

Dof, Doo, #2652

Exh, NO 3496

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

官署供述書

供述者 河

澄

虎四

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郎

私、河邊虎四郎は官毒の上次の通り供違致します  
一、私は一九三八年十二月から一九四〇年二月迄、日本大使館附陸軍武官として伯林に駐在しました。當時の階級は少將でありました。大島氏は一九三八年十月から一九三九年十月迄駐獨大使でありました。

二ノ一、一九三八年十月私は大島中將の後任として獨逸在勤大使館附武官を命ぜられ、日本出發前參謀本部で私の新職に關し關係者から種々の説明を受けました。その中で諜報に對する諜報並に諜略に關し、一九三七年五月頃から一九三八年夏頃迄大島武官の下に在つて伯林で専ら此問題を取扱ひ、其後參謀本部に歸つて居つた白井中佐から話を聴きました。白井の言ふ所によりますと、彼自身の経験から此作戦には大なる期待を懸け得ないといふ様を口切でありました。二ノ二、私は一九三八年十二月伯林に着きましたから白井中佐の後任として一九三八年夏頃以來大島武官の下で此仕事に専任してゐた馬奈木大佐の説明を受けました。私は白井、馬奈木兩氏の話によりまして、  
(イ) 歐洲に於て我々日本人が斯かる目的のためには有力な露人其他を見出すことは至難であること

- (ロ) 今日迄日本側が連絡を保持してゐる所謂白系露人又は其團體に對しては、逸側は必ずしも好感を寄せて居らぬこと
- (イ) 我々日本人が歐洲を根據として反蘇的工作の準備をなさんとすることとは極めて困難で將來効果を期待し得べき見込が薄いこと
- (三) 伯林の日本陸軍諜報機關の經費は人件費を含めて一年三十萬圓以下であること
- 等る知りました。尙茲で申添へますが、諜略に關しては従前から參謀總長の訓令により戦時の場合を願願しての研究や計畫の立案は命ぜられ、平時にこれを實行することは嚴禁せられて居りました。

二ノ三 私は此事項を前武官大島中將と同様に専ら馬奈木大佐に取扱はしめ彼から報告を受けて居りましたか、大島大使には之を報告したことはありません。大使は此事項には其職務上關係がなく又事實上に於ても大島大使は此事項に關係していませんでしたし、此事項に關して一度も私に訊かれたことすらなかつたのであります。

二ノ四 私は此問題に關係してゐた日系露人等に二、三回會つたことがありますか、彼等は例へば瑞西で病を發つて居たパーマードの様な單なる反露イデオロキストに過ぎぬか又は職業的になつてしまつて反露工作の名目で我々に常に金錢を要求してゐたに過ぎぬ者でありました。

二ノ五 前述の白井中佐が伯林、郊外フアルゲンゼーに家を買ひ馬奈木大佐が之を引繼いで此處に少數の日系露人を住はせて居つたこと並に此等の日系露人が小規模な反露宣傳ビラを印刷して居つたことは私も知つて居りました。しかし此等の宣傳ビラかどうなつたかは私は知りません。

二ノ六 大島氏或は其他日本陸軍將校が波蘭から氣球によつて反露宣傳文書を蘇聯内に送込んだとか或は黒海を渡つてクリミヤに此種の文書を持込むためにモーターボートを買つたとか或はスターリン暗殺のためにロシア人を蘇聯内に送込んだといふやうなことは誰からも全然聞いたことがありませんでしたし私の全然知らないことであります。

三ノ一 一九三八年十二月私が陸軍武官として柏林に到着しました時、大島大使は日獨伊蘭の條約締結に關して獨逸政府と交渉中でありました。私は此時から翌一九三九年八月交渉が打切られる迄海軍武官と共に屢々日本大使館内の相談に加はり、大島大使を中心として此問題を論議しました。

此交渉について大島大使は非常な苦心をせられ、之がために大使館官廳部、陸海軍武官を集めて研究されたのです。

三ノ二 日本政府及び陸軍中央部が此條約の締結を欲する理由として大島大使が屢々私共に語られたことは、當時支那事變が不測に擴大して日本が其解決を焦つてゐるに同らずなかなか終結しないし、又一方蘇の強大な兵力に危惧を感じて居つたので、獨逸と此條約を結ぶことによつて蘇聯よりの萬一の攻撃に備へると共に日本の外交上の地位を強化し一日も早く支那事變を終結せしめるといふことでありました。

此條約の締結によつて日本の足場を固め他國に對して侵略戦争を開始し又は遂行する手段にするのだといふやうなことを私は大島大使から承つたことはありませんし、又大島大使がそんなことを意圖し希望したといふ話を誰からも聞いたことはありません。

三ノ三 それは一九三九年二月此條約に關する日本政府の訓令を持つて伊藤大佐が陸海軍將校各一名を帶同して柏林に來られた時のことであり

ました。

私は大使館主腦部、海軍武官と共に伊藤使節一行を中心を集つて、其説明を聞きましたが、此訓令の主旨は、此条約に基く日本の對獨武力援助義務の對象を露清のみに限定しようとするにありました、之は大島氏が從來同氏に傳へられた政府の意圖に従て、日本は露清を此条約の主たる對象と考へるが英露も亦從たる對象となると獨逸に回答した所とは非常に相違するものでありました。

そこで大島大使は、此の如き日本の意圖を獨逸に傳へることは、從來の經緯に僅み獨逸をして日本不信の感を抱かしめる虞があるのみならず、到底獨逸側は之を受諾する見込はないといふ意見を政府に具申されました。

三ノ四、在任詔第二二三〇號によりますと、一九三九年五月二十七日大島大使は獨逸外務大臣に對して「日本陸軍大臣は大島大使に電報で要請して、東京の諸機關の審議を妨げないやうに富分有田外相に對する行動を差<sup>へ</sup>られたい。陸軍は内閣の倒<sup>れ</sup>を賭して戦ふ覺悟であると言つて來た」といふ趣旨の話をせられたとあります。之に關して私は次のことを記憶して居ります。

一九三九年五月頃のことでありましたが、條約交渉について日本の態度が余りにも明瞭を缺きますので私は東京に宛て、日本は獨伊と條約を結ぶか取止めるか態度を明かにしなければならぬ、何時迄も曖昧な態度であつては外國の不信を招くのみであるといふ趣旨の電報を打ちましたところ、板垣陸軍大臣から私に宛てて、日獨伊條約の件は今内閣で銳意検討中で話が纏まりかかつてゐるから性急に斷がない方がよい。現内閣を倒すといふやうな考は微塵も自分の念頭にないといふ意味の叱責の電報が参り、私から大島大使に此話をしたことがありました。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）十月二十七日に於東京

供 述 者 河 邊 虎 四 郎

右ハ富立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス。

同日於同所

立會人 島 内 龍 起



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Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (translation)

Deponent: KAWABE, Torashiro

I, KAWABE, Torashiro, state under oath as follows:

1. I was in Berlin from December 1938 until February 1940 as Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy, with the rank of Major-General. Mr. OSHIMA was Ambassador from October 1938 until October 1939.

2 - 1. In October 1938, I was appointed Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Germany succeeding Lt. General OSHIMA. Prior to my departure from Japan, I was briefed by various persons at the General Staff Office in Tokyo on various subjects concerning my new duties. At that time, I heard explanations as to intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in Berlin against Soviet Russia from Lt. Col. USUI who had been in Berlin, from May 1937 until January 1938, exclusively in charge of these matters under Military Attache OSHIMA, and had returned to the General Staff in

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Deponent: KAWABE, Torashiro

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Tokyo thereafter. He told me that from his own experience no appreciable results could be expected from these activities.

2 - 2. After my arrival in Berlin in December 1938 I heard explanations from Col. MANAKI, who succeeded Lt. Col. USUI and was exclusively in charge of this work from the summer of 1938 under Military Attache OSHIMA.

Through what I heard from USUI and MANAKI I learned the following facts:

(a) It was very difficult for us Japanese to find able Russians in Europe for this purpose;

(b) The Germans were not necessarily in sympathy with the White Russians or their organizations with which the Japanese side had been maintaining contact up to that time;

(c) It was particularly difficult for us Japanese to prepare any Anti-Soviet activities from Europe as a base and prospects of useful results in the future were also slim;

(d) The expense for the Japanese intelligence organs in Berlin amounted to no more than 300,000 yen annually including personal expenses.

I might add here that as regards counter-intelligence activities, only study and planning in consideration of wartime were laid down by the Chief of the General Staff; however, it was strictly forbidden to put them actually into effect in peace time.

2 - 3. I, like my predecessor OSHIMA, left Col. MANAKI entirely in charge of these matters. I received reports from him, but never transmitted them to Ambassador OSHIMA. This was because the Ambassador had

no relation whatsoever with this matter within scope of his official duty. Furthermore Ambassador OSHIMA, in fact, did not touch upon these matters and never asked me questions about them.

2 - 4. I met several times with the White Russians concerned. I found out that they were either nothing but anti-Soviet ideologists, like Bamard who was at that time staying in Switzerland for recuperation, or professionals who used to demand money from us by presenting impractical and fantastic anti-Soviet plans.

2 - 5. I knew that Lt. Col. USUI had bought a house at Falkensee in the suburbs of Berlin, and had turned it over to Col. MANNKI. I knew also that a few White Russians were quartered there; they were engaged in a small scale printing of anti-Soviet pamphlets, but I do not know what became of those pamphlets.

2 - 6. I have absolutely never heard from anyone that OSHIMA or any other Japanese army officers sent anti-Soviet pamphlets into Soviet territories by balloons from Poland, or that they bought a motor-boat to bring such papers into the Crimea across the Black Sea, or that they sent Russians into Soviet Russia for the purpose of assassinating Stalin. Any such matters were completely unknown to me.

3 - 1. When I arrived in Berlin as Military Attache in December 1938 Ambassador OSHIMA was engaged in negotiations with the German Government regarding a Japanese-German-Italian treaty. From this time, until the negotiations were terminated, around August 1939, I, together with the

Naval Attache participated in frequent conferences within the Japanese Embassy and discussed this matter, Ambassador OSHIM. acting as leader. During these negotiations, Ambassador OSHIM. always gave the matter most careful consideration and often called the Embassy staff, the Military and Naval attaches together for consultation and study.

3 - 2. As to the reasons why the Japanese Government and the central army authorities wished for the conclusion of this treaty, Ambassador OSHIM. often told us as follows:

At that time the China incident was unexpectedly expanding without any prospect of an early termination, and all eager Japanese efforts for settlement had been of no avail. Moreover, both the Japanese Government and the army circles felt themselves threatened by the powerful armament of Soviet Russia. They wanted, therefore, by concluding this treaty with Germany and Italy, to improve the diplomatic position of Japan with the ultimate purpose of bringing the China incident to the earliest possible end, and, at the same time, to be prepared for any attack from Soviet Russia. I never heard from OSHIM. that Japan intended or desired to utilize this treaty after its conclusion as a means of initiate or wage aggressive war against other countries. Neither have I ever heard from anyone that OSHIM. planned or desired anything of this nature.

3 - 3. In February 1939, Mr. ITO, Nobufumi, accompanied by an officer from both the Army and the Navy, arrived in Berlin bringing the instructions of the Japanese Government regarding this treaty. I, together with the higher

Embassy staff and the Naval Attache, was present when envoy ITO gave the explanations to the Ambassador. The purport of this instruction was to limit to Soviet Russia the object of Japanese Military assistance, to be given to Germany and Italy on the basis of the treaty. This was at variance to what OSHIMA had already communicated to Germany upon instructions of the Government, namely that although Japan considered Soviet Russia as the primary object of this proposed treaty, Britain and France would also be included as secondary objects. Facing this situation, OSHIMA cabled his opinion to Tokyo that, in view of the progress up to that time, Germany might become distrustful of Japan if he transmitted to Germany the changed Japanese view as instructed, and, moreover, would never accept the proposal.

3 - 4. According to Exhibit No. 2230, Ambassador OSHIMA told the German Foreign Minister on 27 May 1939 that "the War Minister requested OSHIMA by wire to hold off until later against ARITA in order not to disturb the discussions among the various quarters in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow." Concerning this I have the following recollection:

According to my memory, it was about the middle of May 1939, I dispatched a telegram from Berlin to Tokyo stating that Japan must clarify her position as to whether she was going to conclude the treaty with Germany and Italy or not, and that to continue in the ambiguous attitude of that time would only invite the contempt of foreign countries. Thereupon I received from War Minister ITAGAMI a telegram to the effect

that: "The matter of the Japan-Germany-Italy treaty is now under earnest discussion within the cabinet, and, as the atmosphere is turning favorable to its conclusion, we had better remain silent for the time being. I have no thought whatsoever of overthrowing the cabinet." I told Ambassador OSHIMA of this telegram.

On this 27th day of Oct., 1947.

at Tokyo.

Deponent: K. W. BE, Torashiro (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,

at Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) SHIMANOCHI, Ryu

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) K. W. BE, Torashiro (seal)