムラルル乙級巡洋艦以下ハ一
 括シ各國共通ノ合計噸數ヲ定ムル止メ各國ヨリテ
 其ノ需要ニ応ジ適當ノ艦種ヲ選ビ其ノ適當量ヲ
 整備セシム

(二) 特殊ノ國情ニ依リ特ニ必要ト認ムル國ハ甲巡ノ保有
 量ヲ自ラ減ズルコトニ依リ防禦的の性能ヲ有スト認ムラ
 ル艦船即ケルニ記載セラルル艦船ヲ増加スルコトヲ得
 ベシ

右増減ノ方法ニ付テハ幾多ノ種類ヲ考慮シ得ベキモ
 專ラ技術的審議ニ委ヌベキモノトス

(三) 方法ニ加フルニ更ニ本項ニ記載セラルル方法ヲ以テスレ
 バ各國ハ極メテ廣範範圍ニ於テ其ノ需要ヲ調節シ其
 ノラアルネラビリケルヲ項充シ得ベシ

(四) 右諸項ニ定ム範圍内ニ於テハ各國ハ其ノ自由意思
 ニ依リ海軍軍備ヲ整備シ得ルモノトス從ツテ日本案
 下ニ於テモ各國建艦案宣言ノ如キ方式ヲモ採用
 包含セシメ得ベキモノトス

(五) 以上ノ如クスルモ尚修正ノ必要ヲ主張スル國アルハ各國間
 ニ之ヲ慎重ニ研究シ若シ適當ナル修正ノ必要アルヲ確
 認セラルルニ於テハ此ノ修正ヲ否ムモノニ非ズト雖モ元來吾
 人ノ主張ノ根本ハ屢々説明セル如ク先ヅ不脅威不
 侵略ノ狀態ヲ確立スルニアルヲ以テ假令右ノ如キ修
 正ヲ許ストスルモ夫レハ各國ノ特殊ノ事情ニ基ク純然
 タル防禦用ノモノニシテ決シテ折角確立セシ不脅威

不侵略ノ狀能ハシテ環球スガ如キ海洋戰斗兵力増加
ヲ許スモノニ非ザルコトハ我主張根本方針ヨリ見テ當
然ノコトニ屬ス

尚共通最大限ハ各國石限度迄建艦スベシト謂ニ非
ズルコトハ屢次説明モ通ニシテ各國ハ其國防上必要ト
スル最小限度ニ止マルベキハ勿論アリ之ニ對シテハ各國ノ
誠意一ダドウニシト相互信賴ヲ要求スルモノニシテ之
ナクシテハ軍縮條約ハ如何ニ形式ニ依ルコト向ハズ協
定シ得ザルコトハ本委員會モ之ヲ否定セザル所ト了解ス
他方ニ於テ帝國ノ主張スル如クシテ海軍兵力ハ他國ヲ
脅威スル性質ヲ除去スルハ各國共大ニ建艦ヲ必要
トセズ又之ヲ企圖スル國モナキニ至ルベク其通日最大限ヲ設
定スルハ一般的海軍ヲ増大スル傾向ヲ有スト為ス杞憂
ナリト考フ

中四

帝國提案ニ對シ各國全權ヨリ種々帝意見アリシガ此
際之等ノ意見ニニ對シ我方基礎的觀念ニ基キ
当方ノ見解ヲ簡單ニ述ズルコトト為サントス斯クフルコトニ
依リ一層我提案ノ趣旨ヲ明瞭トラス得ヘシト認ムル
ルヲ以テテリ

一太平洋ニ國スル故ヲ以テ同海面ニ於テ他國ト均勢ヲ要
求スルト共ニ歐洲海面又ハ大西洋ニ可然兵力ノ控置ヲ
要ストノ趣旨ノ説アリタルガ此ノ主張ハ結果ニ於テ多數
國標準ノ海軍ヲ要求スルモノトモ解セラレ軍縮協定

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基礎觀念トシテ適當トラスト思考セシ

又右ノ主張ハ海軍兵力ノ移動性大ニ持負ヨリ見テ承服シ難キ
コトハ屢次説明セル通り

ニ海外領ニ交通線等ノ大ニ理由ヲ以テ沿岸警備察用港灣防
備用等洋ニ戰鬥力ナキ純防禦用小艦艇ヲ他國ヨリ多ク要
スルコトトベキニ之ヲ了解シ得ルモ同一理由ニ依リ海軍兵力全般
ノ優勢ヲ要求スルコトヲ以テ他國ノ安全感ヲ動搖セシムルニ云々
シ尚現在均等兵力保有國ニ行見ルモ海外領ニ交通線等
ノ同一ヲラガルハ固知トスル可キ

三、一部局地防禦ニ付テ屢々論ゼラレル處斯九局地ノ防備
為ニ優勢兵力ノ保有ヲ主張ス其ノ結果他國ノ本土ノ中
怒ニ脅威ヲ與フルニ至ルコトハ女當テリト認ト難シ
海外領地植民地及海上交通線ノ保護ハ一ニ懸ツテ海ヲ制
スルヤ否ニ依ルコトハ自明理ナリ

四、他國ニ於テ海外領地植民地ヲ有スル國ニ等シ各地ニ於テ根
據地ト補給ノ便宜ト有ス之海上交通線保護上測リ知
ルベカラザル利ヲ享有スルモノニテラズ其ノ海軍兵力ヲ所要
ノ海面ニ集中移動スルヲ更ニ容易トラセルノ利便アリ

假ニ海ニ依存スル國家矢テ海軍兵力ヲ必要トスルノ説ニ從
ハハ帝國ノ如クハ全然海ニ依存スルモノニテテ而モ國內資源田豆
富テラズ加フルニ人口ハ世界各國中最モ稠密ニシテ且至活及產
業上ハ必需品ノ大部ヲ遠ク洋ヲ渡リテ他國ヨリ仰グモノナリ此ノ實
等ヲ其ノ必要物資ヲ海外ニ仰グトモ其ノ大部ヲ自國領土内ニ
求メ得ルトスル相違

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アリ更ニ國內資源豊富ニシテ概不自給自足ニ得ル
國ニ比スルニ格段ノ相異アリ此ノ見地ヨリスルモ帝國ノ如キ國
ガ更ニ有利ナル地位ニ於テ他國ヨリ勢兵力ヲ以テ其ノ安全
ヲ期シ難キハ明ナリ

五

帝國ノ飽ク迄海軍軍縮ノ全般的協定ノ成立ヲ希望
スルモノナリ然レドモ又次ニテ不可能ヲ強ヒントスルモノニ非ズ

帝國ハ過云軍縮ノ実績ニ鑑ミ又實情ニ照シ各般ノ方面ヨ
リ考察ノ結果帝國案ヲ提案スルモノニシテ各案ヲ以テスレバ
般海軍軍縮ノ實現極ニ容易ナリト確信ヲ有スモノナリ

一度帝國根本主張採用セラレバ他國提案ノ如キモ適當ニ
修正ノ上採用ノ途ニベキナリ帝國案ハ六期層々案ニモアラ
ズ学究的案ニモテラス柔軟性ニ富ムル也 容力大ニ實際
的案ナリ

帝國委員ハ本案ヲ提出スルニ方リ各國ニ執リ等シテ好都合
ニシテ各國ニ満足ヲ與ヘンコトノミヲ顧念シタリ而シテ世
界一般狀勢ガ軍縮ノ成立ヲ緊急トスニ終リ研究ニ研
究ヲ重スル結果提出シタルモノナレバ各國全權ニ於テ
モ虚心坦懷更ニ精密ニ帝國案ヲ検討シテ世界平和
國民福利増進ノ爲一層考慮アラフコトヲ望ムモノナリ

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (1)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy No. 129

L.N.C. (35) 7

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE; 1935

The Secretary-General presents his compliments and transmits herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Conference by the Japanese Delegation together with a copy of the reply, the terms of which were agreed at the Eleventh Meeting of the First Committee held on the 16th January, 1936.

Secretariat-General,
Clarence House,
16th January, 1936.

JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE,

15th January, 1936.

My Lord,

I have the honour hereby to notify Your Lordship that as it has become sufficiently clear at to-day's session of the First Committee that the basic principles embodied in our proposal for a comprehensive limitation and reduction of naval armaments cannot secure general support, our Delegation usefully continue our participation in the deliberation of the present Conference.

We remain, nevertheless, firmly convinced that our proposal is one best calculated to attain an effective disarmament, and we regret to state that we cannot subscribe, for the reasons we have repeatedly set forth, to the plans of quantitative limitation submitted by the other Delegations.

I desire to assure you, on this occasion, that we most sincerely appreciate the cordial manner in which you have been good enough to conduct the Conference; at the same time, I should like to tender our deepest thanks on behalf of our Delegation, for the hearty co-operation of all the Delegations to this Conference.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Sd.) OSAME HIGANO.

The Right Honourable Viscount Monsell of Evesham, G.B.E.,

First Lord of the Admiralty.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (1)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 2 pages and known as "L.N.C. (35) 7 (Annex 22 (1))" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} London Naval Conference: 1935 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO Jūji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

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Def Doc. # 1904-22(1)

文書の内容に公正に關する證明

本證明書に添附した英語に依りて書かれた二葉からなる「L-2」の
「L-2」の記号を附したる文書(附屬書オニニ)は私が一九
三五年ロントンの海軍會議に專問委員として出席した際配
布を受け現に私が所持してゐる會議議事録の寫であるこ
とを證明する

昭和二十二年七月三十日

於東京

榎本 重治

榎本

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て為された

同日於同所

立會人 奥山 八郎

奥山

Def. Doc. (1904-22-4)

機密

L. N. C. (三五) X

謄本番号オ一ニ九

一九三五年倫敦海軍會議

事務総長は御挨拶を申し上げると共に日本代表より會議議長に宛てたる書翰寫字紙に一九三五年一月十六日開催のオ一ニ九委員會十一回會合に於て同意せる回答寫を傳達致候

ウエストミンスター・スウィー

クラレンス・ハウス

事務局

一九三五年一月十六日

一九三五年一月十五日

倫敦海軍會議日本代表

拜啓

余は閣下に対し本日オ一ニ九委員會會議に於て海軍軍備の廣汎なる制限及縮限に對す我々の提案案中に含まるる基礎的原則は一般の支持を得る事能はること明かとなりたるを以て我が代表は今やこの上本會議の討議に有効に於た加を繼續する事能はずとの結論に到達せしむる通告するの先容を有し候

然れども我々は彼等の提案が有效なる軍備縮小を達成する最

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善の事たることを確信致し居り我方は及西復開陳せる理由によ
り他の諸代表により提出せられたる量的制限案を受諾する
事能はざる旨を述べざる事を遺憾に存し候
余は此の機会に於て閣下が本会議を誠心指導せられたる事を
深謝すると共に本会議全代表の心からなる御協力に対し
我方代表に代り深甚なる謝意を表し候

敬具

永野修身(署名)

海軍大臣子爵三浦元ヲブイガキム閣下

IDENTIAL.

L.N.C. (35) 9

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935

The Secretary-General presents his compliments and transmits herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Conference by the Japanese Delegation.

Secretariat-General
Clarence House,
Westminster, S.W.1.
21st January, 1936.

JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE,

January 20th, 1936.

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's letter of the 16th instant and to state in reply that the Japanese Government are pleased to accept the invitation of the Committee to leave Observers who will keep in touch with the work of the Conference. The Japanese Government understand that such observers are to be present at the meetings of the First Committee and other important meetings.

I further have the honour to inform you that the Japanese Government have appointed Mr. K. Fujii, Charge d'Affaires, and Captain R. Fujita, Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy, as observers at the London Naval Conference.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) OSAMI NAGANO.

Parl. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (2)

The Right Honourable Viscount Monsell of Evesham, G.B.E.,
First Lord of the Admiralty and Chairman of the First
Committee of the London Naval Conference.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (2)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 2 pages and known as "L.N.C. (35) a (Annex 22(2))" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} London Naval Conference: 1935 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ HIKIMOTO, Jiji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)