

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1750

30 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: "Factual Account of July 7th Incident" *by General CHING, Teh-Chun, former Mayor of Peiping. *(Marco Polo Bridge, 1937)

Date: 2 Apr 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: Englis.

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Judge HSIANG, Che-Chun, Chinese Division
SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Chinese Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; KATSUKI, Seiji; KAWABE, Seizo; MUTAGUCHI, Renyan; SAKAI, Takashi; MATSUI (Chief of Special Service, not Iwane); DOIHARA, Kenji.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: All-China Military Aggression; MARCO POLO Bridge Incident

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Details of negotiations and military movements and background immediately preceding Japanese invasion of HOPEI and CHAHAR Provinces, and the LUKUOCHIA (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident, over period 1936-July 1937.

HASHIMOTO and North China Forces Chief of Staff WACHI first attempted to buy lands in WAN-PING, as first step in conquering North China, later resorted to propaganda and economic monopoly. to gain ends, finally resorted to arms. July 7, 1937.

General CHING charges incident began on flimsy pretext Japanese soldier missing, after Japanese had heard, according to their own phone call "shots fired in distance" Further Japanese troops were maneuvering in Chinese territory without notice or permission.

Japanese troops then demanded permission to search city threatened to encircle it if refused. At 0500 (the Chinese not acceding) Japanese troops had encircled city on three sides and began firing first.

Summary of fighting to 30 July, when Chinese forces fell back, is given.

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1750

MS 10

ON THE TRUTH
concerning
The "Marco Polo" Bridge Incident.

A note written by

Lt. Gen. MUTAGUCHI, Renya

The True State of Affairs Concerning
the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident.

A Note written by Lt. General R. MUTAGUCHI

As regards the true facts concerning the cause of the Lukouchiao Incident, I consider that the following twelve points are truly of particular importance from the point of view of inquiry. I, for this reason, have decided to make a report to you regarding this incident in writing lest there should be any misunderstanding on the part of interpreters, etc.

(1) On July 7th, 1937, Colonel Mutaguchi inspected the Battalion under his command at Tientsin and returned to Peking about 1700 hours. Just when I did so, Major-General Kawabe, my Brigade Commander, and concurrently the Garrison Commander of the entire areas, such as Peking, Fengtai, Tungchow, etc. went out for the bivouac ground at Nantaisze in order to see the manner of the inspection of the 2nd Regiment at Tientsin which was under his command. Consequently, Colonel Mutaguchi was placed in the situation in which he was to act for the Garrison Commander there.

As for garrison districts or garrison commanders, they were all to be decided upon by the Officer Commanding the Imperial Japanese troops at Tientsin.

From the standpoint of command of troops, Major General Kawabe was an Infantry Brigade Commander, but he was also the Garrison Commander there from the point of view of protective measures. It was a fixed rule at that time that the Commander of the Infantry Regiment at Peking was to act for the Brigade Commander during his absence. The garrison district near Peking comprised all the areas, such as Peking, Tungchow, Fengtai, etc.

The duty of the Garrison Commander was to command all the Japanese troops which were stationed within the garrison district and was to be engaged in safeguarding the lives and property of all

Japanese officials and people in that district and also in protecting the railway lines, telegraph wires, etc.

(2) At about 2350 hours on the night of July 7th, the report of the following meaning was telephoned to me by Battalion Commander Ichiki who was stationed at Fengtai:

"The 8th Company under his command (Captain Setsuro Shimizu was its commander) got fired upon by Chinese troops at about 2230 hours from a place which was supposed Lungwanmiao while that company was engaged in night exercise in the district which is in the North of Lukouchiao Castle. He, for that reason immediately discontinued that exercise and called the roll. The result was that one recruit was not found. He is just being looked for."

Lungwanmiao is a small mausoleum which lies on the left bank of the Yungtingho River about 400 meters north of Lukouchiao Castle.

The above matter was telephoned to Major Gen. Kawabe, but as he was taking an official trip, that report was made to the Regimental Commander. It was telephoned to the Regimental Commander's official residence which was next door to the Regimental Headquarters and was in the premises of the Japanese Embassy.

I immediately gave the following directions to the Battalion Commander by telephone:

"As this event was made to occur by Chinese troops which had recently been tumultuous somehow and even in view of the Fengtai Incident of the previous year (this will be stated later), it is to be judged that they may have fired upon us because of their contempt for the Japanese troops or for fear of our garrison soldiers. Still, no one can be perfectly sure as to how the state of affairs will change. Therefore, the Battalion under my command will fall in at once on the alert and will concentrate itself in the vicinity of Ichimonji Hill.

Then, taking all protective measures, ascertain whether or not it was Chinese troops that fired upon us. If it be true that Chinese troops did so, collect, for our future negotiations, all the names of persons and date that are all necessary for our exact evidence, I will proceed to the Regimental Headquarters at once."

So saying I rang off.

Ichimonji Hill which has just been stated above is a sand hill which lies 300 meters east of Lukouchiao Castle. That is the name which was used by the Japanese troops on their own authority.

(3) It was about 0030 hours on July 8th, when I arrived at Regimental Headquarters. I awoke the Captain of the week, and ordered the Peking troops to fall in on the alert, by sending out orderlies.

It was about 3 o'clock when all the troops fell in completely as all the officers there had been staying in their respective official residences there at that time.

At ordinary times in Peking, the Infantry Brigade Headquarters, the Infantry Regimental Headquarters and the First Battalion were stationed, but at that time, as for the Brigade Headquarters, Captain Onoguchi, its aide-de-camp, was remaining there as its caretaker. As regards the First Battalion, its commander and the majority of his subordinates were at the bivouac ground at Tungchow for the preparation of their inspection. Thus, it was only one company and one machine gun platoon in addition to the regimental Headquarters that were remaining in Peking.

I instantly gave an order by telephone to the battalion commander, Major Yoshio Kihara, (who had been at Tungchow) to have his unit fall in immediately and proceed to the Japanese target ground in the South East of Chaoyaumen in Peking for further orders.

This battalion was ordered afterwards to proceed to Fengtai. It was about 2100 hours on July 8th, when that battalion arrived at Fengtai, passing the southern part of Peking Castle in defiance of the intense heat.

(4) In addition to the above measures, I informed the Commandant of the Special Service Institutions, Colonel Takuro Matsui, about it and asked him to lodge a strong protest with the Chinese ^{authorities} /against the unlawful acts of those Chinese troops.

The Chinese authorities, however, answered as follows:
"Chinese troops are found at Lunouchiao, but in the vicinity of Lungwangmiao, there ought to be no Chinese troops".

The commandant of the Special Service Institutions reproached them, saying: "According to your statement, there may be no Chinese troops there. But how can you deny the fact that they actually fired upon us there?" The reply on the Chinese side was: "If it be true that you were fired upon, they are not those who belong to any Chinese troops, but I think they are communists, watermelon house watchmen, or bandits. Well, they may be Chinese troops."

The S. S. I. commandant reproached them:
"What would you do, if they were Chinese troops?"

The answer on the Chinese side was:
"Even if they are Chinese troops, they may be considered bandits as they went away from their garrison district without our permission. Whatever you may do with them, we, on the Chinese side, have no objection to it at all." Thus, their attitude was to try to evade their responsibility to the best of their ability. They, however, came to decide to send out their representatives to the actual spot for the negotiations with the Japanese troops there anyway, just based upon the requests made by the commandant of the Special Service Institutions there.

The fact is that I was able to learn the above matter as the result of the information which was given me by the S. S. I. commandant.

(5) After careful consideration, I tried to settle all the incident by means of the negotiations as much as possible. For this reason, I decided to despatch Lt. Colonel Toru Morita who had been a regimental staff to the actual spot for negotiations. It is because I keenly realized the necessity of taking all appropriate measures according to the change of circumstances by remaining in Peking for the purpose of ful-

filling all my duties as the garrison commander.

Although the Chinese authorities went on declaring that it was not Chinese troops that fired upon us, yet to my mind, I knew at that time that there had been Chinese troops near Lungwanmiao at ordinary times. Furthermore, it was quite clear to me, even in view of that Japanese Battalion Commander's report, that they were neither the watermelon house watchmen nor bandits, etc., but they were quite unmistakably Chinese troops, judging from the number of rifles used there at that time, the manner in which they fired upon us, the rounds of ammunition, etc.

Lt. Colonel Morita died fighting as a regimental commander on the field of battle at Nomonhan in August 1939. Lt. Colonel Morita came to his regimental commander about 2 o'clock a. m. because of the order, "fall in on the alert," which was transmitted by the orderly. I, his regimental commander, issued the following order to him:

"You will proceed to the scene of the incident together with the Chinese negotiating committee for negotiations with them. They are expected to come pretty soon. The care to be taken in connection with the matter is as follows:

'That incident occurred at night. It can be considered that these Chinese may have fired upon us in the excess of their fear without realizing that we were Japanese troops. Even in the actual situation in which they knew that we were Japanese troops, it can be a good excuse if they declare that they did not know it. In view of that fact, it is essential for you to continue your negotiations with them based upon this idea just by accepting their excuse which will be made in that way.'

"Lt. Colonel Morita questioned to me once again:

Is it the regimental commander's intention to try to settle this incident by means of negotiations to the bitter end?"

I gave my exact answer to it: "That's it."

On the reason why Lt. Colonel Morita questioned me once again

about my real intention as the regimental commander:
At the Fengtai Incident in previous year (to be explained afterward) I, the regimental commander, negotiated with Chinese negotiating committee as Japanese negotiating committee at Fengtai. At that time the battalion commander Ichiki asked earnestly for disarmament of Chinese troops. I rejected his request saying that my "Bushido" spirit did not permit me to insult by disarming Chinese troops which had apologized to Japanese Army by explaining regret for their fault. And I also told the Chinese negotiating committee that although the battalion commander on the spot asked for disarmament, I rejected his request because my "Bushido" spirit did not permit me to add disarming after asking apology as Japanese proverb says, "It becometh not the fowler to catch the bird which takes refuge in his bosom." I added that I wished to convey my real intention to General Sung Che Yuan.

Afterward, I was told that he reported to General Sung Che Yuan saying "Japanese Army could not disarm Chinese troops being afraid of our strength." I could not help getting angry. And when I explained the particulars of the Fengtai Incident to regimental staff and battalion commanders I told them that judging from the result it might be better to disarm resolutely according to the battalion commander Ichiki's request, but as the past cannot be recovered I had firm determination in my mind if Chinese troops committed unlawful act against Japanese troops:

Although the circumstances were above mentioned, facing serious happening I changed my mind to settle it peacefully by all means, lest it should become serious case for the country and so I told my real intention to Lt. Col. Morita. At the same time to Mr. Wang Lin Chi and Mr. Lin Kan Yu, both Chinese negotiating committee, I stated my hope and also confirmed their rights on account of my intention that the negotiation should be succeeded in suppressing the violence of Chinese troops.

(6) Pretty soon from the Chinese side, Mr. Wang Lin Chi, the governor of Yuan Ping Hsien and Mr. Lin Kan Yu, Kichu Political Affairs Commission, as Mr. Wang's suite came to the regimental Headquarters in company with Captain Tera Taira (whether he was in the rank of Captain or not is quite uncertain).

I questioned Mr. Wang Lin Chi in order to ascertain the following matters, because I had expected that a brigade commander or a military officer of that position at the lowest would surely come in view of the precedent of the Fengtai Incident of the previous year:

"You are a civil official. I wonder whether or not you have so much authority and conviction as to control and pacify Chinese troops on the actual spot, especially such Chinese troops as, we think, have been greatly excited?"

To this, Mr. Wang gave the following reply:

"As regards the question of authority, I am not certain. So I will ask Mr. Chin Teh Shun." So saying, he asked me to allow him to use our telephone. I complied with his request. Thus, about 30 minutes, he continued his negotiations by telephone, which, however, did not come to the point at all.

Time was pressing every moment and it was supposed that the situation on the spot was more and more acute. I for that reason ordered Major Kono, the then regimental adjutant, to ask Mr. Wang who had been engaged in telephone negotiations to come to my place.

Then I required Mr. Wang to proceed quickly to the actual spot together with Lt. Colonel Morita and his party instead of paying any more attention to authority questions.

I said in addition to Mr. Wang as follows at the time of his departure:

"For the great object of promoting the good will existing between Japan and China, I hope you will surely settle this question just by placing these outrageous Chinese troops under control, regardless of your authority questions."

It was 4 o'clock a. m. on July 8th when that party left the gate of the regimental Headquarters.

With regard to the reason why the Chinese side sent out a civilian governor there instead of despatching a military negotiating committee, I judged as follows:

"On the Chinese side, they had a special intention of dealing with that unlawful act to the best of their power as an act which had been taken by communists or bandits. If a militarist had been sent out there, at that time, it would have shown that that bad act was taken by the Chinese Army, they feared. Probably for that reason, that governor who was to be responsible for police affairs was despatched there according to their own machination."

Although I had the above judgment, yet the state of affairs on the actual spot was such as would never allow us to hesitate even for one second. So I decided to have Mr. Wang stop his negotiations with Mr. Chin Teh Shun and thus to send him out to the actual spot immediately.

(7) As I came to realize the necessity of letting the Japanese battalion commander know that a party of the negotiating committee had already started, I called him to the telephone and gave him the following directions:

"A party of the Sino-Japanese negotiating committee left the regimental Headquarters for the actual scene at 4 o'clock a. m. Lt. Col. Morita from the Japanese side and Mr. Wang, the Governor of Yuanpin-hsien, from the Chinese side are taking part in it. You are demanded to act just in accordance with the directions of Lt. Col. Morita."

That Battalion Commander rang off answering to me:

"Yes, I understand." Very soon afterwards, he telephoned to me as follows:

"Regimental Commander! Only a very few minutes ago, we got fired upon quite severely by Chinese troops near Lukouchiao Castle and Lungwangmiao. What shall I do, Sir?"

I asked him:

"About what time in the world did it occur?"

That Battalion Commander said:

"About 3.40 a.m. Sir."

I went on questioning to him

"Now you say 3.40. Then it is quite possible for them to distinguish themselves from us, isn't it?"

The Battalion Commander's answer was:

"Yes it is. They can do so quite exactly. I trust that those Chinese troops there did fire upon us with their perfect understanding that they were doing so against Japanese troops."

Hereupon I made up my mind as follows:

"Up to the present, I have had a ray of hope that it might be excusable on the Chinese side, if they should declare that they fired upon us simply because they could not discern Japanese troops well as it was at night. But now there is no further room for our negotiations. They opened their fire when it was quite clear to them that that we were Japanese troops. That is truly their insult to the Japanese troops. A little more patience on our side would allow Chinese troops to act more and more outrageously and thus the Japanese prestige would be lowered as a result. From now on, we cannot refrain from taking a step to defend ourselves."

Furthermore, in due consideration of the responsibility shirking excuse on the Chinese side, namely, "in the vicinity of Lungwangmiao, there ought to be no Chinese troops. Those who took unlawful acts are not our subordinates. They must be communists or bandits," I came to realize that it would be quite natural for me to take some drastic measures at that juncture against their unlawful acts, from the view point of our invocation of the right of self-defence (1), in the sense of testifying that those who took unlawful acts were Chinese troops, (2), and also for the purpose of bringing this incident to a conclusion with the minimum troubles (3).

I therefore issued the following order to the Battalion Commander:

"They have unlawfully fired upon us not only once but also even twice. It is impossible for us to be patient any longer. It is all right for you to open hostilities resolutely. It is 4.20 now."

(8) I reported by telephone each time to the Imperial Japanese Headquarters at Tientsin concerning all the situations up to that time,

though I had often troubles in the telephone. In regard to my issue of the order for the commencement of fighting, I made a report after I gave that order to the Battalion Commander.

It is because I most firmly believed as follows:

"That was what ought to have been done quite naturally by the garrison commander for his responsibility sake. I feared moreover that the Japanese Headquarters at Tientsin was quite unable to appreciate the actual situation on the spot so exactly as myself. If, in spite of that fact, I should by any chance ask to my superior about the determination I had to make as a matter of course for responsibility sake, it would be throwing my responsibility upon him."

(9) As for my order to the Battalion Commander regarding the commencement of fighting, I was not able to transmit it to Lt. Colonel Morita's party, because that party had been already advancing toward the actual spot in a motor car at that time.

Then the situation developed as follows:

It was about 5 a.m. when Lt. Colonel Morita's party arrived at Ichimonji Hill.

At that time, the battalion commander Ichiki deployed his battalion with the object of making an attack upon Lungwangmiao, had his infantry gun company occupy the position on Ichimonji Hill, and was just going to assume offensive.

Great was the surprise of Lt. Colonel Morita who had not had any means of knowing that his regimental commander had issued the order to that battalion commander to begin an action.

Lt. Colonel Morita jumped to the conclusion that the Battalion Commander was doing a rash thing. He thought in addition that it was quite contrary to the intention of the regimental commander who would always go by the principle of settling the question by peaceful negotiations.

He for that reason immediately ordered that Battalion Commander as follows:

"No advance for attack is allowed. Keep remaining on the spot."

That Battalion Commander thought it very strange to receive such an order at such a time. He, however, ordered his entire

Battalion to halt on the spot just in accordance with the directives of Lt. Colonel Morita. It was because he judged that his regimental commander may have changed his mind. He in addition ordered all his subordinates to take a meal each.

At that time, all the Japanese officers and men were very hungry as they had been in action since the midnight of the previous day.

That Battalion stopped on the line of its deployment (which is found almost in the north of Ichimonji Hill and about 600 meters from Lungwangmiao) and officers and men took out military biscuits from their shoulder haversacks. Some of them put them in their mouths while some other were just going to do so. At that very moment, they got severely fired upon from Lungwangmiao and Lukouchiao Castle.

Lt.Col. Morita who got very indignant at that state of affairs spoke to the Chinese negotiating committee as follows: "As you are very well aware, the whole Battalion on the spot was just going to commence fighting. I have just checked it from so doing just in accordance with the principle of our regimental commander. As you have already seen with your own eyes, those Chinese troops outrageously fired upon us in spite of that attitude on our part. The injustice is entirely on the Chinese side."

Thus, Lt. Colonel Morita ordered that Battalion commander to advance for the attack with the perfect realization that no further consideration should be shown to them. The whole Battalion commenced its advance for attacks from the time of its deployment at the same time. It was just 5.30 a.m.

As soon as that Battalion commenced its advance, the Chinese troops fired upon it quite violently from both Lungwangmiao and Lukouchiao. Still, it continued its vigorous advance and in that way it captured the Chinese position at Lungwangmiao just seven minutes after commencing its advance.

One part of the Chinese troops retreated along the Yungting River and ran into the Lukouchia Castle, while the majority of them retreated away across that river.

In the Chinese positions at Lungwangmiao, some four or five

dead bodies of Chinese officers and men were left behind.

Thus, that very fact was telling us with absolute exactitude that those who took unlawful acts at that time were neither communists nor bandits as the Chinese authorities had stated before, but unmistakably the Chinese troops.

The Lukouchow Incident broke out truly in that way. I believe that the above explanation enables every body to understand quite perfectly that the Japanese troops there made their greatest possible efforts and exertions with their long special patience just like an adult who would try to soothe mischievous children in order that they might be able to settle all the questions concerning those Chinese unlawful acts in a most peaceful way."

"It is enough to provoke a saint," (It would try the patience of a saint.) runs an old Japanese proverb. That Lukouchiao Incident occurred really in a situation exactly like that.

(10) In this connection there is one thing which constantly sticks to the memory of myself, the then regimental commander, and in addition can never, never be forgotten. That is none other than the Fengtai Incident which occurred on September 18th, 1936, namely one year before the occurrence of the Lukouchiao Incident. At that time, I conducted negotiations with the Chinese authorities by the order of Major General Kawabe. I have the pleasure of giving only its outline as regards this event.

On the evening of September 18th, No.7 Company of the Japanese troops at Fengtai and the Chinese troops there passed by each other in front of Fengtai Station. At that instant, this incident originated. The fact is that one Japanese medical orderly who was marching in the rear of that Company was beaten on the head by a certain Chinese soldier at that time. That Japanese Company Commander urged the Chinese troop authorities to send out that bad soldier, while all the Chinese fled into the Chinese Barracks and that bad soldier was not sent out to us at all. The result was that our whole Battalion enveloped that Chinese Barracks and urged them to deliver that criminal. Now, I have just used the word, "Barracks", but it was only a very poor one which had been reconstructed from a Chinese hotel there.

Major General Kawabe who received that report strongly advised all Japanese troops at Fengtai never, never to open fire under any circumstances. That Japanese Battalion which had been facing the Chinese troops there went on keeping itself exactly as it had been and moreover, never, never fired even one round of ammunition in strict obedience to the Brigade Commander's order.

On the other hand, the Brigade Commander ordered me, the then Regimental Commander, to proceed to Fengtai in order to conduct negotiations with the Chinese negotiating committee there. From the Chinese side, a brigade commander named Hsu Chang Lin came to that place as a negotiating committee. The negotiations were conducted in the Japanese Barracks at Fengtai from 3 o'clock to about 5 a.m. on September 19th. The result was the following terms were concluded:

- (1) The Chinese troops at Fengtai will be taken away three kilometers from the Japanese Barracks.
- (2) The Chinese troops will apologize to the Japanese troops there.
- (3) It goes without saying that that criminal will be punished. Moreover, all responsible persons too will be punished. Then, after punishment is over, a report will be made to the Japanese troops in regard to the matter.
- (4) The Chinese troops will give assurances that they will never take any unlawful acts toward Japanese troops in the future.

At that time, the Japanese Battalion Commander there was so very indignant at that incident that he entreated me to allow him to disarm completely that Chinese company which committed outrage there.

I did not accept his entreaty but said to Mr. Hsu Chang Lin, the then Chinese negotiating committee, as follows:

"My subordinate Battalion Commander is now so very indignant at that incident that he is very anxious to disarm that Company quite entirely, but as far as I am concerned, the spirit of Bushido - the soul of our ancient warriors - does not allow me to offer an insult

to your troops by conducting demilitarization when they say they would apologize to Japanese troops with feelings of repentance for their former evil deeds. An old Japanese proverb says, A fowler will not catch a bird which would seek refuge in his own bosom! The reason why I tried to satisfy myself only at your apology at the expense of the enthusiastic petition of my subordinate at this time is truly based upon the above spirit. I hope, when you return, that you will report to Mr. Sung Che Yuan, your chief committee, about this very spirit of mine".

Mr. Hsuholin also gave his consent to it.

During that negotiation, Major Sakurai who was one of the advisers of the Chinese Army was also present there.

In spite of the above fact, only a few days later, Major Sakurai paid a visit to me and told me as follows:

"The Regimental Commander did not carry out demilitarization based upon his lofty spirit, at that time. But Hsuchanglin reported to Sung Che Yuan as follows:

'The Japanese troops were so much afraid of the great fighting power of the Chinese troops that they could not carry out disarmament.'"

After receiving Major Sakurai's information, I came to realize most keenly that I was too good-natured a person to conduct negotiation with the Chinese side and that that was probably one of the reasons why their troops' contempt came to be increased even more greatly toward Japanese troops there.

(11) The circumstances in which Lukauchiao and vicinity came to be used by the Japanese troops as their drill grounds:

It was in July, 1936 which was one year before the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident that the Battalion under my command came to be stationed at Fengtai.

The then Battalion Commander, Major Ichiki made a suggestion to me that he was in great troubles because there was no place for his drills in entire Fengtai area which was none other than Kaoliang field.

With regard to that suggestion, I gave a special order to him

so as to have him reconnoitre the bed of the Yungting River and its vicinity. A very few days later, that Battalion Commander reported to me as follows:

"The bed of the Yungting River and the entire vicinity of Lukouchiao which consist of sand which is mixed with small pebbles have very few farm products, and even in some parts there where some products are found, they are only the farms for peanuts or something of that kind. So they are all very suitable for our drills. I am very sorry that I made a previous report without making any careful reconnaissance." That report was made with his special delight.

I immediately reported that matter to my Brigade Commander, Major General Kawabe, and asked the Special Service Institutions there to conduct negotiations with the Chinese authorities. In this way, the entire area near Lukouchiao came to be used as our drill grounds as a result. This matter was also reported to the commander of the Japanese troops at Tientsin. From that time on, Lukouchiao and vicinity were always used by our troops at Fengtai as their drill grounds.

(12) Our information to the Chinese side which was made beforehand at each time of our exercise.

In view of our realization of the special necessity of preventing the outbreak of further troubles with the Chinese side after the occurrence of the Fengtai Incident of September 18th, 1936, the Japanese side voluntarily made it a rule to make information beforehand to the Chinese side through the Special Service Institutions on each occasion of our field exercise in which the whole battalion under my command was to take part not only at night but also even in the day time.

As for the day time as well as night exercises of the very day of the outbreak of that Incident, the exact information was made to the Chinese side. The regimental commander had already decided to conduct his inspection of the company drills of the Fengtai troops on and after July 9th. Special stress was being laid upon night exercises not only because of my principle but also because of the requests which had been previously made by my commander.

My plan was to tell the battalion that its two companies would

go in for the inspection of their night exercises and the remaining one company for the inspection of its day time exercises, and to let them know on the very day of inspection regarding all subjects of my inspection.

Consequently, the battalion at Fengtai mapped out its plan to use July 8th for the care of arms and clothing for that inspection and decided upon July 7th as the last day for its preparatory training for the inspection. On that day, all companies were engaged in their exercises from the day time till night in all different time and places.

I, the then Regimental Commander, was going to make previous arrangements with my assistants concerning that inspection by collecting all of them in the vicinity of Ichimonji Hill from the very early morning of July 8th.

SUPPLEMENT

- (1) The time mentioned in this note is the standard time in Peking, China.
- (2) In (2) para, a soldier that had been missing was found afterwards as the result of searching. Being astonished by a sudden shooting from Chinese side he had been at a point far from the main force of company.
- (3) To (5) para - Matters which were estimated from number of rifles, method of shooting, number of bullets: Number of bullets were about 70 - 80 rounds. Number of rifles leveled at were no less than 30. The battalion commander instantly judged them to be Chinese troops from the method of shooting which were comparatively accurate.
- (4) In (7) para, matters which I confirmed to the battalion commander about the condition of severe shooting: Number of bullets were no less than 300 rounds. Number of rifles used were at least more than 70. Judging from the sound of bullets passing overhead it was sure that the bullets were shot against our side.
- (5) To (7) para. Points which were distinctly discriminated Chinese and Japanese:
 - a. As figures of Chinese soldiers on the wall of Lukouchia Castle and Lungwangmiao were plainly recognized from our side, we judged that they had to be able to recognize us as Japanese troops from Chinese side.
 - b. The distance between us and them was about 300 meters to Lukouchiao Castle and about 600 meters to Lungwangniao.
 - c. **Daybreak on July 8th in Peking districts was about 0240 hours, if I remember correctly.**
- (6) To (9) para. For Lt.Col. Morita's disposition for the attack at that time, the Chinese committee too approved that injustice was on Chinese side and that the challenge was inevitable.

SUPPLEMENT (2)

(7) To (9) para. Number of corpses of Chinese officers and men left in Chinese position at Lungwangmiao was 27 including officers. And casualties on Japanese side in this fighting were 2 killed and 5 wounded, I remember.

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A FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF JULY 7th INCIDENT

----By General Ching Teh-Chun----

(Formerly Mayor of Peiping and concurrently Vice-Commander of the 29th Army. At present, Vice-Minister of Military Operations)

I. PROLOGUE

A. The Political and Military Conditions in Hopei and Chahar Provinces Prior to the War of Resistance

1. Political - Before the Incident of July 7th, the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was the responsible institution in charge of political affairs in Hopei and Chahar Provinces. General Sun Che-Yuan was the Chairman of the said Council, being appointed by the National Government. The Council had jurisdiction over Hopei and Chahar Provinces and Peiping and Tientsin Municipalities. General Feng Chi-An and General Liu Ju-Ming were the Governor of Hopei Province and Chahar Province respectively. I, myself, was then Mayor of Peiping, while General Chang Chi-Chung, who later fell gallantly for the country as Commander-in-Chief, was then Mayor of Tientsin.

Since their costless invasion of the Chinese North-Eastern three Provinces, followed by the invasion of the Jehol Province, and the Battle of the Great Wall, the Japanese aggressors considered all these Provinces in North China as something that could be very easily taken over. Peiping and Tientsin, therefore, became the front line of national defense. However, all the policies of the local authorities in Hopei, Chahar, Peiping and Tientsin were formulated and carried out in conformity with instructions and laws proclaimed by the National Government.

For example, the election of representatives of the People's Congress, the concentrated military training of all college students, were considered by the Japanese aggressors as measures inconsistent with the status of special area. Repeatedly, Japanese opened negotiations and interfered with such administration, but all the inducements and threats failed. Finally they resorted to the military aggression on July 7th, 1937.

2. Military - In North China, the 29th Army was the main force, which had its garrisons all over Hopei, Chahar, Peiping and Tientsin. At the time of the Incident, the 37th Division under the command of General Feng Chi-An was stationed in the suburbs of Peiping, namely, Nan-Yuan, Pei-Yuan, Si-Yuan, Lukuochiao (Marco Polo Bridge), Chan-Sin-Tien, and Paoting. The 38th Division under the command of General Chang Chi-Chung was stationed at Tientsin, Young-Chun, Langfang, Chuan-Ling-Chen, Taku, Tangku, and along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway such as Ma-Chan and Tsangchow. The 143rd Division under the command of General Liu Ju-Ming was stationed in the Chahar Province, at Kalgan, Chang-Pei, Chai-Kuo-Pao, Yeng-Ching, Nankow, etc. The 132nd Division under the command of General Chao Teng-Yu was spread over the southern part of Hopei Province, namely, Ta-Ming, Ho-Chien, Hsien-Hsien, Jen-Chiu, etc.

Lukuochiao (Marco Polo Bridge) where the Incident of July 7th broke out, is situated about 20 Li southwest to the Chang-Yi Gate of Peiping City. The District Government of the Wan-Ping Hsien was at the east of the bridge. The city of Wan-Ping was not large. Both inside and outside of the city of Wan-Ping were

guarded by troops of the 37th Division. This place, being on the main communication line west of Peiping, was strategically very important. Japanese forces, stationed at Fengtai, had repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison from this place, and also from Chan-Sin-Tien. All these demands were refused by our side in unmistakable terms. In the winter of 1936, Japanese intended to reinforce their garrison force, and planned to build barracks and airfield in the area between Fengtai and Lukuochiao (Marco Polo Bridge), in order to control completely North China. In spite of their efforts in repeated negotiations, we refused them in severe wordings. Thus frustrated, Japanese changed their tactics. They attempted to lay their hands on the local inhabitants by inducing and threatening them to lease or sell the lands voluntarily to the Japanese. But, according to the report of Commissioner Wang Leng-Chai, who governed that area, the local residents had no intention to lease or to sell the lands belonging to them. The residents made sworn statements to that effect and authenticated these statements with their finger prints. One day, HASHIMOTO, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Garrison Forces in North China, Wachi, and some other Japanese officers called on me and again requested to buy these lands. They argued that the local inhabitants desired to lease or sell voluntarily, yet it could not be realized, apparently due to the opposition of the Government in North China. My reply was that, no right of land in any country could be freely leased or sold to foreigners. If we asked for a lease or purchase of land in the vicinity of

Tokyo, could that be allowed by your Government. In the least minimum, landed properties owned by private persons who enjoy ownership of such properties could not be disposed of by the Government at will. Since you asserted that the residents were willing to sell their lands, what was the proof of this assertion. HASHIMOTO countered by demanding us to produce proof of the unwillingness to lease or sell their lands on the part of the residents. Upon this I produced the sworn statements of the residents authenticated with their finger prints and forwarded to me by Commissioner Wang, to the effect that they would not sell any land. HASHIMOTO and other Japanese officers, upon seeing these documents, could not say anything. This episode which brought disgrace and anger to them must have embittered them. From that time on, under the pretext of maneuvers they hoped to invade and occupy Wan-Ping City by catching us unprepared. This was the immediate cause leading to the outbreak of the Incident.

B. Stages of Japanese Aggressions

1. Alienation and Estrangement - The Japanese attempted to alienate and estrange the local authorities in North China from the Central Government by inducement and by threat hoping thereby to disintegrate and destroy separate areas one after another. The numerous attempts they made could be summed up as inducement by bribery and threat by force. All these attempts, however, were met with flat refusal from the local authorities. Their conspiracy could by no means be realized. This was the first stage of enemy aggression in North China, a period running roughly from the Autumn 1935 to the Summer 1936.

2. Economic Monopoly - The Japanese hoped to attain economic monopoly under the mask of friendship and fraternization and the watchword, "equality and reciprocity." The concrete demands made by them were: a. To construct a Tsang-Shih Railway (between Tsangchow and Shih-Chia-Chwang, both in southern Hopei), b. To develop the Lung-Yen Iron Mines (in Chahar Province), and c. To revise Maritime Custom Tariffs at Tientsin, in such a way as to raise tariffs on European and American commodities, and to lower tariffs on Japanese commodities.

All these demands, the acceptance of which would impair the sovereignty of China, were flatly refused. This was the second stage of Japanese aggression in north China. The period covered ran roughly from the Summer 1936 to the Spring 1937.

3. Threat by Armed Forces - After realizing that alienation, estrangement, and attempts to attain economic monopoly had all failed, the Japanese finally decided upon threat by armed force. They hoped to reach their goal without fighting. At the beginning of the Lukuo-chiao (Marco Polo Bridge Incident), Japanese had no anticipation other than Chinese submission after a blow dealt to the Chinese by their comparatively superior forces. They anticipated that Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Chahar, and Dueiyuen Provinces could thus be turned into a region of special status (for the import of the word "special", see translator's note 1), thus realizing the second step in the plan of General TANAKA for the conquest of the whole world. They never thought that, at the call of our supreme leader, all Chinese would rise and take up the War of Resistance on all fronts. As to the drawn-out War of Resistance over long, long

period, and the fact that we never wavered all the way through, was even more unexpected by the enemy.

II. FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENT

At 0010, in the evening of July 7th, 1937, I received a report from the Hopei-Chahar Foreign Affairs Commission, which stated that the said commission had received a telephone call from MATSUI, the Chief of the Japanese Special Service Board, saying: "One company of Japanese troops, in night maneuver in the vicinity of Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) just a while ago, seemed to have heard a few gun shots fired by soldiers of the 37th Division of the 29th Army stationed in the city of Wan-Ping. The gun shots brought some confusion of the troops in maneuver. As a result of the roll call, one Japanese soldier was found to be missing. Japanese troops demanded to enter and search the city of Wan-Ping this very evening." The said commission asked instructions by telephone as to how to deal with the situation. I immediately replied that Japanese troops, maneuvering in Chinese territory at their own will, were in violation of international law. Neither had they notified us in advance, nor had they obtained our permission. The Chinese Government has no responsibility whatsoever for the alleged missing soldier. Even if it is true that a soldier was really missing, we shall order the Chinese troops stationed at Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) to conduct a search for the Japanese soldier on our own behalf in cooperation with local police forces. My instructions were transmitted to the Japanese by the Hopei-Chahar Foreign Affairs Commission. Soon thereafter, the said commission again tele-

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phoned me and reported that after transmission of the reply, both the Japanese Special Service Board and the Japanese troops were not satisfied. The Japanese insisted on conducting a search in the city by force. If refused, they decided to encircle the walled city. I again immediately replied that in case of such unreasonableness on the part of Japanese, so violent and barbarious, we, for the sake of self-defense, could only take the course of resolute resistance. Then I called on Regiment Commander Chi Sin-Wen over the telephone. At that time, one battalion of the regiment under his command was in charge of garrison duties at Lukuochiao, while other two battalions and his Regiment Headquarters were at Chan-Sin-Tien. I asked Commander Chi whether his regiment had maneuvered tonight. Chi replied in the negative. I asked him whether there were any Japanese troops maneuvering in the vicinity of Lukuochiao (Marco Polo Bridge). Chi replied that he had received no such information, but that he would immediately send out his men to investigate. Thereupon, I informed him the negotiations between the Japanese and us, and ordered him to send at once able men to proceed toward the direction of Fengtai, to detect possible Japanese troop movements. On the other hand, I ordered by telephone, Commissioner Wang Lun-Chai, who was concurrently the Magistrate of Wan-Ping Hsien, to investigate and to report on the maneuvering of Japanese troops and whether any Japanese soldier was missing. Soon, I received a telephone call from Commander Chi, who reported that, according to the report of the officer dispatched towards the direction of Fengtai, about a battalion of Japanese troops with six pieces of artillery, was now advancing from Fengtai towards Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), and whether

there was any reinforcements following this column had to await further detection. Thereupon, as the Vice-Commander of the 29th Army, I immediately ordered Regiment Commander Chi to well guard the city of Wan-Ping, that not a single Japanese soldier was to be allowed to come in, that not a single inch of territory was to be allowed to lose, that in virtue of our responsibility as soldiers, to guard our territory, the Wan-Ping city would be, in case of necessity, the most precious and glorious graveyard of our ranks and files, that we should share the same fate with the city. If they did not open fire first, we should not first open fire upon them. If they should first open fire, we were sure to deal them fatal blows. After having my order, Chi sent another battalion to enforce the guard at Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), and he himself led the battalion there to reinforce the defense. At the same time, Commissioner Wang Lun-Chai came to Peiping to report in person the factual result of his investigation. So, I sent Commissioner Wang, together with Wei Tsung-Han, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of Hopei-Chahar Provinces, Lin Ken-Yu, also a member under Commissioner Wei, and Chou Jun-Ye, Chief of Communication Section, of the Pacification Headquarters, to negotiate with MATSUI. At 0500 in the morning, successive reports informed me that Japanese troops had come to the edge of the city and demanded the entry of the city by force, that we had to prepare for the defense on the one hand and to try to stop their entry by negotiation on the other. The Japanese, realizing by that time that there was no hope for them to take the city of Wan-Ping without fighting, finally encircled it on three sides. Our forces put up defense works

on the walls. Around 0600, enemy machine gun fire began to attack the city, and enemy forces came towards it. This was the very beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. And the responsibility of the Incident was also definitely fixed (upon Japan).

Hostilities on the 8th and 9th of July were heavy, and Japanese suffered many casualties. The railway bridge leading to Chan-Sin-Tien was occupied by Japanese in the morning of the 8th, and on the same night, two companies of Chinese troops, each soldier equipped with a pistol, a sword, and four hand grenades, moved up stealthily. They suddenly attacked, when they approached the bridge head. The enemy, about a company strong, was surprised and most of them were killed. Japanese, seeing that they were suffering setbacks, sent MATSUI and others to me on the following day, and asked for negotiation. I had foreseen their intention before they came, so I refused them. Soon thereafter, they came again and explained the intention of truce, adding that the missing soldier had already been found, so that a peaceful settlement would be feasible. We began to discuss and, as a result, decided on three conditions: (a) All military actions should cease on both sides, (b) Troops of both sides should return to their original positions, and (c) The 37th Division which entertains more hostile feelings against Japan, should be replaced by some other unit of the 29th Army for the defense of Wan-Ping city. An understanding was also reached that both sides should refrain from developing henceforth incidents of similar nature. Yet, these conditions were nothing but Japanese tactics to delay and thus to gain time. Utilizing this breathing space, units of the Kwantung Army were

sent to Peiping and Tientsin area for attack. We detected their conspiracy, and had to order hastily the Division under the command of General Chao stationed in Ta-ming and Ho-Chien in southern Hopei to proceed to Peiping. At that time, General Sung Che-Yuan was on leave of absence in his home town in Shantung. After my repeated telegrams asking for his return, he arrived in Peiping on the 12th of July. We discussed strategies and policies. War again broke out on the 14th, and more intensified than before. Every day, enemy shelled the Wan-Ping city by artillery, to cover the advance of their infantry, but were all repulsed by our army. On the 25th of July, enemy airplane, in reconnaissance over the Peiping-Taming highways discovered that our troops of large numbers were advancing northward, and the spearhead had already arrived at Nanyuan. On the 26th of July, Japanese handed us an ultimatum to the effect that the 37th Division be withdrawn from the Peiping area within 24 hours, failing which they would attack us by large forces. To defend ourselves, we attacked immediately on the 27th enemy troops at Fengtai and in the vicinity of Lukuochiao (Marco Polo Bridge). In the same evening, we killed quite a number of Japanese at Fengtai, recaptured the west flank and the south flank of Fengtai, and pressed on near the enemy headquarters there. KATSUKI, Seiji, the Japanese Commander in Chief, ordered Japanese reinforcements from Tungchow and Tientsin, with strong equipment and more than 30 airplanes, to make an onslaught. In the early morning of the 28th, the enemy with the combined forces of the land and air, fiercely attacked Nan-yuen with all their strength. Large scale hostilities developed with heavy casualties, unprecedented since the outbreak of the incident. Around 2 p.m., most

regretfully, General Chao Tung-Yu, Division Commander, General Tung Ling-Kou, Vice Army Commander, were both killed in action. Casualties reached more than 5,000 including both dead and wounded among our officers and soldiers.

Some time before this, repeated telegrams from our Supreme Commander (Generalissimo Chiang) ordered General Sung, Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council to proceed to Paoting (in southern Hopei) and to direct operations from there. General Sung now acted as directed by these orders. I myself went to Paoting with him in the night of the 28th. Considerable success was scored by the Chinese forces in Tientsin who made their attacks bravely on the 29th and 30th of July. Subsequently, they also evacuated according to orders received. They fell back to the south of Tientsin along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, while other troops were put up along the Peiping-Hankow Railway. In close collaboration between each other, they began to engage themselves in long-term Resistance against the enemy. This was what happened during the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident and the War of Resistance thereafter.

Leading Japanese officers who instigated this Incident were:
KATSUKI, Seiji, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Garrison
Forces in Tientsin

KAWABE, Seizo, Brigadier Commander

MUTAGUCHI, Renyam, Regiment Commander

SAKAI, Takashi, Ex-Chief of Staff of the Japanese Garrison
Forces in Tientsin

But the instigator at the very beginning of Japanese aggression in north China was DOHIHARA, Kenji, the same man who instigated the

Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931. All these men should be held responsible for the war of aggression. As to the narcotic policy and various atrocities committed in enemy occupied areas, which according to reports from all sides, were intensified as time went on. Much to my regret I could not produce definite and strong evidences for these activities and atrocities since I had left for operations along Peiping-Hankow, Peiping-Taming, and Tientsin-Pukow Railway lines.

CHING Teh-Chun (sealed)
Formerly Mayor of Peiping and concurrently
Vice-Commander of the 29th Army

At present, Vice-Minister, Ministry of Military Operations

I hereby certify that the above statement was made in Chungking by General Ching Teh-Chun on this day, formerly Mayor of Peiping and concurrently Vice-Commander of the 29th Army; at present, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Military Operations.

Lin Ting-Ping (sealed)
Assistant Director, East Asiatic Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Date: 2 April 1946, Chungking

「七七」事變紀實

一 前言

甲 抗戰前ノ冀察軍政情況

1 政治：「七七」事變前河北、察哈爾ノ政治的責任ヲ負擔スル機關ハ冀察政務委員會デアッタ。中央ニ於テ宋哲元將軍ヲ委員長ニ任命シ、所轄地域ハ河北、察哈爾ノ兩省及北平、天津ノ兩市デアリ馮治安、劉汝明ヲシテ河北、察哈爾兩省ノ省政ヲ分任セシメ、本職ハ當時北平市々長ニ任ジ、國難ニ殉ジタ張自忠總司令ガ天津市々長ニ任セラレタ。

仇敵日本ハ九一八ヨリ何等ノ代償モ無ク我東北三省ヲ侵略シタ。之ニ續イテ熱河ヲ侵シ、又繼イデ長城ノ戰役ヲ起シテヨリ後、仇敵日本ハ早くモ華北ノ各地ヲ其ノ囊中ノ物トシタ。之ガ爲北平、天津ハ國防ノ第一線トナッタ。只、河北、察哈爾、北平、天津當局ノ一切ノ施政方針ハ、中央ノ頒布スル政令法律ヲ遵奉シテ施行スルモノナルニ、國民大會代表ノ選舉、各大學々生ノ集中軍事教練等ノ如キハ均シク敵人ガ非特殊化ノ表徵ナリト認メ、屢々我方ニ向ヒ或ハ利ヲ以テ誘ヒ或ハ脅迫シ容喙シ來レル所デアッタガ、全テ失敗ニ歸シタルヲ以テ、遂ニ「七七」ノ軍事侵略ヲ勃發セシメタノデアアル。

2 軍事：廿九軍ヲ基幹トシテ、河北、察哈爾、北

平、天津全域ニ分布シテ居タ。當時ノ情況ハ馮治安ノ卅七師ガ北平近郊ノ南苑、西苑、北苑、蘆溝橋、長辛店及保定一帶ニ分布シ、張自忠ノ卅八師ガ天津揚村廊房、軍糧城、大沽、塘沽、津浦沿線ノ馬廠及滄州等ノ各地ニ分布シ、劉汝明ノ百四十三師ガ察哈爾ノ張家口、張北、柴溝堡、延慶及南口等ノ各地ニ分布シ、趙登禹ノ百三十二師ガ冀南ノ大名、河間、獻縣及任邱ノ各地ニ分布シテ居タ。

「七七」事變發生ノ地點蘆溝橋ハ北平彰儀門外西南二十里ノ地點ニ在リ宛平縣政府ハ橋ノ東ニ位シ、城壁ハ六キカラズ、城ノ内外ハ均シク卅七師部隊ノ駐屯スル所デアリ、且該地ハ北平西方ノ要衝トシテ頗ル形勢ノ拔ン出タ所デアル。豊台駐屯ノ日本軍ハ曾テ一再ナラズ該地駐屯軍ノ撤退及長辛店ノ讓與ヲ要求シテ來タガ、皆我方ノ嚴重ナル拒絕ニ逢ツタ。二十五年冬仇敵日本ハ駐屯軍ノ増強ヲ圖リ、豊台ヨリ蘆溝橋ニ至ル中間地帯ニ兵營及飛行場ヲ建設シ華北ノ完全ナル控制ヲ企テ此專ニ關シ我方ニ對シ數次交渉ヲ試ミタガ均シク我方ノ嚴重ナル拒絕ニ逢ツタ。日本側ハ茲ニ計畫ヲ變更シ、地方的着手ヲ試ミ利ヲ以テ誘ヒ、或ハ威嚇シ、斯クシテ該地帯ノ住民ニ自發的租賃又ハ賣却ヲ爲サシメントシタ。但シ該地方ノ主任官吏王冷齋專員ノ報告ニ依レバ、該地一帶ノ住民ハ所有地ヲ租賃又ハ賣却スルコトヲ欲セズ且其ノ誓言ヲ爲

シ、拇印ヲモ徴シ證據ト爲シアル趣デアル。或時日本側駐屯軍參謀長橋本及和知等數名來訪シ、尙土地購入ヲ要求シテ云フニハ、該地方ノ住民ハ已ニ自發的ニ租賃シ又ハ賣却セント希望シ居ルニ拘ラズ、今日之ヲ實現シ得ナイノハ、明カニ華北ノ官廳方面ノ妨害工作ニ依ルノデアアル下余ハ答ヘテ勿論何レノ國家タルヲ問ハズ土地ニ關スル權利ハ勝手ニ租賃又ハ讓渡スルコトハ出來ナイ、例ヘバ我々が東京附近ニ土地ヲ租借又ハ購入シヤウトシテモ、貴政府ハ之ヲ許可シナイデセウ。假ニ數百歩ヲ讓ツテ云ヒマスガ、民間ノ田地トカ不動産ノ支配權ガ元々其ノ地方ノ住民ニ歸屬シ、官廳ニ於テ勝手ニ處分スルコトヲ得ナイトシテモ、一体君等ハ該地帯ノ人民ガ自發的ニ租賃又ハ賣却ヲ欲シテ居ルト云フ如何ナル證據ヲ持タレルノデスカト云ツタ處、橋本等ハデハ閣下ハ何カ住民ガ租賃又ハ賣却ヲ欲シナイト云フ確證ヲ持ツテ居ラレルノデスカト聞クノデ、早速王專員ノ報告ニ依ル、住民ノ拇印入りノ賣却租賃反對誓言ヲ呈示シタ處、橋本等ハ返ス言葉モナク、恥ガ嵩ジテ憤怒ト成リ、遂ニ屢々演習ニ名ヲ藉リテハ、我方ノ不備ニ乘ジテ宛乎城ヲ侵略シヤウト企テタノデアアル。之ガ即チ事變發生ノ近因デアアル。

乙 日本ノ侵略ノ段階

1 分化離間。華北當局ニ對シ或ハ脅シ或ハ懸シ、離間ヲ激峻シテ、地方ト中央ヲ離脱セシメ、其ノ

部分化ト各個擊破ノ目的ヲ達セントシ、途中幾多ノ經緯ハアツタガ益テ（利ヲ以テ誘ヒ威ヲ以テ脅ス）利誘威脅ノ四字ヲ出デナカッタ。然シ益テ地方當局ノ嚴重ナ拒絕ニ逢ツテ狡計ハ實現スルコトヲ得ナカッタケレ共、之ガ敵人ノ華北ニ對スル侵略ノ第一段階デアアル。其ノ期間ハ凡ソ二十四年秋ヨリ二十五年夏ニ至ル間デアツタ。

2 經濟獨占。親善友好ノ假面ト平等互惠ノ口頭禪ヲ以テ其ノ經濟獨占ノ目的ヲ達セント欲シタ。其ノ具體的事實ハ凡ソ

一 滄石鐵道ノ建設要求、二 龍煙鐵道ノ開發、三 津海關稅率ノ改訂、歐米貨物ノ關稅增加、日本貨物ノ關稅低減等デアリ、之等ハ益テ我方ニ有害ナル爲、我國ノ主權ハ廢トシテ之ヲ拒絕シタ。之即チ仇敵日本ノ侵略ノ第二段階デアリ、其ノ期間ハ凡ソ二十五年夏ヨリ二十六年春ニ至ル間デアアル。

3 武力脅迫。敵ハ分化離間モ經濟獨占モ益テ不能ナノヲ見テ、遂ニ武力的脅迫ヲ用ヒルコトニ決シ、茲ニ威ハズシテ得ントスル詭計ヲ進シヤウトシタ。蘆溝橋事變ノ初ハ比較的優勢ナ兵力ヲ以テ我ニ打撃ヲ與ヘ、我ヲ屈服セシメ、我國北方ノ冀晉魯察綏等ノ各省ヲ特殊地帯ト化シ、田中ノ世界併呑ノ第二步計畫ヲ達セント圖ツタモノデアアルガ我最高領袖ガ高所ヨリ一呼セバ全國奮起シ、全面的抗戰ヲ敢行シ、長期抗戰トナルモ終始屈セザル此ノ事實ニハ思ヒ至ラナカッタノデアアル。敵ガ今ニシテ之ニ思ヒ至ルモ最早退イト云フモノデアアル。

一九三七年七月七日夜十二時十分、德純ハ冀察
外交委員會ノ報告ヲ受ケタ。即チ日本特務機關長
松井ノ電話ヲ傳ヘルニ。『日本陸軍一中隊ガ今シ
方蘆溝橋附近ニテ夜間演習中蘆溝橋ニ駐屯スル城
内ノ二十九軍卅七師所屬部隊ノ射撃ヲ受ケ、演習
部隊ハ一時混亂状態ヲ呈シタガ、呼名點呼ノ結果
兵隊一名ガ行方不明トナツテ居ルノデ、日本軍隊
ハ今夜入城シテ検査ヲスルト云ツテ居ルガ、結局
如何應對スレバ宜敷イカ、電話デ指示ヲ請フ。』
トノ事、德純ハ折返シ回答ヲ與ヘ。『日本軍隊ガ
勝手ニ我國ノ領土内デ演習ヲスルト云フ事ハ、全
ク國際法ニ違反シタ事デアル。又事前ニ何等ノ通
知モナク、我方モ亦何等許可ヲ與ヘテ居ナイノデ
アルカラ、兵隊一名ガ行方不明ニナツタカラトテ
我方ハ何等責任ヲ負フコトハナイ。若シ事實兵隊
ガ失踪シテ居ルナラバ、即刻蘆溝橋駐在部隊ニ命
令シ地方警察ト一續ニ代ツテ搜索シテヤレ。』ト
外交委員會ヲ經由シ傳達セシメタ所、間モナク又
電話ガアツテ、『傳達シタ所ガ日本特務機關及部
隊ハ皆不満ヲ表明シ、日本軍ハ強硬ニ入城検査ヲ
迫リ、若シ然ラザレバ兵力ヲ用ヒテ城ヲ包圍スル
コトニ決定シタ。』トノコト。即刻余ハ又同示シ
テ。『日本人ハ何ウシテ新ウ野蠻デ分ケガ判ラヌ
ノデアラウカ、我方ハ自衛ノ爲、寧ラ強硬ニ抵抗

セヨ。」ト命ジタ。ソコデ即刻吉星文团长ニ電話ニテ問合せタガ、此ノ時吉团长ノ一營ハ蘆溝橋ニ駐屯シ、其ノ二營及團部ハ長辛店ニ駐屯シテ居タ。該團ニ昨夜演習ヲシタカ否カ照會シタ所、演習ハ行ハナイトノ返答デアアル。又今夜日本軍隊ハ蘆溝橋附近デ演習ヲスルカト聞イタ所、未ダ新カル報告ヲ受取ツテ居ナイガ、今人員ヲ派遣シテ調査シヤウトノ答ヘデアツタ。予ハ日本機關長トノ交渉ノ狀況ヲ告ゲ、且之ニ命令シテ速刻有能ナ探偵ヲ派遣シテ豊台方面ニ向ヒ、日本軍ノ行動ヲ偵察セシメタ。一方行政專員兼宛平縣長王冷齋ニ、日本軍ノ演習及兵隊失踪ノ有無等ノ情況ヲ速ニ調査報告シ、交渉ニ便スル様電話ヲ以テ命令シタ。嗣イデ吉团长ノ電話報告ガアリ、豊台方面ニ派遣シタ將校斥候ノ報告ニ依レバ、日本軍隊凡ソ歩兵一大隊ガ砲六門ヲ擄ヘ、今正ニ豊台ヨリ蘆溝橋方面ニ向ツテ前進中デアアル。其ノ後、後演部隊ノ前進ノ有無ハ尙待機偵察中デアルトノコトデアアル。德純ハ即刻二十九軍副軍長ノ資格ヲ以テ吉团长ニ命令ヲ發シ、蘆溝橋及宛平城ヲ確保シ、日本軍ノ一兵一卒タリトモ進入サセルナ、尺寸ノ國土ト雖モ放棄スルナ、守土有責ノ義ニ本ヅキ蘆溝橋ト宛平城ハ即チ我等官兵ノ最光榮、最貴重ノ墓地トシ、城ト存亡ヲ共ニセヨ。但シ彼ガ發砲スルマデハ我モ撃ツナ、彼若シ發砲セバ我之ヲ迎ヘテ痛撃セヨ、該團長ハ一營ヲ増派シテ自ラ引率シ、蘆溝橋ニ至

ツテ守備ニツケト。斯ノ時王冷齋專員ハ己ニ調査
判明セル真相ヲ携ヘ急遽北平ニ來リ報告シタ。ソ
コデ早速王專員ト冀察委員會外交主席魏宗瀚、委員
林耕宇、綏靖公署交通處長周永業ヲ共ニ松井ノ所
ニ交渉ニヤツタ。早クモ五時前後、報告ニ依レバ、
日本軍隊ハ己ニ城外ニ迫リ、入城ヲ強要シテ居ル
ガ、一面交渉シテ之ヲ阻止シ、一面防備シツツア
リト。此ノ時日本軍ハ一戰ヲ交ヘズバ宛平城ノ入
城ハ不可能ト見テ、遂ニ該城ヲ三方ヨリ包圍シタ。
我軍モ遂ニ城壁上ノ配備ニ着イタ。六時頃敵ノ機
關銃ハ城内ニ向ツテ射撃シ來リ、歩一步進迫シテ
來タ。中日戰爭ハ茲ニ開始サレ、事變ノ罪責ハ茲
ニ確定シタノデアアル。

八九兩日ノ戰爭ハ激烈デアリ、敵軍ノ死傷ハ最
モ多カツタ。長辛店ニ通ズル鐵橋ハ八日朝敵ノ爲
ニ占領サレタ。我軍ハ此ノ曉歩兵二連ヲ派遣シ、
各兵ニ拳銃、大刀各一、手榴彈四ヲ携行シ、密行
前進セシメタガ橋ノ袂ニ接近シタ頃、敵ノ守備兵
一中隊ハ配備ノ間ニ合ハズ多ク殲滅サレタ。敵ハ
戰況不利ナルヲ見テ、翌日松井等ハ交渉ヲ求メテ
來タ。夙ニ其ノ來意ハ察知サレタノデ之ヲ拒絶シ、
タ所、彼等ハ又々ヤツテ來テ休戰ノ意ヲ説明シ、
且失踪中ノ兵隊モ己ニ探シ當テタノデ、平和的解
決ヲ爲スコトガ出來ルト云フ。ソコデ双方直ニ協
議ヲ開始シ、其ノ結果三項ノ條款ヲ決定シタ。即チ

(一) 双方ハ直ニ作戰ニ關スル一切ノ行動ヲ停止スルコト。□ 双方ノ軍隊ハ各々原守備ニ復スルコト。

(三) 蘆溝橋ト宛平城ノ守備ハ二十九軍ニ於テ對日敵意稍濃厚ナル第三十七師部隊ヲ轉配シ、別途他ノ部隊ヲ以テ之ヲ守備セシムルコト。並ニ今後双方此ノ種事件ヲ發生セシメザルコトヲ約定スルトノ附屬協定ガアツタノデアルガ、日本人ハ此等條項ハ原來緩兵ノ計ト爲シ、一面機ニ乘ジテ關東軍部隊ヲ平津作戰ニ移動集中シタ。我方ハ始メテ其ノ詭計ヲ知り、急遽冀南ノ大名、河間等ノ各地駐屯ノ趙師團ヲ北平、天津ニ集中シタノデアアル。當時宋委員長ハ請假シテ山東ニ歸着シテ居ラレタノデ、余ハシキリニ、歸平ノ上處置セラレンコトヲ電請シタガ宋氏ハ十二日歸平セラレ、即刻作戰對策ヲ協議サレタノデアアル。遲レテ十四日ニ至リ双方ノ戰鬪ハ又々開始サレ、更ニ激烈ヲ加ヘタノデアアル。其後敵ハ毎日連續シテ發砲シ蘆溝橋ト宛平城ヲ轟撃シ其ノ歩兵ノ前進ヲ掩護シタノデアアルガ、全テ我軍ニ依テ撃退サレタ。二十五日ニ至リ敵ハ飛行機ヲ用ヒ平大公路ノ我軍ノ狀況ヲ偵察シ、大部隊ガ續々北上シツツアリ、且其ノ先頭ハ已ニ南苑附近ニ到達シタコトヲ發見シタ。ソコデ二十六日我方ニ向ツテ通謀ヲ發シ、三十七師ハ二十四時間内ニ北平ヨリ撤退セヨ、然ラザレバ大兵ヲ以テ進攻セント云ツテ來タ。我軍ハ遂ニ二十七日急遽豐台及蘆溝橋附近ノ敵ニ對シ猛攻ヲ加ヘタ。此ノ日ノ

晚豊台ノ敵軍ハ甚大ナル打撃ヲ蒙リ、豊台ノ西南
 兩端ハ奪還サレ、己ニ其ノ司令部ニ接近スル勢デ
 アツタ。敵司令官香月清司ハ茲ニ通州、天津等各
 地ノ裝備優秀ナル新手ノ兵ヲ移動シ且飛行機三十
 餘機ヲ配シ、企圖ヲ逞シクシタ。二十八日拂曉ニ
 及ンデ敵ハ空陸ノ聯合部隊ヲ以テ頻リニ我ガ南苑
 ヲ猛攻シテ來タガ、双方戦鬪ノ激烈ナコトト死亡
 ノ多イコトハ開戦以來此ノ戦役ヨリヒドイモノハ
 ナカツタ。戦鬪最中不幸ニモ我ガ趙登禹師長及佟
 凌閣副軍長ハ陣歿サレ、將兵ノ死傷ハ五千餘名ニ
 達シタ。

是ヨリ先シキリニ最高統帥ヨリ宋委員長ノ保定
 ニ於ケル指揮ヲ催促スル電命ニ接シタノデ、德純
 モ亦隨行シテ保定ニ赴イタガ之ハ二十八日ノ夜ノ
 コトデアツタ。天津方面ハ二十九、三十ノ兩日、
 一濟ニ敵ニ對シテ猛攻ヲ加ヘ多大ノ戦果ヲ收メタ
 ガ其後命ヲ奉ジテ退イタ。天津南方ノ津浦沿線ト
 平漢線方面ノ我軍ハ連環呼應シ敵ニ對スル長期低
 抗ヲ開始シタ。之即チ蘆溝橋事變ノ經過及抗戰狀
 況デアル。

事變ヲ起シタ敵軍ノ主ナル軍官ハ天津駐屯軍司令
 官香月清司、旅團長河邊正三、聯隊長牟田口廉也、
 駐屯軍前參謀長酒井隆、事變當時ノ參謀長橋本、
 而シテ最初主動的ニ華北ヲ侵略シ、九一八事變ヲ
 勃發セシメタ土肥原賢二デアリ、均シク戦争責任
 ヲ負フベキモノデアル。敵軍ハ中國ノ占領各地ニ

1750-10

於テ、數多クノ毒化政策ト種々ノ暴行ヲ働イタ。
各方面ノ報告ニ依レバ、敵人ノ華北侵略後、其ノ
殘酷ナル行爲ト施行セル毒化ハ數限リナイノデア
ルガ、只々德純ハ夙ニ從軍シテ平漢、平大、津浦、
各線ニ於テ作戰シ、未ダ能ク確實有力ナル證據ヲ
提出シ得ナイコトヲ頗ル遺憾トスルモノデアル。

前北平市長兼二十九軍副軍長

軍令部次長

秦德純

記述印

1750

Actual amount of July 7th Incident

The original of this amount is in
hands of Judge Hsiang, Chinese
Prosecution Section.

I am enclosing
herewith 2 copies, for number,
and eventually to be submitted
to Judge Williams for intro-
duction into evidence -
Room 380 Windsor

DOC NO 1750

Ex 1750 - 198
Ex 2340 - 199

2212 201
2211 200

Conty of Linn - ? no? 202?

(unlinked translation)

七七 奉天紀實

一 前言

甲 抗戰前、冀察軍政情況

(河北) (察哈爾)

政治：七七 奉天前、河北、察哈爾、政治的責任ヲ負擔スル機關ハ

冀察政務委員會ヲアツタ。中央ニ於テ宋哲元將軍ヲ委員長ニ任命

シ。所轄地域ハ河北、察哈爾、兩者及北平、天津、兩市デアリ。馮治安

劉汝明ヲシテ河北、察哈爾兩者、省政ヲ分任セシメ、本職ハ當時北平

市々長ニ任シ、國難ニ殉シテ張自忠總司令カ天津市々長ニ任セ

ラレド。

仇敵日本ハ九一八ヨリ何等ノ代償モ無ク我東北三者ヲ侵略シタ。

之ニ續イテ熱河ヲ侵シ、又繼イテ長城戰役ヲ起シテ、其ノ後、

仇敵日本ハ早ク天華北ノ各地ヲ其ノ囊中ノ物トシタ。之ガ為北平天津ハ

國防ノ第一線トナツタ。只、河北、察哈爾、北平天津當局ノ一切ノ施

政方針ハ、中央ノ頒布スル政令法律ヲ遵奉シテ施行スルモノナリ。

國民大會代表ノ選舉、各大學ハ生、集中軍事教練等ノ如キハ均ク

敵人が非特殊化ノ表徴ナリト認メ、屢々我方ニ向ヒ或ハ利

ヲ以テ誘ヒ或ハ脅迫シハ谷塚シ来ル所テ吾方全テ失敗ニ帰シタルヲ以テ遂ニ

「七七」ノ軍事侵略ヲ勸解セシメタノヲアル。

又、軍事：廿九軍ヲ基幹トシテ河北、察哈爾、北平、天津全域ニ分

布シテ居ル。當時ノ情況ハ馮治安ノ世解カ北平近郊ノ南苑、

西苑、北苑、盧溝橋、長辛店^及保定一帶ニ分布シ、張自忠ノ廿八

師ガ天津楊村、廊坊、軍糧城、大沽、塘沽、津浦沿線、馬廠^及滄州

馬

等、各地ニ分布シ、劉汝明、百四十三師が察哈爾、張家口、張北、柴溝堡、正慶及南口等、各地ニ分布シ、趙登禹、百三十二師が冀南、(河北省南部)大石河向、獻縣及任邱、各地ニ分布シテ居ル。

七七「奉天」發生ノ地矣、盧溝橋ノ北平彰儀門外西南二十里、地上矣、(日本三軍)

在リ、宛平縣政府ハ橋ノ東ニ位シ、城壁ハ大キカズ、城ノ内外ハ均シク七七師部隊駐ル所ナリ、且該地ハ北平西方ノ要衝トシテ頗ル形勢力ヲ披シ出テ所ナリ。豊台駐ル日本軍ハ曾テ一再テ該地駐ル軍ノ撤退及長辛店ノ讓與ヲ要求シテ来タカ、皆我方ノ嚴重ナル拒絕ニ逢ツタ。二十五年

冬仇敵日本ハ駐ル軍ノ増強ヲ圖リ、豊台ヨリ盧溝橋ニ至ル中向地帯ニ各營及飛行場ヲ建設シ、華北ノ完全ナル控制ヲ企テ、此事ニ因シ我方ニ對シ數次交涉ヲ試ミタガ、均シク我方ノ嚴重ナル拒絕ニ逢ツタ。日本側ハ

茲ニ計畫ヲ變更シ、地方的着キヲ試ミ、利ヲ以テ誘ヒ、或ハ威嚇シ、斯ク
シテ該地帯ノ住民ニ自発的租貸又ハ賣却ヲ爲サシメントシ。但シ
該地方ノ主任官吏王冷齋專員ノ報告ニ依ルニ、該地一帯ノ住民ハ
所有地ヲ租貸又ハ賣却スルニトテ欲セズ、且其ノ折言ヲ爲シ、租印ニ徴
シ、證據ト爲シアル趣デアリ。或時日本側駐屯軍參謀長橋本及和知等
數名來訪シ、尙土地購入ヲ要求シテ云フニハ、該地方ノ住民ハ己ニ自
発的ニ租貸シ又ハ賣却セント希望シ居ルニ拘テ、今日之ヲ實現
シ得ナイハ、明カニ華北ノ官廳方面ノ妨害工作ニ依リ
テアルト。余ハ答ヘテ、勿論何レノ國家タルヲ問ハズ、土地ニ關スル權利ハ
勝手ニ租貸又ハ讓渡スルトハ出来ナイ、例ヘバ我々が東京附近ニ
土地ヲ租借又ハ購入シヤウトシテ、貴政府ハ之ヲ許可シナイテセウ。

假ニ數百歩ノヲ讓ラテ云ヒマスガ、民間ノ田地トク不動産ノ支配權ガ元ル其ノ
地方ノ住民ニ帰属シ、官廳ニ於テ勝手ニ処分スルヲ得ナイ
トシテ之^ニ君等ハ該地帯ノ人民ガ自発的ニ租賃又ハ賣却ヲ欲シテ
居ルト云フ如何ト証據ヲ持タレシカト云フタリ、橋本等ハテハ閣下ハ
何カ住民^等ガ租賃又ハ賣却ヲ欲シナイト云テ確證ヲ持テ居ラレ
ノリスカト申クテ、早速王專員ノ報告ニ依リ、住民ノ押印入りノ
賣却租賃及并、折言言ヲ呈示シタリ、橋本等ハ返ス言葉モナク、
羞恥ガ嵩シテ憤怒ト成リ、遂ニ屢々演習ニ名ヲ藉リテハ、我方ノ
不備ニ乘シテ宛平城ヲ侵略シヤウト企テタリ、之ガ即チ事變
發生ノ近因ナリ。

乙、日本ノ侵略ノ段階

1. 分離間：華北當局ニ對シ 或ハ脅シ或ハ賄シ、離間ヲ教唆シテ、地方ト中央ヲ離脱セシメ、其ノ部分化ト各個擊破ノ目的ヲ達セントシ、途中幾多ノ經濟障礙ハアツタカ、全テ（利ヲ以テ誘ヒ威ヲ以テ脅ス）利誘威脅ノ四字ヲ出テナク、然レテ地方當局ノ嚴重ナ拒絶ニ逢テ、後計ハ實現スルミトシ得テカクシキ共、之ガ敵人、華北侵略ノ第一段階デアリ。其ノ期間ハ凡ソ二十五年秋ノ二十五年夏ニ至ル間デアリ。

2. 經濟独占：親善友好、假面ト平等互惠ノ口頭禪ヲ以テ其ノ經濟独占ノ目的ヲ達セント欲シク、其ノ具體的事實ハ凡ソ、

- 一、(滄州) (石家莊) 滄石鐵道ノ建設要求、
- 二、龍煙鐵礦ノ開採、
- 三、(天津) (上海) 津海關稅

率ノ改訂、改米貨物ノ關稅增加、日本貨物ノ關稅修減等デアリ、之等ハ全テ我方ニ有害ナル為、我國ノ主權ハ嚴重トシテ之ヲ拒絶シク、之即チ他

敵日本ノ侵略ノ第二段階アリ、其ノ期向ハ凡ソ二十五年夏ヨリ二十六年春ニ至ル間ナリ。

3. 武力脅迫：敵ハ合化離内ニ經濟独占モ全テ不可能ナク見テ、遂ニ武力的脅迫ヲ用ヒルニ決シ、茲ニ戦ハスニテ得ントスル詭計ヲ達シヤウトシ。

盧溝橋事變ノ初ハ、比較的優勢ナ兵カヲ以テ我ニ打撃ヲ與ヘ、

我ヲ屈服セシメ、我國北方、(河北) (山西) (察哈爾) (綏遠) 綏寧、各者ヲ特殊地帯

ト化シ、田中ノ世界併吞ノ第二步計畫ヲ達セント圖ツルモテアルガ、我

最高領袖が高所ヨリ一呼セバ、全國奮起シ、全面抗戦ヲ敢行シ、

長期抗戦トナルモ終始屈セザル。此ノ事實ニ思ヒ至ラナカクゾ、テアル。

敵が今ニシテ之ニ思ヒ至ルモ最早一遲イト云フモテアル。

二、事變紀實

一九三七年七月七日夜十一時十分

德純

ハ冀シテ、外交委員会ノ報告ヲ

受ケタ。即チ日本特務機關長松井ノ電話ヲ傳ヘルニ、「日本陸軍——中隊ガ、今

ニ方盧溝橋附近ニテ夜間演習中——盧溝橋ニ駐屯スル城内、二十九軍世

師所屬部隊ノ射撃ヲ受ケ、演習部隊ハ一時混乱状態ヲ呈シタガ、

呼名莫呼ノ結果、兵隊一名ガ行方不明トナシ居ルニ、日本軍隊ハ

今夜入城シテ検査ヲスルト云フ居ルガ、結局如何應對スレバ直敷イカ、

電話ヲ指示ヲ請フ。トノ事。德純ハ折返シ回答ヲ與ヘ、「日本軍隊

ガ勝キニ、我國ノ領土ニテ演習ヲスルト云フ事ハ、今ノ國際法ニ違反

シタ事ナル。又事前ニ何等ノ通知モナシ、我方モ亦何等許可ヲ與ヘ

テ居ナイノテアルカ、兵隊一名ガ行方不明ニナラメカラストテ我方ハ何等責

任ヲ負フコトハナシ。若シ事莫兵隊ガ失蹤シテ居ルナラバ、即刻

盧溝橋駐在部隊ニ命令シ也才警務署ト一緒ニ代々搜索シテヤレト

外交委員会ヲ經由シ傳達セシメタ所 向モナリ又電話ガアツテ「傳達シ

タ所ガ日本特務機關及部隊ハ皆不満ヲ表明シ 日本軍ハ強硬ニ入城

検査ヲ迫リ 若シ然ラザレバ兵カヲ用ヒテ城ヲ包囲スルニ決定シタ

トノト 即刻余ハ又回示シテ「日本人ハ何ウシテ斯ク野蠻ヲ分ケ判ラ

ヌデアラウカ 我方ハ自衛ノ爲 專ラ強硬ニ抵抗セヨ」命令シテソレト即刻

吉屋文團長ニ電話ヲ向合セシカ 此時吉 團ノ一營ハ盧溝橋ニ駐屯

シ 其ノ二營(大隊)及團部(聯隊本部)ハ長辛店ニ駐屯シテ居ル 該團ニ昨夜演習

ヲシカ石カ照会シタ所 演習ハ行ハナイト 返答デアリ 又今夜

日本軍隊ハ盧溝橋附近デ演習ヲスルカト聞イタ所 未ダ斯カル

報告ヲ受取テ居ナイガ 今人員ヲ派遣シテ調査シマツト 答ヘアツカ

予ハ日本機南長トノ交渉ノ状況ヲ告ケ、且之ニ命令シテ速刻有能ヲ探偵ヲ派遣シテ豊台方面ニ向ヒ、日本軍ノ行動ヲ偵察セシメタ。

一方行政專員系、宛平縣長 王冷齋ニ、日本軍ノ演習及兵隊失跡ノ有無等ノ情况ヲ速ニ調査報告シ、交渉ノニ使スニ様電話ヲ以テ命令シタ。

嗣イテ吉團長、電話報告カテリ。豊台方面ニ派遣シテ將校斥候ノ報告ニ依レバ、日本軍隊凡ソ歩兵一大隊ガ、砲六門ヲ携ヘ、今迄ニ

豊台ヨリ盧溝橋方面ニ向テ前進中デアリ。其ノ後、後續部隊ノ前進ノ有無、尚待機偵察中デアリトミテアル。 德純、即刻二十九軍副軍

長ノ資格ヲ以テ吉團長ニ命令ヲ發シ、^{反定平城}盧溝橋ヲ確保シ、日本

軍ノ一兵一卒タリトモ進ハサセルナ。又寸ノ國土ト雖モ放棄スルナ、守土有

責ノ義ニ本ツキ、^{ト宛平}盧溝橋城ノ即チ我等官兵ノ最光榮、最貴重ノ

莫施トシ、城ト存之ヲ共ニセヨ。但シ彼ガ奔砲スルニテハ、我々又撃テ之ヲ、
彼若シ奔砲セバ、我之ヲ迎ヘテ、痛撃セヨ、該團長ハ、一營ヲ
増收シ、自ラ引率シ、盧溝橋ニ至テ、守備ニツケト。斯ノ時王冷齋
專員ハ、已ニ調査判明セシト具相ヲ携ヘ、急遽、北平ニ来リ、報告シ、
テ早速、王專員ト冀察委員會外交主席魏宗瀚、委員林耕宗、
綏靖公署交通処長周永業ヲ共ニ、松井ノ所ニ交渉ニヤツタ。早クモ
五時前後、報告ニ依リ、日本軍隊ハ、已ニ城外ニ迫リ、入城ヲ強要シテ
居ルガ、一面交渉シテ之ヲ阻止シ、一面防備ニツツアリト。此ノ時日本軍ハ
一戦ヲ交ヘズバ、宛平城ノ入城ハ、不可能ト見テ、遂ニ該城ヲ三方ヨリ
包圍シ、我軍モ遂ニ城壁上ノ配備ニ着イタ。六時頃、敵ノ機關銃ハ、城
内ニ向テ射撃シ、来リ、歩一步進迫シテ来リ。中日戦争ハ、茲ニ開始セ、

事變ノ罪責ハ茲ニ確定シテアリ。

八九兩日ノ戰事ハ激烈テアリ、敵軍ノ死傷ハ最モ多カシク、長辛

店ニ通ル鐵橋ハ、八日朝敵ノ爲ニ佔領サレタ。我軍ハ此ノ晚

歩兵二連^(中隊)ヲ派遣シ、各兵ニ拳銃、大刀各一、手榴彈四ヲ携行シ、

密行前進セシメタガ、橋ノ袂ニ接近シテ頃、敵ノ準備兵一中隊

ハ^{配備}間ニ合ハス、多ク殲滅サレタ。敵ノ戦況不利ナルヲ見テ、翌日松井

等ハ交渉ヲホメテ来タ。夙ニ其ノ来意ハ察知サレテ、之ヲ拒

絶レシ所、彼等ハ又々ヤテ来テ休戦ノ意ヲ説明シ、且失踪中ノ

兵隊モ已ニ探レ者ヲ多クテ、平和的解決ヲ為スニトカ出来ルト云フ。

ソレヲ双方直ニ協議ヲ開始シ、其ノ結果三項ノ條款ヲ決定シタ。即チ

(一) 双方ハ直ニ作戰ニ由スル一切ノ行動ヲ停止スルニト。
(二) 双方ノ軍隊ハ

各原守備ニ復スルニト (三) 盧溝橋城、^{上宛平}守備ハ二十九軍ニ於テ對日敵意稍

濃厚ナル第三十師部隊ヲ軋配シ、別途他ノ部隊ヲ以テ之ヲ守備セシムニト。

並ニ今後双方此ノ種事件ヲ發生セシメザルニトヲ約定スルト、附屬協定ガ

アトシテアルガ、日本人ハ此等條項ハ原未緩兵ノ計ト爲シ、一面機ニ乘リテ

山東軍部隊ヲ^{(北平)天津}平津作戰ニ移シ動集中シタ。我方ハ始メテ其ノ詭計ヲ

知り、^(河北省南部)急遽冀南、大名、河間等ノ各地駐屯ノ趙師團ヲ北平、天津ニ集

中シタケアル。當時宋委員長ハ請假シテ山東ニ帰者ニテ居ラレタ矣。

余ハ此キリニ、帰平ノ上名置セラレシトテ電請シタカ、宋氏ハ十日

帰平セラレ、即刻作戰対策ヲ協議サレタケアル。遲レテ十四日ニ

至リ双方ノ戦闘ハ又々開始サレ、更ニ激烈ヲ加ヘタケアル。其後敵

ハ毎日連續シテ奔砲シ、盧溝橋ト宛平城ヲ連撃シ、其ノ歩兵ノ前進

ヲ掩護シテハカ、全テ我軍依テ撃退サレヨ。二十五日ニ至リ敵ハ飛

行機ヲ用ヒ(北平(天津府)平大ニ公路ノ我軍ノ状況ヲ偵察シ、大部隊カ續々北上

ニツツリ、且其ノ先頭ハ已ニ南苑附近ニ到達シノヲ見テ并見シタ。ソニテ

二十六日我ニ向ツテノ通謀ヲ弁シ、三十七師ハ二十四時内ニ北平ヨリ撤

退セヨ、然ラザレバ大兵ヲ以テ進攻セント云テ来ヨ。我軍ハ遂ニ二十七

日急遽豊台及蘆溝橋附近ノ敵ニ対シ猛攻ヲ加ヘタ。此ノ日ノ

晩、豊台ノ敵軍ハ甚大ナル打撃ヲ蒙リ、豊台ノ西南兩端ハ奪

還サレ、已ニ其ノ司令部ニ接近ス勢、敵司令部各月清司ハ茲ニ

通州、天津等各地ノ裝備優劣ナル新車ノ兵ヲ移動シ且飛行機三十餘

機ヲ配シ企圖ヲ逞シノシタ。二十八日拂曉ニ及テ敵ハ空陸ノ聯合部隊

ヲ以テ頻リニ我ガ南ヲ犯テ猛攻シテ来トシガ、双方戦闘ノ激烈ナリト

死之、多イコトハ南戦以來此ノ戦役ヨリヒトイモルナカラス。 戦闘最中。

不幸ニ我が趙登高師長及佟凌副軍長ハ陣歿サレ、將兵ノ死

傷ハ五千餘名ニ達シタ。

是ヨリ先シギリニ 最高統帥ヨリ宋要負長ノ保定ニ於ケル 指揮ヲ

催促スル電命ニ接シタ。 德純モ亦隨行シテ保定ニ赴イタガ、之ハ

二十八日ノ夜^{（夜）}テアツル。 天津方面ハ二十九、三十兩日、一斉ニ敵ニ對シテ猛攻

ヲ加ヘ、美ノ戦果ヲ收メタガ、其後、 命ヲ奉リテ退イタ。 天津南方

(天津浦口鉄道) (北平漢口鉄道)
ノ津浦沿線ト平漢線方面ノ我軍ハ連撃ヲ呼應シ、敵ニ對スル長

期抵抗ヲ開始シタ。 之即チ蘆溝橋事變ノ經過及抗戰狀況ガ

アル。

事變ヲ起シタ敵軍ノ主ナル軍官ハ 天津駐屯軍司令官

香月清司、旅團長河辺正三、聯隊長牟田口廉也、

駐比軍前參謀長 酒井隆、奉天時ノ參謀長 橋本、

而之ヲ最初主動的ニ華北ヲ侵略シ、九一八奉天ヲ勃発セシ

メ、土肥原賢二、テアリ、均シク戦争責任ヲ負フヘキモノナリ。

敵軍ハ中國ノ占領各地ニ於テ、^{ヲ働イタ。}數多ク、毒化政策ト、

種々ノ暴行^{ヲ働イタ。}各方面ノ報告ニ依リ、敵人、華北侵略後、

其殘酷ナル行為ト施行セシ毒化ハ、數限リナイノナリ、只々

德純ハ、夙ニ從軍シテ平漢、平大、津浦各線^{ニ於テ}作戰シ、未カ能ク

確實有力ナル證據ヲ提出シ得ナイコトヲ頗ル遺憾トスルモノナリ。

前北平市長兼二十九軍副軍長 秦德純 記述 印