MEMORANDUM

TO : Commander D. R. Carr, Chief, Language Division

FROM : William E. Edwards

SUBJECT: Translation of Personal Letter

SASAKAWA, Rycichi, Cell #2B-10, Sugamo Prison

This morning I received the attached letter from the above-named inmate, whom I interrogated on two occasions in the recent past.

fact, on the occasion of the last interrogation I admonished the prisoner against writing to me; and further, gave him full opportunity at that time to discuss with me, through Mr. Ogita, any matters which he might be disposed to take up with me. He proceeded to discuss the general Russian situation, and I immediately advised him that I did not propose to discuss that subject with him either in my official capacity or as an individual.

will pertain to the Bussian situation for he seems to be "hepped" on that subject. In that I am aware of the fact that the letter was censored in the prison and undeubtedly interespted by CIC.

I have taken the precaution of having Mr. Lambert of our Investigative Division witness my opening of the letter.

document translated just as soon as your pending commitments will permit. Kindly return the original Japanese document together with the English translation thereof in an envelope marked "Confidential." I should like to have an extra copy of the English translation for our Investigative Division.

Attachment

Copy to: Mr. Edward P. Monaghan - Attention: Mr. James Lambert
Mr. David N. Sutton

WHE/nob

MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Tavenner, Comyns-Carr and Brown.

FROM: Mr. Lopez, Capt. Robinson and Mr. Edwards.

SUBJECT: Cross-Examination of ARAKI.

ing: 1. I suggest that ARAKI be cross-examined on the follow-

ARAKI stated that it was ITAGAKI as War Minister who was responsible during 1938-1939 for continuing the China Incident. The pertinent extract of that interrogation follows:

P. 5 Doc. No. 2895

Q. You have answered one part of the question very satisfactorily, but the other part is not yet answered, namely, who was responsible during 1938-1939 for continuing the China Incident?

A. The army I think.

- Q. What leader of the army?
- A. The War Minister, ITAGAKI, I should say.

Q. What about the General Staff.

A. I think some of the younger officers there were perhaps most responsible but I don't know their names.

Pedro Lopez Capt. Robinson William E. Edwards

By

MEMORANDUM FOR: Drs. Nyi and AO

FROM: Mr. Lopez, Capt. Robinson and Mr. Edwards

SUBJECT: Cross-Examination of DOIHARA

1. I suggest that DOIHARA be cross-examined on the following:

a. On pages 1 and 2 of his February 5, 1946 interrogation, DOIHARA stated that he worked for the defendant, then Colonel ITAGAKI who was Chief of No. 2 Section of the General Staff of Kwantung Army. The pertinent extracts of the interrogation follow:

Page 1 Doc No. 2905

Q. General, I want to get some facts concerning the organization of the Kwantung Army Headquarters in Manchuria in August 1931, before the fighting broke out there? First of all, who was Commanding General of the Kwantung Army in August 1931, General HONJO?

A. HONJO, Shigeru.

Page 2

Q. And who was Chief of the second section in August 1931?

A. The Chief of No. 2 section was ITAGAKI, Seishiro, rank of Colonel. I am not sure about the other sections, but there was one man named KATAKURA, Chu, who might have been one of the section chiefs. I am not quite sure if he was chief of a section or not. My memory is not very clear on that. I can not think of the other section chiefs.

Q. Now, did your Special Service organization operate under the control or under the direction of the second section, the Intelligence Section?

A. Yes, Special Service organization was part of No. 2 section.

Q. And you reported to Colonel ITAGAKI? A. Yes, I did work for Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro.

b. On page 7 of his February 12, 1946 interrogation, DOIHARA stated that it was the defendant ITAGAKI who arranged the details of the meeting between DOIHARA and Pu-Yi.

Page 7 Doc. 2909

Q. Did General ITAGAKI have anything to do with it? A. Colonel ITAGAKI was the Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff.

Q. Well, did he have anything to do with sending you to Tientsin?

A. Yes, order to proceed to Tientsin was issued by General HOMJO, the Chief. However, detail as to my meeting with Pu-Yi at Tientsin was arranged by Colonel ITAGAKI.

What was Colonel ITAGAKI'S order, do you remember? In substance, my instruction was to convey to Pu-Yi that should he return to Manchuria the Kwantung Army would welcome his return, and, next, he arranged for my transportation and expenses, etc.

> Pedro Lopez Captain Robinson William E. Edwards

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tavenner and Mr. Comyns-Carr

FROM : Mr. Lopez, Capt. Robinson and Mr. Edwards

SUBJECT Cross-Examination of the Defendant KIDO

1. I suggest that KIDO be cross-examined on the following:

THEY DESCRIPT EXPERIENCE OF THE PERIOD SERVICE.

a. On page 244 of his February 7, 1946 interrogation, KIDO stated that the defendant ITACAKI would be the man to initiate and lead the movement to keep the Japanese Army going across the Great Wall of China. The pertinent extract of that interrogation follows:

Page 244. Doc. No. 2911

- O And who was advocating the expansion of Japan across the Great Well into China.
- A I believe the Kwantung Army.
- Q Were the Chiefs of Staff in Tokyo also advocating further expansion?
- A I believe that the Chief of Staff in Tokyo did not have such a view in mind.
- Q Do you think they were fearful that the Chief of Staff of the Evantung Army would just keep going on and move across the Great Wall into China? Was that the problem?
- A Yes.
- Q They would have led such a movement?
- A Yes.

b. On page 337 of his February 14, 1946 interrogation, KIDO stated that ITAGAKI was one of the outstanding leaders of the China Incident in 1937. The pertinent extract of that interrogation follows:

Page 337. Doc. No. 4134

Would you say that HANAYA and KAGESKA were leaders in the aggressive action that took place as a result of the China Incident in 1937?

A Yes, I believe they were central figures.

o And Tragard libewise was in the Chine Incidents

A Yes.

- o Were there others that come into your mind at the moment that were autotamling leaders in the China Incident and the activities that followed in North China.
- A E don't remember any others at the present time.

e. on pages 344 and 351 of his Pebruary 15. 1946 interrogation. EIDO stated EFAGAET was one of the most aggreenive expansionists. The pertinent extracts of them interrogations follow:

Term 364 Doc. No. 4135

- O But if we were going cheed with the list of names of the particular individuals who were most aggressive as expecuatorists, we would have to include him alongside of FRAGARI and ISHIWARA.
- A Yes.
- Q Was he active in the war that broke out in 19419

A I believe he was an Army Commender.

one of Japan proper?

A I believe he wont to takey later on.

- A was he, to your knowledge, an advocate of driving the British and the Americans out of Asia and did he subsoribe to the Asia for the Asiatics theory?
- A I do not know because I did not hear a clear-out statement concerning him.
- G But that principle one generally followed by ITAGARI and EMINARA and people of that type, was it not?

A 705e

廉准原

According to your disry, the North China garrison Army was taking things into its own hands, imn't that right, and were making demands on thing without consulting with the Chief of Staff in Yokyo or with the Japanese deversant?

A I got this information from the vice minister of War, Hammado, that Welly, the Communion of the Japanese garrison twoop in Mientsin, and Hayami went to Changing and that Hayami, the War Minister is present there for a conference and I felt that that is a good indication that the Army was taking things in their own hands. This Chief of Staff of the Japanese garrison, SAMAI, was he closely associated with Intivara and Tracakin

I believe so. I believe this person had grievences about not receiving any medals and perhaps this dissatisfaction caused him to ereste an incident.

He was active in the movement to expand Japanese influence in North China, want't her

I bolieve oo.

And he and Tradaki nere insisting upon telding metters in their own hands and not leaving negotiations up to the Moreign Office, inn't that right?

Thore were accusations that they were trying to take away the authorities within the Poreign Ministry to

the Army.

d. on page 357 of his February 15, 1946 interrogation, KIDO stated that ITAGAEI with SARAI was very belligerout and setive in femont ing trouble in North China. The pertinent extract of that interrogation follows:

Togo 157. Doc. No. 2192

9 on June 15 and 18. I notice you had come talks with in. TANK of the Asiatic Bureau about the so-called China Incident and immehurian mituation. Do you reasuber what he had to say on these occasions

I believe he gave a talk on the progress of the skurth china ancident which I have related a while ogo and he informed us

that it was settled without any sorious development.

(19th) Isn't it true that in these days, what the Government was concerned about was the four that the Army in the field in Horth China and Manchuria would, without canction from the Government move forward into chima?

There was such a worsy and if such a situation would arise.

the matter of self-defence would eems out.

- Woll, inn't it twee that these men in the field, such as ITAGARI and SAKAI were very belligerent and quite active in formating trouble in North China and that the covernment was very much concerned that they would start some incident so that the armies could sucep in under the Guine of self-defense?
- You, the Government was worried such a thing would arise. And people that were enuming all this trouble for Japon at this porticular period were ITAGARI, SARAI, ISHIWARA and DOITARAY

A I am not clear about Dormana. But the other three you agree with me our

I think so.

Pedro Lopen Captain Robinson

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tavenner, General Vasilyev and Col. Fixel

FROM: Mr. Lopez, Capt. Robinson and Mr. Edwards.

SUBJECT: Cross-Examination of SHIRATORI

L. I suggest that SHIRATORI be cross-examined on the following:

a. On page 16 of his March 19, 1946 interrogation, SHIRATORI stated that the defendant ITAGAKI was among those dictating General HONJO, Commander of the Japanese Army in Manchuria, what to do, and that HONJO was just a mere rubber stamp. We quote the pertinent extract of that interrogation:

Page 16 Doc. No. 2906

Q. Then the War Minister knew and the Foreign Affairs Minister knew that somebody, as you say, of the lower rank in the army were responsible for planning and executing this incident at Mukden?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, now you say the Foreign Minister didn't try to find out who it was or did anything about it? Did the War Minister try to find out who was responsible for it?

I wonder. It was a very abnormal condition in those days in Japan. We call it KOKOYOJO. The lower gets the better of the upper. It was in the hands of the petty officers, officers of the rank of Lieutenant, Captain, at most Commander.

Q. Well, now, who was in command of the army in Manchuria when the Mukden Incident happened? Who was in command?

General HONJO.

Did anybody from the Foreign Ministry or from the War Ministry communicate or talk to him?

General HONJO, himself, was more or less a rubber stamp.

Q. Who was in charge of the army if he was a rubber stamp? Who was telling him what to do?

A. During the time mentioned, several people. Most famous among them was ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA.

Q. What position did they hold?

A. ITAGAKI was regiment commander.

Pedro Lopez Capt. Robinson William E. Edwards

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tavenner and Mr. English

FROM: Mr. Lopez, Capt. Robinson and Mr. Edwards

SUBJECT: Cross- Examination of HIRANUMA

l. I suggest that HIRANUMA be cross-examined on the following:

HIRANUMA stated that the defendant ITAGAKI was War Minister in the Hiranuma Cabinet and that ITAGAKI'S policy in connection with the use of the armed forces was the policy of the military The pertinent extract of that interrogation follows:

Page 13 Doc. 3904

* * *

Q. Who was the Minister of War in your cabinet?

A. General Itagaki.

Q. What was General Itagaki's policy in connection with the use of armed forces?

A. I think it was the policy of the military or the

Q. Do you not know or is it not a fact that you know that General Itagaki's policy was the policy of the military?

Pedro Lopez Capt. Robinson William E. Edwards

By .

MEMORANDUM

TO : Commander D. R. Carr, Chief, Language Division

FROM : William B. Edwards

SUBJECT: Translation of Personal Letter

SASAHAWA, Rycichi, Cell #25-10, Sugamo Prison

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