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

THESIS

Conflict or Consensus:
East Germany, the Soviet Union and *Deutschlandpolitik*
1958-1984

by

Thomas M. Petzold

June 1986

Thesis Advisor: Jiri Valenta

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Visible signs of disagreement over foreign policy between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic have been a rare occurrence. The exception to this condition has been their differing interests in formulating policy on Germany or *Deutschlandpolitik*. Over the past twenty-five years, several factors have drawn the decisionmakers of both countries in three specific instances to develop a *Deutschlandpolitik* which led to discernable discord between them. By comparing the leading factors in an organized, methodical manner, with the help of historical case studies, one is able to better understand the most relevant causal factors relative to this discord. When East German and Soviet foreign policy and economic interests are misaligned and the two leaderships have differing levels of control over their foreign policy formulation, the development of conflict or dispute is most likely. The potential for future differences over this policy issue remains likely as East German leaders work towards alleviating their country's identity problem via foreign policy actions potentially conflicting with Moscow's hegemonal interests

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Conflict or Consensus: East Germany, the Soviet Union and *Deutschlandpolitik* 1958-1984

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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June 1986

ABSTRACT

Visible signs of disagreement over foreign policy between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic have been a rare occurrence. The exception to this condition has been their differing interests in formulating policy on Germany or *Deutschlandpolitik*. Over the past twenty-five years, several factors have drawn the decision-makers of both countries in three specific instances to develop a *Deutschlandpolitik* which led to discernable discord between them. By comparing the leading factors in an organized, methodical manner, with the help of historical case studies, one is able to better understand the most relevant causal factors relative to this discord. When East German and Soviet foreign policy and economic interests are misaligned and the two leaderships have differing levels of control over their foreign policy formulation, the development of conflict or dispute over their respective German policies is most likely. The potential for future differences over this policy issue remains likely as East German leaders work towards alleviating their country's identity problem via foreign policy actions potentially conflicting with Moscow's hegemonal interests.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE PROBLEM

Close relations between Germany and Russia go back three centuries or more. The determining factors drawing them together have covered a broad spectrum from fascination to survival. To be sure, these relations have developed over the years into an ambivalent historical legacy. Ranging from alliances formed to counter Napoleon, Bismark's intricate web of treaties, to wars between each country's Emperor or Totalitarian despot, the fabric of Russo-German relations has been woven of various complex fibers, mixing enmity and entente. **[Ref. 1]**

Today this legacy continues despite the division of Germany. Relations with Moscow are held in both the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as crucial to their primary national interests. Despite the innumberable forces impeding closer relations between Bonn and Moscow, both sides understand their unique reasons why they must pursue certain interests involving the other.

B. THE FOCUS

While this is a most interesting topic, and an important element in this paper, the primary focus of the study will be on Moscow-East Berlin relations. For the East Germans, these relations have indeed been unique since the beginning. Because their state was created by the Soviets they owe its existence to them. While the GDR depends upon Moscow to guarantee this existence, the Soviet Union needs the GDR for ideological, economic and security reasons. Obviously, the dependencies are not symmetrical, but both countries find it advantageous, if not sometimes necessary, to foster the

growth of mutual interests. [Ref. 2: p. 33] Despite this consensus in Moscow and East Berlin on strengthening their close relations, the ambivalent historical legacy does not disappear. Tense or unsettling situations do arise from time to time in their relations. It has been argued by Peter Marsch, for example, that East German leaders will exploit their position as the more dependent partner by manipulating its dependent status vis-a-vis the USSR to defend their own domestic and international interests. [Ref. 3: p. 79] Although not too surprising, the very existence of this conflict does present the political analyst with questions about its causes.

C. THE THESIS

The main thesis in this study is that conflict[1] between the GDR and the USSR is inherent in their relationship over questions of policy towards Germany (*Deutschlandpolitik*). The sources of this conflict arise out of the fact that the two states are operating from two quite different objective conditions, each establishing a unique set of political and economic interests. While their interests usually converge in these areas, each state's different perspective will tend to pull these interests apart when certain opportunities and costs arise. Decisionmakers in Moscow place their *Deutschlandpolitik* objectives within an overall global power perspective, while the Socialist Unity Party (SED) leadership develops its all-German policy almost strictly from a European perspective. [Ref. 4: p. 136] Another root

[1]The term "conflict" as used in this study denotes a level of policy disagreement between the two countries' decisionmakers, which is clearly discernable to Western observers. Because this is not the "normal" state of affairs expected among allies, we use this term as a starting point to emphasize the unusual. In some cases, the term "dispute" may be more appropriate.

cause of this conflict are Soviet hegemonical interests in the East European Socialist bloc, particularly when dealing with the GDR.

Although according to Soviet ideology there can be no "antagonistic contradictions" between states belonging to the "socialist community", conflict has proven to be a fact of life within this community. And the Soviets have over the past decades shown varying degrees of success in resolving or controlling it. Conflict between states does not just appear, however. In a given situation, choices are made, based upon priorities of perceived interests, which may be congruent, unrelated or opposed to those interests of another state. The concept of interest is defined here as positive or negative expectations which motivate policy actions designed to promote or counter those expectations. [Ref. 4: p. 2]

D. THE METHODOLOGY

This study is designed to analyze the GDR-Soviet conflict through a focused comparison of a selected set of three historical cases involving their relations over the past 35 years. Each case may be viewed has being composed of specific East German and Soviet external and internal interests. The three cases selected for study are: (1) Ulbricht-Khrushchev disagreement during the Berlin Crises 1958-1962; (2) Ulbricht-Brezhnev/Kosigin conflict during the advent of European detente 1968-1971; and (3) Honecker-CPSU Politburo dispute following the NATO Tactical nuclear missile decisions 1979-1984.

#1	#2	#3
BERLIN CRISES	**DETENTE IMPOSED**	**HONECKER'S DETENTE**
1958-1962	1968-1971	1979-1984

The extensive historical data available must be applied in such a manner that it can be analyzed for the purpose of explaining past motivations and forecasting future decisions. In recent years, a number of scholars have emphasized the need for a systematic comparison of case studies, particularly when comparing a small number of cases. [Ref. 5: pp. 682-693], [Ref. 6: pp. 79-138] Alexander George and his colleagues have utilized a method called "structured focused comparison", according to which "the investigator deals selectively with only those aspects of each case that are believed relevant to the research objectives and data requirements of the study." [Ref. 7], [Ref. 8: pp. 43-68] The selected factors are then compared to develop context-dependent generalizations about the phenomenon under investigation. Because this study is an attempt to analyze historical evidence within a relatively small number of cases, it is necessary to be extra cautious in transitioning from the simple narration of past events to forecasting likely or probable future events.

I have therefore, chosen Dr. George's structured focused comparison methodology, which is quite useful in analyzing a broad set of variables inside a small number of cases in the search for new causal patterns to conflict or discord in GDR-Soviet relations.

1. Independent Variables

In the search for the "why's" behind a government's policies in its foreign relations one quickly realizes that there are an infinite number of possible sources within which may be the solution or merely part of the solution. I have therefore, selected, as a starting point, a limited number of interests and other factors which are considered the most influential in these policies. The following factors, called independent variables if we can measure them in some way for comparison purposes, for this study are:

1) Primary East German and Soviet Foreign Policy Interests; (Grouped as such: Eastern Europe; Western Europe and the remaining world.)

2) Primary East German and Soviet Economic Interests; and

3) East German and Soviet Leadership Foreign Policy-Making Control.

Obviously, foreign policy interests encompass numerous topic areas and nearly places one back at the starting point. Yet we will discuss the interests of both governments regarding Eastern and Western Europe, the U.S. and China and the Third World where they appear to have been influential in formulating a *Deutschlandpolitik* by either East Berlin or Moscow. The same limitations apply to economic interests, which, fortunately, are easier to uncover and measure than the political ones. The next step is to compare these interests within each respective case to see if they coincide or diverge. While the former situation would leave little likelihood for dispute, the latter might well increase tensions leading to disagreements or conflict between these two states. The hypothesis behind these independent variables is: The greater the convergence of political and economic foreign policy interests between them, the lower the potential for conflict between them over questions of German policy.

The final factor above attempts to deal with an influence upon foreign policy most affected by totalitarian regimes; the effect of personal control by the effective party leader over the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Since the death of Stalin the level of personal control has varied significantly in both the USSR and the GDR. An attempt is made in this study to correlate the level of control in both countries with the level of discord among them over *Deutschlandpolitik*. The hypothesis here is: The greater the synchronization of foreign policy control (whether very much, little or in between) between

the East German and Soviet leaderships, the lower the potential for conflict over questions of German policy.

2. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the level of conflict or discord between the East Germans and the Soviets over their respective *Deutschlandpolitik*. Although the implications are different from our Western concept of the term, we can label this variable, the German Problem, since there are apparently periods when one side views the other's policy as, in fact, problematic. Inextricably tied up with the German Problem, from the Eastern European side as well, is the problem of Berlin policy. Because of the crucial impact the Berlin issue has on both governments, it will be discussed in detail throughout this study and may tend to give the reader the impression that it is itself and independent variable. I am treating the Berlin issues, however, as a vital part of the whole problem both leaderships face in determining an appropriate *Deutschlandpolitik*.

3. Measurement

For necessary comparison reasons, the measurement of these variables will be expressed in terms of their relative position along a spectrum extending to both extremes. Figure 1.1 shows how the foreign policy and economic interests will be placed on a Converge-Diverge spectrum, meaning that in a particular case, the East German and Soviet foreign policy and economic interests in a particular area will be assessed to have a specific level of convergence. This level is indirectly related to the dependent variable--conflict over *Deutschlandpolitik*.

The "black box" area of foreign policy control will be analyzed in terms of the level of coincidental synchronization between the control level by East German and Soviet leaders as individuals. For example, moderate control over



Figure 1.1 Independent and Dependent Variable Relationships.

the foreign policy apparatus by the Soviet General Secretary and a high level of control in this area by the East German Communist Party leader would be considered less synchronized than high control by both leaders during a given case period. Here, again, there is an indirect relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable, which will be measured by the relative level of conflict between the East Germans and the Soviets and assessed a given point along a High <--> Low spectrum.

How will we arrive at selecting a point along the spectrum for any particular variable in any given case? This is accomplished by focussing on specific elements in each case. While accepting that each case is unique in itself, there are several common variables, which, when analyzed as a set, hopefully, will help us explain the outcome of these cases.

The focus comparison method is built around a set of general questions to be asked of each case. The questions are designed to illuminate the selected variables under investigation so that a reasonable attempt can be made to assess the variables' relative value (or place along the spectrum above) in that case. The following questions have been selected for this study:

1) What were the main Soviet and East German foreign policy interests in Eastern Europe, Western Europe and in other parts of the world (USA, China & Third World) which most affected their *Deutschlandpolitik* formulation?

2) What role did economic interests play in affecting both countries' *Deutschlandpolitik*?

3) How was foreign policy decisionmaking conducted in East Germany and the Soviet Union and what affect did it have on their *Deutschlandpolitik*? Did consensus or conflict prevail within their respective political leaderships?

4) What was the level of success by the dominant Party leader in controlling the definitions of the vital issues of that state's *Deutschlandpolitik*? In other words, how successful was that leader in controlling his country's policy on Germany?

5) What were the primary goals established by the Soviet and East German leadership towards the German Problem? What means were pursued to accomplish these goals? Were they a source of conflict between the two countries?

6) What were the main points of conflict between these two countries over the German Problem? What was the relative level of conflict and how was it resolved?

E. THE FORMAT

The first half of this study is designed to set apart the primary variables affecting East German and Soviet foreign policy decisionmaking during the three case study time periods. It is necessary to compare East German and Soviet interests in their relations with East European[2] and West European states and their extra-European interests.[3]

Unfortunately, Western observers have very limited insight into to political operations at work within the leading circles of the Warsaw Pact (WTO) states. Our analysis, therefore, must be based on the interests as they are advanced by influential foreign policy spokesmen in these countries and put forward as official policy and as we can best interpret their expression through a particular course of action.

The other independent variables analyzed are relevant Soviet and East German economic interests, which have a bearing on their policy on Germany and the foreign policy decisionmaking apparatus in both regimes. Understandably, uncovering the foggy data in the "black box" area of the internal decisionmaking processes is extremely difficult and imprecise business. The apparent importance of this variable on *Deutschlandpolitik* decisionmaking, combined with

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[2]The term "East European" is meant in this study to consist of the Warsaw Pact countries and, in some instances, when specified, Yugoslavia.

[3]The term Extra-European is used to express those relevant Soviet and East German foreign policy interests which lie beyond Europe, yet are not such in the East German case to be labled global or world interests.

recent constructive contributions in this area, provide sufficient motivation to attempt to reveal the most significant factors involved as best possible. [Ref. 9], [Ref. 10]

The third chapter reviews the dependent variable. This is done by focussing on the *Deutschlandpolitik* interests of both regimes during the study time periods. Through this manner we may view the level of conflict or discord between the Soviets and their German comrades over German policy.

The principle objective in Chapter IV is to examine in closer detail the variables already outlined as they occured in the historical context. It is then easier to relate how they affected the *Deutschlandpolitik* decisionmaking and led to conflict between East Berlin and Moscow in the three cases during the years 1958-1984. Conveniently, the cases occur at about ten-year intervals. The first case revolves around the Berlin crises 1958-1962, our emphasis being on the Ulbricht-Khrushchev struggle over concluding a peace treaty with the GDR and a settlement of the Berlin problem. The second case, 1968-1971, focuses on Ulbricht's resistance to Brezhnev's concerted efforts to establish a rapprochement with the Federal Republic. The last case, 1979-1984, is less concrete in defining the East Berlin-Moscow conflict due to a lack of available data. The emphasis is on the factors behind the SED leadership to preserve a detente atmosphere with Bonn despite sometimes ambiguous messages from the Kremlin regarding policy between the two Germanies.

F. THE OBJECTIVE

Despite the relatively limited historical perspective available since 1945, the analysis of the selected cases is meant to illuminate the relative importance of specific variables held most causal in East German-Soviet disagreement. The conclusions of the study are presented in the final chapter which hopefully lead to a better understanding

of the causes for future discord between these two countries over their *Deutschlandpolitik*. The German Problem is not likely to be resolved for years to come, meaning that *Deutschlandpolitik* will likewise remain an important policy issue in Europe on both sides of the inter-German border. Hopefully, this study will therefore have contributed to a better theoretical knowledge of this topic, through the application of historical data, to arrive at useful generalizations about future East German-Soviet relations. We might then be better prepared to formulate and conduct policy in this area of the world.

II. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

A. EASTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS

1. Soviet Union

Since 1945, Eastern Europe has been the principle Soviet sphere of influence. For primarily security considerations, which are supported by ideological and political requirements, the Soviet Union has shown more interest in this part of the world than anywhere outside her own borders. Political failures in this region have a dramatic effect on the Soviet role as a major world power; e.g., Poland in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Similarly, ideological failures negatively effect her role as leader of the world socialist movement; e.g., Yugoslavia 1948 and Albania 1961. Over the years the Soviets have learned many hard lessons and have subsequently modified earlier policies in Eastern Europe. As stability was slowly established in this region, the Soviet leadership could afford to turn its attention to other interests, particularly as they gradually developed their global role.

In the late fifties and early sixties, Soviet interests in Eastern Europe were focused on two major concerns: achieving greater Eastern bloc integration and ideological conformity based on Moscow's definition of the term. The goal of these concerns was to hold on to the post-war advances gained in East-Central Europe. East Germany was fast becoming an important member of the East European communist bloc, which Moscow felt it needed to control.

The first goal of integration and conformity meant transitioning from direct Soviet involvement in the military, political, and economic affairs of individual Eastern bloc states to utilizing institutions geared towards

legitimizing Soviet hegemony. The effects of the events in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 were still strongly evident during this period, leading Khrushchev to make substantial efforts toward mending fences.

These efforts began with a "unity" meeting of East European communist leaders in Budapest in January 1957 and a series of bilateral talks with East European delegations in Moscow. These resulted in new bilateral agreements with various Warsaw Pact allies, which incorporated economic concessions and status-of-forces arrangements aimed at reducing East European resentment against the Soviet military presence in the region. **[Ref. 11: p. 82]** This bilateral policy approach under Khrushchev was still part of the Stalinist legacy which was devoid of any multilateral arrangement to facilitate relations within the bloc.

Potential areas for mutual cooperation and integration was found through common economic and security interests. However, a prime institution created to achieve this, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), founded in 1949 in response to the Marshall Plan, remained a paper organization until the late 1950s. Likewise, for the first five years after its founding in May 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was little more than a shell for future development of intra-bloc ties. It had virtually no central staff and was totally subservient to Soviet designs. **[Ref. 12: pp. 20-29]**, **[Ref. 13: p. 258-264]** Until 1961-62 the WTO amounted to little more than a symbolic presence.

Between 1959 and 1962 the slow transition was beginning to be made to put these two important institutions to use for integration purposes. Focus on the military as well as the political functions of the WTO first became apparent in March 1961, when it was agreed to convene regular consultative meetings by the national defense ministers, hold joint military maneuvers and initiate a Soviet-assisted

modernization of East European combat forces. The first of these multinational exercises, *Brotherhood in Arms*, was held in the fall of 1961 in connection with the Berlin crisis. [Ref. 13: p. 262] Khrushchev also used these signs of increased cooperation politically in his repeated boasting of the new "relationship of forces" existing in the world, whereby the capabilities of the coalition of socialist forces are rapidly surpassing the fragmented imperialist forces. Communist controlled East Germany was becoming an ever increasingly important member of this coalition.

After some success in 1956 in the areas of production specialization and coordination of national economic planning, the CMEA showed practically no further development until 1962. It was then that Khrushchev introduced the first serious steps toward socialist economic integration [Ref. 12: p. 25] Despite the lack of practical measures implemented during the Berlin crisis period to improve the integration of the Eastern European states into a cooperative alliance system, the alienated atmosphere of the Stalin years was dissipating. Although perhaps somewhat overstated, Wolfgang Leonhard's observation in 1962 of this change in Soviet emphasis is instructive.

> In practice, however, brutal methods of political suppression and colonial exploitation are no longer applied to the satellites. On the contrary, the Soviet Union tries to link economic and political interests of the communist countries so closely with one another that a more or less voluntary interdependence is created. [Ref. 14: p. 330.]

Khrushchev himself is much to blame for the ideological divergence within the socialist movement following his "secret speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. For the next 12 years Moscow would be trying to make clear to its East European allies and others in the "socialist commonwealth" that a "different road to socialism" did not

reduce the fact that ultimate power remained in the hands of the Soviet Union. The Soviets "never accepted the concept of multiple centers of authority on ideology and doctrine, and asserted the right to determine which policies were correct and which were revisionist" [Ref. 15: p.9].

Tito's action's since 1948 and Albania's divergence in 1960-61 threatened ideological anarchy in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the socialist movement. Every communist party in Eastern Europe with the exception of Bulgaria had shown signs of possible disengagement from following the Soviet vanguard example for socialist development. In an attempt to restore the shaken unity of the communist world movement, Khrushchev invited the leaders of sixty-four communist parties to Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution and participate in an International Communist Conference in November 1957. At this conference Khrushchev worked towards documenting the Soviet leadership role in the movement and to redefine the earlier thesis of "different roads to communism". Overall this conference and another held in 1960 reflected a quasi-successful effort by Moscow to discipline "institutional diversity with ideological conformity", making it quite clear that the Soviet Union claimed the leading role and would determine the primary principles which all participants would have to accept. [Ref. 14: pp. 260-264], [Ref. 15: p. 9.]

During this period the Kremlin leadership was well occupied with establishing its legitimacy in East-Central Europe while not wanting to lose any of its control. Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* was mostly concerned about the latter during this time period. It was still too early to expect legitimacy among their defeated foes-turned-allies, but could recognize the necessity of keeping Germany a non-threat for the future. The German Question was well as

policy on East German relations were still kept as separate entities from East European policy. Therefore, Khrushchev's East European foreign policy interests had only moderate affect on Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* during the period of the Berlin Crises.

An estimation of Soviet interests in Eastern Europe during the period 1968-1971 rests primarily on three characteristics: 1) Their interests were formed more through reaction to events than through their own strategic planning; 2) Eastern European relations were not of primary concern to Kremlin leaders relative to their other foreign policy interests (or distractions), i.e. global policy vis-a-vis the U.S. and rapprochement with Western Europe; and 3) Soviet interests did not change much during the period, showing a good deal of consistency. [Ref. 15: p. 17]

The reform experiments within some East European communist parties in the late 1960s, culminating in the Prague Spring situation under Dubcek, forced the Soviet Politburo to make some very difficult decisions. Without dealing in depth in the processes leading to these decisions [Ref. 16], substantial internal and external pressures grew unabated as a result of a lack of USSR control in this reform movement. The advocates of intervention in Czechoslovakia, comprised primarily of the internal group such as party leaders in the western non-Russian republics, the military and security forces and those members responsible for ideology, and the external group, led by Walter Ulbricht and Wladislaw Gomulka, finally won the debate, but not until after several months of discussion and negotiation. Although the intervention did reestablish the credibility of Soviet military power as the ultimate instrument of Moscow's control in the area, Brezhnev had to interpret the move as a failure of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe

and, subsequently, as a demand to reorganize and redevelop the alliance system.

To guard against such a reemergence of a loss of control within the alliance, Brezhnev set forth plans to "normalize" the Czech situation and to tighten and improve integration of the Eastern bloc alliance system as a whole. This involved internal measures aimed at increasing Soviet hegemony within the bloc but also simultaneously, to improve coordination relationships and reduce intra-bloc divisions. [Ref. 17] The primary reemphasis was on 1) Ideological orthodoxy; 2) Tightened discipline among member states and 3) Strengthening the major institutions which did not question the leading role of the USSR. The latter represented a significant restructuring of the WTO military relations, particularly regarding the role of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), and the CMEA. The Soviets apparently hoped to establish some sort of supranational scheme for socialist integration in all spheres of intra-bloc relations. [Ref. 12: p. 89] Bilateral security treaties were renewed or renegotiated and the East European leaders were invited to meet with the CPSU General Secretary much more frequently, such as the "informal" visits each summer to the Crimea. Also the term 'Socialist Commonwealth' made popular by Khrushchev was slowly replaced by the term 'Socialist Community' (*Obshchina*), without the same connotation of equality. [Ref. 15: p. 17]

Just as the Dubcek reforms directed Soviet interests toward a reemphasis on the need for a tightened alliance, increasing signals from the Federal Republic of an evolving *Ostpolitik* demanded Soviet attention be given to possible East European responses. Beginning prior to the Grand Coalition, the Eberhard government proposed Renunciation of Force agreements in March 1966 to all foreign Eastern bloc nations, with the exception, of course, of the GDR.

Followed shortly thereafter by the Grand Coalition's new emphasis on *Entspannung* (relaxation of tension) policy based on bilateral contacts, the Soviet leadership faced a new challenge of keeping alliance unity in tact in coordinating a communist bloc response to these growing opportunities. As will be discussed below, the Kremlin placed much weight on West Germany's recognition of the post-war status quo in Eastern Europe. Many aspects of the emerging *Ostpolitik* suggested this recognition as a likely bi-product of future negotiations.

At the same time, however, opening contacts with the alliance's "number one" enemy was fraught with great dangers which very possibly could result in a dismemberment of the alliance itself. Most sensitive as well was not to disadvantage the GDR in the course of these contacts. This desire was almost an impossibility from the start since Bonn excluded East Berlin from these agreements.

The Soviet Union, with obvious support from the GDR leadership, insisted on a unified, multilateral approach to *Westpolitik* and a European Security Conference (ESC). With the exception of Romania, this policy held together through 1968.

The year 1969 was a watershed for developing policies on both sides of the Elbe. The multilateral coalition was reduced to only Poland and East Germany, while the momentum increased for bilateralism, promoted by Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Kremlin, although desiring the multilateral approach, could not bring together the various conflicts to forge a united design and could not afford to pass up increasing opportunities with Bonn. Here it is interesting to note that while the Soviets preferred a multilateral approach to a critical policy issue, it had never really exercised multilateralism among the Eastern bloc alliance. Despite significant efforts to make

institutional changes to foster greater multilateral cooperation within the WTO and CMEA, together with increased bilateral consultations, the major planning and communications still flowed much like spikes of a wheel through Moscow in major interactions among the individual members.

Through a series of very important Warsaw Pact summit meetings in 1969, in Budapest in March, in Prague in October and in Moscow in December, there evolved a "controlled bilateralism", according to which Moscow would lead the way to a bloc-wide rapprochement with Bonn. This was to set an example for other Eastern European-FRG contacts as well as lay the groundwork for a European Security Conference. **[Ref. 12: pp. 62-64], [Ref. 18: pp. 196-228].** The Soviets were able to stick to this scheme fairly well which began with the Moscow-Bonn treaty, followed by the Warsaw treaty, a normalization treaty between East Berlin and Bonn, known as the Basic Treaty, and then separate treaties with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria respectively.

The final aspect to mention regarding Soviet-East European interests during this period of detente was the Soviet need for support within Eastern Europe to project the USSR as a new global power. As John Campbell states: "It was not enough to be a superpower in size and military strength. An essential element of the new status was having other states, making up a large part of Europe, in the socialist camp" **[Ref. 15: p. 13].** East Europe's role in Moscow's correlation of forces was important to the Soviets in both their superpower and their world communist leadership role. This would have its most significant application during USSR-US SALT negotiations, which were high on Moscow's list of priortity interests at the time.

As can be seen above, during the 1960s the GDR was increasingly integrated into the Soviet's East European

policy. As an important political partner in the socialist camp, East Berlin had to have been considered and consulted in making significant changes in East European policy. The advent of detente policy with Western Europe forced the Kremlin to consider possible effects on their *Deutschlandpolitik* from the eastern borders of the GDR as well as from the western borders. During this period, what the other East European states did could have lasting effects upon Soviet interests in Germany; possibly affecting both of the individual German states and/or the German Question as a whole. Therefore, Soviet East European foreign policy interests played a very important role in their *Deutschlandpolitik* formulations.

Through the detente experiences of the 1970s, the Soviets entered the eighties much the wiser in regard to East European relations. Integration of member states into the decisionmaking group was to continue, but with institutional guarantees that Moscow was informed of, and involved in the medium and high level decisions made among alliance member states. Although individual states demanded their share of "uniqueness" within the alliance, greater cohesion was still an important goal to be achieved through ideological orthodoxy and economic, i.e. social, stability.

The effect detente had on both East and West Europe could not have escaped Soviet attention. Eastern European economies were boosted and then struck with ill affects of West European economic setbacks. They also gradually developed substantial hard-currency debts to Western banks. The Soviets, since Lenin, have insisted on economic autarky and the negative affects of Western economic troubles on Eastern European economic goal proved a good reminder to Moscow why their forefathers had done so. Although limiting Soviet options in some areas, the debt situation did create some

positive results from Moscow's perspective. These debts created a lasting West European interest in East Europe's economic and social stability. One example of the potential usefulness of this situation may have surfaced after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The evident desire among leading West Europeans to return to "business as usual" shortly after the invasion was obviously supported by many with vested interests in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

The growth of dissident movements in many Eastern bloc countries emphasized the need for greater internal control in some countries while the need for economic stability mandated Soviet leniency in response to Hungarian economic reforms. [Ref. 19: pp. 109-120] Had the latter not proved successful, or created instability in the single-party control apparatus, we probably would not have seen this permissiveness. The point is that Moscow has come to recognize some of the cultural, historic and geographic distinctions related to the various members of their East European alliance. Respecting the limitations and capabilities unique to these states, the Soviets appear to have utilized economic and political roles appropriate for them.

All the East European states could be employed in doing their part in the on-going "peace offensive" engineered by the Soviets after Helsinki. Following the Afghanistan invasion, Soviets and East European leaders understood the necessity of reviving the spirit of European detente, and the East European contacts were in a much better position than Moscow to lead the campaign. [Ref. 12: p. 111]

Although every country had established their own peculiar contacts over the decade of detente, Hungary and Romania were most deeply involved in relations with the West. In many ways they were probably assigned as leaders in promoting the peaceful nature of East European interests

in Western Europe. As leaders of the "peace team", although not altogether a homogeneous one, the Soviets, through the assistance of their East European allies, hoped to exploit fissures in NATO and the failing image of American leadership throughout the free world. [Ref. 12: pp. 113-114]

East Berlin was alloted an ideological watchdog role to be shared with Prague. East Germany also quickly developed an important technical support role in Soviet Third World involvement. Like East Berlin, the ideological strictness adhered to by the Husak regime earned Prague the shared ideological watchdog role among East European WTO members. [Ref. 19: p. 115] Additionally, Czechoslovakia shared a military hardware production role with Poland for intra-alliance deployment and sales to fit Soviet Third World needs. In other areas, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were dependable supporters of Soviet foreign policy, while Romania and Hungary's lack of enthusiastic support would have to be muffled or the affects contained whenever possible.

Poland appears to have been too unstable over the past decades to have inherited any significant role outside Eastern Europe. Her political and economic problems demanded much attention from her Soviet and East European neighbors, who did their best to "help" her through the Solidarity crises in the early years of the new decade.

Despite the economic problems developing in the region and the subtle challenges to Moscow's control over Pact foreign policy, the Soviet Politburo remained quite preoccupied with other problems and interests, e.g. Afghanistan, INF, Third World adventures and the CPSU leadership succession.

Although relative stability in Eastern Europe dominated the period, with the exception of Poland, the mere fact that that East Germany participated in any discussion

of increased room for individualism in socialist foreign policy making drew significant attention in Moscow. But the possible implications this had on Soviet hegemonical interests in East-Central Europe must have kept the Soviet leadership alert to the potential GDR influence within the WTO. Therefore, Soviet East European foreign policy interests were a substantial part of their *Deutschlandpolitik* during this period.

2. East Germany

Walter Ulbricht had his hands full with domestic concerns when the Fifth SED Party Congress met in July 1958, and for the following five years gave little priority towards relations with other Soviet bloc countries. This is not to say that he did not have any substantial interests in Eastern Europe but that these interests were mostly overshadowed by domestic demands. Only during the three months prior to the Fifth Party Congress had Ulbricht removed the last formidable opposition group to develop from Khrushchev's de-Stalinization movement, i.e. the Schirdewan and Wollweber group.

At this congress he further purged members of the Central Committee (CC) and tried to down-play the near desperate economic situation in the GDR by calling for "the building of a material-technical foundation of Socialism". Following Khrushchev's example of setting totally unrealistic economic goals to prove socialist ascendency over the capitalist system, Ulbricht announced that the "chief economic task" in the next three years was to surpass the Bonn government's per capita production of consumer goods. Futile attempts to accomplish this task through an "enticed" collectivization program, the intensification of Party control over State functions and the growing refugee problem kept Ulbricht's attention focussed primarily on internal problems. [Ref. 20: pp. 935-937], [Ref. 21: pp. 60-75]

Having only three years earlier been granted sovereignty status through the 20 September 1955 Treaty of Friendship with the USSR, Ulbricht was still very dependent on Moscow for any legitimacy he might claim. For many reasons, Ulbricht had minimal contacts with his East European neighbors, despite his need for their support for any foreign policy he might propose to conduct. Of course, this may not have been of Ulbricht's own choosing. Memories of Nazi Germany were still coloring the image of East Germany held by Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. Poland and Czechoslovakia were slow to agree, for example, to the open development of the East German National People's Army (NVA) and to the sale of advanced military equipment to the GDR. [Ref. 22: p. 65] Another example was Poland's opposition to the Peace Treaty which Khrushchev threatened to conclude with the GDR. Warsaw feared at the time that it would result in the severing of trade relations by the West, something the Polish economy could not afford to lose.

Ulbricht also needed to keep some distance from remnants of the 1956 reformers in Hungary and Poland. The latter was the only country Ulbricht went to for a bilateral visit during the time period 1958-1962. During this visit in the summer 1958 with Gomulka, Ulbricht found an indirect way to remind his host of his dissatisfaction with Poland's internal policies. Erwin Weit, Ulbricht' Polish interpreter during the visit (and many subsequent visits), describes how Ulbricht, at a much-publicized factory visit, had accomplished this. "Using the pretext of answering questions from the workers, Ulbricht attacked, one by one, all the reforms which had been introduced by the Polish Party leadership in the last two years since Gomulka had come to power." [Ref. 23: p. 49]

Politically, the East European socialist countries were the only international entities willing to recognize

the Ulbricht regime as legal. Erich Honecker, in a speech some twenty-five years later marking the 30th anniversary of the GDR remembered:

> Acting in a truly fraternal spirit, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries admitted our young republic into their community, always standing by its side in the struggle against the diplomatic blockade the imperialists imposed on it. [Ref. 24: p. 485]

The degree of willingness on the part of the individual states is subject to speculation, but, nonetheless, only through their recognition and support did the Ulbricht regime hold any legal evidence of their state's international status. Throughout the Berlin crises, certainly Ulbricht needed his eastern neighbors more than they needed him.

For almost solely survival reasons, Ulbricht had to develop his *Deutschlandpolitik* around the support derived from his eastern neighbors. So far as his sense of responsibility for cooperation as an alliance partner was concerned, he did not appear much interested beyond that necessary for their continued recognition of his state, nor did he expect much more in return. He well understood that the important decisions were made in Moscow and that is where he focussed his attention. During the period, then, Ulbricht's East European policy interests only moderately affected his state's *Deutschlandpolitik*.

By 1968 the situation above had changed dramatically. East German leader's concerns about their East European neighbors struck at the nerve cells of the Ulbricht regime. Political and economic reform as practiced by Czechoslovakia and Hungary could possibly destroy the internal stability finally established by the hard-liners in the SED. Three years earlier they were able to suppress and

redirect the reform elements within the Party.[4] At the same time, the few external legitimacy gains achieved by Ulbricht could be washed away by her allies if they each jumped for the new bait offered by Bonn, without looking out for GDR interests. In this way Ulbricht was quite preoccupied with the internal and external policies of her Eastern allies.

Most important to East Berlin leadership was the possibility of ideological contamination from Czechoslovakia or Hungary. The two and one-half year reform period did have some positive affects on the population and the external image of the GDR. Through gradual, but consistent economic improvements, a relative satisfaction, both economic and political, was developing among the worker and technical-scientific classes. Concurrently, an East German identity was beginning to establish itself within the population, primarily through the prominent role achieved by the GDR economy among the East European states. Apparently, the educational and propaganda system was "breeding" a new post-war generation by 1968 and this was the socialist environment in which this new identity was emerging. All of these improvements could be wasted if events in Prague could not be brought under control.

Understandably then, Ulbricht, together with Gomulka, was a staunch supporter of military intervention in Czechoslovakia during the summer of 1968, if that is what was necessary to to repel the "infection of liberalism" spreading in that country. Ulbricht also found a Soviet colleague in a very similar situation in Petr Shelest, a

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[4]This group included economic experts, Erich Apel and Gunter Mittag, and Premier Willi Stoph. The clamp-down occurred at the 11th CC plenum in December 1965, ending the economic and social reforms gradually in effect since 1963. The end of the short-lived reform era was highlighted by Economics Minister Apel's suicide on the day a long-term trade agreement with the Soviet Union was signed. See Ilse Spittman article, "East Germany: The Swinging Pendulum", in <u>Problems of Communism</u>, July/August 1967.

Politburo member and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, who was concerned about such infections carrying over into his Ukraine population. [Ref. 16: pp. 102-102, 114-116] Neither Ulbricht or Gomulka kept their dissatisfactions secret.

> They became outspoken critics of the Prague reformers and persistent advocates of a hard line policy toward Czechoslovakia in the early stages of the crisis, as demonstrated by their performance at the Dresden Conference in March 1968. [Ref. 16: p. 24]

At that early stage Ulbricht was forewarning doom if things continued in Prague as they were.

East German leaders had other reasons for criticism of the Czech reforms. Internal reforms could lead to changes in foreign policy. For Ulbricht this meant possibly Prague responding to the Kiesinger government's offers of bilateral Renunciation of Force agreements in such a manner which would disregard GDR's interests. The Romanians had already broken out of line through recognition of Bonn in 1967, and a border state like Czechoslovakia doing anything similar would sell out East Berlin's requirements: Full international recognition by Bonn and territorial independence for West Berlin prior to East European negotiations begin with Bonn. Ulbricht needed Moscow's support in his demands for a unified, multilateral response to West German overtures, and possibly hoped to strengthen his hand with Moscow by backing the military option to the Prague crisis. Dr. Valenta suggests another payoff that Ulbricht may have been seeking by pressing the military solution; namely, the prevention, or at least a delay, in the move toward rapprochement between Moscow and Bonn due to the resultant reactions to intervention in the West. [Ref. 16: p. 25]

In any case, any independent bilateral action within the Eastern bloc in establishing improved relations with

West Germany threatened the frail international scaffolding erected by Ulbricht within the diplomatic world. He knew the incentives offered by Bonn, or potentially offered, were a much greater motivating force than his demands for socialist unity. As long as the WTO viewed the Federal Republic as its principle enemy, the GDR could portray itself as the vanguard in the struggle against the West German "revanchist" threat and continue to demand solidarity from its allies in support of East German interests. As the enemy image (*Feindbild*) of the FRG began to lose its credibility in Eastern Europe, the SED leadership found it increasingly difficult to retain the political support of their allies. **[Ref. 4: p. 143]** At the same time, Ulbricht could not fail to realize the political and economic dependence of the East German regime on the other WTO states. Of the 13 states that granted full diplomatic recognition to East Berlin, the Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia comprised 8 of these. Over 40% of East German foreign trade was with the USSR, 68% was with CMEA members.

Up until the Prague Warsaw Pact meeting in October 1969, East Berlin held closest to Moscow, knowing they were the best hope for protecting GDR's interests within the alliance since Ulbricht probably realized the limited influence he held at these meetings. Together, however, the two partners were only able to get away with the above-mentioned "controlled bilateralism", with Moscow leading the Pact in *Westpolitik*.

The failure of Ulbricht's attempts to gain support for his multilateral approach had many unsettling aspects for East Berlin. First of all, Ulbricht expressed the fear of the lack of control while others, namely Moscow, negotiated with Bonn on issues affecting the GDR. **[Ref. 18: p. 255-259]** Second, Ulbricht genuinely distrusted the parties involved, fearing a Soviet "deal" with the West with

disastrous outcomes for the GDR. According to Mr. Weit, his polish interpreter, Ulbricht distrusted the Soviet Union considerably, and the other East European leaders even more. He claims Ulbricht's ultimate nightmare was a deal between the USSR and the Federal Republic, a deal in which Moscow agreed to German reunification on Bonn's terms in return for economic and political concessions by Bonn. [Ref. 23: p. 5] It can be pointed out that during the period December 1969 - September 1971, during which the Soviets were negotiating with Bonn on the Moscow Treaty or with the Western Powers on Berlin, all the actors to this dream were in place, creating an ideal setting for conjuring up such nightmares.

A third major interest of the SED leadership during this period in respect to their East European allies was to reinforce its German "socialist" role in the alliance. Not disconnected from the desire to gain influence for future leverage in dealing with the above two interests, Ulbricht hoped to benefit from East Germany's relatively high production capability which could be imbedded into bilateral agreements. The 1968 growth rates in CMEA trading patterns suggest that the East German economic potential was transforming into political power within the Bloc. The limited political clout which Ulbricht was able to carry to the many WTO meetings on *Westpolitik* was derived from this economic potential. East German expert Peter c. Ludz said in 1969 of Ulbricht on this subject:

> His efforts at isolating Czechoslovakia in the Bloc, and simultaneously, at preventing the isolation of the GDR, have also met with some degree of success. [Ref. 25: p. 68]

The goal of this policy was to establish the GDR in a dominant position within the Eastern bloc that would, hopefully, develop into a self-sufficient "socialist economic system".

East Berlin might then be able to better assert itself in the community, and, subject to Soviet veto power, issue the basic "edicts" to the other non-Soviet, CMEA members. [Ref. 25: p. 69]

Quite clearly one can note the value of the East European allies which the East German leaders hac come to appreciate. Not only their continued international recognition rested upon outward support in the other East European capitals, but also any leverage for effective pressure against the West or vis-a-vis Moscow could only result from collective positioning by the East European leaders. The East Germans came to understand themselves an important element in this equation. East Berlin's East European foreign policy interests were crucial to their conducting a successful *Deutschlandpolitik* according to their perceived interests during the period 1968-1972.

In the 1970s, Honecker led the GDR through the most important developmental period in East German history. Out of the growth from a regional, semi-recognized East European state to an internationally recognized European state active in all parts of the world, East Berlin's dependencies on her Eastern neighbors declined significantly. This change in external legitimacy requirements together with relative stability in Eastern Europe during the early 1980s, excluding the Polish crisis, allowed the SED leadership to place foreign policy emphasis on concerns mostly outside the Soviet bloc while still pursuing certain important East European relationship interests.

The primary GDR interest in East Europe continued to be social and political stability within the WTO member states. Honecker and other SED leaders repeatedly praised the Soviet leadership in all major party matters and demanded close adherence to the Soviet official Party line

among neighboring Pact states. Poland's crisis with "Solidarity" caused significant concern to SED officials, although the publicly declared dangers were presented as much more serious as they actually were. For the most part, workers in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, the area of greatest concern for the SED, felt themselves disassociated from Polish workers, who were seen as lazy and ungrateful for all the assistance provided them by other countries. **[Ref. 26: pp. 1009-1014], [Ref. 27: p. 84]** Obviously, over time the ideas, both political and economic, espoused by "Solidarity" could develop limited opposition in East Germany or Czechoslovakia, but before Martial Law was declared on 13 Dec 1981, there were no signs of such developments in either country. **[Ref. 28: pp. 1048-1058], [Ref. 29]** Reacting, nonetheless, on fears of a possible spread to the GDR of the "Polish disease", Honecker ordered travel restrictions leading to border closings after eight years of visa-free movement between the two countries. **[Ref. 30: p. 21]** Honecker took other steps to correct the situation in Poland as well. Together with open criticism of Polish internal policy and suggestions of "fraternal assistance" during their time of need, the GDR was among the first states to provide economic aid after Jarelzelski took control. There have been no notable indications of East Berlin dissatisfaction with Polish policy since stability was established in 1982.

By the end of the seventies, East Germany had installed itself as the leading technological producer within the CMEA. The many reasons for this condition aside, Honecker appears to press the GDR's development in this area to its maximum output. At the Tenth SED Party Congress in April 1981, he listed ten economic priorities of the "strategy for the eighties", of which seven noted the scientific-technical revolution as means for achievement or

greater exploitation of present capabilities. [Ref. 31] Moscow placed increasing pressure on CMEA members to improve their high-tech production capabilities in the late 1970's. This was perhaps in response to their dissatisfaction with the level of technological transfers received from the West through detente policies. This pressure was most visible when the Soviet representatives "scolded" the other CMEA members for lacking high-tech export equipment during the annual CMEA conference in East Berlin in 1983.

Leading in this high-tech area and in per capita standard of living among its allies, East Berlin has set tough, but realistic, goals for economic development during the 6th Five Year Plan 1981-1985. [Ref. 32: pp. 30-43] A major motivation for East Berlin to achieve even better economic standards is the fact that East German performance is not measured by the population primarily against its East European neighbors, but against the FRG, with whom it has never favorably compared.

Another important interest in Eastern Europe was the Euromissile issue, particularly in regard to Soviet countermeasures to NATO deployment. The response by the WTO of putting SS-21 and SS-22 in the GDR and Czechoslovakia after the Soviets failed to stop the NATO deployment was used by Moscow as an inward and outward sign of cohesion. Within the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union hoped the increased threat would pull the Pact closer to realization of their need of Soviet protection against NATO aggression. Publically, the move was meant to be a sign of the Pact's cohesion and unanimity.

To East Berlin, however, it was no secret that they were again pawns within the Superpower competition for nuclear superiority. Soviet commitment and capability to defend the East German state were appropriately valued, but involving them in the SS-20 MRBM issue by deploying two

additional families of nuclear missiles on East German territory was questionably needed for defense of the WTO. Although they both publicly supported the counter deployment move, East Germany continued emphasis on the need to continue their dialogue with Bonn by "limiting the damage" and Prague allowed the publication of citizens' doubts of the necessity of the decision. These were some signs of both regimes' discomfort with Moscow's hard line missile policy. [Ref. 33]

Political and economic cooperation became a fact of life among the East European states by 1980 and each state had a big stake in the uninterrupted flow of Bloc affairs. East Germany was no exception and as stated above, Honecker intended to involve the GDR much further in these relations. Although Honecker has almost always been the leader in claiming Moscow's great role in any achievement in East European affairs, it appears as though Honecker may have gone "European" on a few occasions, leaving the Soviet Union in the background.

During the summer 1984, following NATO's initial deployment of cruise missiles, the Kremlin came down hard on East Berlin's continued dialogue with Bonn. During this criticism, both Hungary and Romania provided verbal support for Honecker's policy. [Ref. 34] Poland and Czechoslovakia, in the meantime, continued to publish Moscow's criticisms. In August, Honecker was the only WTO member to attend Romania's (Anti-NAZI) celebrations. The other Bloc countries were supposedly protesting Romania's participation in the Los Angeles Olympic Games. In the fall 1984, after Honecker's decision not to visit the FRG, and later in the Winter 1985, <u>Neues Deutschland</u> quoted Hungarian sources emphasizing the importance of the special role East European socialist countries can play in securing and furthering detente, particularly, the special inter-German "community

of responsibility" [Ref. 35], [Ref. 36: pp. 9-13] These appear to have been signals from East Berlin of a desire to pursue their intra-German interests despite Moscow's disinterest in the policy, not with any intention of destabilizing the area, but in the belief that their *Deutschlandpolitik* was for the good of all Pact members.

East Berlin's place within the East European socialist community was realistically realized by Honecker in the 1970's. While appreciating the real power relationships within the WTO, the East Germans well understood the common interests shared by the smaller East European states. These interests would compel the East Germans to not only cooperate in the development of future regional policy, but perhaps even to take a leading role in it. As such, East Berlin's formulation of its *Deutschlandpolitik* was substantially affected by its East European interests during the latter seventies and early eighties.

In summary then, East European interests had some effect on the decisionmakers in East Berlin and Moscow during the Berlin crises, but were very important in influencing these leaders during the Detente period. These interests, although on the periphery of the main controversy, assumed a substantial role in the latest dispute over *Deutschlandpolitik* during the 1980s.

B. WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS

1. Soviet Union

Soviet West European policy has been and continues to be determined by Soviet control over its East European empire, the course of its competition with the United States and the degree of change existing in Western Europe itself. [Ref. 37: p. 80] Robert Legvold suggests that we view Western Europe as a pivot between Moscow's imperial and

global interests--that is, as both a contributor and threat to Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe and the world at large, particularly vis-a-vis the United States. [Ref. 37: p.80]

During the 1950s, the Soviet Union was witness to a period of European cooperation and integration in political and economic spheres like never before experienced. Unfortunately, the philosophies creating thes cohesion ran counter to Soviet goals, particularly in light of the fact that the U.S. was so deeply involved and committed to it. It was therefore of primary interest to Moscow to slow down, stop or even reduce West European integration developments during the 1958-1962 time period.

The formation of NATO, and particularly West Germany's entry into the organization in 1955, were viewed as serious challenges to Soviet post-war achievements in Eastern Europe. The NATO decision in 1957 to deploy nuclear medium-range missiles on the continent, including West Germany, raised the level of serious concern to a new threshold. Soviet interests in Western Europe during the Berlin crises were consequently substantially affected by the need to respond to the missile dilemma.

The primary interest has already been alluded to: the prevention of further military, political and economic integration in Western Europe under U.S. influence which could challenge the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. The greater the disunity among NATO members, the greater the possibilities for attaining a neutral, disarmed Germany(s) along Soviet designs. On the political level, Moscow could continue to take advantage of the strains that had arisen within the western alliance over the Suez crisis or initiate a crisis situation whereby the major players would find it difficult to agree to an appropriate, common solution. The situation in Berlin was a perfect, or almost perfect, candidate for this purpose.

Khrushchev was well aware of the differing interests among Western alliance members regarding the German Problem and Berlin, and he needed only to stimulate the debate. Jack Schick points out quite well the quarreling positions within the Western team, with the Americans and British working toward one direction and Bonn and Paris toward another in response to Khrushchev's ultimatum note in 1958 and 1959. [Ref. 38: pp. 49-96] He suggests, in fact, that De Gaulle and Adenauer had reached an understanding that if the latter supported De Gaulle on certain Common Market policies (*inter alia*, keeping the UK out), De Gaulle would support Adenauer on his Berlin interests. [Ref. 38: p. 62] Leadership disagreements aside, the Soviets had by that time an appreciation of how public opinion in the Western democracies could complicate and aggravate the differences.

The prevention of nuclear missile deployments in the Federal Republic was another major interest to Moscow. [Ref. 11: p. 82] The possible control of these weapons by *Bundeswehr* forces was for a Soviet statesman in the late 1950s a greater danger than China's development, or the American possession, of atomic weapons. [Ref. 39: p. 610] The United States' intial proposals for the deployment of IRBMs in Europe included the consideration of possible allied control, including West Germany. This possibility staggered the Soviets. They could not fathom giving such weapons to a country which had only recently been the major world threat. Bulganin expressed the Kremlin's fear when he wrote

> One likewise cannot fail to take into account, for example, the fact that the placing of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany may set in motion such forces in Europe and entail such consequences as even the NATO members may not contemplate. [Ref. 40], [Ref. 38: p.8].

The methods the Soviets employed in trying to prevent the missile deployments ranged from fanning popular Western opposition to the deployment decision through such proposals like the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear free zone in Central Europe,[5] to warnings that European governments which permitted nuclear bases on their territory risked having their countries totally annihilated in case of war. [Ref. 11: p. 84]

These threats of "country busting", targeted primarily against Great Britain and West Germany, had another purpose as well: the attempt to drive a wedge between Washington and her European allies. To achieve this would not only serve to unravel the alliance, but also drastically reduce American military capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviets in Europe and create a void in Western Europe for increased Soviet influence. The Soviets trumped up many themes for this purpose, pointing out differences between American, French and British interests in the Suez Canal crisis and the danger of peace inherent in their relationships with the United States. [Ref. 11: p. 83]

A further attempt to reduce U.S. influence in Europe was in undermining European confidence in the American European commitment. The creation of the Berlin crises would place the question of commitment at the forefront of discussion, and possibly, debate.

The above three interests could possibly all be better served within DeGaulle's foreign policy objectives if Khrushchev had played his cards correctly. [Ref. 18: p. 165] DeGaulle's fear of Anglo-American control within NATO, his adamant refusal of U.S. control over nuclear weapons in France and fear of a rearmed Germany all amounted to similar

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[5]The Rapacki Plan, first proposed by Poland on 2 October 1957, and offered in an amended version on 14 February 1958, after Polish-Soviet consultations, called for a nuclear-free zone to include the two Germanys, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

interests as those mentioned above, except one. DeGaulle understood and disliked Soviet influence even more than American. Khrushchev never allayed this fear.

Also of importance to Moscow during this period was the continuation of the enemy image or *Feindbild* given to West Germany and the United States. This policy, when successful, established the *raison d'etre* for the Warsaw Pact and, more important perhaps, justified continued Soviet presence in East Germany and Poland. Signs of an actual teutonophobia, as mention above, were noticable, but the exaggerated rhetoric has a critical role in the ideological solidification in Eastern Europe. A clear example may be drawn from passages from a chapter titled "Nature of Modern War" in Sokolovskii's classic book, Military Strategy, appearing in 1962.

> The American monopolists and their allies in NATO have again aided the rise of West German imperialism after defeat. Thus a breeding ground for war, a breeding ground for new aggressive power, threatening the peace, has been created in the center of Europe . . . [Ref. 41: p. 186]

A final important Soviet interest to mention was Khrushchev's desire to impress Western Europe of the Soviet Union's great power capabilities. Perhaps to prove its qualifications for the exchange of one superpower for another in Europe, or a Russian misinterpretation of West European political culture, the reasons behind this remain unclear. Khrushchev used technological and imaginary military gains to engage in what the Russians had accused the Americans of using - namely, "nuclear diplomacy". A certain ambivalence emerged in his policies which entailed attempts to outwit and scare the West combined with a desire to score technological and military "firsts" that would confound the United States, add prestige to the Soviet Union and glory to Khrushchev's regime. [Ref. 39: pp. 609-610]

As noted above, Moscow was greatly motivated in its approach to Berlin and its *Deutschlandpolitik* by political and security interests in Western Europe. To the Kremlin the future security of Europe and the level of Soviet influence there was dependent upon a solution to the German Problem. The Soviet interests in Western Europe were crucial determinants in their selection of solutions and how they could be accepted in the West. Hence, these interests were also crucial to their formulation of a viable *Deutschlandpolitik*.

Under the slogan "Peace and Cooperation in Europe", Moscow appealed to Western European nations during the mid-to-late 1960s for a reduction of tensions and the normalization of relations between East and West European countries. Publicly highlighting the need to recognize the post war status quo in Europe and to reduce the large military forces on both sides, the ultimate Soviet goal remained to increase their influence in Europe while decreasing U.S. influence in the area.

Soviet efforts from 1966-1975 to realize a European Security Conference (ESC) placed renewed emphasis on this goal at a time when U.S. power and prestige was on a definite decline in Europe, primarily due to American involvement in Vietnam. At the same time, increasing problems for the Soviets on their eastern frontiers with China increased their desire to cool off the potential for conflict in the west. [Ref. 39: pp. 748-750] Several shorter term goals were also motivating Moscow to improve relations with the West Europeans in the latter half of the 1960s.

First, the diffusing of the potential West German military bomb was still important to the Soviets. Bonn was still projected as the "number one" enemy on the European continent by the Soviets, who could continue to conjure up

nightmares of another 22 June 1941, given the Federal Republic's incredible postwar economic and political recovery, combined with certain revisionist voices within the West German political leadership who refused to recognized the eastern borders. Despite the risk of weakening a useful ideological tool within the WTO, the Soviet leadership found it necessary to come to terms with the changing power structure in Bonn. Their primary goal in this interest was to get Bonn to accept under International Law the border changes made after WW II, thus eliminating the major potential cause for a revisionist war from the West. This turn of attitude with the West Germans would have other useful effects as well. By reducing the Soviet Union's *Feindbild* in the Federal Republic, the West Germans' psychological dependence on Washington would be weakened. After West German acceptance of Soviet hegemony in East Europe, the road would be open for a European-wide security conference which would further recognize the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.

Second among the Soviet interests in Western Europe was to involve them in arms reduction talks, hoping to reduce and limit both U.S. and West German troops in Central Europe. This would serve not only Moscow's military interests in the area but also create new possibilities for greater Soviet political influence. Third, the desire for economic and technological benefits was part of the new Soviet *Westpolitik*. Increased trade and technological transfers were needed to replace aging industrial equipment, revitalize slagging productivity and fill gaps in the Soviets' high-technological research program. This was felt not only beneficial to the Soviet domestic economy, but could possibly draw West European countries closer to the Soviet Union economically. Increased dependence on Western industrial deliveries to the USSR combined with greater

amounts of raw materials from the Soviets could increase Moscow's influence over West European policies. [Ref. 42: p. 17]

Fourth, by creating a complex foreground of improved East-West relations, the Soviets could carry out the most extensive conventional and nuclear military modernization ever accomplished by the Soviets. Massive armor, artillery and aircraft deployments have taken place in the groups of Soviet forces in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary since 1970 and are still continuing at present. This was accompanied by extensive SS-20 nuclear missile deployments along with shorter range nuclear missile deployments, whose primary targets are found in Western Europe. Beclouded by an era of detente, reaction from the West was delayed six to ten years into this modernization.

A final interest for the Soviets in Western Europe at the end of the sixties was their perceived need to advance a *Westpolitik* that stayed at least one step ahead of the East Europeans in responding to the West's *Ostpolitik*. As mentioned above, Moscow was caught between the desire to control the resumsion of contacts and the fear of missing developing opportunities.

In the process of pursuing these interests, the Soviet Union had to redevelop its image in Western Europe from the bullying enemy to that of the respectable business partner. Adam Ulam states, for example, that

> . . . the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, in contrast to Khrushchev's of 1956-1962, set about to reduce American influence in Europe not through dramatic tactics of threats and ultimatums, but through a more patient and subtle policy intended to emphasize Soviet Russia's new responsibility as contrasted with America's recently displayed irresponsibility. [Ref. 39: p. 722]

The Kremlin's West European interests ranked high on the list of priorities in Brezhnev's foreign policy in this

period. To begin a new phase of Soviet-West European relations, Moscow realized that a shift in their *Deutschlandpolitik* would be necessary. During the advent of detente, the Soviet's West European interests were a vital consideration in how they could reconfigure their overall German policy to fit in with these changes.

Most Western Soviet analysts would agree that the Soviet Union by 1979 had developed into a status quo power. The long sought-after and complex relationships developed in Western Europe over the postwar decades have come to rest on fairly consistent principles. The long-term *Westpolitik* certainly lacks the pendulous, and sometimes surprising, characteristics of West European or, more often, American *Ostpolitik*.

In contrast to the "long-shot" attempts by Khrushchev to pry West Germany from NATO or West Berlin from Western control, or Brezhnev's radical shift toward rapprochement wit Bonn in 1969-70, the Moscow leadership in the past decade has settled into a West European policy that is quite consistent, although complicated. Given the policy is drawn from other external factors (East Europe and global concerns), it cautiously follows a major thrust emphasizing certain prominent interests, avoiding risk, but taking advantage of opportunity. This low-risk, high continuity aspect carried Moscow through the period of leadership transition without any major crises or failures in this important policy area.

As it was back in 1958, the Soviet interest to exert influence within the NATO alliance remained very important during the early 1980s. Over the past decades, however, the Soviet's perception of the degree of influence available to them has become more realistic. Although generally referred to as "driving a wedge into NATO", this wedge can have many

sizes and purposes. The prospect of causing a total breakdown of the Western alliance has probably not been considered possible, or perhaps, desirable, since the late 1960s prior to the conflict over reformist Czechoslovakia. Another possibility is to weaken the alliance, particularly through attempts to exclude the U.S., but not dissolve it altogether. Its existence provides a stability factor against which the Warsaw Pact can remain aligned. A third option is to use West European NATO members, the best choice being the Federal Republic, as a lever for a moderating influence on American policy. **[Ref. 43: pp. 40-42], [Ref. 44: p. 37]**

The degree to which these interests have been pursued is more a matter of opportunity than design. In their reactions to opportunity the Soviets created great pressures within the alliance with such issues as Human Rights, INF and appropriate responses to Soviet involvement in Poland and Afghanistan. Obviously, the alliance itself created many of its own problems through policy occilations and misunderstanding Soviet interests, but Moscow would waste little time in exploiting such fissures.

Within two weeks after the Soviet Afghan invasion, for example, a Brezhnev declaration insisted that Moscow still adhered to their commitment to detente in action and in spirit and criticized those in the West who were undermining it. Intended to play into the hands of those Europeans who questioned the Carter Administration's sanctions, Brezhnev claimed the Kremlin remained "strongly in favor of consolidating and multiplying everything positive that has been created over the years on the European continent". **[Ref. 45: p. 264]** And in April 1980, Pravda printed an article within hours following the abortive U.S. attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran. It was designed to question the responsibility of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the eyes of the West Europeans.

Thus the 'complaisance' of the Western European allies has led to results quite opposite to those which were expected. The policy of 'appeasement' has make the American President even more impulsive, adventurous and unpredictable. This policy threatens to draw the West European countries, against their will and contrary to their interests, into a dangerous conflict in the Middle East. [Ref. 46]

In the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces issue, the Soviets gave some real efforts toward exploiting and fostering West European and West German anti-missile sentiment. Through peace-laden media releases, empty proposals and probably a sizable indirect flow of organization funds to demonstration organizers, the Soviet campaign against the NATO missile deployment was based on the outside hope that such efforts might prevent the stationing of the missiles, and the sure conviction that any increased political polarization within the alliance would make future Western arms decisions that much more difficult. [Ref. 44: p. 37]

Although a great security concern to Moscow, the NATO missile deployment was not as great a perceived threat by them as the 1957 IRBM deployment decision. The earlier IRBM deployment plans included possible non-U.S. control, meaning possibly the *Bundeswehr*. Despite a subsequent decision by the NATO council for sole U.S. control, this willingness on Washington's part to allow West German control, left room for the belief in Moscow of future nuclear weapons in German hands. Twenty years later, it was more credible to Moscow that neither Washington or Bonn wished the Bundeswehr to control nuclear missiles. Also the Soviets did not have such a superiority in theatre nuclear weapons capability in 1958, which they unquestionably possessed in 1979.[6] Needless to say, the Soviet leaders would not be

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[6]Despite Western perceptions at the time to the contrary, the Soviets had only begun to deploy their IRBMs (SS-4 and SS-5) in 1959 and 1960 respectively, with larger numbers of these systems building up rapidly in the early 1960s. In 1979, the West had only France's 18 IRBMs (the

displeased if the anti-missile movement could prevent the deployment, but they were probably more realistic and can appreciate the divisive and confidence-breaking effects of the decision within the alliance.

The West European governments had invested a great deal in *Ostpolitik* as did the Soviets in their *Westpolitik* during the 1970s. These relationships comprised many important sectors within the two societies, excluding military and social. The Soviets may not have benefitted as they had hope for in technological and economic areas, but they did succeed in achieving a degree of subtle political influence through improved contacts. This investment in improved relations was the mechanism by which Moscow pursued another important interest in Western Europe: the maintenance of detente era relationships, particularly with France and West Germany.

All the NATO governments were in concert in their emphatic demand that the Soviets pull their troops out of Afghanistan. Simultaneously, however, they continued emphasizing the need to avoid abandoning the West-East dialogue and argued against the economic sanctions proposed by the U.S. West European leaders acknowledged that detente must be global to hold its meaning, but their actions showed the determination not to antagonize Moscow as long as Europe itself or its interests were not directly threatened by Soviet actions. **[Ref. 45: p. 268]** Indeed, the U.S. and Western Europe were dealing with Moscow on two different levels of interests and Washington was asking the Europeans

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U.S. had already pulled out their earlier intermediate range systems), yet the USSR had over 500 launchers (SS-4/5 and SS-20) facing Western Europe. See John Collins, American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. 340 & 365, and also The Military Balance 1979-80, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979, pp. 2 & 90.

to compromise their regional interests in favor of American global interests. Gerhard Wettig argues the European view rather convincingly in stating how the West Europeans were not so surprised by the Soviet action in Afghanistan and, although they did not condone such actions, they even shared a certain understanding of Moscow's motives. [Ref. 43: p. 47]

The wedge driving effect aside, this need to continue dialogue with West European leaders at times of strained superpower relations was based on Soviet hopes to influence a U.S. hard line course or restore valuable technological and economic for herself and her East European partners. Why the FRG and France? The Federal Republic understands that increased U.S.-Soviet tensions can play their worse scenario out on their soil at their expense. Bonn also realizes that West Berlin and intra-German contacts are subject to Soviet approval. While the Berlin card was not played during the past ten years, Honecker's cancellation of his long-anticipated visit to the West was undoubtedly a sign from Moscow reminding everyone who has the final veto power. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders must not appear too tough on the West Germans because this would diminish their "peaceful country" image and possibly force the West German public toward closer U.S. military ties.

France has always played a balancing role in the Superpowers' West European policy. During times of improved U.S.-Soviet relations, the French have taken an independent, almost provocative, position between the two greater powers. However, during times of tension, Paris has clarified her Atlantic preferences yet preserved her independent course in Franco-Soviet relations. The entire while, during tension or detente, the French maintain their Soviet trade connections on a near constant course.

A final word need be mentioned on the Soviet *Feindbild* of West Germany during the latest period. By and large, it was used sparingly to verbally castigate the conservative voices in the Federal Republic. However, it had other uses at various times during the Moscow-East Berlin, Moscow-Bonn conflicts. Throughout the Polish crisis in 1980-81 and before and after the cruise missile deployments, Moscow attacked the West Germans as "revanchists", depicting them as a source of unstability in Europe.

One use for this propaganda was to send messages to East Berlin, by reminding them of the "danger of revanchist tendencies" in the FRG, of the possibility of economic leverage employable by the West Germans and to remind both sides of their sovereign status. It also was to indirectly inform the SED that their inter-German relations were being well monitored in Moscow. During the Polish crisis Moscow increased her attacks on the West Germans, usually in vague terms, in an attempt to create the necessary *Feindbild* in the East in order to direct the workers thoughts towards national security needs rather than "solidarity" meetings. Finally, throughout the period articles and speeches warned of segments in the FRG who were too militaristic or revisionist for their country's good. These are assessed to have been more reminders to Bonn that Moscow has a determining voice in the level of intra- German relations and the maintenance of good communications with West Berlin.

It is not too surprising, then, to see that the West Europeans continued to demand much attention in Moscow. In their *Deutschlandpolitik*, interestingly enough, East Berlin actions helped to highlight Soviet West European concerns. It is reasonable to believe that the Kremlin would not have come down so hard on Bonn, and certainly not on East Berlin, had Honecker not insisted on his "limit the damage" approach to West Germany following the first missile deployments.

During this period, Moscow's West European interests played a substantial role in determining their *Deutschlandpolitik*.

2. East Germany

The viability of its success aside, the primary GDR interest in Western Europe in the late 1950s was full recognition of her sovereign status. As long as Bonn claimed sole legitimate representation of the German people as an international state and the West European states respected this claim, Ulbricht's regime had no legal standing west of its borders. Throughout the 1958-1962 period East Germany was most frequently referred to in the West as the "Soviet Occupation Zone" or the "Eastern Zone", denoting the lack of legal status granted to Ulbricht's government. Other major East German interests included the withdrawal of all foreign troops from German territory and the declaration and recognition of West Berlin as a free city, totally disconnected from the Federal Republic. These will be discussed in greater detail in a section below.

The Berlin Question and the German Question were considered in the West as still very open, and quite problematic in 1958, subject to settlement by the four major allied powers. This is most evident in the intense diplomatic activity in Western Europe and Washington during the Berlin crises. Although the solutions to the problems varied significantly between the participants, the Question was considered open for solution until the Berlin wall was constructed in August 1961. The problem then still remained, but the viable options considered for solution were cut enormously.

Ulbricht, in his desire to see the German Question closed, with full sovereignty to his regime, of course, was able to squeeze some degree of de facto recognition from the Western powers during the German conference on German Unity

from May to August 1959. Both Bonn and Pankow were granted observer status during the conference, which was understood and publicized by Ulbricht as de facto recognition of his legal status among the governments involved. Short of any other signs of achieving his recognition goals, Ulbricht kept the East German-West European government relations on a level best described as "hostile".

There was no "in between" option for either East or West German state during the first two decades of their existence. Their orientation had to be fully East or West, since their establishment was under the auspices of major powers in one of these camps. By 1958 the East option decision, which Ulbricht had intensely implemented since his "construction of socialism" proclamation at the Second SED Party Congress in 1952, had placed the East German stated firmly in the Soviet orbit. **[Ref. 22: pp. 43-76], [Ref. 25: pp. 4-6]** The sovietization-integration was successful in most major areas, political, economic, military and social, but not psychological.

In order to win the minds of the people, the SED developed a program geared towards a total reorientation of public values from West to East and from capitalism to socialism. This involved defining the enemy as coming from the west, future security and happiness from the east and severing all positive images of things western. Combine this reorientation policy with the hostile foreign policy towards Western Europe, particularly Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic, one can quickly appreciate the lack of East German foreign policy interactions with Western Europe at this time. Trade relations were the only level of "normal" contacts, yet their relative importance was consciously being reduced annually by East Berlin until 1964.

Although East German leaders could not yet afford to develop complex interests adventuring far from their East European and Soviet protectors, the fact of West Europe's existence could not be ignored. Trade with the West was a reality with which they somberly dealt and political recognition in the West was their most secure assurance of their continued existence.

This unceasing desire for recognition lie, however, underneath the fear of being swallowed up or traded away by the very same Western powers, from which they demanded recognition. Therefore, within the vacuum of any substantial relations with Western Europe, existed very important West European interests in Ulbricht's *Deutschlandpolitik* namely, their placing a stamp of approval on his regime.

Although one can point out that the East German regime has always offered to establish normal diplomatic relations with West European countries, in actuality, their relations with these countries shifted from hostility to defensiveness during the 1960s. One of East Germany's leading foreign policy experts and long-time Deputy Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs, Peter Florin, noted in 1967 that

> . . . already on 24 October 1949 the government of the German Democratic Republic informed the governments of all other states of its desire to attain and promote peaceful and friendly relations with other states and that the government of the GDR considers it desirable and necessary to establish normal diplomatic, economic and other relations with any government which is prepared to establish such relations with the GDR on the basis of mutual respect and equality. [Ref. 47: p. 76]

No more than a paragraph further in his book on East German foreign policy, Florin claims that the imperialists states wish to destroy the GDR because of its influence on the working class in West Germany and fears of a German-USSR

coalition against them. **[Ref. 47: pp. 77-78]** The important connection here is that the road to relations with West European countries must lead right through the Federal Republic. As long as Bonn could hold the support of its West European allies in its claim as sole representative of the German nation and East Berlin was not willing to negotiate with Bonn on the latter's terms, normal relations between Western Europe and the GDR were not going to develop.

As was noted earlier, Bonn's support within the western alliance was base on trade, national security, and political relations as well as a bit of indirect coercion through the declared "Hallstein Doctrine" since 1955. Bonn's conditions were impossible for SED leaders to accept since the Adenauer sole representation and reunification policy meant nothing less than the forfeiture of power by the SED. On the other hand, in order to establish some degree of legitimacy in the GDR, the SED leadership could not afford to begin discussions with Bonn regarding their respective status for a future Germany(s). For Ulbricht, the West German population over the border was better seen in the GDR as the enemy, in both ideological and military terms, and as a foreign state than as German neighbors.

Within the Soviet plan for an ESC, Ulbricht came out in strong support for the conference beginning in 1966. His call for an ESC, together with renunciation of nuclear weapons and establishment of diplomatic relations, were combined as a major theme that year in Ulbricht's speeches. **[Ref. 47: pp. 150-154]** Within a multilateral context, the Soviet ESC plan could very likely achieve East Germany's goal of gaining widespread diplomatic recognition within Europe and possibly even the settlement of the Berlin problem.

In 1968 no West European state had yet established formal diplomatic relations with East Berlin. However, the desire to trade with the East Germans was strong enough to circumvent the recognition void. Twelve non-WTO European states had established East German foreign trade representative in their capitals. Leading the way was Bonn itself, who managed to retain about 10% of the total annual GDR foreign trade. To the north, the Scandinavian countries continued to hold high priority in East Berlin's foreign policy interests in so far as they might be the first to break the non-recognition block in the West. Ulbricht continued his unsuccessful attempts to arrange multilateral and bilateral Friendship treaties with his Baltic neighbors.

The great diplomatic breakthrough for the GDR, of course, was the completion of the Normalization of Relations Treaty, called the Basic Treaty, with Bonn in December 1972. The treaty opened up the way for the entry of both German states into the United Nations, and by the end of 1973, East Berlin had formal diplomatic relations with most every West European state. Ulbricht's difficult task of having to deal with Bonn to achieve his other West European goals will be discussed in greater detail in another section below.

Strangely enough, East Berlin's *Deutschlandpolitik* was less dependent upon its West European interests during this period than it was during the previous one. The greater self-confidence developed by Ulbricht's regime, combined with its stronger role in Eastern Europe, took off much of the earlier pressure for recognition by Western Europe. While it remained important to East Berlin and probably had a substantial affect on their *Deutschlandpolitik*, Ulbricht could well believe that his state was a fairly secure entity, and that time was on his side. Unfortunately for Ulbricht, Moscow decided to force a new time-schedule on intra-German relations.

The transition from years of bitter relations to detente with Western Europe created in East German policy, and to an even greater degree than in other East European states, an ambivalence between external and internal interests regarding these relations. Following the Basic Treaty and in the spirit of the Helsinki accords, Honecker endeavored to prove East Germany's credibility as a worthwhile "business-like" partner in East-West relations. This included, for example, the conclusion of over 100 treaties, agreements or protocols with EEC or EFTA countries in areas of economic, technical, cultural or media policy. [Ref. 20: p. 100]

The main motivation has been to be accepted as an equal partner state in Europe through gradual economic and political normalization, where possible, given its geographic location between two conflicting social, political and military blocs. High level, bilateral relations with such countries as Great Britain or France are considered by the SED that externally the GDR is a viable international partner and domestically that the regime's legitimacy is no longer questionable. [Ref. 48] These contacts should develop interrelationships which can be used, when needed, to influence West European policy on matters related to Germany or Berlin. They could also contribute to forming a European identity which can be exploited to highlight differences in American and West European interests. Both of these options were exercised in East Berlin, and in other East European capitals, after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. West European governments realized they had much to lose by following President Carter's "sanction" policy and, likewise felt Carter did not properly appreciate the West European interests. [Ref. 4: pp. 48-48]

Another important motivation to improve relations with Western Europe has been to improve the East German

economy through advantageous exchanges needed to make greater progression in the scientific-technical revolution. The East German leadership can exploit Western desires for greater contacts by acquiring products and technology from the West which are vital to future GDR economic developments.

Counter to this whole drift towards increased East German interests in West Europe are East German limitations on West European influence in the GDR. The closer the East Germans come to rubbing shoulders with their Western neighbors, the more emphatically the differences between the imperialists and the socialists must be pointed out. This had already been referred to in inter-German relations as *Abgrenzung*, and is quite similar in concept. The *Abgrenzung* policy is more specific and nationalistic than the differentialization policy needed vis-a-vis the West Europeans in general.

Another important interest to East Berlin was to play its role designated by Moscow as a messenger of peace in Europe. The purpose of carrying out this role, together with other East European states, is to stir up controversy among the popular opinion in the West. If East Berlin and her allies can convince some major portions of the electorate in the West of their sincerity and seriousness in formulating a peaceful socialist foreign policy, then the groundwork is laid for Soviet interests in the area, particularly for WTO disarmament proposals. Honecker stressed this theme in his address marking the 30th anniversary of the GDR:

> Peace is vital to all the world's nations . . . It is with this in mind that the German Democratic Republic has always perceived and carried out the special responsibilities resulting from its position at the boundary between the two social systems, socialism and imperialism, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO alliances. [Ref. 24: p. 492]

Honecker would like the West to believe that the GDR has the greatest responsibility towards peace given the results of the last World War. He mentions this topic in his autobiography published for Western readership:

> What we have rebuilt from the ruins of the Second WW in a period of over 30 years - this is how the citizens of the GDR see it - must not be reduced to ashes again. Therefore the GDR makes every effort to prevent a war ever being started again from German soil. [Ref. 24: p. 383]

It is therefore in East Berlin's own interests that Central Europe be "turned from a continent of tension and war into an area of lasting peace, good neighborliness and cooperation." [Ref. 24: p. 490]

Although silent on the Warsaw Pact's largest military modernization in its history, the GDR was then able to create out of its peace-minded image incredible arguments against the proposed NATO cruise missile deployment. Honecker again in his 30th Anniversary speech,

> The most aggressive imperialist circles are pushing for increased armaments on the part of NATO to a hitherto unheard-of level and are leaving no doubt in regard to their intentions vis-a-vis socialism and the national and social liberation of the peoples. They do not even rule out the possibility of plunging Europe - and not only Europe - into a nuclear Armageddon. [Ref. 24: p. 490]

Such pronouncements are meant to have desired effects on both domestic and foreign audiences, i.e. the West European "peace movement". Here we run into another ambivalent aspect of GDR West European policy interests. Despite East Berlin's true interest in eased tensions between the East-West alliances, the SED must retain, for domestic purposes, the highly visible impression of "heightened tension" between the aggressive West and the peacemakers in East Berlin and Moscow. This is certainly not new

in Leninist-model regimes, but it must present some difficulties trying to argue simultaneously that "developing a wide range of equal and mutually beneficial relations" with capitalist states is very significant, yet these same states are trying to launch an unprecedented arms drive which is threatening the very survival of mankind.

In this third period, the pendulum of the importance of West European foreign policy interests had swung back to the very important side. To prove its rightful role in European affairs and to retain its potential value to Moscow in this region, East Berlin has shown an interest in dealing with both the East and the West according to its own needs and abilities. In its *Deutschlandpolitik* it invested much stock during the 1970s in its intra-German relations. East Berlin's relations with Bonn, Paris and London have now become very important determinants in its *Deutschlandpolitik*.

In summary, interests in West European relations formed the crucial motivations for Soviet actions during the Detente period and could be valued as having very important influence on both leaderships in both the Berlin crises and during Honecker's detente attempts in the last case. Western Europe plays a dual role, one as bilateral relations between Moscow and East Berlin and the individual West European countries and another role of Western Europe as a single player, i.e. in terms of its effect on Soviet and East German decisionmakers as a unified institution, such as NATO and the EEC.

In both roles, West European interests have always been a focal point, around which both countries' *Deutschlandpolitik* objectives were determined. Likewise, a malalignment of these interests could easily provide fuel for dispute between Moscow and East Berlin.

C. EXTRA-EUROPEAN INTERESTS

1. Soviet Union

After Khrushchev's consolidation of power by the Twenty-First CPSU Party Congress in 1959, he became the most widely traveled Soviet leader in areas outside the USSR. Khrushchev's journeys abroad in 1959-60 included trips to the United States, China, Southeast Asia, France and Austria. Although these trips may have been to focus attention away from growing domestic problems, they signify, more importantly, Khrushchev's desire to project the USSR as an active world actor. It was a rare occurance, indeed, for a Russian leader to journey beyond his own borders. In doing so, Khrushchev was signalling at home and abroad that new roles were developing for his country.

More than anything else, as the USSR adventured in the late 1950s into increasing global concerns, her leaders found their policy increasingly dominated, as Adam Ulam puts it, "by the triangular relation between the United States, China, and the USSR". [Ref. 39: p. 613] Within this triangle the other two players pulled Moscow in opposite directions; attempting with the United States to reach an accommodation to end an era of tense cold war relations and minimize the chances of nuclear annihilation, and to appease Peking's expansionist demands in an attempt to avert an open break between the two largest socialist countries.

During the Berlin crisis period, Moscow pursued two major levels of global interests; one to meet survival needs and the other to maintain their external empire. Both of these were constantly influenced by the triangular relationship mentioned above.

The Soviet Union's survival interests demanded attention be given to the growing nuclear threat. For Khrushchev, this threat had three major sources: the United

States; China; and West Germany. The latter has been discussed and we will return to again. Although the United States was behind in missile technology, as *Sputnik* had proven, American potential in this field did not escape the CPSU First Secretary's strategic thinking. The potential for nuclear conflict with the U.S., and the ultimate physical destruction of the Russian empire, was perceived as quite real.

By 1958, Soviet military strategy had made a transition in reflecting this fear to defining the future conflict with the West as inevitably a nuclear exchange. At the same time, the earlier thesis that war itself was inevitable was dropped, leaving room for other solutions for survival. **[Ref. 49: p. 32]** Soviet military developments likewise corresponded to this strategy with the creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces in 1959 and the deployment of surface to surface medium- and intermediate-range missiles (SS-4s and SS-5s) in the western USSR in 1959 and 1961, respectively, to counter the U.S. nuclear assets in Europe at that time. Although the Soviets had developed the first ICBM, the SS-6, due to technological limitations and strategic military needs, i.e. the need to first counter the European-based, American nuclear capabilities, only a very small number of these ICBMs were ever deployed prior to the development of the next generation ICBM in 1962. **[Ref. 49: p. 66]**

The next Soviet approach to serve their survival interests was to improve relations with the Americans to reduce the risk of conflict. "The fear of a Soviet-American general war involving the use of nuclear weapons led U.S. and Soviet leaders to develop rules and procedures for the management of nuclear weapons." **[Ref. 50: p. 44]** These rules and procedures meant the establishment of a deterrence policy, conducted and understood by both sides. Beyond

this, the fear of accidental breakout of war led both the U.S. and the USSR to begin developing rules for crisis management and crisis avoidance, which by 1962 were well established, even though they were informal and tacit. [Ref. 50: p. 47]

This very interest involving the establishment of rules meant to avoid war, and demanding the opening of contacts between Washington and Moscow, struck at the heart of the widening Sino- Soviet conflict. This entire concept of peaceful coexistence, the retreat from the inevitability of war and the usefulness of East-West contact was considered unacceptable by the Peking communists. The divergence of views on these questions and others was only exacerbated by Khrushchev's visit to the United States in the Fall of 1959. The split was growing in both foreign and domestic policy by mid 1960. [Ref. 51: pp. 240-242]

Adam Ulam points out two essential elements of Khrushchev's foreign policy at this time. First, Khrushchev feared the development of nuclear weapons by the Chinese and probably had been trying to get the U.S. to make a deal with them; no nukes in Bonn, none in Peking. Whether this was within their power, which was unlikely, is less important than the motivations to establish such an arrangement. Second, the growing troubles with Peking played a most important role in Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin in 1958. Before taking on an open conflict with the Chinese in the communist world, or possibly further, Moscow first needed to solve their greatest fear--that of West Germany receiving nuclear weapons. [Ref. 39: pp. 619-623] The low-risk ultimatum placed Khrushchev in a position to settle for an agreement less than the original demands, yet still achieve his primary goal of arranging for an nuclear-free West Germany. The fact that the ultimatum failed in this goal is another matter showing the complexity of the issues and perhaps mismanagement on Khrushchev's part. [Ref. 52]

Another "Chinese" motivation behind Khrushchev's actions on Berlin was to prove his capability to present a hard line stance in facing the West, and to utilize the avid support from the Chinese.

> And the timing of the Berlin crisis leaves no doubt as to the wider context in which the Soviets make their move, nor, even more forcibly, does the fact that the Soviet note to the Western Powers of November 27 which opened the crisis was followed on December 21 by an official Chinese statement from Peking endorsing it. The Soviets were going to squeeze the last ounce of benefit from their fast-waning alliance with China. The latter complied for her own reasons, welcoming any new confrontation between the United States and the USSR. **[Ref. 39: p. 619]**

In response to interests aimed at the maintenance of the Soviet world position, Khrushchev pursued somewhat contradictory policies. While he searched for accommodation with the United States to meet his survival interests, he also applied expansionist policies in the Third World aimed to weaken the West's position there. In such areas as the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, Moscow was in fine position to step in as the new alternative source of support in countries where the European colonial powers were leaving. In these places, the Kremlin wished to prove communist ideology was the "wave of the future". **[Ref. 39: p. 606]** In the Middle East, for example, the British imperial power vacuum, combined with U.S.-European disagreements, left Khrushchev with repeated low-risk opportunities for advancing Soviet influence in the region. Although pressured by Peking to constantly expand the communist empire, the Third World remained during the Berlin crises mostly an area of foreign policy opportunity rather than grand strategy.

Moscow's emerging role as a world power during this period left its leaders very much concerned about the actions and potential actions by the Americans or the

Chinese. The *Deutschlandpolitik* pursued by Moscow during the Berlin Crises was very much affected by these concerns. Khrushchev's interests vis-a-vis the U.S. were likely crucial to his German policy at the time, whereas vis-a-vis China they were somewhat less critical, yet nevertheless, very important. Third World interests played little noticable role in affecting his *Deutschlandpolitik* during this period.

Moscow's increasing global interests during the late 1960s created many influential factors for many decisions made in their European relations during this period. Although in not way totally independent or separate, Soviet extra-European interests can be classified into three groups: Strategic; Defensive; and Ideological. The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership was determined to erase the image of the Soviet Union as a power strategically inferior to its major adversary, the United States. **[Ref. 11: p. 441]** On the nuclear weapons level, Soviet policy through the late sixties was to catch up with the United States in ICBMs, while holding its MRBM superiority in Europe. By 1969, the Soviet Union surpassed the U.S. in total number of ICBM launchers, although behind in SLBM launchers and in accuracy technology. **[Ref. 49: p. 43]** David Holloway stresses the goal of parity in the Soviet nuclear weapons program during the late 1960s in stating

> The ICBM program made it clear that the Soviet Union was intent, at the very least, on matching American strategic power. By the end of the decade the Soviet Union was close to attaining strategic parity with the United States. **[Ref. 49: p. 44]**

At this juncture of achieving parity, the Soviets agreed to discuss arms limitations, which caused much confusion among western analysts as to their motivations. Although it is

still debated, most Soviet foreign policy analysts in the West today agree that the Brezhnev leadership needed a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreement as public verification by the U.S. of the strategically "equal" role thereby granted the Soviet Union.

Concurrent with the nuclear arms competition with the U.S. were Soviet strategic moves aimed at breaking out of its continental power role into one with a global power projection capability. Although the latter developments were hampered by priorities given to attaining parity in nuclear weapons with the United States, the strategic arms modernization and build up also strengthened the Soviet Union in world affairs through opening a range of opportunities in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. [Ref. 11: p. 57]

> The regime's military preparations involved what might be described as a parallel attempt to improve the reach and mobility of Soviet conventional, or general purpose, forces. [Ref. 11: p. 44]

The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership placed much importance on transforming the Navy and Air Force, particularly the Long Range Aviation and Transport components, into effective military and political instruments in support of Soviet global interests. The need for a capability to project both military power and presence was clearly stated in 1972 in a book published in the Soviet Union by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. In the book, Military Force and International Relations, the rapidly growing mission is stated quite clearly:

> Greater importance is being attached to Soviet military presence in various regions throughout the world, reinforced by on adequate level of strategic mobility of its armed forces...Expanding the scale of Soviet military presence and military assistance furnished by other socialist states is being viewed today as a very important factor in international relations. [Ref. 53: p.58]

In practice, this policy involved sending considerable numbers of advisors, instructors, and technicians to "fraternal states" like Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, Syria and Egypt, as well as providing these countries with military and economic aid during this period. One of the reasons why the Soviets could appear to their allies as willing partners in negotiating nuclear arms limitations was the fact that the number of "socialist oriented" states had expanded to all parts of the globe; extending from the Carribean to the Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa to North and Southeast Asia. According to the Soviet view, this correlation of forces is a political factor giving the Soviets and their allies the overall advantage in a political and military show-down with the imperialist forces.

The maintenance of ideological and political control over their socialist allies necessitates remaining at the head of the world socialist movement. Since 1960 this leading role was challenged by Peking. It was therefore necessary to prove to members and aspiring members states that the Soviet Union was the one and only leader on the correct path to communism. This took the form of unending criticism of Peking and rivalry for influence in the Third World. In fact, this need to preempt or replace Chinese influence in the Third World, particularly in Africa and Asia, may be a major reason by the Soviets stepped up Third World expansion efforts after the Sino-Soviet split. [Ref. 54: p.26]

Increased tensions in Sino-Soviet relations finally led to a military crisis between the two states along their joint border in 1969. Furthermore, fears of a U.S. - Red China rapprochement increasingly grew during the late 1960s and early 1970s because of Nixon and Kissinger initiatives in the area.

Finally, the macro position of the Soviet Union in international relations must also be highlighted, i.e. the global role of the USSR among its two greatest rivals. Adam Ulam emphasizes the interconnection of these relations.

> And as Communist China began to emerge from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, what should have been clear and perhaps was to some Soviet leaders long before became obvious: Sino-Soviet relations could not be divorced from those between the Soviet Union and the United States. Whatever Moscow's intentions, fears, and hopes concerning Peking, the Soviet position vis-a-vis China was bound to be weakened by a continuing high level of tension with the West. [Ref. 39: pp. 748-749]

Soviet relations with Washington and Peking during the Moscow's press for a European Security Conference in the late 1960s and the first half of the seventies strongly influenced the formulation of Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik.* In short, Brezhnev's desire to conclude the SALT accord and other agreements with the United States and the growing tensions with China affected the Soviet's willingness to negotiate on Berlin and come to better terms with the Federal Republic.

Entering the 1980s, the major Soviet extra-European interests, as they had been through the earlier decades, were concerned with the protection of its strategic interests at its borders and beyond. These included efforts to stabilize the government in Afghanistan, to achieve further arms control advantages from the United States, to prevent a U.S.-China coalition against the USSR and to maintain Moscow's superpower image among the Third World.

In many respects the Kremlin leadership's interests in Afghanistan resembled similar interests in Warsaw or Prague, only that they were of a greater priority and at the other end of Moscow's continental empire. In two cases on Soviet intervention, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan

in 1979, the Soviets displayed their determination to use military intervention when the government within that external empire was perceived in Moscow as unreliable and unable to maintain proper control. [Ref. 9: p.218] The primary motivations in both situations was the Soviet lack on confidence in the regime's ability to stay in control of political and military events as is absolutely necessary in a Leninist, vanguard party state. Beyond these motivations, Jiri Valenta relates other domestic and strategic considerations involved in these decisions to intervene.

> In the Soviet's view Alexander Dubcek and Hafizullah Amin were charting independent courses in domestic politics in disregard of Soviet counsel, and future developments in both countries were as unpredictable as they were dangerous. [Ref. 9: pp. 218-219]

The Afghan situation was viewed in many respects as even more dangerous than in Czechoslovakia. The Amin regime was unable to defeat the growing resistance from the Muslim rebels, which costs the Soviets lives and resources, given the heavy Soviet military assistance provided for the struggle. These concerns, combined with genuine Soviet fears about spillover effects upon the non-Russian republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, especially aggravated by the growing militancy among Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and Turkey, left the Moscow leadership in a need-to-act situation. Soviet inaction might possibly have led to repercussions in other parts of their empire, i.e. Eastern Europe, the Third World or within the USSR itself. [Ref. 9: pp. 220-221]

Beyond the defensive motivations, many analysts point toward Moscow's offensive goals behind the Afghan invasion. Although probably not part of any grand strategy to advance in the near future to the Indian Ocean, there is substantial credibility to the assessment by Holloway and

others, that, given the defensive requirements and limited risks, there were strategic gains to be made by the move as well. [Ref. 49: p. 98]

In Europe, the leadership in Moscow showed repeated signs of concern over the NATO dual-track decision to deploy the 464 Ground-launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) and 108 Pershing II intermediate-range missiles if the Soviets did not agree to dismantle their SS-20s targeted at Europe. From the Soviet perspective this would not simply mean losing whatever technological edge they had gained from the SS-20 deployments, "it would confront them with a new and terrifying threat". [Ref. 55: p. 17] These American missiles represented a new generation of nuclear missiles that could threaten Moscow and the Western USSR within minutes of a launch from their NATO bases. Although not considered part of NATO's strategic offensive system, such as the UK's SLBM force or France's ICBMs, Moscow holds these weapons to be a substantial strategic threat, significantly increasing the complexity of Soviet strategic defense requirements. To be sure, Mr. Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues perceived the Pershing IIs as a real increase in the strategic threat that would drastically change the entire U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance.

Soviet fears of Chinese aggression had receded markedly since the fall of the "gang of four" and the stabilization of the present leadership in Beijing. Improved political relations between the two even resulted in the visit by high Soviet officials in late 1984 to China, which was the first such visit in 15 years. Not underestimating Russian xenophobic tendencies, Moscow continues carry its fear of a possible United States-China military coalition directed against it. Although their warnings show concern over this possibility, Reagan policy never presented signs of any willingness to move in this direction. Soviet

analysts most likely realize that the U.S. would not perceive such actions to be in its own best interests. **[Ref. 56]**

Finally, Moscow showed an interest in preserving its global superpower status through its policy in the Third World. To appreciate Soviet interests in this field in the early 1980s it is helpful to look back to Soviet activities in the mid-to-late 1970s. During this period of weakened American leadership, the USSR took advantage of growing opportunities in the Third World. They combined these opportunities, created through political and social instability in young governments, in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, with their developing power projection capability. Their principle tool in these policies was their military. As other Soviet means of influencing world events showed themselves relatively ineffective, the Soviets placed greater emphasis on military competition, the Third World providing the forum. **[Ref. 57]**

Since the successes in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Ethiopia, Grenada and Nicaragua, the Soviets have experienced several setbacks and dilemmas. The Israelies pushed unopposed through Lebanon, the South African states are readjusting their relationships with Pretoria and the U.S. put an end to Soviet gains in Grenada, to name a few. In some cases the Soviets have been forced to assume the uncomfortable role of a counterinsurgency power in Third World states.

The Soviets appear to maintain their interests through direct or proxy support to a degree based upon the level of priority and associated risks a particular Third World commitment involves. **[Ref. 58]**

It must be noted that these are usually not security-related interests, but for prestige purposes necessary to prove Moscow's power projection capability and

superpower status. Peter Clement lists the following goals for Soviet policy in south African Third World interests which are also instructive in appreciating their goals in other Third World areas.

1. Supplant or undermine global competitors, the United States, or regional competitors, Western Europe, Japan or China, in political, economic and military spheres;
2. Promote pro-Soviet or leftist change corresponding to broad Marx-Leninist ideological principles, leading to an enlargement of the Soviet side in their "Correlation of Forces";
3. Reinforce its superpower status and its perceived indispensability in being involved in settling major international disputes;
4. Gain access to strategic air and naval facilities; and
5. Win increasing political support for initiatives in international forums. [Ref. 59]

One may note a change in the make up of Soviet Extra-European foreign policy interests which affected their policy decisions regarding Germany. Washington's leading role in the NATO dual-track missile decision left its affect very high on the influence spectrum, while the importance of Chinese interests fell. Soviet Third World interests did not appear to have played any notable role in influencing Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* during this period.

2. East Germany

East German interests lying beyond the European continent during the Berlin crises dealt mainly with the United States, China and a few countries in the Third World. Short of given any satisfaction to their desire for recognition from Washington, the Ulbricht regime maintained an antagonistic attitude towards it relations with the United States. An accommodation between East and West was not one of Ulbricht's relished dreams, due to the possibility of a 'German deal" between Washington and Moscow which would strip Ulbricht of his power in East Berlin.

The SED's interests in Peking were rather complex in 1958-1959. During this time there was notable evidence of an incipient Peking-Pankow axis. [Ref. 51: p. 396] Ideologically, there were disputes within the leadership over supporting the Chinese commune program, which for some long-time East German communists seemed to be a solution to many problems long evaded in Moscow. Questions on the path to communism and the Chinese success in mobilizing mass initiative and revolutionary fervor were vital to developing some domestic legitimacy and in energizing a sluggish economy. In foreign policy interests, both China and East Berlin feared a sell out of their positions through a Soviet-U.S. rapprochement. In addition, both states were struggling in the international environment to break out of their status as "persona non grata". [Ref. 60: pp. 85-87] M. J. Esslin highlighted this point in an article on the subject of Chinese-East German relations in 1959:

> Every time Communist China can score a point in making it evident how unrealistic it is of the United States or the United Nations to refuse to recognize the reality of the existence of a government ruling over six hundred million people, the East German government, although it only rules over sixteen millions, can feel that a blow has been struck in its own interests. [Ref. 60: p. 86]

At the same time, however, it must be remembered that while recognition was number one in the minds of East German and Chinese leaders, it was only secondary to Moscow's interests.

This Pankow-Peking axis was clearly broken by 1960. The SED held a conference in East Berlin in January 1960 on ideological problems, the primary purpose of which was clearly to reassert Soviet ideological primacy in East Germany after the confusion in the previous 12-18 months. Donald Zaggoria suggests that Khrushchev "tightened the screws" on Ulbricht and offered concessions in renewing the

Berlin crisis to induce Ulbricht to get his "house" back in order. Given the pro-Chinese arguments within the SED and Moscow's fear of a "fourth Rome" in Peking, Ulbricht may well have utilized this tool to improve this bargaining position vis-a-vis Khrushchev on German policy. **[Ref. 51: p. 369]** To emphasize his pivotal position, perhaps, Ulbricht delivered a speech at the Chinese Embassy in Berlin during Khrushchev's visit to the United States. In it he supported Khrushchev's actions, while also implying that the Soviet leader's visit to America was merely following the teaching of Mao Tse-tung, "thus making it appear that the Soviet leader's visit was nothing more than a clear tactical move in the ups and downs of **flexible** marxist strategy. **[Ref. 60: p. 87]** At the same time this bargaining chip must be kept in proper perspective, for in the last resort, the Soviet Union is geographically closer to the GDR, China is far away, and there were twenty-one Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany while the Chinese were remote and ineffectual.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s East German interests in the Third World were to seek ways to affirm its own legitimacy. Ulbricht was keen on using international relationships and commitments as a mark of sorely-needed prestige, both within the international community and in the eyes of the East German population. Ulbricht, however, was much less interested in accomplishing the latter than the former goal.

During this period GDR relations with the outside world were primarily limited to trade contacts. North Korea, North Vietnam, China and Mongolia were the only non-European states to recognize the Ulbricht regime with full diplomatic status until the late 1960s. The United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia and Burma had established official representatives in East Berlin but for

various reasons withheld full diplomatic recognition until several years later. This diplomatic isolation was largely the result of the Third World states' fears of political and economic retaliation by the industrialized Western states who supported Bonn's Hallstein Doctrine. Thus the Federal Republic was able to keep many Third World states just outside the reach of their recognition of East Germany, although East Berlin recognized most Third World states, many within days or hours of their newly, found independence.

The GDR reaction to the non-recognition by the Third World was twofold. First, Ulbricht attempted to act as though the problem did not exist. The SED leadership dispatched official messages of greetings to their heads of state and sent a constant flow of official GDR position papers to the United Nations Secretary General and the National Security Council on issues perceived as relevant to East Berlin's interests. On the other hand, Ulbricht used the non-recognition to create purely negative and abusive propaganda directed against the Federal Republic and the United States. Printed in the national languages and distributed in Third World countries, a major purpose behind their release was to stimulate interest in the German question outside of Europe. Additionally, their propaganda may have been directed at Western audiences as well. **[Ref. 61: pp. 112-113]**

Ulbricht's *Deutschlandpolitik* during these years were little affected by extra-European interests. Washington was too far away in political terms and the Third World countries were too far in geographic terms to affect Ulbricht's dilemma in Berlin. The GDR's relationship with China, however, may have had some impact on East Berlin's German policy during this period.

As of late 1967 the East Germans held embassies in only thirteen states. Outside of the Warsaw Pact countries, very little had changed outwardly during the 1960s. Since the western industrialized nations would not establish open diplomatic relations with the GDR, East Berlin continued to seek out such recognition from "socialist oriented" nations and newly established Third World states. These were primarily Middle East Arab states, African and Asian states which had well-established political ties with the Soviet Union.

The next level of international relations was furthered by commercial trade relations. These extended deeper into Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. In most cases these eventually developed into full diplomatic status. However, only the smaller, newly formed Third World nations were willing to recognize East Berlin prior to the 1970s, leaving Ulbricht to focus East German non-Warsaw Pact foreign policy only on these developing countries and national liberation movements. Ulbricht spoke of the importance of these relations at the Seventh SED Congress in March 1967:

> The creation and cultivation of normal relations with Asian, African and Latin American states is of great importance. Generally, it is true that mutually advantageous interests, for example, in foreign trade relations, can develop their potential possibilities in an unhindered manner only when political relations are normalized. [Ref. 47: p. 74]

Under guidance from Moscow, East German policy set to foster these relations was based on a two step process. First, East Berlin would provide political support and limited economic assistance.[7] Second, after their "revolutionaries" had formed a government, East German aid and

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[7] Such as, for example, 5000 bicycles to North Vietnam in 1965. Later, medicines and medical supplies were often provided to national liberation movements during their struggle for power.

cooperation would help them to consolidate their power. According to the official East German view, this was to help the new government establish their political and economic independence. [Ref. 20: p. 101] In this latter stage, the SED would quickly establish scientific, cultural and social exchanges between the two countries, [Ref. 47: pp. 68-71] which was meant to gain influence in the area as quick as possible. The close ties to the "progressive" movements also was meant to project a widening gap growing between the two German states for domestic propaganda purposes. The official SED line on the differing traditions between the two German states is given in the book, *Aussenpolitik*, which was a common text for classroom discussion in the GDR:

> The West German militarists and imperialists, in very close association with the American capitalists, would like to turn back the wheel of history, place the people of Africa, Asia and Latin America in chains and force the recent established national states in the name of neocolonialism once again under imperialist control...The GDR follows another tradition of the German people in relations to those countries and peoples who suffered under colonial repression and led national liberation struggles. [Ref. 47: p. 63]

This same emphasis on "differing" traditions in East and West Germany was to later form the basis for Honecker's *Abgrenzung* policy initiated in the period just prior to intra-German rapprochement.

East German relations with China, with few exceptions, followed Moscow's hard line attitude throughout the time following the Sino-Soviet split. There are indications that Ulbricht respected Mao and some of the changes he introduced in China, however, as a realist, Ulbricht kept his personal views as such on a very low key. By 1969-1970 Sino-East German relations had, like Sino-Soviet relations, reached an all-time low, although Ulbricht tempered his corresponding criticism of Peking at times to show his

disagreement with the Soviet leadership over their Berlin policy.

In its *Deutschlandpolitik* during the period, East Berlin's Third World interests had the greatest influence upon it among the extra-European interests. Ulbricht's demands for recognition within Europe were done so with the probable understanding that most Third World countries would quickly follow suit if he succeeded with the West Europeans. This would, of course, be a great boost for him both domestically and internationally. Other than noting a similar effect which U.S. recognition would have on Third World relations, East Berlin's U.S. and Chinese interests displayed minimal affects on their *Deutschlandpolitik* at this time.

The main thrust of East German interests in extra-European affairs during the early 1980s has been to continue its integration into international organizations on a multilateral basis, and to increase its bilateral influence in its relations in the Third World. Following East Germany's vault into the "real" international scene in 1973-1974, East Berlin placed increasing importance on cooperation with states outside the Soviet bloc system. Although the latter held the top priority in East German foreign policy decisionmaking, GDR officials were quickly competing with their West German counterparts in capitals of western states as well as with most nonaligned states. The goal, of course, was to prove her legitimacy and equality vis-a-vis Bonn, both to the population at home and in the diplomatic circles abroad. In the United Nations, East Berlin sat on five of the seven main directorates (organs), to include the Security Council in 1980-81, and on seven of fifteen U.N. special organizations.[8]

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[8]East Berlin chose not to participate in six special organizations.

Competition with the FRG is again a primary motivation to be active in these international forums. Since their simultaneous entry into the United Nations in 1973, the German Question, including Berlin, had not been an issue of debate. This fact can be attributed to an era of non-crisis on these issues as well as Honecker's desire to gain international acceptance of his claim that the German Question is no longer open. Apparently there are signs of success in these efforts. In an interview with West German Ambassador Rudiger von Wechmar in December 1979, reporters raised the issue of whether the Federal Republic should bring the German Question before the U.N. His response was, basically, that the Bonn government knew when not to force an issue before the assembly when the majority would block, or even hurt, its position. The Third World states, according to the Ambassador, must be better informed on the issue first because "the lack of knowledge about the history and the current situation as it has developed in the German Question is staggering". [Ref. 62: p. 114] Furthermore, as Wilhelm Bruns has claimed in his study on the two German states in the U.N., developing nations, themselves, consider the German Question closed. His argument is that exactly for that reason, that the issue has not been brought to center stage in the U.N., it has never been an issue for the many Third World states to consider and about which to become informed. [Ref. 62: pp. 114-115]

Coinciding with their entry into the United Nations and its associated organizations, the East Germans greatly enlarged their proxy role for the Soviet Union in the Third World. By 1979 East Berlin was reported to have been providing various types of military-related assistance to at least fifteen different governments or organizations in Africa and the Middle East.

A turning point in GDR Third World activity appears to have taken place in 1979. In February a high-level GDR delegation headed by Honecker, but also including Willi Stoph, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the GDR Foreign Minister and leading SED Central Committee specialists on International Relations and economic affairs travelled to Libya, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique. At each major port of call major agreements were concluded, including 20-year treaties of friendship and cooperation with Angola and Mozambique. These were the first of their kind with any Third World countries outside the immediate Soviet orbit. [Ref. 63: p. 21] Ethiopia, fast becoming the primary recipient of Soviet and East German military aid, joined this exclusive club in May 1979 with a military cooperation agreement, and in November with a 20-year friendship and cooperation treaty. [Ref. 64] Herr Honecker visited Africa on at least two occasions that year and allowed the government to officially acknowledge for the first time that the GDR had supported African states and liberation movements with not only military training but also with military hardware. [Ref. 65: p. 75] By the end of 1979, it was clear that the major emphasis in their military assistance program was with Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola and Mozambique. It is not surprising to find that these were major targets for Soviet involvement in the 1980's.

Other areas were also opening up to East Berlin's internationalist duties, namely Nicaragua, Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Iran. In the latter case, East Germany lost no time in attempting to fill the void created in Iran by the decrease of U.S. and Western European influence. For example, less than 24 hours after the Common Market governments threatened economic sanctions against Iran because of the hostage crisis, East Germany and Iran signed a trade agreement in East Berlin. [Ref. 66] A month

earlier, in March 1980, East Berlin signed a 20-Year friendship and cooperation treaty with the Kampuchean government. [Ref. 67]

Through the early 1980's the geographic pattern of primary GDR involvement remained relatively consistent: Africa (Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola and Mozambique); the Middle East (Syria and Iraq); Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Iran); Asia (North Korea, Kampuchea and Vietnam) and Latin America (Nicaragua, Chili and El Salvador).

There exists a broad spectrum of East German military assistance rendered to the Third World. This ranges from direct military equipment deliveries to and combat training of guerrilla forces to medical airlift support during combat operations or construction assistance in the building of harbors and airports. Table I provides a picture of the number of GDR military personnel abroad in recent years as reported by two sources: the West German magazine Der Spiegel and The Military Balance.[9] Table II sketches out an overview of reported GDR military assistance during the latest period. The data for the table are derived from various western media sources and are unverified. The data is, therefore, intended for generalization purposes only.

The political motives behind the GDR's extensive military involvement in the past decade are quite complicated and substantial. Overriding among these is the relationship with the Soviet Union. Melvin Croan best summarizes East Berlin's role in Soviet Third World strategy in calling the East Germans "practitioners of 'applied proto-Leninism'". [Ref. 63: p. 22] In its disciple role,

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[9]The figures from Der Spiegel for 1980 fill in a gap created by a lack of numbers reported in Military Balance 1980-81. The table is meant for relative comparison purposes only.

TABLE I

REPORTED EAST GERMAN MILITARY FORCES ABROAD

Country	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Algeria	NR	250	NR	250	250	250
Angola	1500	1000	800	450	450	500
Ethiopia	"hundreds"	300	550	250	550	550
Iraq	NR	NR	NR	160	160	160
Libya	NR	400	1600	450	450	500
Mozambique	NR	600	NR	100	100	100
South Yemen	100	NR	100	325	75	75
Syria	NR	NR	NR	210	210	210

Notes: "NR" indicates lack of reporting on numbers of personnel.

Sources: 1979, 1981-1984: The Military Balance, IISS, London; 1980: Der Spiegel, No. 10/1980.

East Berlin pays into the Soviet-led, socialist movement pot the most valuable commodity it has to offer: German technical skills and mission-oriented efficiency. Aircraft and tanks are out of the question, and every worker is dearly needed at home. The solution lies in specialists; high in know-how, low in numbers.

Their present role is meant to elevate the political position of the GDR within the "socialist world system" and particularly to create a stronger voice within the East European bloc. The ultimate payoff is to hold a stronger card when policy toward the FRG and Berlin are brought to the discussion table, as has been proven in the U.N. thus far. Internally, the SED leadership must continue in its struggle to prove the regime's legitimacy to its own

TABLE II

REPORTED EAST GERMAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
1981-1984

Country/ Organization	Military Equipment	Combat Training	Security Force Training	Intelligence Service Training	Technical Military Advisors	Military Construction Assistance
Afghanistan			X			suspected
Algeria					X	
Angola		X	X	X	X	X
Chili *		X				
Congo			X			
El Savador *	X				X	
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	X	
Grenada	X		X		X	suspected
Iran	X	X	X		X	X
Iraq	X				X	
Libya			X		X	
Mozambique		X	X		X	suspected
Nicaragua	X		X		X	suspected
South Yemen		X	X		X	X
SWAPO		X				
Syria					X	
Vietnam	X				X	

Information gathered from various open-source materials.
* Guerrilla groups as recipients.

population. Certainly a government which makes treaties and agreements with states all over the globe must be legitimate. Suffering from a chronic political inferiority complex, rooted in the undeniable superiority in size, wealth and popularity of West Germany, the SED plays out its demarcation or *Abgrenzung* policy vis-a-vis the FRG in its Third World assistance programs.

These Third World interests continued to grow during the latest period in terms of their relative importance to East Berlin's *Deutschlandpolitik*. During this latest case, they appear to have played a substantial role in possibly providing Honecker both motivation and psychological support for his German policy actions. Again, East Berlin's foreign policy interests relating to the U.S. and China do not appear to have had any notable affect on its *Deutschlandpolitik*.

In a brief summary, then, in foreign policy interests beyond Europe, two main players, the United States and China, were decisive elements in Moscow's decisionmaking throughout this entire period of study. In the Berlin crises, the Kremlin's American interests were crucial to the initiation and the conclusion of Khrushchev's gambling policies over Berlin, and Moscow's Chinese interests were very important factors effecting these decisions. In the decisionmaking process during the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership on detente policies with the West Germans, this relationship was reversed; the Chinese concerns played a crucial role and the American a very important one. In the final case study, the Soviet's Chinese interests were rather dormant, while the overall confusion over how to respond to American security strategy in Europe was a very important factor effecting Moscow's response to the West German deployment decision. For the East Germans, on the other hand, neither their interests with the U.S. nor China were

significant determinants in their German policy. While Third World interests developed only background influence on the Soviets, these interests were in some ways more influencial in East Berlin, although to what degree is difficult to determine. Perhaps in the latest period, the expansion of East Berlin's involvement in Soviet strategy in the Third World bolstered Honecker's self-confidence in the level of East German influence in Pact affairs. This, in turn, may have had some bearing on his rather bold decisionmaking in 1984.

D. ECONOMIC INTERESTS

1. Soviet Union

The purpose of this section is to analyze economic interests in Moscow and East Berlin as they might influence their German policy decisionmaking during the three cases under study. The discussion of economic variables is fraught with fewer changes and reversals than are so frequently experienced with political variables. From the Berlin crisis to the present day some general trends appear to have been developing. First, beginning with Khrushchev, the Kremlin leadership has become increasingly aware of the need for western input into the Soviet economy if it wishes to compete in the world markets or to stay abreast of western technological advances. Second, the irony of the above realization is that while following through with increased western economic exchanges may lead to potential destabilizing conditions within the Soviet's internal and external empires, ignoring the need to deal with the West will also lead to destabilization. The solution to this dilemma has haunted Soviet leaders since Khrushchev. Finally, the trade relationship between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic has always resembled a trade

relationship common between industrialized and developing countries. The Soviet Union provides the raw materials and energy supplies while the East Germans build the machines and technical products. (See Table VII and Figure 2.1.) The perceived value of this relationship may be what has changed more than the substance over the decades.

The finished product supplier role for the GDR was most appreciated by both Moscow and East Berlin during the Berlin crisis period. The East Germans had a large guaranteed market for their goods and, for the most part, a sure source of raw materials. Had East German products had to compete with western products in the CMEA marketplace, then the East Germans would not have faired very well indeed. Moscow, on the other hand, had a dependable source of finished products, the skilled labor for which was lacking in the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s East Germany claimed about 17% of the total Soviet foreign trade, the largest single trading partner. (See Table IV.)

During this same period, USSR trade with the western capitalist countries was rebounding from its lowest post WW II level, comprising only about 17% of the annual Soviet foreign trade. (See Table III.) One of the factors motivating Khrushchev towards a new accommodation with the West was an appreciation of western economic growth and technological capability. Soviet emigre and Khrushchev expert, Zhores Medvedev, recalls this aspect of Khrushchev's economic interests:

> Khrushchev challenged the nation to study the achievements of other countries, thus supplanting the old Stalin/Zhdanov doctrine of resisting "cosmopolitanism" and rejecting everything foreign; this new approach was extremely important for the development of Soviet science and technology and also make the government pay greater attention to the production of consumer goods. [Ref. 68: p.43]

TABLE III

USSR FOREIGN TRADE BY COUNTRY GROUPS 1946-1981

	1946	1960	1965	1970	1975	1981
Total F.T. Turnover *	1.3	10.1	14.6	22.1	50.7	109.8
% With Socialist Countries	54	73	69	65	56	59
- Of Which CMEA	38	67	58	56	52	47
% With Capitalist Countries	38	16	19	21	31	26
% With Developing Countries	8	8	12	14	12	10

* Billions of Rubles.

Sources: Europa Yearbooks (1960-1983); Statistical Yearbook CMEA 1978; Soviet Union Figures, Facts, Data, Borys Lewytzkyj.

Primary GDR Goods to USSR	Primary USSR Goods to GDR
1. Factory Machinery	1. Petroleum
2. Tractors	2. Natural Gas
3. Chemical Products	3. Coal
4. Agricultural Machinery	4. Iron Ore
5. Hydraulic Lifts	5. Diesel Machines
6. Cranes	6. Foodstuffs
7. Furniture	7. Radio Receivers
8. Clothing	8. Cotton and Wool

Figure 2.1 Summary of Basic Commodity Exchange: GDR - USSR.

TABLE IV

EAST GERMAN - SOVIET TRADE 1950-1980

(Millions of East German Exchange Marks)

Year	Total Trade Turnover	% Total GDR Trade	% Total USSR Trade	Trade Surplus	Total Trade 1960 = 100
1950	1461	40	11	UR - 169	18
1955	3969	38	15	GDR - 425	50
1960	7907	43	17	UR - 125	100
1965	10,566	43	17	GDR - 441	134
1970	15,485	40	14	UR - 855	196
1974	20,103	31	11	UR - 191	254
1978	34,907	36	11	UR - 1229	441
1980	42,609	35	10	UR - 2779	539
1983	N/A	38	N/A	N/A	N/A
1984	N/A	39	N/A	GDR - 600	N/A

Sources: Europa Yearbooks (1960-1983); Soviet Union Figures, Facts, Data; DDR Handbuch; COMECON Foreign Trade Data 1982.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Soviet trade with western capitalist states and other free world states incrementally increased until in the detente period trade grew much more rapidly. (See Table III.)

Of particular interest is the growing attention the Moscow leadership gave to trade with West Germany. Besides a set of treaties signed in 1958, which increased Soviet-West German trade in return for increased emigration of German nationals from the USSR, Khrushchev gave several signals indicating a desired change their economic relations. In his first meeting with the newly arrived West German ambassador, Hans Kroll, in May 1958 Khrushchev clearly stated that next to the rejection by Bonn of atomic weapons, the leading Soviet interest involving their future relations was in improved economic cooperation, particularly the development of a joint chemical industry. [Ref. 69: pp. 361-364] Khrushchev was not alone in this thinking; a few days later in Kroll's meeting with Mikoyan, the older Soviet statesman expressed his great respect for West German economic achievements and was particularly interested in the prospect for improved future trade relations. [Ref. 69: p. 365]

How may these interests have affected Moscow's *Deutschlandpolitik*? If the Soviets placed significant value on trade with both German states, substantial data suggests in fact that they did, particularly on technical products, this might then have strongly influenced Khrushchev in his German policy on Berlin. It is probably not incorrect to assume that much of the pressure Khrushchev felt to placate Ulbricht stemmed from the Soviet's significant stakes in the GDR economy. It is also quite plausible that Soviet interests in West German trade advantages may have exercised some limiting effects on the Kremlin's actions during the Berlin crises.

Erosion in the growth in productivity in the Soviet economy during the 1960s and 1970s has had a significant effect on Soviet foreign policy. By 1969 it had become evident that the 1965 reforms would not be enough to eliminate the economic difficulties. In efforts to counteract this lagging productivity, Soviet leaders began a program of massive imports of advanced technology and machinery from the industrialized capitalist countries. [Ref. 70: p. 177] Besides the desire to increase productivity, Soviet leaders regarded western trade essential to keep up with the West in terms of industrial modernization. Closely related to this theme is the emphasis Moscow had placed on the need to fully exploit the "scientific-technical revolution" through exchanges created through increased international economic relations.

During the late sixties and even into the seventies, leading Soviet economists, scientists and other participants in the Soviet decisionmaking hierarchy began publicizing the need to intensify trade with the United States and Western Europe. When considering the latter proposition, the most attractive trading partner for Moscow was the Federal Republic, who was the leading economic power in Europe. Stephen Larrabee suggests other factors which increased the West German appeal to Moscow:

> As a result of intensity of scientific-technical cooperation with the GDR, there was a widespread familiarity with the German language among the Soviet technical elite. Then, too, memories of the intensive trade between Germany and the Soviet Union during the interwar years when Germany had been Moscow's major trading partner also helped to stimulate hopes regarding the prospects for wider cooperation. [Ref. 18: p. 178]

In his memoirs, Willy Brandt notes the great emphasis Kosygin placed on establishing a program of joint Soviet-West German economic cooperation when the former

Chancellor was visiting Moscow in the summer 1970. Besides trying to tempt the West German leader with offers of massive energy-supply projects, Kosygin also spoke of economic cooperation programs for periods up to twenty years in duration. [Ref. 71: pp. 323-324] Later, in discussions with Brezhnev, the question of relations between the EEC and the CMEA was raised. Brezhnev said: "We are against self-contained blocs, but we are realists: the EEC exists. Possible co-operation with the CMEA can be discussed at expert level. The results could be very interesting." [Ref. 71: p. 341]

The other CMEA states wished to bolster their economies through increased East-West trade during the late 1960s as well. Moscow gave reluctant approval of increased contacts in both political and economic spheres in 1969. The Soviet allies, excluding East Berlin, must have greeted Alexie Kosygin's speech in 1971 before the Supreme Soviet with pleasant endorsement. In the speech he openly invited western participation in the development of the Soviet economy:

> With the transition to the practice of long-term agreements, which guarantee stable orders for industry, new possibilities are opened up on our relations with Western nations. Considerations can be given to the mutually beneficial cooperation with foreign firms. . . [Ref. 72: pp. 189-190]

The needs of the small-scale East European economies for Western trade benefits in high technology and consumer goods are probably greater than those of the much larger Soviet economy. Because the other CMEA members have received relatively little technological aid from their senior ally, the East European countries have reacted to this pressing need for Western technology by adapting relatively greater institutional flexibility and had developed

superior techniques to absorb the imported technologies than the Soviets. The Soviets, in turn, have taken advantage of both their allies' need for, and therefore their efforts to acquire, the imported technology and their allies' ability to adopt it, by drawing from the technology gained through these East European states. **[Ref. 73: pp. 178-179]**

We can thus see that economic interests played a very important role in prompting Moscow to move towards detente policies with the West. The Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* that we focus upon during this period was very much determined by this detente policy. Therefore, Soviet economic interests were very important influences upon Soviet German policy at this time.

As the Soviet Union entered the 1980s, most of the problems recognized by Kosygin and Brezhnev in the 1960s were still present. And the Kremlin leadership most likely no longer hoped, as it had going into detente, that painful decisions about management reform and capital allocation could be avoided by injecting Western technology into the ailing Soviet economy. **[Ref. 44: p. 45]** According to Hannes Adomeit, the motivations in the near future for East-West economic exchanges for the Soviet leadership will be out of domestic necessity than any external political objective. **[Ref. 57: p. 13]**

Western economic troubles in the late 1970s, U.S. political preconditions on U.S.-Soviet trade and Reagan's overall toughened approach to East-West relations have set rigid limits on Soviet access to Western technology in the present decade. As part of the overall deterioration in Soviet-American relations, the Soviets themselves have shifted much of its trade to Western Europe and Japan. Foreign trade with the United States dropped about 50% in the 1980s from its previous level in the late 1970s. (See

Table V.) This shift has led to widely shared impressions in the West, particularly in the U.S., that this "punishment" of the U.S. has been successful, that this has created significant increases in Soviet-West European trade and that the USSR can easily go without such trade exchanges with the U.S. [Ref. 57: p. 14] Despite these impressions, there is sufficient reason to believe the Soviets are still interested in American economic and technological benefits. They continue to lack certain technology as before which is only available through the U.S.

TABLE V

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE WEST

American and West German Trade Examples*

Year	Total Trade	U.S. Amount	U.S. % Total	FRG Amount	FRG % Total
1976	56.8	2.2	3.8	3.0	5.3
1977	63.4	1.5	2.4	3.0	4.7
1979	80.3	2.8	3.5	4.2	5.2
1980	94.1	1.5	1.6	5.8	6.2
1981	109.7	1.8	1.6	6.0	5.5
1982	119.6	2.2	1.8	6.6	5.5

* Billions of rubles.

Source: Europa Yearbooks (1979-1984).

Trade with Western Europe did not change significantly during the later period. Using West Germany as the best example, since it conducts the most trade with Moscow, trade increased in real terms in 1980 and dropped to a level for the next two years that was still greater than during the pre-Afghanistan invasion period. (See Table V.) The basic reason behind this difference between Soviet trade relations with the United States and Western Europe is the

fundamental divergence between the two on the appropriateness and effectiveness of using economic leverage for political purposes. France, for example, outright rejected President Carter's economic sanction policy while the Federal Republic gave it lip-service and little more. As has been pointed out above, the Europeans simply did not accept the U.S. Administration's argument that economic punishment could bring about any desired Soviet reversal, namely the withdrawal from Afghanistan or reduced pressure on Poland. [Ref. 73: p. 185] Throughout the period, the Europeans have requested, sometimes demanded, that the U.S. leave East-West economic relations, except the military-related technology, out of the realm of political difficulties. Not only are there many West European jobs at stake, they argue, but it may also serve as the last important thread holding the two blocs together within talking distance.

A final economic factor that has taken on greater importance in Soviet economic interests are Soviet-East European economic relations. As a result of the hard currency debts accrued during the late 1970s and the sudden rise of the world market price of energy, the East European communist party leaderships have reemphasized in their 1981-1985 economic plans and within the CMEA meetings the need to further improve bloc economic integration efforts. Also important, they note, is the need to improve production efficiency within the system, which has created internal disputes as how to better divide specialization within CMEA, and the need to use the utmost discretion in obtaining credit from the West. Except for Poland and the GDR, most East European debts to the West are relatively manageable. Whereas East Berlin occupies a special status with Bonn and the EEC, and has deeper production capablities for western markets, Poland's debt situation has been drastically out of

hand. Moscow must be sensitive to Western banks' interests, and to governments who are guaranteeing the hard-currency notes which Warsaw has drawn. Furthermore, they must be willing to bail Warsaw out with large doses of aid in times of crisis, as in 1980-1981.

In the early 1980s the Soviets have had to readjust their trade relations with its partner East European allies. Since then Moscow has had to gradually cut energy subsidies to these countries to bring its price of gas and oil up to the market price. This has been extremly difficult on some of the East European economies, who must sell more of their products each year in order to receive the same amount of energy materials from the Soviet Union. Charles Gati makes the point that the effect of this change in relations is a feeling of indignation on the part of the East Europeans:

> They wonder whether the Soviet Union could not afford to do more for them if it did not waste it resources fighting an elusive enemy in Afghanistan, keeping a vast army along its Chinese border and installing modern and expensive intermediate-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. [Ref. 74: p. 75]

During this latter period, Soviet economic interests seem to have little overall influence on their *Deutschlandpolitik*. While strong interests in Western trade continued to exist, they appeared not to affect Moscow's German policy. The slow change in Soviet economic interests in Eastern Europe, however, may have affected East Berlin's and other East European states' actions.

2. East Germany

As in the Soviet case, there exist principle characteristics of the East German economic structure which generally hold true for the entire three periods under investigation. The first is the geographic and historic relationship of the two German economies. While the Western

part inherited the agricultural and heavy industrial base of the pre-war German economic infrastructure, in the East highly skilled and widely dispersed light industry predominated the pre-war areas which later became the GDR. The earlier, highly disciplined command-based infrastructure was not destroyed after the war, but reconfigured to serve new masters, thus facilitating a transition from nationalism to proletarian internationalism as the new leading motivator.

The peaceful competition between the two German states since the early 1950s has forced the East German leaders to behave pragmatically and conduct their economic policies with a certain degree of moderation. This was in stark contrast to the other East European regimes who applied the irrational elements of the Soviet system very early in the post war years. Primarily because of the inherited economic system and the strong competition with the leading West European economic achiever, the East Germans have developed the leading industrial economy in Eastern Europe.

The geographical and historical realities, however, lead the East German population to judge the economic performance of their system based on its success or failure vis-a-vis the Federal Republic rather than on its superior accomplishments in contrast to its eastern or southern neighbors, Poland and Czechoslovakia. This competition is all the more important since the two systems can be best "compared not according to political or ideological values but according to facts and figures which are politically neutral and comprehensible to all." [Ref. 75: p. 60]

Second, because of the light industrial character of the East German economic base, and the fact that the raw materials, energy sources, and agricultural and heavy industrial sectors of a complete pre-war economy are now located in the West, the present day GDR economy is heavily foreign

trade dependent. In order to produce those products it is most capable to produce, and to feed its people in reward for such production, the East Germans must rely on outside trade to obtain the necessary raw materials, energy sources and foodstuffs. (See Tables VI and VII.)

TABLE VI

GDR PRINCIPLE FOREIGN TRADE COMMODITIES

(Shown as % of Export/Import Trade)

	1960	1970	1977	AVE
EXPORT				
1. Machines, Equipment Vehicles	49	51	53	51
2. Fuels, Mineral Raw Materials, Metals	16	10	11	12
3. Other Raw Materials & Processed Products & Foodstuffs	6	7	7	7
4. Industrial Consumer Goods	15	20	15	17
5. Chemical Products & Construction Materials	14	11	13	13

	1960	1970	1977	AVE
IMPORTS				
1. Machines, Equipment Vehicles	13	34	33	27
2. Fuels, Mineral Raw Materials, Metals	39	28	29	32
3. Other Raw Materials & Processed Products & Foodstuffs	39	28	22	30
4. Industrial Consumer Goods	5	5	5	5
5. Chemical Products & Construction Materials	4	6	11	7

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Member States of CMEA 1978.

TABLE VII

USSR-GDR PRINCIPLE FOREIGN TRADE COMMODITY EXCHANGE

Soviet Imports from East Germany
(Shown as % of Total USSR Imports from the GDR)

	Consumer Goods (Incl. Foodstuffs)	Machinery Equipment Transport Vehicles	Fuels & Lubricants	Raw Materials/ Industrial Supplies	Other
1960	12	62	2	10	14
1965	20	59	0.7	9	11
1968	21	58	0.6	8	12

East German Imports from the Soviet Union
(Shown as % of Total GDR Imports from the USSR)

	Consumer Goods (Incl. Foodstuffs)	Machinery Equipment Transport Vehicles	Fuels & Lubricants	Raw Materials/ Industrial Supplies	Other
1960	21	4	15	50	10
1965	11	8	16	53	12
1968	13	15	12	45	15

Source: Soviet and East European Foreign Trade, 1946-1949, Paul Marer.

The Soviet Union realized very early after the war the potential for trade advantages for themselves in establishing a solid trading relationship with the East Germans. It was also important for the Soviets to assure that few other trading options were available to the East Germans as time went on. From Table IV one can see the growth of Soviet-East German trade and the dependency of the East Germans on their allies in Moscow.

Third, since 1960 GDR foreign trade trends have appeared fairly constant. (See Table VIII.) Although the CMEA states receive the lion's share of its trade, there has been a gradual swing towards increased trade with the

non-socialist West at the expense of intra-bloc trade. Although the data are still sketchy, due to East Berlin's reluctance to release regular and complete foreign trade statistics, there are indications that trade with the CMEA partners has increased in the present decade almost to 1970 level (67%). Western imports have been chosen based on their lack of availability within the bloc system and the need to modernize certain industries through western technology in order to become more competitive in the world markets.

Finally, the East German economic potential had made them partners for cooperation as well as competition with their western counterparts across the Elbe. Despite the purposeful trade restrictions and long-standing foul political climate between Bonn and East Berlin, the latter has retained about 10% annual trade with Bonn, who, until recently, has been the largest single East German trading partner, excluding the Soviet Union. Also potentially important is the advantages the East Germans enjoy in the EEC through the Federal Republic, although this is held to a minimum through controls by Bonn.

During the mid-to-late 1950s, the East German economy began reestablishing an industrial production base and Ulbricht pushed for closer alignment with the Polish, Czech and, especially, the Soviet economies. This meant access to steady markets, sources for raw materials, accompanied by slowly disengaging the East German economy from its dependence on West German production. By 1960, East German industrial capabilities showed much potential, despite severe deficiencies, and was well integrated into the CMEA foreign trade net. **[Ref. 22: p. 74-75]** Over two-thirds of her trade was with CMEA members, the leading partners being the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. (See Table VIII.) Although mutual trade benefits were

becoming evident at this time, it was not until 1964-1968 that the East German economy took its real prominence within the bloc through economic improvements and greater CMEA integration. [Ref. 76] [Ref. 77]

Internal economic problems during the late 1950s, however, were threatening the very continued existence of the state. As the number of refugees fleeing to the West grew, so did the economy's present and future skilled labor force, upon which the East German economy was so dependent. Along with the master craftsmen and engineers went thousands of doctors, lawyers, teachers and their families. Without control over these losses, Ulbricht was left to watching the basis for his downfall.

Ulbricht's policies leading up to and during the Berlin crises were most strongly influenced by these economic considerations, which were, in other words, his only road to survival. Externally, the had to build upon new Eastern European economic relationships and internally he needed to gain control over his state's most important economic resource, its skilled and professional work-force.

East Berlin pursued between 1966-1968 an active foreign economic policy designed to strengthen its links with the East European states and discourage them from developing trade links with the Federal Republic. This policy was aimed particularly at Poland and Czechoslovakia, who were the natural trading partners with the GDR in terms of geographic location and industrial trade structure. As a result, in these three years East German trade with the smaller East European states grew faster than did trade with the USSR and the FRG. [Ref. 3: p. 108]

Ulbricht decided in the mid 1960s, after disposing of the reform opposition, to bind the East German economic ties as closely as possible to Moscow. His intent was to

TABLE VIII

GDR FOREIGN TRADE BY COUNTRY GROUPS 1960-1980

	1947	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
Total F. T. Turnover *	1.7	18.5	24.7	39.6	74.4	120.1
% With Soc. Countries	9	75	74	72	70	64
- Of Which CMEA	9	68	69	67	66	61
% With Cap. Countries	91	21	22	24	26	27
- Of Which FRG **	69	10	9	10	9	8
% With Dev. Countries	--	4	4	5	4	7

* Billions of East German Exchange Marks (VM).
** Includes West Berlin.

Sources: DDR Handbuch; Soviet Union Figures, Facts, Data; COMECON Foreign Trade Data 1982.

use the GDR's highly developed industrial capabilities to create a position where East Germany provided the USSR with her most vital machinery and technical products, thereby increasing East Berlin's importance in Moscow. In the process, domestic economic considerations would be placed second to satisfying Moscow's needs. By 1969, however, "it had become apparent to the USSR that the GDR's capacity in this respect would not suffice and that extensive reliance on Western economies was difficult to avoid." **[Ref. 4: p. 5]** It was during the same period, late 1969 through 1970, that, for multiple reasons, the East German economy experienced considerable difficulties.

East Berlin's *Deutschlandpolitik* during this period was affected very little by its economic interests. The successful sealing off of its population during the earlier period greatly improved the internal economic situation. And as mentioned above, the East Germans proved themselves a worthwhile economic partner with their eastern neighbors. Despite the tense political atmosphere created between Bonn and East Berlin in the late 1960s, economic relations were help fairly aloft and remained at a constant level. Perhaps Ulbricht may have felt that he failed to build GDR's economic influence among its allies to a level great enough to influence their political decisionmaking in his favor during the period. Yet, the fact remained, that they wanted more than what his state could offer economically.

If the GDR economy was fairly comprehendable during its first thirty years in existence, by 1979 it had evolved into a much more complex system. The competition situation with the Federal Republic was providing East Berlin some advantages in view of the growing unemployment and inflation in the West. Despite the relief many workers in the East felt for not having to rely on capitalistic successes for

their jobs, the overall economic situation in East Germany, and in the entire Socialist bloc, was in a poor state. In 1980 the socialist economic planners revised their next Five Year plans to include greater intra-bloc growth.

The position gained within CMEA through successful economic and political developments has helped the GDR to fulfill vital assigned tasks within the Socialist community. Fulfilling these tasks was used, as before, as a mechanism to buy greater influence in Moscow and in other East European capitals. A sign of SED leadership's value placed on trade within the CMEA, and perhaps to improve their influence stature, was the signing in 1980 of trade agreements or protocols geared to increase trade 20-40% with Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary over the period 1981-1985. **[Ref. 78]** East German 1984 trade with CMEA countries continued to rise, showing an increase that year of an average of 9% over 1983. Although trade with Moscow also continued to increase (10% over 1983), and now comprises over 38% of the total East German foreign trade, East Berlin's terms of trade are believed to continue their deterioration. **[Ref. 79]** Considering that Moscow commited the East Germans to increase their deliveries of better quality consumer goods to the USSR at the CMEA summit meeting last June, and that both countries signed a 15-year trade agreement shortly thereafter, which also pledged an increase in GDR exports of machinery and electronic products, one can expect this troublesome trend, for East Berlin, to continue. **[Ref. 79]**

From the western analyst's perspective, it appears as though East German leaders have been more willing in recent years to shuffle their foreign trade accounts around to accommodate a constant flow of Western imports into East Germany, but will not exacerbate their debt situation. The West German role in East German economic planning is quite

A) Post, Telephone & Telegraph

-- DM 200 million per Year (1983-1990)

B) Swing Credit (Interest Free)

-- DM 800-600 million/Year
(Decreasing scale 1982-1985)

C) FRG - West Berlin Access Costs (1975-1980)

1. Transit Route Payments -- DM 525 million/Year
2. Autobahn Construction/ repair Costs -- DM 1,887 million *
3. West Berlin Local Transit Construction/repair Costs -- DM 1,010 million

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* Includes DM 156 million in West German Construction equipment.

Figure 2.2 FRG Payments to the GDR for Intra-German Contacts.

complex. East Berlin receives annually billions of Ostmarks from Bonn as part of the the various intra-German agreements on transit to West Berlin and improve contacts between the two countries. (See Figure 2.2.) Aside from the yearly interest-free credit allotment, called the Swing, private West German banks have been willing to provide East Berlin large loans with advantageous terms. Additionally, since 1981, the East Germans have maintained a surplus in intra-German trade, reversing the opposite trend that existed since the 1950s. In fact, in overall Western trade, the West Germans have recently taken a back seat to other Europeans, e.g. Austrians, French and Finns. Whatever the reason for this shift, the East Germans badly need the products they receive from the West to modernize their production capability for further competition. The East German economy is under foreign trade pressure from East and West. While they need to improve the quality and quantity of

foreign trade production to maintain their place in the Western markets, in order to sustain the flow of Western imports, the Soviet Union wants its share of quality products which it demands in return for their deliveries of essential raw materials and energy supplies.

Honecker's decision to attempt to set his own pace for intra-German relations in the early 1980s was likely largely founded upon the GDR's economic interests. Trade and other economic contacts with the West Germans, including large advantageous loans, were essential to foster East German economic and political influence during the coming decades. This occured during a time when Moscow was not showing much sympathy for East European economic problems. These economic interests, therefore, were crucial motivators behind East Berlin's *Deutschlandpolitik* during this last case study period.

In summary, beyond a doubt, economic interests played an extremely important role in determining East German and Soviet leaders' *Deutschlandpolitik* in all three cases. The importance of these interests to each state did not match so well during the three cases with that of the other state's. Whereas the other interests were, perhaps, primarily formulated through perceived images by the leadership of how their regime should fit into a broader international system, such as being granted superpower or hegemonal status for Moscow or international recognition for East Berlin, the economic interest were basically rooted in domestic necessity. To ingore the latter would create risks far greater than not fulfilling these visions of status. Ironically, perhaps, the East Germans were following their most vital economic interests during the Berlin crises in shutting off the contact with the West, while in the latter case, Honecker was pursuing opportunistic economic policies in hanging on to contact with Bonn. While economic benefits

from increased Western trade contacts had a very important influence on Brezhnev's detente policy, and therefore affected his German policies, the East Berlin leadership was much more driven by political concerns in the second case and based little of its *Deutschlandpolitik* on economic concerns at that time.

E. FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING CONTROL

1. Soviet Union

Conflict between two governments, including very often among allied partners, arises out of not only opposing foreign policy viewpoints, but also from the inconsistency of a policy line taken by one of the disputing parties. Most frequently this is the result of internal debate within the foreign policy decisionmaking apparatus, weak or unclear transmissions of the policy direction, misperceptions by one side of the other's policy objectives, or a combination of all three of the above situations. The study of the foreign policy decisionmaking mechanism and how it transmits its decisions to those who must carry them out is critical to understanding relations between two states. This is even more important in analyzing the relations between a super-power and a smaller, dependent state, such as in the Soviet Union-East German relationship. Not only does the smaller state have to fear foreign policy shifts which might endanger its vital interests, but the smaller state must always be ready to exercise its "bargaining" rights when such opportunities present themselves. A divided or weak-ened leadership in the larger state may open for short periods of time opportunities for the smaller to press for its interests which earlier were not possible. The larger state, in this case, the Soviet Union, inversely, can often times manipulate the factions within the smaller state's

decisionmaking group to assure agreement in foreign policy interests. This much less likely, however, when within the smaller state exists a decisionmaking apparatus that is solidly consolidated under the control of one leader, or among a very small and chiefly homogeneous group.

Political decisionmaking authority, particularly in foreign policy matters, is one of the primary symbols, accepted as rewards, of power available to the strongest member within a leninist-model government leadership. Because decisionmaking influence, not economic wealth, is the symbol of power in these systems, the logic of their politics induces the leader to seek absolute power within the leading group, while at the same time this logic impels the other group members to try to prevent the prime leader from acquiring it. **[Ref. 80: p.14]** This can be rather subtle, as for example, when Brezhnev brought his supporters into the Politburo, who were, for varying periods of time, totally dependent on him for their position. The incentive is still there to limit the leader's power, regardless of the ability of the other individuals to act.

Policies are made of various issues which are associated with given definitions. As power is consolidated by a leader, he will seek to sustain **his** definition of the issues, i.e. peaceful coexistence, detente, socialist commonwealth, European Security or *Deutschlandpolitik*. A leader's ability to control the definitions relates directly to his success in determining the course of foreign policy decisionmaking. As we look at the Soviet and East German foreign policy decisionmaking consensus, or lack thereof, during the three periods under investigation, it is useful to focus on the leader's success in holding on to his definition of the vital issues regarding *Deutschlandpolitik*.

Nikita Khrushchev's power and prestige were, to a far greater extent than his predecessor, dependent on the

success of his policies. Running through the heart of most of his policies was a reform tendency, reflecting Khrushchev's personal character as well as a general Russian response to the Stalin years. In the Khrushchev era, the competition between reform and orthodox tendencies, given free play without the application of terror tactics, pervaded the Soviet political scene. [Ref. 80: p. 53] There was also a need within the Soviet leadership to establish the proper balance of dictatorial and oligarchical forces necessary to advance the Soviet Union in the post Stalin world. The result was that in the 1957-1962 period there still existed submerged conflicts within the Kremlin, which did not allow a stable leadership condition to develop. This, according to Carl A. Linden, accounts in part "for the stormy and dynamic quality of Soviet politics in the Khrushchev era." [Ref. 80: p. 37]

In reviewing Khrushchev's decisionmaking authority in foreign affairs during the Berlin crises we have to begin with the fact that in 1957 the "anti-party" group attempted a true palace guard coup which, although it failed at that time, succeeded in a less dramatic fashion seven years later. This removal was, of course, the only purge of a top Soviet leader who actually held significant control within the party. In light of these facts, there were some distinguishing policies promoted by Khrushchev which most likely weakened his foreign policy decisionmaking authority.

The reforms in the domestic economy formulated by Khrushchev, particularly in agriculture and light industry, were, according to some Soviet specialists of that period, the greatest single set of factors leading to the erosion of his power. [Ref. 68] The failures during 1960-1963 were accentuated by the grandiose claims, along with proper propaganda campaigns, made in 1957 and 1959 about surpassing U.S. production in farm consumer products by 1960-1961. [Ref. 68: pp. 75, 97]

Khrushchev also set in motion several designs to reform the CPSU and its associated bureaucratic structure. His efforts in early 1957 to decentralize the economic state bureaucracy and the party contributed to the formation of the anti-party coalition later that year. His reform campaign, which continued for the next several years and also included significant reshuffling in regional party organizations and the military, became a significant generator of discontent after 1957 and emerged as an underlying issue in his downfall in 1964. [Ref. 80: p. 33]

In foreign policy, the Soviet leadership tended to polarize around two main factions. Khrushchev led the moderate group, and the conservative group was led by F. R. Koslov and M. A. Suslov. In general, the moderates favored a relaxation of East-West tensions, even at the expense of a Chinese ally, while the conservatives saw little value in detente policies with the United States and were particularly concerned about the growing conflict with their largest ally in Peking. [Ref. 81: p. 567]

Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence with the West, particularly the United States, ran counter to many in the party leadership, albeit for various reasons. Too many party leaders had risen to their positions assisted in large part by the longstanding CPSU doctrine insisting on friction and unreconcilable conflict between the two ideological and social systems and were not mentally prepared for the abrupt turn about in this doctrine. This subtle conflict is so difficult to notice because of the adherence to Lenin's concept of democratic centralism, according to which all segments of the Soviet bureaucracy are expected to implement the decisions of the Politburo without much discussion once they have been reached. The U-2 affair and the growing split with the Chinese communists brought out some of these latent disputes. Michel Tatu, who was living

in Moscow at the time, had dealt with the effect of the spy plan incident and its aftermath in great detail. He states, for example,

> . . . it seems clear that, in the Presidium, Khrushchev was in trouble on at least two occasions after the U-2 incident owing to his past policy of rapprochement with the United States. This was on May 3 and 4 and then on May 10 and 11. His policy was largely reversed, which was a clear indication of the attitude of the Presidium majority. [Ref. 82: p. 78]

Finally, the often heavy handed manner in which Khrushchev dealt with the ensuing Chinese problems were also cause for growing disagreement with Khrushchev's authority among certain Presidium members. Adam Ulam contends that the reason the Twenty-First Party Congress in June 1959 went over rather uneventfully, given the numerous problems and tense issues at the time, was due possibly to the cancellation of original plans because of a division among the Soviet leaders. [Ref. 39: p. 621]

Presidium disagreement probably became most substantial following a Bucharest meeting of communist parties in June 1960, where Khrushchev openly and vehemently attacked the Chinese leadership for the first time among third party observers. Linden proposes that Peking was well aware of allies in the Presidium, namely Koslov and Suslov, and utilized this to possibly affect Khrushchev's position.

> Hence the Chinese made it abundantly clear at that stage that their complaint was with Khrushchev personally and not with the Soviet leadership as a whole. The Chinese purpose seemed clear: to zero in on Khrushchev as the prime dismantler of the Sino-Soviet axis and communist unity and to drive a wedge between him and his Presidium colleagues. [Ref. 80: pp. 102-103]

Besides Koslov and Suslov mentioned above, Kosygin also became an opposition member within the Presidium. The old-timers, Mikoyan and Voroshilov have been noted as

fulfilling a "braking" role in Khrushchev policies. Additionally, the old anti-party group from 1957, who still had visible support from all of the above Presidium members, were, according to Tatu, showing signs of backstage lobbying in 1961 causing Khrushchev's decision to launch another destalinization attack against them at the Twenty-Second Party Congress. Also wrapped in these anti-Khrushchev maneuvers was supposedly a "Chinese sympathies" factor. [Ref. 82: pp. 145-147]

What effect did this have on his Berlin demands? Basically, we can assume that Khrushchev was not fully alone in determining the important decisions regarding Berlin. Hans Kroll has pointed out that before Khrushchev 10 November 1958 speech and again between that speech and the 27 November "Deadline" note to the three Western Allied powers, the Berlin issue was strongly argued within the Presidium. He notes particularly Mikoyan, Kosygin and Voroshilov's warnings to Khrushchev about overplaying the Soviet position. [Ref. 69: p. 393] Because of his weakening position, particularly after May 1960, when a big shake-up in the Central Committee (CC) and the top state apparatus occured, Khrushchev was probably reacting to internal pressures rather than following an overall plan for the policy. This is even more striking if one considers that while Khrushchev was losing internal authority, his international credibility, vis-a-vis the West, China and East Germany was likewise falling.

Khrushchev, therefore, was unable to completely dominate the foreign policy decisionmaking in the Soviet Union during the Berlin crises. Considering growing challenges to his authority throughout the period, he was probably limited to only partial success in defining the vital issues regarding Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik*, and thus likely faced significant internal limitations on his control over Moscow's foreign policy during the Berlin crises.

Among others in the Soviet Politburo, Leonid Brezhnev appeared to have learned well from his predecessor and fellow Ukrainian. Regardless of the problems demanding reform, the Secretary General should not take a position against an opposition on a novel policy that has any notable risk of failing, particularly if he could afterwards be associated with that failure. Jiri Valenta develops this cautious image of Brezhnev in describing the Soviet leader's careful "flexibility" throughout the protracted decision-making in the Kremlin on the Czechoslovakian problem in the summer 1968. In describing Brezhnev's ability to create a "winning" coalition in the Politburo, Valenta states:

> . . . he (Brezhnev) seems to be more successful in forging a winning consensus within the Soviet decision-making collectivity than his predecessor, whose style in the last years of his leadership antagonized his colleagues an ultimately led them to unite against him. [Ref. 16: p. 28]

The Czechoslovakian intervention was a turning point in Brezhnev's development as a strong Soviet leader. Prior to the invasion Brezhnev did not impress most western analysts as being a "primus inter pares" but rather a "great compromiser" within a Kremlin of feeble decisionmakers, who were driven more by crisis or opportunity than by design. He fell back on organizational supporters who had proven themselves dependable during Stalin's period, such as leaders in the military and heavy industry, which was the conservative, cautious approach.

Only beginning in 1969 did he show himself a more skillful politician who was able to "borrow" programs of others and keep the decisionmaking consensus in tact through providing "a little something" to each important set of players. In this mode, Brezhnev stayed in tune with Kosygin, Suslov and Gromyko and slowly purged those with

relatively stronger views, who advocated change such as Petr Shalest and Aleksandr Shelepen. **[Ref. 83: p. 80]** There were no drastic changes in the top party or state apparatus during this period. In 1971 four new members were added to the Politburo, at least three of which, Kunayev, Scherbitsky and Kulakov, could be counted on as likely supporters of Brezhnev policies. **[Ref. 84: p. 194]**

In 1969 Brezhnev also picked up his activity in foreign affairs in which he gradually replaced Kosygin as the Soviet Union's leading representative in negotiations with the West. Possibly out of the lack of damages suffered from the Czech invasion in Western relations and the first sparks of possible SALT I negotiations, Brezhnev was able to begin designing a coherent plan for *Westpolitik*. This was comprised of a European plan towards convening a European Security Conference and completing a strategic arms treaty with the United States. This assessment is drawn from the relatively steady and pressing manner in which the Soviet leadership pursued these objectives from about 1969 to 1975.

Nineteen sixty-nine may have also been the point where the leadership decided on what Vernon Aspaturian called in 1970 "the root problem of all their problems, the question of purpose." **[Ref. 81: p.916]** Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues apparently chose the primacy of ruling the state over directing a world movement. The consequences of such a decision, with its roots going back to 1959 when Khrushchev visited the U.S. for the first time, meant that to become a global power certain actions must be taken and decisions made to fulfill this role. Brezhnev demanded recognition of superpower parity while striving for dominance, the latter being perhaps the best way to assure maintenance of the former once it is achieved.

Brezhnev's increasing control within the Kremlin also significantly affected Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik*

decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By slowly eliminating the opposition and establishing a harmonious foreign policy bureaucracy, he showed much success in defining the vital issues in Soviet overall German policy. Except for the period immediately prior to the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in March 1971, when he appeared to have taken a few steps backward in the Berlin negotiations, Brezhnev's *Deutschlandpolitik* seems to have had little domestic opposition during this period. Although bumping heads with Ulbricht was apparent at times, Brezhnev's internal support for this German policy probably grew stronger as he and Gromyko chalked up increasing successes in Bonn and Washington.

Following over 15 years of leadership stability and continuity under Leonid Brezhnev, the Kremlin was suddenly faced with a succession crisis during which three aging and ailing leaders occupied and departed the top Soviet decisionmaking position within two and a half years. This changing, old and ill leadership, exacerbated by developing Kremlin power struggles, was unable to provide little more than a policy of crisis management. **[Ref. 36: p. 9]**

The ill health of the Secretary Generals of the CPSU during this period was so common that only 16 of 60 months, from November 1979 to October 1984, was there a "healthy" old Soviet leader in charge of the Kremlin.[10] While Brezhnev stabilized the leading CPSU cadres which led to a non-eventful succession, he "neglected to create the conditions which would institutionalize and pass it on to his successors". **[Ref. 85]** Like his predecessors, Brezhnev used his

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[10] The term "healthy" here is the time during which the press considered the Secretary General able to work at least a few hours in the Kremlin a day. Obviously this includes a lot of speculation, but it is not intended to be so accurate, as it is to make a point on the gaps that had to be filled while the Soviet leaders were incapacitated.

leading position in the Party to consolidate and expand his power over a decade and a half. In this he also personally affected the manning of the Politburo to meet his needs.

TABLE IX

AGE AND EXPERIENCE OF FULL POLITBURO MEMBERS

(Fall 1984)

Name	Birth Date	Age	Cand. Mbr.	Full Mbr.	Years as Full Mbr.
Tikhonov	1905	78	1978	1980	3
Ustinov	1908	75	1965	1975	8
Gromyko	1909	74	----	1973	10
Chernenko	1911	72	1977	1978	5
Kunayev	1912	71	1966	1971	12
Andropov	1914	69	1967	1973	10
Grishin	1914	69	1961	1971	12
Shcherbitsky	1918	65	1961	1971	12
Romanov	1923	60	1973	1976	7
Aliyev	1923	60	1976	1982	1
Gorbachev	1931	52	1979	1980	3

Source: Vernon Aspaturian, "The Brezhnev Legacy: Leadership Uncertainty in the Kremlin" in Washington Quarterly, Winter 1985.

A combination of leadership stability, considering that severe changes in the Politburo were absent during Brezhnev's tenure, the incredibly long lives of the men who got there, and Brezhnev's practice of replacing departing Politburo members with men of approximately the same age as those departed, created a queer phenomenon in the Politburo entering the 1980s. The most senior members were also those with relatively recent Politburo tenure. (Compare Tables IX and X.) This structure also virtually guaranteed that Brezhnev's successor would be drawn from the approximate age bracket to which Brezhnev himself belonged. [Ref. 85: p. 23] As the old guard passed on, another elderly, albeit relatively "inexperienced" in CPSU Politburo terms, new guard took over.

TABLE X

AGE AND EXPERIENCE OF FORMER POLITBURO MEMBERS

(1980-1983)

Name	Birth Date	Death Date	Age at Death/Removal	Full Mbr.	Years as Full Mbr.
Pelshe	1899	1983	84	1966	17
Suslov	1902	1981	79	1955	28
Kirilenko	1906	1982	76	1962	21
Brezhnev	1906	1982	76	1957	26
Kosygin	1904	1980	76	1960	23

Source: Vernon Aspaturian, "The Brezhnev Legacy: Leadership Uncertainty in the Kremlin" in Washington Quarterly, Winter 1985.

Yuri Andropov took over in November 1982, after Brezhnev's death and an inconspicuous power struggle. The colorless and unimpressive Konstantin Chernenko failed to get support for his assumption of the top Party position despite Brezhnev's earlier attempts to structure the Politburo in a manner favorable for such a transition. Although without the solid power base needed to do so, Andropov quickly announced plans to rejuvenate the Party and state system through reforms aimed at improved economic efficiency. This obviously sent a growing shock wave through the party apparatus which had been established based on the Brezhnev principle of cadre stability.

Ill health and subsequent death of the old reformer allowed the party apparatus to breathe easy again and probably contributed to Chernenko's succession. Raised in party life under the Brezhnev tradition, Chernenko would threaten no one. He too was afflicted with poor health problems, not surprising for his age, and other Politburo members carried on their task of seeing to the affairs of the state.

The net affect of this weak, but non-turbulent leadership condition during the succession was a subtle and

uneven emphasis of various policy interests by their respective advocates within the party leadership. Gromyko and Ustinov were part of Andropov's "class of '73",[11] and probably had widening influence in foreign policy matters during his rise and departure from power.

There were frequent signs, for instance, of Gromyko's anti-German influence during mid-to-late 1984, when many considered that he was the major force behind Moscow's fanatical anti-revanchist campaign. **[Ref. 86]** He also warned Honecker via Pravda of the dangers of getting too involved in Bonn's financial traps and was the first Soviet high party official to visit East Berlin after Honecker postponed his trip to the FRG, delivering a fierce anti-West German speech at the GDR's 35th anniversary celebration.

The military and Gromyko's *Weltanschauung* are not necessarily congruous, although both support a hard line in Soviet *Westpolitik*. This mixture provided, among other things, a heavy hand in Afghanistan, incredible tolerance in the Polish crisis and diplomatic incapacity in the Korean Airline shootdown incident. If the West thought it was difficult asessing Soviet motives during these years, the Soviet's East European allies were probably even more confused and worried since many of their interests depend upon Soviet political and military power.

In the Afghanistan decisionmaking process, Valenta assesses that Brezhnev and Kosygin were still involved in the final debate, although in a strikingly weakened condition due to their health. He notes that an inner Politburo group was formed to deal with the developing emergency in Afghanistan on a day-to-day basis. **[Ref. 9: p. 226]** Not surprising, the KGB, the military and the Ministry of

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[11]All three men were raised to full Politburo members that year. I have borrowed this term from Dr. Aspaturian.

Foreign Affairs were leading participants in this select group. George Kennen suggests a bit stronger that Brezhnev and Kosygin had little influence on this important decision:

> It was a move decidedly not in character for either Alexsei N. Kosygin or Leonid Brezhnev. (The one was, of course, ill and removed from active work. The limitations on the other's health and powers of attention are well known.) Andrei A. Gromyko, too, is unlikely to have approved it. These reflections suggest a recent breakthrough, to positions of dominant influence, of hard line elements much less concerned for world public opinion, but also much less experienced than these older figures. [Ref. 87: p . 162]

The Soviet handling of the democratization developments in Poland and near loss of power by the Polish Communist party in 1980-1981 was much more stunning to East European leaders than Afghanistan. For over eighteen months the Kremlin appeared paralized and unable to make a definite decision. In East Berlin and Prague the party leadership must have asked themselves, and perhaps some Soviets, why did the Kremlin allow such extraordinary display of pluralism for such a long time, especially before the world audience. And furthermore, were the Soviet military preparations in December 1980 and March 1981 only for pressure purposes or signs of indecision? It is Charles Gati's opinion that despite well know interests to prevent such developments in Poland, the necessary decisions were simply not forthcoming because "no Soviet leader wanted to be held responsible for the failure of either policy option: accepting the process of 'socialist renewal' or ordering an end to it." [Ref. 74: p. 85] In the debates over the Czechoslovakian problem in the summer 1968 similar fears of "failure" were eventually set aside to control the situation. The Politburo of the early 1980s was perhaps not up to bold decisionmaking, at least this could be the perception by leaders in East Berlin or Prague.

Finally, the occurance of, and subsequent response to, the Korean Airliner (KAL) incident has a taste of disagreement between the Soviet military and civilian leadership. Although it is still unclear why, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Ogarkov was given an unusually visible role as the Soviet spokesman in the aftermath of the event. Was it because he was asserting exceptional power in behalf of the military or did the civilian leadership deliberately attempt to saddle the military with the responsibility of explaining the "misaction" to the world while they sought to distance themselves from the KAL incident? **[Ref. 85: p. 26]** The subsequent demotion of Marshal Ogarkov a year later under explained circumstances, if related, would suggest the dissatisfaction with the military by the civilian leaders.

The many mysteries of Soviet policies in the early 1980s have yet to be solved. They did, however, present their allied partners with several uncertainties which resulted in a relative decline in Soviet authority in Eastern Europe. With the increasing need to solve their own problems, clarity of signals from Moscow is essential for a conflict-free relationship. The transmission of signals was even more disturbed, perhaps, due to the recall of the long-time Soviet Ambassador to East Berlin, P.A. Abrassimov, in June 1983. This overbearing and experienced diplomat behaved virtually as a Soviet pro-consul, wielding enormous power as the Kremlin's representative in East Berlin between the years 1962 -1971 and 1975-1983. **[Ref. 88]** Although his removal may well have pleased the SED leadership, it could also have added to the already complex task of correctly interpreting the Soviet Union's primary interests in Central Europe.

What, then, was the effect of the Soviet's *Deutschlandpolitik*? At worst there was little apparent

success by any one leader or group of individuals, in defining the vital issues involved in the current Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* during the entire period. Again, the lack of unambiguous definitions subjects the resulting policy to inconsistancies. At same time, it must be understood that the Soviet policy was never really under any apparent domestic pressure during the period until the East Berlin leadership decided to take a bold step in its own *Deutschlandpolitik*.

2. East Germany

Foreign policy decisionmaking in the German Democratic Republic has a significantly different characteristic from that in the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union is totally sovereign in its decisionmaking processes, the GDR, even more so than other socialist communist states in Eastern Europe, must dovetail its foreign policy to satisfy the major foreign policy interests in Moscow. Because of its geographic and economic conditions, East German decisionmakers are probably more constrained than any of the other WTO members. During the early, difficult years of establishing its international status, East Berlin's dependence on Soviet support accentuated this requirement.

Two side effects are at play as a result of this need to coincide their policies. First, the East German leadership must enjoy the confidence of the senior Kremlin leaders, risking loss of political power when this support is lacking. Second, because the policies are to compliment one another and the SED Secretary General is responsible for this policy, he should have confidence in the senior Kremlin leadership. The lack of confidence on his part would be evident in the formulation or execution of East German policy, which might then lead to the first condition, resulting in his loss of power; e.g., Walter Ulbricht's situation in 1970-1971.

Walter Ulbricht's control over East German decision-making in the 1950s and 1960s may be likened to the ability of the Persian kings' maintenance of their dynasties through years of court intrigues. A master of communist party maneuver and deception, Ulbricht was able to survive two attempts, in 1953 and 1956, by Politburo members to dispose him. In both cases, the opposition had the visible support of leading party members in Moscow. **[Ref. 89: pp. 135-174]** He took advantage in both cases of popular unrest to prove to his opponents that life would be even worse if he were not at the helm. His seven years in Moscow during the war as well as several years of doing battle within the German Communist Party (KPD) prior to and immediately after the war certainly provided him with ample learning opportunities and strongly influenced him in the Stalinist methods of survival. The latter point did not make Ulbricht a devout follower of Nikita Khrushchev and the feelings were probably mutual.

Ulbricht did learn during most of these close encounters with the opposition and probably accepted the Soviet role in East German affairs whether he liked the leaders there or not. Internally, he was in an unchallenged position in 1958, thanks to his latest round of purges. But he needed some signs of economic improvement to hold off another attack from within and from Moscow. The only person close to Ulbricht in authority was Erich Honecker, who had proven to be his most loyal supporter and party henchman. **[Ref. 90: pp. 181-182]** During the Berlin crises, Ulbricht handled the Soviet leaders and was the main GDR spokesman on *Deutschlandpolitik*, while Honecker was in charge of internal security and national defense matters. The latter was the individual within the GDR responsible for the construction and physical security of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. For their own reasons, the wall was a victory for both men.

For Ulbricht, it allowed him more room for maneuver in his present role, while for Honecker it was like money in the bank by strengthening his position within the SED, gaining increased confidence from Ulbricht and heightened prestige in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. [Ref. 90: p. 189]

Ulbricht's power position in East Berlin was well developed by 1958 so that his demands to the outside world regarding overall German policy went visibly unchallenged within the East German state. It appears as though he were the main individual defining the problems and issues needed to be solved through East Berlin's approach to *Deutschlandpolitik*. If any one person could be associated with the construction of the Berlin Wall, it would have to be Ulbricht himself, though it was only a compromise to his larger *Deutschlandpolitik* aspirations.

Many things had changed in the GDR during the next decade, but decisive decisionmaking authority still rested with Ulbricht and Honecker. The rapid developments in their country brought about increased self-confidence, particularly in Honecker. While Ulbricht still played the decisive role, Honecker had moved much closer to contact with the leadership in Moscow through the buildup and eventual East German contribution to the "fraternal assistance" given to Czechoslovakia. This increased Honecker's involvement in foreign affairs and his influence in Moscow. At this time he probably began to relate to Leonid Brezhnev, with whom he had much in common. Both men were realists for the future, with a background in security and military matters and both emphasized the necessity to utilize technological gains to strengthen the economic and political forces in the socialist camp. Both also had an appreciation for the need to incrementally increase popular support through improved production of consumer goods.

In the late 1960s Honecker took on greater authority within the party and developed popular support through paying considerable attention to the workers' and technocrats' interests alike. The two leaders, Ulbricht and Honecker, finally diverged in their thinking on the issue of *Deutschlandpolitik* after the Brandt government came into power. The Berlin issue best uncovered their differing viewpoints. During the Four-Power Talks on Berlin, Ulbricht would accept a Berlin accord and a rapprochement with Bonn only if his maximalist demands were met. The most important of these were Bonn's formal recognition of the GDR and the acceptance by the Western Powers of East German sovereign control over the access routes to Berlin. While these demands necessitated external acceptance and emphasized external legitimacy, Honecker placed greater importance on internal legitimacy which was determined largely by domestic actions. Honecker agreed to improvements in relations with Bonn only if his *Abgrenzung* policy was successful and supported by Moscow. Perhaps, because he was not head of state, but responsible for security, he arrived at this requirement rather than Ulbricht's. In any case, Ulbricht was demanding an ultimate change in the external environment, while Honecker was limiting his demands to the internal situation. If the outside is unwilling to modify its position, and Moscow wishes to press on with their policy, the internal demands seem more realistic in Moscow's eyes.

Wishing not to portray the transition from Ulbricht to Honecker as a simple one, there was also Kremlin intrigues involved. Gerhard Wettig notes that according to some FRG reports, members of the SED CC had make contacts with circles in the CPSU leadership who advocated rapprochement with China in place of an East-West normalization in Europe. Wettig further reminds us that Ulbricht avoided any

anti-Chinese polemics at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, unlike the party leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. [Ref. 4: p. 92]

Ulbricht had other characteristics which were making him less desirable in Soviet eyes. He appeared increasingly inflexible, which might not be too surprising for a man 78 years old, and his relationship with the Soviet Ambassador to East Berlin, Abrassimov, was anything less than congenial. [Ref. 91] Last but not least, Ulbricht began in 1970 a subtle campaign of showing increasing arrogance about East German socialist accomplishments. His public boasting went beyond the economic sphere, touching on ideological superiority of the German socialist developments. He carried this campaign even the Twenty-Fourth CPSU Congress when he boasted before his Russian hosts that he was one of the few surviving party leaders from the time of Lenin's struggle, apparently assuming that this game him the right to lecture his younger comrades in Moscow, including Brezhnev. [Ref. 92]

Although Honecker was equally as tough on the German rapprochement issue, he accepted and accentuated Moscow's leading role in all foreign policy matters. Perhaps in some ways equally important to Moscow was his strict anti-Chinese line. This does not suggest that he wasn't taking a position that would move him in the quickest possible way to the head of the SED, for, according to Heinz Lippmann, Honecker was reportedly pressing to replace his boss as early as June 1970. [Ref. 90: p. 214]

The rise of Erich Honecker was certainly not done without his circle of supporters. As we can see, these two power centers significantly clashed over our issue of *Deutschlandpolitik*. The result was that during the transition period from Ulbricht to Honecker, there existed only limited success in holding one common set of definitions of

the vital *Deutschlandpolitik* issues, including their solutions. Not only was Ulbricht's position weakened by the Honecker group, but the latter needed time to establish credibility in their policy following the change in party leaders.

Despite some difficult economic times, Erich Honecker's power position steadily increased through the 1970s. Having established support from below as well as from above, he was much more self-confident in his leadership role and that of the GDR by 1980. The popular support was derived through much greater attention given to the needs and interests of workers and technocrats He appreciated the need for cooperation among these groups if the East Germans were to squeeze greater efficiency out of their economic machine. In both word and deed the Secretary General pressed the economy to improve the living standard to reduce the discrepancy between the material life in the East and West German states. **[Ref. 24: p. 493]**

Honecker was able to accommodate the technical elite better than his predecessor. Although they still do not participate in the decisionmaking forums, they are well represented in advisory and functional positions throughout the government. **[Ref. 93: p. 263]** These measures seem to have increased cooperation and decreased conflict at these levels. And, like his Soviet counterpart in Moscow, Honecker established leadership stability among the party cadres.

The support from Moscow was firmly established through Honecker's repeated exhortations on the Soviet Union's leading role in the socialist world and his keeping in close symmetry to Soviet Foreign policy actions. Even while Honecker was attempting to "limit the damage" in intra-German relations against Moscow's perceived interests,

he continued to lay repeated stress on this close East German-Soviet friendship.

The relationship between Honecker and the Soviet decisionmakers following Brezhnev is still unclear. Some analysts have suggested that Mr. Honecker misinterpreted Chernenko's influence and misread the course Moscow would take under his chairmanship. According to this argument, while Honecker and Chernenko may have been in agreement on East Berlin's approach to post-missile deployment *Deutschlandpolitik,* Gromyko was the figure from which approval was needed for his policy approach. Gromyko was considered the leading Moscow opponent to Honecker's policy as it may have been perceived to conflict or interfere with the Soviet Union's "punishment' approach towards the West. [Ref. 94] Although this scenario is among the most plausible possibilities, there is no doubt that Honecker was under added pressure during this period to determine the proper sources behind Soviet decisionmaking and the essence of their respective policy interests.

Nonetheless, within the GDR, Honecker appeared to have enjoyed strong support for his *Deutschlandpolitik*. Although more might be revealed on this later, he seemed to have had much success in formulating his German policy from his definitions of the vital issues involved. As has been noted above, this was in rather distinct contrast with Moscow's lack of definition of these issues.

III. DEPENDENT VARIABLE - USSR-GDR CONFLICT OVER DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK

So far several causal variables influencing Soviet and East German actions during the three case study periods have been discussed in detail. It then becomes necessary to highlight the specific interests and resulting points of agreement and disagreement of both regimes in the "German Problem" itself. Although these interests have surfaced, often times quite randomly, in our discussion of the other variables, it is beneficial to attempt to straighten out the complex webb of immediate interests perceived by the main players in Moscow and East Berlin. In doing so, it will be clearer to us which points in the disputes were most highly contentious.

A. CASE #1 - "THE BERLIN CRISES 1958-1962"

The first three leading interests for the Soviet Union in their low risk gamble on Berlin were closely connected. These were: (1) A renunciation of nuclear weapons by Bonn, even if semi-imposed by the Western powers; (2) An independent Berlin, free of allied military presence and a much weaker West German connection; and (3) Recognized sovereignty for the East German regime, which included, above all, GDR control over all access routes to Berlin from the Federal Republic.

After Khrushchev's subtle ending of the crises in October 1961, one could obviously see that perhaps only the first one had been achieved since the costs of the other two had risen to unacceptable levels for Moscow. The construction of the wall provided a partial solution to the control interests in so far as it ended the mass exodus of East

German refugees. But the all important recognition of a separate, socialist GDR was not squeezed out of Khrushchev's crisis diplomacy.

Some may consider the nuclear weapon the emphasis on the nuclear weapon interest as a revisionist view. Be this as it may, sufficient evidence has been presented, by analysts and observers close to the crisis, to support the assessment that this interest was initially the primary motivating force in Khrushchev's initiating the 1958 crisis. The Soviet's fear of a remilitarized, nuclear armed, revanchist West German has already been clearly stated. The Soviets chose Berlin, a fairly controllable issue geographically and militarily, to open the discussion again on the German Problem.

Although overlooked in the West as common communist anti-German polemic, the main theme of the 27 November 58 deadline note was directed at the failure of the Western allied powers to effectively prevent Germany from becoming a threat to Europe, i.e. the Soviet Union, while the Soviets had done their part in their post-war policy in the GDR. This failure to carry out the agreements allowed the Soviets, according to their argument, to consider the Potsdam Agreements "null and void", including the Western allied rights in Berlin as a whole. High on the list of Western power failures was allowing the Federal Republic to rearm, joining NATO, and the current discussion of possible nuclear missiles in the *Bundeswehr*. The note reads on this subject:

> . . . the governments of the three powers, far from doing this, on the contrary have sanctioned the setting up of a West German army and are encouraging the arming of the Federal Republic of Germany, disregarding the commitments assumed at Potsdam. Furthermore, they have included Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which was set up behind the Soviet Union's back, and, as is clear to everyone, against the Soviet Union, and are **now arming Western Germany with atomic and rocket weapons.** [Ref. 95: p. 252 Note: Emphasis added.]

The deadline note, with its "Free City" proposal, was, as Jack Schick convincingly argues, a test proposal for changing the status quo in Germany and possibly, Europe. [Ref. 38: p. 19]

The first step was to get the allied powers to accept the "historical" changes that had taken place which included a new status for Berlin. This, according to Schick, would psychologically prepare the West for "other" realities, as the Soviets called them, of two Germanies and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. [Ref. 38: p. 19] One can thus see how closely connected all of these three interests were held together.

Another significant point to consider is Ambassador Kroll's information regarding Soviet intentions at the time. It is his belief that the Soviets main consideration regarding their *Deutschlandpolitik* in the fall 1958 was their fear of Bonn acquiring nuolear arms. [Ref. 69: p. 388]

This belief was probably partially based on an unusual set of diplomatic moves in Moscow a week before the deadline note was delivered. According to Kroll, the Austrian ambassador, Baron von Bischoff, was given a note by Gromyko, which was meant to be passed unofficially to Kroll. The main points in the note were:

1) The Soviet government insists that the Federal Republic reject atomic weapons armament;

2) The Soviet government insists on a peace treaty with Germany;

3) The Soviet government suggests a gradual relaxation of tensions and improvement in relations between the two Germanies; and

4) The Soviet government would welcome recognition by Bonn of the democratic republics in Eastern Europe. [Ref. 69: pp. 389-393]

Mr. Kroll placed much emphasis on Gromyko's apparent desire to get this message to Bonn prior to the deadline note, attempting, perhaps, to ward off any misinterpretation

by Bonn of Moscow's main interests. It is also quite possible that this was an attempt by the Soviets to strike up a bilateral deal directly with the West Germans. Also from Kroll's perspective, there was absolutely no desire on Moscow's part for a reunified Germany under the Western concept of the term. Kroll learned through third parties that in private conversations Khrushchev made it very clear that he did not consider reunification a possible solution to the German Problem. [Ref. 69: pp.434-435] The following quote is from Khrushchev's discussions with SPD chairman Erich Ollenhauer in the spring 1959:

> Why do you absolutely insist on reunification, Herr Ollenhauer? Things are going quite well without reunification! As a Marxist you must understand quite well that an area that has been granted with the achievements of socialism can never again reject thes achievements. Such would be a step backwards. [Ref. 69: p. 431]

The need to stop the tide of refugees flowing out of the GDR is based in ideological and economic conditions. Ideologically, the thousands of Germans who left the socialist way of life for the capitalist were creating an internationally visible example of rejection of the Soviet system.

Economically, at least one third of the refugees were young persons between the ages of 20-35, a group that was badly needed for filling the skilled labor requirements in the work force. As has been noted above, the East German economy was in no condition to continue to suffer such losses at that time. For this economic reason and the need for Moscow to publically bestow an internationally recognized sovereignty on his regime, Ulbricht applied continuous pressure on Khrushchev to sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

In contrast to Stephen Larrabee's argument that Khrushchev was only bluffing in his threats to sign a peace

treaty with the East Germans, this author believes that if the costs had not risen during the course of the crisis he would have done so. Although not without certain payoffs in the end, the Berlin crises failed to achieve their original objectives because the West kept increasing the costs to the Soviet regime. **[Ref. 52: pp. 441, 444]** A peace treaty would have granted Ulbricht his demands while also limiting access to West Berlin dependent upon East German approval. Contrary to Larrabee's contention that Bonn's recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe was Khrushchev's main goal, Ambassador Kroll had noted that during this period none of the Moscow leadership, including Khrushchev, expected Bonn to formally accept the German borders as they existed at that time. **[Ref. 18: p. 46], [Ref. 69: p. 450]**

There are two other important interests which the Soviets held throughout the Berlin crises. First, the weakening of the Western ties to Berlin would inevitably weaken Western influence, particularly American, in West Germany. It would also lead to an effective reduction in the American commitment in Europe as it is perceived both by the Americans and the West Germans. Convinced that the American allies would not fight to defend Western occupation rights,[12] Khrushchev may have seen strong possibilities to prove the Americans' lack of the capability and willingness to prevent Soviet challenges in Berlin or, perhaps even further west. According to Khrushchev, the pulling of the Berlin lever could force the West to acknowledge a shift in the international balance of power in Europe in favor of the Soviets. **[Ref. 96: p. 9]**

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[12]According to Slusser, Khrushchev told John J. McCloy, the chief U.S. negotiator in the bilateral disarmament talks, that he believed this to be the case. See Slusser, ref. # 96, p. 91.

Finally, it is necessary to mention the strong possibility of an earnest desire on Khrushchev's part to reduce or end tension in Berlin. No doubt his methods for accomplishing this can now be properly considered suspect. Nevertheless, by bringing the principle sides to the negotiating table, a new settlement, based upon the new "realities" as he saw them, could have, and did, lead to a less hostile environment, given the Western allies were willing to accept some losses in light of the new "realities". In the global arena he was also aiming for such an arrangement. Propaganda intentions aside, there may have been considerable sincerity in Khrushchev's words below from an article by him in Foreign Affairs in October 1959.

> It is therefore, only necessary to overcome the difficulties born of the Cold War in order to find the way to an agreement on West Berlin and on the wider question of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states. This is the way to ease international tensions and to promote peaceful coexistence. [Ref. 97: p. 13]

Despite his willingness to create the crisis environment to achieve certain above-mentioned objectives, in the end the interests to avoid increased conflict with the West took precedence over these other interests and led to either their postponement or abandonment.

During the Berlin crisis period Walter Ulbricht's regime interests in the German Problem were quite concise and uncomplicated. The number one concern was to exercise control over all of Berlin. The Western allies, however, did not accommodate the East German leader in this desire. Short of this, Ulbricht perceived a need to gain control over the access routes between the FRG and West Berlin and to contain the Western, i.e. West German, influence emanating from West Berlin.

Following the Soviet Union's treaty with East Germany in 1955 granting the GDR the freedom "to take decisions on all questions pertaining to its domestic and foreign policy, including its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the development of relations with other states," **[Ref. 95: p. 163]** Ulbricht began to increase his pressure on Moscow for a peace treaty granting him sovereign rights to claim Berlin as his territory. With the peace treaty, of course, would have to come the Soviet resolve to support the GDR in implementing these rights. By 1958 Khrushchev was convinced that a peace treaty may resolve the "abnormal" situation in Berlin. While Ulbricht was emphasizing the need to "enforce the legitimate sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic in the whole of Berlin and to place West Berlin under the authority of the German Democratic Republic **[Ref. 98]**, the Soviets introduced the Free City plan, which was a necessary compromise on Berlin from a GDR standpoint, considering the *de facto* rights of the Western allied powers in the city.

The Free City plan was a main proposal of the initial 27 November 1958 deadline note. In it the Soviets admit that the plan "would be a concession, a definite sacrifice by the German Democratic Republic for the sake of strengthening peace in Europe" **[Ref. 95: p. 261]** since the city lies totally within GDR sovereign geographical jurisdiction, yet would be extremly limited in political control. The alternative to the Free City proposal was the unilateral signing by the USSR of a peace treaty with the Ulbricht regime. Either option would relieve Ulbricht's primary concerns relating to the Berlin problem. These were:

1) Lack of recognition of GDR sovereignty;
2) Occupation forces within GDR territory;
3) Foreign military troops in West Berlin;
4) Lack of control over lines of communication connecting West Germany with West Berlin;

5) Uncontrolled air transport between the FRG and West Berlin;

6) Western military missions in West Berlin and Potsdam; and

7) Unrestrained propaganda and intelligence activities in West Berlin. [Ref. 99]

Ulbricht did not hide the fact that he thought any negotiations on Berlin was a compromise. Just prior to the erection of the Berlin wall, for example, he stated:

> The German Democratic Republic is ready to negotiate the settlement of all questions resulting from the abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin by the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR - insofar as these questions concern the sovereignty of the GDR. This is a concession the GDR is making which the governments of the Western powers should not misunderstand. [Ref. 98: p. 98]

Beyond the immediate Berlin interests, Ulbricht and the SED leadership had two other major concerns at the time; one external and the other internal. First, Ulbricht needed a peace treaty to prove the GDR's legal and sovereign international status to the rest of Europe and beyond. The treaty would have forced the Western powers to have to deal directly with the GDR for their continued existence in and access to West Berlin. The Free City plan may have also accomplished this since it included a clause requiring recognition of the two German states.

Internally, the East Berlin leadership needed to control its borders so it could regenerate its economic capabilities and develop an internal legitimacy originating from a unique socialist German identity. The flow of refugees, growing to several thousand per month in 1961, was extremely costly to their labor force. At this time Ulbricht turned his trade emphasis from the West to East to break the dependence on West German imports.

One needs enhanced visibility glasses to be able to pick out the conflict between East Berlin and Moscow in this

case. A better term in this situation is probably "tactical disagreement." Although both Ulbricht and the Kremlin agreed on the GDR's need for sovereignty over its own territory and international recognition of East Berlin's legal status, they did not agree on the length to which the Soviets should have gone towards achieving these goals. While threatening possible conventional or even nuclear war to back up the option to sign a Peace Treaty with East Berlin, and thus give it control over West Berlin, the Moscow leadership opted for much less dramatic action in the end, when the potential costs involved rose unacceptably for the Soviets.

The most visible result was the Berlin Wall. For Ulbricht, this was a compromise which he was forced to accept. The Soviets achieved more through the crisis, however. Not only did the wall seal off much of the West's influence and control the refugee problem, the process leading up to it did influence the Western powers towards keeping nuclear weapons out of West German hands.

B. CASE #2 - "DETENTE IMPOSED 1968-1972"

No matter how important the German Problem was perceived to have been the Soviet leadership during the detente period, it was never an *Existenzfrage* as it was to the East German leaders. To the Soviets, it was one thread, albeit an important one, making up the overall fabric of their detente strategy in Europe. Their primary concerns were to continue exercising their control over East Germany and other East European states combined with a gradual improvement in relations with the West Europeans.

First and foremost among Soviet interests remained the nuclear weapon issue. Until it was written in a legal document that Germany would not build, own or control nuclear weapons, the Soviet leadership would remain fearful

of a nuclear armed, revanchist Germany. This came out in most every major speech by Khrushchev and Brezhnev during the 1960s regarding West Germany. While the fear of an American nuclear attack had been reduced during this period, the Germans with tactical nuclear weapons, the respected German technical, military know-how and a strong European sense of the past could just ruin the Soviets future designs in Eastern Europe. Understandably, with the creation of the Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn under Brandt and their signing of the Non-proliferation Treaty one month later, this concern was substantially alleviated.

High on the Soviet lists of priorities was the recognition and maintenance of the German Democratic Republic as a separate state. Throughout the early-to-mid 1960s the value of an East German ally grew as the East Germans proved to be economically powerful, ideologically dependable and politically obedient. Two decades of political and economic investment into the East Berlin regime was beginning to bear fruit for Moscow by the late 1960s. During the summer 1968, some Kremlin leaders were probably surprised to see what they had helped to create over the years. The East German leadership was more than willing to help the Soviet solve their problem in Prague. The requirement, therefore, to retain the East German state as an independent member of the socialist bloc had been well established by 1970.

Almost as important was to move the Bonn government to recognize the status quo in Eastern Europe, including the separation of the German nation into two distinct states. This legal recognition of the postwar boundaries would do much to reduce Soviet fears of a grand West German surprise attack to revise them. The first order of business would be to complete Renunciation of Force treaties with Moscow and then with the other East European states. Next, one document could summerize the West German acceptance of the

entire existing European order. This may be applying too much hindsight to Soviet intentions, but the fact remained that Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders eventually realized that their cherished ESC could **only** come about via Bonn. Furthermore, the desire to achieve the ESC goal steadily grew as the new Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn showed greater signs of going along with the Soviet's plan of Bonn's recognition of the status quo before any substantial benefits could be gained through improved relations with Eastern Europe. In the negotiating process, this goal forced the Soviets to compromise on their above-mentioned goal of getting Bonn to formally recognize East Berlin's international status.

Another Soviet German Problem interest was the reduction of Western influence and presence in West Berlin. Social stability would remain threatened in East Germany as long as West Berlin remained an outpost of Western military, political social influence. During the 1960s, the Berlin wall could never be quite high enough to keep out the desires and dreams of capitalist living. In this interest, the Soviets faced two major obstacles. First, the arrangement was well founded in legal terms, and second, the British, French and Americans were determined to stay and exercise these legal rights. These obstacles proved insurmountable during this period, resulting in the Soviet's relinquishing this interest to other, more viable ones.

The long-standing interest to reduce American influence in the Federal Republic continued to remain a valid objective in Moscow. Many opportunities arose in the late 1960s towards achieving this long term goal. Disenchantment with U.S. Southeast Asian involvement, widespread civil unrest in Europe and the coming to power of the first West German Social Democratic party made one easily imagine a Western Europe without American troops stationed throughout. The

Soviets saw their strategy as a zero-sum game, and the goal of a rapprochement with Bonn and the formulation of an ESC was an important part of it.

A significant motivator behind the Brezhnev *Deutschlandpolitik* was the vast realm of technological and economic benefits through increased contacts. The economic miracle in West Germany developed an industrial-technological economic base, of which Moscow felt it needed a greater share. Furthermore, many products unavailable from the West Germans themselves, might be available from the British, French or Americans via the German connection once it was established.

Finally, the inverse of the rapprochement process was also a Soviet interest; that of limiting intra-German contacts. Just as the GDR creates an avenue to increased Soviet influence in Western Europe through the FRG, opening contacts with the latter creates opportunities for increased Western influence in East Germany. While the Kremlin leaders appreciated and supported the formation of the SED *Abgrenzung* policy, the Soviet leaders also feared too much intra-German discussion, which might someday lead to independent action outside of their control. Although this may not have seemed very likely in 1970, this became, in fact, a more plausible possibility in 1984. In addition, trusting the Germans is not one of the Soviet's fortes.

East Germany's German Problem interests had increasingly become tied to the problem of its own identity. Twenty years after its founding, the GDR still remained in 1969 an unaccepted member of the international community beyond the socialist bloc. **International identity** and **domestic legitimacy** remained the central issues for the SED leadership. During this entry period into becoming accepted into the international community, 1968-1972, the East Berlin leadership was forced to readjust the priorities of their interests to fit the situation.

The reality of the German Problem was being shaped primarily by Moscow and Bonn, which demanded constant adjustment on the part of the SED leadership. The ability to recognize reality and to modify goals and policy to match the changing interests was the crucial difference between Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker.

The foremost interest to the East Berlin leaders was to establish a unique identity for the East German state. As mentioned above, this objective had two components; an internal and an external. The former required the creation of a credible, separate socialist German identity for the East Germans. This demanded a revision of German history to show a precedent of a socialist tradition as a dominant force in the German past. This also demanded convincing the population that the socialist way of life was morally and socially superior to their degenerate Western cousins. These were obviously complicated so long as West German media continued to fill the airwaves with news broadcasts and other forms of "propaganda", and as long as the majority of the East Germans had spent most of their lives in a prewar world. While the former required an active policy "offensive" on the part of the SED ideologues, the latter was merely a matter of time.

The external component, which had internal ramifications, was quite straightforward. Ulbricht badly wanted the GDR to be held in the international community as a unique, sovereign state, solely represented by the SED leadership and accepted as an equal to other states, especially the Federal Republic. The latter's influence in the Western and Third World were major constraints in accomplishing this objective. As the Brandt government gradually convinced their East Berlin counterparts that they were willing, unlike their predecessors, to treat them as equal partners, the SED leadership became more flexible. Erich Honecker and

his supporters were willing to accept this recognition of German equality as a compromise on their formal recognition demands on Bonn in exchange for GDR recognition by the rest of the international community.

Even more than their Soviet protectors, the East Germans had reason to fear a "readjustment" of the postwar borders by a powerful West German army. More than once in the 1950s and 60s did West German politicians mention that they considered the situation as "abnormal" and the formal policy of the Adenauer government had been to strive towards reunification. To the SED this meant nothing less than extermination of their positions of power in the East. The Soviets, of course, never let the SED forget this either. For this reason a formal renunciation of force agreement with the Bonn government was of outstanding importance. The East Germans neatly included this renunciation of force statement into their draft treaty between the two states[13] The Basic Treaty did, in fact, combine this renunciation of force clause with a statement on the inviolablity of borders and the respect of territorial integrity.[14]

A third major interest to East Berlin was to get West Berlin recognized as a independent political unit. No less than in the past, West Berlin still represented a lack of complete GDR sovereignty over its territory. Only by severing the political ties to the FRG could Ulbricht claim East German control over the transit routes to the city and work towards further removal of the Allied presence there.

Finally, there existed an interest to establish limited, yet controlled, contact with the West Germans. The emphasis, here, was on the **controlled** aspect. For various

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[13]Article III of the Draft Treaty on the Establishment of Equal Relations, 17 December 1969.

[14]Article 2 of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, 21 December 1972.

reasons, leading segments within the SED saw some value in establishing improved relations with the FRG. Preconditions to these improvements were, of course, to be treated as equals and to be able to control the level and degree of such improvements. Increased intra-German relations could well lead to economic benefits to East Berlin and prove to the outside world that they existed on equal terms. It would also increase East Berlin's leverage in attempting to achieve their interests in the German Problem

Since there had been no precedent for "good" relations with their West German neighbors, it was impossible for Ulbricht or Honecker to predict the effect this might have on their domestic situation. Given the already existing complications, and the recent memory of the Prague Spring, the SED leaders forecast the worst. It was Honecker, together with a few other SED leaders responsible for ideology, Verner and Norden, who went to work on a policy designed to counter the ill effects of such contacts. This policy, given the title *Abgrenzung*, or delimitation, has been mentioned several times above. Any success of any rapprochement with the West Germans could only be possible to the extent that this policy succeeded in convincing the East Germans that the people they were dealing with in the West were not national compatriots, but the opposition in a class struggle for social survival.

The relative importance of these interests became the main source for conflict between Moscow and East Berlin in this case. How and when to achieve GDR recognition and the extent of East Berlin's control over West Berlin and its access routes were two major objectives, on which agreement between Ulbricht and the Brezhnev leadership slowly grew further and further apart. As Ulbricht became entrenched in his demands on these issues, the Soviets saw opportunities regarding other interests that were to be lost if they

acceded to the East Germans' demands. Although more apparent than the Ulbricht-Khrushchev disagreements, outward signs of tension between the East German and Soviet leader were only infrequently noticeable. The dispute ran deep, however, and continued for about 18 months, culminating in the eventual change in leadership in East Berlin.

To Moscow's advantage, the solution had begun to work itself out through the developing domestic struggle in the SED leadership. Neatly accomplished with certain, although discrete, CPSU involvement, the change of leadership produced an SED leader who could see the "realities" of the Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* much better than Ulbricht. Although Honecker was as unwilling to yield on the value of the above objectives, he certainly saw great merit in working closely with Moscow towards achieving them.

C. CASE #3 - "HONECKER'S DETENTE 1979-1984"

The official Soviet position by 1980 was that the German Problem no longer existed; there were two independently recognized German states. The latter fact recognized, according to the Soviets, the post World War II situation in Central and Eastern Europe and an agreement between the Allied powers was properly regulating a peaceful environment in Berlin. This attitude obviously ignored the position held by Bonn on holding open the possibility of future reunification by peaceful means and the Western powers' formal position that the four Allied powers still maintained a legal responsiblity for Berlin and German as a whole. As events developed in Central Europe in the early 1980s, it appeared as though many leaders in Moscow would even agree that there still existed a German Problem.

Moscow's premier interest in this area was, in reality, never threatened during this period. This interest was the preservation of domestic stability in East Germany from

possible outside encroachment. Although perhaps perceived by some Kremlin leaders to have been possibly weakened through intra-German contacts, Honecker's thorough *Abgrenzung* policy kept personal contacts to a minimum while actually using the governmental level contacts to improve his domestic legitimacy.

The Soviet interest to maintain its control, for political leverage purposes, over intra-German relations and West Berlin - FRG connections formed the basis for Soviet disagreement with Honecker's *Deutschlandpolitik*. Moscow had made significant investment in forming the detente relationships which led to improved West Berlin cooperation and increased intra-German contacts. This created a linkage mechanism according to which Bonn was dependent upon Soviet and East German cooperation for the continuation and improvement of these ties. Based on this deepening relationship, Moscow has exploited Bonn's desires in attempts to alter FRG policies in Moscow's interests. The best example of these interests during the latest period were the delay or postponement of the intermediate range nuclear missile deployment and the continuation of trade relations despite increased superpower tensions.

The Moscow leadership offered both rewards and punishments for non-compliance. In the missile issue, Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko made it clear to West German politicians that intra-German relations could not flourish "in the shadow of American missiles". Relations between the FRG and the East Europeans and the Soviet Union would be very much damaged by Bonn's continued support of the NATO deployment policy.

In West German-Soviet trade relations the Soviets also let it be known that these were mutual interests between themselves and not an issue for American dictates. After Afghanistan, the USSR improved the access to Berlin for West

Germans, thus using its role as arbiter to make Berlin an "oasis of detente", hoping to prove to West German officials that there are tangible rewards to be gained if they refuse to follow the American policy of East-West tensions. [Ref. 30: p. 20]

Ms. Stent has pointed out the fact that the Soviets have often stressed the economic benefits available to the West Germans in continued trade relations between the two countries, while also emphasizing the folly of German compliance with American embargo policies. [Ref. 30,] [Ref. 100] According to Moscow's argument to the Germans, the Germans would only be punishing themselves, most specifically the Ruhr working class families, by following a hard line economic policy to compliment their political policies. Bonn might also reap benefits in acting as a moderating force within NATO. Chancellor Kohl did in fact appear to play this role in his efforts to soften American arms control and East-West trade policies. [Ref. 44: p. 36]

The Soviet Union's power over West Berlin and intra-German relations can be used as a means to hold these as a carrot or a stick with not only the West German regime, but also with the East Germans. This was painfully driven home to Honecker in the summer 1984 when Moscow proved that it still set the limits to the timing and degree of permissible contacts.

Another important German Problem interest for Moscow leaders was to reduce, but not eliminate, U.S. influence in the Federal Republic. Over the decades the Soviet leadership has come to appreciate the moderating influence the United States can play on the West Germans. Although the powerful role the Americans play in Europe certainly limits the Soviet's room for maneuver and influence in the region, it also has had a dampening effect on the role of the FRG within Europe. Should the West Germans possess the power to

move away from the United States in Europe, this would probably mean its domination of Western Europe would increase, thus leaving Moscow with a more powerful, less predictable West Germany, possibly with nuclear weapons. **[Ref. 100: p. 250]**

Finally, the Soviet Union in the 1980s must always keep a watchful eye on the growth of West German influence on the GDR, especially the possibility of increasing nationalism. Out of solely security concerns, the Soviets could not imagine a unified German state dominating Europe again. The temptations of Western life-styles and economic success remain potentially reinforced through greater social and cultural contacts, which, when combined with daily West German media access, threatens the ideological stability existing in East Germany. The tempo of intra-German relations must not get out of hand whereby the two German states develop a more autonomous bilateral relationship. Although there was never any question of Honecker becoming another Tito or Ceausescu, his policies in 1983-1984 may have been misinterpreted by a divided and inexperienced Soviet leadership as questioning his subservience to Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* concerns.

In consonance with Moscow's thinking, the SED leadership considered the German Problem solved after Bonn's conclusion of the Moscow, Warsaw and Basic Treaties. The Helsinki agreements also provide the East Berlin regime with further proof of their *de jure* international sovereign status. Apparently Honecker has not considered the *modus vivendi* over West Berlin disturbing enough to question its future status.

The initial fears Honecker experienced of a further breakdown of domestic legitimacy as a result of increased intra-German contact were effectively countered through the *Abgrenzung* policy. By 1980 the generation of young East

Germans entering the work force was born after the construction of the Berlin wall, with physical access to the West never really being more than a remote option. Combining this with effective propaganda and a steady improvement in the standard of living in the East, the SED leadership could deal with their Western neighbors with much more confidence than ten years before.

The most important interest to Honecker and his fellow Politburo members in forming his *Deutschlandpolitik* was the preservation and continued development of a distinct socialist German identity. Only this identity would give the East Berlin regime its long-sought legitimacy from its own population and abroad. In any dealings with Bonn the East Germans repeated that only through their sovereignty being respected could there be any productive business between the two states. In this theme is also Honecker's demand that Bonn recognize East German citizenship as one separate from the Federal Republic's[15] and that the diplomatic representative missions in the two countries' capitals be upgraded to full ambassies. These moves would be final steps that, according to East Berlin, need to be taken to put their relations on an equal basis as those with other states. On the other hand, these were the two main areas where Bonn refused to compromise further in the Basic Treaty negotiations. It was clear afterwards that these points were noted in the treaty as areas in which both sides "agree to disagree".

Whereas the above demands had almost created an impass to improved intra-German contacts by 1980, Honecker surprisingly lowered their priority in the next eighteen months, perhaps with the urging of Moscow, to make way for his next

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[15]According to West German law, any East German coming to the West is considered a West German citizen. This policy is rooted in the sole representation claim but also is part of the one German nation concept.

order of interests; the continued development of intra-German contacts at the governmental level. Perhaps surprising to many SED leaders, there proved to be several benefits for East Berlin in these contacts over the decade of the 1970s. These boosted the regime's internal and external legitimacy through satisfying domestic pressure to cooperate with their Western capitalist neighbors and have signalled to the West Germans and others that they are not an iron-curtain system unable to liberalize itself. Increased family contacts, although severly limited, involved the permission of over 25,000 East Germans to enter the FRG over the past twelve years is the best example of this. East Berlin has learned that releasing dissidents and unemployables[16] makes better public relations and economic sense than to house them in jails or pay their welfare costs. As has been mentioned above, there has been substantial economic stakes involved in the intra-German contacts. A deal has been continuing between Bonn and East Berlin, according to which the former is granted greater human contact and freer movement between the two countries and the latter receives economic, technical and financial support. Not surprising, both regimes are bargaining for benefits in those areas from which they primarily draw their popular legitimacy; political benefits for Bonn in return for economic benefits for East Berlin.

Erich Honecker apparently hoped to draw increased prestige for himself and his regime in conducting a first-ever head-of-state visit to the Federal Republic. For these reasons the visit rested on such GDR requirements as: the visit must take place primarily in the FRG capital; and discussions on a common *communique* must begin beforehand so that the wording would be virtually agreed upon prior to the

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[16]This includes mostly pensioners, prisoners and the chonic unemployed.

visit. **[Ref. 101: p. 22]** Although the West Germans proved themselves insensitive to the prestige element, Honecker probably felt this important for both his domestic stability and in his relations with Moscow. The latter particularly so if he could prove to his Soviet allies that his approach could produce substantive results. Among the issues seen as substantive to the East Berlin officials at the time were the agreement by Bonn and East Berlin to make a joint Renunciation of Force declaration and a settlement on the inter-German border marking along the Elbe river. **[Ref. 102: p.32, p. 22]**

Another important interest to the East Berlin leadership in their *Deutschlandpolitik* was to project the GDR as an independent and important player in European affairs. The pains of recognition left to the past, it became increasingly important to bolster its image realm of influence within Europe. Again the competition with Bonn's status in West European affairs may have played an influencing role.

Together with the above interests, Honecker never missed the opportunity to present his state as a responsible, peace-minded member of the international community. According to Honecker, the fundamental differences between the social systems in the GDR and the FRG, and their commitment to opposing alliances makes it necessity that the two countries work towards reduced tensions during difficult times in superpower relations. Upon this thesis he established his policy of "limiting the damage" caused by the NATO deployment of the Pershing II missiles. **[Ref. 103]**

Over a period of about one decade East Berlin and Moscow were for a second time in dispute over the GDR's role in *Deutschlandpolitik*. This time, however, the roles had reversed; the Moscow leadership was restraining, rather than pushing, East Berlin leaders in their conduct of intra-German relations.

The two main interests causing this conflict were tightly intertwined. While there were strong indications that Honecker wished the GDR to play a greater role in European Security policy, his unique road towards this goal lie in his relations with Bonn. Not only did the Kremlin fear possibly losing its control, and therefore its leverage, over intra-German contacts, the East German leader's actions psychologically appeared in Moscow as a redefinition of the SED's traditional role within the parameters set by Soviet hegemony. [Ref. 36: p. 16]

The resultant dispute was in some ways the most visible ever between these two leaderships. However, very little apparent harm was done since the bulk of the dispute was conducted through the media. The outward appearance was probably much greater than the dispute's real potential for negatively affecting the relations between the two countries. Miscalculations and misperceptions were likely key players, since a resolution came in a rather swift and low-key manner. Although Honecker retreated from his earlier prompting of greater policy roles for the smaller European states and cancelled a highly visible trip to West Germany, the GDR continued their low profile contacts with Bonn . The new Kremlin leadership probably came out of the situation somewhat more intelligent about their allies as well.

IV. CASE STUDIES

A. BERLIN CRISES 1958-1962

1. Setting the Stage

In reviewing the Berlin crises of 1958-1962 it is important to recognize that it was a Soviet diplomatic offensive against West Berlin which carried on, at various tension levels, for over four years. Or as Drs. George and Smoke have put it, "the deadline crisis of 1958-1959 and the crisis of 1961 can usefully be seen as a single tapestry, a long dual over Berlin which did not fade away until 1962 when the United States again asserted its strategic superiority." **[Ref. 52: p. 395]**

The roots to the deadline crisis, which can be considered as the official beginning of the Berlin crises, are found in several events which took place in 1957. Following a NATO Council endorsement of the introduction of American-controlled nuclear weapons in Europe in May 1957, debates formed within the alliance during the following summer. These were especially heated up by the French position demanding joint, allied control over the weapons. The strategic importance of the basing of IRBMs in Europe increased drastically in the eyes of the NATO defense planners in late August when it was learned that the Soviets had successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and again in October when the Russians proved the first to succeed in puting a satellite into orbit, which they called *Sputnik*. In mid-December 1957 the NATO Foreign Ministers agreed in Paris to the following plan: (1) The deployment of IRBMs would be based upon bilateral negotiations between the United States and interested allied

governments; (2) the actual decision to use the missiles would be a joint decision; and (3) nuclear warheads would be stockpiled in Europe under the control of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), U.S. General Lauris Norstad.

Understandably, this NATO decision came as a significant blow to Moscow's sense of security in Europe, particularly since West Germany was among the "interested allied governments" who might not just have the missiles on their territory, but also under their control. A prominent supporter of West German acquisition of nuclear missiles was SACEUR, himself, General Norstad. He stated in in February 1958 that a West German nuclear force was "absolutely indispensable" for a balanced and credible NATO nuclear deterrent in Europe. **[Ref. 104: p.62]**

Besides threats to the individual NATO states and their populations of total annihilation in the event of war in Europe, the Soviets attempted to bring this issue to the negotiating table. A few days prior to the December NATO decision, Soviet Premier N. A. Bulganin proposed a summit conference to discuss the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, which would include both Germanys, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The central role of the nuclear weapons issue played in the Soviet government's initial moves in the Berlin crises, particularly as perceived by the West German Ambassador in Moscow, has already been discussed above. In light of this high level of importance this issue occupied in Soviet decisionmaking, it is remarkable today to note the lack of Western perception of this factor throughout the crises. An observation of one significant example of this, and not intended as a criticism of the individual given that latter day analysts have the benefit of historical documents and hindsight, is the absence of any mention of the Soviet concern over the deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany in a Rand Study on the Berlin issue completed in

preparation for the Foreign Ministers Conference held in May 1960. Later revised and expanded, again without mention of this concern in Moscow, the study was one of the first complete research products dealing with the Berlin crisis at that time. **[Ref. 105]**

Not surprising, the nuclear weapons topic sparked an incredibly heated debate in the Federal Republic. After intensive and violent debate in the spring 1958 in the *Bundestag*, the lower house and primary legislative body in the FRG, the CDU/CSU won the debate authorizing Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Strauss to accept the West German participation in the NATO nuclear weapon deployment scheme. **[Ref. 104: p. 93]** Despite the hysteria building up on both the Soviet and West German sides over the missile issue, on other levels thes two governments were taking their first significant steps towards diplomatic normalization since their establishment of formal relations in 1955. The signing of an agreement in April 1958 opened up increased West German trade for the Soviets in return for a loosening of Moscow's emigration roadblocks allowing thousands of ethnic Germans from the Volga region and other areas in the USSR to emigrate to the Federal Republic. **[Ref. 106: p. 304]**

Walter Ulbricht certainly could not be pleased with any Soviet agreements which might reduce tensions between Moscow and Bonn. West Berlin was the sorest issue facing Ulbricht at the time and any accommodation between these two would mean a loss to Ulbricht's demands for sovereign control and reduction in FRG influence in the city. On the other hand, Adenauer's government had not the slightest inclination to reduce its political and cultural ties with the city. Their connection was brought, in Bonn's view, even closer by the 21 May 1957 Federal Constitutional Court finding that "Berlin is a land (state) of the Federal

Republic of Germany and the Basic Law applies basically in Berlin also." [Ref. 95: p. 210]

This court ruling and other factors were behind Ulbricht's note to each of the four Allied powers in September 1958, which reminded them of their responsibility and the necessity to prepare a peace treaty with both German states. This note was only an indication of the probable growing pressure Ulbricht was putting on the Soviet leadership to solve the Berlin problem.

That some common approach was agreed upon between Ulbricht and Khrushchev shortly afterwards is suggested by arguments that Ulbricht made in a speech he delivered on 27 October 1958, which was printed in Neues Deutschland the following day. The speech took place two weeks before Khrushchev's speech in Moscow, in which the Soviet leader first suggested a Berlin ultimatum, and an entire month before the deadline note. The main argument of all three messages was that while the Soviets had fulfilled their obligations in the Potsdam Agreement, the Western Powers had not. Therefore, Moscow had the right to consider void all the rights given them under the agreement. This meant that the control of Berlin could be returned to the German Democratic Republic under the established norms of sovereign rights recognized in international law. It is highly improbable that Ulbricht could have made this argument without the Kremlin's consent, and even less likely that Khrushchev picked up on this argument after Ulbricht introduced it. In any event, it is quite probable that the Soviet deadline note, delivered to the three Western Allied Powers on 27 November 1958, was motivated by Moscow's interest to satisfy pressure from Ulbricht and the desire to use this low risk lever to pressure the Western powers into negotiations on the German Question, with the hope that the latter would lead to an agreement on a non-nuclear Germany.

2. The Deadline Crisis

The 27 November deadline note began the first of the two Berlin crises leading to the building of the Berlin wall in August 1961. The Soviets conveyed four major points in the note:

1) The Western Powers no longer had legal occupation rights in Berlin;
2) West Berlin should be made a Free City with control of access turned over to the sovereign GDR government;
3) The Soviet government proposed to make no changes in guaranteeing access to Western occupation forces' military traffic for a period of six months; and
4) If after this period negotiations towards reaching an appropriate agreement are not made, the Soviet Union would unilaterally affect the planned measures through agreements with the GDR. [Ref. 95: pp. 249-263]

While Khrushchev was clearly respecting U.S. deterrence capability in Berlin, he also realized that through a low risk option of using the "threat" of coercive action, he had good reason to believe that his military, diplomatic and psychological advantages, given Berlin's geographic and historical conditions, gave him a high probability of success.

The Western response in December 1958, and primarily orchestrated by Secretary of State Dulles, while agreeing to negotiations on Germany as a whole, rejected the Free City proposal and ignored Moscow's deadline requirement. [Ref. 38: p. 36] Since opening negotiations on Germany was the first intended step towards his goal, the Soviets had, thus far, not lost anything, despite the rejection of their first proposal. The cohesion among the NATO powers, and the degree to which they felt they had a continuing role in Berlin and the German Problem, would largely determine the measure of "gains" available to the Soviets through negotiations.

Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan was in Washington in early January 1959 and had already presented

Secretary Dulles with an outline of the forthcoming note when it was introduced as a draft Peace Treaty proposal on 10 January. Apparently Mikoyan stressed Moscow's willingness to negotiate. His visit and the 10 January note convinced many in Washington of the Soviet's serious interest in negotiations, all deadlines aside. **[Ref. 38: p. 37]** Ulbricht, on the other hand, was not as pleased with the Western response and on 8 January published a several page "Reply of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Government of the USSR" in Neues Deutschland. Its thorough repetition of Berlin's historical background, all of which was in the deadline note, and its extremely harsh tone suggests Ulbricht may have intended to remind Khrushchev of the original East German goals. Showing Ulbricht's frustration and impatience, the note states:

> The government of the German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, considers the present misuse of West Berlin as intolerable. It holds the view that thirteen years after the end of the war, and in view of the flagrant disregard of the Potsdam Agreement and other four power agreements on Germany by the USA, Great Britain and France, there could be no more justification for the maintenance of privileges of thes states in the form of the occupation regime in West Berlin. **[Ref. 98: p. 68]**

Furthermore, the "reply" speaks of the 27 November deadline note as a Soviet announcement of their **decision** to "transfer to the German Democratic Republic all functions temporarily exercised by the Soviet authorities." **[Ref. 98: p. 68]** This conscious misinterpretation may have been to mislead the East German public of Soviet commitment to the East German demands on Berlin, thereby creating additional pressure on the Kremlin during the upcoming negotiations.

Within a month after the Twenty-First CPSU Congress Khrushchev lifted the deadline on negotiations on 2 March 1959 while agreeing to a Foreign Ministers Conference on Germany. Although this ended the "deadline" crisis, and

eased tensions somewhat between the two military blocs, the internal disagreements within the alliances continued to flourish as both sides worked towards a common proposal to present at the upcoming conference.

3. Negotiations

The Western powers held together remarkably well throughout the negotiation period despite rifts that developed and gradually grew to cause more acute problem s later in the crisis. The Foreign Ministers Conference met in Geneva from 11 May to 5 August 1959. Both East and West Germany were allowed to attend as observers. Prior to the conference, signs by the British of an overwillingness to negotiate angered leaders in Bonn, forcing Adenauer to join deGaulle in a solid "European" front. Both sides held a firm ground. Repeatedly Gromyko called attention to the NATO decision to introduce nuclear weapons in Germany, but Washington did not take up the issue as relevant to their negotiating position. During late May and early June, under closed sessions without the German delegations, Western and Soviet proposals and counterproposals were exchanged in quick succession, raising the hope of a tentative area of agreement. On 10 June, however, after Ulbricht's visit to Moscow, Gromyko returned to the earlier Soviet proposals to include more deadline threats. [Ref. 38: p. 85] Should the West reject his proposal, Gromyko said, the Moscow leadership would not "confirm it agreement to the continuation of the regime in West Berlin." After this was vehemently rejected by the Western Ministers, the conference stalled again, which was good reason to call a recess for three weeks. Upon reconvening, the Western position held together further despite extremely skillful negotiating by Gromyko. He quickly determined the limits of a united Western position and held his ground from that point, pressing for a split.

The Foreign Ministers agreed to another recess after President Eisenhauer announced on 3 August that Khrushchev would visit Washington for a bilateral summit in September. Although nothing was agreed upon regarding Berlin during the First Secretary's visit with Eisenhauer, the fact that it took place seriously exacerbated Moscow's growing rift with China. **[Ref. 14: pp. 356-357]** The trip was a stark signal to the Chinese as to where Khrushchev's priorities were and the Chinese tension would affect Soviet decisionmaking on Berlin over the following two years.

4. <u>Pressure Builds for a New Crisis</u>

The chiefs of state who followed up on the Geneva conference in summit diplomacy in 1959 and 1960, in efforts to reach a breakthrough in the negotiations impass on the German Problem, were no more successful in such endeavors than their foreign ministers had been earlier. In fact, while the Foreign Ministers were at least working on similar proposals and within a common forum, the summit process took place in varied bilateral and multilateral forums, creating competition and suspicion among the allies on both sides, particularly in the two German capitals. Perhaps in response to pressure from domestic critics, Khrushchev revived his threat of a separate peace treaty with the GDR in January and March 1960. Ulbricht, in the meantime, attempted to negotiate directly with Bonn by sending Adenauer a letter proposing a "German Confederation and Free City" in Berlin in late January. Ulbricht must have been aware of several possible points in his favor at that time. These were, namely: Khrushchev's desire, and perhaps need, to deliver a Berlin victory to the Presidium; the increasing pressure developed through Chinese dissatisfaction with Soviet foreign policy; and the growing rift among the NATO partners over a solution to the German Problem. The U-2

shootdown, which Khrushchev used as his excuse to "torpedo" the Paris Summit Conference in mid-May 1960, also created long felt shock waves within the Soviet leadership. [Ref. 82: pp. 97-122]

The shootdown incident, and its immediate negative effect on Sino-Soviet relations, forced many in Moscow to question Khrushchev's foreign policy with the United States, China and Germany. The changes which resulted within the Soviet leadership have already been discussed. (pp. 100-102) In addition, the renewal of public discussion of West German control over atomic missiles in July did not improve Khrushchev's internal position any. While NATO and the U.S. were still conducting studies on the correct deployment policy to implement, the Eisenhauer Administration verified that it would support a West German request for the missiles if the NATO plan so stipulated. Bonn denied claims that they were requesting any specific type of missiles, like for example, the IRBMs that were currently being deployed in West Germany under U.S. control, but stated that they would "accept" any missile system which NATO found appropriate for their defense. [Ref. 107: p. 262]

At this stage Khrushchev may have felt the need to increase the pressure on Bonn and the Western powers while limiting his involvement and, therefore, responsibility, in doing so. This might then explain why the Soviets authorized Ulbricht to begin imposing traffic restrictions on West German and West Berlin traffic at the end of August 1960. By order of the East German Interior Ministry, Ulbricht began a selective blockade of West German traffic to West Berlin and closed the sector border between East and West Berlin for five days. [Ref. 38: p.130] This action became the first in which Pankow so openly violated the quadripartite status of the city while simultaneously treating East Berlin as a legal part of the GDR. [Ref. 108: p. 2]

In September the GDR imposes further unexpected restrictions by refusing to recognize West German passports while accepting West Berlin identity cards. This was to emphasize Pankow's recognition of West Berlin as a separate legal entity, in line with the Free City proposals. Additionally, Ulbricht demanded that the Western powers remove their garrisons in the city by 1962. [Ref. 38: p. 130] Adenauer unsuccessfully responded to these restrictions by announcing the cancellation of a new inter-zonal trade agreement, scheduled to take effect on 1 January 1961. Ulbricht's threat to cut civilian rail traffic to West Berlin from the FRG eventually brought the two sides to the negotiating table. Ulbricht agreed to remove his threat to restrict West b Berlin access in return for restoring the interzonal trade agreement, but the original access restrictions to East Berlin remained unaffected.

Behind Ulbricht's actions was perhaps his belief in Soviet economic support, considering the Soviet Union had recently guaranteed an increase in the delivery in raw materials to the GDR on 30 November. [Ref. 106: p.315] Ulbricht was in no way enjoying a stable economic situation. In December, the government economic planning apparatus had to present the Central Committee with a new Seven-Year plan because the apparent failures resulting from the one introduced only two years earlier. Moscow provided further relief a few months later by granting the East Germans another credit allotment of over 2 billion marks. The 199,188 refugees who had crossed over to the West proved that the mass exodus was on the upswing again. Since 1956 an average of almost 17,000 refugees per month who were leaving the East meant a tremendous loss of skilled and unskilled labor needed for the postwar recovery of the East German economy. During the spring and summer months of 1961 the average refugee flow was almost 18,500 per month to the West. [Ref. 109: p. 20]

The U.S., on the other hand, found itself without many options, other than verbal protests and to symbolically drive about East Berlin to show the flag. The discovery of the lack of available effective options was to alarm the newly-elected President Kennedy when he entered office and reviewed the Berlin situation. [Ref. 52: p. 414]

Further military events occured in the fall 1960 which most likely increased internal pressure on Khrushchev to reach a "German Agreement". Chancellor Adenauer resumed his request for nuclear weapons for the *Bundeswehr* in October and a month later, on 26 November, the NATO advisory council approved NATO shared control of nuclear weapons. Although certainly more subtle, but nonetheless, unnerving to Moscow leaders, may have been the selection in December of the senior *Bundeswehr* military officer, General Heusinger, to a two-year term as chairman of the NATO permanent military committee in Washington, D.C. [Ref. 107: p. 455]

5. The Berlin Crisis 1961

Unbeknown to the players involved, events and strategies layed out in the spring of 1961 set the stage for the Soviet-GDR decision to heighten the crisis once again that following summer. While the pressure on Ulbricht's regime was increasing daily due to the refugee problem, it was also gaining influence in Moscow. The best indication for this was the March WTO meeting approving the reequiping of the East German army with the latest Warsaw Pact weapons. It was also a sign that this force was considered fit to fulfill a military mission which might soon be forthcoming.

The Bay of Pigs disaster could not have created too positive an impression of Kennedy on Khrushchev. This perceived weakness combined with Kennedy's new nuclear weapons policy in Europe and the refugee problem were most

likely the key factors behind Khrushchev's actions following the Vienna summit meeting. On 10 April the Kennedy Administration unveiled its deterrence policy in Europe at a NATO meeting. The shift was definitely towards greater conventional options prior to escalation to the nuclear level. Inherent in this strategy was not only the lack of emphasis on tactical nuclear missile deployment in Europe but also the decision to set aside any discussion on sharing their control with the NATO allies. To Khrushchev this could easily have been understood to mean that Kennedy was more reluctant than his predecessor to rely on nuclear means of deterrence. A crucial question remained, however; how reluctant?

To test this Khrushchev revived the pressure on the United States during the Vienna summit and shortly afterwards presented another ultimatum in a speech to the Soviet people on 15 June 1961. **[Ref. 96: p. 6]** He restated the Soviet six month deadline for an agreement on Berlin that was presented in Vienna: "We are asking everyone to understand us correctly: The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany cannot be put off any longer, a peace settlement in Europe must be achieved in Europe this year." **[Ref. 96: p. 7]**

On the same day Khrushchev delivered the above message, Ulbricht held a news conference at which he dramatized the insecurity of the access routes to Berlin and once more threatened to interrupt air access as well. His main focus, however, was on the peace treaty and the need for the GDR to be granted its rightful sovereignty. Secondary to the peace treaty goal were plans to seal off West Berlin which were modestly revealed during the news conference. In response to a question as to whether Ulbricht had decided to make the Brandedburg Gate the city limit and "to accept the full consequences of this", Ulbricht stated:

> I take your question to mean that there are people in West Germany who want us to mobilize the builders in the capital of the GDR to erect a wall . . . I am not aware of any such intention. [Ref. 90: pp. 186-187]

While Kennedy and his advisors were still working out an appropriate response to Khrushchev's 15 June speech, Khrushchev announced his intentions to participate in an escalation game to outbid the West if necessary. On 21 June, he delivered in the Kremlin a speech marking the twentieth anniversary of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. Dressed in a lieutenant general's uniform, Khrushchev presented the military with a number of concessions in the course of the speech and through his references to the Berlin situation and the nuclear testing issue, implied that the Soviets were ready to apply the necessary military options to meet the challenge over Berlin. Three weeks later he put more substance behind the Soviet military role in the Berlin threats when Khrushchev announced on 8 July a one-third increase in the Soviet armed forces budget and the suspension of the troop cut program he had begun in January 1960. [Ref. 11: p. 94] The speech also centered on Berlin and the Soviet-GDR peace treaty, treating the latter as though it accomplishment were only a matter of time.

> After the conclusion of the treaty, the Soviet Union will lay down all obligations it has hitherto discharged on the communications lanes with West Berlin. In short, the government of the German Democratic Republic will enjoy full sovereignty over all its territory, just like any other independent state. [Ref. 96: p. 53]

Khrushchev then ended the next section of the speech by expressing an explicit commitment to sign a German peace treaty with the GDR, regardless of a possible military response from the West:

> We shall sign the peace treaty and order our armed forces to administer a worthy rebut to any aggressor if

he dares to raise a hand against the Soviet Union or our friends. [Ref. 96: p. 54]

Throughout July the Soviet leaders launched a verbal offensive around the world to maintain the heightened pace of the Soviet pressure on Berlin. An integral part of this strategy was to attempt to create greater rifts among the Western allies, thereby weakening any common response to an actual substantive Soviet action. [Ref. 96: p. 65] The East Germans joined in this campaign with similar threatening speeches and the passage of a "German Peace Plan" by the *Volkskammer* on 6 July. This propaganda document declared the "conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has become a necessity that can no longer be postponed." [Ref. 110: p. 2] Certainly meant to prepare the East and West Germans for some unsettling events which would likely occur if the peace treaty were soon signed, it may also have been another one of Ulbricht's discreet messages to Moscow of the SED's impatience. As this Soviet-East German pressure intensified in July, over 800 East Germans were fleeing to the West per day through West Berlin, half of which were under 25 years old. To make the situation worse, the Western media continually focussed on this tide of refugees, making this rejection of the communist system a worldwide spectacle. This, in turn, only increased the pressure on the Soviets and East Germans to seek a prompt solution.

On 25 July Kennedy announced the American response to Khrushchev via a nationally televised speech. In this response, Kennedy clearly stated the American's determination to defend their rights in West Berlin. He divulged a number of U.S. measures designed to increase U.S. conventional and nuclear military readiness and signal their determination to the other side. It was a strikingly strong response which was not dependent upon the cohesion of the

American allies. The declared strategy, which was "a series of decisions by the administration", was unilateral in design and action. This greatly reduced Khrushchev's hopes of a weakened Western response through quarrels among the allies.

Robert Slusser makes a convincing argument that Kennedy's speech forced Khrushchev to decide between the maximum objective of forcing the West into accepting a new status for Berlin through Moscow's signing of a peace treaty, or the minimum objective of sealing off the East German regime, thereby shutting off the escape route to the West. **[Ref. 96: p. 93]** The speech also raised the stakes "to a level which the Soviet Union could not afford to match". **[Ref. 96: p. 93]** The result was Khrushchev's decision to settle for the minimum objective, despite the preference in Moscow, and even more so in East Berlin, for the grander maximum objective. Within a few days after Kennedy's speech, probably, according to Slusser's estimate, on the 27th, Khrushchev opted on the plan to proceed with building the wall. **[Ref. 96: pp. 93-95]**

Having chosen the minimum objective, the next course of action was to prepare for its implementation. This was done by keeping the tensions around the issue high through Soviet and East German spokesman, who stressed their intentions to carry out the maximum objective. This type of political deception would warn the West against intervention in Soviet actions around Berlin and would provide a since of relief in the West when the actual Soviet move proves to be markedly less endangering than that expected. The result, hopefully, would be inaction on the Western side. Beginning around 2 a.m. on 13 August, elements of the National People's Army (NVA), the frontier troops and the *Volkspolizei*, assisted by the more zealous members of the German Communist Youth organization (FDJ), began

constructing a barbed-wire fence around the Western Sectors in Berlin. The Soviet `Forces in Germany (GSFG), whose recently reappointed commander, Marshal I. S. Konev, was recalled from retirement on 10 August, remained inconspicuous, but ready, in the background. This was the work of the East Germans, and more specifically, Erich Honecker, who was appointed responsible for the organization, implementation and security for the operation. [Ref. 90: p. 186] By 16 August all access to West Berlin from East Germany was completely sealed off, except for the guarded transportation routes to the Federal Republic.

6. <u>The Crisis Recedes</u>

It was difficult for the West to fully understand Moscow's goals beyond the Berlin wall solution. The Soviet levels of interest in the German Problem were divided among the Presidium leadership, which lent to a confused medley of Soviet statements on Berlin. The military and Gromyko were showing a hard line; Koslov, who was in favor of a hard line, disclosed in North Korea that the deadline was once again over and Khrushchev attempted to present himself as only interested in peace, not offering any openings for negotiations, but also avoiding the threatening talk of mid-summer. There were other pending concerns for the Presidium which apparently found greater attention among the Kremlin leaders. Disarmament talks with the United States, while in danger of collapsing due to the tensions over Berlin, were, in fact, showing some headway and the resumption of nuclear testing by both superpowers revived the discussions on test ban negotiations. The growing problems with China were still looming over the horizon as the CPSU prepared for the Twenty-Second Party Congress to begin in late October 1961.

During the Party Congress the final lingering fires of the Berlin crises were sparked, kindled and finally snuffed. In his opening speech on 17 October, Khrushchev noted the willingness of both sides to reach a settlement of the German Problem and rejected again the notion of a Soviet ultimatum on the issue. On this he stated:

> In proposing a conclusion of a German peace treaty, the Soviet government has been presenting no ultimatum but has been moved by the necessity of finally settling this compelling question . . . we shall not in that case absolutely insist on signing the peace treaty before 31 December 1961. **[Ref. 96: pp. 309-310]**

While this came as a relief to Western officials, Ulbricht was in no way pleased, and according to a Western journalist present at the Congress and who observed Ulbricht at this moment, he certainly did not act like he was pleased at all. **[Ref. 111: p.3.]** A few days later, however, Ulbricht had his opportunity to present his views as to how the Soviets should solve the German Problem. He skillfully ignored Khrushchev's conciliatory action in lifting the deadline and made it quite clear that the "conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is the most urgent task." **[Ref. 96: p. 356]** His argument that the immediate danger of war emanating from the West because of the abnormal situation in West Berlin necessitated an immediate conclusion of a peace treaty came very close to contradicting Khrushchev's recognition that the Western powers were showing a certain understanding of the German Problem.

This act of defiance most probably had the support of certain members of the Moscow leadership, most likely, Koslov. Mr. Slusser's comprehensive analysis of the Koslov-Ulbricht connection at this point is very enlightening. According to his work, an acute crisis in the CPSU leadership allowed Koslov to counter Khrushchev during the

congress over the Berlin issue, which, with the support of Ulbricht and the Soviet military command in Germany, was brought to a new mini-crisis with the West by challenging existing Western rights in Berlin. Beginning on the 22nd of October, Ulbricht's *Volkspolizei* and border guards attempted to demand checking the documents of U.S. personnel entering East Berlin. The obstruction by the East Germans continued to heighten the situation, in reaction to which U.S. tanks pulled up on the U.S. sector border. On 27 October, ten Soviet tanks moved into position along the sector boundary facing their U.S. counterparts. Finally, sixteen tense hours later, the Soviet tanks turned and moved back from their positions along the border. **[Ref. 96: p. 423]** This retreat occured only after an arrangement was made among the Soviet Presidium leadership. In this agreement, according to Slusser's analysis, Koslov would call back the Soviet tanks in Berlin, support Khrushchev in his renewed attack on the Anti-Party group, join in condemning the Albanian party leadership and follow Khrushchev in rejecting the Chinese criticism of this condemnation. In return, Khrushchev had to explicitly disavow the rapidly evolving cult of personality being built up around him and formally acknowledge Koslov's position as the No. 2 man in the party. During the last days of the Congress, these conditions were all met.

After the conclusion of the Congress the Berlin crisis was allowed to dwindle away. The lack of any further military response, so long as Western military access was unhampered, Kennedy's change in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy in Europe, i.e., not granting shared control, and his demonstrated buildup of American conventional and nuclear strategic forces convinced the Kremlin leadership to settle for the minimum objective. Ulbricht may not have gotten his primary interests fulfilled, and apparently was not satisfied with Khrushchev's change in policy priorities,

but were it not for Ulbricht's pressure throughout the crisis, he may not have even gotten a wall to guard.

B. DETENTE IMPOSED 1968-1971

1. Entering the Czech Crisis

Although the Czech crisis is our official starting point for this case study, history is too complex to be able to choose a specific date and try to explain a phenomenon simply from that time onward. Therefore, we must briefly discuss the changes in West German-East European relations in 1967 to better understand the Soviet and East European *Deutschlandpolitik* following the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

As a result of gradual changes in Bonn's *Ostpolitik*, particularly following the construction of the Grand Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, and the lack of political integration of the Warsaw Pact East European states, a growing divergence in East European *Westpolitik* became apparent in the winter of 1967. The new government in Bonn highlighted the following principles on which they were to base their foreign policy:

1) The willingness to relinquish any claim to national control over nuclear weapons;
2) The question of Germany's borders could only be settled in a peace treaty with a unified Germany;
3) The Federal Republic was sole representative of the German people and could not recognize the GDR;
4) It was prepared to establish contacts with the other part of Germany in hope of solving intra-German problems and the conclusion of a renunciation of force agreement; and
5) The Federal Government was interested in concluding renunciation of force agreements and establishing normal relations with East European states. [Ref. 4: p.35], [Ref. 106: p. 330]

Romanian leaders were the first to respond to Bonn's appeals. Bucharest's establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn in January 1967 not only implied a lack of respect

for East Berlin's interests, but the breaking of a solemnly sworn pledge within the Pact not to recognize the Federal Republic prior to its recognition of the GDR. **[Ref. 4: p. 38]** Worse yet, Hungarian, Czech and Bulgarian leaders also showed an interest in Bonn's offer. **[Ref. 18: p. 109]** The Soviets, while initially reserved and perhaps even interested, soon realized, with fraternal advice from Ulbricht, that there were inherent dangers in this policy.

Ulbricht was able to fully express his distress at the WTO Foreign Ministers conference in Warsaw in February 1967. The GDR representatives argued that in offering to improve its relations with the East European countries, Bonn was trying a policy of divide and conquer, which was hostile, rather than conducive to, the cause of peace and detente. **[Ref. 4: p. 38]** Ulbricht's demand, which was supported by the Polish leader, Gomulka, was that the allies must show unconditional solidarity with the GDR if they wanted to safeguard their own interests. Included in this solidarity was the respect for the GDR requirement of full recognition by Bonn **prior** to entering into a political and diplomatic relationship with the Federal Republic. Except for Romania, the GDR demands were supported, albeit for not altogether similar reasons, and accepted at the conference. The Soviet leadership, while supporting Ulbricht and Gomulka, took a somewhat "hesitant and equivocal" stand on the issue, perhaps not yet fully decided on whether the possibilities for opportunity with the Grand Coalition might outweigh its effect on Soviet-East European relations.

A few months later, however, Moscow appeared to have decided for bloc unity over immediate opportunism in its *Westpolitik*. At the Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist Parties in late April 1967, the Soviets clearly supported a harder line on the Federal Republic in order to achieve greater Pact unity. The final conference

declaration on "Peace and Security in Europe" set the following four conditions for the creation of security in Europe:

1) Recognition of existing borders in Europe;
2) Recognition of two distinct and sovereign German states;
3) Bonn's renunciation of access to nuclear weapons "in any form"; and
4) Bonn's recognition of the invalidity of the Munich treaty "from the beginning". [Ref. 18: p. 113]

Despite Moscow's support for the GDR demands, Ulbricht may well have understood the difference in perspectives on which both leaderships were working. While Moscow was hostile towards Bonn, it also held out possibilities for improved relations with the FRG if Bonn were to show greater "realism" in its policy. This dual policy towards the West Germans was based on the hope that when Bonn realizes its lack of success in Eastern Europe, it would be impelled to make concessions on Soviet terms. [Ref. 18: p. 118] East Berlin's fears of a possible sell out by Moscow were not without foundation. When Bonn shifted its concentration of efforts from its East European neighbors to Moscow in late 1967, these fears were again fueled, particularly since the Federal Republic and the Soviets were undergoing a dialogue on a renunciation of force agreement. Under pressure to set Ulbricht as ease, the Soviets pressed a hard line with Bonn through continually drawing in other *Deutschlandpolitik* issues on which Bonn refuse to negotiate. [Ref. 18: pp. 130-142] The talks were discontinued in July, five weeks prior to the Soviet-led invasion into Czechoslovakia.

The crisis building up in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 created a framework for Moscow's attitude to the Federal Republic during that period and immediately after the invasion. Although Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* did not cause the developments in Prague, contrary to claims made by

the SED, Bonn's attempt to seek accommodation with East European regimes was intended to dispel the fear of West Germany by these countries. This fear had been constantly stimulated by the Soviets to form a common source of cohesion among the East European states. As socialist unity was appearing to fall apart in response to Bonn's appeals,[17] the Soviets were able to justify, with the strong urging on Ulbricht and Gomulka's part, the military actions in Czechoslovakia through attacking West Germany's imperialistic and revanchist aims in that country and throughout the Central European region.

2. <u>The Czechoslovakian Invasion and its After-effects</u>

Strangely enough, the effects of the long debated decision to use military force to end the reform movement in Prague placed West Germany-East European and Soviet relations one step closer to rapprochement. Stephen Larrabee has appropriately summed up this paradox:

> While the invasion was essentially a reflection of the weakness of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and a response to forces which were accelerated by Bonn's *Ostpolitik*, it helped to create the very conditions of stability that allowed Moscow to gradually abandon the German bogey and move towards a rapprochement with Bonn shortly thereafter. **[Ref. 18: p.156]**

Moscow indicated within three months after the 21 August 1968 invasion that the leadership was again interested in resuming dialogue with Bonn on the renunciation of force issue. Foreign Minister Gromyko's relatively conciliatory tone towards the FRG in a speech before the United Nations and his meeting with West German Foreign Minister Willi Brandt while in New York on 8 October 1968, the first

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[17] Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with Bonn on 31 January 1968.

meeting between the Foreign Ministers of these two countries since 1962, were positive indications of this Soviet interest.

In 1969 the Soviet-West German climate further improved. The growing storm along their eastern border with China and the linkage policy developing in the Nixon-Kissinger plan for arms negotiations, in which the new administration was tying European detente in with improvements in SALT negotiations, were other factors contributing to the changes in the Bonn-Moscow relationship.

A shift in the Soviet position was evident during the "mini" Berlin crisis in February and March 1969. The East German government sent threatening protests to the Federal government in early February and announced a series of measures they would take should the *Bundestag* convene the *Bundesversammlung* in West Berlin.[18] Ulbricht was in Moscow at this time and the Soviets stepped up their statements, hinting at the possibility that Moscow might not tolerate much longer the inconveniences of the Western presence in Berlin. **[Ref. 4: p. 49]** Both Soviet and East German mass media adopted a harsh tone during the early days in February. American diplomats let their Soviet counterparts know that, in addition to their continuation of exercising their "rights" in West Berlin, continued tensions created by the Soviet side could have negative affects on American cooperation in questions of arms control. Soon afterwards, on 12 February, the Soviets de-escalated their campaign and, despite continued anti-West German polemics over the issue, none of the threatened measures were carried out. This reassessment of priorities most likely took the East Germans by surprise, who shared none of Moscow's interests which led

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[18]This is a special meeting of the West German *Bundestag* to elect the Federal president. It had met every five years in Berlin since 1954 for this purpose.

to the latter preventing the GDR from taking actions which they seemed to have agreed upon previously. [Ref. 4: p.50] Furthermore, as the Soviet leadership saw an opportunity to barter with Bonn on this issue, granting border passes to West Berliners to visit East Berlin in exchange for Bonn moving the *Bundesversammlung* to another location, the GDR representatives sabotaged the arrangement when it came to negotiations. The Soviets were probably embarrassed in the turn of events and likewise able to learn something about dealing with their East German allies. Although the GDR harassed traffic for a few days during the session, the meeting was able to take place in West Berlin on 5 March without significant problems. [Ref. 112]

American concern for Soviet restraint in Berlin was evident in Nixon's talks with Soviet Ambassador Anotolii Dobrynin in mid-February, whereby the President reportedly told the Ambassador that a new crisis over Berlin would certainly jeopardize the SALT talks and upset the progress in expanding the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [Ref. 113] Nixon's visit to West Berlin in late February also made it clear that his administration would not separate Soviet actions in areas of American interests in Europe from the general problem of East-West relations. In addition to appreciating this distinct connection, the Kremlin leaders also understood that any acceptance of the status quo in Europe, perceived by Moscow as important to reducing the chances of another Prague spring, would have to start with West Germany. It was this country to which most of the postwar border changes were affected and upon which the security of Western Europe rested.

3. The Budapest Appeal

The Budapest meeting of the WTO Political Consultative Committee (PCC) on 17 March 1969 was the next

forum at which the Soviets would rejuvenate their serious efforts towards convening an European Security Conference, the goal of which would be the formal recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe. An important watershed in Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik*, the document released to the public differed in several respects from previous declarations. The earlier "anti-revanchist" and "anti-militaristic" polemics were absent and Bonn was not singled out for special treatment as in the Karlovy Vary communique. The requirements for West German participation in a security conference were milder than previously presented. These included:

1) Inviolability of existing borders, including the Oder-Neisse and intra-German borders;

2) Recognition of the existence of the GDR and the Federal Republic;

3) West German renunciation of the claim to sole representation of all Germany and of control over nuclear weapons; and

4) Acceptance of West Berlin as having a special and separate status from the West German state. [Ref. 114: p. D 151]

Conspicuous was that these demands were required to be met for the end product, i.e. by the end of the conference, and, unlike previously, were not necessarily to be met prior to Bonn's participation. This was confirmed by the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn in later discussions. [Ref. 4: p. 52]

At the same time, the Soviets wished to signal to the West a greater commitment to improve thier relations with them, the Budapest Appeal created a tool for the East European allies to demand greater flexibility in their relations with West Germany. No doubt, Romania, who was not a member of the Karlovy Vary conference, sought to utilize the results of the Budapest meeting to legitimize its own efforts to expand contacts with the West. Soon after the meeting, Hungary, too, began to readjust its stand towards the West. [Ref. 18: p. 199] It is therefore understandable

that the wording of the appeal was not agreed upon without dispute. The GDR-Polish position was opposed, according to information passed to a West German reporter in Budapest, by the Romanians and, in a more cautious manner, the Hungarians. Support from the Soviet side, when requested by the East German delegation, was refused. **[Ref. 4: pp. 52-53], [Ref. 115: p. 3]** The Soviet position was most likely responsible for the survival of the more conciliatory line towards the West Germans.

4. <u>The Prague Proposals</u>

From the Budapest Appeal onwards, the Soviets gave increasing signals that they wanted improved relations with Bonn. Of course, there were two problems to be solved within the alliance in the meantime. The first was the above-mentioned freedom the East European allies took upon themselves in interpreting the Budapest results. A conference of the WTO Foreign Ministers was called in late October to develop a bloc-wide plan for future *Westpolitik*. While this meeting brought the Soviets a good two steps forward in planning the way towards rapprochement with the West Germans and, therefore, closer to and ESC, the second problem, Ulbricht's vehement rejection of bypassing his maximal demands as **preconditions** for negotiations, the Soviet leadership was forced to take one step backwards at a Moscow summit meeting in December 1969.

The Prague meeting marked a new stage in developing differences between the GDR leadership and other members of the Pact, particularly the Soviet Union, on the question of how to respond to the new SPD government in Bonn. The convening of a European Security Conference was again the main topic of their Prague Proposals, issued after their two-day meeting on 30 and 31 October 1969. The proposals accepted the bilateral approach and hardly directed any

demands at Bonn. **[Ref. 116]** Both of these points were strongly opposed by the GDR. Ulbricht felt his only protection of this sovereignty and guarantee of recognition of his regime by the Western states lay in a multilateral plan binding on all Pact states with preconditions to negotiations encompassing his maximalist demands. The most important of these were *de jure* recognition of the GDR and recognition of Berlin as a separate legal entity, specifically not part of the Federal Republic. The Brandt government had taken exactly the opposite position. Namely, arguing that bilateral renunciation of force agreements with the Pact states was the most important step towards a relaxation of tensions in Europe. This presented Moscow with a dilemma - accept Brandt's approach, which would open up almost immediately the opportunity to deal with Bonn on several issues important to Soviet interests, or back Ulbricht's demands, which might forestall the talks needed to initiate the convening of an ESC indefinitely.

In November Ulbricht's situation became more aggravated. On 25 November the Brandt government announced its willingness to enter into discussions on outstanding problems with Poland, Ulbricht's final ally to that point. Furthermore, three days later, the Federal Republic signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thus securing one more of Moscow's most critical goals and removing a major obstacle to improved Soviet-West German relations.

Responding to his worsening case, Ulbricht travelled to Moscow on 1 December 1969, two days before a quickly, assembled, "unofficial" meeting of the Warsaw Pact was held in the city. It seems quite clear that the purpose of the meeting was to overcome some of the difficulties between the GDR and Moscow, which had arisen in the past several months. **[Ref. 4: p. 56]** The communique issued upon its closing appeared to be the product of a compromise. Although

demanding *de jure* recognition of the GDR, this was not set as a precondition for further talks. [Ref. 117] The Soviet leaders make the bilateral approach the official policy to follow, while at the same time almost assigning a "division of labor" to the various East European states in their roles vis-a-vis. [Ref. 118: p. 111] The latter probably also included a tentative time line for the development of these relations. Given his unsuccessful attempt to persuade his allies, Ulbricht would make his own interpretation of the GDR's role in intra-German relations.

5. Brandt, Erfurt and Kassel

On 22 October 1969 the German Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party formed the first non-CDU/CSU West German government since the republic's founding. The former mayor of Berlin and foreign minister, Willi Brandt, was chosen as Chancellor. Brandt wasted little time in indicating his government's increased willingness to normalized relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Within one week of forming his new government, Brandt announced Bonn's readiness to recognize the "existence" of the GDR as a second state in Germany. As noted above, by the end of November, he sent positive signals to Moscow in signing the NPT, and by offering to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on a renunciation of force agreement. At the same time, he urged his Western allies to pursue their Berlin talks with Moscow as vigorously as possible. [Ref. 71: p. 366]

The GDR quickly responded to Bonn by presenting an East German draft treaty on 17 December to the Federal Republic which was part of Ulbricht's interpretation of the Pact's bilateral policy. It was also, however, an indication that East Berlin was still reacting to events, rather than controlling them. [Ref. 118: pp. 111-112] As Edwina

Moreton has pointed out, the draft worked both as a sign to Moscow that Ulbricht had acquiesced in the principle of bilateral contacts with Bonn and, by presenting his maximal demands, it could buy Ulbricht some time since he knew the Brandt government was unprepared to accept the terms. In addition, the draft provided an explicit layout of East Germany's base for negotiations and made it clear that further discussions would not simply be on West German terms. [Ref. 118: p. 112]

Soviet Ambassador to East Berlin, Abrassimov, met several times in December with East German leaders. While this was probably to keep the SED informed of Moscow's exchanges with the Federal Republic, it is quite plausible that Moscow was urging Ulbricht to be more responsive to Bonn's willingness to talk. [Ref. 118: p. 114] These meetings with Abrassimov may have become more significant for intra-German dialogue in January 1970, when the Soviet Ambassador met Ulbricht on the 16th, two days after Brandt's "State of the Nation" address. In the speech on the 14th, Brandt announced that concrete proposals would soon be sent to the GDR and rejected Ulbricht's demand for unconditional recognition in place of his formula of "special" intra-German relations. In a full international press conference held on 19 January, the SED First Secretary restated the basis upon which he would frame any negotiations with the Federal government, a position he held until his eventual removal a year later. International recognition would stand as his single-most important goal. Stating this point as the central requirement for peace in Europe, Ulbricht stated quite categorically:

> The establishment of relations under international law between the FRG and the GDR is a basic condition also for normal relations between other states of the Warsaw Treaty and the Bonn government. [Ref. 118: p. 115]

Signs of Soviet influence were visible in his refraining from commenting on West Berlin and his statement that the GDR would await the results of the Soviet Union's negotiations with Bonn before concluding a treaty with Bonn. This point on waiting would reoccur in later developments .

By mid-February 1970, the exchange of notes between Bonn and East Berlin had established the consensus that both sides wished to meet for an exchange of views. Snags developed, however, over the GDR's setting of preconditions and intention to limit the talks to the issue of diplomatic relations. Gromyko's four-day visit from 23-27 February appeared to have helped things along. In their joint communique, the GDR declared its readiness to regulate its relations with Bonn and other states, without mentioning any requirement of full recognition. **[Ref. 119]**

Shortly after Gromyko's visit, East Berlin announced its readiness to conduct "constructive, business-like negotiations" with Bonn. **[Ref. 120]** More snags had to be worked out in March during the preparatory talks, but eventually, a certain degree of motivation on both sides made way for the first meeting between Willi Stoph and Willi Brandt in Erfurt, East Germany on 19 March 1970. With greatly differing motivations on both sides, the least of which on the GDR side appeared to be to negotiate, the only agreement to emerge was that a second meeting should be held in Kassel, West Germany on 21 May. Basically, both sides reiterated their known positions.

Before the second round took place in Kassel, Ulbricht headed a GDR delegation in Moscow. According to the West German newspaper, Die Welt, news leaked out after the second Brandt-Stoph meeting that the Soviets and East Germans had agreed to delaying tactics to be adopted at the Kassel meeting. The Soviets convinced the SED leaders to prevent a complete breakdown of the talks, although

approving an East German intransigent position. The end result was to be a suspension of the talks for an indefinite period. The Soviets, apparently, did not wish to convey to their West German counterparts the impression that East Berlin was giving in. [Ref. 4: pp. 72-73] As a result, the second meeting at Kassel saw Stoph adopt an even harsher stand, yet not find any excuse to break off the discussions, despite the many opportunities to do so given the unruly demonstrations held during the visit. [Ref. 71: pp. 380-386] A "pause for thought" was called before further meetings would be arranged.

6. The Road to Moscow

Already in December 1969 exploratory talks on a renunciation of force agreement between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic had taken place. From these talks both sides concluded that the other was interested enough to begin further discussions. Through three further phases of talks, from January through May, Egon Bahr, the West German spokesman, succeeded in getting the Soviet side, represented by Gromyko, to accept Bonn's concept of "inviolable" border in place of Moscow's preferred term "unchangeable". This protected the FRG position that the final border question is only subject to a peace treaty conducted with the Four Powers in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. Bahr also was able to get the Soviet Union to drop a passage regarding the ratification of the NPT. [Ref. 18: pp. 230-232] Finally, during the final phase of the talks in May the Soviets agreed to drop its intervening rights under Article 53 and 107 of the U.N. charter as well as accepted the stipulation contained in the "Letter to German Unity". [Ref. 18: p. 234] The latter reaffirmed Bonn's ultimate political goal was for peaceful reunification.

By 22 May a rough draft had been worked out, subject to further negotiations. Domestic political differences put off the final negotiations between West German Foreign Minister Scheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko until 27 July. The two Foreign Ministers initialled the final draft on 7 August and Chancellor Brandt travelled to Moscow to sign the treaty on 12 August. After signing, Brandt took advantage of the opportunity to speak with Brezhnev. Among the topics discussed, Brandt mentioned a possible link between the *Bundestag* ratification of the Moscow treaty and "progress" on the Berlin negotiations. While this distressed the First Secretary, Brandt added, "But the politico-psychological situation in the Federal Republic is such that we expect wider approval of the treaty if there is progress on Berlin". **[Ref. 71: p. 340]**

For the Soviet leadership the treaty was seen as an event of "great historical significance". **[Ref. 121: p.32]** One of the final changes achieved by Gromyko was an inclusion in the preamble of a paragraph regarding both sides' determination to improve economic, scientific-technical and cultural relations. This is indicative of Moscow's interest to open up increased exchange in these areas, particularly in trade and scientific-technical, through the conclusion of this treaty. Besides Bonn's renunciation of force, the treaty also gave Bonn's explicit acceptance of the postwar boundaries, including "the Oder-Neisse line which forms the western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic." **[Ref. 122]** This recognition represented their main goal of postwar Soviet diplomacy in Europe. This and the Brandt government's signing of the NPT were major victories for the Brezhnev leadership.

The SED leadership could find very little in the Moscow treaty, with which to be pleased. By Moscow's public

acknowledgement to the world of its confidence in positive changes in West German policies, it robbed Ulbricht of his important policy justification mechanism of presenting West Germany as being the number one enemy. Furthermore, the treaty did not correspond to any of Ulbricht's maximal demands. Recognition of the East German state by the FRG was not made a precondition for the agreement and the wording allowed for the possibility of a future German reunification. At most, in the treaty Bonn recognized the present borders of the GDR. The agreements in the treaty, in Ulbricht's view, were achieved at the expense of East German claims. Not able to openly oppose the agreement, the SED, in Neues Deutschland, briefly reported the "good news", which they followed with the usual East German demands on the Federal Republic. **[Ref. 4: p. 75]**

The official GDR government comment on the Moscow Treaty was published in Neues Deutschland on 15 August 1970. After giving it ritual approval, the response indicated the East Berlin leadership had chosen to interpret the treaty in their own particular light. It was viewed, for example, as a lever to pressure the FRG into diplomatic recognition, arguing that "the obligations in the treaty between the USSR and the FRG consequently require that normal diplomatic relations be established henceforth." **[Ref. 123]** In addition, the article asserted that there was no longer any excuse for third countries to avoid establishing diplomatic relations with East Berlin. The Soviet's disapproval of this interpretation was expressed in Pravda's omission of these paragraphs when it reprinted the GDR's Council of Ministers comment the same day. **[Ref. 124]**

A conference of the PCC of the Warsaw Pact was held in Moscow on 20 August, probably to discuss the significance of the Moscow Treaty within the framework of the Pact's objectives and to press for unanimous approval of the

document. [Ref. 4: p. 76] The additional purpose of preventing the SED from setting out on any obstructionist policy must also be considered. One can assume Moscow's strongest argument was that this opened the way to a Security Conference. The final communique, which was rather weak, did, in fact, make this the central point upon which there was general agreement. No mention was made in reference to upgrading East Germany's international status. [Ref. 125]

7. The Four Power Talks on Berlin

The Four Power negotiations on the status of Berlin became the hottest and finally the turning point in the disagreement between the SED and the leaders in the Kremlin. Back in late March 1970, upon the Western initiative, talks opened regarding the status of Berlin. Initially, during the spring and summer of 1970, the intransigent Soviet position, so totally opposed to the West, suggested to many that there would be little hope for a successful agreement. The Soviets were demanding loosened ties between the FRG and Berlin and were unwilling to discuss access rights. [Ref. 4: p. 82] On these main issues the SED and Soviets were in basic agreement. In their willingness to negotiate in the first place, however, was confirmation of the Soviet Union's continued support of the Four Power status, the very thing the Soviets had been criticizing the West for since the beginning of the Berlin deadline crisis in 1958. During this period, however, the Soviet Union had continued its presence in West Berlin (the Soviet War memorial and their claims to administrative rights in the Spandau Prison). Despite what they may have been telling their East German allies, it is doubtful whether Moscow ever wished to relinquish its occupation rights over the GDR.

The atmosphere changed somewhat when the talks resumed in September 1970. The West German *Bundestag* had made it known that there was a linkage, or *Junktim*, between its ratification of the Moscow Treaty and a "satisfactory" settlement on Berlin. **[Ref. 126]** Although the Soviet position became only slightly more flexible, the little progress achieved was just enough to motivate the participants to continue their efforts. On 4 November, however, the Soviet representatives showed much greater interest in discussing the topic of access to the city from West Germany. Later in the month other signs of progress were discernable during the negotiations. Bonn, and the other Western Powers added increased pressure on the Soviet Union when Foreign Minister Scheel suggested that the Polish-West German treaty, initialed in November, could only be ratified if there were an acceptable Berlin accord. Then, in December, the NATO ministers agreed to a linkage between their support for an ESC and a satisfactory conclusion of the Berlin negotiations. **[Ref. 127: p. 62]**

Throughout November, Ulbricht thought it essential to remind his Soviet allies, through statements and actions, that East German interests were not to be overlooked. While Ulbricht noted the need for greater "consultation between the fraternal parties", he refused to attend the Hungarian Party Congress, at which the Soviet leaders intended to use for an informal summit meeting to work out differences of opinion among the East European leaders. Instead, Gromyko was forced to travel to the GDR for talks which apparently produced no further understanding. They did agree, however, to settle their differences at a meeting of the PCC on 2 December in East Berlin. **[Ref. 118: pp. 168-169]**

During this same time, the West German CDU/CSU were holding a party caucus in West Berlin. Ulbricht, withing perhaps to show both East and West his potential power in

this situation, directed serious traffic delays from 29 November until 2 December. It is uncertain the level of support which the Soviets placed behind this particular display of sovereignty. We are fairly certain, however, that Brezhnev and Ulbricht clashed strongly at the East Berlin conference. **[Ref. 118: p. 169], [Ref. 4: p. 88]** Ulbricht is reported to have accused the Soviet leadership of sacrificing vital East German interests and may have brought up the Chinese accusation of a Soviet "betrayal" of the GDR to gain leverage at the conference. **[Ref. 4: p. 88, fn. 36]** The conference ended with the participants endorsing Brezhnev's earlier formula; i.e., progress is possible if both the needs of the West Berliners and the sovereign interests of the GDR are respected. They also officially proclaimed their "unanimous solidarity with the policy of peace pursued by the German Democratic Republic." **[Ref. 128]** Although the SED leaders did manage to get reaffirmed support of their claim to recognition, it again was not mentioned as a precondition for further negotiations.

When the four Ambassadors returned to the Berlin negotiations on 10 December, the Soviets returned again to a hard line position taken two months earlier. In concert with this attitude, East German authorities once more initiated traffic harassment from 19 to 22 December during an SPD party meeting. The GDR had also entered into talks with West German officials, hoping to arrange an agreement on traffic access. Although the West Germans refused to discuss Berlin issues, including access at this time, the internal debate in Bonn over the correctness of SPD *Ostpolitik* and certain U.S. criticism of Brandt's Berlin policy, may have been behind Moscow's stiffening line at this time, hoping for Western concessions due to the weakened front. **[Ref. 127: pp. 63-66]** The shift by Moscow may also be explained by the growing instability problems in

Poland in mid-late December, resulting in possible increased criticism within the anti-West German circles in the Soviet leadership. Some analysts have noted SED cooperation with Brezhnev's critics in the Soviet party apparatus, among whom were advocates of a rapprochement with China in place of an East-West settlement in Europe. [Ref. 4: p. 92]

During the winter of 1971, the East Germans continued with harassment on the access routes to Berlin, sometimes causing delays of up to thirty hours at the border check points. According to an editorial in Neues Deutschland, these were legal countermeasures caused by the West German government's attempts to misuse West Berlin. [Ref. 129] The misuse referred to by the editorial were reported demonstrations of West German presence in the city, such as FDP and CDU/CSU meetings in West Berlin in January and March. Credible evidence of Soviet support was the Soviet Union's interference in Allied military air traffic for the first time in eight years.

The Soviet negotiating position during this time, while flexible on some individual points, remained uncompromising over matters of principle. In the few months before the CPSU Congress, the Brezhnev leadership may have felt strung between facing criticism from domestic and allied opponents. If they compromised on these principles, particularly after having been set under pressure by NATO to negotiate in their favor, they would be left open to criticism at the congress, while also knowing that the foundations laid for a long-sought security conference might crumble if too harsh a line were taken. Also East Germany was facing the harshest winter in years, which, like Poland, exacerbated its economic difficulties. Brezhnev may have readjusted his priorities by replacing Berlin with concerns over instability in Eastern Europe. The Soviet representative in the Berlin negotiations, Ambassador Abrassimov, and other

high-ranking Soviets reassured the Western side that there was still optimistic reasons to continue the talks despite their disappointing pace.

Brezhnev achieved a victory over the opponents of his foreign policy strategy during the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in late March and early April 1971. In April the Soviet leaders apparently made the decision to advance its *Westpolitik* through adopting a more lenient attitude on Berlin, significantly improving the possibilities for agreement. A major obstacle still remained, however; Ulbricht and the East German demands

Ulbricht's fall from power in East Germany in April 1971 was brought about by primarily internal SED actions, with apparent, and crucial, support in Moscow. It is necessary to deviate somewhat to discuss the background to his dismissal as SED First Secretary. Domestic opposition to Ulbricht's approach to intra-German contacts probably coalized during the spring and summer of 1970, between and immediately following the Erfurt and Kassel meetings. Erich Honecker, responsible for security, and Albert Norden, responsible for ideology within the SED, began in their speeches to present an ultra-hard line vis-a-vis Bonn, with special emphasis on the contrasting class and social systems facing one another along the inter-German border. According to their argument, the imperialistic and militaristic West German system is totally incompatible with the peaceful socialist system in the GDR. **[Ref. 130]** It is important to note that while Ulbricht was primarily concerned with the prestige benefits resulting from international recognition, which, according to Ulbricht, must come through any substantive intra-German rapprochement, these two members of the SED leadership, and later also General Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of Defense, were focussing on the problems of internal instability resulting from closer intra-German

contacts. Probably raising their concerns, for example, was the reaction of the East German local population to Brandt's visit to Erfurt. [Ref. 71: pp. 371-372] Hence, the formulation of the policy of demarcation or *Abgrenzung* in late summer, early fall 1970. [Ref. 131], [Ref. 132]

The principle difference between the two factions involved the dispute over the best tactics for achieving international recognition. The Honecker group eventually accepted the Soviet argument that GDR recognition could only come about through the normalization process, and quite possibly at the later stages of this process. [Ref. 133: p. 43] Throughout the process, Moscow would protect the basic sovereign rights of the GDR in international negotiations. This is why the group that took up the banner of *Abgrenzung* also reinforced the need for the GDR to forge even closer ties with the Soviet Union.

As long as Ulbricht could be reassured by his Moscow supporters that recognition would remain part of the deal, he could be brought along on a cautious road to improving relations with Bonn. After waiting out the Moscow Treaty, and later the Warsaw Treaty, however, he was no longer convinced that Moscow was holding up their part of the bargain. Finally, when Ulbricht got a grasp on the compromises Moscow was willing to make on Berlin in the Four Power talks, Ulbricht established his final, uncompromising stance. Without Moscow's willingness to adopt his demands, Ulbricht's goals and future as East German leader were clearly limited.

In addition to his divergent *Deutschlandpolitik* views, Ulbricht increasingly come to underscore the importance of independent German accomplishments in economic, political and ideological spheres, oftentimes emphasizing their unique departure from the Soviet model of development. [Ref. 134] In the years after the Czech invasion, he seldom

missed an opportunity to emphasize the fact that the GDR had developed an independent ideological base for moving on its own right road to socialism. Given his strong support for Moscow's political leadership, particularly in foreign policy, these exclamations could be reconciled with the main stream of Soviet European goals. [Ref. 134: p. 57] When, however, he became a burden on these goals, as through his inflexible stance regarding relations with Bonn and the GDR's role in Berlin matters, reconciliation became less of a viable option. The knowledge of this may have motivated him to use his speech before the Twenty-Fourth Congress as a "crowning" opportunity to underline the SED's "special position" in the alliance and boast in front of his Russian hosts that he was one of the few surviving party members who knew Lenin.

Honecker, on the other hand, remained conspicuously silent on foreign policy issues, i.e. not supporting or openly criticizing Ulbricht, from mid-summer 1970 through the spring of 1971. [Ref. 118: p. 183] He and his supporters, apparently waited until the proper opportunity arose before any decisive move to take power. Although necessarily appreciating Ulbricht's declining influence in Moscow, they were careful not to underestimate the old man's political cunning, a mistake made too often by opponents in the past.

As is fairly well accepted by Western analysts, Walter Ulbricht was removed during mid-late April by a combination of internal SED opposition and the lack of support in Moscow, although some place greater emphasis on Moscow's role. [Ref. 91: p. 568] His replacement by Erich Honecker was followed, perhaps, by a deal between Honecker and Brezhnev. Meetings between these two leaders occured frequently during May and June. If the SED would go along with trusting the Soviets to securing GDR interests in the

Berlin settlement, Brezhnev would support the SED *Abgrenzung* as the East Germans wished to apply it. [Ref. 118: p. 188]

In May the ambassadorial talks on Berlin took on a new turn when the Soviet position showed a more conciliatory attitude. This began a wave of efforts on both sides to separate political issues from practical matters, where possible, in order that the momentum would continue. On one side, the West, was preparing to accept a change in the legal connection between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, while the other seemingly received approval from the East Germans for improved and guaranteed transit arrangements. As these two points were separated and worked out on their own merits, there was a clear tendency to come to an agreement on practical considerations. [Ref. 4: p. 106] This took most of the summer to accomplish, with frequent Soviet-East German consultations along the way. This was particularly true in August when Abrassimov and Gromyko met with Honecker several times to discuss the last remaining controversial issues and get the SED's final approval. The four Ambassadors signed the agreement on 3 September 1971.

The Four Power Agreement on Berlin called for the GDR government to negotiate transit accords with the Bonn government and work out details on travel, communications and exchange of territories with the West Berlin Senate. These were to be concluded prior to any formal implementation of the Berlin Agreement. After considerable pressure from Moscow, often personally from Gromyko or Brezhnev, the East Germans were able to set aside their own obstructionist interpretations of the Berlin accord to complete their work with the West Germans and West Berliners. The Soviet leadership was in a hurry for its enactment because of the linkage that became explicit between the opening of the preliminary ESC talks and the completion of the complete Berlin agreement. Bonn, on the

other hand, continued to insist on "satisfactory" agreement on the Berlin issues before ratification in the *Bundestag* of the Moscow Treaty.

The final ratification in Bonn of the Moscow Treaty was completed on 19 May 1972. The Berlin Agreement, including the supplementary intra-German transit and travel agreements, went into force on 2 June. Finally, the way was clear for the Soviet Union's long-sought European Security Conference. For the East Germans, they had gotten their hands wet by the transit negotiations with their counterparts in Bonn. Although the continued negotiations were laborious, they eventually led to the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between the two German states, establishing the norms for their future relations. And, as was perhaps promised in Moscow, the GDR state was formally admitted into the international community of states in 1973.

C. HONECKER'S DETENTE 1979-1984

1. The Brezhnev Approach

The high point in East-West relations had been reached in the mid 1970s, following the conclusion of the Helsinki accords in August 1975. The resulting recognition of the postwar status quo, together with the United States' recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal in superpower status by way of the SALT I Treaty (1972), were crowning achievements for the Brezhnev-led Soviet leadership after many long years of endeavor. The intense military modernization of the Soviet armed forces and their cautious implementation through strategic opportunism during a period of weak American leadership in the late 1970s led to a gradual, but steady, worsening of American-Soviet relations. During the 1980s, in words at least, there was atmosphere that often reminded some of the earlier cold war relations. Interestingly enough, just as these two superpowers had to

"persuade" their "Germany" into a complimentary normalization of relations in the heart of the detente years, and not without conflict as we have noted, as the two larger states sought their separate ways, each found it had to do some pulling to get their "Germany" to follow suite.

As the German Democratic Republic celebrated its 30th anniversary in 1979, it enjoyed diplomatic recognition by over 123 foreign states, not including the "special" status from the Federal Republic of Germany. **[Ref. 20: p. 99]** Obviously, it too had grown in international stature during the 1970s. Beyond the existence of these relations, East Berlin placed much emphasis on building the GDR's image in Western Europe and in the Third World. Without repeating what has been already been discussed in detail on East Germany's active role as a Soviet proxy in Africa, Asia, and Central America, suffice it to note that in the period 1977-79, Honecker had extended his foreign policy interests notably beyond the strictly European sphere of his predecessor. In intra-German relations, Bonn's claim for "special" status had not adversely effected East Berlin's international status as had been feared. Nor did the many governmental and technical contacts lead to a loss of ideological purity within the heart of the party members. *Abgrenzung* was also proving more successful than originally thought.

In face of a hardening of the NATO attitude towards the Soviet bloc military modernization, Brezhnev opened a "Peace Offensive" strategy through diplomatic and propaganda channels. Beginning around 1978, all the Pact states were to implement this program in the "spirit of Helsinki". Its primary goal was to break the popular support for NATO's military modernization program, the apex of which was the December 1979 NATO decision to deploy medium-range tactical nuclear missiles. Moscow's strategy was originally well

suited for the latter since NATO adopted a dual-track approach, according to which the final deployment decision would be made dependent upon the outcome of possible negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. There was a four year grace-period during which attempts would be made to negotiate the reduction of the Soviet SS-20 missiles before the final decisions would be made. This left considerable time for the Warsaw Pact to attempt to influence the West in the issues as well as room for different options on both sides for solutions. Whereas Brezhnev may have imagined one set of options, not matter how limited, Andropov, Chernenko, Gromyko and other influential Kremlin leaders during the period, may have had other preconceived outcomes. Honecker, on the other hand, had little choice but to adjust and accept the Soviet option predominant at any given time during the grace-period. This may not have been an easy task for the East German leader.

As part of Brezhnev's peace offensive, he announced in October 1979 that the USSR would withdraw over a division of Soviet ground troops, about 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks, from its forces in the GDR. This unilateral move was meant to exploit domestic political opposition in Western Europe to the NATO modernization program. Another major characteristic of Brezhnev's approach was the emphasis on the contact between the leaders of the major powers and their foreign ministers, i.e. summit diplomacy. This was probably because of the extensive media coverage given the Soviet position in the Western country when such meetings occured, thus providing Moscow with additional propaganda support in the Western world.

The Federal Republic was a major avenue for this purpose, since Bonn has strong motivations to keep their Soviet relations on good standing and the influence Bonn could exert in NATO forums. This last point was

particularly true during the latter half of the seventies, when West Germany's Helmut Schmidt filled the leadership gap created by a weakened American presidency within the NATO decisionmaking circles. During a time when U.S. and Soviet leaders were not talking with one another, Brezhnev and Schmidt met four times from May 1978 to November 1981.[19] Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German Foreign Minister Genscher were also to fill in when the highest level meetings were not possible, such as Gromyko's visit to Bonn in November 1979 in his attempt to forestall German support for the NATO missile deployment.

Presumably, Brezhnev's support for high level contact with the FRG included his eventual approval of an intra-German summit meeting. Originally planned to take place in 1980, Chancellor Schmidt's first visit to the GDR had to wait until two more years after he made his surprise announcement in December 1979 of plans to visit the Eastern half of the nation. Honecker was prompted by Moscow in January 1980 to postpone the first time, reportedly because Brezhnev wanted his opportunity to visit Bonn first. This, then, would prove Bonn's willingness to highlight ties to Moscow despite the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. [Ref. 135] First, however, the West German Chancellor travelled again to Moscow in June to act as a Western spokesman and, in fact, also for exactly the above-mentioned reason. Both sides wished to show their "desire for cooperation and concord", emphasizing the importance they both play in keeping a European peace and the mutual economic and scientific-technical benefits they had drawn since the signing of the Moscow Treaty. [Ref. 136] This justification for continued healthy relations with the Federal Republic is quite similar to Honecker's to be heard

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[19]These meetings were in May 1978, June and December 1980 and November 1981.

a few years later. Brezhnev also used the visit as an opportunity to convey to his guest, and to the American and West European public, the news that the Soviet Union was willing to begin bilateral talks with the United States on arms control, including medium-range nuclear missiles.

In August 1980, it was Schmidt's turn to cancel the East German visit. Polish unrest was much closer to home than Afghanistan, and *Bundestag* elections were due in October. Schmidt saw the possibility of being surprised by an Easter bloc intervention in Poland during his visit. [Ref. 137] Given the issues and the atmosphere of intra-German relations at that time, little could have been expected to result from the meeting, thus subjecting his coalition to greater criticism prior to the elections. [Ref. 138] In fact, there were two more meetings between Chancellor Schmidt and Brezhnev before the West German leader met his counterpart in the GDR.

In December 1980 Brezhnev travelled to Bonn and eleven months later Schmidt paid a return visit to Moscow. These visits were intended to serve predominantly symbolic purposes; both sides wished to signify that thy adhered to a commitment to reduce tensions and come to an acceptable political balance in Europe. [Ref. 43: p. 59] Apparently, by this time Brezhnev felt more confidence in the value, versus the possible costs, in a German summit meeting, which he probably approved during Honecker's visit with Brezhnev in the Crimea in August 1981. As Neues Deutschland reported on the unofficial visit by their chief in the Crimea:

> The discussion partners are of the opinion that extensive international exchange, including political contact between Chiefs of State of differing social systems, are particularly worthwhile and necessary during the present complicated situation. [Ref. 139]

East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer noted in his speech before the U.N. General Assembly on 25 September that the GDR would aid in "preserving detente as the dominating tendency in international life" during the 1980s. [Ref. 140: p. 1123] The East Germans were thus announcing their readiness to play an active part in preserving detente in Europe, which might affect the entire East-West political climate.

In mid December Helmut Schmidt met with Erich Honecker for three days at a secluded retreat house at Werbellinsee, just outside of Berlin. Although highly symbolic, both leaders did walk away with a small bit to report to their supporting constituencies. In return for a six-month extention of the Swing credit and assurances that an arrangement for future Swing credits could be arranged in the spring, Honecker told Schmidt that emigration rules to the West would be eased in the future and that there was a strong commitment by the GDR leadership to continue and improve intra-German relations. He also accepted an invitation for a reciprocal visit to the Federal Republic. On the final day of Schmidt's visit, however, Polish tanks rolled throughout Poland as martial law was declared. The SPD's *Ostpolitik* took another blow as a result of this action in Poland.

The East Berlin leadership did, indeed, improve the level of intra-German contacts beginning in 1982. This improvement followed a period since 1977, during which the intra-German dialogue had been drastically reduced to practically a whisper. By 1981 many in West Germany, including Schmidt's coalition partners in the FDP were questioning the value of strenuous efforts on Bonn's part to keep the contacts alive. This was particularly true following the Afghanistan invasion, declaration of martial law in Poland and East Berlin's drastic increase in the

mandatory daily monetary exchange (*Zwangsumtausch*) for Western visitors to the GDR in October 1980. The latter move doubled the required daily exchange, raising it to OM 25 at an exchange rate of one Deutsche Mark to one Ost Mark for all adult visitors, without any exceptions for pensioners, and required a OM 7.50 exchange for children under 16 years old. Previously pensioners and children were excluded from the *Zwangsumtausch*. **[Ref. 141]** Visitors from West Berlin were required to exchange four times the earlier OM 6.50 per day. These measures were substantive reflections of the SED's *Abgrenzung* policy to limit West German influence through the overall decrease in intra-German contacts. The end effect for both sides is revealing. While for Bonn, the number of West Germans travelling to the GDR ans East Berlin dropped in 1982 from an annual average since 1978 of over 8 million visitors to around 5 million, Honecker was able to substantially increase the amount of West German Marks received from these "contacts". (1981 = DM 75 million vs. 1982 = DM 125 million) **[Ref. 142]**

Immediately following the announcement of these financial measures, Honecker, in a speech in Gera in October 1980, attacked Bonn's interpretation of intra-German relations and the 1972 Basic Treaty. He demanded Bonn's recognition of East German citizenship and the establishment of "normal" diplomatic relations between the two countries. Before this occurs, according to Honecker, there would be little success in improved relations between the two German states. **[Ref. 143]**

Besides the fear of possible liberalization movements springing up out of rising expectations from Western contact, which then might disturb the economy as in the Polish situation, there were certain explicit signs of rising interest among East Germans in the life across the western borders. Throughout the 1970s, East Berlin allowed

some one thousand legal emigrations per year to the Federal Republic. Applications for emigration to the West rose to a high of over 150,000 in the year 1976. Following the easing of emigration regulations in 1982-83, this number triple to an estimated 500,000 in 1983. A growing number of these applicants have been young persons under 25 years. **[Ref. 144]**

An obvious question arises here; namely, why then did Honecker move towards a more conciliatory attitude towards Bonn in late 1981 and into 1982. Two important reasons stand out. First, as part of Brezhnev's peace offensive towards Western Europe, the GDR's increase in intra-German relations would increase the stakes with which Bonn could be threatened to lose should the Geneva negotiations not produce the satisfactory results for the Soviet Union. In this case, Moscow would need to pressure individual NATO governments, but primarily the Federal Republic, into a delay or rejection of the missile deployment option. The meaning of this approach increased if the SPD-FDP coalition were to become dependent upon *Deutschlandpolitik* successes versus NATO nuclear missile deployments. Although this never became true in the 1980s, it was economic differences which brought the collapse of the SPD-FDP coalition in the fall of 1982, Brandt had done this in 1970-1972 and it may have been conceivable to Moscow that a similar situation could redevelop.

The second motivator for East Berlin's change in policy was economic interests. Although the Five Year Plan 1981-1985 called for an increase in trade with the Soviet Union to be accompanied by corresponding decreases in trade with Western Industrialized states, particularly the FRG, a substantial number of East German economic planners pressed for increased trade with the West in order to obtain and pay for new technology and modernization of East German

machinery. **[Ref. 32: p. 40]** Looking to the East, these planners were faced with rising costs for energy from the Soviet Union and unreliable Polish deliveries of coal and other raw materials. Other economic realities were the need to reduce its trade deficit with the West, which could be done by utilizing the interest-free credit from Bonn of up to DM 850 million per year, which was to expire in June 1981 if not renewed. The credit situation and need for western industrial-technological hardware combined with the rising cost of oil from the USSR, subsidies for which were cut by 10% in 1982 by Moscow, led the East Germans to tighten their belts in 1982. They exported as much as possible to the West and imported only the hardware items they needed for immediate industrial modernization projects.

The lack of consumer goods led to food and other consumer goods shortages in 1982 that were reminiscent of the postwar years. Signs of unrest emerged and the memory of events in Poland were still quite fresh. For the first time in 16 years, the GDR achieved a surplus in intra-German trade in 1981. West German Economics Minister, Lambsdorf, met in March 1982 with East German party and state economics officials, including Politburo member, Gunter Mittag, to discuss the future intra-German economic relations. The meeting took place "in the spirit of the meeting at Werbellinsee", meaning that the determination both heads of state expressed in December 1981 for improved contacts also set the tone for the economic discussions. **[Ref. 145]** By June, agreement was reached on a gradual reduction of the "Swing" credit, allowing it to drop in steps to DM 600 million per year by 1985.

Whatever plans Honecker had worked out with Brezhnev in dealing with Bonn were greatly disturbed by two events in the fall of 1982. In October the SPD-FDP coalition in Bonn fell apart, giving rise to the formation of a center-right

coalition between the CDU/CSU-FDP. In November General Secretary Brezhnev passed away, being succeeded by Yuri Andropov, who at 68 years of age, was the oldest successor in Soviet history.

2. The Andropov Approach

The new Kremlin chief appeared to continue the same basic approach towards the West as his predecessor. With Reagan and the Geneva negotiations, a tough line, little signs of flexibility and the same old allegations of U.S. attempts to upset the strategic balance so long fought for by the Soviet Union. Regarding NATO and the Federal Republic, the former might still be convinced of the Soviet Union's security needs and peaceful intentions, and the latter still useful as a megaphone to European American audiences.

In the Soviet determination to stir up opposition to the nuclear missile decision among the West Europeans, Moscow stepped up its support, verbal and financial, to the anti-nuclear movements in the NATO countries. This was especially true in the Federal Republic, where the movement was getting much publicity and where the first Pershing II missiles were scheduled to be deployed at the end of the following year.

By early 1983, Andropov probably did not have too many illusions as to President Reagan's flexibility in the Geneva negotiations. The next best option was to attempt to draw the FRG closer, where possible, to political and economic interests with in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. During Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in July 1983, the Soviets made and effort to point out that "the importance of a constructive dialogue at the summit level cannot be treated too lightly". **[Ref. 146: p. 47]** In a rather cold, but business-like manner, the West German

visitors were reminded of their vast interests vested in Soviet-West German relations, be they economic or political, and told that these interests might well be at stake in the upcoming decisions on adding new missiles on German soil. Yuri Andropov warned Kohl that the USSR had deliberately maintained Berlin as an "oasis of detente" since the worsening of East-West relations, thus reminding the Chancellor of Bonn's dependence on Moscow for tolerable conditions with the GDR. [Ref. 147: p. 29] The Soviet leader also accepted an invitation to visit the Federal Republic in the near future.

At this time, around mid 1983, Andropov began to become ill and slowly faded from the Soviet decisionmaking scene. Before his departure, though, Honecker and Andropov, or his supporters, may have come to an understanding on a common approach to Bonn during the crucial months ahead. Depending strictly analytical speculation and hindsight, Andropov may have agreed to keep its pressure on Bonn and its doors open to communication. The negotiations in Geneva must also continue if there was any hope of delaying a German decision on deployment, since hope inthe negotiations was the SPD's strongest counter-argument against deployment. Honecker, for his part, would treat the Kohl government with moderation, holding out for any significant improvements regarding Bonn's interests, but careful not to stop the dialogue altogether through subtle concessions. The ultimate costs to Bonn, then, would remain high. As to whether the leaders agreed to who determined the moment when they should call in their chips is unclear since Andropov died and Honecker resisted this move for almost one year.

3. The Credit Connection

In fulfilling his part, Honecker may have seen such opportunities knocking at his doorstep that he stayed in the

subtle accommodation mode much longer than his senior allies in Moscow desired. There was a distinct upswing in intra-German activity in 1983. However, to Honecker, the term "intra-German ties" can be translated into meaning getting more West German economic aid. While not ignoring his *Abgrenzung* rhetoric, Honecker avoided personal attacks on the Bonn leadership, emphasizing the need to conduct their relations with one another based on mutual respect and non-discrimination.

In May Honecker postponed his FRG visit a first time, claiming the attitude in the Federal Republic was not conducive to "successful dialogue". He was not far from the truth in this assessment because an incident in April, in which a West German had died while being questioned at an East German border post, had created quite a stir among the Bavarian CSU wing of the conservative party in Bonn.

Strangely enough, a month later, the chief of the CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, reveals a DM 1 billion loan by various West German banks, and guaranteed by the Federal Bank in Bonn, to the East Germans. Strauss was one of the major facilitaters in the deal. This was not trade connected, like the Swing credits, and must have been approved by Moscow prior to its acceptance, given the political atmosphere and the financial commitment involved. In return for the loan, East Germany eliminated the *Zwangsumtausch* for children, agreed to improve their border guards' discipline and gave further assurances of increased emigration permits to the West. **[Ref. 148]** Reportedly, East European diplomats in East Berlin substantiated Moscow's approval to improve these German ties as a continuing means to lure the West Germans away from the missile deployment. **[Ref. 149]**

Purely in economic terms, Honecker was already receiving over DM 1 billion annually from Bonn for traffic

access and communication maintenance and improvements with West Berlin. This is in addition to the over DM 16 billion in trade with the Federal Republic each year and is separate from the above loan. Later in the year, about the time the *Bundestag* approved the missile deployments in November, word was circulating in Bonn that the GDR was seeking another loan to improve its DM 11-12 billion debt to the West, of which nearly half was to come due at the end of 1983. Although the credit deal for another DM 950 million was not completed until July 1984, the preparations may have been initiated between the lower level bureaucrats late in 1983, thus easing the pressure from the earlier creditors. The substantial trade surplus with the Western countries in 1983 also helped East Berlin out of the credit pinch.

4. Honecker's Approach

As Andropov had used Kohl's visit to Moscow in July 1983 to warn of the repercussions to Bonn's interests should they sanction the deployment, both East German and Soviet spokesmen repeatedly pressed home the point that intra-German relations could not flourish "in the shadow of American missiles". In October Honecker, himself, in a open letter the Chancellor Kohl, warned of a new "ice age" in their relations and appealed "in the name of the German people" to stop the upcoming deployment plans. **[Ref. 36: p.8]** By this time, October-November 1983, Moscow and East Berlin were forced with the dilemma of how to implement the threats and "punish" Bonn for its backing of the NATO dual-track decision. Honecker may well have realized that any serious "punishment" to Bonn was going to affect his regime more than Moscow and perhaps, more than Bonn's. For East Berlin would have to bear the major burden of any sanctions imposed by the Pact states in intra-German affairs, resulting in a substantial loss from the extensive financial and economic ties that had been built up in the past decade.

The relative decline of a responsive central decisionmaking authority in Moscow resulting from the prolonged illness of Secretary General Andropov, and the resulting succession struggle that ensued, showed an inability to implement or impose a coherent bloc strategy. This, in turn, weakened the Soviet's ability to enforce bloc discipline. Given the need to forge a clear consensus on the Pact reaction to the final deployment decision and the power struggle taking place in the Kremlin, as evidenced by the conflicting signals coming from Moscow, the Soviet Union ultimately pursued a reactive policy to events developing in Central Europe, particularly in regard to the relations between the two German states. [Ref. 36: p. 9] Furthermore, other Eastern European states used this confused state of Pact affairs as an opportunity to pursue and defend their own national interests by attempting to expand their room for maneuver.

The West German *Bundestag* on 22 November 1983 approved the immediate deployment of American-made and controlled Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear missiles on West German soil. Within a few days the first missile convoys arrived in West Germany and the Soviets used this as their excuse to break off all arms control negotiations in Geneva. This move was unmistakenly a sign to Western leaders and to Honecker that the Soviets must make a decision on how to implement the long-threatened "countermeasures." Honecker, however, did not hesitate to set his own plan in action. Speaking only a few days after the Soviets departed Geneva, Honecker gave an extremely conciliatory speech before the SED Central Committee, stressing the need to "limit the damage" in intra-German contacts and to preserve the achievements of the past, despite the fact that the West German decision caused "serious damage" to the European system of treaties, including the Basic Treaty.

Although admitting that "the situation is no longer what it used to be," Honecker went on to express his hope that "sooner or later disarmament negotiations will achieve positive results and that detente will be continued." [Ref. 150]

Honecker's remarks before the Central Committee carried three significant departures from the Soviet position at that time. First, although stating the deployment decision caused serious damage to the so-called Eastern treaties, he implicitly disavowed previous Soviet-East German claims that the deployment would violate these treaties. He endorsed these treaties as continuing to be "a good foundation for the development of peaceful relationships between nations."

Second, Honecker's remarks implied that the only "countermeasures" to be taken would be the military ones already announced by the WTO, i.e. the deployment of a new generation of tactical nuclear missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. After defending their "unavoidable" deployment, he then admitted that they "did not evoke jubilation in our country". His main answer to "What is to be done?" was to place even more importance on the policies of peaceful coexistence between nations of different social orders.

Third, his emphasis on continued negotiations and dialogue, combined with his assessment that the GDR would "carefully examine every reasonable proposal by the FRG to bring relations between the two German states onto a normal level", strongly suggests Honecker's disapproval of Moscow's handling of their part in the anti-missile deployment effort, i.e. walking out and slamming the door in Geneva.

Since the Kohl government was almost bending over backwards to prove its seriousness to keep the intra-German dialogue alive, it appeared that any "damage" which Honecker

hoped to limit was not self-imposed but rather Moscow directed. In the early months of 1984, Honecker backed up his words with actions by opening a flood gate of official emigration to the West, allowing over 36,000 East Germans to move to the Federal Republic in 1984, more than three times the 1983 figure. [Ref. 36: p. 10] At Andropov's funeral in late February 1984 in Moscow, the two German leaders issued a joint statement on the importance of avoiding nuclear war and of using "common sense" to prevent "the course of international affairs from getting out of control". [Ref. 36: p. 11] Also in February Neues Deutschland printed a speech by Honecker in which he rearticulated his view that intra-German relations are necessary for the "peaceful future for both German states" and the importance of seeing that cooperation prevail over confrontation. [Ref. 151] On the economic side, East German officials concluded an agreement with Volkswagen to produce car engines in the GDR and talks between the two states' financial bureaucracies were leading to another large loan to be guaranteed by Bonn. [Ref. 152]

Moscow's response to the "new situation" during the first three and a half months of 1984 was remarkably vague. Although notably cold in diplomatic exchanges with the Federal Republic, the Soviets initially refrained from commiting itself to the threatened "punishment" or to keeping open the doors to communication. [Ref. 153] This period of indecision opened the way for the birth of polemic disputes among the East European allies over their "special role" in facilitating peaceful relations in Europe during times of strain between the "great powers." Hungary opened the quarrel in late October when former Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow and East Berlin, and then CC Secretary responsible for foreign relations, Matyas Szuros, delivered a lecture on reconciling international and national interests in the

formulation of socialist foreign policy in Hungary. The primary contents of the lecture were reprinted in the Hungarian journal, _Tarsadalmi Szemle_, in January 1984. The Secretary's remarks, which must have been received in Moscow as borderline heresy, raised the issue of differing national and international interests among various states, but particularly between larger and smaller states. He further maintained that there was no longer any question of unconditional subordination of national interests to international interests since the respective national and international obligations of socialist countries had changed. Among these obligations lie the possibility of continuing relations with capitalist countries during periods of a deteriorating climate in overall East-West relations. In asserting "at the same time their national and common interests, all socialists states must take advantage of such special possibilities." [Ref. 154]

The Czech communist party made the next blow in March through an article harshly criticizing any notions concerning independent foreign policy aspirations and rejected the "special role" of "smaller states" in their attempt to facilitate compromise between "great powers". Certain criticism of departing from the socialist community's common foreign policy approach also appeared to be directed at East Berlin's policy as well. This was followed afterwards with a response by Hungarian Secretary Szuros, who defended his position. [Ref. 155: p. 27] These statements were favorably echoed in the East German press. Moscow finally showed where it stood in reprinting a slightly edited version of the Czech article in the Soviet foreign affairs weekly, _Novoe Vremya_, coupled with a very hard line article in the April edition of _Voprosy Istorii KPSS_. [Ref. 36: p. 11]

This hard line position apparently did not predominate at the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' conference in Budapest in mid April. The final communique issued on 20 April was unclear in defining the next moves the Pact states would take. [Ref. 156: p. 36] The Federal Republic was not mentioned or referred to in the statement either. The sense of moderation and vagueness projected by the message reflected an apparent lack of consensus among the Eastern bloc members.

5. The Kremlin Reacts

Any doubts as to the Soviet Union's view towards the Federal Republic were finally swept away in late April and early May when the Soviet press opened a massive anti-West German "revanchism" campaign. This may have been planned to coincide with the 39th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi German in the Second World War. In early May the Soviets broke with earlier policy toward the FRG by putting Bonn on a level with Washington for its imperialistic and militaristic ambitions. Direct connection was made between the CDU/CSU and the German fascists of the past. For the first time in over ten years, Moscow was attempting to revive the German bogeyman in the hope of creating greater socialist unity, the message being: bloc unity is necessary to defend socialism against the onslaught of this revived enemy. It became clear after a few more press attacks that Bonn was not the only intended target. This campaign was to signal to East Berlin to reduce its ties with Bonn so as to punish it for its INF decision.

The SED, however, was not willing to roll over so easy. At the Eighth SED CC plenum in late May, the party defended its "offensive peace policy." Although extolling the strict Soviet line on the negative effects of the deployment on European security and the Soviet demands for

the immediate halt to NATO's missile deployment, Politburo member Kurt Hager avoided any direct attack on the Kohl government in his speech before the CC. He recalled the GDR's geographical and historical responsibility to do all it can to prevent war from reoccuring on German soil. Additionally, Hager noted a "community of responsibility" and a "security partnership", in which "both countries actively contribute to bringing about improvements in the situation after the start of the {missile} deployment." **[Ref. 157]** The East Berlin government accompanied these remarks with continued dialogue with Bonn, including setting a tentative date for Honecker's FRG visit and, in late July, an agreement in Bonn to guarantee the second major loan to East Berlin. The latter was soon followed by an East German announcement that certain travel restrictions would be lifted beginning 1 August. **[Ref. 158]**

Moscow heightened the dispute with East Berlin in printing an article in Pravda on 27 July titled, "In the Shadow of American Missiles", which explicitly warned that East-West relations could not be viewed in isolation from the overall international situation. The latter was characterized by an American-West German effort to "undermine the GDR's socialist system." **[Ref. 159]** The article reminds its readers, in Bonn and East Berlin alike, of earlier remarks by Honecker, in his Gera speech given two years earlier, that Bonn's position on GDR citizenship and the establishment of embassies were regarded as obstacles to improved intra-German relations. "Since then", the article points out, "these issues have not been resolved . . ." Neues Deutschland reprinted the article on 28 July but also responded by reprinting two days later an article from the Hungarian trade union press, Nepszava, which supported Honecker and his policy with the FRG. Hungary was not totally a third party in the dispute, however. The leaders

in Budapest were hoping to hold on to an ally in the pursuit of their own policy of continued contacts with the West, including visits to Budapest in 1984 by Margaret Thatcher, the Premiers from Finnland, Sweden, Belgium and Norway as well as Helmut Kohl and Italian Prime Minister Craxi. **[Ref. 160]**

The battle of the communist press continued in a Neues Deutschland editorial on the ninth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. The article primarily repeated Honecker's main points made before the Central Committee in November 1983, i.e. the need to "limit the damage" and to maintain "dialogue between states of different social systems." **[Ref. 161]** Although the editorial attacked the United States, again the Kohl government was spared. Perhaps the most disturbing to Kremlin leaders was the reference to GDR's independence in their internal and external affairs. The next day Pravda countered with an unsigned editorial which charged Bonn of resorting "to economic levers in an attempt to break up the peaceful postwar arrangement in Europe and, in particular, to disturb the stability of the GDR." By mentioning the recently arranged bank loan to East Berlin and the reciprocal moves by East German authorities to liberalize travel restrictions, the article was taking another step towards openly criticizing Honecker's *Deutschlandpolitik*. Furthermore, in referring to the same terms which Honecker used in his speech, such as "limiting the damage", in its criticism, the Soviets were making a personal attack on the SED Secretary General. **[Ref. 162]** Still not giving in, Neues Deutschland did not reprint the Pravda editorial, but, chose instead to reprint a TASS commentary by the former Editor-in-Chief of Izvestiia, Lev Tolkunov. This article, which suggests more than subtle differences among the Soviet leadership, in stating that continued relations with those in the West "who

have a realistic assessment of the international scene," could produce results, implied that Honecker's loan deals were not all that damaging to the socialist cause. In addition, he was of the opinion that detente still had a role in the future and was not a part of the past. [Ref. 163] The Hungarian press contributed its further support for the East German position in an article published on 5 August praising the GDR's foreign policy. [Ref. 164] By this time the major news services were covering the dispute on a daily basis.

Amidst continued press attacks on West German revanchism, Honecker took the offensive in mid August to defend his policy of "limiting the damage" in intra-German affairs. In a lengthy interview carried in Neues Deutschland, Honecker resorted to his original arguments on the "necessity of doing everything possible" to work toward a condition of peace in Europe through a "community of responsibility". Among these main arguments, the East German leader also provided Moscow with some lines by which they could take delight in referring to revanchist tendencies among certain "forces at the right in the West." Again he avoided direct criticism of the Kohl government. Although he listed the areas of concern which the East German government wished negotiated during the upcoming visit, such as the Elbe river border marking issue, respect for East German citizenship, ending the activities of the Salzgitter registration center and the upgrading of the diplomatic missions, these were not set as preconditions to future improved relations. [Ref. 165] The same day TASS released a limited edited version in English. The next day, however, the news service released a severly edited Russian text which focussed only on Honecker's comments about Soviet-GDR friendship, revanchism in the FRG, East German rejection of national reunification and criticism of American foreign policy. [Ref. 36: p. 59]

On 20 August Neues Deutschland reprinted the Russian version of the TASS article, a move intended to reveal to its readers the official Soviet interpretation of *Deutschlandpolitik* as they view it. The next day Neues Deutschland also reprinted various articles on the dispute from both Eastern and Western media sources. The SED was thus trying to keep the issue public, presenting the picture of who stood where in the dispute. Besides more support from the Hungarians, Honecker also involved Romania in the matter in late August by attending Ceausescu's 40th Anniversary of Romania's "liberation" from fascism. Honecker was the only Warsaw Pact Head of State to attend the ceremonies, since the others were "protesting" Romania's maverick attendance at the Los Angeles olympic games.

6. Honecker Retreats

On 4 September 1984 the chief of the East German mission in Bonn announced the postponement of Honecker's visit to the Federal Republic, stating certain "debates" among the Bonn leadership created an atmosphere "unseemingly" and "detrimental" to the visit. **[Ref. 166]** For most West German diplomats in Eastern Europe, and many West German political leaders, this came as little surprise since the East Germans had been indicating for several weeks that Bonn's political and media handling of the visit showed little understanding for the East German's difficult situation. This was later confirmed by many West Germans, themselves, when the postponement opened up discussion on "what went wrong." **[Ref. 167]**

The postponement of the FRG trip, together with East Germany joining the Moscow-orchestrated "anti-revanchism" campaign, slowly brought the open dispute to an apparent end. Throughout September little was published on Honecker's *Deutschlandpolitik*, except, when pushed, it was

noted that East Berlin still desired continued dialogue with the Federal Republic, although, for the time being, only at the lower working levels. Indeed, low-keyed talks continued on 15 different levels and despite the increase in harsh East Berlin rhetoric, intra-German dialogue continued to show accomplishments through to the end of the year. At the 35th Anniversary of the GDR at the end of September, Honecker's stiff attacks on the Federal government in Bonn proved to the Soviet Politburo and his Soviet guest at the celebrations, Gromyko, that the SED had begun to march in tune with the Kremlin's drummer. **[Ref. 168]**

Among other reasons, Moscow was concerned about their overall influence in affecting East-West relations, particularly when an issue of security is at stake, and the loss of authority in Eastern Europe during the dispute period in 1984. Obviously, the weakened leadership in Moscow had many interests at levels with which the East Berlin leadership did not concern itself.

Honecker, on the other hand, perceived opportunities to improve his domestic and international standing in economic and political areas. These opportunities, which arose from situations in the East and the West, had to be measured against the costs of rebuking Soviet demands. But just as the Soviet leadership void earlier in the year later filled with a solid policy towards the Federal Republic, to which Honecker inevitably had to adjust, the economic and political benefits from his policy on intra-German relations were drastically offset by increasing costs due, in large part, to bungling West German politicians in Bonn. Honecker could not afford to continue to defend his argument for open dialogue with a West German government that misunderstood the sensitivities of his political situation. **[Ref. 167]**

V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE ASSESSMENT

This study has surveyed a better part of twenty-five years of East German-Soviet relations, focussing on periods of dispute over their respective *Deutschlandpolitik*. One could note that the variables affecting the decisionmaking in both countries evolved significantly over this quarter century. The perceptions of the individual leaders of their government's role in influencing political changes in Europe and, in the Soviet's case, beyond, affected the substance of the conflict as well as the level of intensity. A summary of the interest areas we have covered will help to evaluate the whole set of variables involved in order to assess their relative causal importance and to test if the original hypotheses hold true.

On the following pages two tables are presented, which are meant to assist in sorting out the variables used in the study and how they compare with one another. The first table displays the valued importance of interests to each of the two countries and the level of internal foreign policy control by its leader. The second table compares these levels against the other country's to determine convergence of interests or synchronization of the level of foreign policy control. The latter comparison is presented against the dependent variable, or level of discord over *Deutschlandpolitik* between the two countries.

The relative values used in Table XI are from two separate scales. For displaying the relative importance of foreign policy and economic interests in East Berlin or Moscow in a given case, the values are measured on the following scale:

Little -> Some -> Substantial -> Very Important -> Crucial.

TABLE XI

RELATIVE RANKING OF
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AFFECTING EAST GERMAN-SOVIET CONFLICT

Case	Country	Foreign Policy Interests: East European	West European	Extra-European: U.S.A.	Extra-European: China	Third World	Economic	Level of Foreign Policy Control
		Level of Importance						
Berlin Crisis	USSR	some	crucial	crucial	very important	little	substantial	some
	GDR	some	very important	little	some	little	crucial	very much
Detente Imposed	USSR	very important	crucial	very important	very important	little	very important	much
	GDR	crucial	substantial	some	little	substantial	little	some
Honecker's Detente	USSR	substantial	substantial	very important	some	little	little	little
	GDR	substantial	very important	little	little	substantial	crucial	much

Another scale is used to display the levels of internal foreign policy control by the particular Party leadership during each case for each country. The values are measured from the following scale:

Little -> Some -> Much -> Very Much.

The values applied to these interests are derived from the analysis completed in the first section of this study. Understanding the limitations involved, a best effort has been made to make objective value assessments of these interests after analyzing the answers to the common questions asked in each case, given the available historical evidence. The determination of the values displayed in Table XI is the prerequisite to comparing these values and therefore being able to test the hypotheses.

Table XII presents this comparison vis-a-vis the level of discord between the USSR and the GDR over *Deutschlandpolitik*. The table's values are based on a simple scale:

Low --> Medium --> High.

The resulting values are derived from the degree of correlation found in Table XI and the level of discord values have been formulated based upon the analysis discussed in the first part of the study.

TABLE XII

COMPARISON OF
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES VS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

	INDEPENDENT VARIABLES							DEPENDENT VARIABLE
	East European	West European	U.S.A.	Extra-European China	Third World	Economic	Level of Foreign Policy Control	Level of Discord over Deutschland-politik
	Level of Convergence						Level of Synchonization	
Berlin Crisis	High	High	Low	Medium	High	Medium	Low	LOW
Detente Imposed	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	HIGH
Honecker's Detente	High	High	Low	High	Medium	Medium	Low	MEDIUM

It may now be useful to restate the two central hypotheses of this study:

1) The **greater** the convergence of political and economic foreign policy interests between the USSR and GDR leadership, the **lower** the potential for conflict over questions of German Policy; and

2) The **greater** the synchronization of foreign policy control between the Soviet and East German leaderships, the **lower** the potential for conflict over questions of German Policy.

The results of this study generally support the first hypothesis. The second case involving the downfall of Walter Ulbricht did involve both the highest degree of conflict during the entire period and one can note the lowest levels of interest convergence. The other two cases have very similar levels of interest convergence, yet have different resulting levels of conflict or dispute.

One problem obviously lies in some inherent assumptions found in these comparisons and variables. In looking at Table XII, we assume an equality among the variables in their relative affect on the resulting level of conflict. This is an incorrect assumption and can lead to the situation above, i.e., common independent variables with a dissimilar dependent variable. While all the interests have been considered important enough for consideration as independent variables warranting their study, they have at different times, significantly different levels of importance relative to one another and to the dependent variable. While these variables have been analyzed and compared internally to determine their values through cross-case comparisons, no measuring standard existed to determine their value relative to other variables within each case. For example, both East and West European interests have been analyzed for their importance to Moscow and East Berlin relative to their respective *Deutschlandpolitik* across all three cases. Yet no questions were asked as to the relative importance of

either of these two sets of interests within each case on the resultant level of conflict or dispute. To best understand the relative comparisons presented in Table 0 an additional weighting mechanism need be created to better appreciate the different causal affects each dependent variable has within each case.

In evaluating our findings in the light of the second hypothesis, another snag is found. The assumption that the level of synchronization of foreign policy control is an independent variable may be incorrect. Since the level of synchronization is highest in the very case that results in the highest level of conflict and is identical in the other two cases showing differing levels of conflict, a problem exists in the original hypothesis. Two likely possibilities exist to explain this: first, that there exists no correlation between this variable and the level of conflict, or second, that this is actually an intervening variable rather than an independent variable. In the latter case, this variable would have a given affect upon the dependent variable when considered in **conjunction** with other (independent) variables. This author supports the second explanation based upon his belief that foreign policy decisionmaking mechanisms in totalitarian regimes occupy a vital spot on the main arteries of those countries' international relations. In this study convincing evidence revealed instability in relations between the two leaderships whenever a non-synchronous situation existed.

A continuation of this study, then, must consider an analysis of the variables within each case in order that the results of the cross-case analysis may be best appreciated. It should also consider the level of synchronization of foreign policy control as a possible intervening variable which would mandate searching for the areas where it combines with other variables to impact on the dependent

variable. Future studies might also consider other independent variables not included here, such as: regime credibility; domestic stability; national identity; or others more closely related to relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

Looking towards tomorrow, my best evaluation concludes that the GDR's improved identity crisis will have a dynamic affect on other variables which could gradually increase the probability of conflict or disagreement. For example, in search for a more outstanding role in the future European setting, East Berlin may try to readjust both its economic structure and trade relations, even so incrementally, to better utilize its comparative advantages in the World Trade Market and protect itself from political or economic blackmail from the East.

The East Germans may also move towards greater bilateral relationships with the United States or China. These changes, of course, might also effect changes in East Berlin's West German relations. Whereas the Kremlin leadership could perhaps take time in reacting to such changes in East Berlin's Extra-European interests, the slightest readjustment in East German relations with West European nations requires Soviet coordination to avoid disagreements over *Deutschlandpolitik*. The identity problem (or solution) could also manifest itself in attempts by East German ideologues to present East Germany as the "most successful" example of socialist development based on their past social and economic achievements. This would seem to be best applied in Third World relations, where East Berlin could compete to some degree with Moscow for influence should they tire of playing the proxy role for the Soviets.

The Federal Republic should remain the central focus for both Moscow and East Berlin. This triad, however, is built on very different supporting interests, as has been

highlighted in this study. Both communist states will move towards or away from Bonn according to their perceptions of opportunity or threat. Bonn, on the other hand, can manipulate the level of both, but must always watch over its own substantial interests in both sides. The keys to these relations appear to be in the individuals leading these three regimes. The character, experience and level of support they command for novel policy has been a distinctive and decisive feature in all three cases. Likewise, this condition should not change in the future. The new Gorbachev leadership in Moscow and a forthcoming succession within this decade in East Berlin rearranges the cards for a new set of player relationships and opportunities.

The economic variable will probably always be a sensitive factor leading to possible future Moscow-East Berlin disputes. The main reason for this is because of their trade relationship. East Berlin is far more dependent on Soviet raw materials than the Soviets are on East German products, although the latter is a great bargain. Another reason would be responding to pressures for reform. The faults in the centralized command economy cannot be forever hidden and the East German leaders may see it beneficial to reform their economic system is such a way so as to best utilize some of the proven advantages of centralized control with greater western-style rationalization measures. Such changes depend largely on the future elite structure of the East German leadership, whether the technical-economic elites increase their influence in the party decisionmaking apparatus.

Although the results of this study suggest the level of foreign policy control is probably not an independent variable, it most likely does occupy an important role in affecting GDR-USSR conflict. It may be the final weak or strong link between harmony or dispute at times when other

variables would suggest a conflict situation. As noted, the relations still need to be better defined, yet the unquestionable continuation of these two totalitarian regimes points towards the future importance of the relationship between each side's ability to control its definitions of the *Deutschlandpolitik* issues vital to their overall interests.

As the Soviets have shown since 1980, Eastern Europe is moving further and further away from the days of military solutions to political problems. The strange coalition between East Berlin and Budapest must bring an extremely uncomfortable foreboding to the leaders in the Kremlin. The East European leaders may see new opportunities to further integrate their political and economic interests as a group to develop leverage against Soviet hegemony. While depending upon and extolling Moscow's security interests vis-a-vis the West, these leaders may with greater self-confidence and social domestic stability, East Germany included, seek to increase their room for maneuver in domestic and foreign affairs.

A final word needs to be mentioned on Berlin. This city is a symbol for the fact that the German Problem still exists and cannot be concealed. Whether it be seen in the legal documents of the Four Power Agreement of the daily transit of military trains carrying the American, French or British flag, through East German territory, East Germans cannot ignore forever the fact that they are the most burdened by the German Problem, other than the West Berliners, themselves. The time will come again when East Berlin leaders will press for a new arrangement for the city. This may be without tensions and it may be in total agreement and cooperation with the Soviets, but it will occur. Our Western leadership must be sensitive to the many variables involved, some of which have been highlighted

through this study, when the time comes to renegotiate the status of Berlin and reattempt to settle the German Problem.

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