


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SECTION I
CONTROL OF JAPANESE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I BASIS FOR ACTION

When Japan surrendered its governmental machinery was intact. Included in that machinery were the agencies for administering control of overseas possessions and conducting official relations with other countries. There were governments-general in the Home Ministry for the administration of Korea, Formosa and Karafuto; the Greater East Asia Ministry for the orientation and coordination of the political, economic and cultural policies of the nominally independent countries adhering to the co-prosperity sphere, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the conduct of official relations with countries with which Japan was not at war.

Contact and communication with the outside world did not cease on August 14, 1945, when the Japanese Government, through Switzerland, notified the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and China that the Emperor of Japan had declared Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and was prepared to insure the signing of surrender terms. Japanese governmental agencies and representatives abroad continued to carry on their functions as did foreign diplomatic and consular missions in Japan.

To permit the Japanese Government to continue to exercise authority over areas which Japan had acquired by force, duress or stealth and which the Allies had repeatedly declared were to be taken from her would have been inconsistent with the purposes of the Occupation. Similarly to permit the Japanese Government to continue official relations with other governments through its diplomatic and consular representatives abroad and

Appendix A: Cairo Declaration, *Conference, December 1, 1943*, Potsdam Declaration, *July 26, 1945*

through foreign representatives in Japan would have been inconsistent with Japan's position as a defeated and occupied power and incompatible with the Supreme Commander's authority. But until Japan and its outlying possessions had been physically occupied by the Allies and the Japanese Government satisfactorily brought under the Supreme Commander's control there was no effective way of insuring severance of Japan's grip on its colonial and occupied areas or of its official relations with other countries. Thus among the first tasks of the Occupation, perhaps second in priority only to disarmament and demobilization, were these two: (1) severance of Japanese governmental and administrative authority and control over areas outside Japan proper, and (2) severance of direct official relations between the Japanese Government and other governments. These tasks were, in fact, explicitly assigned to the Supreme Commander in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's basic directive for the occupation and control of Japan.*

*1 JCS 1380/15, ~~dated~~ November 1, 1945, provided as follows:

"1.(b) Japan, as used in this directive, is defined to include: The four main islands of Japan: Hokkaido (Yezo), Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku and about 1,000 smaller adjacent islands including the Tsushima Islands."

"4.(d) You will take appropriate steps in Japan to effect the complete governmental and administrative separation from Japan of (1) all Pacific Islands which she has seized or occupied under mandate or otherwise since the beginning of the World War in 1914, (2) Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, (3) Korea, (4) Karafuto, and (5) such other territories as may be specified in future directives."

II GOVERNMENTAL SEPARATION OF JAPAN FROM OUTLYING AREAS

The physical separation of Japan from most of its overseas territories was accomplished at the very beginning of the Occupation by the dispositions of surrender. The decisions governing the allocation of responsibility among the military commanders of the Allied Powers for the physical occupation or liberation of the various components of the Japanese Empire and its occupied or controlled areas had been previously made at governmental levels. In conformity with these decisions, General Order No. 1, issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on September 2, 1945, ordered all senior commanders of the Japanese Land and Sea Forces at home and abroad to surrender to the senior Allied commanders for the areas in which those Japanese forces were situated. Consequently, of all the areas under Japanese control at the time of surrender, only Japan proper (the four main islands plus adjacent minor islands), South Korea and the Ryukyus came under the physical control of General MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Far East. Formosa and the occupied areas of China were returned to Chinese control; Manchuria, North Korea, Karafuto and the Kuriles came under Russian control; Japanese-occupied areas in Southeast Asia and the East Indies came under British control; Borneo, British New Guinea, the Bismarks and the Solomons came under Australian control and, lastly, the Bonins and other Pacific islands came under the control of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Allied military leaders proceeded to install military governments or to return governmental authority to the local civil governments in their respective areas of responsibility.

Appendix B : La, General Order No. 1, SCAP, Sept. 2, 1945

In the United States-occupied portion of Korea, General MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, established military control and assumed all powers of government on September 7, 1945, in Proclamation No. 1 issued from General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, then located in Yokohama.^{3/} These powers were, however, delegated to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Korea (XXIV Corps) who established a U.S. Military Government in Korea separate from the Supreme Commander's military control of Japan. The administration of the Ryukyus also remained separate from that of Japan since a U.S. military government had been established in the Ryukyus before the surrender. In Japan proper the Japanese Government was permitted to retain its powers of civil government subject to the Supreme Commander's military control and supervision. The area within which the Japanese Government's civil authority was effective corresponded roughly to the areas of tactical responsibility assigned to the Commanding Generals of the U.S. Sixth and Eighth Armies.

Among the instructions contained in the Supreme Commander's Directive No. 2 dated September 3, 1945, to the Japanese Government, was one to the effect that the Japanese would maintain intact and continue in operation with existing personnel all overseas and internal communications facilities, including cables, radio telegraph, radio telephone and radio broadcasting facilities, providing access to these facilities by the Supreme Commander's representatives for purposes of supervision and censorship.^{4/} These facilities were utilized in the earliest phase of the Occupation to transmit instructions to and receive information from Japanese military and civil officials in the former Japanese-controlled areas outside of Japan proper. Although the Allied military and civilian authorities in these areas promptly began to remove Japanese officials from positions of authority, the process took some time since these officials

3. Appendix B : 1c, Proclamation No. 1, AFPAC, Sept. 7, 1945

4. Appendix B : 1d, 26 Directive No. 2, SCAP, Sept. 3, 1945

were utilized to transfer authority, wind up Japanese affairs and aid in the initial preparations for the repatriation of Japanese from those areas.

Due in part to this circumstance and in part to the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, there was at first some confusion in the minds of the Japanese authorities as to the extent of the Japanese Government's authority over its officials in former occupied areas. Thus, during the latter part of September, 1945, it came to the attention of General Headquarters that the Japanese Government had included a number of Japanese officials still located in Korea in a promotion list of civil service officials. In a brief memorandum delivered to the Japanese Government on October 2, 1945, the Supreme Commander informed that Government that (1) U.S. Military Government was the sole authority in Korea, (2) the Japanese Government was not to attempt to exercise any administrative authority in Korea and (3) all the purported promotions of Japanese officials in Korea were ineffective.⁵⁷

Although by the end of 1945 the governmental and administrative separation from Japan of the areas outside of Japan had, to a great extent, been accomplished in fact by the Allied Occupation of those areas, censorship intercepts indicated that the Japanese Government was still communicating with Japanese officials in certain of these outlying areas in such manner as to constitute an attempt to exercise governmental and administrative authority over these officials. This pointed up the need for a definitive and comprehensive directive to complete the separation. Therefore, after necessary coordination among the interested staff sections of General Headquarters, a memorandum was

Appendix B: 4a Promotions of Civil Service Officials in Korea, SCMPIN 88, October 2, 1945

issued by the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government on January 29, 1946, directing it to cease exercising or attempting to exercise governmental or administrative authority over any area outside of Japan or over any government officials or any other persons within such areas. In the same directive the Japanese Government was forbidden to communicate with government officials and employees or with any other persons outside of Japan for any purpose other than certain routine functions authorized by the Supreme Commander. A definition of Japan was provided coinciding with the boundaries of the area administered directly under the Supreme Commander. The Japanese Government was informed that the directive was not to be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the identity of the "minor islands" referred to in the Potsdam Declaration as those over which Japan would be permitted to retain sovereignty. Finally, with a view to abolishing Japanese governmental agencies whose purpose was the control of areas outside of Japan, a report of all agencies in Japan whose functions pertained to areas outside of Japan as defined in the directive was requested.

The directive of January 29, 1946, served to clarify a number of administrative Occupation problems, but an unforeseen complication arose early in February 1946 in connection with the Izu Islands which, although strung in a chain stretching many miles south of Tokyo Bay, had for many years been administered as part of Tokyo-to and had on them about 170 officials sent from Japan proper. Under the dispositions of surrender and General Order No. 1 these islands came under the jurisdiction of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, but the U.S. Navy had not established military government over these

Appendix B-4c. Governmental and Administrative Separation
of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan, SCAPIN 677,
January 29, 1946.

islands and up to the issuance of the directive by SCAP they had continued to be administered as part of Tokyo-to. Application of the directive cut these islands off from the Japanese ration distribution systems, government payrolls, banking facilities and schools. The choice was between the establishment by the U.S. Navy of a military government for the Izu Islands so that they could be governed separately from Japan or the revision of the administrative boundaries of Japan to include these islands so that they could be administered by the Japanese Government as before. The question was referred to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Forces, Far East, in Hawaii, who promptly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington the transfer of jurisdiction over the Izu Islands north of 30° North Latitude to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. On March 20, 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the recommended transfer and on March 22, 1946 a Memorandum was issued to the Japanese Government amending the directive of January 29 to include the Izu Islands and the Nanpo Islands, north of and including Let's Wife, within the area defined as Japan for the purpose of administration by the Japanese Government under SCAP supervision. Again the Japanese Government was informed that these administrative adjustments were not to be construed as an indication of Allied policy relative to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in the Potsdam Declaration. On March 30, 1946, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, was notified that the Izu Islands were to be administered by the Japanese Government under the Supreme Commander's supervision in the same manner as the rest of Japan. Thereafter the Eighth Army exercised military government responsibility over the islands through its Tokyo-Kanagawa Military Government Team.

7. Appendix B: 1a

8. Appendix B: 4. Instrumental and Administrative Separation of
Let's Wife and other Islands from Japan 871, March 22, 1946
SCAPIN

III SEVERANCE OF DIRECT RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES

The second task in the control of Japanese external affairs was the severance of direct relations between the Japanese Government and other governments. This entailed (1) the closing of Japanese diplomatic and consular establishments abroad and recall of their personnel, (2) transfer of Japanese diplomatic and consular property and archives in foreign countries to Allied custody, and (3) suspension of direct contacts between diplomatic and consular representatives in Japan and the Japanese Government.

In the execution of this task some difficulties were encountered which required use of the Supreme Commander's authority over the Japanese Government to surmount. The origin of these difficulties lay in an early misconception of the Japanese as to their post-surrender position in relation to the victors-- a misconception based evidently on the assumption that the Japanese Government's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration established a contractual relationship between it and the Allies. The tenaciousness of such an assumption should have been obvious from the unequivocal statement with which the United States Government, on behalf of the Four Great Powers, on August 11, 1945, replied to the Japanese Government's note of August 10, 1945, attempting to qualify its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. It was in reply to this United States statement that the Japanese on August 14, 1945, transmitted their final acceptance and signified their readiness to sign the terms of surrender. From any objective point of view there should have been no further question that the relations of the Allies with Japan rested on an unconditional surrender, not on

~~II Appendixes C, D, E and F: Exchange of Diplomatic Notes and Emperor's Proclamation of Surrender~~

9. Appendix A: 7, Final Japanese Acceptance.

a contract. Any possible further misconception as to Japan's status vis a vis the Allied Powers or as to the authority of the Supreme Commander for these powers should have been dispelled when the Instrument of Surrender was signed on September 2, 1945, for by the terms of that instrument the Japanese agreed that from the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State should be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who would take such steps as he deemed proper to effectuate the surrender terms. ¹⁰

The authority given to the Supreme Commander to carry out his mission under Allied policy directives was supreme and clearly not subject to question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope. ¹¹ True, he was instructed to exercise control of Japan through the Japanese government to the extent that this proved satisfactory for his purpose, but this did not prejudice his right to act directly, or to use force, if necessary. The statement of principles contained in the Potsdam Declaration was to be given full effect, not because the United States and its Allies were bound in a contractual relationship with Japan, but because the Potsdam Declaration was a part of Allied policy enunciated in good faith and intended to be carried out in good faith.

1. Diplomatic and Consular Missions Abroad. Immediately upon receiving notice of Japan's surrender the United States Government in concert with its Allies moved to secure the closing of Japanese diplomatic and consular missions in neutral countries and the transfer to Allied custody of the property and archives of those missions and other property and archives in the hands of Japan's protecting powers in Allied countries, Sweden and Switzerland.

A: 9,
10 Appendix ~~of~~ Instrument of Surrender

11 Appendix A: 12, Authority of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

On August 14, 1945, the United States Department of State requested the Japanese Government, through the Swiss, to make the necessary transfers. Simultaneously, the Allied representatives in foreign countries were instructed to assume custody. The Japanese Government's reply to this request was that it regretted that it could not comply, on the ground that it did not accord with any of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. In the latter part of August 1945, when the Japanese Legation in Afghanistan was ordered closed by the representatives of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government represented to the Allied Governments that this was improper, for the same reason. U.S. and Allied representatives in other countries encountered similar difficulties. In the absence of instructions from the Japanese Government to its representatives or to its protecting powers abroad, diplomatic means were inadequate to secure the required actions. As late as mid-October 1945 the Supreme Commander was informed by the Department of State that in neutral countries Japanese diplomatic archives were still unsealed and the Japanese were acting as if no surrender had occurred. In countries where Sweden and Switzerland were acting as protecting powers for Japan, they were not permitting the Allies to have access to Japanese diplomatic archives.

To clarify this situation required an order from the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government. Accordingly, on October 25, 1945, SCAP by written memorandum directed the Japanese Government to instruct its missions in neutral countries to (1) transfer their property and archives to the custody of Allied representatives in those countries, (2) request Sweden and Switzerland to do likewise in those countries where they were acting as protecting powers for Japan and (3) recall all Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives in neutral countries. 22

12/ Appendix B: *Transfer of Custody of Diplomatic and Consular Property and Archives, SCAPIN 189, October 25, 1945*

The initial reaction of the Japanese to this directive reflected their early misconception as to the Japanese Government's status in relation to the Allies, but it was not lasting. The Japanese Foreign Ministry's first telegram on the subject to its ministers in Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Afghanistan and to its Consul-General in Dublin, dispatched on October 26, 1945, advised them briefly of the contents of the SCAP Directive of the preceding day, but added that the Government intended to ask for an explanation as to the grounds on which the Allied demands had been made. A memorandum by the Foreign Ministry, submitted informally to General Headquarters, cited the American Government's initial request of August 14, 1945, and the closing of the Japanese Legation in Afghanistan about two weeks later by order of the Allied representatives in that country, and the Japanese Government's questioning of these actions.^{13/} In view of the presentation of the directive "before hearing any word from the Allied Powers as to their views on the matter," the Japanese Government sought "information on the best ways of insuring a more faithful execution of the terms of the surrender instrument so as to recover Japan's position among the nations." The memorandum further stated that the recall of Japanese representatives in neutral countries meant "an actual severance of diplomatic relations between Japan and those countries with which she maintains friendly relations," and that it constituted "a step backward from the goal of cementing amicable relations among nations and securing peace to the world." It expressed the hope that after it had been determined that the presence of Japanese representatives in neutral countries would "not be harmful to the Allied Powers," they might be allowed "to resume their normal routine functions as before" and requested that this desire of the Japanese Government be conveyed to the Allied Powers. No reply was made by SCAP to this memorandum but a copy was forwarded

13/ Appendix B: 1. Japanese Foreign Office memorandum on Recall of Diplomatic Missions.

to Washington for the information of the Government. The Japanese were informed that prompt and complete compliance with the directive was expected. On October 31, 1945, the Japanese Government, with its formal acknowledgement of the SCAP's directive of October 23, enclosed copies of telegrams which it had dispatched on October 31 to its ministers abroad in which it advised these ministers of its intention to take the measures required by the directive of October 23, and instructed them to proceed without delay to effect the required actions. There followed a number of conferences with officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry for the purpose of clarifying necessary details for full implementation of the directive, checks of reports of compliance submitted by the Japanese Government against information from the U.S. Department of State based on reports from Allied representatives in foreign countries, and in some cases supplementary instructions to Japanese representatives abroad. The two protecting powers for Japan were authorized to continue to exercise routine functions of protection of Japanese nationals, care of displaced Japanese persons, etc., and for these purposes arrangements were made to make the Japanese records taken over by the Allied Powers in various countries accessible to the neutral protecting powers.

The Japanese Mission to the Vatican required separate treatment. In a SCAP Memorandum dated October 31, 1945, the Japanese had been given definitions of the United Nations, neutral, enemy and other nations, for the purpose of applying SCAP instructions. ¹⁴ The Vatican, because it is not considered by the U.S. State Department as a government in the usual sense, had not been included in this directive as falling under any of the categories. Consequently, the Japanese emissary to the Vatican was not recalled simultaneously with the other

¹⁴ Appendix B: The definitions of "United Nations", "Neutral Nations", and "Enemy Nations", SCAPIN 217, October 31, 1945

ministers pursuant to the directive of October 25, 1945. The Japanese themselves considered him in a special category and were prepared to leave him at his post unless specifically instructed to the contrary. Despite the special status of the Vatican, the continued presence of a Japanese Mission there was considered anomalous in view of Japan's status as a defeated and occupied nation. Consequently, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, the Supreme Commander, on December 15, 1945, notified the Japanese Government that the directive of October 25, 1945 was to be applied to the Japanese Mission to the Vatican.

2. Foreign Missions in Japan. The final measure for the control of Japanese foreign relations was the suspension of official contact between foreign missions in Japan and the Japanese Government. This was ordered in a SCAP Memorandum issued on November 4, 1945.¹⁵ Again the initial reaction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry indicated a tendency to quibble, but again the tendency did not persist. On November 21, 1945, in the memorandum acknowledging receipt of the SCAP Memorandum of November 4, the Japanese Government reported that all necessary measures to carry out the directive had been taken. Concurrently neutral and other diplomatic representatives in Japan were informed by General Headquarters that any matters which they felt necessary to discuss with the Japanese Government should be submitted to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for such action as the Supreme Commander deemed appropriate. By the end of December 1945, the Japanese Government had no relations with the outside world except through the Supreme Commander, and arrangements were being made for the repatriation of Japanese representatives in foreign countries.

Appendix B: *4d, Official Relations Between Japan and Government
and Representatives of Neutral Nations, SCAPIN 237, November 4, 1945*