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other Cabinet Ministers are all
hoping for the adjustment of the
diplomatic relations between Japan
and the United States.

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Monday, July 14, 1941.

Telegram Informing ^{my} Remaining in
Office for the Present.

I ~~write~~ acknowledge receipt of
your telegram No. 356. I am deeply ~~gratified~~ ^{moved}

~~pleased with~~ ^{by} your favor; ~~thereupon, as~~ ^{In accordance with} your

kind instructions, I ~~am determined to~~ ^{will}

remain in office for the ~~present~~ ^{time being} to exert

myself ~~to the best of my ability~~ ^{until} I can manage to settle the

~~existing~~ ^{pending} problems ^{are decided} some way or ~~another~~.

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Being originally an amateur, ^{feared} I have given
~~so much~~ you trouble ~~so often~~ that I ~~am unable~~ do not know how

to apologize for it. But, on my side,

things have ~~been~~ ^{gone} contrary to my
~~and abroad~~
expectations and ~~we have~~
we have constantly lost our prestige ~~to~~
~~to a great~~ to a great

extent ~~at home and abroad~~ ^{at home and abroad as the result of} your

successive telegraphic instructions.

I ~~will~~ ^{will try my best} ~~not to~~ not to make gross

mistakes in futurity attending to my duties

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with ^{scrupulous} ~~religions~~ care, but no matter how ^{much} I

may try, I ~~myself~~ ^{come} from ~~the~~ circles where

~~they give~~ a certain extent of free rein is allowed)

under instructions and this ~~has~~ ^{has}

become my second nature, I am afraid

that I shall again ^{cause you troubles} ~~produce a very~~ ~~un-~~
and our country, since
favorable effect ~~upon the country.~~

And at the same times, viewing from

every angle, I keenly feel that it

is necessary for me to resign from

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my post as early as possible for the benefit
of the country.

In ^{this} connection ~~with the possibility~~, I earnestly
desire that you ^{would}, from a long range view
of things, ~~and on every point~~ ^{immediately} replace me with
~~an acceptable person~~ ^{after} a skilled person ^{after}
acceptable to you. ~~of your fancy~~. I know perfectly well

that I am ^{not} ~~by no means~~ qualified for
the post, and besides, from the very
beginning, I have been a temporary

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time-serving existence. Moreover,

I have had no intention to remain

long in this post, as I ~~had~~ told you

before my departure; So I make

an earnest appeal ^{for your} ~~to your~~ ~~for your~~

favourable consideration,
taking it into your consideration.

(Despatched on the afternoon of
the 14th.)

○ On Monday afternoon Hamilton and

Valentine came to me to return a ^{courtesy} ~~visit~~

at the Secretary of State's order.

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Tuesday, July 15, 1941.

The instructions asked for ~~which were waiting for instructions~~ ~~the~~
~~instructions~~ ⁽ⁱⁿ telegram no. 424
sent on the 23rd of June) ~~was~~ finally arrived.

○ At night Hamilton and Valentine
called on me. Making introductory
after saying) ~~remarks~~ (that they had come ^{at} ~~by~~ the
order of the Secretary of State, who is
^{now} ~~has~~ been recuperating, they ~~begin~~
said that, whereas)
How, the conversations ~~and~~ ^{now} ~~test~~

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centering around the problem of maintaining
~~progress - ~~centering~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~maintaining~~ ~~of~~~~

peace in the Pacific ~~as their chief~~ ^{were} ~~are~~ now in progress,
information had kept pouring in
~~problem, but~~ recently we have often

heard of the information that Japan

has ~~been~~ ^{was} establishing ~~the~~ naval and

aerial bases in French Indo-China. So

they asked

~~We wish~~ to know the actual facts of

the case.

To this I replied that I only knew
~~what had been reported in the press, but I was~~
what had been reported in the press, ^{that} I
not surprised in the least, ~~if it were~~

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by the increased British and American support of Chungking,

by such a rumor at this time when Japan was ~~was~~ ^{gradually} being sieged by the co-operation ~~between~~ ^{among} the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands Indies, and by ~~that~~ ^{the cooperation} between the United States and the Soviet Union, ^{I pointed out that, when} ~~and~~ ^{comparing} ~~with~~ ^{compared} the facts that the U. S. had actually occupied Iceland and ^{that} there ~~was~~ ^{were} rumors that she ~~is going to start to~~ ^{would} take ^{over} the Azores and Dakar, it ~~was not at all~~ ^{was not at all} ~~strange~~ even if Japan should

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carry out what the rumours said. I told
if Japan should carry out as reported.
(them that)

Anyway, I ^{would give an} ~~will~~ answer ~~you~~ after inquiring
of our Government about it, ~~explicitly~~.

Then they asked ^{me} if there ~~had been~~ ^{was, besides the} ~~any~~
Part of alliance, ~~any~~ with Germany and Italy,
special agreement that would place Japan
under the obligation ^{to wage} ~~of waging~~ war against
the U.S. in the event of the ^{latter's} ~~United States'~~
participation in war, besides the Treaty
of Alliance.

I replied that I didn't)

~~I don't~~ think there was any, but that

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the obligations ^{provided for in} ~~which~~ Article III of the ~~Treaty~~ ^{Pact} would arise under such circumstances, ~~will be put in action~~; As to the

particulars of the obligations, I ~~said~~ ^{told them that} ~~there was no need to~~

(inquire of Tokyo, for they ~~were~~ ^{were} just as they ~~are~~ ^{were}

written in the Treaty, ~~was it?~~ Then I

repeated what I had told the Secretary of

State ^{one before, namely,} ~~at the time I have~~ ^{once} told

~~Secretary of State Hull~~ that ^{the Japanese Government} ~~we~~ could

not acknowledge in advance that ~~what~~ ^{future} all actions ~~of~~ of the United States ~~which~~ ^{it} was going to ~~do~~ in future would

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be solely based on self-defence. There would be no way to judge them except by ~~presenting for it~~ investigating each

I added that case minutely. Essentially, the U. S. ^{was} in the safest ^{condition} as far as national defence ~~was~~

concerned, ~~but~~ there ~~was~~ no fear at all

that ^{she} you ^{of being} ~~would be~~ attacked by other

countries. Moreover, ^{pointing out} ~~your~~ ~~country~~ that the United States was on

~~so~~ especially ~~so~~ friendly terms with

Canada, ^{that} Mexico ^{was} just like ^{what} Manchukuo; ~~was~~ to Japan, that the countries south of Panama, not to speak of north

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of it, ~~to~~ ^{were} gradually ~~becoming~~ ^{coming within} the sphere
of American influence, ^{I declared} ~~and so~~ there
~~was~~ no comparison between ^{the United States} your country
and Japan in point of ~~security~~
national defense security.

On this, they advanced the ~~same~~
~~arguments as the~~ Secretary of State's ^{own} arguments.

(Despatched on the afternoon of July 16th)

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Wednesday, July 16, 1941.

Return of the Oral Statement.

On that occasion [^{T.N.} ~~at~~ when ~~at~~ ^{Embassies}]

NOMURA had a talk with Hamilton and Valentine

on the 15th], ~~and~~ the oral statement

of June 21st, I conveyed ^{to them} the complaint

of the Foreign Minister ^{to} ~~to them~~. To this

they replied that they had ~~had~~ no intention

at all of interfering in the internal affairs

of Japan. On the 16th and ^{the} 17th

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WAKASUGI called on the Secretary
of State and returned the oral
statement, ~~mentioned above~~ with
the consent of the Secretary of State,
~~and~~ I telegraphed the particulars of
the case to Tokyo.

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Friday, July 18, 1941

At 6 p.m. I called on Under-Secretary
of State Welles and asked for a friendly
arrangement for
~~management~~ of the passage ^{through the} Panama
Canal of the ~~merchants~~ ^{Japanese} merchantmen lying at
anchor at Panama. He said that
the ~~prohibition of passage~~ ^{for an} was indefinite period
~~based on~~ from the standpoint of
~~the~~ ~~standpoint~~ of national
defence, but that he would give
me an answer after ~~making~~ making

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a minute inquiry.

I also talked of the ^{cabinet} change of the
Cabinet in Tokyo and of ~~the~~ Japanese
position from the standpoint of
~~position~~ national defence. The

Under Secretary of State, on the other

hand, wished to maintain ~~the~~ peaceful

relations ^{between} of Japan and the U. S. A., ^{which} ~~as~~

he said

they had extended ^{for some} ~~through~~ 90 years.

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Saturday, July 19, 1941.

Today new ^{Foreign} Minister TOYODA sent me his compliments, asking for my co-operation; accordingly, I made a representation with ^{an} introductory remark ~~of his~~ acknowledging receipt of ^{his} telegram ~~and pledging~~ ~~myself to~~ ^{the my} utmost effort

I also asked for his instructions again

concerning the ^{pending} ~~existing~~ problems.

The latter part of ^{the telegram} ~~which~~ ran as follows:

"In short, ^{according to my view,} ~~you are not prepared to have~~

~~some means to bring to terms~~ ^{it may not be quite impossible to} find

some means to ^{come} ~~bring~~ to terms ^{on the question} ~~with them~~

of ^{the} right of self-defence, but ^{in respect to} ~~as to~~

anti-Communist ^{the} ~~stationing of troops for~~ ^(anti-Communist purpose)

there ^{is probably} ~~is~~ ^{no room for} ~~compromise~~ ^(compromise)

Therefore, ^{we must} ~~the present situation is a serious~~

~~we~~ find ~~out~~ some wording which ^{is} ~~the~~ ^{acceptable to}

both sides ^{and} ~~would be able to accept~~ ^{(side,}

contriving ^{to obtain the substance to our} ~~to our~~ ^{but this is the most difficult problem in my opinion...}

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Sunday, July 20, 1941.

Called on Admiral Sturke (he was out), and

dropped in at Rear Admiral Turner's ^{home} and

talked ^{over} with him the Japanese advance into French Indo-^{China} ~~China~~ and

understandings, ^{etc.} regarding our occupation

of French Indo-China.

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Monday, July 21, 1941.

Went to New York and ~~resided~~ ^{stayed} at the
"Plaza". At night ~~got~~ ^{received} an urgent
telephone call from WAKASUGI and
decided to ~~start from~~ ^{leave} here early
next morning by air.

Wednesday, July 23, 1941

Wired the following ^{telegram} dated the 23rd.

○ The Gist.

In my telegrams of July 3 and 19
I reported ~~about the~~ influence of
on the effect of
our southward advance on ~~the~~

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Japanese-American relations by

the telegrams of July 3 and July 19,

this effect is now developing
and now the influence developing

with considerable speed, ^{and} there is

a great fear ^{that it will come} ~~of a great crisis~~ very near

to the critical ^{point} moment of the

severing of diplomatic relations.

Feeling the ^{tense} situation becoming ~~tenser~~

^{from} ~~through~~ the talk on Monday between

WAKASUGI and the Under-Secretary

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of State; I asked for an interview
on Tuesday, but received
with the Under Secretary, ~~who had barely~~
an appointment
~~arranged to see me~~ at 3 p.m. on
Wednesday.

I ^{met} ~~met~~ a certain Cabinet ^{Secretary} ~~Member~~
who, ^{hastily} returned ^{hastily} from his destination
a ^{tour} ~~was~~ ~~on~~ last night. He intimated to
his ~~message~~ ^{me} that nothing could
be done ^{as} ~~was~~ ~~impossible~~ ^{as} the Secretary of
Hull ^{was} recuperating, ^{while} Welles ~~was~~ much

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~~embarrassed~~
~~surprised~~. As he asked my view,
I told him that I would do my utmost
according to my conviction, without
losing ~~my~~ hope. Anyway, it is my
observation that the situation will come
very near to the severance of diplomatic
relations.

The cause of this rapid change of
the ~~atmosphere~~^{sentiment} here toward Japan is ~~due to~~^{due to}
our southward advance. ~~and also~~ ^{It is the}

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their observation ^{here} that this southward
advance ~~with~~ ^{is} the initial step ⁱⁿ for
^{the eventual} (advancing) to Singapore and the
Netherlands Indies, ~~insurrection~~. The
Navy here seems to be ^{make} making the
same observation. There appears
to be ^{the} criticism that Japan ^{on the one hand} is ~~making~~
^{proposing} the Japanese-American understanding
the main feature ^{on one hand}, but
on the other hand ~~is~~ mapping

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out the policy of southward advance, thus
~~duping~~
~~and~~ the Secretary of State, himself
This, together with the state of his health, has
~~has been~~ ~~reported~~ and it is reported
given rise to the rumour that the
~~that~~ ~~Secretary of State~~
might resign.
regarding in effect, his state of health
having a great deal to do with it.

Moreover, ~~the~~ ^{is pouring in from Tokyo} information which
is likely to cause the people here to
doubt our true intentions ^{is pouring} ~~is reported~~
in from Tokyo.
~~is pouring in from Tokyo~~ The most ^{striking one} remarkable

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says that
~~of which being~~ (a) my negotiations here
will be "torpedoed" in Tokyo, ^{and} (b) Japan
has given ~~the explanation~~ to the
^{the explanation} the adjustment of
Axis side that ~~the~~ Japanese-American
diplomatic relations is a strategem
^{employed to gain}
~~by the time~~ ^{until the} ~~of~~ completion of
preparations for the southward
advance. Even ^{the highest responsible} ~~those who assume~~
^{persons} ~~the responsibility~~ are said
to have
gradually begun to lend their

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cars to ^{such reports} ~~the~~ ~~reformatory~~. In short,
there is no doubt that,
while the negotiations ~~are~~ ^{were} in progress,
there must have been a third party
^{having} that has made slanderous reports
to estrange Japan from the U.S. and
causing an opposition movement
have occurred on both sides,
either side of us respectively.

We are now in a delicate situation
indeed.

In ^{this} connection, ~~with this~~ ^{that} I wish

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you would ~~express to the~~ take this opportunity to
express to the American ambassador the / Japanese /

~~you~~ ^{will} ~~express~~ ^{express} manifest the Government's

sincere wishes for
Sincerity regarding the adjustment

of the Japanese-American diplomatic

relations and ^{explain} our true intentions
~~in respect to~~

of the advance ^{into} on French Indo-

China, ~~to the~~ ~~standards~~ ~~without~~

~~losing the opportunity~~ ^{that} ~~and~~ ~~on the~~

~~other hand~~, you will ~~show me~~

to me)

privately the policies of the new

Cabinet, ^I on my part, ~~I~~ ^{determined} am ready

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to
do my very best as if I ~~was~~^{had} revived
from death.

(Despatched at noon on the 23rd.)

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Wednesday, July 23rd, 1941.

○ At 1 p.m. was invited by Admiral Stark and dined ^{with him} ~~together~~.

○ At 3 p.m. called on Acting Secretary of State Welles.

When I said, in my talk with

Admiral Stark on the 23rd of July I ^{remarked} ~~and~~ that it seemed ^{to me} that ~~the heads of the American Navy were made up of~~ ^{the heads of the American Navy were made up of} outstanding first-rate figures

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Thereupon
~~to this~~ the admiral said that
among the leaders of the Navy here,
the admiral remarked:

"Ingersoll was 'very able', Turner

~~is~~ "especially good", and so was Tower

of the Air Bureau. As for the fleets,
he said that both ~~Spencer and King~~
~~Spencer~~ Kimmel and King, ^{whom he had}
recommended, ~~Spencer~~ were
~~both of them~~ men fitted for

He also explained that Hart,
their posts. ~~Hart~~
though already beyond the age limit, was
~~retained in service~~ ~~because of his~~
being retained in service because of his
~~inactivity~~ ~~though he had already~~
~~activity~~ he was an able man.

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reached the age limit.

○ Telegraphic Report (9 p.m., the 23rd).

Interview with Welles

In view of the nature of the interview
~~the reason of information we~~
between WAKASUGI and Welles,
~~obtained through IWASUGI's interview~~

~~with Welles~~, I had a talk with Welles

on the afternoon of the 23rd and

expatiated on ~~the fact that~~ ^{the fact that} our south-

ward advance ~~had been~~ ^{was} based on

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~~the ground which was~~ ^{on} indispensable
necessity)

for national security and economy,

especially that Japan alone could not
assume ~~such~~ an attitude ~~of~~ remaining idle,
~~the days of idleness~~ only to be

destroyed, in an economic war in

which every other country ~~had been~~ ^{was}

carrying out "embargo". And then

as to the problem of French Indo-China,

I told him ~~the following~~ ^{that, since there ~~is~~ prospect,}

"According to the ~~press~~ ^{is}

question, according to the ~~press~~

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according to the press, of ~~an amicable~~ a peaceful
negotiation ^{between} Vichy and the Japanese Government,
it would be desirable for the United States Government
likely to proceed amicably between Vichy
to watch the situation for a while and
and so, so I wish you ~~would not~~ ~~to~~
refrain from making) I also told him that
a "hasty conclusion". If you should

if ^{was pleased}
place an embargo on oil too, it ~~would~~,
I feared this would greatly irritate
I fear, register ~~an enormous~~ ~~irritation~~

to the feelings of our people. As ~~for~~ to
the ^{conclusion} ~~settlement~~ of ~~the~~ Japanese -

American understanding, I informed
him that
glad to say the new Cabinet ^{was} as

eager as the former Cabinet ^{to arrive} ~~for~~ the
settlement" at an understanding.

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~~On this~~, The Under Secretary of State,
though he did not repeat what he had
told ~~to~~ WAKASUGI, said to the following effect:

* In brief, the ~~consistent spirit of~~ ^{spirit, which has guided}
the conversations between ~~the~~ ^{Hull and} Ambassador
and ~~Hull~~ ^{me} is ~~incompatible~~ ^{incompatible} with
the Japanese policy toward French
Indo-China. Neither the U. S. A. nor
Great Britain ^{will ever} ~~will~~ attack French Indo-
China. Vichy's ~~policy~~ ^{submission is due}

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~~and~~ ^{to} ~~consider~~ Hitler's pressure.

It is observed that ~~the~~ ~~observed~~ that Japan will ~~not~~

~~be~~ further advance southward, making

French Indo-China her foothold.

Then he added that)

(The U. S. Government had never

made a hasty conclusion for many

years in the past, ^{and that, in short,} ~~After all,~~ ^{the United} ~~we have~~

~~States~~ ^{not being} ~~been~~ influenced by ~~the~~ Japanese

policies."

Though he did not refer to the future,

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he ^{told me} ~~saluted~~ on parting, ~~saying~~, that

"The Secretary of State ^{would} ~~will~~ come back
pretty soon. ^{and would probably} ~~We will~~ be pleased to

resume the conversations with me.

Ambassador [#]

(9 p.m., 23rd)

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Thursday, July 24, 1941.

© Telegraphic Report (8 p.m., 24th).

Feeling keenly the urgency of the situation, I ^{had} asked the Chief of ~~the~~ Naval Operations, ~~Walter~~ ^{during the course of a luncheon with him ^{along} yesterday, the 23rd,} to convey my desire to the President to have a talk with the President. ~~to~~ ~~him~~ ~~when~~ ~~we~~ ~~discuss~~ ~~at~~ ~~some~~ ~~time~~ ~~last~~ ~~night~~, ~~at~~ ~~5:30~~, and at five this afternoon I ^{met} could ~~meet~~ the President privately.

Interview with ^{the} President:

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In ^{accordance} ~~compliance~~ with
your successive instructions, I ~~have~~
explained to the President in detail the
~~the situation of~~ unavoidable cir-
cumstances ^{which justify} ~~which justify~~ Japan's advance
~~into~~ French Indo-China ^{from the} ~~Japanese~~
^{standpoint})
of national economy and ~~the~~ stabilization
of that area. I also explained Japan's respect for
~~the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of~~
the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of ~~that~~
French Indo-China. Next, ~~the~~
~~the~~ ~~sovereignty~~ ~~of~~ ~~that~~ ~~area~~
after informing him that
the new Cabinet also was ^{very} eager ^{to} ~~for~~
arrange ~~the~~
the Japanese-American understanding

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Lurged him to give a ~~straightforward~~
~~answer of deep respect~~ his large-hearted
(based on a broad point of view
political consideration ^{to} for the
maintenance of peace in the
Pacific.

When The President ^{replied} ~~said~~ that, though
~~the~~ public opinion had advocated
strongly ~~that they should place~~ an
embargo on ^{oil export to} ~~the oil for~~ Japan, he
so far persuaded
had been ^{convincing} the public
^{as to} ~~of~~ the necessity [of exporting oil] ~~for~~ in

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order to maintain
the maintenance of peace in the Pacific,
~~was~~ what saying that he ~~no longer~~ had now lost
~~fact that he would find no grounds~~
the basis for this argument,
~~of argument for the policy and that~~
he hinted ^{that an} embargo ^{on oil export ~~might~~ be imposed.} And
as to the ^{advance into} ~~occupation~~ of French Indo-China
he clarified the views of the U.S. Govern-
ment by stating the ^{main points} ~~purpose~~ of the statements
^{issued by}
the State Department ~~published~~ today,
the 24th.

Then the President, with the

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introductory remark that ~~he felt~~ ^{it was}
~~it~~ ^{probably} too late and that ~~it was not that~~

he had ^{made no} previous arrangements with
the State Department ^{in regard to this point,} said to the
following effect:

If ~~you~~ ^{Japan should} withdraw ^{her} ~~your~~ troops
from French Indo-China, ~~and~~ if all
countries guaranteed her neutrality
(as ~~was~~ ^{was} done ^{in the case of} Switzerland),

and then if ~~we~~ ^{could be found whereby} ~~could find~~ some
means ~~by which~~ all countries could

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obtain goods and materials freely
and fairly from French Indo-China,
He would ~~do all he ~~could~~ can for it.~~
He ~~had~~ himself had deep sympathy for
~~the Japanese efforts to procure~~
Japan's ~~efforts~~ efforts to procure
materials. ~~He was very sympathetic~~

The long and short of it was
that I ~~had~~ received the impression
that they were about to carry out
some ^{kind of an} economic pressure ~~upon us.~~ ^{will be}
enforced in the near future.
In company ~~especially~~ with The Chief

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of the ^{Naval} Operations, ~~Section~~ ^{who was} ~~Section~~ specially
called in, ^{said} beside Under-Secretary
of State Welles. (8 p.m., the 24th)

Interview with ^{the} President

In ~~at~~ my interview with the President
I explained the following, besides the
problem ^{of} French Indo-China:

That the proposals for ~~the~~ ^{the} Japanese-
American understanding ^{should} aim ~~at~~ to

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^{maintain}
~~maintenance~~ of peace in the Pacific;

that it is a matter for regret there are

some indications that the U.S.

Government ~~is doubting~~ ^{is suspecting} the true

intentions of the Japanese Govern-

ment; that the Japanese Government

has become much more enthusiastic

since the present Cabinet was formed;

and that, ^{in my opinion,} ~~it is~~ there are means ^{for} settling

~~and~~ the three difficult points: namely,

the right of self-defence, the

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~~China~~
stationing of our troops in Inner Mongolia
of China and in North China, which is
not permanent, and ^{non-discrimination} equality of
in trade
commercial opportunity.

As to the three points above,
I told him that there would naturally
be some means to settle.

In our conversation the President
related is declared that

~~the~~ Hitler was ^{scheming} ~~contemplating~~ the conquest of

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the world (^{He said the same thing during} ~~the world~~ ~~my~~)

interview with him on the 14th of

March, ^{when asked for his view by the President,} ~~March~~ The Secretary of State,

who sat in company with him ^{then,}

~~stated that~~ stated that

he, ^{too, was} ~~of~~ ^{the same} ~~opinion.~~ ^{that} ~~after~~

Europe, Africa ^{would} ~~be~~ ^{the next} ~~in~~ ^{victim,}

and so on — there ^{would} ~~be~~ no

~~end; that~~ ~~in~~ ~~ten~~ ~~years,~~ ~~it~~ ~~might~~ ~~happen~~ ~~that~~ ~~Japan~~

~~will~~ ~~fight~~ ~~your~~ ~~country~~ (will fight)

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~~on~~ the side of the U.S. &

I refuted his view by saying that since ancient times it was ~~it had been~~ proverbially said in Japan

~~from old~~ that 'when the people become warlike, the state ~~is~~ ^{will} surely

~~is~~ be in danger' and 'words are

for refuting false doctrines and

bringing out the truth'

2. As the President seemed to ~~approve~~

regard ~~our~~ ^{that} ~~advance~~ ^{advance into} ~~our~~ French

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Indo-China ~~was~~ ^{would extend further} ~~from~~ ^{southward} under Germany's pressure, ~~pressure~~ ~~and~~ ~~that~~ ~~we~~ ~~should~~ ~~make~~ ~~as~~ ~~great~~ ~~an~~ ~~advance~~ ~~as~~ ~~possible~~ ~~if~~

I ^{him by saying} refuted that there ~~had~~ ^{was} ~~been~~ no

German pressure upon us and that

Japan was ^{acting} ~~not~~ from ^{her own} ~~an~~ independent

standpoint. ~~Through~~ The President ^{my explanation at least in words.}

accepted ~~that~~ ~~in~~ ~~profession~~, it is
However, as you already know,
as you have been already informed

~~that~~ ^{the} public opinion in the U. S. A.

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believes
~~is~~ that Japan, ~~is~~
either in concert with Germany ~~and~~ ^{or}
independently,
will advance either southward
or northward ~~when a~~ ^{when a}
favorable opportunity ~~is~~ ^{offers}.

(Despatched, at noon of the 25th)

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Friday, July 25, 1941.

© At night the White House published ~~the~~^a directives for "freezing" ~~toward~~ Japanese assets.

Saturday, July 26, 1941.

○ Went to New York by plane and ~~prebooked~~^{stayed} at the Hotel Plaza overnight.

Returned home on Sunday.

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Monday, July 28, 1941.

The m. s. TATSUTA-maru, ~~has not~~
(being permitted to enter)
~~entered~~ port, anchoring^{ed} outside ~~the~~

~~Harbor~~ of San Francisco, ^{Harbor Bay} accordingly

I called on Welles (at 5 p. m.) to find out
~~regarding~~ the

connection between^{the} "freezing" and
shipping movements & Cabot on

(at 5 p. m.)

Telegraphic Report (Despatched, 29th)

In
At my interview with Welles on the

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28th, I ~~referred to him,~~ ^{reminded him,} as the sequence of my

talk, that)

(Some time ago, ~~your Excellency~~ ^{for the past ninety years} he had)

(told me that ~~the~~ peaceful relations)

between Japan and the U.S. had

been maintained in unbroken

between Japan and the United
succession ~~for the past ninety years;~~
States. I then said that it was)

~~for me that, it is a matter of grave~~

concern that ~~the two countries~~ ^{the two countries} ~~that~~ ^{of grave}

~~are moving~~ more and more in the direction of a

~~path~~ ^{more and more} in the direction of a ~~dangerous~~

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course, unless ~~we were~~ ^{we were} ~~successful~~ ^{in finding}
out some harmonizing measure ^{could}
^{be found against} toward the policies ^{which} the two countries
were now ^{there was} adopting. If ~~there were~~ ^{no}
'statesmanship' ^{to} that could avoid this,
it ~~would~~ ^{would} be a great sin ^{against} ~~toward~~
humanity, I said.

As he told me that ^{it seemed} ~~he intended~~
that at the time of ^{conversation with Ambassador}
~~of your Excellency's~~ ^{with Minister} ~~had~~
Grew, ~~you had not yet~~
~~not~~ been informed of the President's

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proposal ^{which was} made the other day,
~~propositions~~ ^{to} you had a conver-

sation with Grew, in spite of its

their importance, I replied that I

but that I had

had reported ^{it} them to you in detail

^{today} the day before, though I had ^{only} submitted

^{only} the main points to you at that time.

~~According to~~ what Welles said to
me contained the same meaning as
~~because of a conversation with the President;~~

(he makes it clear that, so long
that is, ~~they have no intention~~
as Japan did not resort to armed occupation
the United States had no intention of
preventing us from obtaining goods

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and materials under the principle of
equal opportunity and there would
be no fear of the security of French
Indo-China ~~being threatened~~, ^{threat against} so long
as Japan ~~does not~~ carry out her
~~unilateral~~ ~~occupation~~

Now, ^{when} ~~we observe~~ ^{under} the present
situation, ~~as far as that~~ we are
~~proceeding~~ ~~single-handed~~
~~proceeding~~ ~~single-handed~~ ~~toward~~ ~~the~~ ~~worst~~
proceeding single-handed toward the worst
in East Asia, with America, Britain,
^{against}

the Netherlands Indies, China and the

Soviet ~~Union~~ ^{Union}. While Japan is performing her
~~duty of checking the United States for the sake of Germany,~~
~~Germany is ~~checking~~ ^{aiding} the United States~~

~~with~~ with the greatest possible care

and prudence, contriving to ~~maintain~~ ^{moderate}

^{American} the people's ~~sentiments~~ ^{sentiments} by bringing out ~~the~~

^{peace} terms ~~of peace~~ ^{as a flanking operation} ~~in their natural course~~

~~not~~ and also doing their best to

avoid ^a German-American War,

~~while we have been fulfilling our~~

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It looks as if Japan ^{were} unwittingly venturing to
plunge headlong single-handed into a war against

~~decly of striking the U.S. for~~

~~It looks~~

~~as if Japan is venturing to take~~

~~the dangerous course plunging straight into~~

~~the~~

~~for waging war independently against~~

Britain and the U.S.A.

It is my earnest desire that you

~~would judiciously cope with the situation~~

~~with the utmost~~

would exercise ^{the utmost} prudence and cope

greatest possible care and ~~meet the~~

with the situation

~~structure properly~~ for the benefit of

a far-sighted ^{state} national policy politically

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taking a long view of the whole situation,
even if quick decision is necessary
~~though I admit that there may be cases~~
from a military point of view,
~~where you must be quick in decision~~

~~strategically~~

(Despatched, 29th.)

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Wednesday, July 30, 1941.

At 11:45 a.m. called on Acting ~~State~~
Secretary ^{of State} Welles ~~by~~ his request. He handed
a note ~~to me~~ regarding the bombing of
the gunboat Intuila and, ~~emphasized~~ ^{remarking that}
~~the following points were made~~ ^{the following points}
~~and were~~ ^{the following points}
it was the President's order, stressed the following three points:
(a) The Japanese Government ~~guaranteed~~
had given a guarantee.
[for not repeating the mistake] at the
time of the Panay Case; (b) Isare

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The Army ~~and~~ and the Navy invested with the
power of doing such a thing? (c) The
Tutuila and the ~~US~~ ^{American} Embassy were located
in the 'safety zone', which is on the
opposite bank ^{of} the city.

I replied that such an incident
~~was likely to~~ ^{was likely to} happen ~~at some time~~ ^{in the} battle-
field and that there ~~would be~~ ^{was} no
~~way of avoiding such~~ ^{absolutely} a mistake ^{absolutely} other than
by giving up the bombing of

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Chungking or ^{by} moving ^{away} the Embassy
and the gunboat. ~~He~~ ^{However, I} promised
him to report it to the Government.

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1688

← Thursday, July 31, 1941.

At 6:45 p.m. called on Acting ~~Secretary~~
 of State Secretary Welles and elucidated the view-
 point of the Imperial ^{Japanese} Government. Took
 my leave after ~~requesting~~ ^{asking} him to ~~arrange~~
 for me a ~~an intermediary~~ ~~for my~~ direct interview with
 the President, should my explanation fail
 to settle the question.

Mr. Welles, after ~~leaving~~ ^{consulting} ~~making~~ arrange-
 ments with the President, announced ^{to the press} the

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settlement of the incident to the press.

(~~At~~ ^{In} my interview with him on Saturday,

Welles told me that he had wired to

the above effect to Grew.)

In the afternoon Takeo IWAKURO (Colonel)

and Tadao NAKAGAWA started for San Francisco

by airplane. I am ^{very} grateful for ~~their~~ ^{the} co-

operation ~~with me,~~ ^{they have given me.} though I also did my

~~what had been in my power~~ ^{best} for them.

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Further, Mr. Welles requested me to
add Thailand, besides French Indo-
China, ⁱⁿ the President's ~~propositional~~ ^{proposal} of
~~made~~ the other day.

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legal bond
double space

August 1941

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Friday, Aug. 1, 1941.

Tonight the embargo on oil was

proclaimed (It is published in the ^{newspapers} ~~press~~).

~~on~~ the 2nd, Sat.).

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Saturday, Aug. 2, 1941.

At 1:45 p.m. called on Acting State Secretary Welles and asked him to use his influence ^{for enabling} ~~regarding~~ the ^{to leave port.} departure of the m.s. ATSUTA-maru. He In view of the guarantees he had given me several times, he felt very sorry ^{for it and} said that he ~~was~~ would do something to cope with the ~~circumstances that he had guaranteed~~ litigation of private parties. He further ~~instructed me~~ ~~to~~ asked me to call him up ^{in case I wanted to see him} ~~if he was wanted~~ as he would report for duty ^{tomorrow,} ~~the day after,~~

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Sunday, too.

In this occasion I explained to him that
in regard ~~to~~ ^{to} the President's ~~propositions~~
~~proposal~~,

though ~~he~~ had not ^{yet} received instructions,

~~and~~, it had become clearer and clearer

that Tokyo ^{was desirous of reaching a} ~~was~~ ~~reaching~~ the Japanese -

American understanding. ^{I added} ~~Back upon~~
~~that it~~)

~~must~~ ^(be) remembered that in Tokyo important

problems are submitted to a Cabinet

conference, ^{and} so we cannot carry out

cannot be handled so ~~expeditiously~~ ^{expeditiously}

things ~~so smoothly~~ as in the U. S. A.,

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where the President is given supreme
authority to decide things himself, ~~and~~
with great authority,
explained.

(166)

Sunday, Aug. 3, 1941.

At 10 a.m. yesterday, Sat., I called on

Post-Master General Walker, ~~and~~ ^{asking} after them

^{about} recent ~~present~~ state of affairs; I told him
the reasons for the ~~Japanese advance~~ ^{advance of Japanese troops into}
~~French Indo-China~~ ^{French Indo-China}

French Indo-China, explaining that

^{Franco-Japanese} ~~Japanese~~ French Indo-China Treaty

regarding French Indo-China ^{had} ~~had~~ made

it clear that the ^{advance of Japanese troops was an} ~~occupation~~ ^{had been}

~~unavoidable~~ ^{unavoidable} measure under the

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present state of affairs, and that this measure was not a permanent ^{one} by any means, was to be ~~reversing~~ by ~~no~~ means.

Then I asked ^{him} if it was not ~~an~~ a good idea

to ~~pledge~~ ^{pledge} non-aggression against ~~the~~ ^{to} ~~neighborhood~~ ^{neighborhood} with the

neighboring states - the Straits Settlements,

the Netherlands Indies and so on -

and ^{to provide for} ~~enable~~ ^{free} the exchange of goods

and materials, ^{thus} ~~for~~, going a step

farther ^{from} ~~to~~ the past negotiations.

But he ~~did not seem to have much~~ ^{showed little}

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and asked me
interest in it ~~and~~ in return ^{whether it}
~~was~~ not true that)

Japan had been making preparations
for an advance ^{into} Siberia.

~~He~~ ^{He} also
~~thought~~ said that ~~it was~~ as
we ~~had~~ already ^{known} ~~been~~ informed of

that the President did not want

war, ^{however, as I see it,} ~~from my point of view,~~ the U.S.A.

is, ~~in the~~ first ^{of all,} ~~places,~~ trying to check

the Japanese advance by economic

war. ~~and~~ All the authorities maintain

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that this is a counter-measure ~~for~~
to the Japanese policies. And at the same
time she ~~is~~ ^{is being} preparing for an armed clash and
seems to be endeavoring
to make China and the Soviets, ^{Union,} not-
to speak of Britain and the Netherlands
Indies, act in concert with her,
~~making preparations for an armed~~
~~clash on the other hand.~~

The fact that ~~the~~ Germany's war against
the Soviet ^{Union is being} ~~is~~ prolonged, than ~~it has been~~ ^{it was}
(more)

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expected, is, indeed, a good news for the U. S., but Walker did not talk so optimistically as the President ^{had done} ~~did~~ at the press conference yesterday, or as Hopkins, a trusted follower of the President, is reported to have said in Moscow.

He only expected a protracted war that would extend over a few years, however, he believed, believing that Germany would not.

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be able to ~~develop~~ ^{undertake} great operations for some
time ~~present~~ ^{even if the eastern front is}
cleared off,

~~had been that~~ because of the heavy

loss ~~of~~ ^{any} personnel and ~~of~~ goods and

materials ~~which~~ ^{sustained by} the German forces,

had suffered had been very great,

and ~~was~~ ^{was} also the shortage of oil. ~~the~~

~~Especially that~~ ^(Predicting that)
~~and~~ ^{During this}

period ~~the~~ ⁱⁿ production of the U. S. A.

would make a great stride, ~~making~~ ^{and thereby}

~~make~~ the situation favorable to ~~the~~ ^{her} she believed
that a protracted war of several years in duration ^{would} ~~take place.~~

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Monday, Aug. 4, 1941.

Request ^{the dispatch of a}
~~Application~~ for ~~sending~~ Veteran Diplomats.

(Despatched, Mon, Aug. 4)

All the papers ^{on} Sunday (yesterday)
~~which~~ devoted large spaces for
~~editorial~~ comments on the Japanese-
American problems, supporting ^{in general} the strong
attitude of the [U.S.] Government. ~~and~~

~~What is more~~ The Gallup Poll also ^{showed}
that there were many people who favored a strong attitude,
find many tough elements, But they
^{hinted} ~~still~~ ^{not} ~~that~~ all the doors ^{have yet been} ~~are~~

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closed to us. As affairs now stand,
the focus of public opinion is ^{focusing} directed
its attention more
~~rather~~ on the relations between
Japan and the U.S.A than on the problems
between the U.S.A. and Germany. As
the days pass, some ^{degree of moderation} pacification may
be expected, but, as it also depends
on the ^{war} situation ~~of war~~ in Europe, we
cannot predict ^{the} ~~its~~ future with ease.
As you will know by the report of

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Although ^{will report to you}
WAKASUGI and IWAKURO, ~~who are going home,~~
the situation upon their return to Japan,
after all, the situation is developing so
fast
every moment, ^{that} ~~and I, to whom~~ time is
an important factor. ~~As I will have no~~
~~a great fault, am fearing that I may~~
~~excuse to offer if I should~~
commit mistakes ~~which will cause~~
at this time,
~~great regret,~~ and, besides, ^{as} there is a limit
to my humble ability, ~~so~~ I wish that
you ^{would} ~~will~~ be good enough to arrange to
^{who are well informed in} ~~to~~ the state of things ^{abroad} at home and
send some veteran diplomat (say,
Ambassador KURUSU) ^{by} ~~at~~ the first

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availability/ship (in order)
opportunity to cooperate with me
for the present.

Inasmuch as ~~the~~ I have no means of
~~to know~~ ~~the~~ delicate
phase ^{and since} of the government's policies, ~~for~~
I can do nothing about it here, ^{special}
I ~~hope~~ ~~that~~ you ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~able~~ ~~to~~ ~~carry~~ ~~out~~ ~~promptly~~
~~my~~ ~~recommendation~~ ~~as~~ ~~soon~~ ~~as~~ ~~possible~~
after ^{special} consideration.

(Despatched in the afternoon of the 4th)

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Wednesday, August 6, 1944

~~My~~ Visit to ~~State~~ Secretary ^{of State} Hull.

At 6 p.m. called on ~~State~~ Secretary ^{of State} Hull

at his private residence (accompanied by OKUMURA; Valentine sat in company).

In compliance with your instructions,

I submitted the proposal ~~and~~ written in English, ~~and submitted the proposal as seen in~~
as per attached,

~~and submitted the proposal as seen in~~

after explaining ~~it~~ ^{it} in detail.

The ~~State~~ Secretary ^{of State} showed little

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interest in our proposal ~~stating~~ saying that
he would examine ~~it~~ ^{it} afterward. ~~He~~

He expatiated on ~~the~~ ^{on} the
relations between Japan and the U.S.A.

With an apology that he would ~~state~~ ^{state}
his ~~own~~ ^{own idea} apart from the proposal,

~~positions.~~

In ~~brief~~ ^{brief}, he said that,
apart from the relations between
him and ~~I~~ ^{me}, he could not ^{deeply} be disappointed
on observing Japan's ~~where~~ ^{where} successive

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that ~~so~~ long as Japan did not
Japanese actions; ~~There would be~~
stop her conquest by force, there was
no room for ~~agreement provided that~~
reaching an understanding;
~~Japanese give up her conquest~~
that so long as the Japanese Government authorities
~~do not expect anything of Japan~~ so
termed the United States' actions as an "encircling"
~~long as she calls what the U.S. has done~~
policy, there was nothing to be expected
~~an enveloping policy,"~~ said he. "We
from Japan; that, whereas they / the Americans /
~~are going~~ ^{wish} to lead a peaceful life, but

it is Hitler's way of acting to smash

up ~~with~~ everything that lies in his ~~advice~~ ^{way},
in the name of
~~and that~~ "self-defence",

~~By this~~ The Secretary of State apparently used a satire

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against Japan in saying so.
~~he concluded, dropping a hint that~~
~~seemed to imply Japan.~~

No matter how much we may
explain, it is now difficult to make
~~(the other side)~~ ^{our country} them understand ~~the~~ intentions, ~~of~~
~~the Empire~~ and, besides, we can ^{unmistakably}
~~correctly~~ notice, that the U. S. Government ^{has made}
up its mind to cope with whatever situation
~~settles its resolution to face the~~
that might arise.
~~word.~~

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Friday, Aug. 8, 1941.

Visit to ~~State~~ ^{of State} Secretary Hull on ^{the} 8th.

(No. 671) At ^{12:}~~10:~~45 p.m. the ~~State~~ Secretary of
~~State~~ ^{to me} handed the reply to our proposals ~~of~~
the 6th. The reply, ~~was~~ just as the
President had told me, ~~nothing~~ did not
yield a single ~~point~~ ^{step}.

Further, I stated strongly the
substance of your telegraphic instructions
and then proposed ~~a committee~~ ^{the holding of a meeting}

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of the ^{leaders} ~~governments~~ of both countries
in Hawaii.

~~Thereupon~~ the ~~State~~ Secretary ^{of State pointed out} ~~that~~ that,

while ~~he~~ recuperating at the White
Sulphur Springs, ^{he received information} ~~he~~ told that the Japanese

Government had decided to use armed

force, ^{and that since then} ~~there~~ ^{had been} Japanese carrying out

steadily his decision. ^{As this ~~was~~ was} ~~that~~ inconsistent

with what ^{he had been} ~~he~~ ^{had been} talking over with

me ^{he said that so long as} ~~you~~ ~~think~~ ~~there~~ ~~are~~ ~~no~~ ~~traces~~ ~~of~~ ~~any~~

there was no change in this policy. There

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(The ~~State~~ ^{of State} Secretary had already repeated that twice, while Welles ~~had said~~ ^{had} ~~once~~ ^{once} said)

(That the turn of expression ~~was~~ ^{was} similar to that ~~used~~ ^{used} by Germany).

Thereupon I pointed out that, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.A. ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ a very safe position

~~stands~~ ^{stands} ~~at~~ ^{at} a point of national defence, ~~she~~ ^{she} ~~is~~ ^{is} speaking of various dangers and

~~she~~ ^{she} ~~is~~ ^{is} explaining ~~the~~ ^{the} necessity of strengthening her

national defence, ~~the~~ ^{the} lengthening of

the term of military and naval service,

and ~~the~~ ^{of} increasing ~~of~~ ^{of} taxes, ~~she~~ ^{she} ~~is~~ ^{is} saying that

~~various~~ ^{various} ~~kinds~~ ^{kinds} of dangers. (it was the

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I declared that
~~I said~~ same with Japan. What Japan had done
or ~~is~~ ^{was} doing ~~is~~ ^{was} necessary to warn and
awake the people, said I.

In ^{short,} ~~an~~ word, what the other party
insists on is that America will resume
the conversations ^{only if} ~~when~~ Japan suspends
the use of armed force. In this respect,
the other side will never retreat and so long
~~that is no longer any room for us to~~
~~as~~ ~~side~~ there is no change in our policy,
~~proceed as stated if you are resolved~~
there is no longer any room for proceeding
~~with the talks~~ and if you make no
with the talks. Accordingly, please

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Wanted in your policies, so I wish
you take ~~it~~ into consideration ~~to~~
the matter of
conveying your intentions through
Grew as occasion demands.

(Despatched, 6 p.m., 8th)

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Saturday, Aug. 9, 1941.

No. 673. Though ~~it is not yet possible~~
to ~~find out~~ ^{find out}

The actual nature of the interview
between Roosevelt and Churchill, of
which I reported to you yesterday, ^{rumors have it that} the
brains of the Army and the Navy here
being ~~said to have~~ ^{are} participated in it.
That, and there ^{is also} ~~being~~ a rumor that
that they ~~are going to make~~ ^{will issue} a joint
statement concerning the Far

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Eastern problems, ~~But~~ Also in
consideration of the fact that the
relations between America ^{and} Britain
_{on the one side} and the Soviet Union _{on the other} are becoming
closer and closer, the Far Eastern
_{whether in the north or south,} ^{the}
problems ~~have~~ become ~~more~~ common
^{problem}
~~questions~~ of the aforesaid states and
there is no doubt ~~that~~ that they will
carry out concerted action or parallel
operations on every occasion, ~~and~~

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Besides, China and the Netherlands Indies
will ~~seem~~ to follow their example, Therefore
I ~~report the above mentioned~~ ^{make this report even if it be} to you
a duplication
regardless of repetition.

(Despatched in the afternoon of Sat., Aug. 9)

Despatched, Aug. 9. No. 674

Upon the President's return

I will endeavor to convince ~~the~~ him.

~~President~~ of the point of your telegram.

waiting for his return, However, as I

have reported ⁱⁿ ~~through~~ my ^{previous successive} telegrams

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and after that, so long as ~~you~~ Japan
~~proceeds~~ proceeds with the present
policy, the U.S. will ^{too} ~~also~~ stick ~~to~~
~~to her own policy.~~ ^{to her own policy.}
thems consistently. (In view of the

U.S. Government's attitude which regards that
our ^{advance into} ~~occupation~~ of the southern part of
French Indo-China has ^{made the trend} ~~the clear~~
of our country's policy definite)
~~manifestation of a decided trend of~~
Japanese policies (on this point, both
the President and the ~~State~~ ^{of State} Secretary are of

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(the same
a mind), I ~~think~~ ~~think~~ ~~think~~ thinks it is difficult to move
the other party by merely having the
~~expression of the Premier~~ ~~methodical~~
Premier come out in person / to carry on
~~the negotiations~~
the negotiations.)

~~to the Premier~~ ~~it is~~ ~~of~~ ~~some~~ ~~move~~

~~the other party~~ (This is clearly ~~from my~~ ~~it~~

interviews on the 6th and the 8th). Almost

no hopes ~~will~~ ^{should} be ~~entertained~~ ^{placed on} ~~of~~ ^{the} coming

interview ^{with} between the President ~~and me~~,

Accordingly, I believe that we cannot ~~develop~~ ^{find a}
~~way out of~~)

the situation unless ~~some~~ ^{some} ~~measures~~ ^{steps} some measure
(Your Government)

that would ^{bring about a} ~~change~~ ⁱⁿ change of the U.S. policies
(Despatched, 4 p.m., Aug. 9)

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Wednesday, Aug. 13, 1941.

Visit to Walker on ^{the} 13th

Today (Wednesday, ^{the} 13th) I had a talk with Walker. He ~~concluded~~ ^{judged} that the advance ^{into} ~~occupation~~ of French Indo-China had ^{after all,} been carried out, in concert with Hitler ^{after all,} and that Hitler had ^{brought} ~~put~~ considerable pressure ^{to bear} upon the French ^{puppet} Government, his political marionette.

As he ^{said that he} was of ^{the same} opinion ^{as} the

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President and the ~~State~~ ^{of State} Secretary regards
on the question of maintaining
~~ing the maintenance of~~ peace in the Pacific,

I retorted ~~that~~ ^{while} it was impossible to ~~evacuate~~ ^{withdraw}
~~any~~ the troops at once, ^{from French Indo-China, I thought} ~~but that~~ it would be
realized at a certain ^{opportune} time, as ^{declared by} the Japanese
Government had ~~pronounced~~.

Then, referring to the ~~convention~~ ^{meeting of}
~~between~~ the ^{heads} governing bodies of both
countries, I told him that, if ~~we~~ ^{such a meeting}
~~convention~~ ^{is held,} ~~we~~ ^{unable to}
~~materialize it~~ we might find out some
measure which would be tolerably

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acceptable to both sides from a broad point of view,
for the general ~~situation~~ ^{view} if ~~it~~ it might

^{not be} satisfactory. ~~we~~ ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~kept~~ ~~promised~~ ~~to~~

talk it over with Hatchell, although he did

not seem to be much interested in it, he
said that he would talk it over with Hull.

~~Another point~~ ~~was~~ ~~made~~ ~~that~~ ~~we~~ ~~found~~

Next I pointed out that
accounts in the press, ^{indicated} that the U. S. Fleet

would ^{be assigned to and concentrated in} ~~take charge of~~ the Pacific, ~~and~~

~~concentrate their power in it, and~~ that

the British and American Navies would
pool their ^{strength} ~~force~~ and

post necessary forces in the Pacific.

I further pointed out

~~pooling their resources, and~~ that ~~it was~~

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not a few persons had declared
~~that the opinion confined to a few people~~

that ~~the~~ American attention of late had
been ~~centered~~^{focused} on Japan rather than

on Germany, and that in ~~the~~ Congressional
quarters ~~the~~^{agreement} ~~of~~^{of} opinion ~~was~~^{was} easily
possible in respect to the policy ~~against~~^{against} Japan.
~~There was a wide agreement.~~

Though he did not ~~venture to deny this,~~^{venture to deny this,}

~~denying it~~, he stated that ^{since} the Jap-

anese Navy ~~being~~^{was} highly trained, should

it act in concert with Germany, it would

be able to ~~bring about~~^{cause} a great "trouble"