


GUERRILLA WARFARE IN NAMIBIA AND ASSOCIATED
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXTERNAL MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Michael Shannon McCrary

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

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by

Michael Shannon McCrary


March 1979

Thesis Advisor:

Barry M. Schutz

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T188645



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Guerrilla Warfare in Namibia and Associated Implications for External Military Involvement		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; March, 1979
7. AUTHOR(s) Michael Shannon McCrary		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE March 1979
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		13. NUMBER OF PAGES
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) There have been few unclassified attempts within the United States, if any, to document the guerrilla war in Namibia in its totality. This work presents a summary and analysis of that struggle through December, 1978, focusing on all aspects of the military and civil insurgency/counter-insurgency situations. Additionally, Namibia's history, its		

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Namibia and the conflict surrounding its pending independence play a primary role in the current and future stability of southern Africa. This research is an attempt to provide policy makers with additional perspective in regard to the pursuit of that stability.

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Guerrilla Warfare in Namibia
and
Associated Implications for External Military Involvement

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1979

ABSTRACT

There have been few unclassified attempts within the United States, if any, to document the guerrilla war in Namibia in its totality. This work presents a summary and analysis of that struggle through December, 1978, focusing on all aspects of the military and civil insurgency/counter-insurgency situations. Additionally, Namibia's history, its present social, economic, and political conditions, and the militant attitudes of the various actors involved are examined from the standpoint of tendencies and factors which could stimulate violent conflict in the future. Salient aspects of these discussions are integrated to form several plausible political-military scenarios which include potentials for near and long term violence and for the involvement of external actors in that violence.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has been a long and exhausting process. It would've been much harder without the help of several people however.

Professor John Marcum of the University of California at Santa Cruz, Professor Chris Leu of the California State University at Northridge, and Tony Wilkinson, noted authority on southern Africa military affairs, all expressed interest and provided encouragement during the early phases of the project.

I would like to express my appreciation to Henry Miller of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. for his assistance in arranging several interviews and for providing insight on the workings of the U.N. Mary Ann Cook of the U.S. State Department and Peggy Greenwood and Debbie Ardan of the Defense Intelligence Agency provided assistance in the procurement of numerous documents.

Professors Jiri Valenta and Russ Stolfi of the Naval Postgraduate School rendered stimulating perspectives in the classroom and in private discussions. As the second reader, Professor Ralph Magnus made valuable comments on the final drafts.

As my thesis advisor, Professor Barry Schutz provided guidance in the selection and approach to the topic and helped me acquire a basic foundation in African studies. He gave freely of his time and advice, and his encouragement and assistance greatly facilitated completion. Thank you.

As always, my wife was understanding and patient. Her support and considerable assistance in preparing the draft copies made this truly a joint effort. I would also like to acknowledge the cooperation of my young son. No longer will I have to close the door in his face with the words, "Sorry, Daddy has to study".

I. INTRODUCTION

A. SITUATION

Namibia (referred to as South West Africa in all references predating June, 1968 and still so by South Africa and the territory's government) is now scheduled to receive full independence in October 1979 after almost a hundred years of foreign colonization/administration. It is currently administered de jure by a United Nations commission which recognizes the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) as the authentic representative of the Namibian people. De facto administration of the country is in the hands of South Africa however. The different moral, political, and historical legal perspectives of these actors have given rise to differing plans for transitional and post-independence political/governmental organizations and processes which have frequently been conflicting and often mutually exclusive. The population of Namibia has been divided in its support of these different plans and platforms to an extent which is not yet clear. The situation is further complicated by the existence of ethnic and racial factions of varying sizes and strengths which are sometimes characterized by long-standing and, as independence approaches, increasingly vehement antagonism towards each other.

Guerrilla activity by the military arm of SWAPO in support of independence began "officially" in 1966, and was

conducted at a relatively low level of intensity until 1975. At that time the internal turmoil of the Angolan Civil War and the subsequent establishment of a supportive government in that country facilitated the use of southern Angola as a sanctuary and greater access to foreign military material and advisory support. The resultant escalation in SWAPO guerrilla operations has been aggressively resisted by South African military and police units stationed in northern Namibia.

The Namibian independence struggle is partially related to and stimulated by the other ongoing or recently concluded liberation struggles in southern Africa. It is also differentiated from these struggles by the legal involvement and a greater consequent commitment of the U.N. in bringing about a true independence of the people, an extensive, active South African political and military presence, and the intermediary maneuvering of several Western countries in advance of a major crisis flashpoint to prevent an escalation of violence. The situation is further complicated by the willingness of Eastern nations to become actively involved militarily in Africa on behalf of selected countries and organizations. Finally, the resolution of the conflict has direct implications for the questions of internal security and political stability and the potential for violence on a much greater magnitude in South Africa. In light of the foregoing, it becomes apparent that a clear understanding of the issues, attitudes,

and capabilities of all interested and involved parties is imperative as a basis for accurate estimates and sound formulation of U.S. foreign policy in this matter.

B. PURPOSE

This paper will analyze various specific aspects of the situation described above and, in light of a continuation of guerrilla warfare, project likely actions, reactions, and possibilities for active intervention by those regional and global actors which may have a stake or an interest in the final resolution of Namibia's independent status.

C. HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses upon which this paper is based and which dictated the research objectives for the paper are:

1. That internal ethnic and political cleavages, exacerbated by diverse expectations of social and economic changes, have engendered conditions of apprehension within the territory's population which are unfavorable to a stable and expedient resolution.

- 2.a. That the level of militant activism on the part of an external actor in support of any of the contending internal political factions is a function of the degree of legitimacy internationally accorded to that faction, its perception of probability of or threat to that faction's ultimate success, and its perception of the effects of such activism on its own political stability.

2.b. That South African interventionist attitudes and actions toward Namibia correlate additionally with their perceptions of two threats: 1) the threat to South African national security presented by international communism in the guise of African nationalism and, to a lesser extent; 2) the threat to the safety of the Namibian White population.

D. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

Four basic research objectives were selected to support the above hypotheses. They are addressed as individual sections in the sequence listed below, with the methodology and approach that were applied in each case also indicated.

1. A descriptive historical review of Namibia's ethnic interactions, racial compatibilities, legal status, and growth of nationalism.

2. A descriptive history and analysis of the guerrilla warfare focusing on escalation trends, order of battle, methods of operation, effectiveness, and external linkages of the parties directly involved at the time of writing.

3. A descriptive analysis of the prospects for a non-violent resolution of Namibian independence incorporating such factors as distribution of population, resources, wealth, and political, ethnic, racial, and economic attitudes.

4. A descriptive analysis of attitudes, involvements and relationships of potential external actors and appropriate

comparative analyses of the Namibian conflict with other southern Africa wars of liberation.

In light of the current and continuing nature of the overall problem addressed in this paper, it should be noted that many aspects of research were terminated with events as of 31 December 1978. This was done to facilitate production of the paper.

E. TERMINOLOGY

Because social and cultural attitudes in Southern Africa have been superimposed and developed along racial lines (and have facilitated, in turn, a heightened sense of racial differentiation) and because these attitudes and deliniations are central to the overall problem, clarity demands an understanding of the associated terminology in the context of its common use in that area. The locally differentiated racial groups are White, African, and Coloured (mixed White and African). The Africans and Coloureds are generally referred to collectively as Non-White. Ethnic groups are viewed as subdivisions of racial groups and usually share fundamental cultural values and forms, a common general heritage, and some degree of political organization. South Africa's apartheid system places restrictions on interaction between racial groups. Within racial groups it further seeks to separate the ethnic groups. South Africa provides varying degrees of administration at both the racial and ethnic levels. The lowest significant level of cultural and political association is the tribe. In most

cases some degree of familial kinship is felt within a tribe. There can be several tribes within a single ethnic group. While tribal differentiation between individuals can be important within an ethnic group's geographic area, it tends to diminish and is replaced by a sense of ethnic unity outside the given ethnic territory.¹

The use of the territorial names "South West Africa" and "Namibia" in this paper also requires clarification. "South West Africa" will be used in referring to all events prior to June 1968 and in quoting or paraphrasing most South African or South West Africa Administration statements. In accordance with recognized international usage, the territory will be referred to as "Namibia" in all other cases.

F. SOURCES

In evaluating research sources, it was recognized that reports, analyses, opinions and facts differ significantly between the opponents in any conflict situation. In this case, where there were variations in historical accounts, greater weight was given to those which seemed more reflective of current African historical perceptions since these form the foundation upon which the prevalent nationalism is based. On the other hand, and for several reasons which are discussed in Section III, combat accounts of South African origin generally received more credence than those promulgated

¹Wade C. Pendleton, Katutura: A Place Where We Do Not Stay (San Diego, Ca.: San Diego State University Press, 1974), p. 6, 15, and F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, cited by Pendleton, p. 10.

by SWAPO. Finally, in considerations of conflicting views of political, economic, and cultural factors, attempts were made to place them within the broader context of recent African history in order to obtain proper perspectives.

II. THE PEOPLE AND HISTORY OF NAMIBIA

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this section is to establish the background, foundations, and historical tendencies and attitudes associated with the various factors of the total problem as they will be analyzed in subsequent sections. Some of these factors which will be at least partially developed or made self-evident in this section are:

1. The history of ethnic and racial interactions which will serve as a foundation for later analysis of the depth and breadth of associated current and projected perceptions, attitudes, compatibilities, and stabilities.

2. A background for the assessment of the strength and scope of the perceptions of the different segments of the population as to who is rightly entitled to what and who has been wronged. This will support discussions on the significance of popular senses of persecution and apprehension or mistrust in subsequent sections.

3. A background for considering the volatility and tenacity of the capability of Namibian Non-Whites for organized violence and the nature of White response to Non-White provocation.

4. To establish a background for current apparent levels of faith in the effectiveness of (and hence the nature of cooperation with) the United Nations in successfully mediating or resolving the issue of Namibian Independence.

5. To establish a foundation for later analysis of the attitudes and the projection of capabilities concerning the post-independence national economy.

B. THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA

Based on official South African estimates, the population of Namibia in 1974 was 852,000. If the rate of increase from the previous census in 1970 to the 1974 estimate has continued, the population should be well over a million. South Africa has categorized this population largely along ethnic lines as shown in Table I. Because much of the African population is rural and remote, and also because many of the members of some of the ethnic groups have migrated throughout the country, some Africans feel that the South African figures for some ethnic groups are quite low. SWAPO has stated the total population may be well over 1.5 million.²

Map 1 depicts the areas of African occupation in Namibia before extensive White settlement.


Map 2 depicts the official geographic population distribution in South West Africa as of 1966. Map 3 depicts the distribution projected by the Odendaal plan in the early 1960's. The actual distribution is somewhere in between these last two since the Odendaal plan was only partially implemented before eventually being scrapped.

²Interview with Kaimbire Tjamuaha, National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO) representative at the United Nations, New York, N.Y., 27 July 1978, and Peter Fraenkel, The Namibians of South West Africa (London, U.K.: Minority Rights Group, 1974), p. 6.

Table I
Population Groups in Namibia
(1974 estimate)

<u>Population Group</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	<u>Number Resident in Homelands</u>
Ovambo	360,000	46.5	290,400
Whites	99,000	11.6	---
Damara	75,000	8.8	14,000
Herero	56,000	6.6	18,000
Kavango	56,000	6.6	40,000
Nama	37,000	4.3	10,000
Coloureds	32,000	3.8	---
East-Caprivians	29,000	3.4	25,000
Bushmen	26,000	3.0	5,000
Rehoboth Basters	19,000	2.2	12,000
Kaokolanders	7,000	0.8	6,000
Tswana	5,000	0.6	300
Others	15,000	1.8	---
Total	852,000	100.0	---

From Duignan & Gann, South West Africa - Namibia, p. 6






Map 1 - Population in 1900 before extensive White settlement

Adapted from Fraenkel, The Namibians of Southwest Africa, p. 30



- 1 Kaokoveld
- 2 Ovamboland
- 3 Okavango
- 4 Caprivi
- 5 Fransfontein
- 6 Hereroland
- 7 Okombahe
- 8 Otjimbingwe
- 9 Ovitoto
- 10 Aminuis
- 11 Rehoboth
- 12 Neuhof
- 13 Krantzplatz
- 14 Berseba/Tses
- 15 Soromas
- 16 Bondels
- 17 Warmbad

Population distribution up to 1966

- Northern boundary of "Police Zone"
-  African reserves
-  White farmland
-  Government land

Map 2 - Population distribution up to 1966

Adapted from Fraenkel, The Namibians of South West Africa, p. 30



Map 3 - Redistribution proposed under Odendaal Plan

Adapted from Fraenkel, The Namibians of South West Africa, p. 30

Many areas actually became "homelands" for specific ethnic groups, although the population transfer to these homelands was rather sparse in some cases, while many of the traditional, small, multi-ethnic reserves have officially become part of the White area but have retained a significant Non-White population base.

The following paragraphs contain brief descriptions of the different ethnic groups found in Namibia.

1. Ovambo

The Ovambo people include seven tribes: Kwanyama, Ndonga, Kuambi, Ngondjera, Kualuthi, Mbalantu, and Ndolonkati-Eunda. The Kwanyama are the largest Ovambo tribe, with more people than any other Namibian ethnic group. Some of these tribes, most notably the Kwanyama, are split by the international border with Angola. The tribal languages are of Bantu origins and are inter-intelligible. When in their homeland, the Ovambo are primarily pastoralists and agriculturalists. Many young Ovambo men (at least 50,000 at any time) spend much of their time out of the homeland on contract labor in the rest of the territory. In the past forty years this flow of labor has reduced the Ovambo isolation from the rest of the territory. Historically, their remoteness, numbers, and organized mode of living protected them from raids from the south and the unsuitability of southern land to their way of life precluded any advances of their own. Later, again due to their numbers and organization, South Africa sealed Ovamboland off from the rest

of the territory, with all entry and exit controlled by the Administration. Partly due to this isolation, the Ovambo were long thought of as placid, docile, and content.³

2. Damara

The Damara are a dark-skinned negroid group who differ completely from the Bantu-speaking groups. Historically they have lacked a central tribal organization and were pressed into servitude by the other ethnic groups. They gradually gave up their original language and adopted that of the Nama. The majority of the people are now spread all over the country as laborers.⁴

3. Herero

The Herero are a Bantu-speaking group (their language differs considerably from other indigenous Bantu-speaking groups) and are physically tall and long-limbed. The people officially recognized as Herero are located throughout the central and southern sections of the territory in several areas and in Hereroland, their designated homeland. As will be discussed shortly, the Kaokolanders in the north are also

³Ruth First, South West Africa (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith Publisher, Inc., 1975), p. 38; Eschel Rhoodie, South West: The Last Frontier in Africa (New York, N.Y.: Twin Circle Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), p. 40; Peter Duignan & L. H. Gann, South West Africa - Namibia (New York, N.Y.: American African Affairs Association, Inc., 1978), p. 6, 7; J. H. P. Serfontein, Namibia? (Randburg, South Africa: Fokus Suid Publishers, 1976), p. 11

⁴First, p. 34-37; Serfontein, p. 14

of Herero stock although they aren't officially classified as such. The Herero consist of two tribes: Herero and Mbanderu. About forty percent of the total Herero population live in Botswana, with most of these being Mbanderu. The Herero are frequently described as extremely proud and somewhat aloof. Until SWAPO's emergence as an international voice in the last ten or fifteen years, the traditional Herero leaders were the primary indigenous advocates of the African cause in the territory. As a group, they alone have offered persistent resistance to any housing, health, and hospital services proffered by the Administration. Originally nomadic herdsman, about half those residing in the homeland still subsist as herdsman while the rest have been absorbed into other aspects of the local economy.⁵

4. Kavango

The Kavango are another Bantu-speaking people and include five tribes: Kwangali, Mbunza, Sambyu, Kbukushu, and Geiruku. They are generally considered to be "cousins" of the Ovambo and sources researched didn't indicate how or when any ancestral divergence may have taken place. The people are generally tillers, herdsman or fishermen (Okovango River) and live in family villages. About a thousand men are usually away on contract labor.⁶

⁵First, p. 27, 29; Rhodie, p. 37; Serfontein, p.12, 13

⁶Serfontein, p. 11

5. Nama

The Nama are a slight-statured, light-skinned Khoisan people and their language has the distinctive click sounds. Because of their light skin they are administered by the South African Department of Coloured Affairs although they are not of mixed ancestry. The Nama were once nomadic herdsman and consisted of two different groups. One group roamed south-central Namibia and included the Rooi Nasie, Velskoendraers, Fransmanne, Groot Dode, Bondelswarts, and Topnaars. The others were called Orlam Namas and migrated from south of the Orange River about 175 years ago. These included the Witboois, Amraals, Afrikaanders, and the Berseba and Bethanie groups. The Nama are now generally spread throughout the southern half of the territory and many of them are employed on White-owned sheep farms.⁷

6. Coloured

The Coloured are of mixed White and African descent. Most are immigrants from South Africa. They generally live in the metropolitan areas of Walvis Bay and Windhoek and work as artisans, teachers and fishermen.⁸

7. East Caprivians

Although they are a Bantu-speaking people, East Caprivians have no ethnic links with the other Bantu-speaking groups in the territory. The two primary tribes are the Masubia and Mafue. The people are primarily farmers and fishermen. At certain seasons the East Caprivi region

⁷Ibid., p. 13; First, p. 32-34

⁸First, p. 48

is virtually isolated from the rest of the territory by waterlogged, swampy terrain.⁹

8. Bushmen

The Bushmen or San are a Khoisan people with slight physical stature and pale skins. Tribal representations include Khung, Keikum, Barakwengo and other small groups. They all speak in clicks but the language differs from tribe to tribe. The Bushmen have traditionally existed as hunters and food gatherers in small family bands. Generally unaggressive, they have always fled from or been driven into the most inhospitable areas of the territory. Most of the Bushmen have retained their historic way of life although in the south many work on farms during the winter.¹⁰

9. Rehoboth Basters

The Rehoboth Basters descended from the racial mixing of Afrikaner trekkers and Nama women in the areas south of the Orange River. They are generally proud of their heritage and prefer to classify themselves as a separate entity from the other Coloureds. Their language is Afrikaans and their group character is greatly influenced by a fervent fire-and-brimstone Calvinism, also inherited from the Afrikaner. More than any other Non-White group in the territory south of the northern restricted areas, the

⁹Serfontein, p. 12

¹⁰Ibid., p. 14; First, p. 46, 47; Rhodie, p. 41, 42; Fraenkel, p. 6.

Rehoboth Basters have managed to sustain their ethnic solidarity in a single geographic area.¹¹

10. Kaokolanders

As mentioned earlier, Kaokolanders are a Bantu-speaking people of Herero stock (the officially recognized Herero are sometimes referred to as the southern Herero, inferring that the Kaokolanders are the northern Herero). The people belong to either the Himba or the Tjimba tribes and are primarily herdsman, often trekking with their stock from one watering place to another.¹²

11. Tswana

The Tswana are a Bantu-speaking spill-over from ethnic groups in Botswana and South Africa and represent an extremely small percentage of the territorial population. The proposal of a separate homeland for them under the Odendaal plan is indicative of the lengths to which South Africa planned to go in separating the different ethnic groups.¹³

12. Whites

Despite the presence of criteria similar to that used to differentiate among Non-White ethnic groups, the Whites are officially recognized as a single ethnic entity. The Whites include Germans and both English and Afrikaans speaking immigrants from South Africa. All three languages are recognized officially. The Afrikaners represent about

¹¹First, p. 41-45; Fraenkel, p. 6; Serfontein, p. 14.

¹²Serfontein, p. 12

¹³Gerhard Totemeyer, South West Africa/Namibia (Randburg, South Africa: Fokus Suid Publishers, 1977), p. 8

65% of the White population. While many are farmers, the Afrikaners also fill most positions in the territory's administration and civil service. A great deal of them arrived only after WWII, a large proportion have retained South African citizenship, and many are there strictly in an administrative capacity. The Germans represent about 23% of the White population and function primarily as farmers and businessmen. About thirty percent of the Germans arrived after WWII and about twenty-five percent still carry West German passports. It is not uncommon for German youths to be sent to West Germany for part of their education. The English-speaking Whites represent about twelve percent of the White population and are found almost completely in the urban areas as businessmen. The Germans and the English look down on the Afrikaners culturally but tend to support them politically and have come to rely on the firm administrative control exercised by the Afrikaners. Despite the fact that more than two-thirds of the Whites live in urban areas, White attitudes and political opinion have been most heavily influenced by the farming "frontiersmen" whose perceptions of single-handed development of the territory in the face of threat from all sides have resulted in a rigid conservatism.¹⁴

13. General

The territory contains more than a dozen ethnolinguistic groups, with many of them further divided into tribes or categories of varying distinctiveness. About

¹⁴First, p. 50-56; Rhodie, p. 43-49; Duignan and Gann, p. 8,9; Fraenkel, p. 6.

seventy percent of all population groups use their mother tongue as their usual language. While majorities of some Non-White ethnic groups reside in their homelands (primarily in the north) the majorities of other groups (primarily in the central and southern areas) reside in the White area. As Serfontein pointed out, effectively there isn't a White area. There is an African area in the north and a "common" area in most of the rest of the territory. There is a possibility that the Non-White population may be larger than current figures indicate and there is a strong probability that the White population will shrink significantly after independence as it is anticipated that many German and South African citizens will return to those countries.¹⁵

C. THE HISTORY OF NAMIBIA

1. The Africans

It is generally accepted that the Bushmen were the first people to occupy any of the area now known as Namibia. They roamed over much of the land as hunters in small family bands. The eventual advance and settlement of more organized peoples slowly forced most of the Bushmen into the scattered, remote areas with which they are now generally associated.¹⁶

Little is known of the origin of the Damara, except that they were one of the first peoples in the region after

¹⁵Duignan and Gann, p. 4; Fraenkel, p. 6; Serfontein, p. 16, 17; Totemeyer, p. 9

¹⁶First, p. 46

the Bushmen. They differ physically from the Bushmen and Nama, but like the Bushmen they lacked a central tribal organization. It has been conjectured they may have arrived with the Nama, whose language they largely adopted and to whom they have been historically subservient.¹⁷

The Nama were the first major, organized people to arrive in ancient Namibia. Although the time of their arrival hasn't been pinpointed, it was well before the arrival of the Bantu-speaking peoples. It is known that one group (including the clan later known as Bondelswarts) settled with their cattle herds in the area of what is now Southeastern Namibia, while another group of clans (later known as Orlams) continued south, stopping below the Orange River in what is now South Africa.¹⁸

The Ovambo appear to have been the next major group to arrive. A Bantu-speaking, agricultural people, they settled along the Cunene and Okavango Rivers and in areas in between which were washed by annual floods. The Kavango are culturally and linguistically related to the Ovambo, and either derived from them (as the Kaokolanders did from the Herero) or arrived either with them or at about the same time. Although this time of arrival isn't clear, it may have been as early as the end of the first millenium A.D., at the same time so many other Bantu-speaking tribes from the central

¹⁷Ibid., p. 34

¹⁸Ibid., p. 32

Africa areas were settling in southern Africa.¹⁹ In any case, they arrived well before the next Bantu-speaking group from central Africa, the Herero. These people entered present day Namibia in the mid-sixteenth century through Kaokoland, to the west of the Ovambo. Some (now known as Kaokolanders) remained in that area, but most continued south with their cattle herds, settling in what is now known as Damaraland, between the Ovambo and the Nama.²⁰

Although there must have been occasional conflict between some of the groups discussed above, the first and primary inter-tribal conflict to receive historical documentation was between the Nama and the Herero. The roots of the conflict lay in the requirements for more land and cattle to sustain the growth of these adjacent, nomadic, cattle-herding peoples. This was exacerbated by the return of the Orlam Namas from the Cape Colony in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as they escaped the pressure of advancing White settlement. The Orlams spoke Cape Dutch, rode horses, and carried rifles. With this military superiority, they moved north under Jonker Afrikaander, marauding for cattle among the resident Nama tribes, and crowding them tighter against the Herero to the north. A serious drought in 1829 drove Herero/Nama pastureland pressures past the breaking point and the older Nama tribes requested the assistance of the Orlams in defeating the Herero. The Orlams were soon

¹⁹Ibid., p. 38; Duignan and Gann, p. 10

²⁰First, p. 27

victorious and confiscated much of the Herero cattle, forced them into a treaty which recognized the Orlams as superior in exchange for protection, and established their "capital" at Windhoek in the 1830's.²¹

When Afrikaander refused to protect the Herero against subsequent encroachment on their land and cattle by other Nama tribes, the Herero withdrew from their treaty and a period of bloody, confused terror followed with both the older Nama and the Orlams pitted against the Herero, but with the Herero themselves apparently split, some joining with the Afrikaanders (an Orlam clan) and others warring independently against the Mbanderu Herero as well. By the 1850's, the Herero were a thoroughly defeated and nearly decimated people.²²

At a power zenith, the Nama formed "The League of (Nama) Nations" in 1858 and pledged, inter alia, not to sell land to any of the Whites beginning to appear from the Cape Colony nor to allow mining without agreement by all. They did encourage traders however, and their debts soon became such that they felt forced to attempt to seize cattle from the Herero to use as payment.²³

²¹Ibid., p. 32; Duignan and Gann, p. 10; Rhodie, p. 121-5; Serfontein, p. 12; Randolph Vigne, A Dwelling Place of Our Own: The Story of the Namibian Nation (London, U.K.: International Defense and Aid Fund, 1973), p. 9

²²Rhodie, p. 125

²³First, p. 33; Vigne, p. 10

During this time the Herero were regrouping under Samuel Maherero and obtaining weapons in trade for cattle. When they were attacked by Orlams seeking cattle in 1863 the Herero successfully repulsed them. In 1864, and assisted by a northern Nama tribe, the Swartboois, they were led to further victories over the Nama by avenging White traders who had lost cattle to the Orlam Namas. The Nama retaliated against this outside interference by attacking these same traders and neighboring missionaries in 1868. This, in turn, resulted in the first request to the King of Prussia for protection against the Africans.²⁴

The hostilities were heightened in the late 1860's by another drought with increased pressures for pastureland. Hunger from the drought greatly weakened both sides however, and facilitated the arrangement of a truce by Rhenish missionaries at Okanhandja in 1870. It was also at this meeting that the Basters obtained permission to settle in the Rehoboth area, after having been displaced from the Cape Colony in 1865 by the Land Beacons Act.²⁵

By this time, German and British traders and missionaries had become involved as advisors and negotiators in inter-tribal politics. The Africans found trading cattle and land for civilized commodities irresistible, but the negative effects on economic and political stability resulting

²⁴First, p. 66; Rhodie, p. 128

²⁵First, p. 42,43; Rhodie, p. 130

from increasing African debts and associated White entrenchment and influence were soon noted by some African leaders. Jonker Afrikaander proposed at one time that traders shouldn't be entitled to residence, that prices of goods should be fixed by the tribal chiefs, and that missionaries should fall under the control of the chiefs.²⁶ Similarly, Maherero was chagrined at the transit of the first group of Boer trekkers through the area and petitioned the Cape Colony for advice and protection against future trekkers as well as future Nama attacks. As a result, a special commissioner was sent to the area from the Cape and he concluded protection agreements with the Herero and the Basters, but was rejected by the Nama. The commissioner departed in 1880 when hostilities broke out again, with the only lasting impact of his presence having been the British annexation of Walvis Bay in 1878 and its subsequent incorporation into the Cape Colony in 1884.²⁷

2. The Germans

Hendrik Witbooi, an Orlam, led the Nama in this new war and, for awhile, they were assisted by the Rehobothers. The resident traders and missionaries sought protection from the Cape Colony. When denied, they turned to Germany. The Germans soon established a protectorate at Lüderitz Bay in 1884 and concluded a protection agreement with the Herero and a sovereignty agreement with the Rehobothers (in return for military assistance against the Africans).²⁸ Again, the Nama

²⁶First, p. 65, 66

²⁷Rhodie, p. 130-3; Fraenkel, p. 8

²⁸Rhodie, p. 134; Serfontein, p. 15; Vigne, p. 10

refused to accept White protection, and in a letter to Maherero, Witbooi prophetically rebuked the Herero leader's submissiveness:

...My dear Kaptein, you will eternally regret your action in having handed over to the White Man the right to govern your country. After all, our war is not as serious a matter as you think...But this thing that you have done,...to surrender yourself to the White Man, will be a burden that you will carry on your shoulders...you will in due course resent them, and then it will be too late for you...²⁹

When the Nama attacked the Herero in 1888, the Germans were unable to provide protection and the Herero revoked the treaty.³⁰

Recognizing that control of Witbooi was the key to controlling the whole colony, the Germans gradually reinforced until they felt strong enough to challenge him in 1893. In reply to the German ultimatum to accept "protection," Witbooi opined that "...Those under protection were the slaves of the protectors..." and asked, "Against whom are we to be protected?" When the strength of the Germans became apparent in battle, Witbooi unsuccessfully sought alliance with the Herero. The Germans soon captured Witbooi and forced a treaty between the Nama and Herero as well as a Nama protection agreement which included the provision of Nama soldiers to the Germans when needed.³¹

In the relative peace that followed, land and cattle swindling by German traders and farmers and an adverse system of penalty compensation for civil violations by Africans

²⁹Vigne, p. 10

³⁰Rhodie, p. 137

³¹Ibid., p. 138

rapidly diminished African holdings and kindled a growing awareness and resentment of the German intentions as later expressed by an official in the German Colonial Office:

The decision to colonize in South West Africa could after all mean nothing else but this, namely that the tribes would have to give up their lands on which they had previously grazed their stock, in order that the White man might have the land for the grazing of his stock.³²

The German subjugation and resultant African resentment and desparation became so intense that tribal rivalries greatly diminished as an issue of contention, with all subsequent African violence being directed against the colonizers.

In 1897 the Mbanderu Herero joined with some of the neighboring Nama tribes to throw off German control and regain their lost herds. The Herero people were split in a leadership dispute at that time and Samuel Maherero (son of Samuel Maherero mentioned previously) chose not to assist the rebels. The Germans, aided by Witbooi's men soon suppressed the rebellion. In the next few years there were additional short-lived uprisings by other Nama tribes, the Swartboois in the north and the Bondelswarts in the south.³³

After 1900 German immigration increased. Farmers initially bought tracts of land from the Hereros and Namas, but soon laws were passed which facilitated the confiscation of land and cattle as penalties in lieu of fines. Traders

³²First, p. 75

³³Rhoodie, p. 140

extended credit at high interest and confiscated cattle as compensation for non-payment.³⁴

The gradual loss of their main source of livelihood goaded the Bondelswarts into rebelling once again in late 1903. The Herero had also reached the breaking point, and with the German soldiers occupied with the Bondelswarts in the south, they attacked German traders and farmers on 12 January 1904. Maherero sought Witbooi's assistance in combatting the Germans, but the Rehoboth intermediary delivered the message to the Germans instead. Heavily outgunned, the Herero were steadily beaten back. Finally, following the decisive battle of Hamakari in August 1904, the entire people took flight into the Kalahari towards Bechuanaland, pursued by General Von Trotha and his infamous extermination orders.³⁵

The Germans were initially assisted in all of this by the Nama under Witbooi, but increasing anti-German sentiment within the Nama was finally catalyzed by the Germans' harsh treatment of the vanquished Herero and Bondelswarts. Witbooi rallied all the Nama tribes, abrogated the ten year German treaty, and launched a guerilla war. Witbooi was killed after a year, but the losing battle carried on until 1907, terminating finally in the Treaty of Ukamas.³⁶

³⁴Fraenkel, p. 9

³⁵Rhoodie, p. 140

³⁶First, p. 79-81

Thus, German authority over most of the territory was finally asserted at a tremendous cost in African lives. Out of 80,000 Herero prior to the war, only 15,000 remained alive in South West Africa and only 1,500 had managed to reach Bechuanaland. Half the Nama had been killed and half of their Damara "vassals" had also died. The Herero tribal lands were declared government property and the Herero survivors were forbidden to own cattle. Laws were soon passed requiring all Africans older than seven to carry passes, prohibiting African purchase of land or animals without official permission, and stipulating punishment as a vagrant for anyone without visible means of support, all of which were intended to force the Africans into labor service for the Whites.³⁷

Despite the foregoing, the Germans never established control over the entire colony. Chief Kambonde of the Kwanyama tribe of the Ovambo had rejected German "protection" overtures in 1894, stating, "...The Germans came with friendly words, but ... they wanted to rule, and that he could do himself." After their bloody experiences with the Herero and Nama, the Germans thought better of antagonizing the numerous and well-armed Ovambo. To ensure this, in 1906 the German government forbade further entry to Ovamboland.³⁸ Subjugation of the Ovambo would be the task of the South Africans.

³⁷Ibid., p. 82, 83

³⁸Ibid., p. 23; Vigne, p. 12; Fraenkel, p. 8

As German South West Africa poised on the brink of WWI, the Africans within the Police Zone (see Map 2) were in a state of total subjugation. German colonial policy had been one of frequently ruthless exploitation for the sake of White settlement. It had provoked the indigenous population to rebellion, and the response had been genocide, confiscation of land and a labor system that was close to slavery.³⁹

3. South Africa's Mandate

WWI combat in South West Africa didn't last long, and on 9 July 1915, the small German colonial army surrendered to the vastly superior forces of the Union of South Africa. In light of their treatment under the Germans and encouraged by promises from the highest South African officials, the Non-Whites were optimistic about their "liberation" and post-war future. The Rehobothers had vigorously repulsed a German attack on their town, and Bondelswarts had served as scouts for the South African army. Most of the other groups had passively resisted the Germans through non-cooperation. Despite an apparent relaxation of Non-White restrictions in the next five years under South African military government however (e.g., restoration of African cattle rights, use of land confiscated from the Germans), Non-White status ultimately changed very little.

³⁹Fraenkel, p. 11

In 1915, King Mandume (Kwanyama Ovambo), having rebelled against the Portuguese in southern Angola, requested South African protection from their savage reprisals. A subsequent border agreement between South African and Portuguese authorities split the Kwanyama tribe between the two territories and gave Mandume refuge in South West Africa. Reprimands over subsequent inevitable tribal border crossings led first to Mandume's open defiance of South African authority and ultimately to the deaths of him and several of his tribe in a small battle in 1917, after which his head was carried to Windhoek and buried as an example.⁴⁰

At the Treaty of Versailles and during the formation of the League of Nations, Britain and South Africa, as documented by John Dugard, lobbied long and hard for the annexation of South West Africa into the Union of South Africa. World pressure eventually forced them to accept instead a class "C" mandate under the system drawn up by the League of Nations. This mandate was conferred on Britain, but was exercised for Britain by South Africa.⁴¹

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 11; Vigne, p. 14; First, p. 98-100; Colin O'Brien Winter, Namibia (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977), p. 107

⁴¹The former colonies of Germany and Turkey were entrusted to members of the victorious Allies for administration and development. These nations were given different mandates for this trusteeship, of which there were three classes--"A", "B", and "C". The gradations of mandates were based ostensibly on the different stages of development attained by the respective territories. Less obviously, the gradations also reflected different degrees of national interest in annexation of the territories concerned, with C mandate territories having been those which the various Dominions of the British Commonwealth had attempted to annex. Only A mandates contained wording which implied probable eventual independence. See John Dugard, The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1973), p. 27-74

The mandate system was shaped against the humanitarian standards of the nineteenth century--"native trusteeship" with no thought or reference to eventual political independence. Referring to the system, the League's Covenant stated in part:

To those...territories...which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such people's form a sacred trust of civilization,...

It went on to state that, "the Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory..."⁴²

Article 2 of the South African mandate agreement read in part:

The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory...as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require...⁴³

Despite the language of these governing documents, South Africa's real attitude was readily apparent in the following report of Prime Minister Botha's statement before the League:

He would support the Covenant because he knew that the League of Nations would consist mostly of the same people who were present on that day, who understood the position and who would not make it impossible for any mandatory to govern the country.⁴⁴

⁴²Serfontein, p. 21

⁴³Fraenkel, p. 10

⁴⁴W. R. Louis, "The Origins of the Sacred Trust," in R. Segal and R. First, South West Africa: Travesty of Trust, cited by Vigne, p. 15

In other words, he accepted the mandate system for South West Africa for the sake of international agreement, but he expected its actual implementation to be much closer to annexation.

This attitude was exhibited again a few years later in a speech by Prime Minister Smuts to the South African parliament:

I do not think it necessary to annex South West Africa...(the mandate) gives such complete sovereignty,... that we need not ask for anything more.⁴⁵

The intentions of South Africa regarding this newly "acquired" territory were also soon apparent to the indigenous Africans. As stated by Prof. J. H. Wellington of Witwatersrand University,

The crux of the matter is surely that the mandatory, having been directed to make the welfare of the natives its chief concern, and having been given the power to carry out this policy effectively, seized the best land for its own (white) subjects, relegating its wards...to areas too small for their sustenance, or else...to land far worse than they were accustomed to.⁴⁶

A Land Board was set up to allocate farms to new White settlers. By 1926 the White population was almost double that of 1914 despite the repatriation of 6,000 Germans, and 380 holdings had been allocated to 1,106 settlers. The government gave the new farmers generous loan terms and remissions on rent arrears, built dams, bored for water and, advanced

⁴⁵Fraenkel, p. 11

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 14

capital for stock. South Africa also set up a special fund to attract 301 Boer-trekker families from Angola, with guarantees of farms, cattle, and sizable cash advances.⁴⁷

To make room for the White settlers, the Africans were displaced from most of their "traditional" lands which they had reoccupied under the military government since 1915, and they were crowded onto small, ill-suited reserves. In the case of the Herero, many refused to vacate until their farms and gardens were finally burned. The government picked the Omaheke as the Herero Reserve--the same Kalahari sandveld on which thousands of Hereros had died of thirst and starvation during General Von Trotha's reign of terror less than twenty years earlier. White farmers had previously been advised to move from the southern edge of the Omaheke because of the local prevalence of lame-sickness in cattle.⁴⁸ Hosea Kutako, acting Herero chief, inspected the Omaheke and, in rejecting it as a site for his people, declared:

It is a desert where no human being ever lived before... It is a country only good for wild beasts...We are human beings and we do not want to be changed into wild beasts.⁴⁹

Crowded into small, barren reserves, it was impossible for the Africans to avoid destroying the small amount of

⁴⁷First, p. 107

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 112; Fraenkel, p. 12

⁴⁹John H. Wellington, South West Africa and Its Human Issues, cited by Vigne, p. 16

grazing available, and most were soon faced with the choice of laboring for the Whites or starving. The Whites came to view the Africans almost solely as laborers, as typified by a statement in the territory Administrator's report to the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1921 in which he noted the "healthy, well-nourished children" which could be seen on temporary government farms, "representing potential laborers for the future."⁵⁰

In one case, this process resulted in a violent reaction. By 1922 the Bondelswarts had lost so much of their land and cattle that they were forced to rely on hunting with their dogs as a last means of avoiding servitude to White farmers. When the South Africans placed a heavy tax on dog ownership, many Bondelswarts were unable to pay and were jailed. The situation was aggravated by prejudicial cattlebranding requirements. The attempted arrest of some former leaders returning from South Africa finally sparked a small rebellion. Fearful rumors among the Whites about these former leaders escalated the situation, and the territorial administration called in troops and aircraft bombing strikes to quell the uprising at a cost of over 100 Bondelswart lives.⁵¹

In his reports to the Permanent Mandates Commission, the territorial Administrator acknowledged that perhaps the

⁵⁰Fraenkel, p. 12

⁵¹Ibid., Rhodie, p. 161-2; First, p. 101-3; Vigne, p. 17

biggest problem in administering the Africans was dealing with their frustrations and discontent in having failed to recover their traditional lands after WWI. The problem, as the Administrator repeatedly explained, was in trying to make the Africans understand the impossibility of the situation due to the "vested rights" of others (White settlers) that had accrued since the end of WWI and the resultant unavailability of sufficient land.⁵²

Even if the duplicity with which these vested rights had accrued is accepted, however, there still doesn't appear to have been a land shortage in the extremes stated by the Administrator. As Ruth First points out, while the government claimed it was an "utter impossibility" in 1922 to restore the tribes to their former lands, there were still huge areas available for the settlement of the Angola Boers in 1928. The Administrator's annual report in 1937 complained that there was "so little land available for allotment" but went on to reveal that "over 21 million hectares are unallocated."⁵³ Any shortage of land appears to have pertained only to the Africans, as a matter of policy.

The South African government soon promulgated more overt policies of African restriction. Under a vagrancy law, Africans could be punished for leaving their reserves except to work for a White man. The "Masters and Servants Proclamation" of 1920 prescribed punishments for neglect of assigned

⁵²Fraenkel, p. 12, 13

⁵³First, p. 116

duties, drunkenness, desertion from a job, etc. The "Native Administration Proclamation No. 11" of 1922 introduced the Pass Laws. "Curfew Regulations Proclamation No. 33" of 1922 prevented Africans from appearing in public in any town between 9:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M.⁵⁴ The ultimate rightlessness of the African was to be seen in the power of the government:

To remove any Native from the highest to the lowest, whether within or outside the Police Zone from any place to any other place within the territory without any right of interference by the courts of the country.⁵⁵

These political restrictions applied to the Rehobothers as well, and in 1924 they rebelled at having insufficient constitutional independence, especially compared to their relatively independent status under the Germans. They formed a local governmental alternative to the one officially recognized by the South Africans and appealed to the League of Nations. The situation was brought under control only after Rehoboth was surrounded by troops, bombers were flown over for intimidation, and 638 men were taken prisoner.⁵⁶

The South West Africa Constitution Act of 1925 delegated responsibility for territorial "Native Affairs" to the territory's Administrator. A 1928 proclamation made him the "Paramount Chief" of the "Natives" and established "Native

⁵⁴Fraenkel, p. 13

⁵⁵I. Goldblatt, History of South West Africa, cited by Vigne, p. 16, 17

⁵⁶Fraenkel, p. 12; First, p. 104-5

Affairs" commissioners for areas outside the Police Zone.⁵⁷

One last act of African defiance and South African punitive military response can be attributed to the legal restrictions placed on the Africans during this period. In 1932 Chief Ipumbu of the Kuambi Ovambo refused to pay a fine and his people became restive. In a move which the government tried to keep secret, the South African Air Force bombed the Chief's village. Ipumbu was deposed and put in detention in Caprivi, the tribe was disarmed, and the village was destroyed.⁵⁸

On one occasion, the Permanent Mandates Commission was told that, "The Native...should be allowed to develop quietly and according to such capacity as he has." The White estimation of this capacity for development can perhaps be partially deduced by the low levels of African educational expenditures rendered by the government during that time. If just the actual scholars are considered, the expenditure for each White was almost six times that of each African. If the expenditures are considered on a per capita basis however, the White expenditure was more than 100 times that of the African.⁵⁹ Obviously it was anticipated that the Africans as a whole would develop in a very limited and controlled manner and would therefore have to remain in White servitude for quite some time.

⁵⁷Serfontein, p. 22

⁵⁸First, p. 100; Fraenkel, p. 12; Vigne, p. 16

⁵⁹Fraenkel, p. 13

The status of the Africans and the attitude of the South African government during the mandate period was illustrated clearly by two conflicting official statements. In 1917, General Smuts declared that the German maladministration, as evidenced by the colonial brutality recorded in the infamous Blue Book, rendered "preposterous" any suggestion that South West Africa be returned to Germany. Yet six years later, a South African official told the Permanent Mandates Commission very frankly that, "they (the Africans) soon realized that conditions would remain practically the same... as they were in German times."⁶⁰

The fact that the League of Nations was, for various reasons, incapable of enforcing the rights of the Africans under the terms of the mandate in South West Africa would eventually be considered by the Africans as reinforcing historical evidence of the absolute necessity for self-generated positive action towards independence.

4. The United Nations, South Africa, and the Namibians

When the United Nations was established in 1945, it, like its League of Nations predecessor, had to deal with the question of former German colonies. It set up a Trusteeship committee to work with the original mandated powers in bringing their mandated territories to independence. South Africa was the only mandated power to reject this course of action, requesting instead the formal annexation of South West Africa into South Africa. The refusal of this request by the U.N.

⁶⁰Segal and First (see 44) cited by Fraenkel, p. 29

and the subsequent counter-refusal by South Africa to place the territory under trusteeship or to recognize any juridical authority of the U.N. in the administration of the territory coupled with its simultaneous statement of intent to continue to administer the territory in the "spirit of the mandate" touched off an international legal battle between South Africa and the U.N. which was to last almost 25 years. General discussion of the various International Court of Justice deliberations and considerations and the actions taken by several U.N. committees and bodies in connection with this legal argument is beyond the scope of this paper. Specific cases will be mentioned as needed to indicate the growth of a widespread feeling within the territory's African population that they would have to take matters into their own hands to achieve independence. Some of the international decisions which supported this indigenous activism will also be discussed.⁶¹

Although their impact was greatly filtered by South Africa's pervasive control of the territory, the same modernizing forces which accelerated the political sensitization of most of the rest of black Africa after WWII were also at work in South West Africa. Traditional African leaders tried

⁶¹An extensive coverage of these international legal proceedings is contained in John Dugard's The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute. Condensed but comprehensive treatments are also contained in Gerhard Totemeyer's South West Africa/Namibia and J. H. P. Serfontein's Namibia?

to use their right under the terms of the old mandate to petition the U.N. as the successor to the League of Nations, but South Africa refused to issue passports. At the request of Herero Chief Hosea Kutako, Reverend Michael Scott began petitioning on their behalf in 1947. As the years went by, he was joined by those few Africans who were able to leave South West Africa and make their way to New York.⁶²

The germ of modern political organization in South West Africa was contained in the South West African Student Body, set up by South West African students in South Africa in 1952. It was reconstituted within South West Africa in 1955 as the South West Africa Progressive Association (SWAPA). Almost all later nationalist groups had their roots in this organization. The Ovambo People's Congress (OPC) was founded by Herman Toivo ja Toivo and Andreas Shipanga in Cape Town in 1958 for Ovambo workers in that area. When Toivo was returned to South West Africa after smuggling a taped petition to the U.N., this organization was reorganized internally as the Ovambo People's Organization (OPO) in 1959. It became the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in June, 1960, after petitioners at the U.N. urged that it avoid being cast strictly as an ethnic based party. The South West Africa National Union (SWANU) was formed in May 1959 with a base of support primarily among the Herero.

⁶²Fraenkel, p. 15; Vigne, p. 20

Several other Non-White political parties soon formed also, and like the two just mentioned, they were all primarily ethnic based.⁶³

During this post-war period two new irritants were added to the list of aggravations from which Non-White South West Africans were seeking relief. The first of these was the rapid expansion of foreign-owned mining operations and the associated requirements for a greater control of the supporting migrant labor system. While contract labor had existed in South West Africa for a long time, the rapidly increasing requirements for laborers and the grouping of hundreds and thousands of these migrants together in single locations tended to accentuate resentment of the system. The first aspects of the mining and contract labor situation to aggravate the Africans were the low wages, the generally squalid living conditions, the extended and repeated family separations and the hopelessness for most Africans of avoiding this form of employment. As the Africans as a whole, and especially the laborers, became more politicized and as their leaders became more sophisticated, the mining and contract labor issues took on additional dimensions. Resentment grew over the arbitrary exploitation of the territory's mineral wealth, the extremely high profits netted by foreign concerns with minimal return to the Africans from these activities, and the distasteful role these factors played in supporting the continued presence and control by South Africa.⁶⁴

⁶³Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 119

⁶⁴Vigne, p. 37

The second post-WWII addition to the list of Non-White South West African grievances was South Africa's institution of apartheid in 1948. After codification and legalization of what had become customary in racial separation, the policy began to expand, became more specific and came to be perceived by all Non-Whites as a system of maintaining White supremacy and denying to all others fundamental human rights. Apartheid forced apart racially mixed communities, and in South West Africa, this led to the Katutura riots. Africans were to be moved from the racially mixed "Old Location" on the edge of Windhoek, where many were free-holders and many more had lived for a long time, to a township further from town called Katutura, which was to be ethnically zoned to minimize contact between the different African groups. Protest demonstrations and boycotts by the Africans culminated in a confrontation between police and a large crowd on 10 December 1959 in which eleven were killed and 54 injured, after which bulldozers began flattening the town. While passive African resistance actually delayed the completion of this transfer process for several years, many of the more politicized were somewhat dismayed at the ineffectiveness exhibited by the U.N. during this episode. Despite petitions before the incident and even after the territory's worst civil violence in almost thirty years, the U.N. appeared to do little more than issue perfunctory denunciations and move on to other business. The need for positive self-reliance was becoming much more apparent to many Africans.⁶⁵

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 21; Fraenkel, p. 15,16; Gibson, p.133

Sam Nujoma, president of OPO, was escorted back to Ovamboland after the riots. Suppression of OPO activities by local Ovambo traditional leaders caused him to leave the country and he soon appeared at the U.N. as a petitioner on behalf of the renamed SWAPO. Between 400 and 900 Africans followed Nujoma abroad in 1961/62 and an expatriate organization soon formed as an external branch of SWAPO.⁶⁶

The growth of SWAPO External was greatly facilitated by the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Through the OAU African Liberation Committee (ALC) SWAPO received funds and improved international diplomatic status. It was also under ALC sponsorship that SWAPO in 1963, after little change in the status of South West Africa despite the independence achieved by most of the rest of Africa in 1960/61, began training guerrilla fighters as the ultimate contingency.⁶⁷

In 1962, Ethiopia and Liberia, as former members of the League of Nations, petitioned the International Court of Justice to rule on the accountability of South Africa to the United Nations for the Administration of South West Africa and to decide whether or not apartheid violated the provisions of the original mandate. On 18 July 1966 the Court

⁶⁶Gibson, p. 133; Totemeyer, p. 62,63

⁶⁷Gibson, p. 135, Vigne, p. 24

finally decided that Ethiopia and Liberia had no "...legal right or interest appertaining to them in the subject matter..." and dropped the case.⁶⁸

The court's decision was a significant disappointment to SWAPO and its African supporters. This, and the generally unsupportive attitudes displayed at the U.N. by many Western governments on the territorial issues, tended to confirm, in SWAPO's eyes, the rightness and necessity of the course of heightened, aggressive self-reliance on which it had recently embarked.

In September 1965 a small group of SWAPO guerillas entered Ovamboland. It soon established several small base camps and began to train thirty locally-recruited men. More small groups infiltrated in February and July, 1966. Brushes with the police by some of these groups led to an intensive search by the South African police and an eventual attack on the main SWAPO camp near Ongulumbashe on 26 August 1966. Two were killed, nine captured, and the rest escaped. SWAPO later designated 26 August 1966 as the date that it "... declared war..." on the government and administration of South West Africa.⁶⁹ This war has continued in varying degrees of low intensity until the present.

A series of actions on the international scene in the next few years served to encourage SWAPO in its struggle.

⁶⁸Dugard, p. 292

⁶⁹Michael Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa (Cape Town, South Africa: Jeremy Spence), p. 4,5

On 27 October 1966, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution terminating South Africa's League of Nations mandate and placing South West Africa under de jure administration of the U.N. The territory was renamed Namibia by the U.N. General Assembly in June 1968 and a U.N. Council for Namibia was appointed to attempt administration of the territory. In August 1969, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Namibia against the illegal presence of South Africa in the territory and calling upon South Africa to withdraw from the territory immediately.⁷⁰

In June 1971, in the face of South Africa's refusal to acknowledge any change in its responsibility and authority towards Namibia, the International Court of Justice responded to a U.N. request for a ruling on the matter and confirmed the legality of the U.N. resolutions and actions and the illegality of South Africa's position.⁷¹

In December, 1973 the U.N. Security Council terminated a mandate it had given the Secretary General for direct negotiations with South Africa on Namibia's independence, as South Africa's actions seemed continually to belie tentative and general negotiated agreements.⁷²

⁷⁰Fraenkel, p. 16, 18; Vigne, p. 39,40; United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship, and Decolonization, "Issue on Namibia" Decolonization, No. 9, October 1977, p. 39

⁷¹Fraenkel, p. 18; Vigne, p. 39,40

⁷²Serfontein, p. 78, 79, 91

In 1974 the U.N. recognized SWAPO as the authentic representative of the people of Namibia. In December 1976 the General Assembly declared its support for SWAPO's armed struggle for self-determination and independence, and accorded SWAPO permanent observer status.⁷³

Despite the growing international opposition, South Africa continued to extend its administrative hold over the territory during the 1960's. By 1969, South Africa had direct control of Namibia's defense, foreign affairs, police, African administration, customs, immigration, revenue, labor relations, mining, health, and other functions. Namibia's economic links and dependencies on South Africa rapidly broadened and strengthened.⁷⁴

In 1964 a South African government commission promulgated what became known as the Odendaal Report, which was to be used as the blueprint for South African development of South West Africa. Among other things it recommended the "giving" of a homeland to each population group. The territory, including the "White area," was to be divided into twelve separate ethnic units. The Non-White homelands were to occupy 39% of the county, with the best land and virtually all the mines to remain in the possession of the Whites. After the plan's implementation, the only Non-White group that would have enjoyed the use of land similar in quality to that used by the Whites would have been the Rehobothers.

⁷³U.N. Dept. of Political Affairs, p. 41, 42

⁷⁴Duignan and Gann, p. 13

The report acknowledged that six of the proposed homelands weren't economically viable and the Africans doubted that any of the others were either. This would have forced the continued reliance of the Africans on the White area for economic survival but would have legalized their almost total lack of rights when working in the White area. The plan was opposed by the Africans not only because of the inequitable land distribution, but also because they felt these separate homelands would be detrimental to racial harmony.⁷⁵

South Africa had refrained from vigorous implementation of the Odendaal recommendations during the time the International Court of Justice was deliberating on the administration of the South West Africa mandate. Once the matter was "resolved", South Africa pushed ahead and began moving Non-Whites from the designated White areas to the various homelands. The first homeland to "achieve" a "self-governing" status was Ovamboland, on 1 May 1973. Since then, Okavango and East Caprivi have also received similar status.⁷⁶

The previously mentioned decision by the International Court of Justice in 1971 against South Africa acted as somewhat of a catalyst for the increasingly politicized Namibian Africans. Demonstrations and rallies at schools and urban/industrial locations and statements by various Non-White leaders evidenced a growing civil militancy within the

⁷⁵Rhodie, p. 241-45; Vigne, p. 33; Fraenkel, p. 31, 32; Serfontein, p. 58

⁷⁶Fraenkel, p. 17, 19, 29

territory. This new activism found fertile ground in the deep grievances held by the Africans against the contract labor system and sparked a labor strike in December 1971.

Originally organized in Windhoek and Walvis Bay, it soon spread throughout the country and by the middle of January 1972 it involved at least 13,500 workers (primarily Ovambo) and had affected 23 industrial centers, including eleven mines, seven of which had to shut down. Most of these workers were temporarily repatriated to Ovamboland. Their idle discontent precipitated numerous incidents of civil disobedience and violence against figures or symbols of authority. These incidents and reports of plans for more extreme actions were generally attributed to SWAPO organization. Although the workers eventually returned to work, the changes made in the labor system proved to be of little substance in the long run.⁷⁷

Nationalistic demonstrations and rallies occurred with increasing frequency, better organization and greater militancy. When elections for an Ovamboland administration were held in August 1973 following its establishment as a self-governing homeland, a boycott organized by SWAPO and other opposition parties resulted in an electorate turnout of only 2.5 percent. A much more spontaneous demonstration of anti-South African feeling was demonstrated between June 1974 and early 1975 when several thousand people left Namibia for Zambia via Angola, apparently not so much to join SWAPO's

⁷⁷Vigne, p. 42-46; U.N. Dept. of Political Affairs, p. 16; Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), Feb. 1-29, 1972, p. 2387,8.

struggle as simply to escape what for then was an unbearable situation.⁷⁸

Throughout this period, South Africa sought to contain and defuse the activities of the internal branch of SWAPO through increasing arrest and detainment of members and supporters. By late 1974 it was forced to undertake an additional approach in the face of increased international pressure, the pending independence of Angola, and a desire for detente with other southern Africa states. In an effort to promote viable African leadership alternatives to SWAPO and to set the territory on the road to independence, South Africa convened a constitutional conference (known as the Turnhalle Conference) on 1 September 1975. Convened on an ethnic basis, the conference was rejected internationally and by SWAPO and other Non-White Namibian political parties for its lack of true representation, the illegality of South Africa convening such a body, and a projected form of government which appeared to perpetuate the principle of separate ethnic areas and governments.⁷⁹

The results of the Turnhalle Conference were subsequently shelved as a result of a new initiative by the five Western members of the U.N. Security Council in April 1977 to achieve a solution which would be acceptable to all parties concerned.⁸⁰

⁷⁸Fraenkel, p. 19; Serfontein, p. 229-31

⁷⁹U.N. Dept of Political Affairs, p. 27; Serfontein, p. 262

⁸⁰U.N. Dept. of Political Affairs, p. 30,31

Although extensive negotiations have been conducted to date, a firm, workable agreement has continued to elude the participants, primarily because of the suspicion and wary intransigence exhibited by SWAPO and South Africa towards each other, the Western negotiators, and in South Africa's case, towards the U.N. as well. Although these negotiations are continuing, international expectations on their effectiveness have diminished. South Africa has conducted internal elections in which most Non-White political parties did not participate and the results of which accordingly did not receive international recognition. SWAPO has responded with vows to escalate its combat operations with threats of assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union.

5. A Brief Bottom Line

The cumulative impact on the African political psyche of the history of the political/military struggle in Namibia first to retain independence, then against perceived injustices, and finally to regain independence, will be discussed later in the paper. A generalized recapitulation of the opposing forces and attitudes consistently at work in this struggle is probably appropriate now however.

As in the rest of Africa, definite and often violent ethnic differences existed before the arrival of the Whites. Despite these differences, specific issues frequently precipitated unlikely ethnic coalitions and divisions. Still, these differences were sufficient to prevent any unity of action

against the Whites when they did arrive, and even facilitated playing off one group against another by the Whites. Since then, ethnic interaction has been largely precluded through the form of South Africa's "native" administration. Despite their advocacy of a non-racial, unitary, independent Namibia, almost all African political parties, including SWAPO, are perceived as essentially ethnically based. The Non-Whites feel they have historically received hypocritical and ill treatment at the hands of the Whites, who are generally regarded with skeptical mistrust. Despite moral and material support, international organizations have thus far been ultimately ineffective in rectifying the political situation of the Africans.

The Whites feel their societal position was hard won and is well deserved, and that it was only through their efforts that the territory has advanced. South Africa and the Whites have historically advocated ethnic separation, have resolutely resisted international opinions and pressures in the conduct of their internal and external political activities, and still maintain a very paternalistic attitude towards Non-Whites in general.

III. THE WAR

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this section is to examine both the current nature of the insurgent/counterinsurgent warfare associated with SWAPO's struggle for Namibian independence and the history of its military escalation in order to establish the military portion of the foundation upon which projections of future actions will be predicated.

Some of the aspects of the military situation which will be examined are:

1. Geographic considerations.
2. The opposing military structures.
3. The breadth and depth of military operations.
4. The operational effectiveness of the participants.
5. The nature of involvement by external actors other than South Africa.
6. The modification of the Namibian civil legal system to accomodate counterinsurgent warfare.
7. The militant attitudes or resolve of the opposing forces and the nature of indigenous popular support.

In discussing several aspects of the military situation in Namibia (e.g., personnel strength, casualties, operational effectiveness), greater reliance will usually be placed on South African accounts and figures than on those announced by SWAPO. As will be noted later in discussing the use of propaganda and psychological warfare, it is a common

insurgent practice to fabricate or greatly inflate claims of success. On the other hand, since South African troops only serve in the operational zone for short periods of time and then return home, the government can't very well deceive the public on military casualties for any length of time. Further, given the nature of the operations, and the size and commitments of the overall South African military establishment, the figures as reported by South Africa are generally in line with those reported in other counterinsurgencies and with the author's own experiences as a member of the U.S. Navy SEAL team in Vietnam. Still, given the nature of counterinsurgency warfare, it is certain that many African casualties reported as guerrillas were actually civilians caught in suspicious circumstances at the wrong times and places.

After studying several classified documents on the military situation in Namibia, it was decided to use only unclassified material as the basis for this paper. There were several reasons for this, not the least of which was a desire to avoid the length of coverage that the much more detailed classified reports would have encouraged. Secondly, there is sufficient accurate unclassified information available for discussion and to facilitate deduction adequate for the purposes of this section of the paper. Third, in the course of researching this paper it was noted that there didn't seem to be any recent complete account of the total military situation in Namibia available to people working at an unclassified level. Perhaps this paper will help.

Finally, it was felt that given the likely distribution of this paper, those who might have a need for the detail provided by classified sources would probably have access to them through their own channels. For those readers, some of the registered classified sources which might be of interest are listed below.⁸¹

B. THEORY

In dealing with a topic of this nature, most writers delve extensively into their versions of the sciences of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare before focusing on a particular situation. In this case a very short overall summarization which was synthesized from several sources will be presented.⁸² The purpose of this is to provide a framework for evaluation of the situation in Namibia.

⁸¹Deleted to permit wider distribution.

⁸²If the reader desires a greater depth of discussion on these opposing types of warfare, it is recommended that he consult any of the following sources:

- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, (New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964)
John J. McCuen, Lt. Col. U. S. Army, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1966)
Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare, (New York, N.Y.: Walker and Company, 1967)
Special Operations Research Office, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1965)
Special Operations Research Office, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, Washington, D.C.: American University, 1965)

1. The Insurgent

Theories of insurgency warfare seem to differ primarily only in the number of phases into which a particular writer has decided to divide the total process. Additionally, differences in terminology (e.g., guerrilla, insurgent, revolutionary) usually reflect a narrow concern for whether or not the situation is developed primarily from within or without a country, whether or not the controlling government is legitimate, and the degree of popular support accorded to either side. It is interesting to note that South Africa, both officially and within the press, describes the soldiers of all African liberation movements as "terrorists" on the grounds that more common terms such as guerrilla or insurgent imply the recognition of a state of war, a degree of legitimacy, and internal popular support. South Africa has defined "terrorist" officially in its legal code in such a manner as to apply in all situations of violent indigenous action against the ruling government.⁸³ Unfortunately, there seems to be a paucity of recognized terms for specifically describing a member of the military wing of a liberation movement which is recognized internationally as legitimate and who fights from an external base against a government which is recognized internationally as illegal (e.g., the case in Namibia). Consequently, the

⁸³Morris, p. 324,5

terminology used in this paper for discussing these subjects will apply in a very broad sense. Members of SWAPO's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), will usually be referred to as guerrillas. Terms such as insurgent, liberation fighter, or revolutionary will have a broader connotation which can include members of the political organization the guerrillas are supporting and those involved in sabotage, terrorism, and even civil disobedience as well. The forces opposing them within Namibia (the South African Defense Force (SADF), police, Namibian forces, etc.) will normally be referred to as counter-insurgents, security forces, etc. It should be noted that inside Angola, PLAN is frequently required to function as a counter-guerrilla force in conjunction with the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Angola (FAPLA) and Cuban forces in their struggle with the guerrilla forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

The aim of an insurgent force normally is to achieve a political objective by military means. This usually consists of harassment of the opponent by small, lightly armed groups utilizing mobile tactics. Civil disobedience, sabotage, and terrorist tactics are frequently incorporated into this struggle as well. The intent is not so much to defeat the enemy in open battle as it is to achieve a stalemate or a continuing level of activity which eventually forces the counterinsurgents to decide that the cost of continuing an indecisive struggle is no longer worthwhile.

Within an insurgent organization the political body is usually structured on country, region, state, district, and village levels. The military structure frequently parallels this. In most guerrilla situations the small basic units usually operate rather independently in areas allotted to them. Large units aren't maintained permanently but may be formed by concentrating several groups for a particular operation.

The basic requirements for a successful insurgency are generally categorized in terms of:

- a. A simple, inspiring, and convincing cause.
- b. Support from the local population, whether active, passive, voluntary or coerced, for such things as food, information, recruits, freedom of movement, and security.
- c. Bases and sanctuaries relatively inaccessible to the security forces.
- d. Sufficient mobility to attack security forces consistently on guerrilla terms.
- e. The ability to move freely, concentrate forces, attack, and rapidly disperse.
- f. Material support (arms, equipment, food, medical supplies, money, clothing) either from an outside source or a sympathetic population.

The model insurgency process is usually discussed in phases. Initial phases usually are categorized in terms of:

- a. The clandestine formation of an underground which includes recruiting, training cadres, soliciting funds and developing external support.

b. A psychological offensive which includes political agitation, civil disobedience, and selective terrorism.

c. An expansion in which front organizations are established and mass support is crystalized.

After the above groundwork has been laid, the military phase normally begins and, as the insurgent strength and effectiveness grows, it passes through the following stages:

a. Harassing tactics by small guerrilla units aimed at forcing the government to overextend its defense activity.

b. Security forces are compelled to defend installations and territory with substantially larger forces.

c. The extension of guerrilla warfare and the creation of "liberated areas".

d. A conventional offensive against the security forces and government strongholds.

The last phase in the insurgent process is the consolidation phase in which positive control is extended over the populace.

In October 1977, Major General W. Black, Director General of Operations for the SADF listed five phases in a classic insurgency war:

a. Establish a revolutionary party within the country which is being attacked.

b. Clandestine subversion of the local population.

c. Open revolt, internal unrest, terrorism, sabotage.

d. Classic guerrilla warfare.

e. Spreading the security forces to such an extent that a certain area could be taken and from there move further.

General Black indicated that South Africa was then involved in a third phase situation in Namibia.⁸⁴

2. The Counterinsurgent

It is usually more effective and economical for the government and security forces to defeat the insurgents by making it impossible for them to continue fighting than to kill them all in battle. It is simple but valid to say this can be done by depriving the insurgents of their basic requirements as discussed above: the will to win; support of the population; bases; mobility; supplies and information.

The most effective way to weaken an insurgent's will to win is to neutralize the cause for which he is fighting. Additionally, propaganda and psychological warfare coupled with decisive military victories can be used to undermine his will to fight by convincing him of the hopelessness and danger of his position.

Denial of popular support to the insurgents usually involves a combination of negative measures and positive incentives. Negative measures include such things as curfews, detention of suspects, and restrictions on individual liberties. Other controls for isolating the populace from the insurgent include food denial, resettlement, and establishment of a local militia. Positive measures include protection of government collaborators and the populace as a whole from insurgent reprisals, civic action, propaganda,

⁸⁴ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sub-Saharan Africa (FBIS,SA), 26 October 1977, p. E5

redress of popularly perceived grievances, and the promotion of viable alternatives to insurgent programs and courses of action.

Counterinsurgent forces should make enemy bases their first priority target in preference to pursuing individual gangs. If it is impossible to attack guerrilla bases, action should be taken against the political organization instead.

Restriction of insurgent mobility can be accomplished through many of the controls just discussed with respect to denial of popular support. Additionally, such measures as population registration, checkpoints on lines of communication, standing patrols, observation posts, and ambushes will also curtail insurgent mobility.

Finally, denial of popular support and elimination of insurgent bases as discussed above will diminish the flow of information and material support for the insurgents.

To accomplish the foregoing, the civil and military sectors must effectively adapt and coordinate in a total counterinsurgent effort. The legal system must be modified to accommodate security and control measures of a more repressive nature. Although good intelligence, mobility, proper training and equipment, and adequate force levels are basic requirements for any successful military campaign, their natures in counterinsurgency are much different than in other forms of warfare and the security forces must adjust accordingly.


C. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. Boundaries

Namibia's northern border is 1460 km long. It is formed naturally in parts by three rivers, with the rest being straight line segments between these rivers. The portion of the border formed by the Cunene River is approximately 290 km long; the segment between the Cunene and Okavango Rivers is about 435 km; the segment along the Okavango is 320 km; the straight line between the Okavango and the Zambezi Rivers is 300 km long; and the last segment along the Zambezi is 115 km long.

The two overland segments of border are marked by "cut lines" and "no-go" strips and are fenced and mined in the most vital areas. The cut lines are eight meters wide and have been defoliated. The no-go areas are one kilometer wide and have been depopulated. The cut lines bound the no-go areas on both the north and south.⁸⁵ The degree to which the rivers act as barriers is not clear, although they are felt to be fairly effective. Most of the Cunene runs rapidly, with some falls, through a glacial valley with generally steep and rugged terrain on either side. The Okavango, although slower, still moves fairly rapidly. Its depth is generally well over a man's height and it is several hundred meters wide in some places. The Zambezi

⁸⁵W. V. Bournes, Col., USA, ex-Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy, Pretoria, RSA, in taped correspondence with the author, 9 January 1979



Map 4 - Border Operational Area

Adapted from United Nations Map No. 2947.1, November 1977

is quite wide and fast-flowing, with Katima falls being part of this border stretch. Published accounts of operational activities have included very few instances of PLAN units infiltrating across these rivers.

Frequent reference will be made to the "Border Operational Area" (BOA, operational zone or area). The BOA includes Ovamboland, Kavango, and Caprivi. Although some SADF troops are stationed in Kaokoland, it apparently isn't considered as part of the BOA. Additionally, the term "border area" is frequently used by South Africa and appears to connote proximity to the actual northern border.

2. Terrain

There are four distinct natural regions in Namibia: The 80-120 km wide belt of Namib Desert reaching along the entire coastline; the semi-arid mountainous hard veld plateau covering the central part of the interior; the lower-lying eastern and south-eastern sandveld areas which are extensions of the semi-arid Kalahari; and the relatively well-watered, bush-covered, sandveld plains to the north and north-east of the Etosha Pan.

Moving from west to east along the border the terrain changes substantially. After leaving the Namib desert, Kaokoland is quite barren and mountainous with few trees. In Ovamboland the northern and eastern areas are termed open forest while the western and southern portions are called tree steppes.⁸⁶ The terrain is extremely flat and sandy.

⁸⁶Owambo (RSA: Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, 1971), p. 3

The terrain through most of Kavango is also flat, but it increases in bush density and forestation as one moves east, especially along the Okavango River. Past the Kwando River the terrain becomes very swampy. The nature of the swamp varies with the season, with water rising in the rainy season from November to April, and then, inexplicably, again in the middle of the dry season.⁸⁷ Pictures of Ovamboland indicate that between the occasional high trees, the vegetation is either four-to-five foot bush or very low grass with fair amounts of open, packed sand.⁸⁸

Further south in the rest of the territory, vegetation of any height becomes much scarcer. The central plateau averages 4000 ft in altitude, while some of the small mountain ranges reach 8000 ft. None of these mountains form any significant natural barriers.

3. Precipitation

The annual rainfall generally varies from almost nothing in the south and along the west coast to a substantial amount in the northeast. Representative annual rainfalls are: 3.4 in. at Warmbad; 15.1 in. at Windhoek; 20.7 in. at Tsumeb; and 26.6 in. at Katima Mulilo. Most of this rain occurs in the summer, from October or November through March or April.⁸⁹

⁸⁷Rhodie, p. 98

⁸⁸Owambo, pictorial survey

⁸⁹Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 20 (Chicago, Ill.: William Benton Publisher, 1967), p. 1026

During the rainy season, much of the BOA becomes swampy and untrafficable off paved roads. In Ovamboland, most of the water drains into shallow temporary lakes (called pans) in its southern portion, the largest being Etosha Pan. South of the BOA the rainfall gives rise to temporary rivers which flow either to the coast or into Botswana. When these are dry, there are no rivers within Namibia.


4. Population Distribution

The population distribution in the northern portion of the country varies considerably. Kaokolanders are spread thinly throughout their rugged area east of the Namib desert. In Ovamboland, as can be seen from Map 5, the population is concentrated in the north central part of the area. In Kavango, the population is generally distributed along the river. The western part of Caprivi, the 32 km wide strip leading to East Caprivi, is almost entirely uninhabited except for a small number of Bushmen.⁹⁰ The population distribution in the East Caprivi area is not known, although it is probably spread thinly also.

The population in the rest of the territory is distributed very sparsely. With the exceptions of Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Tsumeb, Keetmanshoop, and perhaps Otjiwarong, all urban areas number less than ten thousand.⁹¹ The overall density rate is 1.04 persons per sq. km., one of the lowest

⁹⁰Rhodie, p. 97

⁹¹Duignan and Gann, p. 9



- ▣ Densely populated zone
- ⋈ Edge of inhabited area
- Town
- x Isolated settlement

Map 5 - Ovamboland Population Distribution

Adapted from Ovambo, p. 10


rates in the world. If Ovamboland and the two largest urban areas (Windhoek and Walvis Bay) are excluded, the density drops to .48 persons per sq. km.

5. Lines of Communication

The lines of communication in Namibia are restricted in many ways. The highway system totals about 34,000 km, but only slightly more than one-tenth of that is paved.⁹² The basic system consists of a single main route running from the southern border to the northern border. Additional legs extend from this main artery to towns to the east or west. In the north, the main road runs through Ovamboland, but branches connecting Kavango and Caprivi meet at Grootfontein.

Within the BOA, highway travel is slow. The main road from Grootfontein is only partially paved. The roads into Kavango and leading to Caprivi are relatively unimproved and trafficability decreases during the rainy season. A bridge across the Okavango River and a hard-surface all-weather road through the center of Caprivi to Katima Mulilo were recently completed, greatly improving access to that area. Military convoy traffic is further complicated by the necessity of sweeping for mines. Consequently, it can take several days to travel from Grootfontein to any of the urban or military centers in the BOA. The ability of this road system or that in the rest of the country to support continuous heavy military traffic is doubtful.

⁹²Samuel C. Adams, Zimbabwe Namibia, Anticipation of Economic and Humanitarian Needs (The Agency for International Development, 1977), p. 193



————— Paved roads
 ++++++ Railroad

Map 6 - Primary Surface Lines of Communication

Adapted from Fraenkel, The Namibians of South West Africa, p. 4

The rail system includes almost 2,500 km of track.⁹³ It basically parallels the main highway from the southern border north to Grootfontein and Otavi. Branches extend west to the coastal towns of Lüderitz and Walvis Bay, and east from Windhoek to Gobabis. The vast majority of military traffic arriving at the main BOA support base at Grootfontein arrives by rail.

There are small airstrips at many small towns, and private planes are common in the sparsely populated rural areas. Facilities at Windhoek, Walvis Bay, and Grootfontein can easily accommodate large aircraft. Air facilities at the urban command centers in the BOA must certainly have been improved to this capability also. Although air transport can reduce travel times within the BOA by factors of 15 to 20 and more, the limited numbers and natures of military aircraft in the BOA preclude their use in this capacity except in special circumstances.

Port facilities in the territory are extremely limited. Walvis Bay is an excellent natural harbor, but as will be discussed later, it and a surrounding area of 1,124 sq. km. legally belong to South Africa. Lüderitz is the only other port facility but is little used and relatively remote from the rest of the territory.

6. Military Considerations

The conditions in the BOA, especially in the border areas, are reasonably conducive to guerrilla operations.

⁹³Ibid., p. 194

Although the rivers restrict access along much of the border, the terrain and population densities generally facilitate the clandestine movement of small groups. The vegetation is not sufficiently dense to allow large groups to remain undetected for very long. The flatness of the ground facilitates surveillance from raised observation posts in areas of sparse vegetation (e.g., the cut lines). While the effects of rain on the terrain tend to hinder security force mobility, the effects of the dry season on the terrain tend to enhance mobility, with even two-wheel drive vehicles apparently capable of travelling rapidly through the bush in most areas not heavily forested.⁹⁴ In the more populated area of Ovamboland, the population density is such as to facilitate both mingling of guerrillas among the population for cover and an adequate amount of sympathetic support, even if the percentage of active sympathizers were to be relatively low.

South of the BOA the guerrilla loses what environmental advantages he had. The population and vegetation is much sparser. The population mix and distribution would also not be conducive to guerrilla operations, as most farms and ranches are operated by Whites, and some members of the other Non-White ethnic groups tend to perceive the guerrillas generally at Ovambo, making the level of local voluntary support questionable. Aerial observation, observation posts

⁹⁴Bournes tapes; A. J. Venter, South African military journalist, in taped correspondence with the author, 12 November 1978

on some of the numerous small mountains, and the vast expanse of the territory would all tend to mitigate against the undetected movement of even small units on foot. The open country would also facilitate pursuit by the security forces.

A serious vulnerability of the infrastructure in the south is the railroad. Its length makes it virtually impossible to defend against small teams of saboteurs, and its importance to both the economy and the military effort make it an inviting target.

D. THE COURSE OF THE WAR

In discussing the history and trends of the insurgency in Namibia, the narrative of the early years will consist primarily of the presentation of a series of representative events, since the apparent very low level of activity defies quantitative summarization. The discussion of the war in more recent years will be structured more in the form of semi-annual summaries, although particularly significant events will also be mentioned specifically. It should be noted that some of the figures and locations cited will be approximate at best, as South African censorship precludes continuously accurate reportage of the insurgency. Further, since much of the information is summarized from virtually all research sources, footnotes will be limited to specific incidents or statements.

1. The Early Years

A very early indication of SWAPO's (then OPO) intent or consideration of the use of violence to achieve its

political goals appeared in a letter from Mburumba Kerina at the U.N. to Herman Ja Toivo in South West Africa in February, 1959. It stated in part that if any chiefs spoke out against disruption plans "...tell our people to burn their places at night--secretly of course."⁹⁵

As noted earlier, by the early 1960's SWAPO had come to the realization "...that to rely on the United Nations intervention to liberate Namibia was to leave this liberation to mere chance."⁹⁶ The subsequent exfiltration, training, and infiltration of SWAPO guerrillas which resulted in the police raid near Ongulumbashe in August, 1966 has already been noted in Section II. Prior to that, in May, 1966, SWAPO had promulgated a document of campaign instruction for combatants in South West Africa which specified a broad spectrum of insurgent actions and targets.⁹⁷

In September 1966, insurgents carried out their first attack on a government installation (albeit a non-military target) against a compound of the Department of Bantu Affairs at Oshikango. Although the buildings were

⁹⁵From the Windhoek Commission of Enquiry Report, presented as evidence in the SWAPO trials in Pretoria in September 1967, as cited by Morris, p. 2

⁹⁶Hamutenya and Geingob, "African Nationalism in Namibia," in Potholm and Dale, Southern Africa in Perspective, as cited by Morris, p. 2

⁹⁷Morris, p. 3

substantially damaged, no casualties occurred. Planned simultaneous attacks at Oshikati and Ondangua failed to materialize.⁹⁸

The first White casualty occurred in December 1966 when a farm 130 km north of Grootfontein was looted and its owner wounded.⁹⁹

The first attempted assassination of a civic figure occurred in December 1966 at Ukuambi and resulted in the death of a bodyguard.¹⁰⁰

During the time discussed so far, the South African Police (SAP) had continued to track down and capture or neutralize most of those insurgents who had escaped at Ongulumbashe. SWAPO's combat presence or capability within South West Africa was reduced to the point of almost complete ineffectiveness and remained so for the next four years. This capability was reportedly further exacerbated by insufficient food and military supplies for the insurgents.¹⁰¹

One exception to this inactivity occurred in June 1968 when insurgents established a temporary camp in Caprivi, looted a store, and ambushed an SAP vehicle patrol. It also appears as if two police helicopters may have crashed or been shot down during the tracking of this group. Although

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 5

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 6

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 6

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 9

this incident was officially denied, Al Venter, a journalist in good repute with the Government, claims to have interviewed SAP participants in the incident.¹⁰²

SWAPO introduced mine warfare in 1971. The first detonation was in May in eastern Caprivi near Katima Mulilo, killing two SAP and injuring nine others.¹⁰³ This type of warfare was particularly advantageous for SWAPO as it could be carried out by small groups who could infiltrate from Zambia, plant mines, and exfiltrate in a matter of hours. The roads were sufficiently primitive to afford quick and complete concealment and the vast majority of the vehicles were operated by the civil administration or security forces. SWAPO could thus be relatively sure of acquiring satisfactory targets at low risk, and the incidents gave the impression of a more vigorous liberation struggle.

A SAP follow-up operation after another mining incident near Katima Mulilo in October 1971 resulted in the first charges by Zambia against South Africa for violation of Zambian territory.¹⁰⁴

As noted earlier, the turbulence in Ovamboland following the repatriation of thousands of striking workers resulted in the imposition of security conditions akin to martial law in Ovamboland, SAP reinforcement, and opened

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 7

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 7

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 10

the door to SADF participation. PLAN military activity continued to be confined almost entirely to Caprivi however, as SWAPO did not yet have adequate access to Angola as a base of operations.

In 1973 PLAN began operating more aggressively in larger groups against SAP units. This included a recoilless rifle attack on a SAP outpost in January and an ambush of a SAP foot patrol in April, both in Caprivi.¹⁰⁵

The first SADF death as a result of insurgent action occurred in a mine incident in Caprivi in May 1973.¹⁰⁶

In response to South African "detente" initiatives in 1974, Zambia adopted a policy of dialogue with South Africa. Although denied by Zambia and the SWAPO Central Committee, dissidents have reported that Zambia curtailed PLAN operations at that time and seized most weapons.¹⁰⁷

2. 1975

Portugal's decision in November 1974 to grant Angolan independence in November 1975, the subsequent reduction of Portuguese military control in the country, and the ensuing violent struggle for power among the three liberation movements (Popular Movement for the Liberation

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 14

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 15

¹⁰⁷Kenneth Abrahams, "The Formation of the SWAPO (Democrats)," The Namibian Review, No. 12, June 1978, p. 2

of Angola (MPLA), National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)) finally provided SWAPO with access to southern Angola for use as a base and sanctuary for insurgent operations in Ovamboland. Public reports of SWAPO presence began to emanate from southern Angola in late spring and early summer.¹⁰⁸ Because of the contiguity of UNITA's area of operations to Namibia, SWAPO had always maintained good relations with that movement. At this point, the two were cooperating closely with some sharing of camps and equipment,¹⁰⁹ and there were allegations by MPLA of SWAPO involvement in the Angolan situation on UNITA's behalf.¹¹⁰ With this new access PLAN's first raid into Ovamboland since 1966 occurred in October 1975 when two tribal policemen, a deputy headman, and four other civilians were killed in an attack at some makeshift border posts.¹¹¹

When SADF became actively involved in the Angolan conflict in late October on behalf of UNITA and FNLA however, SWAPO was forced to reappraise its situation. Despite both the distastefulness of UNITA's new relationship with South Africa and allegations that UNITA had agreed to guide the

¹⁰⁸ ARB, December 1-31, 1975, p. 3871

¹⁰⁹ Times of Namibia, July 1977, p. 19

¹¹⁰ ARB, September 1-30, 1975, p. 3771

¹¹¹ ARB, October 1-31, 1975, p. 3806

SADF to SWAPO camps in exchange for active assistance,¹¹² SWAPO was so firmly entrenched in UNITA territory that the SWAPO leadership didn't formally shift allegiance to MPLA until a few months later in January. Even so, the shift was unpopular in some SWAPO quarters as many SWAPO personnel and approximately 30,000 Namibian refugees were still located within the UNITA region of control when it occurred and since there were strong ethnic ties (Kwanyama Ovambo) between many SWAPO and UNITA members.

This shift in guerrilla allegiance apparently didn't sit well with Zambia either, as Zambia favored UNITA over MPLA at that time. In addition to the weapons already confiscated, there were further reports of war material shipments through Zambia for PLAN being diverted to UNITA. PLAN was a demoralized and very poorly armed organization at this time and proved easy prey for the SADF.¹¹³

South African Army (SAA) presence in the very southern part of Angola in most of August through most of October was later justified on the grounds that it was protecting the Calueque pumping station of the Cunene River/Ruacana Falls dam and hydro-electric project 30 km inside Angola's southern border and that there was a need to prevent any increases in SWAPO activity which the turbulent power vacuum in Angola might facilitate. During this time this SADF presence grew as MPLA's military wing, FAPLA continued to advance

¹¹²FBIS, SA, 2 March 1976, p. 2

¹¹³Abrahams, p. 2, 3

south and as the SADF conducted more operations against SWAPO deeper into Angola. No information has been published on the extent of the operations conducted against SWAPO by the SADF in southern Angola, although it appears to have been considerable, as will be seen shortly. Several accounts were published of SADF follow-up or hot pursuit operations in October through December which ostensibly originated in Ovamboland and spilled over into Angola against PLAN bases. These all resulted in substantial casualties for PLAN, with one skirmish alone accounting for sixty-one PLAN killed-in-action (KIA) against three SADF losses.¹¹⁴

On 16 December it was reported that since May, 1973, three hundred and forty-one guerrillas had been killed and that the SADF had experienced twenty-two losses in "over a month."¹¹⁵ Since the level of activity in this two and a half year period had been extremely low prior to the latter third of the 1975, it can be surmised that most of these SWAPO casualties occurred at that time. Of these, only ninety-three were publicly tied to SADF operations originating in Namibia. This would indicate that at least two hundred of these casualties probably occurred in southern Angola in unreported incidents.

SWAPO also reactivated its dormant policy of selective terrorism during this time. In August, the Chief

¹¹⁴ARB, December 1-31, 1975, p. 3872

¹¹⁵FBIS, SA, 17 December 1975, p. E5, and 22 December 1975, p. 7

Minister of Ovamboland, Chief Filemon Elifas, was assassinated.¹¹⁶ There was also an attempt on the life of the Ovamboland Justice Minister and three White civilians were killed in two incidents, one as far south as the vicinity of Grootfontein.

3. January - June, 1976

SWAPO casualties in the first four months were few in number. This was attributable perhaps to reduced operations as a result of the high rate of casualties and general demoralization experienced in the previous four months and the physical reorganization following the shift of allegiance to MPLA, which was compounded by UNITA being pushed back into the area which SWAPO had used as a base of operations. The operational effectiveness of the PLAN forces in Zambia at this time continued to be greatly restricted by severe shortages of arms, food, and medicine and a growing discontent with SWAPO political and military leadership.¹¹⁷ This led initially to the detention by Zambia of many of the SWAPO leaders in Zambia (April) and eventually to the detention of almost all PLAN forces in Zambia (July) in order to avert a mutiny.¹¹⁸

The few operations which were conducted appear to have been relatively successful however. A casualty summary

¹¹⁶ ARB, August 1-31, 1975, p. 3742

¹¹⁷ FBIS, SA, 27 April 1976, p. 23; Abrahams, p. 2,3

¹¹⁸ ARB, April 1-30, 1976; "Open the Detention Camps," Times of Namibia, July 1977, p. 16; Abrahams, p. 3

published in April (again dating back to May 1973) indicated that SWAPO losses had only increased by nine, to three hundred and fifty, while SADF losses during the time of its intervention in Angola (withdrawal completed on 25 March) had climbed to fifty-four.¹¹⁹ This is substantiated by published incident accounts which cumulatively indicate SADF casualties as twelve killed-in-action (KIA) and seven wounded-in-action (WIA) against eight PLAN KIA and unknown WIA during the first four months of 1976.

The number of insurgent incidents, particularly skirmishes, began to increase in May. The military casualties for the last two months of the period were 17 SADF WIA and 44 SWAPO KIA with 17 WIA. PLAN military activity was focused almost exclusively in Ovamboland although there were indications of reconnaissance taking place in Kavango. There were a few occasions of very deep SWAPO penetration, as a shootout took place between police and two SWAPO members near Windhoek in April¹²⁰ and a group of ten insurgents was noted "embarrassingly" far south in the White area in June.¹²¹

Selective terrorism also continued. The death of two Whites on a farm near Okahandja,¹²² coupled with the

¹¹⁹ ARB, April 1-30, 1976, p. 4007; FBIS, SA, 27 April 1976, p. E5

¹²⁰ FBIS, SA, 21 April 1976, p. 3

¹²¹ ARB, June 1-30, 1976, p. 4069

¹²² ARB, February 1-29, 1976, p. 3941

White deaths noted earlier, spurred the farmers in northern Namibia to request that the government install protective fencing around their farms.¹²³ A few prominent Ovambos opposed to SWAPO were also abducted, among them the Ovamboland leader of the Democratic Cooperative Development Party.¹²⁴ It was announced in April that since August 1975, 14 civilians had been abducted by PLAN.

Finally, a few civilians were killed or wounded in acts of apparent "blind" terrorism.

4. July - December, 1976

The increased tempo of PLAN's military activity noted at the end of the period just discussed continued for the first month of this period. This was reflected in published casualty figures in July which summed to seven SADF KIA and three WIA and 44 SWAPO KIA and 11 WIA. On 18 July, a South African spokesman announced that a recent series of mopping up operations had netted 50 SWAPO KIA.¹²⁵

Most published reports of military activity in August dealt with the SADF tracking efforts and gradual elimination of a unit of about 15 PLAN soldiers who had penetrated south of Ovamboland. There were several skirmishes as the evading unit split up into smaller elements. By the

¹²³FBIS, SA, 4 May 1976, p. E5

¹²⁴FBIS, SA, 21 April 1976, p. E3

¹²⁵FBIS, SA, 21 July 1976, p. E6

time the whole unit was finally neutralized in September, eight of them had been killed.¹²⁶

There was also some South African/Zambian interaction in July and August, which included allegations of a SADF raid on a Zambian village with 22 casualties and some mortar shelling back and forth.

When noting the low level of insurgent activity after the first month of this period, most South African authorities attributed it to the rainy season or to a greater focus on terrorist activities against the civilian populace. Published reports don't support this however, with the only significant civilian incident noted being the deaths of the family of one of the bodyguards to the Ovamboland Chief Minister.¹²⁷

More likely reasons for PLAN's diminished activities in Namibia during this time were that first, as noted previously, almost the entire PLAN contingency in Zambia (1,000-1,800 men) was detained by Zambian authorities in July to avoid possible intra-movement fighting, and second, beginning in late August the PLAN forces in Angola became heavily involved (albeit somewhat reluctantly) in the FAPLA/Cuban operations against UNITA in southern Angola. In a determined effort to neutralize UNITA's effectiveness, MPLA and Cuban forces mounted a large scale campaign in the south which apparently included a great deal of populace

¹²⁶ FBIS, SA, 11 August 1976, p. E4; 1 September 1976, p. E10; 15 September 1976, p. E12

¹²⁷ ARB, July 1-31, 1976, p. 4100

intimidation.¹²⁸ SWAPO was forced to participate as the price for MPLA and Cuban support and assistance in its own struggle for Namibia. This operational requirement for SWAPO has continued to the present and has surely detracted from the effectiveness of its activities in Namibia. In line with this participation, there were reports in September that PLAN had abducted 142 Kwanyama Ovambo UNITA sympathizers from Ovamboland and had eventually executed 120 of them.¹²⁹ There is some doubt as to whether or not this was a valid report however. In addition to the usual denials from Angola and SWAPO, a South African summary of abductions the next year didn't include this figure, although if the abductees were actually refugees from Angola (a good possibility), that status may have differentiated them from Namibians for purposes of accounting.

5. January - June, 1977

The factors which dictated a low level of PLAN military activity in most of the last time period were still operative throughout most of this one also. An incident in the Caprivi Strip in February was the first in that area in over a year and a half and resulted in three SADF WIA and twelve PLAN KIA.¹³⁰ There was also a brief period of military

¹²⁸ FBIS,SA, 30 September 1976, p. E6; ARB, October 1-31, 1976, p. 4205; FBIS,SA, 9 November 1976, p. E11; FBIS,SA, 15 November 1976, p. E11, 12; ARB, December 1-31, 1976, p. 4257

¹²⁹ ARB, September 1-30, 1976, p. 4174

¹³⁰ ARB, February 1-28, 1977, p. 4337

activity during most of April in Ovamboland which included several incidents of cross-border fire and resulted in 20 PLAN and one FAPLA KIA.¹³¹

In contrast to the low level of insurgent military activity, terrorist actions against the civilian population apparently increased. Significant reported incidents of selective terrorism included the abduction of a White man and four of his children,¹³² abduction of a tribal leader,¹³³ and an unsuccessful ambush on the Commissioner-General for Indigenous Peoples in South West Africa, Jannie de Wet.¹³⁴ The most significant act of general terrorism was the abduction of 126 students and staff from a mission school in April, during the brief period of PLAN military activity noted above.¹³⁵

6. July - December, 1977

The low level of PLAN military activity noted in the two previous periods continued for the first four months of this period. At the end of October however, a small battle took place which marked the beginning of a period of PLAN military aggressiveness.

¹³¹ARB, April 1-30, 1977, p. 4408

¹³²FBIS,SA, 10 March 1977, p. E5

¹³³FBIS,SA, 2 June 1977, p. E9

¹³⁴ARB, June 1-30, 1977, p. 4475

¹³⁵FBIS,SA, 21 April 1977, p. E7

A SAA patrol clashed with an 80 man PLAN unit soon after it crossed the border into Ovamboland. In the ensuing action, fire was allegedly received from a PLAN base across the border in Angola, and reinforcements were called in for hot pursuit. The skirmish lasted 36 hours and resulted in 61 PLAN KIA against five SAA losses. This was the most significant engagement since the SADF operations during the Angolan intervention, and was the first time a group of insurgents that large had been noted in Namibia.¹³⁶

There were several subsequent reports of SADF clashes with large (40-50 men) PLAN units and the overall level of activity also increased. This turn of events resulted in protective increases in the size of SAA patrols as well. Cumulative military casualty figures from published reports for this period were 113 PLAN KIA and 13 SADF KIA. SADF casualties for the year were announced as being a third less than experienced in 1976.¹³⁷

Insurgent activities among the civilian populace also increased. Although security forces thwarted an attempted abduction of 50 young Ovambos by PLAN in August,¹³⁸ there were ten successful abductions of tribal figures, bodyguards, and Home Guardsmen in November and December. At the end of the year it was announced that 23 village headmen had been

¹³⁶ ARB, October 1-31, 1977, p. 4617

¹³⁷ FBIS, SA, 28 December 1977, p. E4

¹³⁸ FBIS, SA, 5 August 1977, p. E5

murdered in 1977.¹³⁹ It was also noted that PLAN landmine activities increased significantly during this period.¹⁴⁰

Although surely not the first occurrence in the war, the first noted report of PLAN sabotage was in July. This involved the destruction of power lines to the Calueque water scheme in Angola which provides Ovamboland with most of its water. The first instance occurred in Ovamboland, but after the lines were repaired, they were cut again in Angola.¹⁴¹

Finally, one of the few incidents in the Caprivi area involved a mortar and machine gun attack on Katima Mulilo from across the river in Zambia, allegedly by a Zambian army unit.¹⁴²

7. January - June, 1978

The upward trends in SWAPO insurgent activity noted at the end of the previous time period carried over into this period and escalated further, especially with respect to acts of terrorism among civilians. An SADF statement in mid-February indicated that border violations since August of the previous year had increased considerably, with 49 known as of the end of January.¹⁴³

¹³⁹Eric Marsden & Harold Evans, "Murder is the midwife for country's new birth," London Times, 9 April 1978, p.8

¹⁴⁰FBIS,SA, 28 December 1977, p. E4

¹⁴¹FBIS,SA, 20 July 1977, p. E3

¹⁴²FBIS,SA, 4 November 1977

¹⁴³"Hot Pursuit into Angola Reported; 18 Said Dead," The Windhoek Advertiser, 13 February 1978, p.1, in Joint Publications Research Service, Sub-Saharan Africa (JPRS,SA)

Although published accounts of military clashes in the first few months of the period didn't mention PLAN units as large as those encountered a few months earlier, they still must have been fairly large, as the SADF announced in late February that there seemed to be a new pattern in the war, with higher casualties on both sides coming from fewer incidents.¹⁴⁴ This statement was supported by the cumulative casualties for January and February, which appear to have been about 22 SADF KIA and 55 SWAPO KIA, much more balanced than usual, especially if the high-casualty operations like the one the previous October are viewed as unusual.

Although casualties dropped, the frequency of incidents continued to rise in March (49) and April (42), with a flurry of incidents reported at the end of April. It must be remembered however, that the majority of these weren't military engagements as the figures also included such things as civilian intimidation, movement reports, and mine discoveries.¹⁴⁵

An unofficial count at the beginning of April placed the fatalities in twelve years of war at 166 for South African Security forces and 689 insurgents for SWAPO. This would indicate a total of less than 1,000 military and civilian deaths in twelve years as compared to approximately 8,500 in

¹⁴⁴ ARB, February 1-28, 1978, p. 4762

¹⁴⁵ "Geldenhuys Reports Recent Border Incidents," The Windhoek Advertiser, 3 July 1978, p. 2, in JPRS,SA

five years in Rhodesia at the same time, indicative of the differences in insurgency intensity levels.¹⁴⁶

As mentioned earlier, terrorist activities against civilians also increased markedly during this period. Reported casualties due to landmine explosions were much higher than ever reported previously, with six deaths and 25 injuries in several different incidents. There were several large scale abduction incidents which were conducted by large PLAN elements (60-80 men). In January an entire settlement of 19 was abducted.¹⁴⁷ In February 119 students were reported abducted from a mission school close to the border, although there is some doubt as to whether or not this was a bonafide kidnapping.¹⁴⁸ Finally, in April, 73 people were hijacked in a bus on the road between Oshikati and Ruacana.¹⁴⁹ When all the individual abductions were included, the total for the whole period was well over 300.

The incidents of selective terrorism were similar to those in the previous period, with the most notable cases being the assassinations of the Ovamboland Minister of Health and Welfare in Ovamboland in February¹⁵⁰ and Chief Clemens Kapuuo in Windhoek on March 27. He had been President

¹⁴⁶Larry Heinzerling, "Namibia War Called a Chess Game in the Dark" (AP), Monterey Peninsula Herald, 2 April 1978 p. 5C

¹⁴⁷"SWAPO Gang Abducts 19," Johannesburg Star, 19 January 1978, p. 3, in JPRS, SA

¹⁴⁸FBIS, SA, 27 February 1978, p. E8, ARB, 1-28 February 1978, p. 4762

¹⁴⁹FBIS, SA, 26 April 1978, p. E4

¹⁵⁰ARB, 1-28 February 1978, p. 4762

of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and Paramount Chief of the Herero.¹⁵¹ Chief Kapuuo's death was the most significant incident in a spate of political violence in Windhoek during March and April. Clashes between Ovambo SWAPO supporters and Herero DTA supporters resulted in about 50 deaths¹⁵² and marked the first significant civil violence since the turbulence in Ovamboland in early 1972 following the nation-wide strike.

Although South Africa agreed on 25 April to accept the western proposals for a constitutional settlement of Namibian independence and installation of a U.N. peacekeeping force, events and circumstances (The one germane to this discussion was the escalation of insurgent activity. Others will be discussed later.) compelled South Africa to carry out what was probably the most significant military action in the war to date. This was the May 4 airborne raid on the main SWAPO/PLAN military command center at Cassinga, Angola (code-named "Moscow"), 250 km north of the border, and simultaneous raids at other, smaller SWAPO bases in Angola, one of which was code-named "Vietnam". More than 700 paratroopers participated in the main twelve-hour raid, which was mounted from within South Africa. Preparations for the raid may have been masked by Operation Quick Silver, a large army exercise in South Africa in April and May. Casualties

¹⁵¹ARB, 1-3 March 1978

¹⁵²ARB, 1-31 March 1978, p. 4794

in the raids were apparently only six SADF KIA, but more than 1000 SWAPO KIA with at least 500 of these being PLAN guerrillas, 250 WIA, and 63 prisoners. Although many of those killed were refugees and women and children, there has been speculation since then that the guerrilla casualties might well have been much higher than reported at the time.¹⁵³

The effects of the raids on PLAN military capabilities was immediate and obvious. In addition to severe losses of personnel and equipment and organizational confusion, there is evidence that FAPLA evacuated PLAN groups from southern Angola and concentrated them at towns deeper in Angola to deter a repetition of the South African raid.¹⁵⁴ Angola also ordered a cessation of PLAN cross-border operations until it could increase its own anti-aircraft capabilities near the southern border. The operational result of all this was a reduction in insurgent activity from 91 incidents in the two months prior to the raid to 27 incidents in the two months following the raid, with many of these being mine incidents in which the mines had been planted before the raid.¹⁵⁵

Two reported sabotage incidents in May and June deep within Namibia gave evidence that despite the slowdown

¹⁵³ARB, 1-31 May 1978, p. 4865-4868, FBIS,SA, 25 April 1978, p. E8

¹⁵⁴Devin Benson, "After Action Report: South African Strike Into Angola," Soldier of Fortune, November 1978, p. 50

¹⁵⁵"Geldenhuys Reports Recent Border Incidents," The Windhoek Advertiser, 3 July 1978, p. 2, in JPRS,SA

in activity in the operational area, the SWAPO underground was apparently widespread and becoming more aggressive. The first of these was an attempt to explode the bridge across the Guruchab River, 40 km south of Keetmanshoop. The second was the explosive destruction of some track on the railroad from Windhoek to Walvis Bay and the subsequent derailment of a train. The first case was the first insurgent incident that far south in Namibia, while the second case, together with a similar but unsuccessful attempt the previous month, was the first time insurgents had tampered with the railroad.¹⁵⁶

8. July - December, 1978

PLAN's military inactivity stemming from the raid at Cassinga carried over into July. Although there were reports by the end of the month that PLAN elements were starting to move back into the operational area in greater strength, actual contacts were infrequent and there were no deaths reported on either side during the month. Although there were several civilian casualties, most of these were in landmine incidents in which the mines may have been planted much earlier.

As August progressed, it became obvious that PLAN was regaining much of its aggressiveness and capability. Although still desirous of avoiding and breaking contact with security forces as much as possible (as indicated by continuing low casualty figures), both the sizes of many

¹⁵⁶"Saboteurs Derailed Train," Johannesburg Star, 22 June 1978, p. 5, in JPRS,SA; "Russian-Made Rifles Confiscated," The Windhoek Advertiser, 18 July 1978, p. 1 in JPRS,SA

of the PLAN units and the frequencies of contacts and other incidents seemed to have returned to pre-Cassinga levels.

In late August, another major clash occurred which, although apparently on a lesser scale than Cassinga, also ranks as one of the most important military engagements of the insurgency to date. This was the PLAN rocket and mortar attack on the town and base at Katima Mulilo early in the morning of 23 August, and the SADF retaliation into Zambia which commenced almost immediately and lasted until 26 August.

Perhaps feeling the needs to gain some measure of revenge for the devastation at Cassinga and to demonstrate to the rest of the world that SWAPO still retained a viable military effectiveness capable of liberating Namibia, the attack followed several SWAPO statements that it planned to intensify the struggle. Origination of the attack from Zambia into Caprivi as differentiated from the normal Angola/Ovamboland pattern may have stemmed from the weakened state of PLAN in Angola, a refusal by Angola to permit an incident which would invite South African retaliation, or a SWAPO estimate that Katima Mulilo was relatively lightly defended. Plans for the impending attack were apparently known far enough in advance by the SADF to have permitted a warning to the military advisor of the visiting U.N. investigatory team and to have allowed the civilian population to be adequately

bunkered.¹⁵⁷ The quick and forceful response of the SADF was also indicative of ample forewarning and preparation.

The actual rocket and mortar attack lasted sporadically for two hours. PLAN forces initiated it from bases across the border in Zambia. After SAA return fire had silenced them, Zambian forces opened fire from the town of Sesheke, across the river from Katima. Shortly after the Zambian fire had been suppressed, the SAA initiated its armored car and mechanized infantry counter-attack. At this point, the casualties apparently stood at nine SADF KIA and ten WIA (all from one rocket, apparently after their officer-in-charge failed to ensure they were under cover) and twelve Zambian civilians killed, with six wounded. PLAN casualties at that point remain unknown.¹⁵⁸

While South Africa has never announced any PLAN casualty figures for the retaliation, sixteen corpses were brought back to Katima Mulilo at the end of the first day. The actual numbers of casualties appear to have been much greater however, although this can only be deduced. The South African government didn't deny unofficial reports that SWAPO bases had been destroyed and hundreds of SWAPO fighters

¹⁵⁷ FBIS, SA, 23 August 1978, p. E3; Jean Fischer, "Jean Fischer from Windhoek," To The Point, 1 September 1978, p. 11

¹⁵⁸ FBIS, SA, 24 August 1978, p. E3, E4; FBIS, SA, 25 August 1978, p. E10; Carel Birkby, "SWAPO's Desperate Gamble that Failed," To The Point, 1 September 1978, p. 9

had been killed or that SADF units were chasing down fleeing SWAPO groups as late as 26 August.¹⁵⁹

It was known prior to the incident that 400 to 500 PLAN troops occupied two bases in the vicinity. When this knowledge is coupled with post-operation statements by the Commander of the South West African Command (SWAC) of the SADF such as "...terrorist bases had been wiped out...", it became obvious that a great deal more transpired than was officially released. The apparent length of the battle supports this as well. While the 16 acknowledged PLAN casualties were reported after the first 24 hours, Zambian sources indicated that fighting was still raging 24 hours later, and it wasn't until another 36 hours had passed that the South African Defense Minister announced completion of the retaliation. Finally, an on-the-scene question to an SADF officer participant as to whether or not only 16 had been killed was answered with "Hell, no...We wiped the bloody murderers out." Another noted that, "We just killed a helluva lot of terrorists."¹⁶⁰

Routine PLAN military activity continued right through September. Contacts were infrequent, and casualties totalled only one SADF KIA and eight PLAN KIA.

The last three months of the period saw an increase in PLAN aggressiveness towards the security forces, as

¹⁵⁹Birkby, p. 9; Humphrey Tyler "South Africa moved swiftly after SWAPO attack," The Christian Science Monitor, 28 August 1978, p. 8

¹⁶⁰Birkby, p. 9, 10; FBIS, SA, 28 August 1978, p. E5-E7

contacts, sizes of units, and casualties all increased to pre-Cassinga levels or higher, with PLAN initiating a large number of the skirmishes. Of note during this time were two instances of cross-border fire by FAPLA elements and another by a Zambian unit (in addition to the major clash described above). In January 1979, the SADF KIA figure for the year was reported as 30.

Although there were no mass abductions during this period (seven children in September being the largest group), Namibian civilians suffered more casualties within the country than previously, with the vast majority of these being landmine or bomb victims. Published accounts indicate that casualties were at least 33 killed and one hundred and eleven wounded. Casualties in the first half of the period can probably be attributed to the relative safety of civilian targets for a weakened PLAN. Those in the latter part of the period were related more to attempts to disrupt elections, with many of them occurring deep within Namibia. Incidents of note were the deaths of 17 and 12 civilians in different Ovamboland vehicle mining incidents, three bombings with 15 injuries in Windhoek just prior to elections, and another in Swakopmund on 30 December which resulted in 60 injuries. Instances of murders and abductions of African symbols of authority continued at about the same rate as in previous periods.

Also of interest during this period was an apparent upsurge in minor sabotage in Ovamboland. Beginning in July and continuing at least through November, there were frequent

cases of destruction of telephone poles and communications lines and of sabotage to water pipelines, water towers, and reservoirs.

Despite the instances of civil and urban violence noted above, SWAPO disruption of the internal elections did not materialize on the scale which had been expected.¹⁶¹

E. THE OPPOSING FORCE LEVELS

In estimating probable force levels of the opposing military structures in Namibia, SWAPO will be discussed first since any deductions about the security forces will logically be predicated on SWAPO's military strength.

1. The Insurgents

There have been many public estimates on the personnel strengths of SWAPO external and PLAN, although differentiation between SWAPO, PLAN and refugees isn't always clear.

It was noted earlier that between 400 and 900 members of SWAPO followed Sam Nujoma abroad in 1961/62. In late 1968 several thousand Africans left East Caprivi for Zambia.¹⁶² Several thousand (some estimate 6,000) left Namibia in 1974/75.¹⁶³ From June through August 1977 500 youths crossed the border to Angola.¹⁶⁴ Numerous others have left individually

¹⁶¹FBIS, SA, 7 December 1978, p. E4

¹⁶²Morris, p. 8

¹⁶³Fraenkel, p. 19

¹⁶⁴D.G. Santos, "SWAPO Takes Its Stand!" South African Report & Comments, April 1978, Vol. I No. 2, p. 7, reprinted from Armed Forces Magazine of South Africa.

or in small numbers ever since the early 1960's and many others have been abducted and pressed into service. In December 1976 Ovamboland officials claimed knowledge of at least 5,000 Ovambos who had left the territory for PLAN military training and acknowledged that the actual figure was probably greater.¹⁶⁵ In May 1978, South African sources indicated that about 30,000 Namibians were believed to be refugees from the territory.¹⁶⁶ From these estimates must be subtracted the numbers of those who may have already been killed in combat (about 2,000), those who are receiving academic training abroad (estimated at between 600 and 760 since 1975¹⁶⁷), dissidents placed in detention (reported at between 1,000 and 1,800¹⁶⁸), and the considerable staff of SWAPO's worldwide political organization.

As to the numbers of those actually trained and ready as guerrillas, in September 1966, the South African Police in the territory claimed knowledge of more than 250 SWAPO soldiers in transit camps in Zambia and Tanzania.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ARB December 1-31, 1976, p. 4266

¹⁶⁶ARB, May 1-31, 1978, p. 4866

¹⁶⁷General J. J. Geldenhuys, "SWAPO is likened to fleas on a dog's back," Interview by Colleen Hendricks in The Johannesburg Star, undated in May 1978.

¹⁶⁸ARB, May 1-31, 1977, p. 4442; "Shipanga Return Approval," The Windhoek Advertiser, 27 June 1978, p. 1, in JPRS, SA

¹⁶⁹Morris, p. 5

By 1970 a South African estimate indicated that SWAPO had 1,500 men under arms.¹⁷⁰ In July 1975, the South Africans estimated that 3,000 guerrillas were under training in Angola and that 500 were already armed and combat ready.¹⁷¹ In July 1976 another South African estimate of 5,000 men under arms was announced¹⁷² and a paper produced for the office of the U.N. Commissioner of Namibia arrived at a range of between 2,500 and 5,000 total PLAN combatants.¹⁷³ Between October and December 1977, there were estimates of PLAN strength as being: 2,000 in Angola, 1,400 in Zambia, and 300 in Ovamboland;¹⁷⁴ 3,000 in Angola and 400 in Namibia;¹⁷⁵ and 2,000 in Angola, 800 in Zambia, and between 250 and 300 in Namibia.¹⁷⁶ In May 1978, shortly after SADF units had killed or captured between 1,000 and 1,500 SWAPO supporters in the raid at Cassinga, The Chief of the SADF in Namibia stated there were still 2,700 PLAN guerrillas in

¹⁷⁰Sean Gervasi, "South Africa's War on Namibia," prepared in the office of the U.N. Commission for Namibia for the U.N. Security Council, July 1976, p. 11

¹⁷¹ARB, July 1-31, 1975, p. 3711

¹⁷²The Windhoek Advertiser, 9 July 1976 as cited by Gervasi, p. 11

¹⁷³Gervasi, p. 17

¹⁷⁴FBIS, SA, 26 October 1977, p. E5

¹⁷⁵Geldenhuyts

¹⁷⁶FBIS, 28 December 1977, p. E4

southern Angola and another 800 in Zambia.¹⁷⁷ A few months later in September, South African intelligence sources were quoted as estimating 4,500 SWAPO guerrillas in Angola and Zambia.¹⁷⁸ In light of all of the foregoing, it is reasonable to assume that PLAN probably has a total strength of from 3,500 to 4,500 or 5,000.

Regarding the disposition of these forces, exact locations are unavailable at the unclassified level. A 1976 South African estimate of 800 guerrillas in Ovamboland¹⁷⁹ was probably high, perhaps purposely so in order to stimulate greater internal support for the South African position. A more recent estimate of 100 PLAN combatants within Ovamboland at any one time¹⁸⁰ may have been accurate at that point (given the recent events at Cassinga and Angola's subsequent clamp-down on PLAN cross-border operations) but, in a more general context, is probably low given the overall trend of the war. In light of the changes in both the local and international situation since the 1976 estimate, this one may have been purposely inaccurate also, in order to convey an impression of confident control. Despite the existence early in the war of bases within the territory (e.g., trenches, excavated sleeping quarters, water supplies, ammunition storage at Ongulumbashe and in the Singalamwe Forest in East Caprivi¹⁸¹)

¹⁷⁷Geldenhuis

¹⁷⁸FBIS, SA, 25 September 1978, p. E1

¹⁷⁹Gervasi, p. 17

¹⁸⁰Geldenhuis

¹⁸¹Morris, p. 4,7

which were used by PLAN for several months and despite continuing claims by SWAPO of semi-liberated areas and bases in the territory,¹⁸² most of the PLAN forces presently in Namibia on more than a one or two day basis are either constantly on the move or else dispersed among the population in given areas for short periods of time.¹⁸³

Estimates of PLAN strengths in Angola and Zambia were given above. There are some indications that within Zambia there may be some co-location of PLAN and Zambian military forces,¹⁸⁴ perhaps as a deterrent to South African raids or shelling. Within Angola, many of the combat-ready guerrillas are located at camps fairly close to the Angola/Ovamboland border, while command, support, reserve, training, and administrative forces are stationed further north (e.g., Cassinga, 250 km north of the border).¹⁸⁵

In estimating the number of combatants SWAPO might be able to activate within the territory at present or in the future, one also needs to consider the members of SWAPO's internal political organization and whatever militant underground may be in existence. Despite the results of the

¹⁸²"SWAPO: Mobilize the People with the Truth," Dakar TAXAW, May 1978, p. 8, translated in JPRS, SA; Marja Liisa & Kimmo Kiljunen, "South African Presence Dominates Everywhere," Southern Africa, August - September 1978, p. 12

¹⁸³Geldenhuis; Al J. Venter, "South Africa vs SWAPO Terrorists," Soldier of Fortune, November, 1978, p. 47; Venter taped correspondence.

¹⁸⁴Geldenhuis

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

recent internally supervised elections, it is generally accepted that SWAPO has a wide base of political support and might obtain a clear majority in a U.N. supervised election. Given both the violence which has attended Namibia's political campaigning and the organizational potential facilitated by numerous large clusters of African laborers throughout the territory, it is reasonable to assume that should the political/military situation deteriorate and should sufficient arms be available (although not an absolute prerequisite), SWAPO could probably call upon tens of thousands of potential guerrillas. These could either be used in the capacity of widening the present insurgency or of providing behind-the-lines resistance should PLAN attempt to escalate the struggle to a more conventional level with communist support. As of yet however, there have been relatively few caches of insurgent war material discovered south of the operational area, indicating that this sort of uprising would not have optimum effect, at least initially.¹⁸⁶

In discussing the existence of a SWAPO underground and its potential combat strength, the increase in sabotage outside the operational area in the past few years and the assassination of political figures in urban locations, if not carried out by the underground, were surely set up and supported by one. An underground can be widespread and very effective with relatively few operatives however.

¹⁸⁶Venter, taped correspondence.

Additionally, because of their well established covers, they are usually more valuable in that capacity until such time as their area has been secured by the insurgent forces. Therefore, it is unlikely that SWAPO would count on significant military support from this section of its organization in any attempts to expand the struggle internally.

2. The Counterinsurgents

Before discussing force levels of the SADF in Namibia, a basic understanding of its overall structure is required. The SADF has three military services: The Army (SAA); the Air Force (SAAF); and the Navy (SAN). Within each branch, the active duty forces at any given time include members of the permanent force (minimum three year enlistment) and national servicemen (conscripts, with an active duty obligation recently increased from one to two years, followed by eight years of varying reserve duty). At their induction, national servicemen are designated as members of either the civilian force or the commandos and ultimately serve their reserve duty in those capacities. The differences are that the citizen force is trained and structured to augment the permanent force, while the commandos are geared more towards local home defense and internal security. While in the reserves, individuals and units are normally called up for active duty three weeks each year, although for the past

three years the call-up for citizen force reserves has been extended to three months.¹⁸⁷

The South African Police (SAP) assisted by indigenous Africans, were the first security forces involved in counter-insurgency operations in South West Africa. South African military presence in the mid-1960's was confined to an army base at Walvis Bay and a small air base near Katima Mulilo in eastern Caprivi (due to its seasonal geographic isolation from the rest of territory, eastern Caprivi was administered separately by South Africa at that time). The size of the police force at that time is unknown. The earliest quantitative reference found with respect to police strength was a statement three weeks after the police raided the camp at Ongulumbashe that the size of the police force in northern South West Africa had been more than doubled.¹⁸⁸ It is probably safe to assume that if the strength of the security force could be doubled in that short a time, it couldn't have been too large to begin with.

The strength of the police force continued to increase and they performed all aspects of counterinsurgent

¹⁸⁷International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1977 - 1978, (Dorking, U.K. : Adlard & Son Ltd., Bartholomew Press, 1977), p. 47; "Military Units Have Service Time Extended," FBIS, SA, 18 December 1975, p. E2, 3; "Botha Says Military Service Doubled to Two Years," FBIS, SA, 22 April 1977, p. E5

¹⁸⁸ARB, September 1-30, 1966, p. 620

warfare: intelligence, security, small unit patrols, targeted operations, and light air support.¹⁸⁹

The outbreaks of civil violence in Ovamboland in January and February 1972 resulted in an airlift of police reinforcements from Pretoria to Ovamboland and the announcement that where necessary, SADF units would assist the police in protection of the international boundaries.¹⁹⁰ This precipitated the beginnings of the SADF troop build-up throughout Namibia, as increases in operational troop strengths in the northern areas required administrative and logistic support which was then established further south. Most public estimates of SADF troop strengths in Namibia prior to the South African involvement in the Angolan civil war were proffered by SWAPO or sympathetic organizations primarily as propaganda and were extremely high.

In 1973, 7,000 South African troops participated in "Operation Swaland Blitz" in Namibia,¹⁹¹ although it isn't clear what connection there was between this and the normal security force levels in the operational area.

SAA activities in Angola in 1975-76 in connection with that country's civil war were launched from Ovamboland. Estimates of SAA strength in Angola were numerous at the

¹⁸⁹Morris, p. 3 - 14

¹⁹⁰ARB, January 1-31, 1972, p. 2358,9 and February 1-29, 1972, p. 2387,8

¹⁹¹IIS, Strategic Survey 1973, (London, U.K., 1974)

time, but in retrospect, the annual survey of the International Institute of Strategic Studies was probably more accurate than most. It noted a force of about 2,000 as being involved in the main penetration, with most of these being logistic, artillery, and light mechanized armor support for FNLA/UNITA guerrillas. Additional troops were active against SWAPO/PLAN bases closer to the border and guarded several refugee camps.¹⁹² These deployments tend to jibe with a January 1976 report by the South African Defense Minister that 4,000 - 5,000 SADF troops held and were patrolling a tract of land up to 50 miles deep into Angola.¹⁹³ It is reasonable to conjecture that this force was backed up by a fairly sizable contingent (probably 1,000 -2,000) in reserve across the border in Ovamboland. The expansion of the military infrastructure which had begun throughout Namibia in 1972 had rapidly accelerated to support the Angolan intervention. Given the bureaucratic momentum of large military organizations and the ascendancy of a hostile MPLA government supportive of SWAPO in Angola, it is unlikely that South Africa drew down its troop level in Namibia to any extent immediately following its withdrawal from Angola. It is more likely that some of these or additional troops were spread out to reinforce the more secondary areas of concern in the operational zone (Kaokoland, Kavango, Caprivi)

¹⁹²IISS, Strategic Survey 1975, p. 30

¹⁹³IISS, Strategic Survey 1976, p. 48

and that much of the supporting infrastructure further south was consolidated and improved into a more permanent status. As anxiety over the possibility of a near term PLAN/FAPLA/Cuban invasion of Namibia subsided, it is possible that much of the armor was withdrawn as it would've been of little use in the counterinsurgency effort. This would've left an SAA force of 3,000 - 5,000 in the BOA.

If a SAP presence in Namibia of 2,000 is accepted,¹⁹⁴ with the majority of them (perhaps 1,300) probably located in the operational area, then all of the reports and associated deductions above lead to a cumulative estimate of active SAA and SAP counterinsurgency forces in the field in the BOA at that time of 4,000 - 6,000. Despite occasional fluctuations, the tempo of the guerrilla warfare in the BOA hasn't escalated significantly and there haven't been any public reports of increased SAA deployments to that area until just prior to the recent elections. Increased lengths of active duty call-up for South African citizen reserve forces with assignment to the operational area, and extensions of active duty obligations for national service conscripts with additional assignments to the operational area¹⁹⁵ were

¹⁹⁴Kenneth W. Grundy, "The Use of Blacks in the South African Armed Forces," presented at the 21st Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Baltimore, Md., November, 1978, p. 12

¹⁹⁵FBIS,SA, 18 December 1975, p. E2,3; ARB, January 1-31, 1976, p. 3903; FBIS,SA, 23 April 1977, p. E5; Gherhard Pieterse, "Longer Border Duty," Johannesburg Sunday Times, 24 September 1978, p. 8, in JPRS,SA

implemented to reduce the strain on SADF manpower resources rather than to increase troop levels. Therefore, a strength of 4,000 - 6,000 for the field forces in the operational area is probably still valid. Should the level of guerrilla activity remain fairly constant, this presence may even decrease some if the developing Namibian army units prove to be effective.

This estimate becomes more credible if one accepts a commonly held security force: guerrilla ratio of 10:1 as being required for security forces to maintain control.¹⁹⁶ Despite the existence of several thousand PLAN forces in southern Angola and Zambia, South Africa is primarily concerned with controlling PLAN activities in the BOA (offensive missions targeted against specific PLAN positions in southern Angola are not the same as trying to control southern Angola, and don't require much if any increase in troop strength). If 300 - 500 is accepted as a very generous upper limit on PLAN strength in the BOA, with most of them being in Ovamboland, is theoretically quite adequate. Used conventionally, that many troops might not be very effective in defending an area the size of the BOA or even Ovamboland. Spread throughout the area in small units however, and with the consistently aggressive patrolling which the short deployments (until recently, three months) could

¹⁹⁶ A rough average of force ratios in several counter-insurgencies obtained from various sources.

facilitate, a counterinsurgent force that size could be very effective, especially in light of PLAN's general low level of activity.

There is very little information available on South African Air Force (SAAF) activity in Namibia. There are several small air facilities in the operational area, generally several hundred kilometers apart. Although the Impala MK II jet was recently taken into service and was projected as being very useful in counterinsurgency warfare,¹⁹⁷ there has been no indication of its presence on a regular basis in the operational area. Tactical air activity has been largely confined to medevac, troop transport, command and control of follow-up or pursuit operations, and some aerial observation or reconnaissance, all carried out by various classes of helicopter or light propellor planes.¹⁹⁸ Estimates of the numbers of these aircraft stationed in the operational area are such that the number of personnel required for operation and support is almost certainly less than 500.

Various units of Namibian soldiers have also been employed in the operational area. Ovambo and Kavango battalions were first organized in 1976¹⁹⁹ and a year later numbered "several hundred."²⁰⁰ In mid-1977 The Pretoria News reported that a Bushmen battalion and Rehoboth Baster

¹⁹⁷ARB, May 1-31, 1976, p. 4028,9

¹⁹⁸Venter, taped correspondence.

¹⁹⁹ARB, November 1-30, 1977, p. 4643

²⁰⁰FBIS,SA, 10 March 1976, p. E5, and 18 August 1976, p. E7

and Nama companies had also formed.²⁰¹ Training for members of other ethnic groups was planned also, with recruiting targets of 160 per group.²⁰² All Non-White military personnel except Ovambo, Kavango, and Bushmen were eventually incorporated into the largely non-ethnic 41 Battalion. It is composed of five companies with a total troop level of 400 - 600. It deployed to the operational area in September 1978 and has been touted as the nucleus of Namibia's projected army.²⁰³ Plans for another Namibian battalion of paratroopers were announced in September 1978.²⁰⁴ Not including the paratrooper battalion, the combined strengths of the others is probably in the vicinity of 1,200 - 1,600. This is generally compatible with South African claims that twenty percent of the troops in the operational area are Non-White, given the 4,000 - 6,000 figure deduced earlier which included some Non-White troops deployed from South Africa.²⁰⁵

²⁰¹DIA Intelligence Information Report (IIR) 6 880 0442 77,
9 August 1977

²⁰²ARB, November 1-30, 1977, p. 4643

²⁰³Grundy, p. 16; "South-West's Own Army Trains," Die Republikein, Windhoek, 9 June 1978, p. 4, translated in JPRS,SA, "Proposed Paratroop Battalion," The Windhoek Advertiser, 20 September 1978, p. 1, in JPRS,SA

²⁰⁴"Proposed Paratroop Battalion"

²⁰⁵Grundy, p. 17; DIA IIR 6 880 0514 78, 21 September 1978; "Black Battalion Returns," Johannesburg Post, 2 July 1978, p. 2, in JPRS,SA

In addition to the security forces discussed so far, Ovamboland, Kavango, and Caprivi each have their own Home Guard. These are paramilitary organizations which generally function in support of the civil counterinsurgency effort in conjunction with the police in such things as crowd control, security and as body guards for tribal leaders, although there has been some evidence of participation in SAA army patrols as guides, trackers, or interpreters.²⁰⁶ The Home Guards probably don't total more than several hundred.

In light of the foregoing, the cumulative strength of all the forces which are or could be used in actual combat against SWAPO/PLAN insurgency within the Border Operational Area in Namibia is probably 5,500 - 8,000.

Another general military rule-of-thumb is that there should usually be a 2:1 ratio between support and combat troops to optimize effectiveness. This yardstick surely doesn't apply in Namibia however. Because of its proximity and long-standing status as essentially an extension of South Africa, and because of the very transient nature of all SADF deployments in the BOA, a large amount of the required staff, logistical, and administrative support probably takes place in South Africa. Based on this, a very rough approximation of the SADF support forces required in Namibia might be half the combat forces in the BOA. Most of these support forces are probably located at the larger military

²⁰⁶"Tradition, pride, and discipline...all belong to the DLI,' Paratus, South Africa, April 1978, p. 8,9

installations south of the BOA. Although armour, heavy artillery, and conventional infantry haven't played much of a role in the BOA counterinsurgency,²⁰⁷ it would make sense strategically for South Africa to keep some of these forces in reserve south of the BOA in case the warfare should suddenly escalate to a more conventional nature. Given overall SADF strength levels, a 2,000 man force of this nature might be supportable, primarily with active duty reservists.

Thus, through a process of logical deduction based on acceptable reports and of rough approximations stemming from reasonable military strategies and practices, an estimate of 11,000 - 14,000 as the strength of government forces within Namibia has been arrived at. This figure is lower than the 15,000 - 25,000 range of estimates contained in most Western press reports.

A recent development, of as yet undetermined permanency, was a troop build-up in Ovamboland prior to the recent elections. It was cited by the Ovamboland Chief Minister as "...a considerable build-up...to safeguard the territory from interference and intimidation from outside during...(the) election..." and "...would remain...for as long...as deemed necessary."²⁰⁸ A "considerable build-up" can be speculatively quantified as an increase of perhaps

²⁰⁷Venter, taped correspondence.

²⁰⁸FBIS, SA, 30 November 1978, p. E4

25 percent, but certainly no more than 50 percent. Based on the estimation arrived at earlier, the security forces in the operational zone can be recalculated as being between 7,000 and 12,000. This probably resulted in an increase in overall "in-country" troop strength since this augmentation wouldn't have been drawn from the contingency forces south of the operational zone, as they would have been held in place as an election security insurance for the urban areas. This leads to a new estimate of overall troop strength as 13,000 - 18,000, although this may only be a temporary peak.

The headquarters for the South West African command (SWAC) are in Windhoek. The primary support base for the BOA is at Grootfontein. The BOA is divided into two military areas and one sub-area for local command and control purposes. 1 Military Area includes Kavango and the western part of Caprivi up to the Angola/Zambia border. 2 Military Area is Ovamboland. 13 Sub-area is the eastern portion of Caprivi. A small number of troops are also located in Kaokoland.²⁰⁹ Prior to final posting in the BOA, all units receive two weeks of counterinsurgency training at Oshavello.²¹⁰

As mentioned before, the majority of the security forces are deployed in Ovamboland. The general scheme of troop deployment follows logically from part of the SADF

²⁰⁹SADF Directorate of Intelligence, "Military Service in the Operational Area," p. 3

²¹⁰Venter, taped correspondence

mission in the BOA, which can be summarized as the prevention of PLAN guerrilla infiltration into Namibia and the protection of the population from those which do infiltrate. Accordingly, larger and more permanent SADF bases are generally located near the larger towns which are close to the northern border. Numerous small field bases and observation posts are located in proximity to the actual border and known infiltration routes. The rest of the border area and the rural areas in the rest of the BOA are covered by temporary roving patrols.²¹¹

Some of the known troop concentrations in 1 Military Area are the headquarters at Rundu, Andara, and the Bushmen battalion in the western Caprivi area.²¹² Any units consisting of African and Portuguese refugees from Angola probably are posted in western Kavango or eastern Ovamboland since this is where most of the 40,000 refugees are located. Although some UNITA units may work from this area also, most of those which remain in Namibia for any period of time apparently are posted further south at Grootfontein and are moved to the border or into Angola only for operational missions.²¹³

²¹¹Ibid.

²¹²Ibid., "A Deserved Abode in 1 Military Area," Paratus, June 1978, p. 35

²¹³Francois Soudan, "South African attack rumours: rationalization for foreign presence," Jeune Afrique, No. 934, 22 November 1978, p. 22, JPRS, SA, translation.

The headquarters for 2 Military Area is at Oshakati, with some of the other main base areas being Ruacana, Okalongo, and Eenhana.²¹⁴

Headquarters for 13 Sub-area are at Katima Mulilo, with most of the troops based there also.

Most bases mentioned here within the BOA also have SAAF detachments co-located or in the vicinity. These detachments normally consist of from five to ten aircraft, usually a mix of Alouette and Puma helicopters and small fixed wing observation planes.²¹⁵

The White commando organization within Namibia hasn't been discussed due to a lack of information. At this point they don't constitute part of the standing security forces. Should the conflict spread beyond the BOA however, they might be activated as additional security within their local areas. Additionally, if a conflict situation should ever arise in which the SADF didn't actively participate and yet there were still many Whites in the country, the commando organization or its remnants could form the nucleus for White or conservative armed resistance.

F. EXTERNAL MILITARY PARTICIPATION

In discussing the military participation of external military actors in the Namibian conflict to date, it is

²¹⁴SADF Directorate of Intelligence, p. 3; Gervasi, p. 20; "SWAPO Confronts UNITA," Namibia Today, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1977, p. 5,6

²¹⁵Venter, taped correspondence.

frequently difficult to determine fact from fiction.

Allegations of external participation by both sides have been numerous, as they make good propaganda.

1. Military Support for the Counterinsurgents

The most frequent charges made by SWAPO against South Africa concern the support and use of UNITA guerrillas in both Namibia and Angola. The allegations, which started with South Africa's collaboration with UNITA during the Angolan civil war, are generally true, although perhaps not on the scale charged by SWAPO.²¹⁶ South Africa has rendered substantial material support to UNITA's estimated 10,000 to 12,000 troops in Angola. Additional claims have included the training, outfitting, and harboring of several battalions of UNITA soldiers and Angolan refugees in eastern Ovamboland and Kavango. These units have been used against PLAN and FAPLA elements in Angola both as large forces in a more conventional manner and as small clandestine units.²¹⁷ It has also been alleged that these same units have intimidated the civilian population in the BOA in Namibia while charading as PLAN elements in order to influence public opinion against SWAPO. Although this last claim is harder to substantiate or accept, things of that nature frequently occur in counter-insurgency warfare, and therefore it must be considered as a definite possibility.

²¹⁶Bournes taped correspondence; Nicholas Ashford, "ITN team back after 110-day bush ordeal," London Times, 27 November 1978, p.1

²¹⁷FBIS, SA, 8 October 1976, p. E5; 19 November 1976, p. E5; 19 January 1977, p. E1

Allegations of a less likely nature have included the participation of Chilean army units, both in the instruction of the UNITA troops and in the intimidation of civilians in Angola and Namibian while disguised as Cubans.²¹⁸ Although Chile and South Africa are on good terms, with some military interaction, that type of participation is hard to accept. The high risk of greater adverse world opinion towards Chile should it be found out would seem to greatly outweigh the apparent absence of any benefit to either country from such a relationship.

Other less frequent charges by SWAPO of participation by U.S., British, Israeli, and West German mercenaries²¹⁹ are almost certainly not true except perhaps for isolated individuals in the UNITA units. Claims of Portuguese mercenaries are more credible,²²⁰ but again, these would be working with the UNITA units also.

In 1975 South Africa acknowledged assistance from the Israeli military in the form of antiguerrilla tactics training for SADF officers.²²¹ It is not known how long this assistance continued.

²¹⁸FBIS,SA, 21 February 1978, p. E1

²¹⁹FBIS,SA, 16 March 1977, p. E7

²²⁰FBIS,SA, 13 August 1976, p. E1

²²¹FBIS,SA, 24 July 1975, p. 8

2. Military Support for the Insurgents

a. Angola

When SWAPO opted for cooperation with MPLA vice UNITA during the Angolan civil war, one of the driving factors was the potential for increased Soviet and Cuban support of its own struggle for Namibia. Part of the arrangement appears to have been an agreement to assist these combined forces in defeating UNITA. Although SWAPO hasn't reneged on its bargain, it would seem that the involvement has carried on much longer than originally anticipated. Once again, it is hard to separate reality from false propaganda, but the weight of reports seems to indicate that the relationship between PLAN and FAPLA has sometimes been less than cordial and that it is experiencing increasing strains as the Angolan and Namibian guerrilla wars drag on.

In 1976 and early 1977 there were several reports of fighting between PLAN and FAPLA units over scarce supplies.²²² More recently, the restraints placed on PLAN's cross-border operations by Angola in order to avoid massive SADF retaliation into Angola and the pressures applied by Angola's President Neto on SWAPO's President Nujoma to accept the Western proposals for U.N. supervised elections have surely hindered PLAN activities in Namibia and have perhaps caused some resentment. There have also

²²² FBIS, SA, 30 June 1976, p. E6; ARB, January 1-31, 1977, p. 4302; FBIS, SA, 10 February 1977, p. E11

been reports of FAPLA dissatisfaction with PLAN participation against UNITA. It has been said that MPLA feels the first priority should be to eliminate UNITA as this would give SWAPO clear lines of communication for its fight in Namibia. SWAPO's attitude is said to tend increasingly towards the view that the UNITA issue is an Angolan domestic matter.²²³ In any event, SWAPO really has no alternative but to cooperate with MPLA if it wants to maintain both its Angolan sanctuary and the promised eventual full support of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Focusing more on the actual military conflict in Namibia, there have been several isolated incidents involving FAPLA cross-border small arms fire at border posts and towns from Ruacana to Rundu. There have also been a few FAPLA KIA on the Namibian side of the border. These incidents probably reflect a lack of control within FAPLA more than a policy of direct action against the SADF however. The policy usually proclaimed publicly by MPLA is that its full support for SWAPO's struggle stops short of crossing the border into Namibia. The only military roles that FAPLA theoretically plays in the Namibian conflict are those of border defense against SADF incursions and, to a lesser extent, protection of SWAPO camps from SADF raids. In both cases, any "success" is much more a function of constraints placed on the SADF for South African political reasons than the effectiveness of the FAPLA defense.

²²³Benson, p. 50

The headquarters for SWAPO's external organization are in Luanda.

b. Cuba

The roles of Cuban troops in the Namibian guerrilla war so far have been primarily instructional and advisory. Despite reports of a few Cubans KIA inside Namibia²²⁴ and several more during the raid at Cassinga, the military activities of the reported 25,000 Cuban troops in Angola²²⁵ has been focused almost exclusively on eliminating the guerrilla liberation movements left over from the Angolan civil war. At this point it appears that the only clash of any significance between Cuban and South African troops since the Angolan civil war occurred during the SADF raid at Cassinga. At that time, several Cuban advisors and instructors were reported killed at the camp and a Cuban armoured column sent to assist was stalled by landmines set by SADF paratroopers.²²⁶

Knowledgeable observers have noted that the quality of the PLAN soldier based in Angola has improved and they have attributed much of this to Cuban training in Angola.²²⁷

²²⁴Venter, taped correspondence

²²⁵FBIS, SA, 3 April 1978, p. E2

²²⁶Benson, p. 50; Geldenhuys

²²⁷Venter, taped correspondence; Geldenhuys

c. Soviet Union

Although SWAPO had maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union and had received some equipment and training from them since the early 1960's, it wasn't until after the Angolan civil war that substantial support really became available. At that time the Soviets allegedly offered large amounts of aid and instructors for a "quick kill" war similar to the climax of the Angolan civil war. The price of this was for SWAPO to scale down and phase out any Chinese support it received.²²⁸ Since then, SWAPO's President Nujoma has repeatedly acknowledged the support rendered by both the Soviets and the Cubans.

During the long negotiating process between SWAPO, South Africa, and the Western members of the U.N. Security Council, there were frequent reports of Soviet pressure on SWAPO to reject any compromise solutions and to continue and escalate its armed struggle.²²⁹

Most recently, there has been concern in South Africa over reports of a build-up of top level Soviet military planners in Angola, allegedly to plan and direct a military campaign in Namibia in a manner similar to the Soviet planning and direction functions demonstrated in Ethiopia. The Russians are reportedly determined to crush UNITA resistance before launching any campaign in Namibia

²²⁸ ARB, February 1-29, 1976, p. 3942

²²⁹ Louis Wiznitzer, "Proposals for Namibia garner yes-but answers," Christian Science Monitor, 2 May 1978, p. 10; Lawrence Pintak, "Zaire and Angola leaders ready to bury the hatchet," London Times, 19 August 1978, p. 5

however, and this determination is said to have resulted in an influx of East Germans to replace Cubans in many field leadership positions.²³⁰

d. East Germany

Although the presence of small numbers of "East European" military personnel in Angola has been frequently reported since the civil war, it wasn't until 1978 that the East Germans began to be mentioned in increasing numbers and almost to the exclusion of all others.

All reported combat participation has been against UNITA, with the East Germans apparently leading FAPLA platoons and flying troop helicopters. Although most reports to date were originated by UNITA or South Africa, a recent one from West German government sources indicates that there may be at least 5,000 East German troops in Angola.²³¹

The potential for eventual East German military involvement in Namibia gains some credence linguistically and culturally. It is further supported by reports of the formation of an East German "Afrika Korps" consisting of several thousand civilians. This organization is alleged to be a "shadow" administration for Namibia which would be

²³⁰ "Soviet generals may pose threat," The Sunday Mail, Salisbury, 18 June 1978, p. 1, in JPRS,SA

²³¹ FBIS,SA, 5 April 1978, p. E1, 24 November 1978, p. E7, and 4 December 1978, p. E1; Ashford, "ITN team back after 110-day bush ordeal."

installed upon a SWAPO takeover to assist SWAPO in running the new country.²³²

e. Zambia

Zambia has provided sanctuary for SWAPO almost from its inception, and most of the U.N. sponsored programs for SWAPO are maintained in Zambia. Lusaka also served as the headquarters for the external SWAPO organization until its recent relocation in Luanda.

Despite this close relationship, Zambia has been unable to provide any real military assistance to SWAPO aside from allowing the establishment of PLAN bases close to the Zambia/Namibia border. Zambia's traditional international political position has precluded direct access by Cuban and Soviet advisors and instructors to PLAN units in Zambia. Additionally, arms and equipment for the PLAN troops in Zambia have arrived via Tanzania as opposed to a more direct delivery for units in Angola. Consequently, the PLAN troops in Zambia have, on the whole, been of a lower quality and more poorly armed than those in Angola.²³³

As noted earlier, Zambia constrained PLAN operations while attempting detente with South Africa and again when SWAPO initially shifted allegiance to MPLA. Zambia also detained almost the entire Zambian faction of

²³²"East Germans prepare Namibia occupation force," Die Suidwester, Windhoek, 25 August 1978, p.1, in JPRS, SA translation; The Star, Johannesburg, (title unavailable), 26 June 1978, p. 1

²³³Venter, taped correspondence

PLAN in the summer of 1976 in order to sqelch a potential mutiny. There are conflicting reports as to whether or not these people have yet been released.

There have been numerous reported incidents of small arms and even mortar fire from Zambian troops near Sesheke directed at the town and SADF base at Katima Mulilo. As in the case of FAPLA cross-border fire however, most of these incidents are attributed to a lack of Zambian Army command and control over remote units and not to an overall agressiveness in the Zambian political/military posture.²²⁴

f. Summary

In summary, it can be said that so far, foreign military involvement on behalf of SWAPO has been limited to provision of equipment, training, advice, and ineffective protection. While there is potential for more direct military involvement by some of these external actors, it probably will not come to pass until, among other things, UNITA has been neutralized as a guerrilla force. It is for this reason, and the related fact that many PLAN troops will remain tied up against UNITA in the interim, that South African can be expected to continue to support UNITA in its struggle in Angola.

²²⁴ ARB, May 1-31, 1977; FBIS, SA, 4 November 1977, and 22 December 1978, p. E7

G. COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

During the early phases of a counterinsurgent effort, law and order are normally still the responsibility of the civil administration and are bounded by the prevailing civil legal system. Usually it soon becomes apparent that effective counterinsurgent action is hampered by laws and procedures which were not intended or designed to cope with subversive activities. It is at this point that special legal powers and procedures begin to appear to facilitate the military and police control required for effective counterinsurgent activity, both preventive and reactive. These special legal powers wouldn't be acceptable under normal conditions, but, together with stern punishments for the insurgents, they are supported on the grounds that innocent lives must be protected and that insurgents operate outside the law in ruthless fashion and would otherwise escape the punishment they deserve.²³⁵

The special legal and security measures which have been implemented in Namibia governing military/police interaction with both the civilian populace and members of SWAPO/PLAN in the prosecution of the counterinsurgent effort will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Additionally, examples of political and civilian harassment and support by the administration for different political factions under the guises of legal counterinsurgency powers and protection of the populace will also be presented.

²³⁵ Paget, p. 31-34

Namibia's relationship to South Africa has greatly facilitated the construction of a pervasive counterinsurgent legal system in the territory since, in many instances, appropriate laws were already on the books in South Africa and procedures to support them were in effect.²³⁶ Transferring these controls to Namibia has been a simple process. The degree of population control inherent in apartheid (homelands and reserves, pass laws, curfews for Non-Whites in White areas, etc.) not only fulfilled some counterinsurgent requirements, but, to some extent, also conditioned the general populace to living in a closely controlled society.

Modification of South West Africa's civil legal system began in October 1966, shortly after SWAPO's "declaration of war" two months earlier. The anti-sabotage provisions of South Africa's 1962 General Law Amendment Bill were extended to South West Africa. Willful acts of damage or destruction of essential buildings or installations were made punishable by death or a minimum of five years in prison.²³⁷

In June 1967, South Africa gazetted the Terrorism Act and extended its powers to South West Africa. It provided for punishment by death for the crime of terrorism and for unlimited detention of people suspected of either terrorist

²³⁶The Suppression of Communism Act was promulgated in 1950 and various General Law Amendment Acts were promulgated in South Africa in the early 1960's dealing with such things as sabotage, placards, meetings, and detention on suspicion.

²³⁷ARB, October 1-31, 1966, p. 642

activities or of withholding information about such activities.²³⁸ It was made retrospective to 27 July 1962 when the first members of SWAPO were recruited for terrorist training abroad.²³⁹ It was on this basis that the 37 Africans who were arrested at and after the police raid at Ongulumbashe in August 1966 were tried for nationalistic activities aimed at overthrowing the government and administration of South West Africa. Since there was some doubt initially as to whether the retroactive extension of this law would hold up in court, the men were also charged alternatively under the Suppression of Communism Act.²⁴⁰

When thousands of Ovambo workers were transported back to Ovamboland following the nation-wide strikes which began in December 1971, South Africa enacted extensive emergency regulations with respect to Ovamboland in January and February 1972. These were known collectively as Proclamation R17. Ovamboland was effectively placed under martial law, entrance was strictly controlled by permit, a news blackout was imposed, news media access was severely restricted with all subsequent reports requiring administration approval, meetings of more than five people were generally

²³⁸ ARB, June 1-30, 1967, p. 801

²³⁹ Morris, p. 19,20

²⁴⁰ ARB, August 1-31, 1967, p. 846

prohibited, and indefinite detention without charge was permitted.²⁴¹ In May 1976 Proclamation R17 was extended to Kavango and Caprivi as well when those areas were officially termed "security districts" and overall political power in all three areas was transferred to the military.²⁴² Additional powers were also granted to uproot villagers in "prohibited areas," order curfews, search premises or people, arrest suspected terrorists, and control population movements.²⁴³

In February 1974 South Africa passed the Riotous Assemblies Bill, designed to further limit the possibilities for subversion by permitting the banning of any meeting of any size, public or private, lawful or unlawful as long as there was reason to believe that public peace was endangered by the meeting.²⁴⁴ In April 1977 South Africa extended the provisions of the Riotous Assemblies Act to Namibia.²⁴⁵

By January 1977, the flow of people from embattled southern Angola into Namibia, both refugees and those just seeking food or medical treatment, reached such proportions that new, non-racial identity documents were issued to all

²⁴¹ARB, January 1-31, 1972, p. 2359, and February 1-29, 1972, p. 2388

²⁴²FBIS,SA, 21 May 1976, p. E3

²⁴³ARB, May 1-31, 1976, p. 4037

²⁴⁴ARB, February 1-28, 1974, p. 3138

²⁴⁵ARB, May 1-31, 1976, p. 4027

Namibians in order to limit the possibilities of PLAN members infiltrating into Namibia posing as Angolan civilians.²⁴⁶

By mid-1977 the military and police had essentially been given a free hand to conduct the civil counterinsurgent effort in the operational area. Although this did facilitate near total control of the civilian population and effectively supported generally successful military operations, the moral acceptability of these repressive measures began to hinder South Africa's international negotiating position after it had agreed to drop its plans for an internal independence settlement in favor of an internationally recognized solution. Faced with the eventual prospect of "one man, one vote" elections and with a majority of the potential voters living under Proclamation R17, both the need to improve the internal political climate of Namibia in order to favorably influence a future poll towards an outcome acceptable to South Africa and the need to allow greater freedom of speech and movement to conduct election campaigning were recognized. Consequently, shortly after he was installed as the Administrator-General of South West Africa, Mr. Justice Steyn repealed Proclamation R17 in November 1977 and replaced it with two less stringent proclamations. At about this same time the pass laws were abolished for the territory as a whole, the homelands were opened to visits by other ethnic

²⁴⁶ ARB, January 1-31, 1977, p. 4301

groups²⁴⁷ and the Riotous Assemblies Act was amended.²⁴⁸

The election campaigns of the main political parties soon heated up and resulted in numerous violent political clashes in Windhoek. Additionally, SWAPO took advantage of the relaxed civil controls and stepped up its campaign of political assassinations, culminating in the death of Chief Clements Kapuuo in March 1978. This series of events precipitated the promulgation of emergency measures the following month which gave broad powers of arrest and detention without trial to the Administrator-General during the period of independence negotiations.²⁴⁹ These measures were still in effect at the end of 1978.

Other laws or processes which have played a role in countering subversion in the Namibian civil sector are: an old law, recently updated (July 1978) by an Administrator-General proclamation, permitting the expulsion of anybody who "...threatens the peace or good government of the territory..." which has been used most notably against religious leaders who have openly opposed administration policies;²⁵⁰ a law prohibiting illegal exit from the territory; and stiff penalties for anyone found guilty of intimidating or trying to discourage potential voters.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ARB, November 1-30, 1977, p. 4643

²⁴⁸FBIS, SA, 14 November 1977, p. E8,9

²⁴⁹ARB, April 1-30, 1978, p. 4831

²⁵⁰ARB, July 1-31, 1978, p. 4939

²⁵¹ARB, June 1-30, 1978, p. 4901

It should be noted that two civilian control measures frequently used in other counterinsurgent situations which have not been used in Namibia are population resettlement and food control programs.²⁵² The former is usually intended to both facilitate protection of the populace and restrict any supportive interaction between the population and the insurgents. Food control programs are aimed at limiting the possibilities for the local populace to provide substantial food support to insurgents. It may be that South Africa feels the situation within the operational area is not of sufficient intensity to warrant these types of actions.

Based on this adapted legal foundation, any time the general situation has become particularly tense (e.g., following Kapuuo's assassination, periods of increased activity in the operational area, during elections) the response of the authorities has been to round up and detain prominent members of SWAPO's internal organization. Additionally there have been several instances where individual SWAPO officials have been detained and tried for offenses which in other situations would seem to be extremely trivial. While these and many other instances of legal harassment make good press for SWAPO and its supporters (in light of South Africa's "illegal" administration

²⁵²Venter, taped correspondence

of the territory), they are valid security measures within the context of a counterinsurgency, and when placed in the perspective of counterinsurgent efforts in other places, in many ways the situation is actually more liberal than the norm.

Other practices by the administration which don't necessarily derive from specific security legislation and are not anti-subversive in a strict sense, but which do reflect the intention and capability to restrict SWAPO activities and influence the population towards an eventual non-SWAPO resolution have included such actions as:

1. Allegedly permitting administration officials and the DTA, SWAPO's primary political opposition, to carry out frequent voter intimidation during the registration process and again during elections.²⁵³

2. Police dispersal of SWAPO political rallies as being too violent and disorderly after allegedly having allowed DTA members to interfere and stimulate the violence despite theoretical police protection for the rallies.²⁵⁴

²⁵³"Church Report Charges Fraud," New York Times, 6 December 1978, p. A3; Chege Mbitiru, "Kenyan reporter gives first-hand account on elections," Nairobi Daily Nation, 11 December 1978, p. 6 in JPRS,SA

²⁵⁴"Police told to give SWAPO protection," Johannesburg The Star, 23 January 1978, p. 1, in JPRS,SA; SWAPO says intimidation had collusion of authorities," Johannesburg The Star, 6 February 1978, p. 5, in JPRS,SA; Bishop James Kauluma, "Things stay the same says Bishop," interview by Karen Rothmeyer, Southern Africa, April 1978, p. 22

3. Alleged job transfers of SWAPO supporters employed by the government.²⁵⁵

4. Permission to tribal authorities in Ovamboland to detain and publicly flog people on the grounds that they were members of SWAPO.²⁵⁶

South Africa has also taken several steps to legalize and facilitate military operations in Namibia's operational area. The designation of the three northern security districts was mentioned above. The presence of troops in those areas prior to that, which contravened the provisions of South Africa's League of Nations Mandate for the territory, was justified on the grounds that the heads of government in those homelands had requested military protection of their international borders.²⁵⁷

In support of frequent public statements by South African government leaders as early as 1970 regarding the intent to carry out "hot pursuit"²⁵⁸ and to provide greater legitimate latitude for offensive action, South Africa promulgated the Defense Amendment Act in January 1976. This bill gave the Defense Minister the legal right to order

²⁵⁵"Teacher transfers laid to SWAPO affiliation," The Windhoek Advertiser, 17 January 1978, p. 1

²⁵⁶ARB, February 1-28, 1975, p. 3539

²⁵⁷ARB, January 1-31, 1972, p. 2359

²⁵⁸ARB, September 1-30, 1970, p. 1863

South African forces into action anywhere in Africa south of the equator to counteract any security threat.

An additional act designed to limit PLAN militarily was the designation of a strip one kilometer wide on the southern side of the Namibian/Angola border as a depopulated "no-man's land" in May, 1976 at the same time these areas were declared security districts.²⁵⁹ This also is alleged to have stemmed from requests by homeland political leaders. It involved the resettlement of approximately 3,000 people in Ovamboland. Known as the "Jati" strip, it runs along the entire northern border between the Cunene River and the Okavango River with Oshikango as the only legal crossing point.²⁶⁰ A similar strip runs along the northern border of western Caprivi.

Finally, it should be noted that the incorporation of all the foregoing security measures into the civil legal system has resulted in treatment and prosecution of PLAN guerrillas as common criminals vice prisoners-of-war.²⁶¹

In attempting to determine the effectiveness of implementation of this adapted legal system against the insurgency in Namibia, there is very little specific information available to use as evidence. When one considers the vastness of the area to be controlled and the

²⁵⁹ARB, May 1-31, 1976, p. 4037

²⁶⁰FBIS, SA, 19 May 1976, p. E5 and 6 July 1976; ARB, January 1-31, 1977, p. 4301

²⁶¹ARB, June 1-30, 1977, p. 4475

relatively small security force so employed (compared to other counterinsurgent situations), the apparent success of the overall program so far may partially be a reflection of the lack of an active SWAPO underground within Namibia and a limited effectiveness of PLAN forces in general. South African journalist Al Venter has covered warfare in Africa and the Middle East since the early 1960's. In his opinion, compared to other situations he has covered, the police and SADF in Namibia have been quite lax or liberal with such things as road check points, curfews, and border control.²⁶² As noted previously, this may be due primarily to the low intensity of the insurgency.

H. THE PURSUIT OF POPULAR SUPPORT

Two of the most important aspects of any counterinsurgency war are the amelioration of the popular grievances which fueled the insurgency and the winning of the hearts and minds of the population. Successful accomplishment in either endeavor by the government in power is tremendously hindered by the repressive atmosphere which normally exists in a counterinsurgency situation, as noted in the previous subsection. In the Namibian situation, the popular grievances have been addressed primarily through reforms to the apartheid legal system. The pursuit of increased popular support for South African programs through improvements in African

²⁶²Venter, taped correspondence

well-being and living conditions has occurred primarily in the BOA and has been addressed largely through SADF civic action programs.

1. Legal Reforms

The first significant South African attempt to come to grips with the growing demands for independence and equality in Namibia was the Odendaal Plan for autonomous homelands, discussed earlier. As far as most Namibians are concerned, this was not so much an attempt to solve the main problem as it was to reduce it to several small, similar problems which could be more easily contained. This plan was eventually abandoned under pressure both from abroad and within.

In November 1974, the South-West Africa Native Administration Proclamation of 1922 was amended to allow African officials in homeland governments and other African political leaders recognized by Pretoria to travel freely throughout the country without passes.²⁶³

In May 1975, the African pass law and the Masters and Servants Proclamation of 1920 was abolished. The South African government also placed limitations on the flogging of political opponents which had been taking place for more than two years under tribal leadership in Ovamboland.²⁶⁴

²⁶³ARB, November 1-30, 1974, p. 3442

²⁶⁴ARB, May 1-31, 1975

In June 1975, the legislative assembly in Windhoek officially eliminated some aspects of racial discrimination by permitting the admission of all races to hotels, restaurants and cafes at the discretion of the owners.²⁶⁵

In September 1975 South Africa convened a constitutional conference (the Turnhalle Conference) on the future of Namibia. As discussed earlier, this was an attempt to arrive at an internally-generated plan for independence under South African guidance. The conference was eventually eliminated as an official body in the face of international pressures, although the conference principles have been adopted as platforms by some of the conservative political parties. September also saw the removal of "Whites Only" and "Non-Whites Only" signs from all public buildings in Windhoek.²⁶⁶

In June 1976, the constitutional conference passed a series of resolutions to appeal to the various South African government departments in Namibia to eliminate many aspects of apartheid and racial inequality. The issues addressed indicated that implementation of most of the reforms discussed above had proceeded very slowly if at all in the intervening year.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ARB, June 1-30, 1975, p. 3671

²⁶⁶FBIS,SA, 3 September 1975, p. E10

²⁶⁷FBIS,SA, 4 June 1976, p. E5

The territory's first multiracial political meeting was held in September 1976 in Khomasdal, the Coloured quarter of Windhoek. It was attended primarily by Coloureds, with a few Whites and Africans present also.²⁶⁸

In January 1977, South Africa agreed to the abolition of apartheid in Roman Catholic schools, hospitals, and clinics in Namibia. Any positive effects of this were soon offset when the South West Africa Administration withdrew its subsidy to Catholic schools on the grounds that they had defied the National Party policy of segregated education. It was also announced in January that all Namibians would soon receive identical identification cards regardless of race.²⁶⁹ As discussed in the previous subsection, this was aimed primarily at controlling Angolan refugees, but it was also a step away from ethnic I.D. cards prescribed under apartheid.

Following South Africa's decision to negotiate on an internationally acceptable independence for Namibia and the July, 1977 appointment of an Administrator-General for South West Africa during the territory's transition to independence, the rate of legal reform accelerated.

In October, all laws prohibiting marriage and sex across the color line were eliminated. Pass laws were

²⁶⁸FBIS, SA, 3 September 1976, p. E7

²⁶⁹FBIS, SA, 13 January 1977, p. E3; ARB, February 1-28, 1977, p. 4337

abolished first outside the military zones and a few weeks later within the military zones (repeal of Proclamation R17), although how these abolitions differed from the one announced two years earlier isn't clear. Laws providing for indefinite detention and requiring permits for meetings of more than five people were also scrapped.²⁷⁰

It was announced in December that all private schools would be allowed to accept students of all races although government subsidies would only be provided for White students.²⁷¹ All restrictions on the purchase of land by Africans in African townships were set aside²⁷² and the Windhoek City Council announced plans for a new "open" or "mixed" residential area in the city.²⁷³ Finally, it was announced that the Bantu education system was to be abolished, to be replaced by a single national syllabus for all students.²⁷⁴

In June 1978 it was announced that all government employees and public servants would receive equal pay for

²⁷⁰ARB, October 1-31, 1977, and November 1-30, 1977, p. 4642, 3

²⁷¹"Private schools accept Non-Whites," The Windhoek Advertiser, 15 October 1977, p. 1, in JPRS,SA

²⁷²ARB, December 1-31, 1977, p. 4862

²⁷³"Windhoek to have White-Black-Brown area," The Windhoek Advertiser, 19 December 1977, p. 1, in JPRS,SA

²⁷⁴ARB, December 1-31, 1977, p. 4862

equal work and equal qualification. The new pay structure was implemented on 30 November.²⁷⁵

In September the First National Development Corporation was established to provide low interest loans for business and industry in order to stimulate the economy and create employment opportunities. It's board includes members of all major ethnic groups and the corporation superceded the Bantu and other homeland development corporations.²⁷⁶ The potential for this corporation appears somewhat limited at the present, however, as capital flight from the territory has made banks wary of extending substantial credit.²⁷⁷

2. Civic Action

In the past few years the South African administration and the SADF have expended considerable effort in the BOA and at other base areas in norther Namibia in order to offset the presence of PLAN and its terrorist tactics, to win the hearts and minds of the people, and to encourage a

²⁷⁵"Government equalizes salaries and wages," Allgemeine Zeitung, Windhoek, 14 June 1978, p. 1, JPRS,SA translation; "Equal pay implemented," The Windhoek Advertiser, 1 December 1978, p. 3, JPRS,SA

²⁷⁶"Steyn announces National Development Corporation," The Windhoek Observer, 16 September 1978, p. 1, JPRS,SA

²⁷⁷"Flight of capital, economic transition problems discussed," Johannesburg, Sunday Times-Business Times, 26 November 1978, p. 15, in JPRS,SA

flow of operational information from the civilians to the security forces.²⁷⁸

Signs of "20/80" are posted all over as a constant reminder of the SADF formula for a successful counter-insurgency: 20 percent combat and 80 percent people or political programs. This starts with explicit standing orders that no man in uniform is to molest the locals in any way.²⁷⁹

Many reserves on active duty with appropriate civilian backgrounds are sent to the BOA expressly for civic action programs. These programs include extensive medical, agricultural, and veterinary services, road improvement, construction projects, educational assistance, and athletic supervision for young people.²⁸⁰ While many personnel are assigned exclusively to "static" civic action projects, others participate in "contact" patrols, which include armed security forces and medical, agricultural, and veterinary personnel. These patrols go out into the bush for several days and carry out civic action and elicit information in the more remote areas.²⁸¹ One U.S. military observer

²⁷⁸B. Redelinghuys, Col., SAA, SAA Attache at South African Embassy, Washington, D.C., in interview with the author, 10 August, 1978

²⁷⁹Venter, taped correspondence

²⁸⁰"A deserved abode in 1 Military Area," Paratus, June 1978, p. 34,35

²⁸¹Redelinghuys interview

estimated the overall SADF civic action program to be as intensive and thorough as any he had ever witnessed.²⁸²

While most of the SADF effort has been manpower intensive, the Administration has poured large sums of money into northern Namibia for extensive housing developments, sports and recreation facilities, shopping centers, extension of electrical facilities, street improvements and lighting, and water, storm drainage and sewage systems. The advertised purpose of these expensive schemes is to boost the African living standard.²⁸³ Unmentioned but almost as obvious is the intent to buy support for a "moderate" approach to independence and resistance to SWAPO politicizing.

3. Propaganda

Propaganda and civilian terrorism are essentially the only means SWAPO has to counteract and discredit South African and political opposition politicizing and other popular support efforts as described above. With no liberated areas, SWAPO has been unable to implement and demonstrate any of the programs it espouses for the population as a whole. The ability of SWAPO's internal party in Namibia to distribute information on a mass basis has generally been quite restricted through government interference of one form or another. A great deal of information is passed through regular radio

²⁸²Bournes taped correspondence

²⁸³Gail Visagie, "Plans underway to boost living standard," The Windhoek Advertiser, 13 September 1978, p. 2, in JPRS, SA

broadcasts from Zambia and Angola by SWAPO's external political organization however, and these usually reach at least as far as Windhoek.²⁸⁴ In the BOA, PLAN infiltrators occasionally conduct political meetings for groups of civilians gathered at gunpoint.²⁸⁵ Terrorism, especially selective terrorism, is used to discredit the capability of the security force to protect the populace and to discourage people from accepting positions of authority in opposition to SWAPO. SWAPO propaganda has followed lines similar to those of many other African insurgencies (e.g., reports of constant victories, economic exploitation, charges of racism, allegations of atrocities), but South Africa's illegal presence in the territory, SWAPO's status in the U.N. as the only authentic representative of the Namibian people as a whole, and the depiction of the moderate political opposition as South African puppets have all received extra attention.

Although South Africa has, through various means, effectively limited the distribution of information within Namibian by SWAPO's internal wing, they have not restricted it nearly as much as they could, which would be simply to prohibit it on the grounds that it is subversive. Further, apparently there has been no attempt to jam SWAPO radio

²⁸⁴Venter, taped correspondence

²⁸⁵Ibid.; Bournes taped correspondence

broadcasts or to prevent Namibians from listening to them.²⁸⁶
This seeming laxity could simply reflect the low intensity of the insurgency and the level of real threat that South Africa perceives. More likely however, it is also a conscious restraint, aimed both at demonstrating South Africa's impartiality during the transition to independence, and the prevention of SWAPO's mystique being enhanced through denial of public information.

The more conventional forms of South African propaganda within the country have generally focused on the Marxist nature of SWAPO, the need to prevent domination of one ethnic group by another, the fallacy of SWAPO's claim to represent Namibians as a whole, dissention within SWAPO ranks, civilian atrocities, the depiction of PLAN as an ineffective military force, and improvements in living standards.

Within the political arena, the moderate and conservative opposition has generally echoed the South African propaganda, and their political campaigns have tended to focus more on discrediting SWAPO's image and perceived platform than on expounding on their own merits. The government controlled radio programming within Namibia has been dominated by SWAPO's moderate opposition, the DTA,

²⁸⁶Ibid.

evidencing close ties with the South African administration.²⁸⁷ Finally, South Africa's Information Department scandal has surfaced in Namibia with strong allegations that government money was used to buy two independent newspapers, after which they began supporting the DTA very strongly.²⁸⁸

I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRUGGLE

In attempting to assess the effectiveness of each side in prosecuting the opposing war efforts, the problems of censorship and misleading propaganda tend to cloud realities much more than on most topics discussed so far. While practices and programs are proclaimed proudly in some cases and can be easily deduced in some other cases, neither side is willing to admit failure or misdoing.

1. Objective Accomplishment

Objective accomplishment is a logical place to start in the assessment of insurgent/counterinsurgent effectiveness in Namibia. Although official, comprehensive and specific statement of objectives in the actual struggle apparently have not been promulgated as programs by either side, they can probably be summarized as follows.

²⁸⁷"SWANU leader scores UN/HCR, DTA actions," The Windhoek Advertiser, 9 February 1978, p. 5; "Returnee mentions changes in 15 years, scores DTA, AKTUR," The Windhoek Advertiser, 10 February 1978, p. 6, both in JPRS,SA

²⁸⁸"Pretoria funded Namibia Press," Africa Report, January-February 1979, p. 25

a. SWAPO/PLAN

(1) Gain the support of the majority of the population.

(2) Disrupt South African and local government administration processes and discredit the security forces and opposition figures of authority.

(3) Establish a liberated zone within Namibia.

(4) Defeat the security forces.

b. South Africa and the Security Forces

(1) Win the support of the majority of the population through neutralization of grievances and acceptable alternatives to those programs advocated by SWAPO.

(2) Prevent PLAN military infiltration into Namibia in order to facilitate a peaceful transition to independence.

In very simplistic and general terms, it would appear at this point that SWAPO can probably be considered as successful in the accomplishment of its first objective, while PLAN has had only very limited success in the second, and virtually none at all in the last two. On the other hand, although the security forces have been extremely successful in accomplishing their military objective against PLAN, it would appear that, while some progress has been made, the degree of true popular support for South African and the political parties and programs generally associated with it is probably less than they have hoped

for. These answers are too simple however, and don't shed any light on the factors of which they are comprised.

2. Operational Constraints

In assessing combat effectiveness, both sides have been operating under constraints which have prevented the continuous exercise of their full capabilities. PLAN's involvement in Angola's continuing struggle with UNITA has certainly detracted from the military effort in Namibia. On the other hand, PLAN soldiers may have gained considerably more real combat experience in that endeavor than they have in Namibia. This is especially true if one considers the possible eventuality of a more conventional war in Namibia with participation by Cubans or East Germans. Operations from Zambia were minimal from late 1974 through 1977 due initially to government constraints and then to detention of the whole PLAN contingent. Further constraints were placed on PLAN in the summer and fall of 1978 when Angola and Zambia both exerted pressure to minimize cross-border operations during independence negotiations and, at least in Angola's case, until anti-aircraft border defenses could be strengthened as protection against South African retaliation. Finally, on the occasions when SWAPO/PLAN appear to have suffered very high casualties (i.e., in Angola in the fall of 1975, at Cassinga, and in the Katima Mulilo follow-up) operational activity has decreased thereafter. It should be noted that the time required for recuperation after a major setback appears to be decreasing, however.

The restraints placed on the security forces in Namibia so far appear to have been primarily political in order to minimize any damage to the South African negotiating position at the U. N. The South African objective is not to destroy PLAN, but merely to keep it from operating in Namibia (although elimination would certainly achieve this). Large scale cross-border operations have generally occurred only as follow-ups to PLAN operations in Namibia or as preventive measures when the intensity of PLAN activity in Namibia appeared to be escalating beyond levels acceptable to the South Africans. While the security forces have scored impressive victories on those few occasions when operational constraints were relaxed, it must be remembered that those operations generally caught PLAN by surprise. It would be foolish to think they could be repeated again and again under less restrained rules of engagement. Another constraint on the security forces is the standing policy to avoid antagonizing the local populace. It was noted earlier that harsh treatment of suspects and the local populace during interrogation is a common aspect of counterinsurgency. Despite frequent allegations of atrocities committed by the security forces against African civilians, South African has demonstrated some restraint in this area at the expense of greater control.

3. Normal Modus Operandi²⁸⁹

In assessing the effectiveness of the ordinary modus operandi of both sides, it should be noted that if the casualties suffered in the extraordinary situations discussed above are set aside, the PLAN:SADF casualty ratio of approximately 3 or 4:1 isn't especially outstanding within the context of counterinsurgency warfare.

PLAN operations normally consist of the infiltration of a unit into Namibia for a few days at most, with a specific mission in mind. Penetration is normally shallow, 20 to 30km. Equipment and weapons are usually stashed during the day. The group generally remains concealed during most of the day although some members with contacts in the area may mingle with the local people. Following accomplishment of its mission, the unit exfiltrates back across the border. Although most penetrating groups are still quite small, there has been some tendency for guerrillas to infiltrate in larger groups (50-100) for protection and then to split into smaller elements for actual mission accomplishment. Most missions involve civilian targets, placement of landmines, or sabotage. Very few if any units are specifically targeted against security force bases or patrols. Clashes usually result from chance encounters or targets of opportunity, although there have been numerous ambushes of security force border patrols initiated near the border both within the BOA or from Angola or Zambia.

²⁸⁹Bournes and Venter, taped correspondences

Security force operations have continuously adapted in order to cope with the changing insurgency. The basing scheme and the civic action "contact" patrols were previously discussed. Other types of normal patrols are motorized border patrols along the cut lines and other roads in the vicinity, border ambushes along frequent infiltration routes, and reconnaissance/combat patrols with the purpose of finding and engaging PLAN elements.

A few years ago the reconnaissance and combat patrols were small (five to ten men) and stayed out for several days. As the size of some PLAN infiltrations has increased, the security force patrols have also become larger. Platoon-size (20-30 men) patrols are the rule now, with larger groups of up to 60 working in known infiltration areas. Once contact is made, follow-up forces are frequently called in. Depending on the situation, these can include helicopters for fire support and command and control, additional mortar fire support from nearby bases, helicopter-borne troops, motorized troops, horse-mounted troops, Bushmen trackers, or dogs. There have also been reports of motorcycle troops being used in follow-up operations. Artillery heavier than mortars is generally not used for tactical fire support within Namibia.

Border surveillance apparently relies almost exclusively on patrols and static visual means augmented by the use of landmines in the no-go strip. On the whole, these are reportedly insufficient to prevent determined groups

or individuals from crossing in either direction. There have been recent reports of the installation of mechanical sensors in hopes of improving the surveillance effort.

4. Intelligence

Given the relatively small size of the security force vis-à-vis the extent of the BOA and the porosity of much of the border, the security forces rely heavily on intelligence in order to maintain control. South Africa apparently operates an extremely effective counterinsurgent intelligence organization. Military Intelligence most likely controls the field work conducted in Angola or Zamiba, while the effort in Namibia involves the police as well, although there have been reports of friction between the police and SADF in this area. While well-placed and loyal informants probably provide a great deal of the information in Namibia, it has been noted that the local populace as a whole is much more responsive to both the intelligence system and security force reconnaissance patrols after PLAN has suffered a setback in the area. Within any counterinsurgency this is one of the reasons the security forces seek to protect the populace and why the insurgents seek to discredit the capability of the security forces to provide this protection. As evidenced by the high PLAN casualties, the instances of tactical surprise, the precision of execution, and in the case of Katima Mulilo,

the foreknowledge of attack, the SADF obviously has excellent knowledge of PLAN activities outside Namibia.²⁹⁰

Much less is known about PLAN's intelligence capabilities. Most of its selective terrorism is probably based on intelligence although it may be collected in the immediate vicinity as opposed to through a broad and continuous organized effort. PLAN units also frequently rely on the local populace to either cover their presence in the area or to warn them of approaching security forces.²⁹¹

5. Quality of the Combatants

South Africa likes to portray PLAN as a demoralized, under-equipped, under-fed, and poorly led band of terrorists. They support this with testimony from defectors and UNITA guerrillas which include reports of dissension, desertion, arrest, and execution in both Angola and Zambia, as well as claims of ethnic favoritism, weak leadership, hunger, poor medical treatment, and dismay over SADF victories at Cassinga and Katima Mulilo.²⁹² Similar charges have also been made

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Venter, taped correspondence

²⁹² "Hundreds said shot," Johannesburg The Star, 1 February 1978, p. 15; "Why SWAPO could never take the South-West by force of arms," Windhoek Die Republikein, 16 June 1978, p. 2; "SWAPO soldier surrenders," Johannesburg Post, 4 July 1978, p. 10, all in JPRS,SA

by SWAPO dissidents who experienced the situation in Zambia and southeastern Angola from 1974 to 1976.²⁹³ All of the above is probably true in varying degrees, although perhaps less so now than in previous years. The fact that PLAN seems to recuperate faster after each major setback isn't indicative of declining morale. While the killing of wounded comrades to prevent their capture by security forces might offend western sensibilities, it also evidences more than a normal level of commitment.²⁹⁴

While the quality of the PLAN soldier is generally denigrated by most South African sources,²⁹⁵ Al Venter, after covering African insurgencies for almost twenty years, ranks PLAN military professionalism generally higher than any of the other liberation armies currently or recently fighting in southern Africa. As evidenced by some of the operations they have conducted, he placed some of the elite PLAN units on a par with almost any special forces organization in the world.²⁹⁶

SADF soldiers are well trained and generally well motivated for duty in the BOA. Their motivation is due

²⁹³Kenneth Abrahams, "The Formation of the SWAPO (Democrats)," The Namibian Review, June 1978, p.1-7

²⁹⁴"Terrorist comrades cut throat," The Windhoek Advertiser, 1 September 1978, p. 1, in JPRS, SA

²⁹⁵Bournes taped correspondence; Dr. W. Brückner de Villiers, "External Influences," Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 4 & 5, 1978, p. 144, Geldenhuys

²⁹⁶Venter, taped correspondence

primarily to a constant barrage of government and media reports and warnings depicting South Africa as almost a lone crusader against communism and stressing the need to prevent Namibia from becoming a communist springboard into South Africa. When this is overlaid on the Afrikaner spirit of determined survival and resolute superiority, the struggle becomes very moral and almost religious for many. On a more pragmatic level, the previous SADF tours of three months in the BOA (twice during a two year active duty service) with only ten weeks actually operational were very conducive to enthusiastic attitudes. A soldier was transferred back home before he had a chance to be worn down by the war. Although operational tours for active duty national servicemen were increased to five month tours a year ago, there hasn't yet been any public feedback on what effect this may be having on morale.

Despite the foregoing, there have been reports of the beginnings of an attitude at the lower SADF levels which can be characterized as "Why are we fighting here if they're (Namibia, SWAPO) going to get their independence anyway, no matter what we do."²⁹⁷ There have also been reports of boredom on the part of most SADF troops as only two percent have supposedly actually ever seen a terrorist, dead or alive.²⁹⁸ Despite the admitted low intensity of the war, this figure seems quite low given the number of SADF

²⁹⁷Ibid.

²⁹⁸SADF Directorate of Intelligence, p. 6

troops reported in the BOA and the frequency and geographic spread of clashes with PLAN units.

Of interest is the apparently high level of morale and increasing level of quality of some of the Non-White troops, particularly the Namibian ethnic battalions. Although educational and cultural deficiencies have made for a slow development process, the progress of many of these units has received favorable South African comment, although some of this was obviously propoganda. While much of the military attraction for the Africans is financial and the total strength of all the units together is relatively small in the context of the total war effort, morale is high and long waiting lists for entry are reported.²⁹⁹ This seems to mirror the experiences of the Portuguese in which African units were steadfast in their loyalty to Lisbon, and remained as cohesive and disciplined units even after many of the European troops refused to fight or respond to orders.³⁰⁰ The battalions associated with the homelands in the BOA have seen sufficient operational duty to have proved their worth,³⁰¹ although the leadership is still in the hands of Whites. It is of interest that while the Ovambo battalion has generally proved effective, it is by

²⁹⁹"Military contributes to Caprivi economic development," The Windhoek Advertiser, 20 October 1978, p. 4, in JPRS, SA

³⁰⁰Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in Africa: Comprehensive Notes on Counterinsurgency," ORBIS, summer 1977, p. 405,406

³⁰¹Venter, taped correspondence

far the smallest of the BOA ethnic battalions despite having a population base almost ten times that of any other BOA homeland. While much of this can probably be attributed to the high numbers of military-age Ovambo men who are working on contract in the South, it may also say something about the ethnic perceptions of SWAPO by different ethnic groups and their associated willingness to support or oppose it.

6. Popular Attitudes

In assessing the effects of both the civil programs, propaganda, and the actual military activities of both sides on the local populace, it must be remembered that indications of support for one side or another may not reflect true political inclinations so much as a desire to avoid or minimize violence. The African churches in Namibia exert a strong influence on the attitudes of a very large number of the Non-Whites, including those in the BOA. While the churches generally support SWAPO goals, they are opposed to violence, and this attitude has carried over to much of the population. There have also been reports of civilian cooperation with the security forces which appear to have been motivated more by desires to help the security forces finish their operations in the immediate vicinity so they would leave, rather than having been founded in a sincere animosity towards the guerrillas. Although the soldier with the gun tends to command the respect of the civilian populace under his immediate authority, the nature of that

respect and its long term implications are ultimately determined by the manner in which that authority is exercised.

Despite frequent SWAPO claims of South African atrocities against civilians in the BOA, it would appear that the harshness of the situation in Namibia is perhaps less than in most other counterinsurgencies, although that may not have much meaning or comfort for the BOA population. More odious to the Africans perhaps was the sudden appearance of large numbers of White troops who have since exerted great control over their lives while displaying a collective attitude of frequently ill-concealed contempt. It must be remembered that the White presence in the areas which comprise the BOA was almost non-existent a little more than ten years ago.

The Non-White security forces are also sometimes viewed with trepidation. The high morale of the ethnic battalions was noted above. Unfortunately, this high morale has sometimes manifested itself as overzealousness in controlling the local population. The Home Guards mentioned previously have apparently earned the worst reputation of all as a result of their lack of discipline and frequent incidents of belligerent drunkenness and apparently indiscriminate abuse of civilians.³⁰² In light of the foregoing, even if individuals in the civilian

³⁰²Bishop James Kauluma, "Things stay the same says Bishop," interview by Karen Rothmeyer, Southern Africa, April 1978, p. 22; Allen Pizzey, "Mission pupils on the run with SWAPO," Johannesburg, The Star, 24 February 1978, p. 3, in JPRS, SA

population have no first hand knowledge of security force atrocities, their general perceptions of the security forces might make them receptive to such claims by SWAPO.

While SWAPO/PLAN may be more guilty of atrocities than the security forces, and although these incidents are touted as prime examples of SWAPO barbarism, their negative effect on the population may be less damaging to SWAPO objectives than the reports of security force abuses are to theirs. Selective terrorism is targeted against representatives of the homeland administrations which, at least in Ovamboland, are generally held in low regard. Although many mass abductions are bonafide kidnappings, a good portion of them have occurred under questionable circumstances, especially those involving young people who may have followed PLAN soldiers on their own free will. Acts of blind terrorism (e.g., landmines), while directly attributable to PLAN, may also be mitigated somewhat in African eyes by a point of view in which they are seen as an unfortunate aspect of a war for which South Africa is ultimately responsible.

Although some of the foregoing rationale for weighting the public opinion more heavily against the security forces than PLAN may be a bit flimsy, the bottom line is that there are at least 30,000 Namibian refugees in Angola and Zambia, and emigration is continuing.³⁰³ While some of these are

³⁰³"Alleged SWAPO crossers," The Windhoek Advertiser, 19 September 1978, p. 2, JPRS, SA

families of PLAN soldiers, most of them appear to have left Namibia more to get away from South African control than to actively participate in SWAPO's struggle. This is supported to a certain extent by numerous reports of Angolan and Namibian abductees being pressed into service with PLAN,³⁰⁴ which would indicate that few of the available refugees are joining.

The reception of the South African civic action programs and legal reforms within the civilian populace is also questionable. The degrees to which these are perceived as crash programs with ulterior motives and solely as the result of international and nationalist pressures is unknown, although these factors worked against the Portuguese in their colonies.³⁰⁵ Although there is no proof, it is likely that the beneficiaries of much of the largess reported earlier are Africans tied to organizations popularly perceived as pro-administration. Additionally, the normal disparaging attitudes towards rural Africans by the majority of the SADF who aren't directly involved in civic action, especially when displayed under arms on patrol, and the delays between passage and implementation of some legal reforms have probably limited the overall positive potential of these programs. Finally, some knowledgeable South African observers have opined that despite

³⁰⁴FBIS,SA, 17 April 1978, p. E6

³⁰⁵Henrikson, p. 402

its breadth, the overall civic action program has been less successful than intended.³⁰⁶

In summary, it would appear that SWAPO has been able to achieve more politically among the civilian population through propaganda and terrorism than South Africa has with civic action, legal reform and fairly good internal security, although this may be less true in non-Ovambo areas.

³⁰⁶Redelinghuys interview; Venter, taped correspondence

IV. INTERNAL FACTORS

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this section is to examine several internal, non-military factors and variables in the Namibian equation and assess their individual potentials for causing violent conflict of a nature that would invite participation by external actors. Topics which will be discussed are:

1. The platforms and bases of support for the primary political bodies and their images among the population as a whole.
2. The attitudes of the Whites towards the Africans, power-sharing, and majority role, and their likely post-independence reactions.
3. The nature of ethnicity in Namibia and the possibilities for post-independence primordial violence.
4. The African educational deficiencies and their impact on post-independence stability.
5. The structure and focus of the current economy, the natures of possible post-independence economics and attitudes and their potentials for popular frustration and strife.
6. The military, economic, and political aspects of the ultimate sovereignty of Walvis Bay.

B. THE POLITICAL CONTENDERS

The increasing political consciousness of the Namibian Non-White in the last 15 years combined with the ethnic heterogeneity of the population has given rise to almost 40 political parties and interest groups. Most of these parties have specific ethnic orientations, are quite small, and are based on limited platforms. With the approach of actual elections, most of this hodge-podge realized the hopelessness of many of the individual situations. The trend in the last two years has been towards the formation of coalitions or alliances capable of greater political clout. These unions have occurred across ethnic and ideological lines. With the exception of SWAPO, all the important political forces in the territory are now alliances of one form or another.

The rest of this subsection will be devoted to a discussion of the organizations, platforms, and popular support of the four most significant political bodies in Namibia. These are the revolutionary South West Africa People's organization, the centrist Namibian National Front, the conservative Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, and the very conservative Action Front for Retention of Turnhalle Principles.

1. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

a. Party Organization

Although SWAPO theoretically functions as a single organization within and outside Namibia, there are

actually several factions with different political roles. The external wing of SWAPO (SWAPO External) is headquartered in Luanda, Angola, is quite militant, and has been the subject of most of the discussion on SWAPO in this paper thus far. This faction looks after all aspects of international relations, finances, and negotiations associated with SWAPO's pursuit of Namibian independence. This faction also directs the guerrilla activities of PLAN and either conducts or arranges for training and education of young Namibians who will fill professional and administrative roles in an independent Namibia. Under President Nujoma and a Central Committee, SWAPO External functions essentially as a government-in-exile. The other SWAPO factions are inside Namibia.

The SWAPO Youth League can be described as radical and somewhat militant. It is a self-governing federal body headquartered in Windhoek. Although it includes some who aren't actually SWAPO members, its program is based on lines set down by SWAPO. It advocates liberation through struggle and a revolutionary political orientation. A large portion of the Namibians who have left the territory to join the external struggle have either been members of the SWAPO Youth League or were recruited or influenced by it.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁷Töttemeyer, p. 64

The rest of the internal organization, SWAPO Internal, exists essentially in two groups although there apparently isn't any administrative differentiation. The primary function of SWAPO Internal is to conduct political activity in order to broaden SWAPO's support base within Namibia. One group's presence is primarily in Ovamboland, and to a much lesser extent, in Caprivi.³⁰⁸ The other group, which includes the leadership of SWAPO Internal, the National Executive, is headquartered in Windhoek and draws its support from contract workers at mines and in the urban areas (primarily Ovambo) and from a multi-ethnic cross-section of African professionals, students, and religious leaders. SWAPO Internal's political approach to struggle and resistance has remained relatively moderate in order to retain legal status within the territory. This can also be attributed in some degree to police harrassment of the leadership to the point where many have left the territory, and to close monitoring and restrictions of political activity imposed by the South African administration, especially in the BOA. Another factor is the strong influence of the various African churches. As a whole, Africans in Namibia are devout christians. The churches have actively promoted the SWAPO goals of independence, but have rejected violence as a means of achievement and Marxism as an ideology. These views have been adopted by many in their congregations.

³⁰⁸Ibid.

b. Platform

Although SWAPO External has produced a national program and SWAPO Internal has produced a set of constitutional proposals, both of which address the administration and development of an independent Namibia, they are both a few years old and many points in these statements haven't received the clarification that many of those involved in the Namibian situation would like to see, especially in light of the increasingly radical tone of SWAPO External's public statements. This absence of specific information may stem from either a conscious effort by the SWAPO leadership to mask their intentions for fear of losing Western support in negotiations or the simple lack of a comprehensive program, as charged by many dissidents.³⁰⁹ If the later is the case, it may reflect either a fear that the process of formulating a specific plan of action might split the party before independence, an all-consuming focus on the liberation process itself as once reported in Zambia,³¹⁰ uncertainty because of the number of variables involved,³¹¹ or a combination of these. In any event, those aspects of a platform which SWAPO has announced have been made under

³⁰⁹Abrahams, p.1

³¹⁰ARB, October 1-31, 1976, p. 4204

³¹¹Shafashike Kahana, Deputy Representative, SWAPO Permanent Observer Mission to the U.N., interview with the author, 1 August 1978, New York, N.Y.

the assumption that it will be the controlling political power in the Namibia and will not need to compromise or enter into a political coalition.³¹²

With respect to popular perceptions of SWAPO, the following list includes the more important points of those post-independence projections which it has announced publicly at one or another.³¹³

(1) A national system of local government which rejects the principles of homelands or regionalism based solely on ethnic affiliations, and rejection of the authority of traditional leaders.

(2) A raceless society with a place for everybody, but on SWAPO terms only. SWAPO fully expects most Whites will leave.

(3) Termination of relations with South Africa until it becomes truly democratic.

(4) Those having opposed the struggle will be condemned as traitors.

(5) Planning and development of the economy will be governed by the principles of scientific socialism.

(6) The economic equalization of all according to merit.

(7) Private ownership of property and means of production will be allowed only if it serves the interests

³¹²Ibid.

³¹³Ibid., SWAPO National Programme, as presented by Töttemeyer, p. 75-80

of the people. Home ownership and monetary savings will not be affected.

(8) State ownership of natural resources, all infrastructure, and the media.

(9) Land will be given to the tillers and the government will assist farmers in the organization of cooperatives. Those who acquired land prior to independence will be required to enter into new agreements which will define the terms by which the land could be owned.

(10) The banking system will be owned by the people.

(11) Education will be free and compulsory.

(12) The inclusion of Walvis Bay as an integral part of Namibia.

SWAPO Externa's public pronouncements and its discussion of political concepts have taken on more of a Marxist tone since it increased its association with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Although the language of African liberation draws heavily on Marxist terminology, the changes in SWAPO's character are noteworthy, as it was previously unaligned and its ideology was relatively moderate in nature. While it isn't clear whether this reflects a sincere change in political attitude, it has tended to harden the existing opposition to SWAPO in Namibia.

c. Popular Support

The degree of popular political support for SWAPO in Namibia can only be addressed in general terms. Based on all accounts, it is safe to say that in an open election SWAPO would garner more votes than any other party. Whether or not this support would extend to a majority of all votes isn't clear. It is generally expected that SWAPO would attract a large majority of the Ovambo voters. SWAPO also appears to have substantial minority support among the Nama, the Damara, and the Caprivians.³¹⁴ Some of the factors which impact on SWAPO popularity or which may serve as partial barometers are presented in the following paragraphs.

Despite SWAPO calls to boycott and accepting charges of widespread voter intimidation, the voter turnout in the recent internal elections organized by South Africa was almost 90%. Compared to turn-outs of 2% in 1973 and 55% in 1975 for Ovamboland elections held under similar conditions, this high figure must reflect some erosion of SWAPO popular support.

The civic action programs in the BOA have surely had some positive effect on South Africa's image (and, by association, DTA's) relative to that of SWAPO's among the local population.

³¹⁴Clive Cowley, "Political parties in SWA/Namibia," Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 4 & 5, 1978, p. 153

If active support by the people would have facilitated the establishment of a greater and more effective guerrilla presence in Ovamboland, then the failure to do so may indicate a less-than-advertised popularity. As noted in other places however, this is also due to a more passive political attitude internally and to pragmatic self-survival in light of the security force presence. SWAPO political objectives are probably still supported by the majority and free polling would probably reflect this.

Allegations of PLAN participation in numerous atrocities in Angola against Kwanyama Ovambo supporters of UNITA, accompanied by the presence in the BOA of 40,000 Angolan refugees from this fighting may have cost SWAPO some support among the Namibian Kwanyana, the largest tribe of the Ovambo.

Outside the BOA, although there is still a long way to go, the legal reforms of the past few years have probably softened some Non-White attitudes towards South Africa, at the expense of SWAPO.

With the media controlled by South Africa largely for the benefit of the DTA, the constant barrage of adverse propaganda depicting SWAPO as a communist Ovambo organization, highlighted by President Nujoma's statement that SWAPO was not fighting for majority rule but rather to seize power,³¹⁵ has also surely had some effect. Reports of

³¹⁵"SWAPO nails its colors to the mast," Johannesburg The Star, 27 February 1978, p. 14, in JPRS, SA

SWAPO plans to eliminate the political opposition and to eliminate the Herero have been taken at face value by many.³¹⁶ With most of its leadership detained, harrassed, or in exile, SWAPO Internal has been unable to mount an effective campaign to counter this propaganda.

SWAPO intransigence in coming to terms on the details of an agreement for U.N. supervision of elections, while based in part on mistrust of South African intentions, may also reflect less than complete confidence in its ability to poll a clear majority of votes. It has contributed to a growing impression among many in Namibia that SWAPO may increasingly favor revolution just for the sake of revolution. It has also created some annoyance with SWAPO leadership on the part of some leaders of front-line states and a feeling that SWAPO may be letting opportunities and events pass it by.

Despite both the foregoing and its general lack of military success, SWAPO still draws heavy Ovambo support and is viewed by many others as the torch-bearer of Namibian independence. SWAPO has taken up arms while the other parties have not. SWAPO has been recognized by the U.N. as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people while the others have not. These factors, together with the promises of immediate social and economic equalization and the vituperance of the SWAPO/South African rivalry have created a mystique and an authenticity which

³¹⁶Tjamuaha interview

is especially appealing to those who have experienced the harshest aspects of apartheid (contract laborers) and to many of those whose rising expectations have been most frustrated (students, professional people). In many non-Ovambo ethnic groups it is accepted that while the traditional leaders have the support of a majority of the older population, SWAPO has the support of a majority of the younger population.

The recent extensive coverage of the 1976 dissension in SWAPO External in Zambia was expected to adversely affect SWAPO's base of support, but apparently this hasn't happened. While the dissension obviously hindered the military struggle, there is still sufficient agreement over objections for the party to have retained most of its internal and international support.

There has also been some recent trepidation on the part of church leaders over alleged violence against civilians by PLAN and the increasing Marxist tone of SWAPO External. The churches have withheld any definitely adverse comment however, on the grounds there hasn't been sufficient evidence in either case to warrant a change in position. 317

317 "Anglican, Catholic, Lutheran churches express viewpoint," Johannesburg, The Star, 21 February 1978, p. 20, in JPRS, SA; Caryle Murphy, "Namibian Church Leaders Reexamine Ties with Guerrillas," The Washington Post, 3 January 1979, p. A15

2. The Namibian National Front (NNF)

a. Organization

The NNF is a coalition of six parties and ethnic factions. Another party, the SWAPO Democrats, has signed a joint statement with NNF stating that the SWAPO Democrats were in full and unqualified agreement with the NNF, although they apparently stopped short of formally joining the coalition. The SWAPO Democrats was formed by some of the SWAPO leaders imprisoned in Zambia in 1976.

b. Platform³¹⁸

The NNF envisages a vote for all adults, a democratic system of government, and an independent judiciary. The NNF pledges to secure national unity and territorial integrity in a unitary state, but allows for the establishment of two to five provincial councils.

It proposes a unicameral parliament as the supreme legislative body. A third of the members would be elected in single-member constituencies, while another third of the seats would be divided among political parties, in direct proportion to their share of the total vote in a general election. Together, such members would constitute an electoral college, which would allocate the remaining one-third of seats to minority groups.

The executive would consist of a figure-head president, a prime minister and a cabinet.

³¹⁸Cowley, p. 151; "NNF issues policy declaration on suffrage," The Windhoek Advertiser, 16 February 1978, p. 5, in JPRS, SA

The NNF supports the principles of a mixed economy, with both public and private participation, provided that the latter excludes unhealthy monopolies and "other forms of abuse." The private sector would be closely involved with the state in national development.

Progressive taxation is envisioned as a measure to eliminate "excessive accumulation of economic means" and to accomplish an equitable distribution of wealth. Expropriation or nationalization would be the exception rather than the rule, it would only take place in the national interest and fair compensation would be paid.

The NNF rejects any regionalism of the Namibian state in homelands in whatever form it may occur.

Walvis Bay is to be retained as part and parcel of Namibia.

Education will be compulsory for all Namibians without discrimination, with equality of opportunity in schooling.

c. Popular Support

Since the NNF boycotted the recent internal elections there are no real measures of its base of support. It is felt to have the support of about half the Bastards and Coloureds, and perhaps a majority of the Damara. It has minority support within the Herero and the Nama, and to a much lesser degree among the Whites. As presently constituted, NNF has very little support from the Ovambo, but this could change dramatically if the SWAPO Democrats are

able to attract a large Ovambo following and if they can be persuaded to close ranks with the NNF. Of the three major political coalitions, NNF has the most potential for growth. A major obstacle in this growth is a serious lack of financing.³¹⁹

Most criticism of NNF policies has come from the political right, and has included the following charges:

(1) The NNF has mistakenly associated ethnicity with apartheid and therefore is wrong in rejecting it.

(2) The NNF economic policies will strangle large companies, frighten away potential investors, and cause national income to shrink.

(3) Progressive income taxes will reduce production and growth incentives.

(4) The NNF and SWAPO have the same goals, their only difference being the method of obtaining them.

Criticism from more radical political opposition usually depicts NNF as lacking liberationist authenticity.

3. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)

a. Organization

The DTA was formed in October 1977 just prior to South Africa's dissolution of the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. When the all-White National Party refused to ratify the constitutional proposals of the Turnhalle conference, the President of the conference, Dirk Mudge,

³¹⁹Cowley, p. 150,151

left the party and established the Republican Party. He then called upon the conference representatives of all the ethnic groups to form political organizations and join in an electoral alliance to seek election on the basis of the draft constitution of the conference. This was done, and the DTA now includes eleven parties, each representing an ethnic or racial group.³²⁰

b. Platform

The DTA proposes a multi-ethnic government on the first tier and representative authorities for ethnic groups on the second tier. In a division of powers between the two tiers, the former would deal with matters of national importance, the latter with affairs of community concern. The bulk of powers would be allocated to the central government.

Deputies to the national assembly would not be elected directly. Instead elections would be held for ethnic authorities, which would be constituted as electoral colleges, to choose their deputies to the national assembly. The eleven ethnic communities would be given equal weight in the assembly, in effect one vote each, with the size of their deputations determined on a sliding scale related to their populations. If such arrangements were found to deny representation to some of the people, possibly on the grounds that they defied or opposed ethnic classification, the national assembly would institute an electoral college or colleges for them.

³²⁰ARB, October 1-31, 1977, p. 4616

In consultation with their representative authorities, ethnic deputations to the national assembly would each appoint a minister, not necessarily from their own ethnic group, as well as a deputy-minister from their own ranks.

Likewise the power to dismiss ministers, or deputies to the national assembly, would rest exclusively with ethnic groups.

Both the national assembly and the council of ministers would make decisions on a basis of consensus unless they agreed in advance to a majority vote. A single deputation in the assembly or a minister in the council of ministers, would be able to veto a decision.

The DTA proposes a bill of fundamental rights, as part of the constitution, with the removal of racial discrimination and the protection of ethnic identity as prime objectives.

Finally, the DTA supports the principle of a free economy, with maximum participation in the private sector and government involvement only where necessary.

c. Popular Support

The DTA is the primary political opposition to SWAPO. It draws primarily on the conservative, traditional elements in Namibia and has little support from the youth or the detribalized. The majority of its supporters are relatively unsophisticated and live primarily in rural areas. In terms of variety, the DTA draws upon a wider ethnic base of support than any other party or alliance.

It appears to hold majority support among the Herero and the Kavango, and support from about half the Coloureds, the Basters, and the Caprivians. It holds some minority support among the Whites, the Nama, and the Ovambo. It apparently has little support from the Damara.³²¹

The DTA has received tremendous financial support allegedly from West Germany and South Africa.³²²

Criticism of the DTA by its more liberal political opposition has generally included the following charges:

(1) The emphasis of ethnic autonomy in the second tier of government is only cosmetically different from the concept of bantustans or the Odendaal Plan and will tend to perpetuate racism and apartheid and promote civil unrest.

(2) The principle of consensus in the central government will make it hard to act as a nation and there will be little chance of changing the laws that facilitate White dominance.

(3) The ministers of the central government will be at the mercy of the ethnic groups from which they came.

(4) The unqualified capitalist economic program will perpetuate the profits of those currently monopolizing

³²¹Cowley, p. 147

³²²"Pretoria Funded Namibia Press," Africa Report, January-February 1979, p. 25

the means of production to the detriment of the African population.

(5) DTA's conservative opposition, AKTUR, has charged DTA with trying to lead the country down the path to racial integration.³²³

Despite the overwhelming vote it received in the recent internal elections, DTA's image, at least internationally and among the opposition, was tarnished considerably. Instances of varying degrees of intimidation were frequently reported during the long registration process. There were numerous reports of disruption of opposition political meetings by DTA members. The massive funding for DTA and its domination of the media heightened suspicions of South African collusion. Finally, during the election, many of the illiterate apparently received excessive "help" in marking their ballots.³²⁴

There is a growing concern among some of the Non-White leaders in the DTA that ethnicity and consensus have been over-emphasized and that the DTA platform should be changed. Most of the rest of the Non-White DTA leaders feel that the ethnic measures should be viewed as transitional in nature and they foresee an eventual abolition

³²³June Goodwin, "Namibian Elections: World Credibility Gap Widening," Christian Science Monitor, 4 December 1978, p. 6

³²⁴Chege Mbitiru, "Kenyan reporter gives first-hand account on elections," Nairobi Daily Nation, 11 December 1978, p. 6, in JPRS,SA

of the measures.³²⁵ Many of the Non-White leaders also expect that many Whites will eventually leave the country even under a DTA government, as the anticipated evolution into a non-racial state under black majority rule will probably be unacceptable to many of them.³²⁶

4. The Action Front for Retention of Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR)

a. Organization

AKTUR was formed when the Whites-only National Party was excluded from the DTA after the dissolution of the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. In addition to the National Party, its members include deeply conservative Whites from the old United Party, and some Coloured and Basters.

b. Platform

AKTUR proposes basically the same system of government as the DTA. The difference is to be found in emphasis and attitude. AKTUR would give fewer powers to the multi-ethnic central government, more to the second-tier representative authorities for ethnic groups, where it could continue to resist social desegregation if it retained control of the White authority. It is prepared to accept the development of residential suburbs. Similarly it argues that DTA policy would lead to the desegregation of hospitals,

³²⁵Cowley, p. 148, 149

³²⁶Tjamuaha interview

schools and other public institutions. In essence AKTUR seeks to retain aspects of White exclusivity and privilege in a situation of change which it does not fully agree with.³²⁷

c. Popular Support

Based on the results of the recent internal elections, AKTUR has very substantial support among the White population, and surprising minorities in the Coloured and Baster groups. Although it is doubtful that this support will grow, it probably will not decrease any in a U.N. supervised election either. On the other hand, DTA's recent election results will be subject to very considerable erosion to SWAPO and the NNF.

5. Summary

In a fair election it is quite likely that none of the political bodies discussed here would be able to garner a dominant majority position. Although there are possibilities for majority coalitions (SWAPO/NNF, DTA/AKTUR, and to a lesser extent, DTA/NNF), the remaining sizable minorities in each case would be sufficiently at odds with the basic political philosophy of the majority as to create a very unstable situation. This eventuality gains credibility when the virtually non-existent track record of multi-party states in Africa is taken into consideration. Despite this, since the Whites would probably offer the stiffest resistance to political compromise among the

³²⁷Cowley, p. 146

conservative elements, their absence might afford reasonable expectations of tentative accomodation among the Africans.

C. WHITE ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS

In trying to come to grips with the attitudes and perceptions of Namibian Whites towards independence under the different systems proposed by the main political bodies, the separation of reality from propaganda is a problem once again. Some reports speak glowingly of the progress of racial reconciliation in Namibia, while others urgently protest against integration and project dire circumstances ahead. As will be seen, it is felt the latter case is closer to the truth of the general White perceptions. Further, there is a close building-block relationship between propaganda and reality, as White anxiety tends to facilitate the acceptance of propaganda as reality, thereby distorting the perceptual basis against which further and more strident propaganda is received and evaluated.

Before discussing the nature of racial propaganda in Namibia and its apparent effects on White perceptions, the inherited racial attitudes of the Whites need to be addressed briefly.

1. The Afrikaners

The Afrikaner Herrenvolk mentality has been distilled through centuries of rationalizing White racial domination and a long struggle for Afrikaner survival which has assumed mythical and even religious proportions in Afrikaner history. One end result has been the general

Afrikaner view that not only do Africans on the whole suffer flaws in their intelligence and character make-ups which have precluded economic and cultural advances parallel to the Afrikaner, but that they are somehow impure and that left to their own, they are also naturally unclean and somewhat offensive physically and that close contact with them should be minimized. Another result has been the desire to maintain the Afrikaner identity as an ethnic group and as a nation. The Afrikaner is intensely proud of what he perceives himself to be and he doesn't want to lose his identity through submergence in a non-racial state. While the foregoing might seem extreme compared to most of the pronouncements currently emanating from Namibian and South African sources and while the progress of some urban and educated Africans is noted with paternalistic pride, interviews with presumably sophisticated Afrikaners have left the author with the impression that these are true root feelings, frequently hidden by only a thin veneer of tolerant enlightenment.³²⁸ Finally, from his position of dominance and self-assured superiority, the Afrikaner (all Whites for that matter) has long assumed that the African wanted to emulate him and was genuinely honored when he was allowed to associate with the

³²⁸Mbitiru: Venter taped correspondence; Redelinghuys interview; David Steward, Counsellor, South African Mission to U.N., New York, in interview with author, 1 August 1978

Whites and partake of their advanced economic or cultural development in some way.³²⁹ Now that modern African nationalism has given the lie to this last assumption and has revealed the African resentment and hatred which was suppressed for so long, the traits of the Afrikaner character discussed above have, in Namibia, generally precluded both an honest acceptance and a sincere attempt to adapt to the approaching independence and the roles of equality the Non-Whites intend to claim for themselves.

The vast majority of Namibian Afrikaners now support the AKTUR political coalition. Indications of the gut level reaction of most Afrikaners to the tone of the territory's movement towards independence have included the desertion of Afrikaners from the DTA to AKTUR after DTA advocated that all residential areas be opened to all races,³³⁰ attacks on mixed couples (usually German or English-speaking Whites) by gangs of Afrikaner youths in Windhoek,³³¹ AKTUR publication of a picture of the Administrator-General (viewed as too liberal by most Afrikaners) kissing the cheek of an African girl at a debutante ball,³³² and an AKTUR

³²⁹Ottile Abrahams, The Namibian Review, No. 3, March 1977, p. 8,9

³³⁰"Councillor responds to "fence-sitter" accusation," The Windhoek Advertiser, 10 January 1978, p. 1,2, in JPRS,SA

³³¹Eric Marsden, "DTA hopes to dominate assembly," London Times, 28 November 1978, p. 10

³³²Ibid.

election campaign poster depicting a pretty, teen-aged White girl sitting in a field of wild flowers, with the caption, "for her sake."

It is expected that approximately 30,000 South African Afrikaners will return to South Africa after independence, regardless of the power structure of the new government. It is the author's opinion that many more will eventually follow, even if a conservative DTA government is formed, as the changing situation will eventually prove unacceptable to their cultural sensitivities.

2. The Germans

The Germans carry a legacy of colonial brutality which exceeds anything demonstrated by the South Africans in Namibia. The Germans have also heartily supported apartheid. In spite of this, the Germans don't appear to have clouded the issues of White dominance and African subjugation with the same stubborn emotionalism the Afrikaner has. The Germans have viewed the Africans simply as a group of people who could be forced into their service and kept there with no attempt to rationalize this relationship. There has been much less reluctance to work side-by-side with the African on the German ranch, and African or Coloured mistresses apparently don't raise German eyebrows.

Germans throughout the world are noted as pragmatic. In Namibia they have to be. Their roots in Namibia are deeper than the Afrikaners and their homeland is much further removed geographically. The German appears better

suitied than the Afrikaner to accept most of the equalizing changes which will come his way, provided there will still be room for a reasonable degree of free enterprise , private property and freedom from harassment. German schools in Windhoek now accept African students and the first mixed marriage recently took place.³³³

Under a SWAPO government most Germans now feel they would probably be forced to leave the new country. In particular, SWAPO has long made a specific point of excessive German ranch lands and the need for a more equitable distribution. Most German farmers now believe that if SWAPO comes to power they will be dispossessed without compensation and driven out.³³⁴ This won't happen without violent resistance from at least some of the farmers.³³⁵

3. The English-speaking

The attitude of the small English-speaking White population in Namibia towards the ascendancy of African power is similar to that of the Germans. As businessmen they have enjoyed the profitability that apartheid afforded them, but they are willing to continue without it under the same conditions as the Germans. With relatively little

³³³"The End of the Blond Pieds Noirs," Brussels Special 27 September 1978, p. 42,43, JPRS,SA translation

³³⁴ARB, January 1-31, 1976, p. 3909; FBIS,SA, 21 December 1976, p. E6; FBIS,SA, 25 October 1977, p. E7; "Nujoma expulsions," Paris Valeuis Actuelles, 20 November 1978, p. 52, JPRS,SA translation

³³⁵"The End of the Blond Pieds Noirs"

involvement in agriculture, the English-speaking Whites don't suffer from dispossession anxieties the way the other Whites do.

4. Collective Attitudes

Although many Whites may feel willing to accept any situation short of a SWAPO government, there is still considerable foot-dragging in preparations at this point. The administration has been slow to implement decisions of its own and of the constitutional conference for dismantling apartheid. After measures are put into effect, the Whites soon find ways to circumvent them. Both Afrikaner and German farmers see the land won and developed by their forefathers as being snatched from them. There is even some bitterness towards Pretoria for appeasement at their expense.

After the urban bombings in December, side arms on White civilians have apparently become common and urban streets are almost deserted at night. For every SWAPO claim that they are willing to accept and protect the Whites in a SWAPO-organized society, there is also a threat that all Whites must go. The revolutionary violence against the Whites in Zaire and Rhodesia has been a depressing reinforcement of the worst fears of vengeful African guerrillas let loose among White civilians.

The White exodus in both Angola and Mozambique exemplify the likely future. This occurred in Mozambique despite both constant FRELIMO assurances before and after independence

and a marked lack of violence against Whites. Unassuaged anxieties and a refusal to accept the degradation of equalization were the overriding considerations.³³⁶ These factors probably would have even greater impact in Namibia, as SWAPO hasn't been nearly as conciliatory towards the Whites as FRELIMO was and the Whites maintain a position of greater elevation and separation than did the Portuguese.

Events of the past year in Zambia may have been even more unsettling to the Whites. The Zambian government, which bills itself as non-racial and is closer to the NNF model than the DTA, has been unable or even unwilling to control crime and violence against Whites in the copper belt, on the farms, and in Lusaka.³³⁷ The facts that the level of harassment actually wasn't great and that Africans have suffered also probably received little notice in Namibia. The White Namibians, conservative and frightened as a whole, are easily influenced by adverse propoganda.

³³⁶Allen Isaacman, "Mozambique Since Independence," Africa Report, July-August 1978, p. 4

³³⁷John Burrell, "As in Zaire, White exodus hurts Zambia's copper belt," Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 1978, p. 9; "Reflections of increased crime: White exodus feared," Johannesburg The Star, 17 July 1978, p. 17, in JPRS,SA; Lawrence Pintak, "Angry White Farmers threaten to burn crops if Zambia does not halt guerrilla attacks," London Times, 13 November 1978, p. 7; "White farmers can pack and go Dr. Kaunda Says," London Times, 28 November 1978, p. 10

D. ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND PRIMORDIAL CONFLICT

There has been a great deal of comment on the ethnic diversity of the Namibian population and its impact on the pending independence. The subject has generally been addressed within two contexts. The first is that of the legitimacy of SWAPO's claim of representation of the interests of the Namibian popular majority and the dissenting claims of various competing ethnic and political groups. This has already been discussed to some extent and will only be decided by a fair election. The second context is with respect to the prospects for post-independence stability, regardless of the ultimate governmental structure. The scope and passion of these claims and projections tend to vary with the political interests of the different advocates and are frequently contradictory. In this subsection one aspect of this subject will be discussed--the prospects for primordial³³⁸ violence among Non-Whites in Namibia.

In order to focus exclusively on the Non-White inter-ethnic attitudes and to project their possible intensities if given free reign, consideration of any mitigating influence of White control or counteraction has been minimized

³³⁸Theoretical background for this discussion was drawn from Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Old Societies and New States, ed. by Clifford Geertz, (London, U.K.: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1963), and Irving L. Markovitz, Power and Class in Africa, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 110-119

or omitted. This should not be taken as an implied forecast that Whites won't have any role in an independent Namibia.

1. The History of Ethnic Conflict

South Africa has generally characterized Namibia's history as one of chaos and genocide which resulted from ethnic differences which placed the different groups "poles apart in traditions, customs, and culture."³³⁹ The argument continued that despite the passage of considerable time, the forced integration of these disparate ethnic groups into a single unit and the withdrawal of South African authority would mean a return to the bloody disorder of their history, as supported by the course of events in many other African countries.³⁴⁰

In relating the current situation to African history in Namibia, the groups which were antagonistic towards each other in the 19th century (Herero and Nama) appear to have resolved their differences long ago.³⁴¹ The group which now allegedly seeks to dominate all the others, the Ovambo, was historically uninvolved in ethnic warfare and had very little contact of any kind with the other groups. The Damara, who were enslaved by both the Herero and the Nama, have indicated through heavy support for the NNF that they don't harbor significant ethnic anxieties. Hence, historical ethnic animosities appear to have little bearing on present

³³⁹Rhoodie, p. 5

³⁴⁰Ibid., p. 42, 277

²⁴¹First, p. 31, 32

Namibian attitudes. The only factor which has historical roots seems to be the Herero sense of its history of martyred struggle against colonization. The feeling among conservative Herero is that: 1) except for the Nama, no other group lifted a finger against the Germans and that until recently, no other group had resisted the South African administration to the extent they had; and 2) If the Herero hadn't been decimated in the German War, their population would be much greater than it is now and they would be accorded a greater role in Namibia's future. Therefore, they feel they deserve extra consideration and are reluctant to subordinate themselves to another group.³⁴²

2. The South African Administration and Ethnic Attitudes

Since the suppression of the 1904-1907 rebellions, there has been an absence, until recently, of anything which could be construed as violence among the Namibian Non-White ethnic groups. The South Africans are partially correct in their assertions that this has been due to their administration and control of the Africans as this has included the generally drastic reduction in the stocks of cattle owned by Non-Whites, the inability of most Non-Whites to own land, the segregation first into reserves and later into homelands, and the restrictions on mobility imposed by the pass laws. Thus, not only were the traditional issues of ethnic conflict tremendously suppressed, but the

³⁴²Tjamuaha interview

possibilitities for contact and antagonism in any form among the various ethnic groups were drastically reduced. At the same time however, the prevalent ethnic isolation and laudatory administration propoganda associated with the homelands and separate development policies greatly reinforced the ethnic identifications of the various groups. Despite this, through lack of issues and contacts, ethnic antagonism among the groups withered. It eventually paled in comparison to an increasingly intense fear and resentment of the Whites. The key question will be how well the artificially intensified ethnic identities can cope with a general lack of experience in group interaction when all external restraints are removed.

The contract-labor system and the associated residential compounds found at all sites of extensive employment have tended to both heighten and diminish ethnic sentiments. On the one hand, the sense of displacement and alientation experienced by the individual laborers and the ethnic grouping in the housing developments has led to a reaching out and affiliation with others of similar backgrounds and a conscious accentuation of their ethnic identity to a greater extent than existed within their homeland. Alternatively, it is these same enclaves and the transient nature of most of their populations which have facilitated the spread and intensification of SWAPO nationalism which has increasingly transcended ethnic political differences,

especially among the younger and urban populations. Not only have these concentrated bodies of uprooted males provided fertile ground for nationalistic prosyletizing, but the departing laborers have carried the message home to areas legally inaccessible to most of the agitators.

It was in one of these urbanized black enclaves that incidents of spontaneous, politically-related, ethnic violence occurred from February through April 1978 and resulted in approximately 50 deaths and hundreds of injuries in Windhoek.³⁴³ While the motives behind this violence were essentially nationalistic (SWAPO vs. DTA), the fact that the participants were divided along ethnic lines (Ovambo vs. Herero) has probably strengthened ethnic animosity and anxiety (at least for the Herero) between the two groups.

Fanon has commented on the source of this aspect of primordial violence in connection with the intensification of nationalism. He attributed it to the African's constant state of tension and his actual or conditioned inability to relieve this tension through removal of the source--the White colonizer. Thus, violence along ethnic lines becomes a surrogate for violence against the real oppressor.³⁴⁴ If

³⁴³"SWAPO--DTA clash," Johannesburg The Star, 1 March 1978, p. 3, in JPRS,SA; FBIS,SA, 8 March 1978, p. E4; "Bloody battle rages as tribes clash at funeral," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 9 April 1978, p. 1

³⁴⁴Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York, N.Y.: Grove Press, Inc., 1961), p. 54

this is so, the question of just how divisive these tendencies are and how residual the effects of this induced primordialism will be once the real source of aggravation is removed become more significant and harder to answer.

3. Primordialism within the Nationalistic Movement

As the pre-eminent nationalist movement, SWAPO claims to have transcended primordial discord. To a certain degree however, its history argues against this. In its original forms, first as the OPC and then as the OPO, it was exclusively an Ovambo-oriented organization. Many of its leaders were also members of the National Executive Committee of the South West African National Union (SWANU), which they expected to become the united national party.³⁴⁵ The name change from Ovambo People's Organization to South West African People's Organization in 1960 was politically cosmetic and stemmed from influence and legitimacy rivalries among the South West African petitioners at the U.N.³⁴⁶

Recognizing the importance of the legitimacy that a broad-based nationalism would confer, the leaders of various nationalistic organizations have made numerous attempts at political union (SWANLIF, NUDO, SWANUF, NNC, personal

³⁴⁵Gibson, p. 132

³⁴⁶A 17 November 1959 letter from Mburumba Kerina at the U.N. to Herman ja Toivo in South West Africa contained the following instructions, "You see what I want to say is that do not follow the OPO when it is changed into (SWAPO) to be dominated by other groups. Be very careful about this very much.", as reported by Louw, p. 18

agreements among leaders) which have either fallen short of their objectives or failed completely due to leadership rivalries and ethnic disaffection.³⁴⁷

With respect to SWAPO External, dissenting members of its leadership have usually cited "tribalism" as one of the reasons for their disenchantment.³⁴⁸ SWAPO External's touted ethnic diversity at the leadership level has also frequently been discounted as a cosmetic ploy to lend legitimacy to its claims of majority representation.

SWAPO Internal appears to have been much more successful in projecting a non-ethnic image. It has drawn support from various Non-White political organizations of differing ethnic affiliations as well as individuals of diverse ethnicity from the urban, intellectual, religious, and youth categories.³⁴⁹

The deaths of apparently thousands of Kwanyama Ovambo at the hands of PLAN and FAPLA in Angola have stemmed more from Kwanyama support for UNITA and refusal to join SWAPO than from tribal animosities on the part of SWAPO, although the Kwanyama probably wouldn't accept this reasoning now. It is unlikely that SWAPO retribution would carry over to Kwanyama in Namibia in the future unless they were to actively resist SWAPO authority.

³⁴⁷Gibson, p.118-141; Duignan & Gann, p. 31

³⁴⁸Gibson, p.133

³⁴⁹Duignan & Gann, p. 27; United Nations Department of Political Affairs, p. 20-21; Andries Botha, SWAPO: Dialogue or Conflict? (Sandton, S.A.: Southern Freedom Foundation, 1977), p. 23

4. Ethnicity in General

Outside SWAPO there is genuine apprehension among some non-Ovambo groups that they will be dominated by the Ovambos in a unitary Namibia. South Africa and the DTA have played successfully on these fears. In 1975 there was considerable promotion by many African leaders in Namibia of an Ovambo-originated scheme for a separate Ovambo nation, uniting the Angolan and Namibian Ovambo.³⁵⁰ The creation of the ethnic battalions has frequently been cited as not only having fanned the flames of ethnicity, but as having given it teeth as well.

Ethnic cultural and social affiliations permeate most facets of life in Namibia, but this is common in many countries, and the nature of these associations don't appear to hold potential for violence of a serious nature.

At this point, despite the Ovambo numbers and the conservative Herero sense of deserved destiny, no Non-White ethnic group is ascendent over another, either economically or politically. Nor has any been in that position for a long time. Should SWAPO attain a pre-eminent position in an independent Namibian government, it would appear that only the Herero might react immediately with serious civil violence. As will be discussed in section VI however, if this should occur, it probably would not escalate into a serious threat to national stability.

³⁵⁰ARB, January 1-31, 1975, p. 3511 and March 1-31, 1975, p. 3573

E. EDUCATIONAL DEFICIENCIES

The educational system for Non-Whites in Namibia has historically been grossly inadequate. As a result, the educational level of the vast majority of those Non-Whites who have received some education is extremely low. Despite the instigation of some educational reform by the South African administration in the past decade, Namibia will still enter into independence with a Non-White majority educationally unprepared to assume the governmental authority and national responsibilities to which it will be legally entitled.

The discussion in this sub-section will focus on the Non-White educational dilemma in Namibia and the impact it is likely to have on Namibia's post-independence stability.

1. The Dilemma

When Allard Lowenstein visited Namibia in 1959, there were no in-country facilities for university level education and it was against government policy to allow Africans to attend "tribal colleges" in South Africa. Only one Non-White had ever been granted permission to accept a scholarship at a university outside South Africa. Only two Africans had ever received undergraduate degrees (Mburumba Kerina and Jariretunda Kozonguizi, both at the U.N. at that

time as the Chairman of SWAPO and President of SWANU, respectively).³⁵¹

In 1959, there were a total of 9,969 Africans in schools in the Police Zone (south of the Caprivi, Kaoko, Ovambo, and Kavango reserves). Of these, only 1,058 were in state schools and the rest were in mission schools. Only 367 students were above the equivalent of fifth grade and there were no Non-Whites studying beyond the eleventh grade. North of the Police Zone, including the populous Ovambo reserve, there were no state schools and no students beyond the fifth grade."³⁵² Hans Beukes, a Baster, summarized the territory's apartheid education at the time as "...intended to isolate Non-Whites from cultural contact and influence from the rest of the world."³⁵³ The 1960 report of the U.N. committee on South West Africa summarized the educational system as being directed towards "...preparing the Natives as a source of cheap labor for the benefit of the Europeans."³⁵⁴

³⁵¹Allard K. Lowenstein, Brutal Mandate, (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Co., 1962), p. 118; Ruth Sloan, The Educated African, ed. Helen Kitchen (New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 297-8; Gibson, p. 122,132

³⁵²Lowenstein, p. 118; Sloan, p. 297

³⁵³Lowenstein, p. 119

³⁵⁴Ibid., p. 120

Despite South African improvements in the territorial education system since then, it was estimated by the U.N. in 1977 that only two percent of the African students reach secondary schools and that in 1973 there were probably only ten African university graduates in all of Namibia.³⁵⁵

It is interesting to note that the U.N. report just mentioned didn't discuss the number of African graduates there might be outside of Namibia. This is important because until recently, virtually the only opportunities for university schooling for Africans were outside South Africa. SWAPO has pointed out that it has been responsible for the education and training (presumed to mean university level) of more Africans in 14 years than South Africa has in over 60 years. This was done through U.N. scholarships and aid from various associations and foundations arranged by SWAPO (SWANU also for a time).³⁵⁶ If this is so, it would seem that SWAPO would certainly have an attraction for the brightest and most ambitious African students, the "cream of the crop." Additionally, to carry this one step further, the U.N.'s low estimate for graduates inside Namibia would seem to indicate that most of these foreign-educated graduates are remaining outside Namibia, most likely in affiliation with SWAPO External.

³⁵⁵United Nations Department of Political Affairs

³⁵⁶Hage G. Geingob, "Namibians Train for Tomorrow," The UNESCO Courier, November 1977, p. 21

2. The Consequences

In light of the crucial role normally played by an educated elite in a nationalistic movement, it is to SWAPO's credit that it has been able to accomplish as much as it has despite the paucity of advanced educational opportunities. Still, despite whatever managerial expertise SWAPO leaders may have acquired through the administration of an extensive and compartmentalized organization and an apparent "corner on the market" of young educated Africans, it is unlikely that they will be adequately prepared in numbers or expertise to assume an exclusive role in directing the affairs of an independent Namibia.

Similarly, it is unknown but questionable as to how well the functions of "tribal" governments, the Turnhalle negotiations, and the heightened political organizing of recent years have prepared the non-SWAPO Africans for roles in national government and administration.

Some White Namibians now recognize their failure in developing the Africans.³⁵⁷ Duignan and Gann present evidence of dependent Namibia being "over-governed" by a vast bureaucracy.³⁵⁸ Disregarding a SWAPO solution, there has been much discussion about a two or three-tiered government following independence. When this is coupled with the requirement to assume many national responsibilities

³⁵⁷"We should have built up African citizens," The Windhoek Advertiser, 3 February 1978, p. 1, in JPRS, SA

³⁵⁸Duignan & Gann, p. 21

now handled by South Africa, it would appear that the post-independence bureaucracy could be quite extensive also. By rights, the Non-White majority should participate heavily in the administration of this bureaucracy and the country. Unfortunately, given the number of positions which should theoretically be open to them, there will most certainly be a paucity of Non-Whites initially qualified to fill them. This incapability to participate in the face of opportunity is likely to produce widespread frustration.

In summary, the historic neglect of Non-White education in Namibia will certainly diminish the prospects for post-independence stability. In a moderate, multi-racial government along the lines projected by the DTA, the Non-Whites will be faced with an inability to compete on an equal footing with the Whites in government administration. A crucial aspect of this problem is the unknown degree or intensity of Non-White expectations. If they fully recognize their deficiencies and are willing to participate in an appropriate preparation and transition process under White tutelage (again, assuming a "moderate" form of government), the situation might eventually be rectified in a stable manner. If, however, the Non-Whites refuse to acknowledge their shortcomings and, out of impatience and mistrust of White promises, insist on assuming their rightful positions, the result could be widespread frustration, resentment, and instability. Should SWAPO accede to power and form a government along the lines of its current projections,

there would most likely be a mass exodus of Whites. SWAPO would be vastly unprepared to cope in a stable manner with the ensuing economic chaos and possible resistance from some of its current political opposition. If not in effect or happening already, this situation would require the imposition of repressive measures of control and would invite an influx of Eastern economic, administrative, technical, and military aid and advisors, as has happened in Angola.

F. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Due to the preclusive length of a detailed study and the absence of current pertinent information, Namibia's economy is addressed only in very general terms.³⁵⁹ It is felt this is sufficient for discussing the economic factors which might contribute to significant post-independence conflict. Following a description of the current economy, the alternatives and problems which might be encountered under the two likely independent economic systems will be discussed. While these projections either don't cover or have over-simplified some aspects of the total situation,

³⁵⁹Although constrained by a lack of current specific statistics, relatively detailed studies on Namibia's economy can be found in The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, by Roger Murray, Jo Morris, John Dugard, and Neville Smith, Africa Publications Trust, Uppsala, Sweden, 1974, and Zimbabwe Namibia, Dr. Samuel C. Adams, Jr., Project Director, Sponsored by the African-American Scholars Council under contract with the Agency for International Development, 15 March 1977. These works provided the basis for the economic discussion contained herein.

it is felt that the basic issues with respect to the potential for violent conflict have been addressed.

1. The Current Economy

Namibia's economy has three significant features: it is oriented primarily towards narrowly-based export industries; it is dominated by foreign capital and enterprises; and it is labor intensive, with a heavy need for manual labor.

The economy is divided into two sectors. The wealthy, White-owned sector is a modern, commercial economy based on intensive exploitation of natural resources, particularly mineral and human resources. In physical terms this constitutes two-thirds of the territory and contains most of the known mineral reserves, land suitable for animal husbandry, ports and railways. The subsistence sector includes most of the African population and is based on small stock (sheep and goats) with some cattle-raising and maize-growing in the north. The African areas are generally characterized by a lack of natural resources, insufficient water and usable land, and an inadequate infrastructure. The subsistence sector provides the cheap labor on which the money economy is based.

2. Areas of Endeavor

Namibia's economy is based primarily on three areas of productive activity: mining; agriculture; and fishing.

a. Mining

Mining is the largest sector of the economy, comprising 60% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 60% of exports. Namibia is among the larger producers of minerals in the world. The sector is dominated by diamond, copper and lead production. Uranium production began a few years ago and may eventually be the most important mineral product, with current mines having sufficient reserves to supply one-ninth of the world's projected requirements for 1985.³⁶⁰

b. Agriculture

The agricultural sector includes cattle and beef products largely for export, and the export of Karakul sheep pelts. Both industries have suffered setbacks in recent years. Rising production costs and reduction of South African quotas have affected the cattle industry, while decreased European demand has hurt the sheep sector.³⁶¹

c. Fishing

In the past, the sardine fishing industry out of Walvis Bay, together with the agricultural industries, has provided 20% of GDP. It also has suffered in recent years due to overfishing by local and foreign concerns.³⁶²

³⁶⁰ Adams, p. 197, 208

³⁶¹ "Cattle raisers said to be financially in trouble," Windhoek Die Suidwester, 20 January 1978, p.1, JPRS,SA translation

³⁶² "Decline of fishing industry since 1970 described," The Windhoek Advertiser, 31 January 1978, p. 3, in JPRS,SA, Adams, p. 213

d. Other

Except for food, drink, and tobacco, manufacturing and other secondary industries are relatively underdeveloped due to the sparse and generally poor population, huge distances between towns, and shortages of key raw materials. This type of activity contributes less than ten percent to GDP. The subsistence sector contributes about three percent of GDP.³⁶³

3. South African Linkages

Namibia's institutional arrangements, its civil service, its exports and imports, and all taxes and duties are controlled by South Africa. Money from these revenues has been used to finance infrastructure improvements, commercial subsidization, and South Africa's territorial administration, all largely to the benefit of the Whites. Namibia will be at a distinct disadvantage after independence compared to most ex-colonies in that these systems will completely disappear and there may be few remaining carriers of institutional memory.

South Africa will also have legal jurisdiction over Walvis Bay, Namibia's primary port and the center of the South African-owned fishing industry. This will also minimize customs revenue to an independent Namibia.

The commercial economy has been developed as an integral part of the South African economy, with South

³⁶³Adams, p. 185

Africa purchasing around 50% of Namibia's exports and providing about 80% of imports.³⁶⁴ South African-owned companies control the majority of Namibia's lucrative mineral production. The transportation system is focused on South Africa, accentuating these links.

4. Foreign Participation

Overseas corporations, primarily from the U.S. and western Europe, control most of the mineral production outside the South African interests and operate with very large profit margins. One-third of the GDP went to foreigners in 1973 and it was estimated then that this would have increased to one-half by 1975.³⁶⁵

5. The Africans

One estimate of African economic participation in Namibia in the early 1970's is shown below.

Table II

NAMIBIA LABOR FORCE

Subsistence Agriculture	87,000	42.2%
Modern Agriculture (on White farms)	36,000	17.4%
Civil or Domestic Service	33,000	16.0%
Commerce and Finance	25,000	12.1%
Mining	18,000	8.7%
Fishing	<u>7,500</u>	<u>3.6%</u>
TOTAL	206,500	100.0%

From Adams, Zimbabwe Namibia, Anticipation of Economic and Humanitarian Needs, p. 181

³⁶⁴Ibid., p. 318, 319

³⁶⁵Ibid., p. 310

As noted previously, the subsistence sector is located in the homelands. The other sectors are located in the White areas and 43,000 of the Africans participating in them were on contract from the north. The contract workers, primarily Ovambo, work under the worst conditions and have become the most militant. Local, non-contract workers include the Herero, Nama, and Damara. While all groups oppose South African rule, the differences between contract and non-contract employment account for some of the differences in levels of political activity among African workers.

The African professional class consists largely of teachers, nurses, and clergymen, with most located in the homelands. There is virtually no other employment in the homelands, with an estimated 70% unemployment level in Ovamboland.³⁶⁶

Wages in Namibia have been remarkable for two reasons. White wages are exceptionally high, with many South Africans regarding Namibia as a place to "get rich quick", while African wages are lower than those in South Africa, with most earning less than the subsistence level. These inequalities are reflected in the per capita GDP, which in 1972 was estimated to be \$5,525 for Whites and \$325 for Africans.³⁶⁷ Whites dependent on farming have an average 65 times as much

³⁶⁶Ibid., p. 182

³⁶⁷Ibid., p. 86

useful land per person as the African. When the White average is compared to the situation in crowded Ovamboland, the ratio becomes 170:1.³⁶⁸

6. The Prospects

In order to avoid strife, the primary economic goals of any independent Namibian government will have to be the integration of Africans into all sectors and levels of the economy and a more equitable distribution of wealth and resources throughout the population, to include subsidization of the low-profit, labor-intensive agricultural sector by the high-profit, low-labor mining sector. Obstacles to the accomplishment of these goals will be the lack of African education and training, the economic necessity of perpetuating labor-intensive industries, the lack of African infrastructure, White land ownership, and foreign control of many productive resources. Based on the platforms of the primary political contenders, the economy of independent Namibia will be either highly socialistic or an essential continuation of the present free-enterprise system.

Under a free-enterprise system, and given the probably assurance of South African military protection, most Whites would probably remain in Namibia, at least initially. The territorial administration would gradually transfer its activities to the new administration and civil

³⁶⁸Ibid., p. 188

service, and economic relations with South Africa and foreign corporations would probably remain much as they are now, although with more stringent regulation of foreign profitability. With the White concern for maintenance of standards, the economic equalization plan would likely be one of eventually raising the Africans to the White levels. Although some qualified Africans would find immediate, equal placement in the government and civil service, the process would be extremely costly and slow overall. Redistribution of land would probably also be limited. While multiple-farm ownership might be officially eliminated, the mechanisms for accomplishing this would probably preclude all but the most affluent Africans from obtaining any land. While the patience of the Africans under a government with this type of economic program (essentially DTA) can't be gauged in advance, it is likely that frustrations due to the apparent lack of change under the same dominant group of Whites would eventually surface, first among the sizable opposition, but then among government supporters as well. The unchanged situation would probably be touted as final proof of negative White attitudes and of the need to drive them out and start over again.

Under a socialist system administered by an elected SWAPO government, there would probably be extensive nationalization of private property and most Whites would probably leave. Although new profit arrangements would certainly be negotiated, the operations of the foreign corporations, and perhaps even the large South African concerns, might

not be jeopardized. Despite the resentment focused on these corporations by SWAPO and its international advocates, the resulting economic dislocation could be horrendous as exemplified by the cases of Angola and Mozambique. Still, although there are several parallels, particularly in Angola,³⁶⁹ it is questionable whether the SWAPO leadership will heed either the obvious lessons or the experienced advice of the leaders of those countries. It could be that the nationalistic passion within SWAPO would be such that accepted concepts of economic pragmatism would be swept aside in the desire to root out anything representative of South Africa or, to a lesser extent, indicative of potential neo-colonialism. There may even be some radical elements within SWAPO which view a period of economic hardship and struggle as essential for unification and "purification" of the new state.

³⁶⁹One significant similarity is the existence of large diamond mining concerns. In Angola, the DIAMANG corporation underwent a form of nationalization. Subsequent white flight and increased diamond smuggling contributed to an 80% decline in production. The South African diamond concerns in Namibia could face a similar fate. With a much larger role in the Namibian economy, similar drops in production would have a proportionately greater effect. Additional similarities are the foreign-owned oil operation in Angola and the foreign-owned mining operations in Namibia. Angola's hands-off policy has permitted Gulf Oil to continue profitable operations and its state revenues have become one of the primary props of the economy. Similar agreements with the mining concerns in Namibia could yield similar benefits. The communists have probably promised significant management and technical assistance to SWAPO for the operation of these large concerns should they be nationalized. It is reasonable to assume that similar assistance has been attempted in Angola, but the results have been sufficiently poor for President Neto to have begun putting out economic feelers to the West. Finally, both Angola and Mozambique have resumed extensive trade with their former colonizer and have urged expatriate Portuguese to return and assist in building the new countries.

There are several factors besides the Angola and Mozambique examples which could militate against such a course of action, however. The state revenues from these corporations would be needed to subsidize the agrarian reform which is more central to African aspirations. Another reason for stopping short of a total ejection of South African corporations would be the need to reach accommodation on Walvis Bay. While it might be possible to isolate this enclave to the point that it would wither into commercial uselessness to South Africa, the process would seriously disrupt the tremendous export sector of the economy (assuming foreign concerns were still operating) and would severely limit the influx of foreign aid which would be needed. Finally, as reported by SWAPO dissidents, the SWAPO leadership has been guilty of financial chicanery in the past at the expense of the organization.³⁷⁰ Although not deemed likely, the possibility that side agreements might be made which would permit the large corporations to continue operations must be considered.

While the White exodus would drastically reduce the country's internal commercial activity, the expected influx of foreign aid and technical and administrative assistance might be sufficient for the purposes of a spartan new regime. With respect to national stability, the most important aspect of a strict socialist economy

³⁷⁰ Abrahams, p. 2


would be the immediate levelling effect for the population. Not only would most of the Whites be gone, but the irritants of the economic disparities and the lack of opportunity which they represented would also be gone. African income levels and living standards which had been unacceptable within the context of the inflated and White-controlled free-enteprise system might now be more acceptable with everybody in the same situation and facing the same struggle.

G. WALVIS BAY

The issue of sovereignty over Walvis Bay is sufficiently complex that the U.N. Security Council didn't include its resolution as a pre-condition in its Namibian independence plan for fear of snarling negotiations indefinitely. The current understanding is that it will be a matter between South Africa and an independent Namibia. The crux of the problem is that the port and 1,124 sq. km. surrounding it legally belong to South Africa, while economic necessity and geographic logic argue in favor of Namibian sovereignty. Administration of Walvis Bay was recently returned to the Cape Province after having been administered as part of South West Africa for convenience since 1922.³⁷¹

All political leaders in Namibia, even those accused of favoring and relying on South Africa, feel that Walvis

³⁷¹"Political involvement in Walvis Bay denied," The Windhoek Advertiser, 14 December 1977, p. 1, in JPRS, SA



Map 7 - Walvis Bay

Adapted from South Africa Tourist Map, South Africa Department of Information

Bay should be incorporated into an independent Namibia.

Most Walvis Bay citizens consider themselves as Namibians.³⁷²

South Africa recognizes that it will have to give up Walvis Bay eventually. At this point, with South Africa feeling like it has conceded more than its share on the Namibian issue with no thanks or apparent change in attitude from the international community, the retention of Walvis Bay has become an Afrikaner point of honor.³⁷³

South Africa also intends to retain Walvis Bay to see whether Namibia gets a moderate, cooperative government or one that is radical and hostile. Not only would South African retention prevent Walvis Bay from becoming a military base for a hostile power, but to a certain extent, the Army, Navy and Air facilities already there would permit South Africa to hold a radical Namibia hostage in order to minimize revolutionary hostilities on its western boundaries. In SWAPO's point of view, it fears that a sizable South African military presence at Walvis Bay would exercise a powerful influence over Namibia's freedom of action.

While Walvis Bay could probably be sustained expensively but indefinitely as a military complex, it couldn't survive

³⁷²ARB, July 1-31, 1978, p. 4937

³⁷³Stewart interview

for long as a commercial community against the will of an independent Namibia. Once Namibian territorial waters are extended out to 200 miles, Walvis Bay would be left with a narrow corridor 40 km. wide and the fishing industry would have to shut down. As a port, it couldn't survive without a flow of goods to and from the interior. Water and power could also be easily denied.³⁷⁴

A situation permitting them to retain military installations might be acceptable to South Africa. This would provide sovereignty and use of the port to Namibia, but the South African presence might be unacceptable to SWAPO. Namibian businessmen have proposed that Walvis Bay be turned into a free port with South Africa retaining its military bases. Although there would be a loss of customs revenues, this might be offset by the attractions of tourists and investors.³⁷⁵

Despite the complexity of the issue, it isn't likely to lead to armed conflict. If a moderate government is formed, an accommodation will probably be arrived at in an amicable fashion. If a SWAPO government is elected, the resolution of the problem will be much more difficult, but still would probably not include the use of force. South Africa could not be ejected militarily by SWAPO

³⁷⁴ARB, July 1-31, 1978, p. 4937

³⁷⁵Eric Marsden, "South Africa hangs on to Walvis Bay," London Times, 12 May 1978, p. 10

without the active participation of foreign troops. Given the legality of the issue and the primary role the U.N. has played overall, it is unlikely that this type of assistance would be forthcoming. In the event the whole Namibian question is eventually successfully resolved in favor of SWAPO through active Cuban, East German, and Soviet military participation, it is unlikely that Walvis Bay's legal status would deter the conquering forces.

V. MILITANT MOTIVATIONS

The last set of considerations to be discussed before making projections on possible Namibian conflict scenarios are the apparent capabilities, attitudes, and intentions of the various potential participants and some of the associated underlying factors. Some aspects of these considerations have already been discussed in section III. With its likely actions and reactions being probably the most important pieces in the puzzle and yet the least predictable, South Africa will be discussed first and in greater length than the other actors.

A. SOUTH AFRICA

Throughout the history of the conflict, South Africa has reiterated the view that Namibia's future has to be determined by its people and that South African security forces would remain until that could be accomplished in a peaceful manner or for as long as the recognized authorities requested protection. South Africa has encouraged the people in the territory not to be deterred by the spectres of conflict or of failure to achieve international recognition through absence of SWAPO electoral participation.

South Africa is firm in the conviction that it is looking after the slighted interests of a sizable portion of Namibia's population, perhaps even a majority. The righteous sentiment behind this view is reinforced by the South African

perspective that this segment of the Namibian population as represented by the DTA, and somewhat by AKTUR, is obviously more rational and sensible (as evidenced by its westernized approach to independence), and therefore more worthy of a dominant position in the new country.

The impressive figures of the recent South African-supervised elections in Namibia appear to have bolstered South African confidence in DTA's ability to perform well and will be a very important factor in any South African agreement to go ahead with the U.N. election process.

The South Africans also desire the establishment of a government such as advocated by DTA so that it could be exemplified as proof that the one-man, one-vote unitary state advocated by agitators in South Africa is not the only solution to its own problems. While there are substantial differences between the DTA platform and South Africa's own plans for separate development, there are also similarities, at least in spirit.

In estimating the prospects for a suitably stable government in Namibia, South Africa probably also feels the need for significant White participation as a moderating influence. The system currently advocated by the DTA provides for this, providing sufficient White presence is maintained. There is also a feeling in South Africa, built up through Afrikaner blood relations and years of close association and interaction, that if the White "South Westers" aren't South African, they are at least still

strong kith and kin. For both these reasons South Africa can be expected to maintain a posture of military presence or readiness which will be reassuring to Whites in Namibia.

South African attitudes towards the U.N. roles of mediation and supervision of the independence issues and process have been characterized by charges of SWAPO favoritism and the suspected inability of any peace-keeping force to monitor and constrain guerrilla bases and activities. Still, South Africa is desirous of obtaining U.N. recognition for elections in Namibia, for it is feared that lack of legitimacy will provide the pretext for the possibility of eventual direct communist participation.

Given the possibility that a SWAPO government might permit the large South African mining concerns in Namibia to continue operations with a more equitable distribution of profits, it is felt that the economic importance of Namibia to South Africa isn't sufficient to be a serious factor in judging South Africa's determination to dictate the outcome of events in Namibia.

In considering eventualities in which South Africa would feel required to maintain a defensive presence in Namibia or to combat an escalated war which would include an invasion with communist participation, South Africa faces a basic dilemma. It revolves around how much and how long it can sustain an active commitment in Namibia in light of current and anticipated constraints on its resources, economy and force levels, as balanced by its perception of a threat

to its own stability and security that could be held by an antagonistic, communist-backed, African state on its western border.

The possible South African military commitment needs to be considered at two levels, the first being an essential continuation of the current presence and activities with the possibility of an eventual, gradual reduction if and when the Namibian indigenous forces become capable of assuming a greater portion of the security effort. The second level of consideration would be an escalated presence on a more conventional basis should PLAN ever carry the struggle to that level with Cuban, Soviet, or East German participation.

Developments in Rhodesia and South Africa itself enter this equation. On one hand, the deterioration of the situation in Rhodesia and the recent incidents of guerrilla activity in South Africa make a stable western border very desirable. On the other hand, these developments "closer to home" may presage an increased, long-term requirement for security forces within South Africa which could degrade its capability to maintain a viable military presence in Namibia. Related considerations are the unknown degrees to which siege mentality and the perception of a threat of total

war aimed at the annihilation or expulsion of the White minority have developed in South Africa.³⁷⁶

South Africa currently has a large and very credible conventional force of tanks, helicopter transport, and strike aircraft. Despite claims of increasing self-sufficiency in military industrial production, South Africa couldn't afford to wage an extended, intensive conventional war in the face of unlimited Soviet material support for PLAN and other foreign participants. Not only would the Soviets be able to replace PLAN material losses faster than South Africa could replace its losses, but South Africa might soon face the requirement to withdraw in order not to leave the Republic itself dangerously vulnerable due to diminished military capability. Still, South Africa surely recognizes that to be successful in any conventional military confrontation, the combined communist forces would have to mount a campaign of greater size and sophistication than any of their previous African endeavors. Exclusive of other factors, South Africa isn't likely to compromise its principles or slacken its resolve on Namibian independence until such intent and commitment have been demonstrated by SWAPO's military supporters.

³⁷⁶A White Paper on Defense was tabled in the South African Parliament on 29 March 1977. It contained formal statements of the perceived strategies, policies and aims of South Africa's enemies as well as South African national objectives and policies. These statements all evidence acute awareness of immediate threats both from international "Marxists" and regional "Pan-African" forces. See South Africa 1977 (Johannesburg, RSA: South African Department of Information, 1977), p. 942,3

Should its military involvement in Namibia be opposed to a final U.N. decision on Namibian governmental legitimacy, South Africa would face a very real threat of increased or even complete international trade sanctions. The threats of total trade sanctions haven't impressed South Africa in the past, as it felt the Western members of the U.N. Security Council would be affected seriously enough themselves to prevent such a thing happening. There has been recent speculation that this confidence may not be as strong as in the past in some South African circles, however.³⁷⁷

Significant increases in defense expenditures in recent years have contributed to a stagnation of economic growth in South Africa. Prolongation or worsening of this recession will cause the African unemployment situation to deteriorate, resulting in further aggravation of the civil situation within South Africa. Should the war escalate to a more conventional level and should South Africa begin to suffer serious material casualties, some industry would have to be diverted to defense production in light of the current international arms embargo. While import substitution in the event of total sanctions might give the economy a temporary boost for a few years as it did in Rhodesia, this would soon give way to serious economic deterioration and heightened African unrest.

³⁷⁷ "South Africa Yields on U.N. Forces for Namibian," San Francisco Chronicle, 4 December 1978, p. 14

Even without sanctions there would probably be an undetermined point at which economics would eclipse security apprehensions over Namibia. While there certainly wouldn't be a trade-off point between economic and defense considerations in the case of a threat aimed directly at South Africa, the South Africans would not be willing to sacrifice to that extent over Namibia.

The loss of South Africa's nearly exclusive source of petroleum in Iran will exacerbate both economic and military considerations. While industry energy requirements are provided largely by coal, transportation and the military are almost totally dependent on petroleum. New sources will be more expensive and, given South Africa's standing with most of the Third World, may be tenuous at best. While reserves, oil-from-coal processing and severe civilian rationing could ameliorate the situation for a time, a conventional war effort in Namibia against world opinion might soon become unsupportable.

The consideration of South Africa's perception of the threat to its internal stability from a SWAPO-governed Namibia is based on the following:

First, a South African withdrawal from Namibia in the face of adverse political or military developments, or even a hesitancy to oppose such developments, might be construed by African militants at home as an encouraging sign of weakness.

Second, the birth of another militant, majority-rule, African state on its border would be expected to have a psychologically agitating effect on South African Blacks. Similarly, it is likely feared that the anticipated exodus of Whites from Namibia under these circumstances, coupled with a similar exodus from Rhodesia, might create the adverse psychological impression among all races that the Whites were finally on the run.

Third, South Africa also may be psychologically unable to admit that despite whatever it can or will do, SWAPO's struggle against perceived South African authority in Namibia will continue and perhaps escalate. To accept this would place increased strains on the credibility of its plans and pronouncements concerning South Africa's own future.

In estimating the actual threat to South Africa which a hostile Namibia could connote, the primary consideration would be the common border which could facilitate guerrilla infiltration and would require military and police presence. Half the border follows the Orange river and the other half goes through the Kalahari Desert. While the border terrain is conducive to surveillance and defense against a conventional force, small groups of guerrillas could penetrate, although the barren terrain and considerable distances generally involved would require a guerrilla capability for extended self-sufficiency which might be prohibitive. Of greater threat perhaps would be a change in relations

between Botswana and South Africa. Under a Namibian government opposed to South Africa, and assuming it also controlled Walvis Bay, Botswana would have an opportunity for access to an ocean exclusive of South African pressure. Although the construction of adequate transportation links might take quite awhile, this new degree of independence from South Africa would make Botswana more susceptible to African pressure to support South African guerrillas along the extensive common border. Although much of this also is Kalahari Desert, the increased surveillance and security requirements for South Africa would significantly burden the security forces.

The issue of Walvis Bay has already been discussed with respect to its own physical survivability, its utility in holding a SWAPO government hostage, and what it could mean to Botswana. An additional consideration would be the requirement to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining free access to a port which could be used to funnel arms and equipment to South African guerrillas in Namibia and Botswana. The recent expansion of the naval facilities there is an indication of South Africa's current intentions for Walvis Bay.³⁷⁸

Similarly, in spite of the U.N. negotiating process and the possibilities of imminent occupation by the U.N. peace-keeping force and subsequent elections, South Africa has continued to upgrade its military facilities throughout

³⁷⁸ FBIS, SA, 30 October 1978, p. E4

the territory. This would seem to indicate plans for more than a temporary presence.

Although the war effort in Namibia has consisted essentially of small-unit counter-guerrilla warfare, the large operations discussed earlier have indicated a South African capability and willingness to strike hard and sudden over long distances. While this might not be a consideration with respect to the conduct of a conventional war in Namibia, it has bearing on the possibilities for intervention to achieve limited objectives.

Other aspects of some of these South African actions have been their lack of international expectation, their contradiction of the apparent directions of South African diplomacy just prior to each case, a strategy whereby "the best defense is a good offense," a tendency to react to military provocations with tremendously magnified retaliations, and a disregard for adverse international opinion.

In light of these successful sorties and the expanse and terrain in Namibia, it can be conjectured that the South African response to a conventional type of invasion by PLAN with communist support would include significant air-mobile operations behind the advancing enemy lines and thrusts into Angola and Zambia. South Africa doesn't have the resources to repel a significant force over a long period of time simply through the strength of its front-line defense.

B. SWAPO

Despite major military setbacks in the past year and some restrictive operational pressures from its host countries, current PLAN activity levels seem to reflect an increased SWAPO aggressiveness. Outwardly sure of its majority support, SWAPO has adopted the position that if it doesn't win an election, then obviously the election was unfair, in which case it will continue to fight.³⁷⁹ It is convinced that with sufficient communist backing it can eventually wear down South Africa. Although SWAPO has long maintained that it doesn't need active participation from external actors to carry out its liberation of Namibia, it is felt that attitude has surely changed as the struggle has dragged on with nothing tangible to show for it. As noted earlier, any popular uprising on SWAPO's behalf would probably have limited effectiveness and could be contained for a long time by police and the military. Finally, SWAPO's changing positions on the military aspects of the U.N. ceasefire and peace-keeping plans and its continued military activities have been viewed by many as deliberate attempts to abort the election process in favor of an eventual military solution, perhaps out of private fears that its base of support may have eroded enough to cause electoral doubts.

C. THE UNITED NATIONS

While the presence of a U.N. peace-keeping force would probably provide a moral deterrent to military participation by most external actors, it would be unlikely to deter SWAPO or South Africa should either feel particularly threatened by the other. In fact, with SWAPO presuming favorable inclination by the U.N. and the members of the peace-keeping force, it might be inclined to attempt to establish itself in key geographical positions within the territory. If this went unchecked by the U.N. force, it could be expected that South Africa would attempt to push SWAPO out of those positions by force of arms and would thereafter be reluctant to relinquish them.

Should the U.N. elections result in a political situation which is inherently unstable and unresolvable, it is doubtful that any of the contending political groups would attempt to seize control through violence while the U.N. peace-keeping force and transitional administration were present unless this presence began to drag on indefinitely. By the same token, it is unlikely that the U.N. would withdraw its presence from Namibia should the elections result in an obviously volatile situation, although it isn't clear what further ameliorating actions it might be able to take.

It is also unlikely that the U.N. would legitimize election results in disagreement with the neighboring Black African states.³⁸⁰

³⁸⁰Henry Miller, Advisor, U.S. Mission to the U.N., interview with the author, New York, N.Y., 2 August 1978

Finally, although the official U.N. position remains unchanged, in some circles there has apparently been a softening of the opinion that SWAPO is the sole representative of the Namibian people.³⁸¹

D. THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY

In discussing the potential for active Soviet, Cuban, or East German military support or participation with PLAN in an escalated conflict within Namibia, they will be referred to collectively as the communists since their interests and attitudes are generally in concert and probably won't seriously contradict those of the Soviet Union.

Soviet objectives in Africa which could pertain to Namibia might include: the spread of its political and economic influence in a manner concomitant with its role as a world power; the diminution of Western influence and control, including the denial of important raw materials; and the promulgation of Soviet political-security interests, especially as they involve the Soviet Navy.³⁸² The promotion of instability within Southern Africa is conducive to the accomplishment of these objectives.

The Cuban criteria for involvement in combat in Africa appear to emphasize those situations which have: a high

³⁸¹FBIS,SA, 10 January 1979, p. E6

³⁸²Colin Legum, "The African Environment," Problems of Communism, January-February 1978, p. 1,2

Soviet priority; a favorable military situation; and a generally recognized legitimacy.³⁸³

The last criterion listed above is most central at this point in time. With the degree of U.N. involvement in the whole Namibian question, it is highly unlikely that the communists would engage in overt participation with PLAN until such time as the U.N. negotiation efforts collapse completely or unless the results of this process prove inconclusive or are rejected by the U.N., the OAU, and the neighboring frontline states. By the same token, should the situation reach an impasse and with the OAU, the frontline states and SWAPO clamoring for the military ejection of South Africa, the communists might be favorably disposed to enter the fray.

At this point, military criteria would become operative. The indications so far are that the communists would be unlikely or unable to embark on a major undertaking in Namibia until the guerrilla opposition within Angola was reduced to insignificance. Although perhaps not one of the most important factors in the equation, the PLAN capacity, both numerically and qualitatively, to function in anything more than a token role of legitimization in a conventional war is questionable and might cause some

³⁸³Dr. Edward Gonzales, Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, in a talk at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 16 November 1978

communist hesitancy. Finally, and most importantly, for the first time in Africa the communists would be facing a strong, well-trained, well-organized, and modern foe. While there is no doubt that the communists could eventually defeat even the most determined South African resistance, the effort required would be much larger than anything undertaken so far in Africa and PLAN's role would pale to insignificance. The communists are unlikely to become actively involved as participants if the prospects for a relatively quick, decisive victory aren't favorable. A decision to participate on these requisite levels would depend not just on the situation in Namibia, but also on a positive assessment of the other regional and international pressures on South Africa at that time. Even after initial African encouragement, a military display of this magnitude might have serious long-range repercussions both in Africa and internationally, although this probably wouldn't be an issue of concern to the Soviets at the outset.

E. ZAMBIA

Based on Zambia's record to date, it isn't expected that Zambia would play much of a role in any expanded Namibian war effort. While having allowed liberation movements to use Zambia as sanctuary and despite the vehemence of its anti-South African and anti-Rhodesian pronouncements, Zambia's actions have ultimately demonstrated pragmatic restraint and incapacity even in the face of

serious reprisal incursions. In the case of Namibia, the short stretch of Zambia's common border in an area which probably wouldn't be considered as vital to Namibia's conquest also mitigates against any Zambian involvement. As evidenced by the pressures it has applied on SWAPO in the past and its need for regional stability before it can begin to strengthen its fragile economy, Zambia wouldn't feel compelled to reject a conservative government in Namibia provided the U.N. vouched for the honesty of the elections.

F. ANGOLA

Angola has hosted and supported the bulk of SWAPO's struggle since early 1976. There have also been recent reports of willingness to provide troop detachments to assist in Namibia's liberation.³⁸⁴ Despite this, any active participation in some sort of future combined assault on South African forces in Namibia would probably be reluctant and at most a token quid pro quo for PLAN participation against UNITA. Given the history of negotiation pressures and operational constraints it has placed on SWAPO, Angola, like Zambia, has no desire to become involved militarily with South Africa. Given the cloak of U.N. legitimacy, Angola would accept the presence of a conservative non-SWAPO government in Namibia.

³⁸⁴ FBI, SA, 6 December 1978, p. 3

As in Zambia, the prime concern of the Angolan leaders is the perpetuation of their regime. Towards this end they must get the economy moving. Western economic assistance at this point is largely contingent on a reduction of Cuban military presence, but the continuing strife within the country and along its southern border preclude this. Recent international political and diplomatic events have left South Africa as almost the sole external support for the remaining Angolan guerrilla movements, primarily UNITA. South Africa will continue to promote this instability as long as it is of diversionary value to its security effort in Namibia, which will be as long as SWAPO continues to press the struggle from Angola. Again, Angola would be willing to accept a conservative Namibian government and withdraw its support for SWAPO, provided the U.N. conferred electoral legitimacy.

While Angola might be subject to Soviet pressure to continue support for SWAPO regardless of the U.N. position, there would also be some resistance to this pressure in that more progress in neutralizing guerrilla activities has been made through Angola's own regional and international diplomacy than through the Soviet military consortium. Additionally, the communists have thus far been unable to spark the Angolan economy, which has also accounted for the recent trend toward broader MPLA horizons.

G. THE WESTERN NATIONS

Aside from roles similar to their present ones as negotiators or as logisticians for a U.N. peace-keeping force, it is unlikely that any of the Western nations would become militarily involved in any escalation of the Namibian conflict. With respect to South Africa, the threat of economic sanctions through the U.N. Security Council would be the only weapon they would brandish. These would be a factor only in a case where South Africa refused to permit U.N. supervision of elections and independence transition even after SWAPO agreed to and did in fact abide by all South African stipulations or South Africa flagrantly refused to accept the outcome of U.N. supervised elections and attempted to impose its own solution on Namibia. Even in these cases there might be reluctance to impose economic sanctions. Not only would the economic interests and the conservative elements in some of the Western nations come into play, but the removal of sanctions even after the Namibian question was settled would probably be opposed by most of world opinion as long as South Africa's own internal situation was still a matter of international concern. Finally, if communist participation in support of PLAN became much more visible, the Western nations would be reluctant to pave the way for them in such blatant fashion.

VI. SCENARIOS OF VIOLENCE

Based on the discussion of the previous sections and as a conclusion to this paper, several conceivable Namibian political scenarios will be analyzed with respect to their potentials for incurring or inviting external military intervention. At this point in time the internal support for each of the contending political parties is too speculative to permit prediction of one scenario over another.

A. SCENARIO 1

Should South Africa and the current DTA-dominated Constitutional Assembly together decide to forego U.N. supervised elections, the resulting government would probably be recognized only by South Africa. With no apparent future in negotiations, SWAPO would continue guerrilla war in the north. SWAPO's internal organization would quickly become more militant. Nationwide strikes and school boycotts would soon occur. Civil disobedience would take place on an increasing scale and there would probably be an escalation in the exodus of young Africans. Due to limited weapons availability, internal guerrilla warfare probably would be restricted to isolated cases however. Communist participation in PLAN operations would gradually increase and the South African military presence would increase commensurately, with more frequent cross-border strikes. If and when UNITA

was neutralized within Angola (although perhaps not a prerequisite) and if other regional and international factors were favorable, a communist-supported PLAN invasion might be attempted.

The foregoing scenario would be unlikely to play all the way through however. Despite probable ups and downs in the future negotiating process, it is felt that South Africa will ultimately agree to some form of U.N. supervision of Namibia's transition to legitimate independence. Accepting the single-minded determination of the Afrikaner political body, the long term spectres of either a doubtful pyrrhic victory or a psychologically damaging withdrawal and the possibilities of increased sanctions in some form, all accompanied by further estrangement from the rest of southern Africa and the world in general would certainly seem to overshadow any security benefits to be derived from preventing a SWAPO government in Namibia. At this point, there is no assurance that a relatively moderate government might not be elected in Namibia. It also isn't certain that a SWAPO government would significantly increase the overall threat to South African security. Although there would be significant differences between the two situations, the fact that South Africa and Mozambique have thus far peacefully co-existed and interacted might provide some hope for a similar relationship with Namibia under a SWAPO government. This would certainly be more likely if SWAPO were to assume

power through elections than if it forcibly seized power after extended and escalated warfare.

B. SCENARIO 2

A scenario in which South Africa was adamantly opposed to U.N. election results in favor of SWAPO wouldn't be likely to produce armed conflict. South African opposition could arise over perceived partiality in the electoral process or simply out of antagonism towards SWAPO. In either case, having acquiesced to the U.N. elections and with the U.N. peace-keeping force in place, South Africa wouldn't challenge the organization militarily at that point. All of the possible deterrents discussed in scenario 1 above would apply here as well, but with even greater surety.

C. SCENARIO 3

A scenario in which SWAPO refused to participate in U.N. elections could have several outcomes.

In the event SWAPO refusal resulted from what were widely perceived as unreasonable stipulations by South Africa, a train of events similar to those discussed in scenario 1 would begin, although at a slower pace as the Western nations would attempt to continue negotiations. For the same reasons cited in scenario 1, it is likely that further compromise would be reached eventually. The fact that the DTA would probably be able to strengthen its support base in the intervening period would give South Africa added confidence to compromise further.

In the event SWAPO's refusal was widely perceived as based on its own intransigence, the scenario might play itself out in one of two ways. In the first case, the guerrilla war would continue as before and the frontline states would continue to pressure SWAPO to modify its position. With a final U.N. decision on legitimacy still pending and with SWAPO cast as the spoiler, it is unlikely that communist participation would escalate to the point of supporting a PLAN thrust into Namibia. If the situation became quite extended, SWAPO might even become more reluctant to participate in elections as DTA support strengthened through popular association with numerous civic improvement projects funded by continuing massive infusions of South African money. With SWAPO perceived more and more as a hard-core revolutionary organization, some of its internal support might also erode in favor of the NNF. The frontline states might eventually become less adamant in their public support for SWAPO. Some moderate African states and some Western states might also soften their views of SWAPO electoral participation as an absolute requirement. This erosion of general support would eventually lead to the effective disintegration of SWAPO as presently constituted. A small, militant faction would continue infrequent terrorist activities from abroad. The rest of the organization and its support would be absorbed into more conventional political roles in Namibia, either collectively as a regular party with a diminished base of support, or individually in

alignment with other parties. The scenario would be similar to that which evolved in Cameroon in the 1960's.

A less likely second case stemming from blatant SWAPO intransigence would be a U.N. decision to conduct elections without SWAPO participation. Once SWAPO realized the firm intent of the U.N. it would surely acquiesce and participate. In both of these cases however, the likelihood of external participation in any escalation of conflict by PLAN would be almost nil.

D. SCENARIO 4

In the event SWAPO found itself in an unexpected minority position following legitimate U.N. elections, it is unlikely that any of SWAPO's African supporters would advocate the continuation of a guerrilla struggle. Host countries would soon close down SWAPO bases as a precondition to establishing relations with the new state. While communist countries might attempt to continue covert assistance to SWAPO for a struggle within Namibia, the new government would probably call upon either South African or U.N. assistance if the guerrillas ever posed a serious threat.

E. SCENARIO 5

Another possible scenario involves the election of SWAPO into a dominant position in Namibia, the formation of a very socialistic government, and the acceptance of this situation by South Africa. Violence from this situation might develop in several ways.

Should White resistance to SWAPO nationalization efforts become violent, either individually or through the old commando network, or should there be blatant and threatening harassment of the Whites in general, and should the U.N. peace-keeping forces be unable to control it, South Africa probably wouldn't hesitate to take whatever actions it felt might be required to ensure the safety of the Whites. This would probably take the form of a Kolwezi-type security and rescue operation of limited objectives and duration, but on a much larger scale. With SWAPO legitimacy against it, South Africa certainly wouldn't attempt to impose any governmental forms on Namibia. With communist military advisors probably already present in Namibia and main force units readily available just across the Angolan border, South Africa would make its military objectives very clear, would exercise restraint in confrontations with PLAN forces, and would withdraw once the safety of the Whites was insured, essentially through evacuation of those who wanted to leave.

If these incidents concerning Whites should take place after the departure of the U.N. peace-keeping force, the European communist advisors might exercise somewhat of a restraining influence on SWAPO and would probably facilitate the rapid emigration of all those Whites who wanted to leave. South African intervention on behalf of the Whites would only be attempted should violence become widespread and without provocation. SWAPO, its communist advisors, and communist military units would've become well established throughout

the country by this time. South African military options would be very limited, especially from the standpoint of avoiding a rapid, entangling escalation. Any intervention attempts would probably be limited to those towns with White suburbs which might facilitate rapid airborne evacuation, probably to Walvis Bay.

It is unlikely that either of the above scenarios would occur. SWAPO is not likely to implement governmental reforms which might require violent or repressive enforcement as long as the U.N. peace-keeping forces are present. Further, although SWAPO has stated that Whites aren't required for the future success of Namibia and that it fully expects most of them to leave, it has also stated that they are welcome to stay on SWAPO terms and there have been no specific threats of violence. Contrary to White propaganda, the overall history of African violence against Whites also militates against wanton reprisals. Most Whites that would leave Namibia would probably do so during the U.N. transition period via South African or West German airlifts, thereby greatly reducing the number of Whites which could later become targets of violence or harassment. Finally, should any Whites still in the rural areas after the U.N. departure violently resist nationalization of their farmlands, SWAPO would need to make only a few "examples" for the rest to realize the futility of resistance. South Africa might rationalize that these Whites had been given ample opportunity

to emigrate during the transition period and would not risk serious military involvement on their behalf.

Another source of potential conflict under an elected SWAPO government would be African ethnic animosities and anxieties. Should a situation involving ethnic violence erupt while the U.N. peace-keeping force was in place and it proved unable to exert control, South Africa would probably send troops into Namibia temporarily. The objective of these troops would be more to protect the Whites from spill-over violence until their evacuation than it would be to actually quell the African violence. Should ethnic violence occur sometime after the U.N. had departed, it is doubtful that South Africa would attempt to intervene at all. As noted before, it might feel sympathy for any Whites remaining in the country at that time, but no moral commitment. It's attitude towards the Africans would probably be one of letting them fight it out among themselves. Should the ethnic opposition prove substantial, there is a good possibility that South Africa might provide covert support (similar to that provided UNITA) if it felt that low risk destabilization of the Namibian government served its own security needs. Still, the potential for external intervention due to African ethnic violence is very small. It is highly unlikely that SWAPO would permit Ovambo to perpetrate actions against any minority ethnic group. Not only is SWAPO avowedly non-racial, but the records of other genuine national liberation movements doesn't support this type of action. The presence of the

U.N. peace-keeping force would also serve as an initial moral deterrent. Ethnic violence would be more likely to result from anxieties or perceived injustices on the part of one of the minority groups, the Herero being a likely example. In the short term and following the U.N. departure, this could result from SWAPO elimination or detention of opposition political leadership. Such actions could be perceived by their ethnically-grouped followers in primordial contexts (e.g., as in the SWAPO/Ovambo vs. DTA/Herero clashes in Windhoek in early 1978). SWAPO wouldn't act in this manner while the U.N. was still on the scene however, and it is likely that any African leaders who might feel seriously threatened would emigrate during this transition period along with the hard core of their followers.

In the longer term there is potential for ethnic violence should the Ovambo assert themselves disproportionately in all facets of the government and economy, a likely eventuality. To have any effectiveness, the various minorities would need to band together, a less likely eventuality. External participation would entail suppressive assistance to SWAPO from foreign communists within Namibia and could include covert South African support for the dissenting ethnic group(s), although South Africa would stop short of any direct involvement.

Walvis Bay represents a very real potential for conflict between South African and an elected SWAPO government, especially if SWAPO maintains an antagonistic posture. Although South Africa might be willing to negotiate with a

cooperative SWAPO government on the commercial and civil aspects of Walvis Bay, it might also insist on the perpetuation of its own military facilities, the preclusion of any other foreign military bases, and some sort of regulation over military equipment shipments through the port to Namibia. These conditions probably would be unacceptable to SWAPO and the stalemate would result in either the permanent acceptance of a trade and customs situation unfavorable to Namibia or an attempt to eject South Africa militarily. While foreign communists would probably render artillery and staff planning support for such an endeavor, the legitimacy of South Africa's position would probably deter their participation in Walvis Bay proper, at least initially. Foreign units might also be expected to assume temporary defensive responsibilities in other parts of Namibia to free PLAN troops for participation in the take-over attempt. South African resistance in Walvis Bay would be stiff and diversional strikes against other areas in Namibia would be likely. Depending on both international reaction to the conflict and PLAN success, foreign communists might be encouraged to participate more fully in combat. Regardless of the degree of direct communist participation however, the logistic links to Walvis Bay would be too vulnerable for South Africa to hold out indefinitely in the face of a determined PLAN offensive.

The last scenario for violence on the part of external actors in association with an elected SWAPO government involves the evolution of a situation similar to the one

currently existing on both sides of the northern Namibia border. The establishment of South African guerrilla bases in southern Namibia with PLAN protection and subsequent guerrilla incursions into South Africa would be sure to spark pre-emptive and retaliatory South African strikes. This eventuality, while probably certain under a SWAPO government, wouldn't transpire in the near future. South African guerrillas lack sufficient strength and organization at this point to pose a threat of that nature from Namibia.

F. SCENARIO 6

A scenario in which the DTA or a coalition headed by it becomes the dominant political power through U.N. recognized elections would be unlikely to develop situations conducive to external military involvement other than South African assistance as requested. Although the communists would attempt to continue covert assistance to SWAPO, the external sanctuaries would probably soon be rescinded. Any subsequent attempt to organize guerrilla activity within Namibia which couldn't be contained by Namibian forces under South African advisors would result in a request for SADF assistance.

Within this scenario continued economic disparities might eventually result in unrest and violence. Again, if this couldn't be contained by Namibian resources, South Africa would probably be asked to provide assistance.

G. SCENARIO 7

The final scenario to consider is one where U.N. elections produce a situation in which no political body or coalition is able to claim a decisive majority and in which there is little likelihood of compromise or cooperation between the main contenders. The volatility of the situation would be readily apparent and the U.N. would find itself forced to maintain a peace-keeping force for longer than anticipated. As the U.N. presence dragged on, and without substantial change in the opposing political positions, the population would become more restive and civil violence such as occurred in early 1978 could break out. If the U.N. was unable to control this violence and if one group's position appeared in jeopardy, intervention by an external actor on behalf of its client would be likely, if only to reestablish order and maintain the status quo. This intervention would probably precipitate a similar response from the opposing external actors however, and a situation of tense confrontation or even active combat would soon exist. One possible break in the deadlock would be if a great many Whites decided the future was too unstable and decided to leave. Not only would this remove much of the backbone from the conservative resistance to compromise, but it would also reduce South Africa's sense of commitment to support militarily the remaining conservative element. Failing this, it is likely that active combat would soon break out throughout the country with PLAN and the communists on one side and the

Namibian ethnic forces and the SADF on the other. Although the unsettled guerrilla situation in Angola together with an initial military superiority would probably sway the near-term course of this conflict in favor of South Africa and the conservatives, the continuing absence of international legitimacy would engender a situation similar to the one discussed in scenario 1, and with the same eventual results. Based on the realization of this ultimate probability, South Africa might act with limited objectives and with more restraint than just described.

H. CONCLUSION

Depending on the composition and legitimacy of the eventual Namibian government, it is almost certain that the external actors who provided support to the dominant political body in that government during the independence struggle will be asked to lend their presence and provide defensive assistance to the new state, at least initially. This presence will be legitimate, will probably be respected in most quarters, and will probably deter intervention by opposing external actors.

Incidents of racial or ethnic violence aren't likely to be significant at the outset and won't invite external intervention from actors not already legitimately on the scene. There is long range potential for broader violence based on ethnic and economic disparities. Any overt external participation in these cases would be at the request of the legitimate government for the purpose of maintaining

control. It is probable that the rebelling group(s) in these situations would receive covert assistance from external actors opposed to the legitimate government.

The resolution of the Walvis Bay question or an electoral situation which results in a narrow majority and uncompromising attitudes appear to hold the greatest potentials for overt, illegitimate, external intervention and for confrontation between external actors.

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CORRESPONDENCE

In response to six pages of questions about the guerrilla warfare in Namibia, the following individuals provided taped responses:


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