

Doc. 4065

Evid

Folders

(27)

EXHIBIT NO. 654 A

Doc. No. 4065B

Page 1

TELEGRAM (Code Clerk)

PARIS, German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs.

1 Oct 1941 - 2100 hours

Arrival: 1 October 1941 - 2300 hours

Economic Delegation No. 467 of 1 October 1941

Re. Telegram No. 152 of 22 September 1941, Ha Pol 6075 g111

Re. Interim Report on Indo-Chinese rubber; Japan/U.S.A.

Negotiations have been conducted with the French delegation, presided over by DE BOISANGER, in line with orders as in the above telegram. At the outset DE BOISANGER expressly confirmed the order, reported by me in telegram No. 454 of 22 September 1941, to the Governor-General of Indo-China to release the 5,000 tons which the Japanese had requested for September. He then stated the request of his government for German support of the French efforts to obtain Japanese approval for delivery of 5,000 tons to the U.S.A.

Indo-China urgently needed the proceeds from such sales for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else, and declared in answer to a question from the German side, that in payment of the said goods the U.S.A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold.

French request was turned down as not in accord with instructions. Concerning our demand which was presented in the session, DE BOISANGER replied to me yesterday on behalf of his government that it appreciated the German attitude and would take the German point of view into consideration during the pending negotiations with Japan. He was not authorized to give a more extended declaration. I pointed out to him again that the German request was urgent and again brought forth that not only the Japanese, but also the German Government would not countenance further export of raw rubber from Indo-China to the U.S.A.

The German Commissioner, JEHLE, has by now left for Berlin. He suggested that at the French delegation, an additional release of 5,000 tons, as requested by Japan, first of all for October, be secured. We are continuing to urgently attend to the matter and may further report on it.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. No. 4065B
Page 1

TELEGRAM (Open)

PARIS - 6 October 1941 - 2045
Arrival, 6 October 1941 - 2330

No. 3031 of 6 October 1941

State Secretary, BENOIST-MECHIN, today revealed during a conversation, that considerable difficulties with Japan are occurring daily in Indo-China, while Japan, apart from a few exceptions, observes the Treaty's military provisions, she is violating France's economic and political sovereignty more and more.

At the time, Darlan had, in the Vichy Cabinet, personally and very strongly supported the solution sought by Japan with Indo-China since he feared that a different policy would furnish the Anglo-Saxon fighting forces with a pretext for interference and besides he desired to establish good relations with a state that had signed the Tri-partite Pact.

Owing to the aggressive behavior of the Japanese against France's sovereignty in Indo-China, doubts have been expressed within the French Government as to whether Darlan's conception was right; furthermore a stiffening on the part of the adversaries of his policy among French military and administrative circles in Indo-China is to be feared.

I was receptive in regard to Benoist-Mechin's information, the aim of which evidently was German intervention in Tokyo.

ABETZ

Secret State matter - to be kept in locked file.

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO, 15 October 1941 - 0600 hours
Arrival, " " " 1520 "

No. 2095 of 14 October

Re. Telegraphic orders dated 8 October, No. 1775 - Pol II

Observations here confirm the description of conditions as reported to Berlin from Saigon by Councillor of Legation, Neumann during the last few days. As was to be expected, the occupation of Indo-China did not proceed without friction.

I heard from the Foreign Ministry that there are numerous points in dispute concerning the interpretation of the defense agreement. The controversy concerns the treatment of the Chungking-appointed Chinese consul, the handing over of certain airplanes, the seizure of quarters and goods, anti-French propaganda disseminated by the Japanese army among the native population, and so on.

The French ambassador has lodged a number of protests, and has pressed hard the removal of matters of complaint. The Japanese government intends to increase the occupation forces, at present being 25,000, according to a report from Saigon, to 40,000. I was assured by the Foreign Ministry that the French-Japanese agreement does not provide for a maximum limit for Japanese occupation troops.

The Japanese Government seems to intend to wrest a number of concessions from the French Colonial administration through local military authorities. Only after the creation of a fait accompli will former Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA, apparently slated for handling questions relating to Indo-China, leave for Saigon. I understand that this will not materialize before the beginning of November.

I am under the impression that both parties will not let it come to an open conflict. The Japanese government is endeavoring to keep up the outward appearance of a defense alliance and, furthermore, is afraid of diminishing the economic utilization of the country in case of an open clash, through passive resistance of the colonial administration and the native population. The Deputy Foreign Minister told me that the rice quota, amounting to 700,000 tons and urgently needed this year, was secured on the strength of the agreement concluded by MATSUOKA. It is, however, hoped that even greater quantities will be obtained

owing to better prospects for the harvest.

The Foreign Ministry denied that there had been a Japanese-Siamese argument in the Border Commission concerning the supervision of the demilitarized zone. The Border Commission was only just starting out on its tasks. Identical telegram to Saigon.

OTT

CERTIFICATE

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065B.

/s/ ULRICH STRAUS

4065B

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

EX 477 A

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process) To be kept in locked file. MOST URGENT

Tokyo, 4 October 1941 2,575

Arrival: 4 October 1941 1325 hours.

No. 1974, of 4 October.

For the German Foreign Minister.

Re: Telegraphic report of 2 October, No. 1960 with Pol. VIII

NOTE: Sent on to Special Train under No. 3351. Tel. Ktr.
4 October 1941.

As I have stated in my last report, the Japanese-American negotiations seem to be without result, unless the United States fundamentally changes her attitude towards the Chinese question which they will find difficult to do. However, even after the breakdown of the negotiations, there remains in JAPAN, a certain sense of uncertainty as to what policy should be adopted in JAPAN. For the first time in her history JAPAN feels herself physically isolated and surrounded by enemies. In a spirit of optimism and jingoism she has tested her forces on militarily inferior CHINA; now she is under the impression, despite brilliant individual successes, that she cannot successfully terminate this conflict by military means. Even more than this feeling prevailing within the country, the long drawn out service behind the front /Etapendienst/ has probably impaired the Japanese punch and readiness for sacrifices. One cannot help feeling that the mobilization, begun in July, has enhanced the sense of weakness by bringing to light the numerous economic and material deficiencies.

In spite of this, the realization has increased during the last weeks that by a policy of mere wait and see, the goals of JAPAN will not be furthered, nor will her continued existence be secured. As a result of a careful sounding out of the Army leaders (Minister for War, Chief of General Staff, Head of the Political Section and of the Section for Foreign Armies) the following picture of their ways of thinking is arrived at.

(The inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to bring about a new distribution of power in EUROPE and the Far East by overpowering the British Empire. Keeping

ROOM 58
D

AMERICA at bay and eliminating the SOVIET UNION could only be mere means to this end.)

Now that Germany has begun the fight with the SOVIET UNION and has carried it through militarily successful to a great extent the important thing is to reestablish the connection of the powers of the Tripartite Pact through SIBERIA as soon as possible, and to concentrate the entire energy on fighting ENGLAND in the Middle and Far East as well as on the British Isles. Operations in European RUSSIA had demonstrated that the armies of the SOVIET UNION have suffered defeat but that the political collapse of the regime does not automatically follow. (Japan's waging of a war against the Far Eastern Army, still considered as being in fighting trim, is not feasible before next spring, unless a moral collapse of the regime comes about. The tenacity displayed by the SOVIET UNION against GERMANY indicates that not even by a Japanese attack in August or September could the route via SIBERIA be opened up this year). There are two ways of reaching this objective in the future: either by exploiting the considerable weakening of the SOVIET regime to be expected after the occupation of MOSCOW, to induce the remainder of RUSSIA to freely cooperate in this, JAPAN could contribute even in winter by bringing pressure to bear upon RUSSIAN supplies from the Far East at the appropriate time; the other way would be to attack SIBERIA from west and east during next spring for which JAPAN would then be in a position to do this/ despite having the CHINA conflict on her hands. In that case, however, huge areas would have to be traversed and common operations would not be easy, so that even in this case a political solution would be called for after some time.

Military actions by JAPAN against the Anglo-Saxon position in the South are independent of the time of year. It is to be endeavored to link /them/ up with a German drive against the Anglo-Saxon position in the Middle East, although there is no absolute necessity to wait /for it/. However, victory over the British Empire would be complete only when our actions from both sides would collapse the Indian position.

With the request for confidential, one group seems to be missing, I am stating the remarks as they were made to me by the War Minister in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff. In their frank peculiarity they clearly show the attitude taken by the leadership towards a campaign against RUSSIA. The remarks reveal also that the plans directed against the South, which chiefly have to be executed by the Navy, are not

too well considered and are lacking in preparation. I am at one with the Military Attaches in the impression that at least as far as the Army is concerned, the calculations which have been made are superficial, and that the state of preparations does not guarantee the success of a southward push beyond initial conquests. In French...one group garbled)...only a few military establishments have been set up thus far, according to concordant information. The relatively little outfitting of the troops with modern material, the length of the lines of communications, but most of all the feeling of having no unified energetic leadership deprives the Japanese fighting forces of the assurance which is essential to success. It is therefore to be supposed that the present government will further try to put off a southern drive.

The activation of JAPAN in the sense of the Tripartite Pact can most easily be brought about by demonstrating to her technically and politically, the possibility of operations having a tangible common goal (passage through SIBERIA or a combined attack in the Middle East or the Far East). A long-distance flight from the Russian front to MANCHULI as soon as this is technically possible, would probably make a deep impression here. Considering the formalistic character of the Japanese, I would like to suggest again that due consideration be given to whether after adequate preparations the attempt should not be made to entrust the commission, stipulated by the Tripartite Pact at the request of the Japanese, with the deliberation of common, military, economic and political tasks. The feeling that they are not consulted distresses circles which are otherwise ready to cooperate and hits them on their weakest spot, their self-esteem.

In the foregoing statements of the Army leaders, no mention was made of an American participation in the war. I was able to find out that in military considerations they were almost completely setting aside or ignoring the possible intervention of the UNITED STATES, while always referring to the British Empire as the enemy. Doubtlessly this is partly due to the desire to keep secret what is going on in the none too pleasant course of Japanese-American negotiations. But even stronger is the often reported atavistic fear of getting entangled in a conflict with the UNITED STATES, the end of which can perhaps not be foreseen. The Japanese Government /Staats-fvenng/ wants to embark on such a conflict only if worst comes to worst and wants to decide the time itself; at least help in deciding upon it. This not only chimes in with the character of the Japanese but also with the point of view of the Japanese Government of whether an attack in the sense of Article Three of the Pact is in question, must be decided through

common consultation by the Three Powers. I call to mind that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had insisted on a concrete fixing of this already at the negotiations over the Tripartite Pact, conducted here with Ambassador STAHRER as negotiations chairman and myself.

The feeling that a conflict with the United States will not be avoided is gaining for us, however, it is of the greatest importance that JAPAN should take part in deciding as to when it is to be mutually waged.

I need not specially mention that I have argued along the lines indicated by my instructions and by an utterance regulation /Sprachregelung/ issued in BERLIN concerning the further prosecution of the fight against the SOVIET UNION, as well as the military and political weakness of the Anglo-Saxons. However, in view of the existing ratio of strength within JAPAN we have at present to reckon with the attitude described above the more so since the opinions of the Navy are identical by and large, with the utterances of the Army leaders.

I shall next report on the attitude of the political circles.

OTT

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4065

Date 14 ~~July~~ June, 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: *Proposals: Foreign Ministry file (State Sec'y Japan vs USA) Exchange of telegrams, mostly between Tokyo and Berlin.*

Date: 10 Oct. 1941 - 15 Oct. 1941 Original () Copy (✓) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (✓)
Has it been photostated? Yes (✓) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *Nurnberg*

PERSONS IMPLICATED: *OTT, AMAN, OSHIMA, KATO, MATSUOKA*

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Aggressive Warfare

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

contains, among others, the following items:

Attached

Analyst: *V. Straus*

Doc. No.

H. Klemm

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State Secretary

Japan, vol. 5

a

1
Item 1) Telegram from Hemmen, Paris, German Armistice
Delegation for Commerce, 1 October, 1941.

Report on the disposition of 5,000 tons of Indochinese raw
rubber, which was ~~to have~~^{sent} gone to the United States. Further
export to America of raw rubber would not be permitted by Germany
and Japan. 160666 - 60667

~~Item 2) Telegram from Off. Tokyo, 2 October, 1941. Division~~
~~According to a report from the director of the European^A the~~
~~Privy Council has agreed to the closing of the Polish Embassy~~
~~in Japan. Approval of cabinet and emperor is expected.~~

Item 3) Telegram from Off. Tokyo, 2 October, 1941.

Report on negotiations in Washington, which KONOYE had
initiated. Off cannot get any specific information on them from
the Foreign Office, but is told that they have not progressed.
No Japanese government is able to make palatable to the people
and the Army the demands on which the United States bases its
negotiating. ~~The anniversary day of the Three Power Pact,~~
~~gave the opportunity to impressively parade the usually~~
~~split opposition. One gets the impression that the adherents~~
~~of a policy of compromising with the Anglo-Saxons have~~
~~reached their maximum effectiveness.~~

~~Item 4) Telegram from Ott. Tokyo, 4 October, 1941.~~

~~Report that Washington conferences are going on, though grave difference and difficulties are being encountered.~~

Item 3) Telegram from Ott. Tokyo, 4 October, 1941.

Report that the Japanese government has protested British and Iranian actions in denying the Japanese the use of code telegrams from Teheran and have applied similar restrictions on the Iranian minister here. The Japanese legation in Teheran was accused of harboring a German which was not true. Further, the Iranian government and British circles ~~had~~ claimed that the legation is giving asylum to the grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who is a dangerous anti-British agitator. The Foreign Office confidentially tells me that the grand Mufti had actually found sanctuary in the legation for a while, but has now fled. Ott told the Foreign Office that the Germans did not want the grand Mufti to fall into the hands of the Russians or English and asked the whereabouts of the Mufti. However, the Foreign Office didn't know.

160673-74/

(A)

The recognition is spreading however, that Japan's aims are not to be obtained by doing nothing. The opinion of the Army leadership (War Minister TOSU, chief of general staff /SUGIYAMA/ and Director of Political Division /OIKAWA/) is as follows:

Item (4) Telegram from Off. Tokyo, 4 October 1941.

Report on Japanese sentiment which Ott describes as disillusionment at not gaining a clear victory in China, a resulting feeling of weakness, the feeling of being surrounded by enemies. During the past weeks, ~~authoritative leaders~~ ^(A) have decided that by remaining dormant, Japan can gain ~~nothing~~ and they give the following impression. The Three Power Pact has the inherent aim of conquering the British Empire and a new distribution of power in Europe and East Asia. After Russia has been beaten, the most important thing would be to resume contact of the Axis powers over Siberia and to concentrate our entire energy in fighting England everywhere. As no Japanese attack on the Russian Far Eastern Army can be expected before Spring ~~unless a moral collapse should occur about~~, ~~so~~ that there are two ways of reopening the Trans-Siberian Railroad. One way would be to utilize the capture of Moscow to press the rest of Russia to cooperation - and Japan, at the proper moment, could apply pressure on Russian troops in the Far East. On the other hand, there could be an attack on Siberia from East and West next Spring, which Japan could undertake despite her problems in China. Independent of the time of year is a

(continue on page marked 4.)

^{Because of this and due to}
~~For that~~ ~~the~~ fact that there is no strong ^{Cont'd} ^{from} 4a
leadership, it is probable that the present government
will try to postpone the action in the South. An activation
of Japan can be most easily achieved if the possibility of
operations of a common goal, such as Siberia or a
combined attack on the Near and Far East can be
made clear technically and militarily. Off suggests
that, after proper preparations, the attempt is made to
advocate that the Commission, which was formed by the
Three Power Pact of Japan's insistence concern itself
with common military, economic and political problems.
The feeling that they are not being consulted, bothers the
Japanese, especially their egoism.

The statements of the military leaders above, refrain
from mentioning America and speak only of England as the
main enemy Japan would only attack America as a last
resort. In the negotiations here MATSUOKA insisted
on defining ~~whether an~~ attacks in the sense of Article III
of the Pact. ~~possibly existent~~. The feeling that a
conflict with America is inevitable, is gaining.

/60675 - 60679/

(Continue on p 4 with Item 4)

Japanese attack against the Anglo-Saxon position in the South.

^{confidential}
OTT ^{states that he is} repeating the statements of the War Minister, made in the presence of the Chief-of-Staff, ~~and OTT~~ heard them. They show how the leadership feels about a war against Russia. Furthermore, they show that the plans against the South, which have to be borne by the Navy in the main, are not complete and thorough. Confirmed on opposite page. ↑→ (marked 4a)

Item 4 Telegram from Wohltat and OTT. Tokyo 6 October, 1941.
Report from Wohltat in which he agrees that German should continue the flow of heavy machinery to Japan in exchange for raw materials from the Far East. Due to Anglo-Saxon measures Japan now feels herself weak, and activist circles are hoping for the reopening of the Siberian Railroad to a friendly industrial power, Germany. OTT adds that circles in Japan which favor an understanding with America, are pointing to the fact that no economic help could be gained if Japan remains in the Axis camp. Thus, if Germany could send material aid to Japan, it would strengthen activist forces here. 160680-821

Item 8) Telegram from Abetz, Paris, 6 October 1941.

State Secretary Benoist-Mechin told Abetz that difficulties regarding Japan are mounting daily in Indo-China. Though Japan, with a few exceptions, is keeping to the military clauses of the agreement, she is more and more endangering French political and economic sovereignty. Though Darlan has been in favor of meeting Japan's terms, his judgment has now been doubted by the French government, because of Japan's aggressive action against French sovereignty and a stiffening of French political and economic opposition to Darlan's policy is consequently feared.

1666831

~~Item 9) Telegram from Mt. Tokyo, 1 October, 1941.~~

~~The Foreign Office requests an early report as to whether the German government sanctions the transport of British nationals from Lissabon to England on the "Asama Maru". In case the Germans sanction the proposal, 400 German women and children can leave for Lissabon on the "Asama Maru".~~

Item 10) Telegram from Ritter, Special Train, 8 October, 1941.

A proposal to open up a route from Japan to

Germany via the waters north of Siberia. In order to achieve this, the cooperation of Japan and complete secrecy are most essential. Ritter asks Ott to give this information to the Japanese Foreign Minister in a confidential manner. The proposal should be carried through by the German Naval Attaché and a small group of Japanese Navy officers.

160685-86/

Item 7) Telegram from Ott, Tokyo, 9 October 1941.

Report that the threat of restricting the propaganda activities of belligerent nations in Japan has now been actualized. ~~The entire Japanese press policy is visibly based on the endeavor to impress the Japanese people with the German successes in Russia and at the same time control German propaganda. The success of this propaganda has caused tension in the government.~~

Ott told the Vice Foreign Minister AMAN that he would not ^{voluntarily} retreat from his stand on propaganda which is in the interests of the Three Power Pact. He asserts that Germany is on a lower plane than America, which could handle England's propaganda. Aman answered that the verbal

4065

7

note represents the decision of the cabinet and cannot be changed. However, the Japanese authorities have decided for a policy of furthering the Three Powers Pact, and will therefore take over German propaganda interests themselves. Ott believes that he will be able to influence the Japanese public with the help of friends in the government, who share that viewpoint, and also publicly stand up against the restrictive measures. He will look for new ways of disseminating embassy propaganda. ~~Under these circumstances I would appreciate it if you ^{could} ~~would~~ express OSHIMA ^{with my best} ~~in these~~ ^{circumstances.}~~

~~Item 8) Telegram from Bücher, Helsinki, 11 October, 1941.
Report that the division chief of the Japanese Foreign Ministry said that he is sure that it would eventually come to a war between the United States and Japan.~~

~~Item 9) Telegram from Ott, Tokyo, 11 October, 1941.
Ott believes that the matter of opening up a route via northern Siberian waters would better be~~

8

taken up with the proper Navy people, instead of with the Foreign Minister.

Item 9) Telegram from Off. Tokyo, 11 October, 1941.

A report by Off on the Navy plans. The Navy has recently won a lot of prestige and ^{air arm has} the ~~Navy~~ been able to gain much experience in China. Since the Anglo-Saxon influence in the Navy is still very considerable, it was especially important to politically utilize ^{the embassy's} personal friendships in Navy circles. A comparatively fast change has occurred. Young officers feel that an attack on the Anglo-Saxons is inevitable. In order to remain a great power Japan must attack the Dutch East Indies. It was consequently a clever move in the part of the group under Konoze that they termed the ~~final~~ and probably unsuccessful negotiations with the United States as final and necessary, ^{and} after their failure, ^{of which} Japan can pursue its aims with greater assurance.

The Navy ^{believed it} has reached its maximum power and is ready to do its part in southern operations. Concerning the fluctuation of the strategic attack plans, ^{Off} Hase already reported. ^(B) In this indication there is a weakness, a direct attack on Singapore is now considered impossible because of the increased British strength there.

(B)

Plans mentioned are: ^{surprise-} Attack on Singapore, either before or after occupation of Thailand, occupation or ~~circum~~ ~~skippi~~ by-passing of the Philippines, blockade of Singapore with attack on Borneo and Sumatra.

9

after the occupation of Siam, a land and sea blockade of SINGAPORE can be effected. At the same time, the PHILIPPINES must be taken. Despite difficulties, the securing of cover in the flanks will secure the occupation of British and Dutch oil regions in Borneo and Sumatra. It is doubtful whether these areas can be held for a long time against Anglo-Saxon pressure. Consequently it is important to know how the Axis powers intend to operate after conclusion of the war in Russia, and whether or not they will be able to supply arms to Japan against the United States, after the collapse of England. I have emphasized Japanese participation in the final blow against Russia and Germany's approval of bold Japanese plans in the South. In order to activate the Japanese allies, it would be best to agree on a common plan against the Anglo-Saxons.

160693-60697/

Item (A) Telegram from Thomesen. Washington. 11 October, 1941.
Report that the Japanese are sending three ships to pick up nationals in America. Thomesen believes that American policy will have to change since Japan's national spirit has been aroused and will not be

contained by the ABCD powers. Roosevelt's policy is ~~to show Japan the way clear of her obligations under the Three Power Pact.~~

Item 11) Memo from Gaus, Berlin, 11 October, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador in Vichy, KATO, asked Gaus about future operations against England and expressed the fear that Germany would conclude a compromise peace with England.

Ambassador OSHIMA thought that it ~~is~~ important to renew the Anti-Comintern Pact. He's telegraphed to Tokyo about it several times, but ~~has~~ received no answer. If a big event would be made of the renewal, it would have a great political effect.

1607001

~~Item 17) Telegram from Do Kurat, Stockholm, 13 October, 1941.~~

~~Report that Japanese government had told its representatives not to have too close a contact with Germans since Japan's future foreign policy is not determined, that was before German success in Russia.~~

4065

11

~~Item 18) Telegram from Dunkwort, Stockholm, 13 October, 1941.
Swedish press reports on England deteriorating
position as the result of German successes.~~

~~Item 19) Telegram from Ott, Tokyo, 13 October, 1941.
Sobei Hara, a member of the Diet, told of his
impressions of a totally Americanized South America,
which has lost most of its liberty to the United States.
(on English)~~

~~Item 20) Telegram from Sastman and Schumann, Paris, 14 October, 1941.
Report of recent purchase of oil by Bata and Paul
companies.~~

Item 21) Memo from Weizsaecker, Berlin, 14 October, 1941.
The attached article shows Japanese concern ^{not} to miss
her connection with the great political developments. Perhaps
this uncertainty is the best way of getting Japan into the
war. 160706 /

Item 22) Memo from the DNB representative, Berlin, 13 October.
Germany's successes point to a quick Russian collapse.
The "Kokumin Shimben" says, England might yet make
a peace with Germany, and to gain what she has

lost in Europe will try to make up for it in the Far East. America would join England's advance. The difficulties facing Japan in creating the Greater East Asian Sphere would increase. Japan should not remain behind the development of the world.

~~Item 23) Telegram from Off. Tokyo, 4 October, 1941.
60675-60677 is identical with 60708-60710
and is analyzed there. Item 6.~~

~~Item 24) Telegram from Off. Tokyo, 11 October, 1941.
60713-60717 is identical with 60693-60697
and is analyzed there. Item 14.~~

~~Item 25) Telegram from Off. Tokyo, 15 October, 1941.
Report on the proposed shipping of German women
and children from Japan to Lisbon on the "Osama Maru"
and transport of British citizens from Lisbon to England
on the same ship.~~

~~Item 26) News from Eisenlohr Berlin, 15 October, 1941.
Referring to a telegram from Off. dated 4 October
1941, German delivery of war material can only be~~

justified by important political considerations in Japan. The Japanese requests are huge. The departments concerned with the delivery have been apprehensive about the matter, but they are taking a more positive standpoint now. In addition the Japanese have been told that their wishes will be met wherever possible, as proof of German-Japanese cooperation.

Item 22) ~~Excerpt from the telegram sent to Tokyo on 8 October 1941~~
 Report that plans to meet Japanese wishes ~~will be met~~ though ^{due to} the size of the projects, they have to jibe with the German armament program.

Item 19) Telegram from Off. Tokyo. 15 October 1941.
 Report that the Japanese occupation of Indo-China is not proceeding without friction. The controversy concerns the handling of the Chungking consul, relinquishing of certain airplanes, confiscation of quarters and warehouses, the spreading of Japanese anti-French propaganda among the native population, and so on.
 The Japanese government intends to increase her occupation army to 40,000 troops. The Japanese government has the intention to force through several

demands through its Army here. after the facts accomplish
 have been in effect, former Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA will
 go to Saigon to presumably discuss the Indo Chinese problem.
 Off has the impression that neither side is willing to let it come
 to an open conflict. The Japanese Government wants to
 protect the picture of a treaty of defense to the outside, and a
 conflict would lower the country's economic value.

160723-24/

~~Item 29) Telegram from Wohltat's Off. Tokyo 15 October, 1941.
 Report on the raw rubber delivery from Indochina and
 Thailand.~~

Doc. 4065(A) + (B) Evid

Folder 6

(106)

FRENCH INDOCHINA

Doc. No. 4065B

Page 1

TELEGRAM (Code Clerk)

PARIS, German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs.

1 Oct 1941 - 2100 hours

Arrival: 1 October 1941 - 2300 hours

Economic Delegation No. 467 of 1 October 1941

Re. Telegram No. 152 of 22 September 1941, Ha Pol 6075 g111

Re. Interim Report on Indo-Chinese rubber; Japan/U.S.A.

Negotiations have been conducted with the French delegation, presided over by DE BOISANGER, in line with orders as in the above telegram. At the outset DE BOISANGER expressly confirmed the order, reported by me in telegram No. 454 of 22 September 1941, to the Governor-General of Indo-China to release the 5,000 tons which the Japanese had requested for September. He then stated the request of his government for German support of the French efforts to obtain Japanese approval for delivery of 5,000 tons to the U.S.A.

Indo-China urgently needed the proceeds from such sales for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else, and declared in answer to a question from the German side, that in payment of the said goods the U.S.A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold.

French request was turned down as not in accord with instructions. Concerning our demand which was presented in the session, DE BOISANGER replied to me yesterday on behalf of his government that it appreciated the German attitude and would take the German point of view into consideration during the pending negotiations with Japan. He was not authorized to give a more extended declaration. I pointed out to him again that the German request was urgent and again brought forth that not only the Japanese, but also the German Government would not countenance further export of raw rubber from Indo-China to the U.S.A.

The German Commissioner, JEHLE, has by now left for Berlin. He suggested that at the French delegation, an additional release of 5,000 tons, as requested by Japan, first of all for October, be secured. We are continuing to urgently attend to the matter and may further report on it.

HEMEN

Doc. No. 4065B
Page 1

TELEGRAM (Open)

PARIS - 6 October 1941 - 2045
Arrival, 6 October 1941 - 2330

No. 3031 of 6 October 1941

State Secretary, BENOIST-MECHIN, today revealed during a conversation, that considerable difficulties with Japan are occurring daily in Indo-China, while Japan, apart from a few exceptions, observes the Treaty's military provisions, she is violating France's economic and political sovereignty more and more.

At the time, Darlan had, in the Vichy Cabinet, personally and very strongly supported the solution sought by Japan with Indo-China since he feared that a different policy would furnish the Anglo-Saxon fighting forces with a pretext for interference and besides he desired to establish good relations with a state that had signed the Tri-partite Pact.

Owing to the aggressive behavior of the Japanese against France's sovereignty in Indo-China, doubts have been expressed within the French Government as to whether Darlan's conception was right; furthermore a stiffening on the part of the adversaries of his policy among French military and administrative circles in Indo-China is to be feared.

I was receptive in regard to Benoist-Mechin's information, the aim of which evidently was German intervention in Tokyo.

ABETZ

Secret State matter - to be kept in locked file.

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO, 15 October 1941 - 0600 hours
Arrival, " " " 1520 "

No. 2095 of 14 October

Re. Telegraphic orders dated 8 October, No. 1775 - Pol II

Observations here confirm the description of conditions as reported to Berlin from Saigon by Councillor of Legation, Neumann during the last few days. As was to be expected, the occupation of Indo-China did not proceed without friction.

I heard from the Foreign Ministry that there are numerous points in dispute concerning the interpretation of the defense agreement. The controversy concerns the treatment of the Chungking-appointed Chinese consul, the handing over of certain airplanes, the seizure of quarters and goods, anti-French propaganda disseminated by the Japanese army among the native population, and so on.

The French ambassador has lodged a number of protests, and has pressed hard the removal of matters of complaint. The Japanese government intends to increase the occupation forces, at present being 25,000, according to a report from Saigon, to 40,000. I was assured by the Foreign Ministry that the French-Japanese agreement does not provide for a maximum limit for Japanese occupation troops.

The Japanese Government seems to intend to wrest a number of concessions from the French Colonial administration through local military authorities. Only after the creation of a fait accompli will former Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA, apparently slated for handling questions relating to Indo-China, leave for Saigon. I understand that this will not materialize before the beginning of November.

I am under the impression that both parties will not let it come to an open conflict. The Japanese government is endeavoring to keep up the outward appearance of a defense alliance and, furthermore, is afraid of diminishing the economic utilization of the country in case of an open clash, through passive resistance of the colonial administration and the native population. The Deputy Foreign Minister told me that the rice quota, amounting to 700,000 tons and urgently needed this year, was secured on the strength of the agreement concluded by MATSUOKA. It is, however, hoped that even greater quantities will be obtained

owing to better prospects for the harvest.

The Foreign Ministry denied that there had been a Japanese-Siamese argument in the Border Commission concerning the supervision of the demilitarized zone. The Border Commission was only just starting out on its tasks. Identical telegram to Saigon.

OTT

CERTIFICATE

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065B.

/s/ ULRICH STRAUS

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process) To be kept in locked file. MOST URGENT

Tokyo, 4 October 1941 2,57S

Arrival: 4 October 1941 1325 hours.

No. 1974, of 4 October.

For the German Foreign Minister.

Re: Telegraphic report of 2 October, No. 1960 with Pol. VIII

NOTE: Sent on to Special Train under No. 3351. Tel. Ktr.
4 October 1941.

As I have stated in my last report, the Japanese-American negotiations seem to be without result, unless the United States fundamentally changes her attitude towards the Chinese question which they will find difficult to do. However, even after the breakdown of the negotiations, there remains in JAPAN, a certain sense of uncertainty as to what policy should be adopted in JAPAN. For the first time in her history JAPAN feels herself physically isolated and surrounded by enemies. In a spirit of optimism and jingoism she has tested her forces on militarily inferior CHINA; now she is under the impression, despite brilliant individual successes, that she cannot successfully terminate this conflict by military means. Even more than this feeling prevailing within the country, the long drawn out service behind the front /Etapendienst/ has probably impaired the Japanese punch and readiness for sacrifices. One cannot help feeling that the mobilization, begun in July, has enhanced the sense of weakness by bringing to light the numerous economic and material deficiencies.

In spite of this, the realization has increased during the last weeks that by a policy of mere wait and see, the goals of JAPAN will not be furthered, nor will her continued existence be secured. As a result of a careful sounding out of the Army leaders (Minister for War, Chief of General Staff, Head of the Political Section and of the Section for Foreign Armies) the following picture of their ways of thinking is arrived at.

(The inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to bring about a new distribution of power in EUROPE and the Far East by overpowering the British Empire. Keeping

AMERICA at bay and eliminating the SOVIET UNION could only be mere means to this end.)

Now that Germany has begun the fight with the SOVIET UNION and has carried it through militarily successful to a great extent the important thing is to reestablish the connection of the powers of the Tripartite Pact through SIBERIA as soon as possible, and to concentrate the entire energy on fighting ENGLAND in the Middle and Far East as well as on the British Isles. Operations in European RUSSIA had demonstrated that the armies of the SOVIET UNION have suffered defeat but that the political collapse of the regime does not automatically follow. (Japan's waging of a war against the Far Eastern Army, still considered as being in fighting trim, is not feasible before next spring, unless a moral collapse of the regime comes about. The tenacity displayed by the SOVIET UNION against GERMANY indicates that not even by a Japanese attack in August or September could the route via SIBERIA be opened up this year). There are two ways of reaching this objective in the future: either by exploiting the considerable weakening of the SOVIET regime to be expected after the occupation of MOSCOW, to induce the remainder of RUSSIA to freely cooperate in this. JAPAN could contribute even in winter by bringing pressure to bear upon RUSSIAN supplies from the Far East at the appropriate time; the other way would be to attack SIBERIA from west and east during next spring for which JAPAN would then be in a position to do this/ despite having the CHINA conflict on her hands. In that case, however, huge areas would have to be traversed and common operations would not be easy, so that even in this case a political solution would be called for after some time.

Military actions by JAPAN against the Anglo-Saxon position in the South are independent of the time of year. It is to be endeavored to link /them/ up with a German drive against the Anglo-Saxon position in the Middle East, although there is no absolute necessity to wait /for it/. However, victory over the British Empire would be complete only when our actions from both sides would collapse the Indian position.

With the request for confidential, one group seems to be missing, I am stating the remarks as they were made to me by the War Minister in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff. In their frank peculiarity they clearly show the attitude taken by the leadership towards a campaign against RUSSIA. The remarks reveal also that the plans directed against the South, which chiefly have to be executed by the Navy, are not

too well considered and are lacking in preparation. I am at one with the Military Attaches in the impression that at least as far as the Army is concerned, the calculations which have been made are superficial, and that the state of preparations does not guarantee the success of a southward push beyond initial conquests. In French... (one group garbled)... only a few military establishments have been set up thus far, according to concordant information. The relatively little outfitting of the troops with modern material, the length of the lines of communications, but most of all the feeling of having no unified energetic leadership deprives the Japanese fighting forces of the assurance which is essential to success. It is therefore to be supposed that the present government will further try to put off a southern drive.

The activation of JAPAN in the sense of the Tripartite Pact can most easily be brought about by demonstrating to her technically and politically, the possibility of operations having a tangible common goal (passage through SIBERIA or a combined attack in the Middle East or the Far East). A long-distance flight from the Russian front to MANCHULI as soon as this is technically possible, would probably make a deep impression here. Considering the formalistic character of the Japanese, I would like to suggest again that due consideration be given to whether after adequate preparations the attempt should not be made to entrust the commission, stipulated by the Tripartite Pact at the request of the Japanese, with the deliberation of common, military, economic and political tasks. The feeling that they are not consulted distresses circles which are otherwise ready to cooperate and hits them on their weakest spot, their self-esteem.

In the foregoing statements of the Army leaders, no mention was made of an American participation in the war. I was able to find out that in military considerations they were almost completely setting aside or ignoring the possible intervention of the UNITED STATES, while always referring to the British Empire as the enemy. Doubtlessly this is partly due to the desire to keep secret what is going on in the none too pleasant course of Japanese-American negotiations. But even stronger is the often reported atavistic fear of getting entangled in a conflict with the UNITED STATES, the end of which can perhaps not be foreseen. The Japanese Government /Staats-fvenng/ wants to embark on such a conflict only if worst comes to worst and wants to decide the time itself; at least help in deciding upon it. This not only chimes in with the character of the Japanese but also with the point of view of the Japanese Government of whether an attack in the sense of Article Three of the Pact is in question, must be decided through

common consultation by the Three Powers. I call to mind that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had insisted on a concrete fixing of this already at the negotiations over the Tripartite Pact, conducted here with Ambassador STAHMER as negotiations chairman and myself.

The feeling that a conflict with the United States will not be avoided is gaining for us, however, it is of the greatest importance that JAPAN should take part in deciding as to when it is to be mutually waged.

I need not specially mention that I have argued along the lines indicated by my instructions and by an utterance regulation /Sprachregelung/ issued in BERLIN concerning the further prosecution of the fight against the SOVIET UNION, as well as the military and political weakness of the Anglo-Saxons. However, in view of the existing ratio of strength within JAPAN we have at present to reckon with the attitude described above the more so since the opinions of the Navy are identical by and large, with the utterances of the Army leaders.

I shall next report on the attitude of the political circles.

OTT

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs; and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE 12 Nov 47.

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 4065

TRIAL BRIEF

EXHIBIT NO. 654-A, 654 788-A, 788

BACKGROUND DOC. NO.

*Evidentiary used in
Court*

SIGNATURE *[Signature]*

ROOM NO.

*All telegrams are
in Court.*

J. Mattison

W. H. B.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

19 Sept. , 1946

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4085 A for Taranenko.

Arrange for reproduction of 125 copies in English and

105 copies in Japanese as follows:

Eng SF: If any questions concerning this translation please see
Lt. Strauss in translation and beat his head but good..!

Get certificate at end also.

Done 9/20 Fred

G. KINGS

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

後ヲ撰テ保管スベシ

電報（秘密番号法）

東京 一九四二年十月四日

待受分 S

着 一九四二年十月四日

一三時五分

至急報

十月四日附才一九四号

獨逸外務大臣宛

十月一日附才一九六〇号の電報を告参照

PPOL 八三ヨル

註特別列車宛才三三五号ニテ轉送 四一年十月四日附

TELL-K 七 R

前、報告ニテ述ベタ如ク、日米交渉ハ米玉ガ支那問題系
 ヤル其ノ態度ヲ根本的ニ變更セザル限り——之ハ米玉ハ
 困難テアルカモ知レナイガ——效果無ク過ヤムルト恐ハレル。
 勿論亦決裂ノ後ニ取ル可キ改革ニ関シ或ル程度ノ因感感
 カ日本ニ存在シ續テヤル。日本ハソノ歴史ニ始メテ物的ノ孤号、
 諸敵ニ包圍サレテヤルト感シテヤル。日本ハ樂觀的且主戰
 論的ニ武力的ニ方レル支那デカ試シテ爲シテ而シテ輝カシイ
 個々ニ成功モ不稱此ノ事變ヲ空想的ニ成功裡ニ終結セシメ
 得テトイフ印象ヲ受ケテヤル。本玉ガ於ケル此ノ感シ以テ陸軍
 ノ支那ニ於ケル長期ニ渉ル駐屯勤務ハ日本ニ改革力及ニ戦
 争精神ヲ害シタカモ知レヌ。七月ニ開始サレテ動員ヘ之ガ多ク
 經濟的及物質的ノ缺乏ヲ表面化シタ事ニ依リ劣弱感ヲ更

増大シタトイフ印象ヲ禁ゾ得ナイ。其レモ不拘 最近數週間
軍ニ無爲ニ待期スル事ニ依ツテハ日本目的ハ促進サレ日本存
在ハ保全セヨトイフアラトイフ認識ガ高マシ。軍部指導者(陸軍
大臣參謀總長政治及ビル五軍課長)精細ナル打診ノ結果
彼等ノ見解ヲ次ノ如ク想像シ得ク。

『三玉條約ハ英帝皇ノ打倒ヨリヨーロッパ及ビ極東ニ於ケルソ
 新シイ勢力カノ分配ヲ誘致スルニ役立ツトイフ固有ノ目的ヲ有スル。
 アメリカニ對スル防禦トソ聯ト排除ハ比目ノ爲ノ手段タリ得ル
 ニ過ギヌ。』獨逸ガ聯ト戰闘ヲ開始シ軍事的天體成功裡
 ニ戰闘ヲ遂行シ後ハ出來ル又速カニ之ヲ經由シ三條約ニ
 ノ連絡ヲ復活シシ。全精力ヲ込テ。極東ニ英領諸島ニ於ケ
 ル英帝ノ打倒ニ集中スル事ガ肝要ナル。歐露ニ於ケル作戦
 ハソ聯ノ軍隊ハ撃破サレテ改權ノ政治的崩壞ハ之ニ依ツテ自
 動的ニハ起ラカウ事ヲ示シタ。日本ノ未ダ依然トシテ戰闘舞
 イト云ハヒキル極東軍ニ對スル文戰ハ改權ノ道德的潰滅カ起ラ
 ス限リ。東春迄ハ不可能デアト。ソ聯ガ獨逸ニ對シ示シテ
 議サヘ八月カ九月ニ日本ガ攻撃ヲナシテモシマレハソ聯ハ本年申ニ
 ソ聯通セラレ得ヌト推察セシムル。』此ノ目的ニ將來到達スル爲メ
 ニソ聯道ガ在ル。『モスコウ』攻略後ソエソト改權ノ豫想セラル多ク
 損害ヲ殘余露西臣ヲ自發的ニ協力セシムル爲メ利用スルカ
 一此ニハ日本ハ冬期間ニ任意時ニ極東ニ於ケル露西臣ヲ輸送シ
 屋迫ラカヘル事ニ依リ貢獻シ得ル。—— 然ラバ東春ニモヤ
 ヲ西ト東カニ攻撃シ得ル。其際ニハ日本ハ支那事及ノ負擔ニモ不
 拘ソレカ可能デアラウ。後者ノ場合ニモ然レ通過スル地域ハ極メテ廣

大テアラウシ共同作戰ハ容易トハテアラウ。其ノ結果此ノ場合ニ於テモ暫クシテカラ政治的解決カ薦メラレテアラウ。

南方ニ於ケル米英ノ地位ニ対スル日本ノ武力的進出ハ季節トハ其關係デアル。近東ニ於ケル米英ノ據点ニ対スル、独逸ノ進出トハ其同作戰ハ努力カニ値スルガ無制限ニ待タスベキデハ無ク、英帝皇ニ対スル勝利ハ勿論、我々ノ西面作戰ガ印度ノ地位ヲ搖リ動カヌ時始メテ完全ニナルデアラウト。

余ハ此ノ内々ノ...
(用ニ部缺カモモト也)...
ハノ要請ト其ニ參謀總長列席ノ下ニ

陸軍大臣ニヨリナサレタル詳海ヲ余ニサケタル如ク繰返ヌ。之ハ露西亞トノ戦役ニ対レ如何ナル見解ニ立ツニナルカヲ彼等ノ腹藏ナキ特色ニ於テ明瞭ニ示レテナル。此ノ詳海ヲ多更ニ主トシテ艦隊ガ引受ケナケレバナク此ノ南進政策ハ其レ程考慮サレテモ居ラス準備カレテモ居ナイ事ガ更ニ現レル。大使館附武

官等ト同様 余モ少ク支陸軍側ニ於ケル見掛ケ丈ケ熟慮ハ表面ニモテアリ準備ノ状態ハ初期ノ侵略以テ南進ノ成功ハ保證レナイ。ト云フ印象ヲ受ケタ。佛蘭西(一部不^明)ニ於テハ一致シタ情報ニ依ル此迄未ダ全ク僅カテ軍中ノ施設ガ作ラレタ^過ギ又軍隊ガ近代の資材ニテ比較的僅カレカ武装セラレテ居ラヌ事、連絡線ノ長大就中統一のテ強イ意志ハ之見指揮ヲ有レテキナイトイフ感じハ日本軍部カラ成功ニ不可缺ナ自信ヲトツテナル。其故ニ現在ノ政府ハ南進政策ヲ更ニ延期モ下試ミルデアラウト假定スベキデアル。

三、同盟の意味ニ於ケル日本活動ハ、日本ニ明皇ヲ天同目的
 (ベリッパ通路若クハ、近東或ハ東亞ニ於ケル共同攻撃)ヲ持ツ作
 戦ノ可能性ヲ、技術的且政治的ニ見ヨケル。最モ早く連日
 ラルデアラフ。其後ニ若ク露西亞戦線ヲ、滿洲里ハ、長距
 離飛行ガ実行セルヲハ是ハ當地ニ於テ恐ラ大ナル印象ヲ
 与ヘルデアラフ。此尚モ無ク技術的ニ可能ニルデアラフ。日本人
 形式主義者の性格ニ鑑ミ、三、協定ニ於テ是ノ發起ニ
 規定セヨク。委員会ニ、天同ノ軍事的、経済的及政治的
 課題ノ討議ヲ斡旋スル試ミハ相当ノ準備ノ後為サル。
 キカ否カニ付、今一、提案シ、右ク思フ。相提マテ良イト云フ感
 情ハ他ノ矣。テハ協力ニ應ズ。群衆ヲ困ラセ、ソノ最大弱點即チ彼
 等ノ自負心ニ觸レルノデアアル。

前述ノ軍部指導者ノ詳論ニハ、米軍ノ参戦ニ付イテハ、
 述ベテキナ。余ハ、彼等ガ米軍ガ或ハ、軍事的考慮ニ於テ参
 戦スルカモ知ラズ。予ヲ殆ド余ク友外視シ、又ハ無視シ、而シテ常
 ニ英帝心ノミヲ仇敵ト稱シキルト確信シ得ル。

此ノ下ハ部分的ニハ疑モ無ク、日米交渉ノ余リ考シカザル経
 過ヲ知ラセザイトイフ希望カラ説明セル。

然レトウ、更ニ強イノハ、屢々報導セシタ。果シト恐ラ多見
 透シ着カス紛争ニ陥ルトシテ、隔世遺傳的恐怖デアル。此
 ノ紛争ヲ日本ノ国家ノ指導ハ極端ナ困難ノ場合ニミ
 遠行ポイント欲スリノ時期ヲ自カラ決定ポイント欲スルカクトモ之
 ヲ共同テ決定ポイント欲スル。協定ヲ三項ノ意味ニ於ケル攻撃
 ガ存在スルカ否カトイフ問題ハ、三、共同討議ヲ決セラレバ

ナラズト云る人、日本人ノ性格ニ適應スル許リテ無ク日本ノ国家
 指導ノ見解ニ適合スルアル。余ハ外務大臣、松岡ガ既ニ交渉
 指導者ニシテ、スターモトニ便及、余トノニ不協定ニ關スル当地
 交渉ニ際シ、此ニ關スル具體的確定ヲ固執セラルヲ想スル。其
 未由ト、紛争ハ不可避ズルト云フ感情ハ増大セラレタリ。我々ニ取
 ヲテハ、然レ、日本ガ何時、殊ニ依ルト共同ニテ紛争ヲスベキカト云
 フ決定ヲスニスル、トイフカ最大ノ意味ヲ持ツテキル。
 余カ余ニ兵ヘラ多制令、茲ニ伯林ニテ怒リテ、言論統制ニ從
 ヲテ對テ、戦ノ今後ノ遂行及、結果、軍事上ノ政治ニ、考
 弱ニ付、論ガ多シク、特ニ述ベル必要ハ無シ。日本ニ於テ、現在ノ勢
 カ關係ニ鑑ミ、然レ、作ラ、述、多シク、立場ヲ現在考慮ニ入レテ
 ケレバ、ナシ、殊ニ海軍見解ハ、陸軍指導者ノ、評論ト、大体
 一致スルカ、アル。
 政界ノ立場ニ關シテハ、續イテ報告スルデアラウ。

オット

4065A

書類ヲ四〇六五A號

證

余 *Ulrich Stearns* ハ、余ガ独逸語及ロ
 果語ニ精通ス者ナルコト显ニ独逸語
 原文及ロ 日本語原文ヲ对照ノ上右ハ本書
 類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證ス
 事ニ證ス

Ulrich A. Stearns

No 6

MIND

E. Sh.
proofed

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

19 Sept. , 1946

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4065 A for Taranenko.

Arrange for reproduction of 135 copies in English and
105 copies in Japanese as follows:

Eng ST: If any questions concerning this translation please see
Lt. Strauss in translation and beat his head but good..!

Cut certificate at end also.

G. Koncz

9-30

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

STRAUS

7 August, 1946

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4065 B for Onoto.

Arrange for translation as follows:

Items 1, 5 and 14: German-English,

German-Japanese translation and Three way check.

Checked - U. Straus

Jba

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

Ditto done 13 Sep but held for cert.
Fred

Straw

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

~~STRAITZ~~

6 Sept, 1946

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4065B for Queto

Arrange for translation as follows:

*It appears to me that Item 4 & not
Item 5 was translated. The original
request was for Items 1, 5, & 14.*

MBA

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

Mr. Oneto,

Your request is for items 1, 5, & 14. Your note requests only items 5 & 14. If you wish to cancel item 1 of Doc. No. 4665B, please send a check sheet to Lt. Ohberg, Rm 364, so stating. If you wish all three items, as per your original request, I will go ahead with the duplication.

Miss Allen

Miss Allen.

Please, will you be so kind to go ahead for the three items 1, 5, and 14.

Robert Frey

10-9-46.

書類番號 四〇六五

電報 (暗号ナ)

パリ、独逸ノ休戦經濟代表 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月廿二時
着 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月一日二時

一九四一年十月一日付 經代・第四六七號

一九四一年九月二十二日付電送電報第一五二号へ返電^{+) Hapol 6075 G III}

件名、佛印生ゴムー日米ニ就テノ中間報告

ド・ボアサンゲンヤ議長トスル佛蘭西代表ト上述ノ電送電報
ノ指令ニ從ツテ交渉が行ハレタ。ド・ボアサンゲンハ先ヅ最初ニ、
私ニ依ツテ一九四一年(昭和十六年)九月二十二日電送電報 第
四五四号ヲ以テ報告シタル佛領印度支那總督ヘノ指令ヲ
日本ノ希望スル九月分ノ五千噸ニ適用スル事ヲ明カニ確認
シタ。ソレト關聯シツツ彼ハ果國向ノ五千噸ノ供給ニ對ス
ル日本ノ承認ヲ得ル爲ノ佛蘭西ノ努力ニ當リ独逸ノ支援
ヲ求メル彼ノ政府ノ懇請ヲ持々出シタノデアッタ。佛印ハ
外デ得ラレナイ生活必需品ヲ獲得スル爲ニコノ賣却ニ依ル收
入ヲ切ニ必要トシ、独ノ中間質問ニ對シテ果國ハ佛ノ封鎖
資金ヲ解放モシナイシ亦マルク金ヲ斯カル物品代金ノ
支拂ニ受取ラナイダラウト言明シタ。佛ノ希望ハ、指令ト相
反スルノデ拒絕サレタ。
昨日ド・ボアサンゲンハ私ニ、會議ニ於テ提出サレタ我々ノ要求
ニ對シ彼ノ政府ノ答ニ於テ次ノ如ク答ヘタ、政府ハ独逸ノ
態度ヲ尊重シ目下懸案ニナツテキル日本トノ交渉ニ當

No. 1

テモ独逸ノ立場ヲ考慮スルデアラウト。ヨリ廣汎ナ言明
ニツイテハ彼ハ何等ノ權限ヲ有シナイト。私ハド・ホアサンヂエ
ニモラ一度独逸ノ要請ノ切實サヲ指摘シ更メテ、當ニ日本
ノマナラズ独逸政府モ亦佛印ヨリ米國ニ對スル生ゴムノ今後
ノ輸出ヲ許容シナイデアラウ旨ヲ表明シタ。独逸國代表
者イニエレハソノ間ベルリンヘ出發シタ。

彼ハ佛蘭西代表ニ日本ノ希望シタ追加ノ五〇〇噸ノ使用ヲ差
シ當リ十月分ニ確保スル様ニ盛ニスヌメタ。事務ハ此處デハ至
急ニ續イテ處理サレテキル。ソレニ就テノ報告ハ留保サレテ
キル。

ヘンメン

電報 (平文)

パリ 一九四一年(昭和十五年)十月六日ニ。時四十五分

着 一九四一年(昭和十五年)十月六日ニ三時三十分

一九四一年十月五日付 第三〇三一号

内閣書記官長ベヌアムミヤンハ今日會談ニ於テ次ノ如ク報
告シタ。即チ印度支那ニ於テハ毎日日本トノ大イナル困
難が確認サレテキルト。日本ハニニノ例外ヲ除イテ條約ノ軍
事的條項ヲ嚴守シテキルノニ。夫ハ段々トフランスノ經濟的
且ツ政治的主權ヲ損傷シタト。ダルランハヴイシー内閣ニ於
テソノ當時日本ニ依ッテ希望サレタ印度支那トノ調整ノ

タメ個人的ニ非常ニ強ク身ヲ挺シテ來タ、ト云フノハ彼ハ他ノ
 政策ガアングロサクソンニ干渉ノ爲、口實ヲ與ヘルカモ知シヌ
 事ヲ~~隠~~レ且ツソレ以外ニ彼ハ三國同盟ヲ署名シタ一國トノ善
 キ關係ヲ恢復セント欲シタカラデアル。印度支那ニ於ケルフラ
 ンスノ主權ニ對スル日本ノ侵略的行動ニ依ツテ、フランス政府内
 ニ、ダルランノ立場ガ正シイカ否カノ疑惑ガ喧シクナツテ居リ
 且ツ印度支那ノフランス軍部並ビニ官廳筋ニ於テ彼ノ政
 策及對者ノ硬化モ~~恐~~ルベキデアルト、
 明カニ東京ニ於ケル独逸ノ干渉ヲネラツテキルベヌア・ムシヤン
 ノ報告ニ對シ私ノ態度ハ受容的デアッタ。

アベツ

電報 (秘密暗号ノ法)

東京 一九四一年(昭和十六年) 十月十五日 午前六時
 着 合 十五日 十五時五分

秘密國家事項

十月十四日付第二〇九五号 秘密事項トシテノミ取

扱、事

十月八日付第一七七五号ノ電報訓令ニ對スル返電 廿 P.O.II G.R.S
 當地ノ觀察ハ、サイゴン公使館顧問ノイマンニ依テ
 最近ベルリンへ報告サレタ狀況圖ヲ確認スルモノデアリ
 佛印ノ占領ハ二期サレタ如ク摩擦ナシニ進行シタ
 モノデアナイ。

私ガ外務省カラ聞イタ所ニヨレバ、防衛協定ノ解釋ニ就テ多クノ争莫ガアルト。論争ハ重慶ニ依ッテ任命サレタ支那ノ領事ノ取扱、或ル飛行機ノ讓渡、宿舎ト現品トノ接收、原住民ノ間ニ日本軍隊ニヨル反佛宣傳等々。フランス大使ハ数々ノ抗議ニ着手シ且ツ不平ノ種ヲ取除ク様^程ヲ迫ツタ。日本政府ハ、サイゴンヨリノ報告ニ依リハ現在ニ五千ヲ算スル上占領要員ヲ四万ニ増加スル意圖デアアル。外務省ニ依リ私ニ次ノ如ク確言サレタ。日佛協定ハ日本ノ占領兵力ニ對シ何等上限ノ制限ヲ規定シテオナイト。

日本政府ハ先ツ出先軍部ニヨル數々ノ要求ヲフランス植民地總督府ニ實現サセル意圖ヲ持ツテオナハ様ニ思ハレル。既定ノ事實ガ創ラレテ始メテ佛印問題處理ノ爲ニ決定サレタル前外務大臣其ノ澤ガ西貢ヘ出發スル事ハ明カデアアル。其ハ私ノ聞ク所ニヨレバ十月初旬以前ニ起ラヌト。

兩者ハ公然タル衝突ニ到ル事ハナイト云フ印象ヲ私ハ持ツテオナハ。日本政府ハ防衛同盟ノ外觀ヲ維持セント努力シ且ツソレ以外ニ公然ノ衝突ニアツテ植民地總督府及ヒ原住民ノ無抵抗ニヨリ該地域ノ經濟的利用性ノ挾搾化ヲ恐レテオナハテアル。外務次官ガ私ニ語ツタ如ク、本年既ニ松岡ニ依リ締結サレタ協定ニ基キ七十万噸ノ非膏ニ必要ナル

米ノ量ヲ確保シテキルト。然レ收穫ノ見込ハ一層
 良好ナルタメ尚ヨリ大ナル量ヲ得タイト望ムデキルト。
 非武装地帯ノ統轄ニ関スル國境委員會ニ於
 ケル日泰論争ハ外務省ニヨツテ否認サレタ。
 委員會ハソノ仕事ヲ始メクバカリデアル。
 西貢ヘ同電アリタシ

オット

書類第四〇六五B號

證

余 *Ulrich Staus* は余が獨逸語及び日本語ニ
 精通セル者ナルコト並ニ獨逸語原文及び日本語
 原文ヲ對照ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確
 ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證マルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Ulrich Staus

Doc. No. 40657

Bulby Wick

書類番号ヤ中の木々々

錠ヲ掛ケ保管ス

電報 (秘密暗号法)

東京 一九四一年十月四日 二時五七分 S

着 一九四一年十月四日 一三時二五分

至急報

十月四日付ヤ一九七四号

獨逸国外務大臣宛

十月二日付ヤ一九六〇号⁺電報々告参照 +

カ POL ハニヨル

註 特別列車宛ヤ三三五一号ニテ轉送 四一年十月四日附

TEL. K 77

前報告ニテ述ヘタ如ク、日米交渉ハ米國ガ支那問

題ニ於ケル其ノ態度ヲ根本的ニ変更セザル限リ

——之ハ米國ニ困難ヲアルカモ知レナイガ——效果無ク過キ去

決裂

ルト思ハレル。 勿論亦 難航ニ陥ル後ニ取ル可キ政策ニ

31 Day Week

2
固シ或ル程度、困惑感が日本ニ存在シ續ケテキル。

日本ハソノ歴史上始メテ物的ニ孤立シ、諸敵國ニ包圍

主戰論

サレテキルト感ジテキル。日本ハ樂觀的且備突的ニ

武力的ニ劣レル支那ヲ力試シテ存シ、而シテ

輝カレイ個々ノ成功ニモ不拘此ノ幸変ヲ軍事的ニ成

受ケ

本國ニ於テ

功裡ニ終結セシメ得ナイトイフ印象ヲ與ヘラキル。此ノ

感ジ以上ニ本國ニ於テ、陸軍ノ支那ニ於ケル長期ニ

涉ル駐屯勤務ハ日本ノ攻撃力及ヒ犧牲精神ヲ害シ

タカモ知レヌ。七月ニ開始サレタ勤員ハ之ガ多クノ經濟

乏

的及物質的、缺陷ヲ表面化シタ事ニ依リ劣弱感ヲ

更ニ増大シタトイフ印象ヲ禁ジ得ナイ。

John Black

了

其レモ不拘、最近數週間、軍ニ無事ニ待期スル事ニ依

フテハ日本ノ目的ハ促進セズ日本存立ハ保全セラレタ

高マツタ。

デアラウトイフ認識が自以テ、軍部ハ指導者ノ(陸軍大

臣、參謀總長、政治及ビ外國軍課長)精細ナル打診

ノ結果彼等ノ見解ノ次ノ如ク想像ニ得タ。

三國條約ハ英帝國ノ打倒ニヨリヨーロッパ及ビ極東

ニ於ケル一ツ新レイ勢力ノ分配ヲ誘致スルニ役立ツトイフ固

排除

有ノ目的ヲ有スル。アメリカニ対スル防禦トソ聯ノ進斷ハ此ノ

目的ノ爲ノ手段アリ得ルニ過ギヌ。

大体

獨逸ガソ聯ト戰鬥ヲ南

始シ軍事的ニ廣ク成功裡ニ(戰鬥)遂行シタ後ハ、出來

ル丈速カニシベリア經由ノ三條約國ノ連絡ヲ復活シ、全精力

3/20/41 check

ヲ近東、極東並ニ英領諸島ニ於ケル英國ノ打倒
ニ集中スル事ガ肝要ナル。 歐露ニ於ケル作戦ハソ

聯ノ軍隊ハ撃破サレタガ政権ノ政治的崩壊ハ之ニ依ツテ

自動的ニ起ラナカッタ事ヲ示シタ。 日本ハ未ダ依然ト

レテ戦闘ニ強イト云ハレテナル極東軍ニ対スル交戦ハ

不可能ナルト。

政権ノ道德的潰滅ガ起ラズ限リ、未春迄ハ起リサカモ無い。

ソ聯ガ獨逸ニ対レ示レタ頑強サハ八月カ九月ニ日本ガ攻撃

用

ヲナレタモ、レベリアノ通路ハ本年中ニ打通セラレ得ヌト推察セ

ラル。 此ノ目的ニ將來到達スル迄ニハニッノ道ガ在ル。 モスコ

残余ノ

ウレ改略後ソビエツト政権ニ豫想セラレル多大ノ損害ヲ露

西亜ヲ自發的ニ協力セシメル為ニ利用スルカ——此ニハ

John Clerk

5

日本ハ冬期間ニモ任意ノ時ニ極東ニ於ケル露西亞ノ輸送ニ
壓迫ヲ加ヘル事ニ依リ貢獻シ得ル——然ラザルハ

來春シベリヤ^ヲ西ト東カラ攻撃シ得ル。其際ニハ日本ハ

ソレカ可能デアラウ。

支那並ニ負擔ニモ不拘此ノ^ノ態勢ヲトリテアキウ。

後者ノ場合ニモ然レ通過スヘキ地域ハ極メテ廣大デ

アラウン共同作戰ハ容易デハナイデアラウ。其ノ結果

此ノ場合ニ於テモ暫クシテカラ政治的解決ガ薦メラレ

ルデアラウ。

地位

南方ニ於ケル米英ノ據地ニ對スル日本ノ武力的進出ハ季子

節トハ無自係デアル。近東ニ於ケル米英ノ據地ニ對ス

ル獨逸ノ進出トノ共同作戰ハ努力ニ値スルガ無制限

30 Day Week

結果ヲ待テハキテハ無イ。英帝國ニ対スル勝利ハ

勿論、我々ノ西面作戰ガ印度ノ地位ヲ搖リ動カス

時始メテ完全ニナルデアラフト。

余ハ此ノ内々ノ………^十ノ要請ト共ニ參謀總長列

十) 一句不明ナルモノノ如シ

席ノ下ニ陸軍大臣ニヨリナサレタル詳論ヲ 余ニナサレタル

ル如ク描寫スル。之ハ露西亞トノ戰役ニ對シ如何ニ

見解ニ出シテユルカク行テテノ陸軍大臣ニ對シ於テ

指揮ガ善サレルカク 腹藏ナク、奇異ニ明瞭ニ表シテ

ナル。此ノ詳論カラ更ニ主トシテ艦隊ガ引受ケル此ノ

南進政策ハ其レ程優レテモ居ラス準備サレテモ居ナイ

事ガ推測サレシ。大使館附武官トシテ余モ少ク共

陸軍側ニ於ケル見掛ケ丈ゲノ熟慮ハ表面上ノモノデ

アリ、準備ノ状態ハ初期ノ侵略以上ニハ南進ノ成功ハ

3rd Day check

保証シテイ、ト云フ印象ヲ受テタ。佛蘭西(一部不明)

ニ於テハ一致シテ情報ニ依レバ、此迄未ダ全ク僅クナ

軍事施設が作ラレタニ過ギ又。軍隊が近代の資材

ニテ比較的僅カレカ武装セテ居ラ又事、連絡線ノ長大

就中 統一的ナ強イ意志ニヨリ指揮ヲ有シテオナイトイフ感じ

日本軍部ニ成功ニ不可缺ナ自信ヲ興ヘタ。其故ニ

現在ノ政府ハ南進政策ヲ更ニ推シ進メント試ミルデアラウ

ト見ル可キテアル。

三國同盟ノ^{意味}主旨ニ於ケル日本ノ活動ハ、日本ニ明白ナ

共同目的(シベリア通路、若クハ近東或ハ東亞ニ於ケル共

同攻撃)ヲ持ツ作戰ノ可能性ヲ、技術的且政治的ニ見セタ

場合 最も早ク得ラレルデアラウ。其故ニ若シ露西亞戰

3rd Day Desk

線カラ滿州里ヘノ長距離飛行ガ實行サレルナラバ、是ハ當地ニ於テ恐ラク大ナル印象ヲ與ヘルデアラウ。此ハ固モ無ク技術的ニ可能ニナル事ナリ。日本人ノ形式主義者ノ性格ニ

鑑ミ、三國協定ニ於テ日本ノ發起ニテ規定セラレタル委員會ニ共同ノ軍事的、經濟的及政治的課題ノ討議

ヲ斡旋スル試ミハ相当ノ準備ノ後為サル可キカ否カニ

付、今一度適當ノ考慮ヲ求メ度ク思フ。相談サレ度

良 且無イトイフ感情ハ他ノ莫テハ協力ニ堪スルハ困ラセ

ソノ最大ノ弱矣即チ彼等ノ自負心ニ觸レルノデアアル。

前述ノ軍部指導者ノ詳論ニハ米國ノ参戰ニ付テハ

速ヘテホナイ。余ハ彼等ガ米國ガ或ヒハ軍事的考慮

ヲ始メタカモ知レ又事ヲ度外視シ又ハ無視シ而シテ

3rd Day check

9

常ニ英帝國ノミシ^仇敵手ト称シテキルト確言シ得ル。

此ノ事ハ部分的ニハ疑モ無ク、白米會談^{之指リ余リ若シカラザル}始メキレタ許リ

の經過ヲ知ラセ、~~其ク~~無イトイフ希望カラ明~~カ~~カ~~レ~~ル。

然レモラ更ニ強イハ、¹³屢々報導セラレタ、采國ト恐ラク

見透^レノ着カヌ紛争ニ¹³陥ルト云フ、隔世遺傳的恐怖

デアル。此ノ紛争ヲ日本ノ國家ノ指導ハ極端ナ困

窮ニ¹³導^カカモ知^レズ、ソノ時期ヲ自カラ決定スルカモ知

スルカ、少クトモ^{セント欲スル}、^{セント欲スル}之ヲ共同テ決定スルカモ知^レズ。協定ナ

三項ノ意味ニ於ケル攻撃^ノが存在スルカ否カトイフ由顯ハ三

國ノ共同討議テ決セラレネハナラヌトイフ事ハ日本人ノ性

格ニ適庶スル許^リテ無ク日本ノ國家指導ノ見解

ニモ合フデアル。余ハ外務大臣松岡が既ニ議長

之指被はす也

Erwan Clerk

テアウタ
トオダ
スター
大使及余トノ三國協定ニ因スル本
交渉

謝議ニ際シ此ニ因スル具体的確定ヲ固執シタ事ヲ
想ヒ出サセル。

ハ不可避ナリ
米國トノ紛争ヲ掛リ合ヒ度々異イトイフ感情ハ増大シ

テホル。我々ニ取ツテハ然レ日本ガ何時殊ニ依ルト共同シテ紛争
最大ノ

ヲナスベキカドモ決定ヲ共ニスル、トイフ事ガヨリ大キキ意味ヲ
持ツテホル。

余ガ余ニ與ヘラレタ訓令茲ニ伯林ニテ發セラレタ言論統制

ニ従フテ對ソ戰ノ今後ノ遂行及ビ米英ノ軍事上政治

上ノ弱事ニ付論シタ事ヲ特ニ速ヘレ必要ハ無イ。日本ニ於ケル

現在シ
勢力固係ニ付然レ作ラ上述シタ立場事現在評價サ

七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百

リホハサマ、殊ニ海軍ノ見解ハ陸軍指導者ノ詳論ト

3 Day look

一致スルキャラクター。

政界ノ立場ニ因リテハ續イテ報告スルデアリウ。

オフト。

~~大のオセキ~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Watts

11 Sept., 1946

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

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*Done 16 Sep but held for certificate
Fred*

Doc. No. 4065 B

~~The Why Check~~

書類番号 4065

電報

(暗号手)

パリ: 狹逸ニ休戦経情代表

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月一日二時

着

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月一日二三時

一九四一年十月一日付 経代・オ四六七號

一九四一年九月二十一日付電報(送電) 一五ニキム、返電カ

Ha Pol 6095 4 III

件名、佛印生ゴム(日米)ニ就テ、中向報止

ド・ホアサン^ニ議長トスル佛蘭西代表ト、上述、電送電報、

指令ニ従ツテ交渉が行ハレタ。ド・ホアサン^ニハ先ツ最初ニ、^ニ和ニ依ツテ

一九四一年(昭和十六年)九月二十一日 電送電報 オ四五四号ヲ以テ 報シロシタル

佛領印度支那総督ヘ、指令ヲ、日本ノ希望スル九月分ノ五千噸ニ適用

スル事ヲ明カニ確認シタ。ソレト因肝シツツ彼ハ、米同ノ五千噸ノ

~~Miss G. J. Clark~~

供給ニ対スル日本ノ承認ヲ得ルヲメノ佛蘭西ノ努力ニ依リ独逸ノ支援

ヲ拒ル佛ノ政府ノ懇請ヲ持テ出シテアツタ。佛印ハ、非テ得ラ

レナイ生活必需品ヲ獲得スル為ニコノ賣却ニ依ル收入ヲ切ニ必要

トシ、獨ノ中國境內ニ對シテ米國ハ佛ノ封鎖撤去ヲ解放モクナイシ

亦マルクニツク金ヲ斯カル物品代金ノ支拂ニ受取ラナイタラウト

言明シタ。佛ノ希望ハ、指令ト相及スルノテ、拒絶サレタ

昨日、ド・ホアサニエハ私ニ、會議ニ於テ提出サレタ我々ノ要求ニ

對シ彼ノ政府ノ答ニ於テ次ノ如ク答ヘタ、政府ハ独逸ノ態度ヲ尊重シ

目下懸案ニツケテ日本トノ交渉ニ當ツテモ独逸ノ立場ヲ考

慮スルデアラウト。ヨリハ凡ソ言明ニツイテハ彼ハ何等ノ權限ヲ

有シナイト。私ハド・ホアサニエニモウ一度独逸ノ要請ノ切實ヲ

指摘シ更メテ、當ニ日本ノミナラス獨逸ノ政府モ亦佛印ヨリ

~~Manly Clark~~

米國ニ対スル 生ゴムノ今後ノ輸出ヲ許容シナイテアラウ旨

ヲ表シタ。明 独逸國代表者イエーレハソノ向ハルリンハ出タシタ。

彼ハ、佛蘭西代表ニ日本ノ希望シテ^{追加ノ}噸ヲ^{使用}差シタリ

十月分ニ確保スル様ニ盛ニスヌメタ。事務ハ此処テハ至るニ

ト^後理サレテナル。ソレニ矣ニノ報セヨ^ノ留保サレテナル。

ハンメン

These My Check

4065-B

電報 (平文)

パリ 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月六日ニ。時四十五分

着 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月六日ニ。時三十分

一九四一年十月六日付 第三〇三号

内閣書記官長へヌア・ムニヤンハ今日会議ニ於テ次ノ如ク報告

シタ、即チ印度支那ニ於テハ、毎日、日本ト、大イテル困難ヲ決定サレリ

キルト。日本ハ、ニ、三ノ例外ヲ除イテ條約、軍事的條項ヲ嚴守シ、キルトノニ

夫ハ段々トフランスノ経済的且ツ政治的を確ク損傷シタト。カイルン

ハ、グアテマール内閣ニ於テ、ソノ者時、日本ニ依ツテ希望サレタ、印度支那

トノ調整ノタメ、^{國人的}非常ニ強ク身ヲ挺ニテキルキ、ト云フ、ハ、彼ハ、他ノ政策

カ、ニテ、^{ニテ}キルキ、タメ、口裏ヲキル

ハ、干渉ヲ拒スル、アングロサクソン勢力ヲ棄テ入レルカモ知レヌ、事ヲ内心レ且ツソレ

~~3456789~~

以外ニ三子同盟ヲ署名セシメトノ言キ肉係ヲ恢復セント欲シ

ヲカラテアル。印度支那ニ於ケルフランスノ立権ニ對スル日本ノ侵

略的行動ニ依ツテフランス政府内ニ、ケルランノ立場カ正コイカ

否カノ疑惑カ喧コクナシテ居リ、且ツ印度支那ノフランス軍部

並ニ官廳筋ニ於テ彼ノ反對者ノ硬化カモ存心セハキテアルト。

明カニ東洋ニ於ケル独逸ノ干渉ヲネラワセナルハメア・ウシヤンノ

、然否ハ主要的ニテアルカ。

報告ニ對シテ私ハソノ報告ヲ受ケトルトイフ態度ヲ取ワタ

アベツ

~~None May Check~~

電報 (秘密暗号法)

東京 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月十五日 午前六時

着

全

十五日 十五時二十分

秘密國家事項

十月十四日付第二〇九五号

秘密事項より取扱等

十月八日付第一七七五号 電報訓令ニ対スル返電

Pol II
G.Rs.

当地、觀察ハ、サイゴン公使館顧問ノイマンニ依テ最近報告サレタ

狀況圖ヲ確認スルモノテアル。佛印ノ占領ハ、予期サレタ如ク、摩擦

ナシニ進行シタモノテハナイ。

和ノ外務界内カラ向イタ所ニヨレハ、防衛協定ノ解釋ニ就テ

多クノ争點カアルト。論争ハ重慶ニ依ツテ任命サレタ支那

領事ノ取扱、或ハ飛行機ノ讓渡、宿舍ト眼品トノ差押、

日本軍隊ニヨリ

原住民ノ間ニ及佛宣傳等々。フランス大使ハ数々ノ抗議文書ニ

~~Free Day Club~~

着手シ且ツ不平、種ヲ取り除ク様 強ク迫ツタ。

日本政府ハ、サイゴンヨリノ報告ニ依レバ現在ニ萬五千

占領

ヲ算スル要塞要員ヲ四萬ニ増加スル意圖デアル。外務省

ニ依リ私ニ次ノ如ク確言サレタ、日佛協定ハ日本、^{占領}軍兵力ニ

對シ^{何等}上限ノ制限ヲ規定シテナシト。

日本政府ハ、先ヅ出先^{テマ}軍部ニヨル數々ノ要求ヲフラン

ス植民地總督府ニ實現サセル意圖ヲ持ツテナル様ニ思ハ

レル。既定ノ事實員ガ創ラレテ始メテ、佛印問題処理ノ

為ニ決定サレタル前外務大臣芳澤ガ西貢へ出發スル事ハ

明カテアル、其ハ私ノ聞ク所ニヨレバ十一月初旬以前ニハ起

ラヌト見ハレテナル。

Amey W. Black

兩者ハ公然タル衝突ニ到ル事ハナイト云フ印象ヲ私ハ持ツ
テアル。日本政府ハ防衛同盟ノ外觀ヲ維持セント欲カシ
且ツソレ以外ニ公然ノ衝突ニアソテ植民地總督府及び
原住民ノ定^{無抵抗}ヨリ^{該地域ノ}経済的利用性、挾搾
化ヲ恐レテアルノテアル。外務次官ガ私ニ語ツタ如ク、
本年既ニ、松岡ニ依リ締結サレタ協定ニ基キ七十
萬噸^米ノ割当量ヲ切^キ確保シテアルト。然レ收穫、
見込ガ一層良好ナルタメ尙^ハ増量ヲ得タイト望ンデアルト。
非武装化^加帯ノ統轄ニ関スル事境委員会ニ於ケル
日泰論争ハ外務省ニヨツテ否認サレタ。
委員會ハソノ仕事ヲ始メタハカリテアル。

~~Three Day Check~~

西貢へ同電アリタシ

オット

E. Sh

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

11 Sept, 1946

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

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9-18

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

*attach to
ag 788A*



DOCUMENT DIVISION

9-18 1946

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Ex. 654-A

Doo 4065A

後ヲ掛ケ保管スベシ
電報（秘密暗号法）

康系 一九四一年十月四日
着 一九四一年十月四日

一時五分
一三時五分

至急報

十月四日附才一九四四号
獨逸至外務大臣宛

十月二日附才一九四〇号ヲ電報之告参照
F.P.O.L. 八三ヨル

註特別列車宛才三三三三号ニ轉送 四一年十月四日附
T.E.L. K 七 Y

Ex 654

前報告ニテ述ベタ如ク日米交渉ハ米至ガ支那問題ニ於
ケル其ノ態度ヲ根本的ニ變更セザル限り——之ハ米至ハ
困難ナルカモ知レシイガ——效果無ク過ギタルト思ハレル。
勿論亦決裂ノ後ニ取ル可キ政策ニ関シ或ル程度ノ困惑感
ハ日本ニ存在シ續キテ居ル。日本ハソノ歴史ニ始メテ物的孤立シ、
諸敵至ニ包圍テ居ルト感シテ居ル。日本ハ樂觀的且主戰
論的ニ武力的ニ方レル支那ニテカ試シテ居シ而シテ輝カシイ
個々ノ成功モ不拘此ノ事變ヲ軍事的成功裡ニ終結セシメ
得テイトイフ印象ヲ受ケテ居ル。本至ガ於ケル此ノ感シ以上ニ陸軍
ノ支那ニ於ケル長期ニ渉ル駐屯勤務ハ日本ニ攻撃力及ビ犠
牲精神ヲ害シタカモ知レヌ。七月ニ開始サレタ動員ハ之ガ多ク、
經濟的及物質的ノ缺乏ヲ表面化シタ事ニ依リ劣弱感ヲ更ニ

101

増大シタトイフ印象ヲ得ナシ。其レモ不拘、最近數週間、
軍ニ無爲ニ待期スル事ニ依ツテハ日本目的ハ促進ナシ日本存
立ハ保全セラレテアラハトイフ認識ハ高マシ、軍部ノ指導者(陸軍
大臣、參謀總長、政治及ビ外務軍課長)精細ナル打診ノ結果
彼等ノ見解ヲ次ノ如ク想像シ得ル。

『三三條約ハ英帝ヲ打倒シヨリヨロビ及ビ極東ニ於ケルソ
サシイ勢力カノ分配ヲ誘致スルニ役立ツトイフ固有ノ目的ヲ有スル。
アメリカニ對スル防禦トソ聯ノ排除ハ此ノ目的ノ爲ノ手段ナリ得ル
ニ過ギヌ。』獨逸ガソ聯ト戰闘ヲ開始シ軍事的天體成功裡
ニ戰闘ヲ遂行シタ後ハ出來ル又速カニミリト經由リ三條約
ノ連絡ヲ復活シ、全精力ヲ込テ、極東ニ英領諸島ニ於ケ
ル英軍ヲ打倒ニ集中スル事ガ肝要ナル。歐露ニ於ケル作戦
ハソ聯ノ軍隊ハ撃破サレタガ改權ノ政治的崩壞ニ依ツテ自
動的ニ起ラテカク事ヲ示シタ。『日本ノオホク依然トシテ戰闘強
イト云ハヒキナル極東軍ニ對シテハ文戰ハ改權ノ道德的潰滅カ起ラ
ヌ限リ、東春迄ハ不可能デアト。ソ聯ガ獨逸ニ對シテ示シタ頑
強ハ八月カ九月ニ日本カ攻勢ヲナシテモニヤクハ一通路ハ本年甲ニ
ク開通セラレ得ヌト推察セシムル。』此ノ目的ニ將來到達スル爲ニハ
ニラノ道カ在ル。『モスコウ』攻略後ソビエト政權ニ豫想セラレル事ハ
損害ヲ残余露西臣ヲ自發的ニ協力セシムル爲ニ利用スルカ
— 此ニハ日本ハ冬期間ニ任意ニ極東ニ於ケル露西臣ノ輸送ニ
壓迫ヲ加ヘル事ニ依リ貢獻シ得ル。— 然ラザレバ東春ニヒリヤ
ヲ西ト康カク攻撃シ得ル。其際ニハ日本ハ支那事變ノ負擔ニモ不
拘ソレカ可能デアラウ。後者ノ場合ニモ然レ通過スベキ地域ハ極メテ廣

大テアラウシ其同作戰ハ容易ナハトテアラウ。其結果此ノ場合ニ於
テモ暫クシテカラ政治的解決ガ薦メラレルデアラウ。

南方ニ於ケル米英ノ地位ニ対スル日本ノ武力的進出ハ季節トハ無
關係ナル。近東ニ於ケル米英ノ據地ニ対スル、独逸ノ進出ト其
同作戰ハ努力ニ値スルガ無制限ニ待タスベキデハ無イ。英帝心
ニ対スル勝利ハ勿論、我々ノ西面作戰ガ印度ノ地位ヲ搖リ動カ
ス時始メテ完全ニナルデアラウト。

余ハ此ノ内々ノ………^{(カ)一部缺ケタモ、如シ}カ、要請トモニ參謀總長列席ノ下ニ
陸軍大臣ニヨリナサレタル詳論ヲ余ニサレタル如ク繰返ス。之ハ
露西亞トノ戰役ニ対レ如何ナル見解ニ立ツテキルカヲ彼等ノ
腹藏ナキ特色ニ於テ明瞭ニ示レテキル。此ノ詳論カラ更ニ主トシテ
艦隊ガ引受ケナケレバアラナイ此ノ南進政策ハ其レ程考慮サ
レテモ居ラス準備カレテモ居ナイ事ガ更ニ現ハル。大使館附武
官等ト同様 余モ少クモ陸軍側ニ於ケル見掛ケ丈ケ熟
慮ハ表面ノモノデアリ。準備ノ状態ハ初期ノ侵略以テハ南
進ノ成功ハ保證シナイ。ト云フ印象ヲ受ケタ。佛蘭西(一部不
明)ニ於テハ一致シタ情報ニ依ルニ此迄未ダ金ク僅カテ軍ヲ
施設ガ作ラレタニ過ギ又軍隊ガ近代の資材ニテ比較的僅カレ
カ、武装セラレテ居ラヌ事、連絡線ノ長大就中統一的ナ強イ意志ハ
見指揮ヲ有レテキナイトイフ感ハ日本軍部カラ成功ニ不可缺
ナ自信ヲトツテキル。其故ニ現在ノ政府ハ南進政策ヲ更ニ延
期セント試ミルデアラウト假定スルモテアル。

三、同盟ノ意味ニ於ケル日本ノ活動ハ、日本ニ明白ナ、共同目的
 (シベリア通路若クハ、近東或ハ東亞ニ於ケル共同攻撃)ヲ持ツ作
 戦ノ可能性ヲ、技術的且政治的ニ見ヨテラハ、最も早く遠
 ラルテアラウ。其故ニ若シ露西亞戦線カラ滿洲里ヘ長距
 離飛行ガ実行サルナラハ是ハ當地ニ於テ感ラズ大ナル印象ヲ
 与ヘルデアラウ。此尚モ無ク技術的ニ可能ニナルデアラウ。日本人
 形式主義者ノ性格ニ鑑ミ、三、五協定ニ於テ日本ノ發起ニテ
 規定セザル、委員会ニ、共同ノ軍事、経済的及政治的
 課題ノ討議ヲ斡旋スル試ミハ相当ナ準備ノ後為サル
 キカ否カニ付、今一、提案シ、及ク思フ。相談サレ良イト云フ感
 情ハ他ノ矣、テハ協力ニ應ズル群衆ヲ因ラセ、ソノ最大弱點即チ級
 等ノ自負心ニ觸レルノデアル。

前述ノ軍部指導者ノ詳論ニハ、米軍ノ参戦ニ付イテハ、
 述ベテナク、余ハ彼等ガ米軍ガ或ハ軍事的考慮ニ於テ参
 戦スルカモ知レヌ、予ヲ殆ド全ク反外視シ、又ハ無視シ、而シテ常
 ニ英帝軍ノミヲ仇敵ト稱シテキルト確言シ得ル。

此ノ予ハ部分的ニ疑モ無ク、日米交渉ノ余リ其レカナル経
 過ヲ知ラセ無イトイフ希望カラ説明サル。

然レトウ、更ニ強イノハ、屢々報導セラレタ、米軍ト恐ラズ見
 込レノ着カヌ紛争ニ陥ルト云フ隔世遺傳的恐怖デス。此
 ノ紛争ヲ日本ノ軍家ノ指導ハ極端ナ困窮ノ場合ニミ
 遠行セントシ、又、ソノ時期ヲ自カラ決定セト欲スルカウトモ之
 ヲ共同テ決定セント欲スル。協定ヤ三項ノ意味ニ於ケル攻撃
 ガ存在スルカ否カトイフ問題ハ、三、五ノ共同討議ヲ決セズハ

ナラヌト云る人日本人ノ性格ニ適應スル許リテ無ク日本ノ國家
 指導ノ見解ニ適合スルゾル。余ハ外務大臣松岡ガ既ニ交渉
 指導者デアルタ。スターキー大使及余トノ三協定ニ關スル當地
 交渉ニ際シ此ニ關スル具體的確定ヲ固執シタリテ想ヒ出セル。
 米トノ紛争ハ不可避デント云フ感情ハ増大シテキル。我々取
 ヲテハ然レ日本ガ何時殊ニ依ルト莫同シテ紛争ヲナスベキカト云
 フ決定ヲ其ニスル。トイフ予ガ最大ノ意味ヲ持ッテキル。
 余カ余ニ与ヘラタ訓令茲ニ伯林ニテ發ビラタリ言論統制ニ從
 ヲテ對リ戦ノ今後ノ遂行及ロ果英ノ軍ヲム政治ノ劣
 弱ニ付論ガ多ク特ニ述ベル必要ハ無イ。日本ニ於ケル現在ノ勢
 カ關係ニ鑑ミ然レテラ述ルタリ。立場ヲ現在考慮ニ入レナ
 ケレバナラナイ。殊ニ海軍見解ハ陸軍指導者ノ評論ト大体
 一致スルカラデアアル。

政界ノ立場ニ關シテハ、續イテ報告スルデアラウ。

No 6

4065A

書類 4065A 號

證

余 Ulrich Strom ハ余ガ独逸語及ビ
 日語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並ニ独逸語
 原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ对照ノ上右ハ本書
 類ヲ眞実ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ
 確證スルコトヲ
 茲ニ證ス。

Ulrich A. Strom

供 述 書

余、W. P. P. Cumming
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル國務獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ國務取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／＼柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部管轄ヲ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該國務獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ陸在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

曰余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、函送セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫真ノ贈本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫真贈本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、暫保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢圖覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫真贈本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

TELEGRAM (Code Clerk)

PARIS, German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs.

1 Oct 1941 - 2100 hours
Arrival: 1 October 1941 - 2300 hours

Economic Delegation No. 467 of 1 October 1941

Re. Telegram No. 152 of 22 September 1941, Ha Pol 6075 g111

Re. Interin Report on Indo-Chinese rubber; Japan/U.S.A.

Negotiations have been conducted with the French delegation, presided over by DE BOISANGER, in line with orders as in the above telegram. At the outset DE BOISANGER expressly confirmed the order, reported by me in telegram No. 454 of 22 September 1941, to the Governor-General of Indo-China to release the 5,000 tons which the Japanese had requested for September. He then stated the request of his government for German support of the French efforts to obtain Japanese approval for delivery of 5,000 tons to the U.S.A.

Indo-China urgently needed the proceeds from such sales for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else, and declared in answer to a question from the German side, that in payment of the said goods the U.S.A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold.

French request was turned down as not in accord with instructions. Concerning our demand which was presented in the session, DE BOISANGER replied to me yesterday on behalf of his government that it appreciated the German attitude and would take the German point of view into consideration during the pending negotiations with Japan. He was not authorized to give a more extended declaration. I pointed out to him again that the German request was urgent and again brought forth that not only the Japanese, but also the German Government would not countenance further export of raw rubber from Indo-China to the U.S.A.

The German Commissioner, JEHLE, has by now left for Berlin. He suggested that at the French delegation, an additional release of 5,000 tons, as requested by Japan, first of all for October, be secured. We are continuing to urgently attend to the matter and may further report on it.

HEMEN

TELEGRAM (Open)

PARIS - 6 October 1941 - 2045
Arrival, 6 October 1941 - 2330

No. 3031 of 6 October 1941

State Secretary, BENOIST-MECHIN, today revealed during a conversation, that considerable difficulties with Japan are occurring daily in Indo-China, while Japan, apart from a few exceptions, observes the Treaty's military provisions, she is violating France's economic and political sovereignty more and more.

At the time, Darlan had, in the Vichy Cabinet, personally and very strongly supported the solution sought by Japan with Indo-China since he feared that a different policy would furnish the Anglo-Saxon fighting forces with a pretext for interference and besides he desired to establish good relations with a state that had signed the Tri-partite Pact.

Owing to the aggressive behavior of the Japanese against France's sovereignty in Indo-China, doubts have been expressed within the French Government as to whether Darlan's conception was right; furthermore a stiffening on the part of the adversaries of his policy among French military and administrative circles in Indo-China is to be feared.

I was receptive in regard to Benoist-Mechin's information, the aim of which evidently was German intervention in Tokyo.

ABETZ

Secret State matter - to be kept in locked file.

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO, 15 October 1941 - 0600 hours
Arrival, " " " 1520 "

No. 2095 of 14 October

Re. Telegraphic orders dated 8 October, No. 1775 - Pol II

Observations here confirm the description of conditions as reported to Berlin from Saigon by Councillor of Legation, Neumann during the last few days. As was to be expected, the occupation of Indo-China did not proceed without friction.

I heard from the Foreign Ministry that there are numerous points in dispute concerning the interpretation of the defense agreement. The controversy concerns the treatment of the Chungking-appointed Chinese consul, the handing over of certain airplanes, the seizure of quarters and goods, anti-French propaganda disseminated by the Japanese army among the native population, and so on.

The French ambassador has lodged a number of protests, and has pressed hard the removal of matters of complaint. The Japanese government intends to increase the occupation forces, at present being 25,000, according to a report from Saigon, to 40,000. I was assured by the Foreign Ministry that the French-Japanese agreement does not provide for a maximum limit for Japanese occupation troops.

The Japanese Government seems to intend to wrest a number of concessions from the French Colonial administration through local military authorities. Only after the creation of a fait accompli will former Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA, apparently slated for handling questions relating to Indo-China, leave for Saigon. I understand that this will not materialize before the beginning of November.

I am under the impression that both parties will not let it come to an open conflict. The Japanese government is endeavoring to keep up the outward appearance of a defense alliance and, furthermore, is afraid of diminishing the economic utilization of the country in case of an open clash, through passive resistance of the colonial administration and the native population. The Deputy Foreign Minister told me that the rice quota, amounting to 700,000 tons and urgently needed this year, was secured on the strength of the agreement concluded by MATSUOKA. It is, however, hoped that even greater quantities will be obtained

owing to better prospects for the harvest.

The Foreign Ministry denied that there had been a Japanese-Siamese argument in the Border Commission concerning the supervision of the demilitarized zone. The Border Commission was only just starting out on its tasks. Identical telegram to Saigon.

OTT

CERTIFICATE

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065B.

/s/ ULRICH STRAUS

Zwiby Check 1

Doc No 4065A †

Telegram

[Secret Cipher process]

To be kept in locked file. Most urgent!

TOKYO, 4 October 1941, 2,57 S

Arrival: 4 October 1941 1325 hours

No. 1974, of 4 October.

For the German Foreign Minister. P. VIII

Re: Telegraphic report of 2 October, No. 1960 with ^{4th}

Note: Sent on to Special Train under No. 3351, Tel. Ktr. 4 October 1941

As I have ~~reported~~ ^{stated} in my ~~preceding~~ ^{fore}

~~going~~ last report, the Japanese-American

negotiations seem to be without result;

unless the United States

~~this could only be prevented by a fundamen-~~
~~tal~~

tally changes ~~in the~~ attitude of the UNITED

STATES towards the Chinese question, which

~~however~~ they will find it difficult to effect.

However, even break down

It cannot be denied that after the ~~planned~~

3 Way Check 2

~~ring~~ of the negotiations, there remains, in
certain, uncertainty
JAPAN; a ~~persistent~~ a sense of ~~helplessness~~
in Japan.

as to what policy should be adopted. For the
feels herself
first time in her history JAPAN ~~is aware of~~

~~being~~ physically isolated and surrounded by
In a spirit of optimism and ~~recklessness~~ jingo
enemies. She has tested her forces on

~~inferior~~ which is no match for her,
militarily CHINA, weaker ~~in the military field~~; now
~~certain~~,

she is under the impression, despite brilliant
individual

~~individual~~ successes, that she cannot success-
fully terminate this ~~war~~ ^{conflict} by military means.

Even more than this ~~realization~~ ^{feeling} prevailing.

within the country, the long-drawn-out

3 Way Clear

/Etappendienst/

4

service behind the front has probably

impaired the Japanese ^{punch} ~~force to strike~~

and readiness for sacrifices. One cannot help

feeling that the mobilization, begun in July,

has enhanced the sense of weakness by

bringing to light the numerous economic

and material ~~weak spots~~ deficiencies.

In spite of this, the realization has

increased ~~spread~~ during the last weeks that the ^{aims} ~~aims~~

goals of JAPAN will not be furthered, ^{will} ~~by~~ nor their

continued existence ^{be secured.} ~~guaranteed.~~ By As a

result of a careful sounding ^{out} of the

3 way deal

5

Army leaders [Minister for War, Chief of General

Staff, heads of the political section and of

the section for ~~the study of foreign armies~~ of their ways of thinking,

the following picture is arrived at:

~~According to them~~ [The inherent aim
bring about
object of the Tripartite pact is to ~~produce~~

~~to~~ a new distribution of power in EUROPE

and the Far East by ~~bringing down~~ ^{overpowering} the
~~farflung~~

British ~~World~~ Empire. ~~To~~ Keeping AMERICA
Union

at bay and ~~to~~ eliminating the SOVIET ~~Union~~
could only

~~be~~ must be more means to this end. Now
with
against

that Germany has begun the fight ~~the~~ SOVIET

3 Way Check

6

and has
UNION, ^{and has} carried it through ^{militarily} ~~rather~~ successfully ^{to a great extent,}

the important thing ^{is} ~~was~~ to reestablish, ~~as soon~~
~~as possible,~~ the connection of the ^{powers of the} Tripartite

Pact through SIBERIA as soon as possible, ~~and~~
and ~~well as to concentrate~~ ^{the entire} all available energy

~~upon~~ fighting ENGLAND in the Middle and Far
as well as

East, ~~and upon~~ the British Isles. ~~The military~~

^{European} Operations in ~~Europe~~ RUSSIA in ~~EUROPE~~
^{of the SOVIET UNION}

demonstrated that the ~~armies~~ have suffered defeat

but that ~~however~~ the political collapse of the regime ^{does} ~~did~~

not follow, automatically. ^{Japan's waging of a war} ~~Japan's waging of a war~~

against the Far Eastern Army, still considered

zuby check

7

being ~~as~~ ^{trim} in fighting ^{is} ~~conditions~~ ^{are} not feasible ~~at~~
annual

before next spring, unless ~~the regime~~ collapses of the
comes about.

regime ~~no~~ ^{displayed by,} The Tenacity of the SOVIET UNION

~~is its fight~~ against GERMAN ^{has} indicates that

not even by a Japanese attack in August

or September could the route via SIBERIA

be opened up this year. } There ^{are} ~~was~~ two ways of

reaching this objective in future, ~~namely by~~

either ^{by} exploiting the considerable weakening of
(to which ~~could~~

the Soviet regime) ~~to~~ be expected after the occu-

pation of MOSCOW, ^{to} ~~for~~ inducing the remainder

~~part~~ of RUSSIA to ^{(freely co-operate - in} ~~participate~~ ~~in~~ this, ~~and~~ JAPANS

3 Way Check

8

~~essentially~~ could contribute even in winter by bringing

pressure to bear upon Russian supplies from the
(at the appropriate time)

Far East $\frac{1}{2}$ the other way would be to attack

SIBERIA from WEST and EAST ~~in the coming~~ ^{during next}

spring, ~~at that time~~ ^{for which} JAPAN would be in a po- ^{then}

sition to do this despite ~~the being~~ ^{having the war} ~~being~~ ^{conflict}

~~in~~ CHINA on her hands. In that case,

^{areas} however, huge ~~spaces~~ would have to be

~~overcome~~ and ~~traversed~~ ~~negotiated~~ ~~so that~~ common operations

would not be easy, ~~hence~~ ^{so that} even in this

case a political solution would be called

for after some time.