

Dec. 2027

(212)

Doc. #2027

4

Vol. 27

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

December 18, 1945

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 4716 to 4925

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Tuesday, December 18, 1945

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster
and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee.

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WARD N. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in
2 order. Does counsel have anything at this time?

3 Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, one or two small matters.

4 From time to time we wish to place in the record evi-
5 dence that has come along that has been gotten in response
6 to requests. We have three highly significant documents
7 here which I would simply like to have spread on the record.
8 They relate to the meeting at Argentina.

9 The State Department has delivered to us three memoranda
10 prepared by Mr. Sumner Welles covering his conversations with
11 the President and Prime Minister Churchill at sea on August
12 10th and August 11th. These relate to the so-called parallel
13 action matter and I simply, without taking the time of the
14 committee to read these memoranda, I would like to suggest
15 that they be spread upon the record. They were made avail-
16 able to us yesterday. We had them immediately mimeographed
17 and in view of their importance I wish to place them in the
18 record immediately.

19 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.
20 Each member of the committee has been furnished a copy?

21 Mr. Gesell: Yes. And they may, I think for convenience,
22 following the suggestion of Senator Ferguson made the other
23 day, be designated 22-B, so that they will run along with
24 exhibit 22 which contains the other documents relating to
25 this subject.

1 The Vice Chairman: These will be designated exhibit 22-B,
2 is that correct?

3 Senator Brewster: There are several of them. Shouldn't
4 they be B, C, D, and so forth?

5 Mr. Gesell: Very well. Will designate the one of
6 August 10th 22-B, the one covering the morning conference of
7 August 11th 22-C and the one covering the afternoon conference
8 of August 11th 22-D.

9 The Vice-Chairman: Very well.

10 (The documents above referred to
11 were marked Exhibits Nos. 22-B,
12 22-C and 22-D and the same are
13 in words and figures as follows,
14 to-wit:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE:

Sunday, August 10, 1941
At Sea.

SUBJECT: British-American Cooperation.

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary of State.

COPIES TO:

I accompanied the President this morning to attend the religious services and the lunch which the Prime Minister was giving for the President on the PRINCE OF WALES. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch that in accordance with the conversation which was had between the President, the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander and myself at the President's dinner last night he had made two tentative drafts covering proposed parallel and simultaneous declarations by the United States and British Governments relating to Japanese policy in the Pacific and of a proposed joint declaration to be made by the President and the Prime Minister when their present meeting was terminated. The two drafts read as follows:

"Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government.

Copy
rlk 1

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

rlk 2

"Declaration by the United States Government

that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power."

"Declaration by His Majesty's Government that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, His Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

"Declaration by the Netherlands Government:

rlk 3

1 "1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the
2 Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in
3 which Her Majesty's Government would be compelled
4 to take counter measures even though these might
5 lead to war between the Netherlands and Japan.

6 "2. If any third Power becomes the object
7 of aggression by Japan in consequence of such
8 counter measures or of their support of them, Her
9 Majesty's Government would give all possible aid
10 to such Power."

11 Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will
12 be for consideration whether they should be pressed
13 to make a parallel declaration.

14
15 The draft of the proposed joint declaration
16 reads as follows:

17 "The President of the United States of America
18 and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, represent-
19 ing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom,
20 being met together to resolve and concert the
21 means of providing for the safety of their respec-
22 tive countries in face of Nazi and German aggression
23 and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom,
24 deem it right to make known certain principles which
25 they both accept for guidance in the framing of

rlk 4

1 their policy and on which they base their hopes for
2 a better future for the world.

3 First, their countries seek no aggrandizement,
4 territorial or other;

5 Second, they desire to see no territorial
6 changes that do not accord with the freely ex-
7 pressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

8 Third, they respect the right of all peoples
9 to choose the form of government under which they
10 will live; they are only concerned to defend the
11 rights of freedom of speech and of thought without
12 which such choosing must be illusory;

13 Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair
14 and equitable distribution of essential produce
15 not only within their territorial jurisdiction but
16 between the nations of the world.

17 Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only
18 cast down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective
19 international organization will afford to all
20 States and peoples the means of dwelling in security
21 within their own bounds and of traversing the seas
22 and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need
23 of getting burdensome armaments."

24 As I was leaving the ship to accompany the Presi-
25

rlk 5
1 dent back to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me
2 that he had likewise given the President copies of these
3 documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some
4 declaration of the kind he had drafted with respect to
5 Japan was in his opinion in the highest degree important,
6 and that he did not think that there was much hope left
7 unless the United States made such a clear-cut declara-
8 tion of preventing Japan from expanding further to the
9 south, in which event the prevention of war between
10 Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He
11 said in the most emphatic manner that if war did break
12 out between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately
13 would be in a position through the use of her large num-
14 ber of cruisers to seize or to destroy all of the
15 British merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the
16 Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British
17 Dominions and the British Isles unless the United States
18 herself entered the war. He pled with me that a dec-
19 laration of this character participated in by the United
20 States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands
21 and possibly the Soviet Union would definitely restrain
22 Japan. If this were not done, the blow to the British
23 Government might be almost decisive.

Sumner Welles.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.
24
25 U SW . GAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE:

Monday, August 11, 1941
At Sea.

SUBJECT: British-American Cooperation

PARTICIPANTS: The President.
The British Prime Minister.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Honorable Harry Hopkins.
The Under Secretary of State.

COPIES TO:

The President received Mr. Churchill this morning on the AUGUSTA at 11:00 a.m. There were present at the meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins and myself.

I

The conference commenced with the subject of Portugal. The President read to Mr. Churchill the letter addressed to the former by the Prime Minister of Portugal. It was agreed by both that the contents of the letter were highly satisfactory and made possible without any difficulty the carrying out of arrangements for the occupation of the Azores as a means of assurance that the islands would not be occupied by Germany.

(Handwritten note)
card for
Atlantic Charter.

rlk 7

1 Mr. Churchill stated that a highly secret operation
2 decided
3 had been attended upon by the British Government, namely,
4 the occupation of the Canary Islands during the days
5 immediately after the September full moon. This date,
6 as Mr. Churchill remembered it, would be about the
7 15th of September. The British Government were under-
8 taking this operation with full knowledge that the
9 islands had been recently heavily fortified and that a
10 very large number of German officers were engaged there
11 in the training and preparation of the Spanish troops.
12 It was undertaken with the further realization that this
13 step would almost inevitably involve a Spanish attack
14 either in conjunction with or upon the instigation of
15 German military forces and that such attack would render
16 untenable by the British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar.
17 The British Government, however, had decided upon the
18 step in view of its belief that the situation in Spain
19 from the British standpoint was going from bad to worse
20 and that Hitler almost inevitably would undertake the
21 occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent
22 penetration of North Africa if any collapse took place
23 on the part of the Russian Army or even if a winter
24 stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill stated
25 Gibraltar would be isolated anyway and the occupation
by Great Britain of the Canary Islands was of the utmost

rlk 8

1 importance in guarding a southern Atlaptic convoy route
2 into the British Isles.

3 In view of this operation, the British Government
4 would not be in a position conveniently to carry out
5 the commitment they had made to the Portuguese Govern-
6 ment to assist in the defense of the Azores.

7 In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar's letter to
8 the President, it was therefore agreed that the British
9 Government immediately upon the return of Mr. Churchill
10 to London would notify Dr. Salazar that the British
11 Government could not conveniently undertake to assist
12 in the defense of the Azores and would further inform
13 Dr. Salazar that they therefore desired him to request
14 the United States for such assistance. It was agreed
15 on the part of the President that immediately upon the
16 receipt of such notification from Dr. Salazar the United
17 States would send the necessary forces of occupation to
18 the Azores and that the Brazilian Government would be
19 simultaneously requested to send at least a token force
20 to take part in the expedition.

21 The President stated to Mr. Churchill that in view
22 of our present military situation if the United States
23 undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a
24 position in the near future at least to undertake the
25 protection of the Cape Verde Islands. Mr. Churchill

rlk 9

1 stated that the British Government would be in a posi-
2 tion to occupy the Cape Verde Islands with the under-
3 standing that it would later turn over the protection
4 of those islands to the United States at such time as
5 the United States was in a position to take those
6 measures. Mr. Churchill further stated that during the
7 time that the United States was landing the necessary
8 forces in the Azores, the British Navy would maintain a
9 large force between the Azores and the mainland of
10 Portugal in order to render impossible the sending of
11 any German expeditionary forces should Portugal at that
12 time be already occupied by Germany.

II

11 The Prime Minister then said that he desired to
15 discuss the situation in the Far East. He had with him
16 a copy of a draft memorandum, of which he had already
17 given the President a copy and which suggested that the
18 United States, British and Dutch Governments simultaneous-
19 ly warn Japan that further military expansion by Japan
20 in the South Pacific would lead to the taking of counter
21 measures by the countries named even though such counter
22 measures might result in hostilities between them and
23 Japan; and, second, provided that the United States
24 declare to Japan that should Great Britain go to the
25 assistance of the Netherlands East Indies as a result

rlk 10

1 of aggression against the latter on the part of Japan
2 the President would request from the Congress of the
3 United States authority to assist the British and Dutch
4 Governments in their defense against Japanese aggression.

5 The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of
6 the two statements handed to Secretary Hull by the
7 Japanese Ambassador on August 6.

8 The Prime Minister read them carefully and then
9 remarked that the implication was that Japan, having
10 already occupied Indochina, said that she would move no
11 further provided the United States would abandon their
12 economic and financial sanctions and take no further
13 military or naval defensive measures and further agree
14 to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for
15 Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of which
16 were particularly unacceptable.

17 The President replied that that was about the
18 picture as he saw it, that he felt very strongly that
19 every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of
20 war with Japan. He stated that what he intended to do
21 was to request Secretary Hull by radio to inform the
22 Japanese Ambassador that the President would return to
23 Washington next Saturday or Sunday and desired to see
24 the Ambassador immediately upon his return. The
25 President stated that in that interview he would inform

rlk 11

1 the Japanese Ambassador that provided the Japanese
2 Government would give the commitment contained in the
3 first paragraph of the proposal of the Japanese Govern-
4 ment of August 6, namely, that the Japanese Government
5 "will not further station its troops in the Southwestern
6 Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the
7 Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will
8 be withdrawn", specifically and not contingently, the
9 United States Government, while making it clear that
10 the other conditions set forth by the Japanese Govern-
11 ment were in general unacceptable, the United States
12 would, nevertheless, in a friendly spirit seek to ex-
13 plore the possibilities inherent in the various pro-
14 posals made by Japan for the reaching of a friendly
15 understanding between the two Governments. The Presi-
16 dent would further state that should Japan refuse to
17 consider this procedure and undertake further steps
18 in the nature of military expansions, the President
19 desired the Japanese Government to know that in such
20 event in his belief various steps would have to be
21 taken by the United States notwithstanding the Presi-
22 dent's realization that the taking of such further measures
23 might result in war between the United States and Japan.

24 Mr. Churchill immediately declared that the pro-
25 cedure suggested appeared to him to cover the situation

rlk 12

1 very well. He said it had in it an element of "face-
2 saving" for the Japanese and yet at the same time would
3 constitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the
4 consequences involved in a continuation by Japan of her
5 present course.

6 There was then discussed the desirability of in-
7 forming Russia of the steps which would be taken as
8 above set forth and of possibly including in the warn-
9 ing to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive
10 steps by Japan against the Soviet Union.

11 I stated that in my judgment the real issue which
12 was involved was the continuation by Japan of its
13 present policy of conquest by force in the entire
14 Pacific region and regardless whether such policy was
15 directed against China, against the Soviet Union or
16 against the British Dominions or British colonies, or
17 the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific
18 area. I said it seemed to me that the statement which
19 the President intended to make to the Japanese Govern-
20 ment might more advantageously be based on the question
21 of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon
22 Japanese moves in the Southwestern Pacific area.

23 The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this
24 and it was decided that the step to be taken by the
25 President would be taken in that sense.

rlk 13

1 The question then arose as to the desirability of
2 the President's making reference in his proposed state-
3 ment to the Japanese Ambassador to British policy in
4 the southern Pacific region and specifically with regard
5 to Thailand. The President said that he thought it
6 would be advantageous for him to be in a position at
7 that time to state that he had been informed by the
8 British Government that Great Britain had no aggressive
9 intentions whatever upon Thailand. Mr. Churchill said
10 that in this he heartily concurred.

11 I asked whether it would not be better for the
12 President to be in a position to state not only that
13 Great Britain had no intentions of an aggressive charac-
14 ter with regard to Thailand, but also that the British
15 Government had informed the United States Government
16 that it supported wholeheartedly the President's pro-
17 posal for the neutralization of Indochina and of Thailand.

18 Mr. Churchill stated that he agreed that it would
19 be well to make an all-inclusive statement of that
20 character with respect to British policy, that he trusted
21 that the President would, therefore, inform the Japanese
22 Ambassador that he had consulted the British Government,
23 and that the British Government was in complete accord
24 with the neutralization proposal, and that it had like-
25 wise informed the President that it would in no event

rlk 14

1 undertake any initiative in the occupation of Thailand.

2 It was agreed that Sir Alexander Cadogan, after
3 further consultation with Mr. Churchill, would give me
4 in writing a statement which the British Government was
5 prepared to make with regard to this issue.

6 The President expressed the belief that by adopting
7 this course any further move of aggression on the part
8 of Japan which might result in war could be held off for
9 at least thirty days. Mr. Churchill felt that if nego-
10 tiations or conversations actually took place between
11 the United States and Japan on the basis which had been
12 formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese
13 policy might be modified and that a war in the Pacific
14 might be averted.

15 III

16 Mr. Churchill then said that he desired to bring
17 up for discussion the proposed joint declaration by the
18 President and himself.

19 The President said that he believed the best solu-
20 tion of this problem was for an identic statement to be
21 made in London and in the United States, probably on
22 Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime
23 Minister and the President had met at sea, accompanied
24 by the various members of their respective staffs; that
25 these members of the two Governments had discussed the

rlk 15

1 question of aid under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act
2 to nations resisting aggression, and that these military
3 and naval conversations had in no way involved any
4 future commitments between the two Governments, except
5 as authorized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act;
6 that the Prime Minister and the President had between
7 them discussed certain principles relating to a better
8 future for the world and had agreed upon a joint de-
9 claration which would then be quoted verbatim.

10 Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form
11 in which the President had desired to make it clear that
12 no future commitments had been entered into. The Presi-
13 dent stated that that portion of the proposed statement
14 was of extreme importance from his standpoint inasmuch
15 as a statement of that character would make it im-
16 possible for extreme isolationist leaders in the United
17 States to allege that every kind of secret agreement
18 had been entered into during the course of these con-
19 versations.

20 Mr. Churchill said that he understood that side
21 of the question, but that he believed that any cate-
22 gorical statement of that character would prove deeply
23 discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries
24 and would have a very serious effect upon their morale.
25 He likewise made it clear that a similar effect would

rlk 16

1 be created by British public opinion. He asked if the
2 statement could not be worded in such a way as to make
3 it positive rather than negative, namely, that the members
4 of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of the President
5 had solely discussed questions relative to the furnishing
6 of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the
7 terms of the Lease-Lend Act. The President replied
8 that he believed that the statement could be drawn up
9 in that way and that if he then were queried in the United
10 States he need merely reply that nothing had been dis-
11 cussed or agreed upon other than that which had already
12 been indicated in his public statement.

13 I then gave the President, Mr. Churchill and Sir
14 Alexander Cadogan copies of a redraft which I had made
15 this morning of the proposed joint declaration before
16 Mr. Churchill had arrived and had had an opportunity of
17 going over it with the President, and the latter had
18 approved it. Mr. Churchill then commenced to read it.
19 He suggested that there be inserted in the text of the
20 third point before the word "self-government" the words
21 "sovereign rights and". This was agreed upon.

22 Mr. Churchill then read the fourth point which read
23 as follows: "Fourth, they will endeavor to further
24 the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without dis-
25 crimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to

rlk 17

1 the raw materials of the world which are needed for their
2 economic prosperity."

3 He immediately inquired whether this was meant to
4 apply to the terms of the Ottawa agreements. I replied
5 that, of course, it did, since the policy which the
6 United States Government had been pursuing for the
7 better part of nine years had been addressed primarily
8 towards the removal of all of those artificial
9 restrictions and controls upon international trade
10 which had created such tragic havoc to world economy dur-
11 ing the past generation. I said I understood fully the
12 immediate difficulties which this occasioned him, but
13 I pointed out that the phraseology was "they will
14 endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not
15 imply a formal and immediate contractual obligation on
16 the part of his Government. The President stated that
17 he believed the point was of very great importance as
18 a measure of assurance to the German and Italian
19 peoples that the British and the United States Govern-
20 ments desired to offer them, after the war, fair and
21 equal opportunity of an economic character.

22 The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was
23 without any power himself to agree upon this point.
24 He set forth in considerable detail the position of the
25 United Kingdom vis-a-vis the Dominions and emphasized

rlk 17

1 the raw materials of the world which are needed for their
2 economic prosperity."

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4 apply to the terms of the Ottawa agreements. I replied
5 that, of course, it did, since the policy which the
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18 a measure of assurance to the German and Italian
19 peoples that the British and the United States Govern-
20 ments desired to offer them, after the war, fair and
21 equal opportunity of an economic character.

22 The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was
23 without any power himself to agree upon this point.
24 He set forth in considerable detail the position of the
25 United Kingdom vis-a-vis the Dominions and emphasized

rk 18

1 his inability, without the agreement of the Dominions,
2 to enter into the proposed declaration insofar as this
3 point was concerned. He said that insofar as he himself
4 was concerned the issue was one with which his own per-
5 sonal life history was connected. He referred to the
6 days at the outset of the century when Joseph Chamberlain
7 first brought up the proposal for Empire preferences and
8 the predominant part which this issue had played in the
9 political history of Great Britain during the past forty
10 years. He said that he felt that the proposal as now
11 phrased would have the enthusiastic support of all the
12 liberals everywhere. He said that he himself was heart-
13 ily in accord with the proposal and that he himself had
14 always been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to
15 the Ottawa agreements. He said, however, that it would
16 be at least a week before he could hope to obtain by
17 telegraph the opinion of the Dominions with regard to
18 this question.

19 Harry Hopkins then suggested that Sir Alexander
20 Cadogan and I be requested to draft new phraseology which
21 would take care of these difficulties and prevent the de-
22 lay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. He said it was incon-
23 ceivable that the issuance of the joint declaration should
24 be held up by a matter of this kind.

25 I said that in my own judgment further modification

rlk 19

1 of that article would destroy completely any value in that
2 portion of the proposed declaration. I said that it was
3 not a question of phraseology, that it was a question of a
4 vital principle which was involved. I said that if the
5 British and the United States Governments could not agree
6 to do everything within their power to further, after the
7 termination of the present war, a restoration of free and
8 liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the
9 sponge and realize that one of the greatest factors in
10 creating the present tragic situation in the world was go-
11 ing to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war
12 world. I said that the trade policies of the British Em-
13 pire during the latter portion of the nineteenth century
14 had, I felt, contributed enormously to the sane and pros-
15 perous condition of the world at that time, and that, of
16 course, I realized that the tariff policies pursued by the
17 United States and many other countries during that period
18 had played an important part in the creation of the evils
19 which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however,
20 that it seemed to be imperative that we try to agree
21 now upon the policy of constructive sanity in world
22 economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a
23 new and better world and that except through an agree-
24 ment upon such a policy by our two governments there
25 would be no hindrance whatever to a continuation later

rlk 20

1 to the present German practices of utilizing their trade
2 and financial policies in order to achieve political ends.

3 Mr. Churchill agreed very emphatically to this
4 policy. He and Sir Alexander Cadogan both agreed that
5 it was not a question of phraseology, but that they were
6 up against a material obstacle which Mr. Churchill had
7 already indicated. The Dominions would have to be con-
8 sulted. It might well be that an agreement could not be
9 had from the Dominions and that consequently the pro-
10 posed joint declaration could only be issued some time
11 after news of the meeting between the President and the
12 Prime Minister had been given out. Mr. Churchill
13 suggested that the inclusion before the phrase "they
14 will endeavor to further" of the phrase which would
15 read "with due regard for our present obligations"
16 might ease the situation.

17 The President suggested, and Mr. Churchill agreed,
18 that the latter would try and draft some phraseology which
19 would make that situation easier, and it was arranged
20 that I would call later in the afternoon upon the Prime
21 Minister and Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them
22 such redraft as they might have in mind.

23 Mr. Churchill was in entire accord with points
24 five and six.

25 He then read point seven and after discussion at the

rlk 21

1 meeting of this point it was agreed that the phrase
2 "to use force" be replaced by the word "aggression" in
3 the second sentence of the seventh point.

4 Mr. Churchill said that, of course, he was heartily
5 and enthusiastically in favor of this point seven,
6 which had been initiated by the President. He inquired,
7 however, whether the President would not agree to support
8 some kind of "effective international organization" as
9 suggested by the Prime Minister in his original draft
10 of the proposed joint declaration.

11 The President replied that he did not feel that
12 he could agree to this because of the suspicions and
13 opposition that such a statement on his part would
14 create in the United States. He said that he himself
15 would not be in favor of the creation of a new Assembly
16 of the League of Nations, at least until after a period
17 of time had transpired and during which an international
18 police force composed of the United States and Great
19 Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Mr.
20 Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be
21 candid if he did not express to the President his
22 feeling that point seven would create a great deal of
23 opposition from the extreme internationalists. The
24 President replied that he realized that, but that he
25 felt that the time had come to be realistic and that

rlk 22

1 in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point
 2 was complete realism. Mr. Churchill then remarked that
 3 of course he was wholeheartedly in favor of it and
 4 shared the President's view.

5 The meeting then broke up and I arranged with
 6 the President that I would drop by to see him after
 7 my conference later in the afternoon with the Prime
 8 Minister. The latter stated that he would not be able
 9 to leave until at least 5:00 p.m., tomorrow, August 12
 10 and that as he felt it of importance to reach a com-
 11 plete meeting of minds with the President upon all of
 12 the issues involved, that he would be willing to spend
 13 an additional twenty-four hours should that be neces-
 14 sary.

Sumner Welles

U SW . GAM

17 - - - - -
 18 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

19 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

20 DATE:
 21 Monday, August 11, 1941
 22 At Sea

23 SUBJECT: British-American Cooperation.

24 PARTICIPANTS: Sir Alexander Cadogan.
 The Under Secretary.

25 COPIES TO:

rlk 23

1 I went by arrangement to see Sir Alexander Cadogan
2 on the PRINCE OF WALES this afternoon. He gave me to
3 read memoranda which he had already completed on the
4 conference between the Prime Minister and the President
5 this morning and, with a few changes which I indicated,
6 they appeared to be a correct presentation of the dis-
7 cussion and of the agreements reached.

8 With regard to the draft of the joint declaration,
9 Sir Alexander told me that the Prime Minister had already
10 radioed to London the text of the proposed joint dec-
11 laration incorporating therein modifications of points
12 four and seven. Sir Alexander gave me the revised text
13 to read. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister's draft of
14 point four was far broader and more satisfactory than
15 the minimum which the President had instructed me, after
16 our conference of the morning, to accept, I raised no
17 objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change
18 in point seven I stated that while it was completely
19 satisfactory to me and entirely in accord with my own
20 way of thinking I had no idea what the President's de-
21 cision might be. I said that I would have to submit it
22 to him.

23 Sir Alexander stated that the Prime Minister felt
24 very strongly--perhaps exaggeratedly--the opposition which
25 would be created on the part of a certain pro-League-of-

rlk 24

1 Nations group in England to the contents of point seven
2 declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook
3 aggression outside of their frontiers. He went on to say
4 that while he believed there would not be the amount of
5 opposition which the Prime Minister anticipated he
6 nevertheless thought that it would be a tragic thing
7 to concentrate solely upon the transition period after
8 the war was ended when some kind of joint police power
9 would have to be exercised by the British and by the
10 United States Governments and omit any reference to the
11 need of the creation of some effective and practicable
12 international organization which would function after
13 the transition period was concluded. I said that as
14 I had already indicated while I was in full agreement with
15 his own views the matter would have to be determined
16 by the President.

17 We discussed the desirability of informing the
18 Chinese Government of the steps which the United States
19 Government in the person of the President was taking
20 with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very
21 definitely that every effort should be made to keep
22 China closely informed of what was being done in her
23 interest by Great Britain and by the United States I
24 wondered whether telling China of what the President
25 intended to state to the Japanese Government at this

rlk 24

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2 declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook
3 aggression outside of their frontiers. He went on to say
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16 by the President.

D. G. MOTCHINSKY - JUAN S. ORAW

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18 Chinese Government of the steps which the United States
19 Government in the person of the President was taking
20 with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very
21 definitely that every effort should be made to keep
22 China closely informed of what was being done in her
23 interest by Great Britain and by the United States I
24 wondered whether telling China of what the President
25 intended to state to the Japanese Government at this

rlk 25

1 particular moment would not mean that the Government at
2 Chungking for its own interests would make public the
3 information so received. If publicity resulted, I stated
4 I feared that the extreme militaristic element in Tokio
5 and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled
6 by Germany would immediately take advantage of the situa-
7 tion so created to inflame sentiment in Japan to such
8 an extent as to make any possibility remote, as it might
9 anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through
10 negotiation with Japan. Sir Alexander said he was
11 entirely in accord and would be governed by those views.
12 He said, of course, 'I realized how terribly persistent
13 the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in
14 London, Dr. Wellington Koo, would undoubtedly press
15 him day in and day out to know what had transpired at
16 the meeting between the Prime Minister and the Presi-
17 dent with regard to China. He said that he felt that
18 the best solution was for him merely to say in general
19 terms that the two governments had agreed that every
20 step should be taken that was practicable at this time
21 for China and its defense and avoid going into any
22 details.

23 I subsequently went to see the President. The
24 President said that he was entirely in accord with
25 the redraft of point four which was better than he had

rlk 26

1 thought Mr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He
2 also accepted without question the amendment made by
3 Mr. Churchill to point seven and the President said that
4 it seemed to him entirely desirable since the amendment
5 made it clear that once the war was over a transition
6 period would have to take place and that the permanent
7 international organization would only be set up after
8 that experimental period had passed. He had jotted down
9 certain minor changes in the text of the proposed joint
10 declaration, most of which were merely verbal changes
11 for the purpose of clarification.

D. G. MOTTENBACH, JUAN S. DRAW

12 I said I felt it necessary for me to ask him
13 whether he did not believe that a very considerable
14 opposition on the part of extreme isolationists in the
15 United States would result from that portion of point
16 seven which declares in the judgment of the United States
17 that it is essential that aggressor nations be disarmed.
18 I said that if a great Power like the United States
19 publicly declares that something is essential, the
20 inference is that the Power is going to do something
21 itself about it. I said it appeared to me more than
22 likely that the isolationists will insist that this
23 public statement by the President meant that the United
24 States would go to war in order to disarm not only
25 Germany but even possibly Japan and theoretically, at

rlk 27

1 least, even the Soviet Union if that country should
2 later once more embark upon aggression on its neighbors.
3 The President replied that the whole intent of point
4 seven, as he saw it, was to make clear what the objec-
5 tive would be if the war was won and that he believed
6 people in the United States would take that point of
7 view. He further said he felt the realism inherent in
8 article seven was one which would be apparent to the
9 enormous majority of the American people and that they
10 would enthusiastically support the need for the dis-
11 armament of aggressor nations.

12 I said I also had been surprised and somewhat
13 discouraged by a remark that the President had casually
14 made in our morning's conference--if I had understood
15 him correctly--which was that nothing could be more
16 futile than the reconstitution of a body such as the
17 Assembly of the League of Nations. I said to the
18 President that it seemed to me that if he conceived of
19 the need for a transition period upon the termination of
20 the war during which period Great Britain and the United
21 States would undertake the policing of the world, it
22 seemed to me that it would be enormously desirable for
23 the smaller Powers to have available to them an Assembly
24 in which they would all be represented and in which
25 they could make their complaints known and join in

rlk 28

1 recommendations as to the policy to be pursued by the major
2 Powers who were doing the police work. I said it seemed
3 to me that an organization of that kind would be the most
4 effective safety valve that could be devised.

5 The President said that he agreed fully with what
6 I said and that all that he had intended by the remark
7 he made this morning was to make clear his belief that
8 a transition period was necessary and that during that
9 transition period no organizations such as the Council
10 or the Assembly of the League could undertake the powers
11 and prerogatives with which they had been entrusted during
12 the existence of the League of Nations.

13 I further said that while from the practical
14 standpoint I was in agreement that the United States
15 and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or
16 would exercise the police trusteeship and that it
17 seemed to me that it would be impossible if such a trust-
18 teeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other
19 American republics or for that matter the countries at
20 present occupied such as Norway, the Netherlands, and
21 even Belgium. The President said that he felt that a
22 solution for this difficulty could probably be found
23 through the ostensible joining with Great Britain and
24 the United States of those Powers, but it would have to
25 be recognized that it would be ostensible since none of

rlk 29

1 the nations mentioned would have the practical means of
2 taking any effective or, at least, considerable part in
3 the task involved.

4 I said that it seemed to me that now that the text
5 of the joint declaration had been agreed upon, since I
6 assumed from what Mr. Churchill had told me that the
7 British Government would support his recommendations
8 with regard thereto, all that was left to do in the way
9 of drafting was the preparation of the brief statement
10 which would be issued simultaneously in London and at
11 Washington announcing that the President and the Prime
12 Minister had met, referring to the discussions under
13 the Lease-Lend Act and the inclusion at the termination
14 thereof of the text of the joint declaration. I said that
15 Mr. Churchill had told me that he had cabled his Government
16 that he was not leaving Argentina until Wednesday afternoon
17 and said it seemed to me that everything could be definitely
18 agreed upon and cleared up by 1:00 p.m. tomorrow, and I
19 could see no practical reason for waiting another twenty-
20 four hours. The President agreed and said that he would try
21 and get a decision reached in that sense when he saw Mr.
22 Churchill this evening.

23 Sumner Welles

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1 Mr. Gesell: Also, we would like to have, just to make the
2 record complete, designated exhibit 8-A three additional re-
3 ports received from General MacArthur concerning the Japanese
4 attack on Pearl Harbor. These simply supplement the infor-
5 mation already available but we want to furnish to the com-
6 mittee everything we have received. Perhaps, following Sen-
7 ator Brewster's suggestion, these should be designated 8-A,
8 8-B and 8-C.

9 The Vice Chairman: That is, the 4 December 1945, exhibit
10 8-A; 29 November 1945, 8-B; and 12 November 1945, 8-C, is
11 that correct?

12 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

13 (The documents above referred
14 to were marked Exhibits Nos.
15 8-A, 8-B and 8-C.)

16 Mr. Gesell: Now, my attention was also called to the
17 fact that while in the questioning of Admiral Wilkinson re-
18 ference was made to the letters from Admiral Kimmel concern-
19 ing the transmission of information, that I failed to read
20 into the record Admiral Kimmel's request for information and
21 the replies that he received and with the committee's per-
22 mission I would like to get those into the record now.

23 Some time ago the committee was handed this correspond-
24 ence between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark and we do not
25 feel it should be offered at this time since it relates to

1 the testimony of those officers when they appear, but I will
2 simply read the pertinent portions relating to this matter of
3 information.

4 The first is a postscript appearing to a letter of
5 February 18, 1941 addressed to Admiral Stark by Admiral Kimmel
6 which reads as follows:

7 "D.S. We receive through radio and other intelli-
8 gence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japan-
9 ese merchant ships, but we have no definite information
10 on the important Japanese trade routes. Can you send
11 us the latest information you have on this? I am in-
12 itiating separate correspondence on this topic.

13 "I have recently been told by an officer fresh from
14 Washington that ONI considers it the function of Oper-
15 ations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with informa-
16 tion of a secret nature. I have heard also that Oper-
17 ations considers the responsibility for furnishing the
18 same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not
19 know that we have missed anything, but if there is any
20 doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Com-
21 mander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on
22 subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will
23 you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be
24 no misunderstanding?"

25 To that letter there is a reply of Admiral Stark's

1 dated March 22, 1941 and I will read the portion relating to
2 the postscript I have just read from Admiral Kimmel's let-
3 ter. (Reading)

4 "With reference to your postscript on the subject
5 of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furn-
6 ishing of secret information to CincUS, Kirk informs me
7 that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping
8 you adequately informed concerning foreign nations,
9 activities of these nations and disloyal elements within
10 the United States. He further says that information
11 concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels
12 is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you
13 wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or
14 sent by despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section
15 devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which
16 move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping
17 which moved over each route."

18 There is then a further memorandum or letter of
19 Admiral Kimmel dated May 26, 1941 which it is my understanding
20 he delivered to Admiral Stark with respect to information.
21 That memorandum under paragraph VII reads as follows:

22 "The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very
23 difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of
24 government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation.
25 He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change

1 of policy, reflected in current events and naval move-
2 ments and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the pos-
3 sible effect upon his own situation. He is not even
4 sure of what force will be available to him and has
5 little voice in matters radically affecting his ability
6 to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of informa-
7 tion is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty,
8 a condition which directly contravenes that singleness
9 of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action
10 so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

11 "It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid de-
12 velopments in the international picture, both diplomatic
13 and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge
14 of the military authorities themselves, may militate
15 against the furnishing of timely information, but cer-
16 tainly the present situation is susceptible to marked
17 improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current
18 policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at
19 times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
20 to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses
21 of action to conform to current concepts. This is par-
22 ticularly applicable to the current Pacific situation,
23 where the necessities for intensive training of a par-
24 tially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against
25 the desirability of interruption of this training by

1 strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending
 2 eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of
 3 distance and time, the Department itself is not too well
 4 informed as to the local situation, particularly with
 5 regard to the status of current outlying island develop-
 6 ment, thus making it even more necessary that the Com-
 7 mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy
 8 and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

9 "It is suggested that it be made a cardinal princi-
 10 ple that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immed-
 11 lately informed of all important developments as they
 12 occur and by the quickest secure means available."

13 I am sorry for that long interruption.

14 The Vice Chairman; That is alright. Does that complete
 15 counsel's request?

16 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: Just as a matter of information, I notice in addition to the six documents which have already been admitted for the record under the exhibit numbers given there is a one-sheet statement here "War Plans Division (OP-12)". Is that to be included now, or just for the information of the committee?

Mr. Gesell: No, sir, that is in anticipation of the questioning of Admiral Turner. It relates to the functions of the War Plans Division. We can insert it now, but we thought perhaps the members of the committee wished to see it, for possible use in the examination of Admiral Wilkinson.

The Vice Chairman: Is that all, Counsel?

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON

(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman: Admiral, do you have any statements that you desire to make regarding your testimony?

Admiral Wilkinson: There are one or two questions, Mr. Chairman, that were asked me yesterday to which I have at least partial information.

One was the number of personnel engaged in the radio intelligence work, including the decrypting, in the fall of 1941. I inquired about that. Although the best witnesses, of course, are the communications authorities, the information

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 they gave me was that the total radio establishment was 700,
3 including about 80 officers. That embraced the entire world,
4 as far as our radio intelligence activities were concerned.
5 Of this total nearly two-thirds were engaged in direction
6 finding or intercept work, or training for that work, and the
7 remainder, some over one-third of the 700, and including most
8 of the officers, was engaged in the crypt analysis and trans-
9 lation, which was the primary question.

10 The second question was to locate, if practicable, the
11 incident which I spoke of wherein Lieutenant Commander Okada,
12 the Japanese Naval Officer, engaged in espionage on the West
13 Coast and had reported the precise location of the ships in
14 the Bremerton Navy Yard. That information I have not found.
15 It is not in the local file apparently. We have sent a
16 dispatch to the West Coast to find the documents that were
17 seized there, and I have an intelligence report from Los
18 Angeles to Tokyo, an intercepted, decrypted and translated
19 code message speaking of the movements of several ships, and
20 included in there that a 55 destroyer squadron was moved from
21 San Diego to presumably San Pedro. The translation is inade-
22 quate on the 25 and 2 vessels which were tied up at the
23 Bethlehem and Los Angeles shipyards and repair work was
24 begun.

25 Then there are further notes as to the movement and
prospective movements of other ships.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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In checking my testimony with respect to the distribution of the intercepts in the locked pouches, and in the bags, I find I was in error in my recollection in that the locked pouch was left for the Chief of Naval Operations and separately for the Secretary of the Navy, and a sealed pouch was left at the White House.

I said I thought there was a separate copy there, and one for the War Plans officer. The copy that came to the Far Eastern Section and myself was a folder, and I had erroneously thought that was the same copy that went elsewhere. There were separate copies.

The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas from Illinois will inquire.

Senator Lucas: Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday you gave to the committee certain information about the location of the various fleets of potential enemies throughout the world during the month of November and the first week of December, and you advised the committee that there were many ways in which the Navy could detect these fleets; first by actual sight by our own merchant ships, and second by our own attaches, or the consuls at the various ports.

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WARD N. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Now, let me ask you, insofar as information coming
3 from the Far East is concerned, from whom did you receive
4 such information as to the location of the Jap ships during
5 the months of November and December, 1941.

6 Admiral Wilkinson: We had reports from the State De-
7 partment, the consuls, we had reports from our Naval
8 Attache in Tokyo, and I do not know whether he was able
9 to detect anything at that particular period.

10 We had several very pertinent reports from our Assistant
11 Naval Attache at Shanghai, and our observers in the Chinese
12 ports, one or two, and they also got further reports.

13 Senator Lucas: Now, are you familiar with the memoran-
14 dum entitled "Japanese Fleet Locations" from November 4
15 up to December 1, inclusive?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: I should like to have you, Admiral,
18 look at this document. The document is dated December
19 1, 1941. I would like to have you tell the committee
20 what the letters "Op-16-F-2" mean at the top there?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Operation 16 is the Office of Naval
22 Intelligence, and F-2 is the Far Eastern Section. That is
23 the office that originated the paper, Captain McCullom's
24 office.

25 Senator Lucas: That memorandum purports to advise

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Naval Intelligence in Washington as to the Japanese Fleet locations as of December 1, 1941; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: To the best of the knowledge that we could deduct and infer, and actually have from our various stations, they were not only the sightings, but also radio intelligence analyses, the traffic analyses of ship calls, and so on, conducted primarily at Honolulu and Corregidor, and adjusted between the two.

On November 24, we had sent out a message saying we would not expect many more sightings in the open seas because of the ocean traffic falling off, and in consequence we would be more and more reliant on the radio intelligence, and would Com 14, which was Honolulu, and Com 16, which was Corregidor, please make complete analyses of everything that came, and Com 16 would be the record coordinator, because they had more intercepts and larger scouting work.

Senator Lucas: This is the last account received from the Far East in answer to that query?

Admiral Wilkinson: It is the result of what they had had, and what we could pick from our other reports as well, although we had instructed our naval attaches and observers to send reports also to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic, and Commander in Chief, Pearl Harbor, so those fellows, in addition to ours, had the benefit of the naval attaches

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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3 and observers report. All three officers had the same
4 sources.

5 Senator Lucas: In answer to the query you also received
6 from Hawaii their best judgment as to the Japanese fleet
7 location at that particular time?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, and all three officers
9 were aware even before the printing of the data which went
10 into the preparation of this paper.

11 Senator Lucas: I presume you have made an examination
12 of both of these reports, one received from the Far East
13 and one received from Hawaii at that time?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not quite understand you.

15 Senator Lucas: I presume you have examined, I presume
16 you did examine at the time, the memorandum that came from
17 the Far East as well as the memorandum that came from
18 Hawaii, with respect to the fleet locations of the Japs?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: I understand, sir. There was not
20 a specific memorandum as such. There were a series of
21 messages indicating factual data, and they were compiled
22 in the Far Eastern section.

23 I myself did not examine the memorandum coming in.

24 Senator Lucas: Who did examine it?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Captain McCullom's section, and
I think Lieutenant Commander Watts.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Were they under your direct supervision?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: It was the duty of those two officers to examine these memoranda as they came in, and give to you their evaluation, or their best judgment as to what they meant?

Admiral Wilkinson: To prepare this paper which we have before us, which was not only for me, but after I approved it, it was for the benefit of all officers who received it.

Senator Lucas: It is my understanding that the report that came from the Hawaiian Department indicated definitely that they had lost the fleet completely as of December 1, 1941, that is the fleet that finally struck the Hawaiian Islands, they reported that they knew nothing about that fleet from their own intelligence work that they were doing at that time; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall it specifically, but I think it is not quite correct, because all of us had lost it.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: That is the point I wanted to make, insofar as the memorandum from the Far East is concerned. You will notice on the first page it states definitely that the battleship HIYEI was located near Sasebo, and the battleship KIRISHIMA was located near Kure.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Then on the next page, insofar as the carrier fleet is concerned, you find that the AKAGI was located near Kyushu, and the KAGA near Kyushu, the SORYU near Kure, the HIRYU near Kure, the RYUJO near Kure, the ZUIKAKU near Kure and the SHOGAGU near Kure. It is my understanding that those two battleships and those vessels in the carrier fleet that I have just mentioned were in the Pacific force that attacked Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: I am just wondering whether or not that was ever called to your attention as being in direct conflict with the report that was made from Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: It is obviously an error. That was the last indication we had gotten on those ships. We had reported in other papers, as I recall, and certainly in conversations to the recipients of this memorandum that some battleships and a number of carriers were unlocated and were believed to be in home waters. Home waters, of course, is an

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

indefinite term, signifying waters near the Japanese Coast.

Senator Lucas: Now how would the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Division locate, for instance, the battleship HIYEI as being near Sasebo? How would he get that information?

Admiral Wilkinson: Possibly from radio direction finding on a ship which was sending out a radio message and which was identified, correctly or wrongly, as that particular battleship; possibly from the fact that the radio station at Sasebo was issuing messages apparently directed to that ship and hence she would be in the vicinity of Sasebo to receive those messages.

I am not sure of the other features of radio intelligence, because that is outside my scope, but that is my general naval knowledge as to how one would detect it.

Senator Lucas: Obviously, though, the battleship we are talking about was not near Sasebo at that time.

Admiral Wilkinson: Quite right, sir.

Senator Lucas: And the point occurred to me as to how an intelligence officer could be mistaken about two battleships and a number of carriers in the carrier fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson: They had not been located recently, sir. The statement should have been more correctly made, "Unlocated" instead of which the statement was apparently

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 made as of the last location in which they had been found
3 and where, pending evidence to the contrary, they were still
4 presumed to be.

5 Senator Lucas: Which report did the Navy follow, if
6 you remember, with respect to the Japanese Fleet being lost?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not quite understand, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: Which report did the Naval Intelligence
9 in Washington follow with respect to these ships being lost
10 or being located? One report says they were located and
11 another report says they were lost.

12 Admiral Wilkinson: We followed the report that we were
13 not at the moment able to locate them, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: In other words, you did not give any
15 consideration to the Far Eastern report then?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: We should have checked it and
17 corrected it, but we checked that by our knowledge of unlocated
18 ships. The two are obviously in conflict.

19 Senator Lucas: Obviously if these two battleships and
20 this great group of ships in the carrier fleet were near Kure
21 on December 1st, it would be rather difficult for them to
22 get to Hawaii by December 7.

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: I was just wondering whether that was not
25 taken into consideration by those here in the Naval Intelligence

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Department, insofar as we assumed there was a failure of a
3 proper warning at the time in Hawaii.

4 Admiral Wilkinson: There might have been, sir, but I do
5 not think so, because the recipients of this material who
6 you will note on the last page were the Chief of Naval Opera-
7 tions OP-12, which was the War Plans, OP-38-W, which was the
8 so-called War Room where the tracks of ships were maintained,
9 and all of them were aware that certain ships had not been
10 located. So that this report erroneously entering the last
11 location where they had been found rather than their present
12 location I do not think was deceptive to the Navy Department,
13 nor did it go out as such anywhere excepting those officers
14 that I mentioned, as shown on page 4.

15 It is true, of course, that this data from which this
16 was compiled was also available at Manila and at Pearl Harbor,
17 and the wrong inferences might have been drawn there as to
18 the location of these ships, even though this paper itself
19 did not go there, but I think that all hands were aware that
20 certain ships had not been located, because we have had
21 statements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer that he knew
22 that they were not located, and I believe the same thing is
23 true in Manila.

24 Senator Lucas: Do I understand from your last statement
25 that the memorandum of Japanese fleet locations that came

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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from the Far East was also available to the Hawaiian Department on December 1, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. This memorandum was furnished only to those recipients that are listed on page 4, the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chief of War Plans Division, the Chief of the office where the tracking of the fleet was carried on, and the head of the Foreign Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The data, however, from which this was compiled was available in both Manila and in Pearl Harbor. It was possible that erroneous deductions might have been made from it, but I do not believe such to be the case, since we have evidence indicating that it was known that those ships were unlocated at both those stations.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Well, the Hawaiian Department definitely informed the Intelligence Department here in Washington D. C., that they had completely lost the Japanese fleet at that particular time and gave no report to your department such as was found in the Far Eastern report of December 1st, with respect to these particular battleships and carriers, the ships in the carrier fleet that I have pointed out?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, they made no such report. This is, I think, erroneous. This is obviously erroneous. I think it was compiled from the last locations at which they had been sighted, and they were by no means certain that they were still there, but that was the last one they had.

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Senator Lucas: Was the Japanese fleet ever lost for a period of three weeks before insofar as the Intelligence Department of the Navy was concerned?

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Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure that the entire Jap fleet had been. I am not sure of any particular large force, but I know that it was impossible to keep track of all the ships and all the forces in any fleet continuously.

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I think it probable that large elements were lost from time to time and subsequently recovered in harmless positions. This time it was in a harmful position when it was

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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found.

Senator Lucas: Do you remember ever losing track of a task force of the size that struck Pearl Harbor at any time previous to December 1st?

Admiral Wilkinson: I would not know of my own recollection, and I do not recall having been so told.

Senator Lucas: Was there any reason why this task force should go into hiding if it was going into the China Sea and was on its way to Singapore, we will say, or the Australian section?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes; every nation is always desirous of concealing its full plans, and although it was obvious that some strength was going down to the south China Sea, there would be good reasons to hide the fact that their main strength was going there.

Again, they might have been proceeding into the Marshalls, for an attack on New Guinea or on Borneo. They might have been working down to the Marshalls for an attack toward Samoa. It would be desirous of concealing the movements of its main strength forces wherever they were.

Senator Lucas: The only real reason for the concealing of their force was the United States battleships and the Fleet at Pearl Harbor; isn't that true?

Admiral Wilkinson: I would say no; no, sir. They

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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would not want the British at Singapore to know. They would not want the American planes in the Philippines to be ready to attack in case there should be a breach. I think they would not want to disclose their plans no matter where they were.

Senator Lucas: Well, they had not been very secretive about their movements up to the last three or four weeks before Pearl Harbor, had they?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think they were usually pretty secretive, sir. They would start out, as I recall, for maneuvers, and, just as we did, go into radio silence, and they had sent a lot of amphibious vessels and cargo vessels down to the south China Sea, which, since they were loaded in China, could not be hidden, but the movement of their combatant vessels had been pretty carefully screened.

Senator Lucas: England did not have much of a fleet around Singapore at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, not much. She had several ships on the way. I think it was the 5th or 6th of December that the Repulse and the Prince of Wales that was subsequently ill-fated, that they arrived in Singapore, and, of course, they were on the way.

Senator Lucas: Admiral, passing from that subject --

Mr. Gesell: Senator, may I interpose?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: I have not offered these fleet location summaries as an exhibit, and in view of your questioning I think perhaps we should designate this entire folder as an exhibit, which would be Exhibit 85, so that it will be easier to follow the examination.

Senator Lucas: All right.

The Vice Chairman: It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit 85.)

Senator Lucas: Admiral, on yesterday you were discussing with counsel and members of the committee the conversations that you had on the morning of December 7, 1941, when you received the 14th part of the message, 13 of which were sent on December 6. You stated you immediately went to Admiral Stark. You also stated that as you construed the message:

"* * * They were fighting words. I was more impressed by that language than with the breaking off of negotiations which, of itself, might be only temporary. Those would be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations could be resumed."

There seems to be some conflict in the testimony, according to counsel, as to when this message was delivered

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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to Admiral Stark, but according to your testimony, to the best of your recollection, it was somewhere around 9:15 to 9:30?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Now, did you tell Admiral Stark at the time that you believed that a proper construction of that message was more than the breaking off of negotiations and that they were really fighting words in your opinion? Do you recall that?

Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is that I told him that that was a very strong final part to that message and that I thought that they were going to press on in the direction of the advance which they were then following in the South Sea and that something might be expected in that or other directions, but I think particularly I said that, and I thought the fleet should be advised of the latest development in the nature of this strong language.

Senator Lucas: And what was his reply, if you recall?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think he agreed with me at the time, sir, and my recollection is that I said he made an effort to reach General Marshall, or said that he would make such an effort.

Senator Lucas: Did you have any further conversation with him, with respect to sending a message to Hawaii, to

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet there?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: When I said the fleet, I meant
4 the Pacific Fleet. No further conversation.

5 Senator Lucas: No further conversation?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: But he did not send a message immediately
8 after that conversation?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: So I understand. He did not while
10 I was there, the few minutes I was there.

11 Senator Lucas: He had the authority so to do, as Chief
12 of Naval Operations?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: If he had seen fit to do so?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Lucas: The message that was sent, as I recall,
17 was around 11:30 that morning?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: So I understand.

19 Senator Lucas: So there was at least an hour and a
20 half difference between the time the message could have been
21 sent by Admiral Stark, and the time that one was actually
22 sent to the War Department?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

24 Senator Lucas: Now, you have been to Hawaii, Admiral?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: I have been where?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: I say, you have served in Hawaii with the Fleet in the Pacific, as I understand it.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Do you know how many ships were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not of my own knowledge.

Senator Lucas: Well, from what you have read, and what you know about the situation, do you know the number that were in there?

It is not so material.

Admiral Wilkinson: I couldn't say. My recollection is about six battleships, six cruisers, and a dozen destroyers, but there may have been more.

Senator Lucas: I was wondering how many battleships and how many destroyers could leave the harbor say in an hour and a half?

Admiral Wilkinson: The usual time of sortie, as I recall, was ten minutes for a major ship. In other words, one battleship or cruiser per ten minutes. They would be able to put out one destroyer in between each of the larger ships. If they were pressed, they might be able to get two destroyers between each of the larger ships, but it would not be very desirable as there would be some danger of collision.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: They would be pressed on the morning of December 7, if the message had gone?

Admiral Wilkinson: They undoubtedly would have made every effort, but if they tried to put too many ships out, they might have had a collision with the result of the blocking of everyone which would be another story.

Senator Lucas: Of course, any ship that got out of the harbor would be better able to protect itself?

Admiral Wilkinson: It would have been able to maneuver to avoid the bombs or the torpedoes and would have been probably able to man the guns with the entire ship's company immediately, but little sooner, in fact, than they did in port, because the call to General Quarters that all battle stations be manned was carried out immediately on every ship, I understand.

Senator Lucas: I think that is correct, Admiral.

Now, Admiral, how long did you serve in the Navy Intelligence after December 6, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson: After December 6?

Senator Lucas: Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson: Seven months.

Senator Lucas: From there, where did you go, sir?

Admiral Wilkinson: I went to command of battleship Division 2 in the Pacific for five months, and then to

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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the South Pacific as Deputy Commander of the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey. A vacancy occurred some six months later in the Amphibious Forces of the South Pacific, and I was made the Amphibious Commander of the 3rd Amphibious Force, and remained such.

Senator Lucas: In what sea battles did you participate?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't know that I participated in any sea battles, as such.

I ran the amphibious campaign in the South Pacific for a year, and then I was in command of the operations against Palau and Yap. Yap was substituted for Leyte. I went in command of one of the two amphibious forces at Leyte, and then again in command of one of the two amphibious forces at Lingayen and again at the landing on Luzon. In the South Pacific Campaign I had perhaps a dozen landings.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Murphy

Senator Lucas: Let me ask you, Admiral, as a matter of
curiosity, what class did you graduate from at Annapolis?

Admiral Wilkinson: 1909.

Senator Lucas: And what State are you from?

Admiral Wilkinson: Louisiana.

Senator Lucas: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will
inquire.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral Wilkinson, I have a few questions.

I notice from a study of the messages forwarded by the
Navy and received by the Navy that apparently notice had come
into Washington that the Japanese had ordered the various
offices throughout the world to destroy their code, but I
see no notice whatever from Tokyo to Hawaii to destroy the
code there.

Do you know whether or not there was any such message?

Admiral Wilkinson: I presume there was, sir. I don't
recall the message proper, but I know the Hawaiian Consul
burned his code I think the day before the attack.

Mr. Murphy: There have been questions asked here of
witnesses and some witnesses have concluded that when word
comes about destroying a code that that is a very strong
indication of war, and I notice in the messages here word
from Admiral Kimmel on December 6, 1941 that the local Consul

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 at Hawaii had commenced destroying his code or was in the
3 actual process of doing so.

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: In Navy parlance, what is the significance
6 of that, from the standpoint of expectation of war or trouble?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Well, obviously any nation is desirous
8 of protecting its code. Ordinarily, through international
9 courtesy, diplomatic missions and consular missions are proof
10 against search and seizure, and any action of that sort would
11 be a grave international offense.

12 Now, if any country feared that relations would become
13 so strained with another that the other country would incur
14 the risk of an international offense and would invade the
15 diplomatic mission and seize the codes it would be obviously
16 best to burn them up first.

17 The significance, in other words, is that they thought
18 relations were going to be pretty tricky and sensitive, even
19 though there might not be actual war.

20 Mr. Murphy: I notice in Exhibit 37 at page 40 there is
21 a message from Washington to Pacific Commanders in which the
22 following is contained:

23 "HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT
24 CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO
25 JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG SINGAPORE

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 BATAVIA MANILA WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR
3 CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT
4 CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS PERIOD"

5 Now, Hawaii is not contained in that message, is it?
6 That is Exhibit 37.

7 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. Apparently a separate
8 dispatch was sent to Hawaii, which we did not have at hand
9 at that time.

10 Mr. Murphy: Then I notice on page 41 there is a message
11 as follows:

12 "CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER
13 ORDERED LONDON HONGKONG SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY
14 MACHINE PERIOD BATAVIA MACHINE ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO PERIOD
15 DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY ALL BUT ONE
16 COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS PERIOD BRITISH
17 ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED
18 PERIOD"

19 Still no message to Hawaii.

20 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, none apparently.

21 Mr. Murphy: Apparently.

22 Then I notice on page 42 a discussion of some points
23 throughout the world from the United States to Tokyo, Bangkok,
24 Peiping, Shanghai, telling our agents there to destroy their
25 machines and codes, but no message to Hawaii.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I think, as I recall,
3 I initiated that message.

4 Mr. Murphy: I notice on page 43 a message to Peiping
5 and Teintsin.

(4) 6 Admiral Wilkinson: Those were to the Marine detachments
7 there.

8 Mr. Murphy: No message to Hawaii.

9 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. Both of those last two
10 were our messages out to exposed positions to destroy their
11 codes and obviously Hawaii was not in danger of capture.

12 Mr. Murphy: You felt Hawaii was fairly safe at that time?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Certainly not subject to capture.

14 Mr. Murphy: Right.

15 Now then I notice --

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Without sufficient notice to destroy
17 the codes.

18 Mr. Murphy: Right.

19 I notice on page 44 notice being sent to Guam.

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. Guam was exposed and they
21 were told to destroy everything except what they needed urgently
22 and be ready to destroy that.

23 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, going to page 46, down to page
24 46 there is no intercept whatsoever obtained, apparently, by
25 our forces, which would indicate that the Japanese had told
26

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Hawaii to destroy its code or ciphers; isn't that right?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Then the message that we do get on December
5 6th comes from Admiral Kimmel himself.

6 Admiral Wilkinson: No, it comes from Admiral Bloch.
7 Information derived from our District Intelligence official
8 and his contacts through Japanese personell indicate that he
9 was informed by underground channels that the Consul was
10 burning his stuff.

11 Mr. Murphy: In that case there would be no need of
12 Washington telling Hawaii because Washington is telling Hawaii
13 about the incident?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, in the Pearl Harbor story as contained
16 in the United States News of September 1, 1945 at page 34 I
17 see a statement under the heading of: "The Navy account of
18 the Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor. Sources
19 of information are Japanese."

20 The statement is as follows:

21 "The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at
22 Tankan Bay was about November 22nd and they awaited word to
23 act before the force moved out on the 27-28 of November, 1941."

24 Where is Tankan Bay?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: It is on one of the Islands of the

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

southern Kuriles just north of Hokkaido.

Mr. Murphy: That is not connected with the Gulf of Tonkins, it is an entirely separate place?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. The Gulf of Tonkin is in the South China Sea.

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson: In no way connected.

Mr. Murphy: Takan Bay is up in the Kuriles?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, southern Kuriles.

Mr. Murphy: Are you familiar with the testimony of Admiral Inglis?

Admiral Wilkinson: Only roughly.

Mr. Murphy: Well, the place he testified the fleet left from was the southern part of the Kuriles.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, southern Kuriles.

Mr. Gesell: Etorofu Jima.

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Where would that be in connection with Takan Bay?

Admiral Wilkinson: Takan Bay is a bay on the Island of Etorofu Jima. Jima means island.

Mr. Murphy: Would you have any any special knowledge as to the conflict which apparently existed between the Navy and the Army officials at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7 as to whether or not there was a Jap force in the Marshalls?

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Admiral Wilkinson: I don't know that there was a conflict, sir. I know that from radio intelligence, which at the best is analytical and scientific guessing, that the Pearl Harbor Radio Intelligence Center thought that there was a large force in the Marshalls and the Corregidor unit could not confirm that. I understand later that there was a force there of reasonable size.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: I think "conflict" is the wrong word.
3 There was some difference of opinion between the Naval
4 Intelligence and the Army, as I understand it, as to
5 whether there was a force there and as to the size of
6 it.

7 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall a difference of
8 opinion between the Army and the Navy. All I recall is
9 a difference between the radio intelligence center of
10 the Navy at Corregidor, and at Pearl Harbor.

11 Mr. Murphy: That may be.

12 Admiral Wilkinson: I know there was an airplane re-
13 connaissance ordered to go over the Marshalls to try to
14 photograph the situation, but I do not believe it was ever
15 carried out.

16 Mr. Murphy: You say you learned about the message of
17 the 27th from Washington to Pearl Harbor either hours or
18 days afterward. Did you ever see a reply from Admiral
19 Kimmel to that message?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Was that unusual?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: I wouldn't know, sir; and if there
23 had been a reply there was no reason that I should assuredly
24 have seen it.

25 Mr. Murphy: Was it usual naval practice in a case of

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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that kind?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not unless requested to report at once. Often, in an important message, the word "acknowledge" is added. I forget whether it was on that one or not. And that is simply an indication that you have received and understand it.

Mr. Murphy: In the message of November 27, some of the language is as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

That would be the first part of it.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

"* * * an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Executive an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46X."

Now, at this point, an appropriate defensive deployment, what would that be in regard to the Fleet generally?

Admiral Wilkinson: Speaking purely as a naval officer and without connection with this plan, it would be to make such disposition of his air forces and his submarines and

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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his surface vessels, as he would consider necessary in carrying out the tasks assigned in War Plan 46. I do not recall whether that was the so-called Rainbow Plan or not. I suppose it was Rainbow-5.

Mr. Murphy: I think it was, but it would mean necessarily a change in the status quo until you were prepared to meet that situation, wouldn't it?

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not familiar with the status quo. It would require him at least to review his present situation and see whether it was consistent with the war plans. He might find it was consistent, or he might find that changes were necessary.

Mr. Murphy: After that, I find the following:

"Inform district and Army authorities."

Admiral Wilkinson: That is Admiral Bloch and General Short.

Mr. Murphy: That would mean that he discussed this message, wouldn't it, with Admiral Bloch and General Short?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. If not discussed, at least informed them of the message.

Mr. Murphy: Of the fact that he received it?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: "A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

Now, you say you know of no reply from either Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall any, no sir. As I say, there may have been a reply which I never saw.

Mr. Murphy: Did you feel particularly concerned about sabotage at Hawaii? Would you consider it one of the major problems out there?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, I think so. We had a very large Jap population, and we knew from our intelligence reports that there were a number of very strongly patriotic Japanese there as well as the general run of Japanese of whom we could not be certain.

Subsequently, a large majority of them were found to be very loyal, and an excellent regiment came from there, as I understand. Our suspect records showed from three to five hundred Japanese that we regarded as definitely dangerous, and 500 as potentially dangerous.

Then we knew that there were a number of consular agents in the employ of the Japanese Government.

Mr. Murphy: Did you think that the situation at Hawaii was such that the efforts of the authorities there should be concentrated on sabotage to the neglect of

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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avoiding the danger from air attack and from submarine attack?

Admiral Wilkinson: My judgment would be that nothing should be neglected, that sabotage should be guarded against, but should not be guarded against as the sole objective, although it was the most immediately probable one.

The potential forces were actually present for that.

Mr. Murphy: I have one last question, Admiral.

Did you ever, within a year prior to December 7, 1941, ever hear anyone in the Navy say that the Fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson: That the Fleet was what?

Mr. Murphy: That the Fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Wilkinson: I was there until May. I saw some of the maneuvers. I myself was not convinced that the antiaircraft defenses provided on the Islands would stop a large raid. I was not convinced that they would be adequate. I think there was always the possibility in all of our minds that an attack could be made. I do not know that we could say definitely the Fleet was insecure, but that a full and adequate protection, which would, of course, be difficult to achieve to 100 percent was not available to the extent that we would like, either in air-

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 h6 craft to defend the place by counterattack against air
3 or antiaircraft guns.

4 Mr. Murphy: Would the Fleet have been more secure at
5 Lahaina Roads than it was in the Harbor itself?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I would say less secure.

7 Mr. Murphy: If the Fleet had been taken out of the
8 Harbor and taken to Lahaina Roads, and we had the same
9 experience in the amount of damage that we had at Pearl
10 Harbor, we would have had more ships at the bottom of the
11 ocean, wouldn't we?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: We would have had that and also
13 we would have the exposure to submarine attacks. Pearl
14 Harbor was fairly secure against submarines. Quite secure,
15 in fact.

16 Mr. Murphy: We would have had the same danger from
17 air attack and less danger from submarine attack by being
18 in the Harbor as compared to Lahaina Roads?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say so. The only advantage
20 of Lahaina Roads would be that the ships could get under
21 way and stand out together, whereas they had to do so
22 separately in Pearl Harbor.

23 On the other hand there would be more exposure to sub-
24 marines and less protection from anti-aircraft guns.

25 Mr. Murphy: Assuming that the Japanese had been able

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy
Senator Brewster

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2 to have the same number of carriers and other equipment,
3 the same number of planes, and that the Fleet were at
4 Puget Sound or at San Pedro, and the Japs succeeded in
5 making a sneak attack, would the Fleet have been any
6 more secure at either of those places than it was at
7 Pearl Harbor, assuming a sneak attack?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say rather less so. I
9 don't think the anti-aircraft protection, assuming it
10 was in action, was as complete at either of those places.

11 Of course, the Japanese fleet would have further to
12 go to get there, and at Long Beach the ships would have
13 moved out more readily. Puget Sound, certainly in
14 Bremerton, they could not.

15 Mr. Murphy: That is all.

16 The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster of Maine will
17 inquire.

18 Senator Brewster: Admiral, how long had Admiral Kirk
19 been in the Intelligence Division before you came in, do
20 you recall?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Admiral Kirk?

22 Senator Brewster: Yes.

23 Admiral Wilkinson: I think from March 1st to October
24 15 of 1941.

25 Senator Brewster: He was just there for practically

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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six months?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: Who was there before him?

Admiral Wilkinson: Admiral Anderson had been there and left about the first of January. Captain James, the former Assistant Director was acting director for two months.

Senator Brewster: How long was Admiral Anderson there?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think about two years.

Senator Brewster: Had there been any established tour of duty in that position?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not specifically. Usually officers on a shore duty tour will remain in fixed positions from two to three years. Captain Kirk went to sea before the expiration of his tour in order to obtain an opportunity for a command which was open at the time, and I did not remain similarly. It was wartime, and I had a very promising job.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1 Senator Brewster: You much preferred to get to sea?

2 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I think that is what most
3 of us would like to do.

4 Senator Brewster: Officers do not welcome shore duty?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Well, I think we are interested in
6 them, but we like to practice our profession at sea.

7 The Vice Chairman: Would you mind a word, there, Senator?
8 I believe while the Senator had to be away General Marshall
9 testified that everybody in the War Department wanted to get
10 assigned to duty with troops. So I imagine that applied to
11 the Navy, too.

12 Senator Brewster: I can quite understand that.

13 Admiral, could you give your estimate of the importance
14 of Naval Intelligence as a function of the Navy?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I think it is quite important, sir.

16 Senator Brewster: I think so, too. I think that all
17 events have demonstrated it. And what impresses one is the
18 change here in this most critical period in our history. Men
19 remained for less than a year and had had, as I understand
20 it, no previous experience in this field.

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

22 Senator Brewster: Do you know whether any steps had
23 been taken to see that more trained personnel in the higher
24 echelons were made available in this field?
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Admiral Wilkinson: Usually, Senator, officers with considerable previous experience in intelligence were placed there.

Senator Brewster: But that was not true.

Admiral Wilkinson: I cannot account for my having been appointed to it, although I was pleased at the appointment, despite the fact that it took me from my battleship, because I considered it a responsible position, and felt complimented to be chosen for it.

But in general the officers who have been there have had duty abroad and in intelligence work. Captain Kirk had been Naval Attache in London, and Admiral Anderson in London and I think somewhere else. And other officers in that position have normally had experience under that office before they became the head of it.

Senator Brewster: But you welcomed the release from those duties yourself, as you have indicated, in your transfer back to your battleship assignment.

Admiral Wilkinson: I was interested in both jobs, sir. I was very much interested in the work but I wanted to have a command at sea.

Senator Brewster: Do you know what became of Captain Zacharias?

Admiral Wilkinson: He is -- I saw him in Washington a

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2
3 few days ago.

4 Senator Brewster: I mean at that time, where was he?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: He was in command of a cruiser, I
6 think, in the Pacific.

7 Senator Brewster: He had had rather extensive experience
8 in appraising Japanese psychology, did he not?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: I understand Admiral Kirk made every
10 effort to get him back into Naval Intelligence after Admiral
11 King came to Washington, and he was shortly so ordered.

12 Senator Brewster: Yes. Had he been at one time Chief
13 of Naval Intelligence?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

15 Senator Brewster: Never had been?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. He had been on duty in
17 the office, however.

18 Senator Brewster: He spent a great deal of time studying
19 the Japanese situation and was a Japanese language student
20 of rather extraordinary attainment?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure but I think he had
22 been a language student and became Naval Attache.

23 Senator Brewster: And he was used for the Japanese
24 language broadcasts as a result of his familiarity with the
25 language?

Admiral Wilkinson: I understand quite effectively.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

Senator Brewster: Now, in the situation at Honolulu there was a great deal of construction work going on during 1940 to 1941, was there not, in the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral Wilkinson: Quite a little, sir. The Navy Yard, building of drydocks and building of quarters.

Senator Brewster: So there were a good many thousands of civilian employees in the Pearl Harbor base day by day, were there not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: And who was responsible for screening them to determine as to their reliability?

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure of the precise direct responsibility. The Commandant of the Navy Yard and his industrial manager were interested. Our Naval Intelligence, the district of Captain Mayfield, in conjunction with the FBI, were very much interested. And I fancy it was those two that were consulted or who checked on the employment of civilian employees.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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2 Senator Brewster: I would rather not have your fancy,
3 but I would rather have what you know as to who was respon-
4 sible and what steps were taken, if any.

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know. I do know that the
6 FBI and the District Intelligence Officer were screening
7 everyone out there.

8 Senator Brewster: But you do not know who was specifi-
9 cally responsible in the naval establishment or the FBI for
10 that screening?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

12 Senator Brewster: I speak of this from personal exper-
13 ience in visiting there in December 1940 when I was impressed
14 and somewhat amazed at the thousands of Orientals circulating
15 there, particularly in the Pearl Harbor naval base, at which
16 time I asked the contractors what they knew about these peo-
17 ple and they said, "Nothing, except that they were supposed
18 to be American citizens."

19 It was obvious that unless they had a very considerable
20 staff that it would be difficult to know about this consider-
21 able number of people who had complete access to all the
22 Pearl Harbor facilities so far as my observation was con-
23 cerned. You were serving there during some of that period?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: I was serving there on ships. I
25 was not detached to shore. It is my recollection that no

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

1
2 employes of Japanese blood were out there in the latter days
3 prior to the attack, were allowed to be employed. I think,
4 however, Chinese were.

5 Senator Brewster: Well, at what time, if you know, was
6 the ban on people of Japanese extraction imposed?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know. I would recollect
8 it was six months to a year prior to the attack.

9 Senator Brewster: Well, you were not there, were you,
10 after May of 1941?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

12 Senator Brewster: And would not know whether or not it
13 was in effect then?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: I think it was in effect before May.

15 Senator Brewster: Will you verify that in the records
16 if possible?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: If I can, sir.

18 Senator Brewster: And I would like also to have this
19 information about who was responsible for that screening.

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Brewster: Now, when did you first see the re-
22 port of General Martin regarding the air defenses of Hawaii
23 and which I think was concurred in by Admiral Bellinger, that
24 was issued under date of August 20, 1941?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Very recently.

28 3

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

1
2 Senator Brewster: You never saw that while you were
3 Chief of Naval Intelligence?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

5 Senator Brewster: Wasn't that rather unusual that it
6 did not come to your attention?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. As I said, the activities
8 relating to our own war plans and our own movements of
9 forces and preparations were not under my division and they
10 were not brought to my attention. There was a good deal of
11 insistence in the department upon the value of security and
12 the knowledge of war plans was closely held and there was no
13 necessity, it was felt, and I agreed, that my division in
14 a large number of people or in a small number should know,
15 and I was sometimes told in conversation but there was no
16 system set up whereby any documents were sent to my office or
17 even to myself.

18 Senator Brewster: Well, in a correlation of naval in-
19 telligence as to a possible attack wouldn't it be rather es-
20 sential that there should be pretty complete collaboration
21 between your agency of Naval Intelligence and the other pre-
22 parations for defense?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: There would be a desirability that
24 we should know what they were doing or planning to do but the
25 balance between the possible loss of security by extending

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

1 the knowledge as against the necessity of our knowing was in-
2 clined toward not telling us.

3 You recall Admiral King's favorite maxim that "only
4 those who need to know", and while it would have been desir-
5 able I cannot say that it was necessary.

6
7 Senator Brewster: Well, the most valuable possession
8 which we had in the Pacific was the fleet, was it not? You
9 perhaps agree with that as a naval officer.

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, because it was not static.

11 Senator Brewster: Yes. Because the military establish-
12 ments were primarily for the purpose of defense of the fleet
13 based in the port for security. That is what we got Pearl
14 Harbor for, as a naval defense.

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Brewster: And the defense of Pearl Harbor, it
17 has already been pointed out, was in order to make it pos-
18 sible for the fleet effectively to function in that vast
19 ocean, was it not?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say certainly 75 to 90 per
21 cent of its purpose was that but it was also, of course, a
22 defensive feature for our own territory. It belonged to us
23 and we would naturally defend it.

24 Senator Brewster: You knew in the latter part of Novem-
25 ber and early December as Chief of Naval Intelligence that

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

1 you had lost contact with important elements of the Japanese
2 fleet?

3
4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Brewster: And yet you had no knowledge as to
6 what steps were being taken by your reconnaissance in the
7 vicinity of this fleet, of the American fleet, to see that
8 these carriers might not be approaching for a strike?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Brewster: Well, doesn't that impress, - it im-
11 presses; perhaps I should say a layman, as a lack of correla-
12 tion that here you as Navy Intelligence knew you had lost
13 some Jap carriers and yet you had no knowledge as to whether
14 other parts of our services, military and naval, were taking
15 necessary steps to see that our fleet was not exposed to a
16 sneak attack.

17 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. We would have received the
18 information of any discoveries made by searches from any of
19 our operating forces but we were not told of the searches which
20 of themselves were made. In other words, we did not know
21 whether a search was being made from Midway or Johnston or
22 Hawaii, but we would have received information of any dis-
23 coveries that such searches had made.

24 Senator Brewster: And in your function to protect the
25 security of this fleet it was not within your function or scope

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

1
2 to recommend to anyone that it might be wise to carry out
3 aerial reconnaissance to protect the fleet?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: My function was to utilize the mater-
5 ial which was received. I should have desired to have re-
6 ceived more material and I might well have been well advised
7 to urge actual operations to secure the information although,
8 as a matter of fact, those operations would not be within
9 my province to order, but I might well have urged their being
10 made.

11 Senator Brewster: That is, you could have --

12 Admiral Wilkinson: It was not my function, however, to
13 do so but I might well have done it.

14 Senator Brewster: Yes. You could have volunteered the
15 suggestion but it was not a part of your responsibility or
16 function?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Brewster: Do you know whether as a result of
19 this experience any steps have been taken to change that sys-
20 tem of functioning, as to whether or not Naval Intelligence
21 today would recognize that as part of its responsibility?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not believe they have, sir. I
23 do not know that specifically, I do not know that.

24 Senator Brewster: Wouldn't Pearl Harbor argue rather
25 persuasively that it might be a good idea and that when they

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

lose track of an enemy fleet that it might be well to be sure that our fleet was not going to be approached without warning so far as the aerial reconnaissance might disclose?

Admiral Wilkinson: Surely, yes, sir, but you see there is a distinction between the operations of the forces in the field, that is to say, the fleets, and the operations of the officers in Washington. Now, the fleet collects and is normally responsible for what we term combat intelligence; that is to say, sending out a scouting line or sending out a reconnaissance fleet of planes. They collect that information and that is sent to Washington.

Senator Brewster: Let me interrupt you. Would that be true in time of peace?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think that would be true in time of peace, yes.

Senator Brewster: Thank you.

Admiral Wilkinson: And the fleet collects the combat information, or in the absence of combat, the operational intelligence we might call it, and the office at home would not prescribe to the fleet the precise measures to be taken to get that. I think we have sent, not the Intelligence of itself, but operations on the recommendations of Intelligence have sent information out saying, "Please find out what you can about such a thing" and in fact you will recall that Operations

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 told Admiral Hart to please send the scouting fleets over
3 the South China Sea for several days to give us the informa-
4 tion.

5 Now, that is the operational intelligence which is con-
6 ducted by the forces in the fleet and might be initiated by
7 them or might be initiated by the operational side rather
8 than the intelligence side of the department proper. In that
9 particular instance of the force of planes over the South
10 China Sea I do not believe I made such a recommendation but
11 I would have been prepared to join in it. I think Admiral
12 Turner probably initiated that.

13 Senator Brewster: Well, then, as I gather, that would
14 be the responsibility of someone higher up in correlating your
15 reports as to the missing fleet and the protection of our
16 fleet, to see to it that these operational surveys were car-
17 ried out?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say so, yes, sir, except that
19 I might say, of course, at any time I was free to recommend.

20 Senator Brewster: Yes. Now, what about the submarine
21 that it has been alleged circulated in Pearl Harbor in the
22 early morning before the attack? What knowledge have you re-
23 garding that?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: None before the attack. I have the
25 information afterwards.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

1
2 Senator Brewster: I am not asking you before. I am
3 asking you now. What is your information as to what happened
4 there?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: It is my understanding that submarine
6 contact was made several hours before the attack and that it
7 was in the restricted waters and that two of our vessels at-
8 tacked it and believed that from the absence of subsequent
9 sound indications, believed that they sank it.

10 Senator Brewster: When you speak of the restricted area,
11 how extensive was that?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Oh, very limited; I think five or
13 not more than ten miles, at least, off the entrance to Pearl
14 Harbor.

15 Senator Brewster: I am asking more particularly about
16 another submarine beside the one that you speak of which you
17 think was sunk off the entrance to Pearl Harbor, about one
18 that was supposed to have circulated through Pearl Harbor
19 and gone out and an officer from which submarine they cap-
20 tured near one of the points in Oahu.

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I have asked about that, sir, and I
22 think the best opinion now is that that map that was sup-
23 posed to indicate that the submarine had been in and come
24 out was an indication of the chart, of the track that it
25 proposed to follow and that there was no definite confirmation

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 in any way that it ever had been in.

3 Senator Brewster: What became of that Jap officer?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know, sir.

5 Senator Brewster: Did you ever examine him?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: The chart?

7 Senator Brewster: No, the Jap officer who was captured?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I did not examine him.

9 Senator Brewster: The Jap officer, as I understood you,
10 that had the chart.

11 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I did not examine him.

12 Senator Brewster: Did anyone from Naval Intelligence?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: I think he was examined in Hawaii.
14 I am not sure.

15 Senator Brewster: Did you have a copy of the report on
16 that?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall. I think we did.

18 Senator Brewster: What did you base your opinion on that
19 this was not an actual chart of an operation?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Oh, on recent discussion with Cap-
21 tain McCollum who examined the chart carefully and who had
22 been familiar with the testimony of the officer, I believe.

23 Senator Brewster: Mr. Counsel, was there a request ever
24 made for a copy of the examination of that Japanese officer?

25 Mr. Murphy: I believe the record --

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 Mr. Gesell: None has been made.

3 Mr. Mitchell: None has been made that I remember.

4 Mr. Murphy: I believe the record will show there was a
5 question asked as to whether or not he was available and Ad-
6 miral Inglis said he would look into it, into the whole matter.

7 Senator Brewster: Did you mention the examining data?

8 Mr. Murphy: I don't remember.

9 Senator Brewster: I think that would be most significant.
10 I would like to have it. I am not prepared to say at this
11 time that we should examine the Jap officer and have him
12 testify, but I think the examination by the Army and Navy
13 Intelligence would be very pertinent.

14 Mr. Murphy: I don't mean to say that there was a re-
15 quest for him to testify. I asked if he was still alive or
16 what happened to him and I don't know whether I requested the
17 report but if it is available we should have it.

18 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

19 The Vice Chairman: If you will permit me, I think the
20 Admiral stated that his opinion about it came from Captain
21 McCollum and I believe Captain McCollum is listed as a wit-
22 ness. Is that right, counsel?

23 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, hasn't counsel furnished
24 us with some information on this point? I have made a request
25 and I think they furnished us with information that was very

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 meager.

3 Mr. Mitchell: There have been so many discussions that
4 my memory fails me. I have no recollection of that at this
5 time.

6 Senator Ferguson: I think they reported to me that it
7 was very meager, they had no definite information. Isn't that
8 right?

9 Mr. Gesell: I think that is correct, Senator. We will
10 check it.

11 The Vice Chairman: And isn't it correct that Captain
12 McCollum is listed as a witness?

13 Mr. Gesell: Yes, it is.

14 The Vice Chairman: Well, if he gave the Admiral that
15 information he might be in a position to help us.

16 Admiral Wilkinson: I think he can tell you on what he
17 based his interpretation that he discussed with me.

18 Senator Brewster: Is that a matter in which there is com-
19 plete concurrence between the Army Intelligence, Naval In-
20 telligence and the FBI as far as you know?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know, sir.

22 Senator Brewster: Do you know who captured this fellow?
23 That is, was it the Army or the Navy or the FBI?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know. My recollection is he
25 landed at Bellows Field and if that is the same one he was

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 captured there by the Army.

3 Senator Brewster: Did you have occasion to look into
4 the communication from the destroyers who sank the submarine
5 outside of Pearl Harbor and communicated this to the short,
6 did you have occasion to look into that at all to know how
7 long it took?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: No. I have seen a good many since,
9 subsequently, but I have no direct knowledge.

10 Senator Brewster: Did you have any contact with any of
11 the fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor there through
12 your Naval intelligence? Did you have operators in that field?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not understand, sir.

14 Senator Brewster: The fishing fleets operating off of
15 Pearl Harbor were very extensive.

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Oh, yes. Our District Intelligence
17 officer was very much, - was very directly concerned in that
18 fishing fleet and we had laid down a number of restrictions
19 which were carried out by the local Coast Guard, but inspired
20 by us, as to the removal of all Japanese aliens from the boats,
21 the registration of the boats, limiting them to certain hours
22 and certain areas and the removal of radio apparatus. They were
23 under thorough control and restriction for some time prior to
24 the attack.

25 Senator Brewster: Have you testified as to how many oper-

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 ators you had in Naval Intelligence in Hawaii? Have you given
3 us those figures?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not specifically. I can readi-
5 ly obtain it. I gave the figures for the fleet as a whole.

6 Senator Brewster: Yes. Will you give us those that were
7 in Hawaii?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

9 Senator Brewster: And did I make it clear, that I would
10 like that report of the examination of the Jab submarine of-
11 ficer if there were any examination and if it is available.

12 Did I understand you to say, Admiral, that the Grew mes-
13 sage of January 1941 regarding a possible Jap attack on Pearl
14 Harbor did not come to your attention prior to December 7,
15 1941?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall it, sir.

17 Senator Brewster: That was not a matter of any discus-
18 sion or concern in the Intelligence Department during the
19 period that you served from October to December?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall it. It might have
21 been mentioned.

22 Senator Brewster: You spoke about the number of consular
23 agents in Hawaii by the Japanese. There was a rather unusual
24 number, was there not?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

1
2 Senator Brewster: Do you remember how many?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: There had been quite a discussion
4 about that. There was, of course, a law in effect that all
5 agents in the employ of foreign nations should register and
6 they had not been required to register and the commandant
7 of the District and our Intelligence officer were very anx-
8 ious to get them under control and there had been some cor-
9 respondence back and forth about it.

10 Senator Brewster: Do you remember how many there were?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I would say in the order
12 of about fifty, perhaps more.

13 Senator Brewster: Are you sure it was not 150?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: No, I am not sure; at least fifty
15 of them.

16 Senator Brewster: I think counsel can inform you that
17 it was more. I think it ran up to an amazing number for so
18 comparatively small area.

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. We were trying to make them
20 comply with the law but there was some instruction put in
21 about any rigid steps conflicting with the efforts made to
22 assure the loyalty of the remaining Japanese. On December the
23 6th we said we hoped to get some decision in a month, I be-
24 lieve.

25 Senator Brewster: Did you have any reason to suspect,

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 during the period between October and December 7, 1941 when
3 you were functioning as Director of Naval Intelligence, that
4 the Japs suspected that we were breaking any of their codes?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. I do not know specifically in
6 that period but there had been a message which I recall some-
7 where around October, I think, that the Germans had informed
8 the Japs that there were indications that we were breaking
9 some of their codes. Several messages that were sent from
10 Japan indicated that they wished their agents to be par-
11 ticularly careful in their reports to protect their codes.

12 Senator Brewster: Have you located the messages which
13 contained those references to the German warning?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: I think I can find one, sir.

15 Senator Brewster: I would like to ask counsel whether
16 they have located those.

17 Mr. Gesell: No, we have not, the ones I believe the
18 Senator refers to.

19 Senator Brewster: What steps have you taken?

20 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I refresh Mr. Gesell's
21 memory? I had a request in for such information and I am
22 sure that my letter states definitely that there were no
23 such codes, - I mean no such messages. Do you recall that,
24 Mr. Gesell?

25 Mr. Gesell: No, I do not.