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SECTION VII.

CIVIL SERVICE

I. EARLY PHASE

1. Why Reform Was Necessary. Were the reform of the Japanese civil service entirely a matter of introducing modern principles of scientific personnel management into the Japanese government in the interest of efficient governmental administration, it might well be hailed as a great service to Japan but its relationship to the Potsdam Declaration, to the purpose of the Allied Occupation or to the functions of SCAP's Government Section might be difficult to perceive. Such relationship at once becomes apparent, however, when it is considered that a successful reformation of the Japanese civil service will not only enhance governmental efficiency but will break up one of the ruling cliques of pre-surrender Japan--the tightly knit, exclusive and self-perpetuating bureaucracy which exercised the powers of government over the people in the feudal concept of dynastic rule by divine right--and will substitute therefor a body of democratically selected officials who will administer the laws in the concept of service to the people.

Before the Occupation it was recognized by Japanese as well as Western students that the Japanese bureaucracy was a key instrument in the totalitarian regimentation of the people's life. The attitude of the members of the bureaucracy toward the public, to whom they felt little obligation, was one of pride and arrogance. ~~Since~~ In their official acts they spoke for the Emperor; the public's role was but to obey. Protected as it was by police vigilance, this authority went unchallenged. As the government multiplied and tightened its controls over political, social and economic activities, the nation's dependence on the administrative decisions

of government officials increased and so did the power of the bureaucracy. Undemocratic by composition and conviction, the bureaucracy was a natural ally of both the militarists and the Zaibatsu, a ready, willing and effective instrument for carrying out the policies of those groups.

The decision to utilize the existing Japanese governmental machinery to effect the Occupation's purposes inevitably involved the risk that idealogically hostile bureaucrats would by administrative sabotage mullify Occupation policies or the programs of Japanese political leaders evolved pursuant thereto. To guard against this risk required constant vigilance and surveillance. To some extent the risk was reduced by the removal of identifiable militarists and ultranationalists from public life, and the enhancement of the power, prestige and effectiveness of the Diet to make it truly "the highest organ of state power" created within Japan the force which could most successfully bring the bureaucracy under democratic control. Since the bureaucracy would outlast the Occupation, however, a fundamental reform of the system was early recognized as necessary.

2. Early Steps. While reform was recognized as necessary, it was also recognized that an institution so pervasive and so firmly established as the Japanese bureaucracy could not be reformed by summary measures, that superficial tinkering would produce only superficial results. Existing studies on the Japanese civil service were scanty. The first requirement was a survey of the scope of the problem itself. This was undertaken in November 1945 concurrently with the Section's studies of the organizational structure of the Government.

These early inquiries, conducted by the Government Section with the collaboration of officers of other SCAP Staff Sections interested in the

Japanese Government personnel administration from the points of view of their respective functional responsibilities, yielded much valuable information on such features of the civil service as: legal basis; organisation and procedures; recruitment, examination, placement and promotion of all ranks; classification of positions and individuals; pay, allowances and bonuses; retirement and welfare provisions; training, pre-service and in-service; sources of personnel; morale; attitudes, toward the public and toward their offices; discipline, tenure, employee rights. This information came from government officials, university professors and other sources. In the process, the Government Section found a few informed individuals who were aware of the existing system's shortcomings and who would welcome changes. Some concrete proposals for reform were submitted by Japanese experts.

It soon became apparent that basic reform would require the continuing efforts of a sizable staff of experts to make the studies and develop the recommendations for reform legislation and to supervise its implementation. No such body of experts being available in the Government Section,* or for that matter, in General Headquarters, the Government Section in January 1946 seriously considered initiating a formal SCAP Memorandum directing the Japanese Government to appoint a special commission of experts to draft proposals for basic reform of civil service system under SCAP guidance pursuant to standards to be set up by SCAP.[1] This proposal was set aside, however, in favor of inducing the Japanese by suggestion to initiate the necessary action in the interest of more efficient government.

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* Only one member of the Government Section, Lt. Milton J. Esman, AUS, was engaged in this task at the time.

1. Appendix B: 8a, Memo for Chief, Government Section, January 30, 1946. "Japanese Civil Service Reform."

551

3. Bureaucratic Reaction. In February 1946 the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation, which at that time handled government personnel policy matters at Cabinet level, submitted to the Government Section for approval a plan for the "reform" of the civil service whose main constituents were some simplification of the hopelessly complicated pay and allowance scales, modification of the elaborate system of personal ranks, changes in the content of the higher civil service examination and the establishment of three categories of classifications. The Bureau's representatives were sufficiently candid to admit that the plan made no fundamental changes, but claimed that it represented an initial break in the traditional system and was a forerunner of more basic changes. It was obviously an effort to soften the impact of the Government Section's interest in the civil service field and to appease vigorous newspaper criticism of bureaucratic abuses which were then making their appearance.

The plan was cleared by the Government Section as non-objectionable and a "step in the right direction" with the reservation that it could in no way be considered to take the place of fundamental reforms considered desirable. The plan was adopted in April 1946.

In other sections of this report it has been noted that the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation occupied a strategic position in the Japanese governmental machinery and that it frequently used this position to influence not only the legal form but the substance of government-sponsored legislation, thus shaping national policies with the least amount of responsibility to the people's representatives in the Diet.* Since the top officials of the Bureau included some of the leading lights of the Japanese bureaucracy--

* Section III, The New Constitution of Japan; and Section V, The National Diet.

all of them, skilled practitioners and staunch exponents of legalistic formalism in government--such influence was invariably reactionary. Naturally the Bureau's response to the Government Section's suggestion was not such as to arouse senguine expectations of substantial reforms on the government's initiative.

4. Japanese Government's Request for Assistance. In April 1946 the Government Section again had under consideration a proposal, concurred in by five other interested staff sections of GHQ, to initiate a formal SCAP directive on civil service reform. The use of a directive at that stage of the Occupation would have been a departure from the technique of leadership as opposed to direction employed by the Government Section beginning about March 1946. At this critical point the cause of civil service reform received unexpected support within the Japanese Government in such form as to bring about decisive action. On May 3, 1946 the Minister of Finance personally submitted to an official of the Finance Division of SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section a letter requesting that a commission of American experts be invited to study the Japanese civil service and draft a plan for the "fundamental and thoroughgoing revision of the salary and allowance system in conformity with a position classification plan based on American experience." This letter was entirely unsolicited and unexpected, although it may have been stimulated by a brief description of the American classification system presented by the Labor Advisory Mission to SCAP which was in Tokyo at that time. The letter was forwarded to the Government Section for appropriate staff action.

Inquiry disclosed that the Bureau of Legislation had not been informed of the Finance Minister's letter. Because of its stubborn resistance to fundamental civil service reform, the Bureau found the letter embarressing.

Its officials considered it a tricky and irresponsible violation of their jurisdiction by the Finance Ministry's Bureau of the Budget, which had advocated a more scientific approach to the personnel classifaction and pay and allowance systems than the conservative Bureau of Legislation was willing to accept. This intra-government discord was aired at a Cabinet meeting on May 14, 1946. The Minister of Finance relieved the tension by apologizing to the Director of the Bureau of Legislation for his haste, but not until he had prevailed on his Cabinet colleagues to support the request contained in his letter. This support was evidenced in an "understanding" reached by the Cabinet on May 14, 1946 of which slightly different versions--similar, however, in substance--were submitted to Government Section by the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation and the Ministry of Finance.[2]

The Japanese Government was officially on record as requesting with complete Cabinet accord the assistance of a mission of American experts to study and draft plans for a fundamental reform of its civil service system. True the Japanese request was motivated by a desire for higher efficiency and morale, while the Occupation's basic aim was democratization. There was a risk that the Japanese might attempt by adopting limited reforms in position classification and compensation to avoid a fundamental democratic recasting of their feudal bureaucratic system. To offset this risk, however, was the great advantage of initiating the operation on the basis of a voluntary request of the Japanese Government, the likelihood that as one result of the mission's efforts there would be created a group of Japanese converts to a modern and democratic civil service system, and the possibility of winning sufficient support among influential Japanese to gain voluntary institution of an adequate reform program. The advantage of Japanese sponsorship was

Appendix B: 8b, Correspondence from Japanese Government Regarding Request for Civil Service Mission.

deemed of sufficient value to warrant granting the Government's request. Accordingly, on the recommendation of the Government Section, the Supreme Commander transmitted the Japanese Government's request to the War Department with request for favorable consideration.

II. THE UNITED STATES PERSONNEL ADVISORY MISSION

In response to the Japanese Government's request, approved by General MacArthur, the United States Personnel Advisory Mission to Japan was constituted by the War Department and sent to Japan in November 1946.*

The object of the Mission was to study the personnel system of the Government of Japan including all laws, policies, practices and procedures through which personnel operations were carried out, and on the basis of its findings to make recommendations designed to effect improvement in the overall personnel administration of the Japanese Government.

Arriving in Tokyo on November 30, 1946, the Mission set about orienting itself to the situation then existing in Japanese public administration. This orientation started with a conference with General Whitney, Chief of the Government Section, in which General Whitney summarized the fundamental problems, policies, and accomplishments of the Occupation. The use of the administrative facilities of the Government Section was accorded to the Mission and the Mission was invited to draw freely on the accumulated experience and information of the Section's staff and files.

With the cooperation of members of the staff of General Headquarters, a series of lectures and question periods was scheduled which gave the Mission an organized review of Japanese history, Occupation policies, the organization of the national government, the organization of the local governments, the

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* Mr. Blaine Hoover, President, Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada, was appointed Chairman of the Mission. The other members were Mr. Manlio F. DeAngelis, Chief, Program Planning Staff, U. S. Civil Service Commission; Mr. Robert S. Hare, Chief, Field Classification, U. S. Civil Service Commission; and Mr. Pierce MacCoy, Director of Personnel, U. S. Department of State.

political parties, the judiciary, labor problems and the Japanese character and psychology.

The Mission also made a study of information in the files of General Headquarters dealing with personnel administration in the Japanese Government. For many months prior to the arrival of the Mission in Japan, members of the Government Section staff had made studies of Japanese personnel practices. These studies, while not in all cases exhaustive, were fairly well documented and exceedingly helpful in portraying significant conditions, and useful in determining the Mission's approach to the major problems presented.

Following these preliminary studies, the Mission opened conversations with the representatives of the Japanese Government. That government had, on October 26, 1946, by Imperial Ordinance, established an Administrative Research Bureau. The Administrative Research Bureau, under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, was authorized to conduct investigations, do research, and formulate plans for the reformation of the organization, the personnel system, and the administrative procedures of the Japanese Government. Organized conferences between the Mission and the President and Division Directors of Staff of the Administrative Research Bureau were instituted December 24, 1946.

The work of the Mission and the Bureau was integrated and for technical purposes decentralized. Committees under the advisorship of the Mission members and including Division Directors of the Administrative Research Bureau were set up to conduct investigation in designated areas of personnel administration within the Japanese Government. These committees immediately launched their programs.

A General Committee was established to receive and consider reports of the advisors to the special committees and on the basis of such reports to (1) promote

progress of the work of the special committees, (2) coordinate work of the special committees and (3) consider major problems developed by the special committees.

The first meetings of each of the special committees were devoted to the clarification of basic concepts of merit system administration. Although a great many of the concepts had no counterpart in Japanese experience, the committees quickly grasped the basic ideas and terms pertaining to their special study areas. These preliminary group discussions, although primarily devoted to the explanation of basic principles, were of great benefit to the Mission as well as to the Japanese committee members. Through the exchange of ideas, the Mission members, acting as committee advisers, gained valuable insight into the practices and attitudes prevailing in those areas of Japanese public administration in the particular areas of personnel administration under study.

Accordingly, the Mission entered the new year having (1) informed itself as well as possible, within the limitations of time, concerning the broad aspects of the Japanese governmental situation, (2) reviewed the studies previously made of personnel administration in the Japanese Government, (3) established relations with the Japanese officials as a basis for work, and (4) launched a series of special studies.

The Mission through its Special Committee on Position Classification and Pay had, meanwhile, set the Administrative Research Bureau to work on a limited position classification survey. Although relatively few positions were involved, the survey was designed to include positions in each of the more important ministries and agencies of the National Government and to cover as wide a variety of classes of employment as possible.

The objectives of this "pilot" position classification survey were threefold:

1. To secure specific detailed information as to the relationship of pay to the duties performed among the various classes of employment in the Japanese Government.
2. To develop effective methods of making position classification surveys in the Japanese Government and to try them out.
3. To develop and train a staff of Japanese technicians which, with the benefit of outside technical advice, would be competent to assist in carrying out position classification activities.

The survey was launched in March, 1947. It was an undertaking of special interest and significance and required the utmost in tact of execution. The Japanese government service had never based its personnel administration on the relative evaluation and classification of the duties and responsibilities of positions, but had conducted personnel assignments and transactions according to a rigid, complex system of assigning official rank to individual persons without particular reference to their posts of duty.

The findings of the special committees were, quite generally, negative. This is, the Japanese counterparts of many of the key elements of a modern personnel program were either lacking, or were based on tenets and traditions inefficient and entirely foreign to democratic principles of public personnel administration. The administration of Japan was found to be particularly weak in the program areas of recruitment, including examination, compensation, including position classification, employee safety, employee utilization and evaluation, recreation and retirement. There was inadequate provision for the maintenance

of discipline and the equitable treatment of employees. On the other hand, in the areas of personal training, health and welfare, Japanese administrators had gained some experience which, though neither consistent on a service-wide basis nor modern in conception, could be utilized in building a modern personnel program.

In general it was apparent that the bureaucracy through which the former Imperial Government had operated was still firmly entrenched and had not essentially changed its allegiance to feudalistic methods and principles of operation. Off

Effective progress had already been made by the Occupation authorities in eliminating from positions of influence persons whose previous military, political and economic activites and associations had demonstrated their lack of sympathy with Japan's efforts to democratize her institutions.

Of no lesser degree of danger to the successful democratization of Japan's institutions of public administration were the vast majority of old-line Japanese bureaucrats. To have allowed these officials to perpetuate themselves and their like-minded subordinates in power would have meant the courting of continuous attempts to sabotage principles of efficiency and merit in public administration.

The United States Personnel Advisory Mission to Japan recognized and accepted its share of responsibility for breaking up this clique of reactionary bureaucrats. The approach taken by the Mission was to create, by the legislative enactment of a National Public Service Law, such standards of merit and equitable treatment in public personnel administration that, with few exceptions, old-line officials of the pre-democratic Japanese bureaucracy would be forced

out of their posts. At the same time application of the same standards for civil service administration would enable the selection and appointment of objectively qualified replacements.

It was not envisaged that the Government of Japan should attempt any single system of personnel administration in its entirety simply because such a system had elsewhere operated successfully. Neither did the Mission assume that certain personnel administrative activities were to be regarded as unsuited to Japan simply because Japan was not currently utilizing them. Such an assumption would have been fatal to progress anywhere. The Mission went on the assumption rather, in its approach to drafting a program of public personnel administration for Japan, that the collective experience in the development of public personnel administration in jurisdictions having progressive democratic institutions of government had shown the worth of certain services and techniques. In this connection the Mission gave special attention to recruitment, training, position-classification, compensation, employee evaluation, health, safety, welfare, recreation, employee relations, retirement and employment statistics. The analysis of the Japanese situation was made in terms of these techniques and services. However, the interest was not in form or terminology, but rather in assuring the existence of administrative devices of some sort adequate to produce the results which our more familiar services are designed to obtain.

In drafting a constructive program, several objectives of general applicability were borne in mind and should be mentioned.

Adequacy. Any proposed system of personnel administration must envision the future of the nation and lay a foundation sufficiently broad, strong and progressive to support an efficient administration of the Government personnel under conditions of modern operation in the years ahead.

561

Simplicity of Standards. In constructing a basic civil service law, considerable specific detail is necessary if adequate safeguards against violations are to be maintained, particularly if it must, as it were, speak for itself in an administrative environment which is potentially, if not actively, hostile to its purposes. Accordingly the Mission endeavored so to state standards of personnel administration in the Law that their unmistakable comprehension and easy recollection by legislators, government employees and the public generally would be possible even in the absence of trained and experienced public personnel administrators.

Recognition of the Individuality of Japan. Technical studies revealed many areas of administration in which methods and procedures for accomplishing the objectives of the Law would need to be characteristically Japanese if they were to be practical. The Law, as drafted and recommended by the Mission, provided flexibility in the rule-making powers of the Japanese National Personnel Authority sufficient to make possible such appropriate adaptations in the technical programs as would facilitate the attainment of the basic standards.

Practicality in Introduction. Although the Law, as proposed by the Mission, envisaged a comprehensive, modern program of public personnel administration for the Japanese Government, this objective was not considered possible of sudden attainment. To require immediate full-fledged operation of the complete program provided for by the National Public Service Law would be to over-load and confuse both the personnel agency and the administrative agencies of the government with the result that the personnel program would probably fail to acquire efficiency, momentum and effectiveness and would suffer loss of prestige. Accordingly, the Law, though by no means encouraging unnecessary delay

in the application of certain of its more complex and unfamiliar programs, provided for their gradual application subject to the discretion of the National Personnel Authority.

With the principles and objectives summarized above in mind, the Mission started to formulate a National Public Service Law in such a way as to encompass the many related objectives dependent upon this particular Law. The Mission devoted continuous and intensive effort to the organization and exact phraseology of each provision of the Law and to the relationships of the various provisions to each other and to the whole. Passage of the resulting draft of the National Public Service Law was recommended to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in an interim report dated April 24, 1947. This interim report was submitted because of the urgent necessity of destroying the feudalistic bureaucracy and initiating in its stead with a minimum of delay the development of a modern system of Civil Service Administration.

Several recommendations were contained in the report. Essentially these recommendations were, first, the creation within the Japanese Government of a powerful central personnel agency; second, action to secure enactment of the proposed National Public Service Law, providing service-wide standards of personnel administration under which a democratically oriented merit service could be established and the efficiency of the service promoted; and third, the establishment of a Civil Service Division in the Government Section to advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on programs, policies, and procedures relative to the reform of the personnel system of the Japanese Government.

The need for a central personnel authority to enforce, on a service-wide basis, the standards and policies of a modern merit system and to provide guidance to Japanese administrators in deriving maximum benefits from the system's

operation was appreciated by the Mission within a month after their arrival in Japan. Further, the Mission firmly believed that such a central authority should be set up as promptly as possible in order that its staff might gain experience and insight into the techniques and objectives of merit system administration under the leadership and instruction of technically competent Occupation personnel.

A final report to the Supreme Commander, under date of June 16, 1947, marked the official termination of the Mission. Thereafter its work was continued by the Civil Service Division of Government Section, organized on June 1, 1947 in accord with the Mission's recommendation.*

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* Mr. Blaine Hoover, Chairman of the Mission, was designated Special Assistant to the Chief, Government Section and appointed Chief, Civil Service Division.

III. INITIAL OPERATIONS

The recommendations of the United States Advisory Mission were presented to high officials of the Japanese Government, including Prime Minister Katayama and his Cabinet, early in July 1947. In October the National Public Service Law, based on these recommendations, was passed by the Diet, laying the legal basis for a fundamental reform of the Japanese Government's civil service. In a number of important respects, however, the Law as passed differed from the draft recommended by the Mission. As passed, the Law provided that a Temporary National Personnel Commission was to take office by November 1, 1947. It was thus necessary to make a final selection of the three Commissioners of the Temporary National Personnel Commission in order that they might be installed in office on November 1st. The three men chosen to be Commissioners were Dr. Kiyoshi Asai, Chairman, Mr. Okiie Yamashita, and Mr. Yoichi Ueno.

Arrangements were then made for the formal administration of the Oath of Office to the three Commissioners on November 1, 1947. It was an occasion of historical significance in Japan since the Oath of Office administered to the Commissioners by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was the first civil Oath of Office ever subscribed to by a Japanese public official.

Shortly after November 1947 members of staff of the Civil Service Division, recruited in the United States during the Summer, began to arrive in Tokyo. All members of staff were initially given for intensive study background material relative to the organization and functions of the Government of Japan. Simultaneously, questionnaires were being forwarded through the Temporary National Personnel Commission to various ministries and agencies of the Japanese Government requesting information relative to organizational structure, functions, and

key personnel. As replies to these questionnaires were returned to the Division, careful analyses were made of their content in preparation for a project of charting the upper levels of the National Government which was to be undertaken in January 1948.

Much preparatory work was done by the Training Branch of the Civil Service Division in the development and planning of training course materials and course outlines for the training of the technical staff of the Temporary National Personnel Commission in an institute which was to commence in February 1948.

As the staff of the Civil Service Division stabilized, attention was directed to a searching and comprehensive analysis of the National Public Service Law as enacted. It was found to have been considerably altered, both as to the internal sequence and as to content, from the draft which had been painstakingly planned and developed by the United States Personnel Advisory Mission to Japan. Much of the detailed specification considered by the Mission to have been essential was omitted as well as several crucial substantive and administrative provisions.

One such provision which was omitted in the enactment of the Law was the prohibition of employees in the government service from engaging in strikes or other forms of concerted work stoppage which would be detrimental to the conduct of governmental activities. The law as enacted applied to less than one-fourth of the employees of the government. Another provision which was omitted from the Law would have given the National Personnel Commission special status similar to that enjoyed by the Japanese Board of Audit in the presentation of its annual operating budget for Diet approval. This provision had been deemed necessary in order to prevent possible financial sabotage of the National

Personnel Commission's program by the budget authority of the Government of Japan which is located organizationally in the Finance Ministry and is thus subordinate to the administrative direction of the Minister of Finance.

The name of the central personnel agency which was to be set up under the National Public Service Law was to have been the National Personnel Authority. As the law was enacted, the name of the central personnel agency was changed to the National Personnel Commission. The term "commission" had been intentionally avoided by the Mission in selecting a name for the personnel agency since the character used by the Japanese to express "commission" is also understood by them to mean "committee" and to characterize numerous administrative bodies often unimportant and of a relatively temporary nature.

The United States Personnel Advisory Mission to Japan had included carefully phrased specifications as to the qualifications of, and the division of responsibilities among, the Commissioners of the National Personnel Commission and its Chairman. Justifiably high and necessarily specific qualifications had been set forth as a basis for the selection of the Commissioners by the Cabinet. These qualifications were largely omitted in the Law as it was passed by the Diet. The Mission had intended that there should be vested in the Chairman of the National Personnel Commission considerable executive responsibility in order that the commonly observed weaknesses in administrative decisiveness of a three-man commission might be, to a great extent, avoided. None of this type of executive responsibility was given to the President in the Law as passed.

The entire law had been re-written in such a manner as to make the Commission entirely responsible to the whims of the Prime Minister . Under these changes the Commission could not, without the approval and sanction of

the Prime Minister, issue rules to implement the law or change existing rules; could not make recommendations to the Diet concerning the pay schedules or confer with members of that body; could not issue orders or directives to facilitate the performance of its legally authorized functions; could not inaugurate new fields of personnel studies; could not initiate disciplinary action on high ranking officials. In the field of disciplinary action on high ranking government officials, the Commission was restricted to merely investigating the matter and making recommendations to the Prime Minister. The cumulative effect of these weaknesses made the Law a feeble instrument, and important revisions in it would have to be made before it could be relied upon to effect a democratization of the well entrenched feudal bureaucracy of Japan.

By January 1, 1948, the staffing of the Division was substantial and its recently recruited members of staff had received brief and intensive but quite comprehensive orientation in the organization and functions of public administration in Japan. Accordingly, a schedule of operations for the Division was put into effect with the beginning of the new year. Relative priorities among the scheduled projects were determined with reference to July 1, 1948, this being the date after which all provisions of the National Public Service Law would come into force, subject to the discretion of the National Personnel Commission and the Commission's readiness to implement them.

This schedule of operations appears on page _____.

Each project, whether of an administrative or managerial or program nature, presented peculiar and difficult aspects which had to be allowed for in the overall timing and coordination of the program of operations. Characteristic of many of the projects was the desirability and the practical necessity of

CIVIL SERVICE DIVISION
GOVERNMENT SECTION

SCHEDULE OF OPERATIONS

January 1 to June 30, 1948

	Jan.					Feb.				Mar.					Apr.				May					June					
	1	3	10	17	24	31	7	14	21	28	6	13	20	27	3	10	17	24	1	8	15	22	29	5	12	19	26	30
General Personnel Administration Branch	F	C												K / P	U	X			RES									
Organization Branch	B						G			L				Q					V			Y			Z			
Classification & Compensation Branch	E						H												R / M									
Examination Branch	A						I										N	S	W									
Training Branch	D / J						O												T									

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CIVIL SERVICE DIVISION
GOVERNMENT SECTION

KEY TO SCHEDULE OF OPERATIONS

		Date
A	Select staff for National Personnel Commission	Jan. 2 to Jan. 30
B	Clarify organizational structure upper levels Japanese Civil Service	Jan. 7 to Feb. 9
C	Revise National Public Service Law	Jan. 2 to Mar. 15
D	Plan training of staff National Personnel Commission	Jan. 2 to Jan. 31
E	Cooperate in revision National Public Service Law	Jan. 2 to Feb. 9
F	Secure building for National Personnel Commission	Jan. 2 to Jan. 31
G	Organize functions of National Personnel Commission	Feb. 10 to Feb. 28
H	Identify "critical" positions Japanese Civil Service (for examination)	Feb. 9 to May 31
I	Assemble material examinations critical administrative positions	Feb. 1 to Apr. 27
J	Train interpreters on special technical vocabulary	Jan. 19 to Jan. 31
K	Draft program to promote prestige National Personnel Comm.	Mar. 15 to Mar. 22
L	Organize offices of National Personnel Commission	Mar. 1 to Mar. 15
M	Initiate general classification study Japanese Civil Service	June 1 to June 30
N	Select Ministry personnel officers for special instruction	Apr. 27 to May 15
O	Train staff National Personnel Commission	Feb. 2 to May 15
P	Review annual budget of National Personnel Commission	Mar. 15 to Mar. 22
Q	Set up rules of National Personnel Commission	Mar. 15 to May 15
R	Initiate general compensation studies Japanese Civil Service	June 1 to June 30
S	Select personnel key positions NPC	May 17 to May 31
T	Give special instruction personnel officers - ministries	May 17 to June 30
U	Study and Advise on appointment permanent members NPC	Mar. 22 to Mar. 30
V	Organize staff National Personnel Commission	May 17 to May 29
W	Initiate development of examinations "critical" positions Jap. Civ. Ser.	June 1 to June 30
X	Study critically and report to date overall progress C. S. Div. Program	Mar. 31 to Apr. 30
Y	Organize staff functions and offices Ministry Personnel Offices	May 31 to June 23
Z	Construct schedule of operations permanent NPC period beginning 7/1/48	June 23 to June 30

closely coordinating and collaborating with the staff of the Temporary National Personnel Commission, and frequently through the Commission's offices, with officials of other agencies of the Japanese Government. Having to accomplish certain portions and stages of projects by so-to-speak "remote control" characterized by a major language difficulty, has not infrequently led to unforeseeable delays in project completion, in spite of the planning and effort of all concerned. Another factor in the progress of the Division's schedules of operation was the change of Cabinet in the Spring of 1948 with its attendant uncertainties of governmental program and policy.

One of the first major projects of the Division was to clarify the organizational structure of the upper levels of the Japanese civil service. Surprising though it may seem to one accustomed to the American practice of charting organizations and work operations, the Japanese had not, prior to the Occupation, attempted to chart their vast and complex organizations of government. There was, therefore, great need on the part of the Civil Service Division for a chart showing the organizational and functional relationships of the various Japanese Ministries and other administrative agencies to each other, to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and to the Judiciary and Legislative Branches of the Government. Early completion of this project was essential, since it formed the basis for such other projects as the identification of critical positions for examination and classification purposes.

Progress on this project was piecemeal and at times slow, due to the scattered sources of data which had to be utilized and the need for accuracy. Although members of the staff of the Temporary National Personnel Commission cooperated in the gathering and checking of organizational information, they

also were faced with the problem of digging necessary data out of unindexed official documents, and facts from officials whose concepts of organization were often vague.

While the urgent charting and description of the functions of all of the major administrative organizations and their principal subdivisions has long since been completed, this work cannot be considered closed. The rapidly changing national needs of postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation appear not infrequently to necessitate changes in both "old line" and temporary administrative functions with corresponding changes in the organizational structure of the Government.

In May 1948 the Civil Service Division was charged with a new responsibility. The drafting of a proposed law providing for the establishment of a merit system of personnel administration in locally autonomous governmental bodies such as prefectures, cities and towns, constitutes one of the division's most significant and interesting projects. Clear-cut local autonomy in Japanese administration was virtually non-existent prior to the enactment by the Japanese Diet in 1947 of the Local Autonomy Law. Such local self-determination as existed was almost inextricably complicated and vitiated by its involvement in respect to finance, selection and control of staff, and lines of administrative control with the highly centralized National Government. Accordingly, the first objective to be accomplished in drafting personnel legislation for local Japanese government bodies was to extend the political autonomy provided for in the Local Autonomy Act to the area of local public personnel administration. The second major objective was one which all public service laws in a democracy hold in common; that is, the promotion of efficiency of public administration along

lines consistent with democratic administration.

With this general background in mind, the Division proceeded to develop more specific studies of the circumstances and requirements of local public administration. Due to the fact that there have existed no personnel agencies at the local level, there were problems to be considered such as the provision of expert guidance, technical training, and interim technical supervision and control. Provision was made for these matters in drafting the proposed law by assigning such responsibilities for over-all supervision and assistance to the National Personnel Commission on a strictly interim basis. In a further effort to educate and assure high standards in local public personnel administration, considerable detail was included in the provisions of the proposed law which would in the American situation ordinarily be left for incorporation in administratively promulgated rules and regulations. A "Local Public Service Law" applicable to prefectures and municipalities throughout Japan has been drafted and will be advanced for consideration in due course.

Meanwhile, work proceeded in recognition of the fact that laws were only first steps and that bureaucratic reform in Japan would be a facade unless the laws were immediately, expertly and fully enforced. First priority in the Division Schedule of Operations was given to the selection and training of a "skeleton staff" for the Temporary National Personnel Commission. Early in January an open competitive examination was developed by the Examination Branch of the Civil Service Division. Out of the approximately 1,000 persons who took the examination, a quarter was selected from the top of the list, ranked according to scores made on the examination, to take the first basic training course for the staff of the National Personnel Commission.

The first basic training course in public personnel administration was given to the staff of the National Personnel Commission and representatives of the various ministries from February 2, 1948 until May 14, 1948. The objectives of the course were to give the trainees the primary concepts of personnel management, to arouse their enthusiasm for the task ahead, and to give them some sense of security in their new work. By the results of the examinations and through personal observations, it is concluded that these objectives have been met.

Total attendance at this training course was somewhat in excess of 400 trainees. These persons who attended the course representing other ministries and agencies of the Japanese Government were to form a nucleus of personnel directors and technicians upon the activation of the public personnel program and establishment of "operating" personnel offices under the provisions of the National Public Service Law.

In the development of a work program for the installation of a national personnel system in the Japanese Government, early consideration was given to organizing the functions of the Commission, drafting rules for the administration of the program, establishing the Commission in suitable quarters, and developing its technical and administrative staff.

At the time that the organizational pattern of the Commission was being developed, appropriate office space was sought and secured. The ex-Ministry of Home Affairs Building was assigned to the National Personnel Commission and immediate renovation of the first floor was undertaken, stressing these factors of office lay-out and equipment which would reflect efficiency in administration.

In organizing the functions of the Commission, the work was divided into clear-cut units of operation. These were labeled "sections" and were coordinated through a level of bureaus headed up by the Executive Director who reported to the Commission. These sections were conceived as units which could be established in the order of their importance and urgency in the development of the Commission's program without the necessity of establishing all units simultaneously. This simplified the presentation to the Japanese Government of the proposed organization and assisted in the development of its staffing.

Concurrent with securing office space for the Commission, a training program was undertaken to indoctrinate a staff of personnel in public administration and modern practices of personnel administration. This group of trainees was recruited by transfer from other Government positions and from outside by open competitive examination. Upon the completion of the training program, analysis was made of each trainee and in accordance with his capacity and interest each was assigned to one of the sections which was being established at that time.

A set of rules was drafted based upon the National Public Service Law. These rules implement the Act but at the same time do not include a great deal of procedural information. This latter type of information will be covered by procedural memoranda issued by the Commission. It was felt that a simplified set of rules would be more understandable and more readily administered by the Commission and the operating personnel offices.

Normal procedure in the installation of a merit system would call for the early identification and survey of the "critical" positions of the organizations

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falling within its scope for the purpose of classifying such positions and developing examinations for the selection of qualified incumbents.

The Civil Service Division held in abeyance this part of its schedule of operations. Extensive reorganizations throughout most of the ministries and major agencies of the Government of Japan were being proposed in the Spring of 1948 for legislative enactment by the Diet. To have attempted to identify and evaluate specific existing positions at such a time of structural fluidity would have undoubtedly resulted in much lost motion and unnecessary disturbance to the officials and organizations involved.

Nevertheless, general preparations for the identification and examination of critical administrative, technical, and professional positions were possible and were accomplished by the Position Classification and Compensation and the Examination Branches of the Civil Service Division. Continuing studies were made of the structure and functions of the various governmental organizations, and thousands of test items, drawn from general experience in examining for positions in the public service, were compiled and conveniently indexed. This groundwork would greatly facilitate the prompt development of examinations as soon as it might become advisable to identify specific "critical" positions in the Japanese Government.

High priority in the Division's schedule of operations was given to the revision by amendment of the National Public Service Law. Contemporary events, particularly the injurious effect of an almost continuous series of strikes and other labor dispute tactics on the part of organized government employees, gave practical demonstration of the importance of strengthening the provisions of

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the Law, the effectiveness of which had been nullified or reduced in the version enacted by the Diet. Accordingly, a comprehensive revision of the law in the form of a series of proposed amendments was completed in May 1948.

Coordination of these proposed amendments in General Headquarters was delayed by serious differences of opinion which developed between the Government Section's Civil Service Division and the Economic and Scientific Section's Labor Division on such questions as scope of coverage of the National Public Service Law, the meaning of collective bargaining as applied to government workers, and the use of strikes or dispute tactics against the government. Concrete suggestions to the Japanese Government were withheld pending reconciliation of these intra-mural differences in General Headquarters.

By July 1, 1948, when the Temporary National Personnel Commissioners assumed responsibility under the National Public Service Law for personnel administration in the Government of Japan, the situation, from the point of view of successful civil service reform, was decidedly unfavorable and further delay might have rendered it irretrievable. The points of view of the two staff sections proving irreconciliable, the issues were laid before the Supreme Commander and discussed before him at length on July 6, 1948. The decision of the Supreme Commander on the disputed issues formed the basis of a letter which he addressed on July 22, 1948 to the Prime Minister of Japan in which he called attention to weaknesses in the National Public Service Law and suggested that it be revised in accord with basic principles governing public service in a democratic government.3/ The way was now open for the Civil Service

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3/ B: Se, General MacArthur's letter of July 22, 1948 to the Prime Minister of Japan regarding revisions in the National Public Service Law.

Division, in direct dealings with the Japanese Authorities, to advise on necessary revisions of the Law and the implementation of it so as to make the Japanese civil service both democratic and efficient.