

Doc. 3332 Evid

Folder 12

(13)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3332

11 December 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Excerpt from Nurnberg Court Record

Date: 11 Feb 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

IPS Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nurnberg Court Record

PERSONS IMPLICATED: None

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: German Aggression Against
Soviet Union

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Cross examination before the Nurnberg International Tribunal of
Paulus, former Field Marshall of the German Army, by USSR General Rudenko.

Analyst: JAMES HOYT

Doc. No. 3332

Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of The United States of America, the French Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 11 February 1946, 1400 to 1730 hours, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.

MAJ. GENERAL ZORYA: Mr. President, following the statement made by the Russian Delegation, I will ask for permission to cross-examine the former Field Marshal of the German Army, Paulus, who will be cross-examined by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the witness may be brought in.
(The witness took his place in the box)

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q Will you please tell me your name?

A Paulus.

Q Will you repeat this oath after me? "I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing?"

(The Witness repeated the oath)

Would you like to sit down?

BY GENERAL RUDENKO:

Q Your name is Friedrich Paulus?

A Yes.

Q You were born in 1890?

A 1890.

Q You were born in the village of Breitenau, in Kassel?

A Yes.

Q By nationality you are a German?

A Yes.

Q You are a former Field Marshal of the German Army?

A Yes.

Q Your last official position was Commander of the Sixth Army at Leningrad?

A Yes.

Q Will you please tell us, Witness, whether you have given a statement to the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics?

A. Yes, I gave it to them.

Q You are confirming such statement.

A Yes, I confirm that.

Q Tell us, please, Witness, what you know regarding the preparation by the German High Command of the armed attack on the Soviet Union.

A From personal experience, I can state the following:

On the 3rd of September, 1940, I took office with the High Command in the General Staff. I was a General Quartermaster and as such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and in addition carried out the instructions of an operational nature which he delegated to me.

When I took office I found in my sphere of work, or influence, among other things, a still uncompleted ^{operational} plan which concerned itself with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational work or scheme had been carried through by the then General Major, Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose temporarily had been taken over to the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chief of the Army, Halder, gave the development of this plan into my hands and on the following basis:

There was to be a check of the possibilities of an attack against the Soviet Union, covering the territory, or terrain, the strength of the attack, the manpower to be needed, and so forth. For this purpose there was also mentioned that about 130 ^{to} 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. In addition, from the beginning we were to keep in mind taking Roumania into consideration as far as this operation was concerned. The north wing was to include Finland, but this was problematical and was not included in the general plan.

Then, in addition, as a basis for this work which was to be undertaken, the intention of the OKW--the purpose of this operation was to be first the destruction of the Russian Army in the West, Russia, and to prevent them from getting into Russia

As Point 2, the reaching of the line from which the Russian air arm could not effectively attack Germany.

And the last point was the reaching of the line, the Volga-Archangelsk.

The working out or preparation which I just outlined was completed at the beginning of November through two attacks with which I was concerned. The officers of the General Staff entrusted with this work, as a basis for the attacks, assumed that to the south one army was to be redeployed from the South of Poland and from Roumania, with the idea of reaching the Dnieper River. To the north of this area there was to be one army group and the strongest around Warsaw; and to the north, to reach Minsk, Smolensk and later to push through to Moscow.

Then there was to be a third army group, the Group North, to be taken from the area of East Prussia to push through the Baltic regions toward Leningrad.

And the conclusions which were taken from these plans was that the Dnieper was to be reached and Smolensk and Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried on according to developments, and to plan accordingly.

In connection with this, for these undertakings, and for the evaluation of all victories, there were to be several conferences through the General Staff Chief of the Army, that of the Army Groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, through the Chief of that time, Colonel Kinsel, there was a speech about Russia, describing the geographic and economic situation, about the Red Army, and so forth. And the significant point of this speech was that some preparations for an attack by Russia was not known. With these maneuvers and conferences as I have just described there were theoretical discussions and plans for this offensive and after conclusion of these conferences, the scheme of the attack was considered concluded and ready.

At this time--that is, on the 10th of December 1940, the Over-Commander gave our Directive No. 20, and this directive as issued was the basis for all military and economic preparations. And these directions or instructions were to be carried out in such a way that deployment of troops was made ready and developed. These first directives for the deployment of troops in February, 1941, were confirmed by Hitler and they concerned themselves with all these measures and were made known to the troops. Then several supplementary directives were issued.

For the beginning of the attack, the Over-Commander counted on the period of time which would make it possible to carry large movements of troops in Russia, and all preparations were concluded. Then at the end of March Hitler decided to make a change because of his desire to attack Yugoslavia. Then orders as of the 1st of April were set after that time--

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast.

THE WITNESS: Where shall I begin?

THE PRESIDENT: I think you better begin where you said that at the end Hitler made a change in the plan.

A (continuing): Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date for the beginning of the attack had to be changed by about five weeks. That meant postponement to the last half of June. And indeed, this attack actually took place on the 22nd of June, as planned.

Then, in conclusion, I would like to state that the preparations for this attack on the Soviet Union which actually took place on the 22nd of June had been prepared.

Q In what way and under what circumstances--

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared?

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q Did you give the date from which the preparations went forward?

A I am referring to the 3rd of September 1940, when I assumed office, and my observations refer back to that point.

BY GENERAL RUDENKO:

Q In what way and under what circumstances was the participation in the aggression on Soviet Russia ushered in by the participation of Roumania?

A From personal observation, I can say the following:

In about September 1940, at the time in which I was concerned with the operational workings or preparations for the attack on Russia, and from the beginning, the using of Roumania was envisaged for the marching in, that is the right or south wing of the German Army and that was taken into consideration right from the beginning. Then a military mission at that time headed by Cavalry Leader Hansen was sent to Roumania. Then a whole Panzer Division, the Thirteenth, was transferred to Roumania. For those who knew about the future plans it was obvious that this step could only serve to make ready the future partner in the war for the future plans and steps which we had to take now regarding Hungary.

In December 1940, Colonel Laslow came to the High Command of the Army at Zossen, to the headquarters of the Chief of the Hungarian Operational Group. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization.

The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the question of changing over its units into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized groups such as Panzer Groups. The chief of the Organization and myself advised Colonel Laslow at the same time because several Hungarian commissions were in Berlin. The Hungarian Minister of War was also present at the same time, and we discussed the exchange of supplies or the sending of supplies--German supplies--to Hungary.

It was clear to all of us who were concerned with future plans that all these measures with regard to supplying arms to other armies was only possible at that time when these armies could be used for war, for Germany.

Regarding Hungary, there is a further point I should like to mention: With the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler at the end of March, 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On the 27th or 28th of March I was called to the Reichschancellery in Berlin where at that time there was going on a conference between Hitler, Keitel and Jodl and on which the Chief of the Army had been active. This conference had just been concluded. When I arrived I was advised by the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia and for once to eliminate a flanking movement from the direction of Greece, because there was a rail line leading to the South, and to get this rail line, and then also for the future--for the case "Barbarossa" to keep the right flank clear for this plan, for the carrying out of this plan.

I was charged with the mission and received the required number of officers to go to Vienna to give certain orders to the appropriate officers and then after that to travel on to Budapest to the Hungarian General Staff and to carry out the same mission there and to agree with them on the deployment of German troops in Austrian territory and the participating of Hungarian troops in the attack against Yugoslavia.

On the 30th of March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with General Wertz, then with the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laslow. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly and the desired result was achieved. The result was then written down on a card, and on the card that I received from the General Staff of Hungary was contained the deployment against Yugoslavia, the deployment

of Yugoslavia as envisaged, and also the manpower in the Carpathian sector was discussed. This was to protect the rear against the Soviet Union and the fact was a sign that even on the side of Hungary the realization was that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.

As a matter of principle, principally, the taking in of Hungary into the preparation of these plans and later on into the carrying out of these plans as far as that is concerned at that time I received the attitude of Hitler and it was as follows:

Hitler thought that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture the areas which she had lost in the First World War. And in addition, they were afraid that Roumania, which was an Ally of Germany and might push them into the back ground. As far as this attitude was concerned, Hitler thought Hungary in line with his ideas. But he was, ^{AS} we we could see from various examples, very cautious toward Hungary, and for two reasons: For one, he did not believe Hungary; and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many promises at too early a stage, and I can cite one example: The question of the oil regions. Later when the attack was begun that is the attack against Russia, the Seventeenth Army which was fighting at that point had the emphatic order at all costs to take this before the arrival of the Hungarians.

Regarding this future partner, according to my observation, the strategy of Hitler was such that as far as certain participation was concerned he counted on it and sent armaments and help but he was not certain when he went to make all his plans and did not set a certain time when to initiate Hungary into his plans.

Then we come to the Finnish question. In December, 1940, the first visit of the Finnish General Staff Chief took place at Zossen. General Heinrichs had a conference with the General Chief of the Army, but I can't remember the contents of the speech out of this conference. But he did make a speech about the Finno-Russian War of 1939-1940. He gave this speech before the officers of the General Staff of the Army and told his officers who were present at the time -- that is in connection with the discussion of the Eastern plans -- this speech before these officers had quite a significance at that time, because it coincided in time with the directive issued in December.

This speech was significant in that battle experiences with the Red Army were made clear and a judgment of the Finnish troops -- that is, for future plans by the Germans-- could be made known.

Then there was a second visit of this Finnish General Staff Chief. That was at Zossen at the headquarters, and it was perhaps in the second half of March, 1941. The Chief of Staff of Finland arrived from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The contents of these conferences with the Chief of Staff was the cooperation of the Southern Finnish Manpower with the Operation Barbarossa, and working together with the Army Group North which was to come from East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was reached that the Finnish troops were to be determined according to the pushing forward of the German Army Group North and the later command pushing forward towards Leningrad. That was to depend on later agreements according to the development of events.

Those are the personal observations which I myself made in the beginning, and the drawing together of the analysis into a common action.

Q In what way was the attack on the USSR carried out by the German troops under the High Command?

A Will you please repeat the question. I did not quite get it.

Q How, and under what circumstances, was the armed attack on the USSR carried out, the attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite government and the High Command of the German Army?

A The attack on Russia took place as I described, after a plan which had been prepared much in advance and had been prepared very carefully. The troops involved in this attack had been assembled, and only on special instructions were they taken group by group into the line of future deployment and then, on this whole long front, from Rumania to Eastern Prussia, they were to be ready. Of course, Finland was excluded from this.

The troops were assembled along this front for a simultaneous attack, and the operational plan on a large scale, as I described in the beginning, was tried out mentally, so to speak. Then, the deployment and marching up of troops in detail, in groups, corps, divisions, was discussed in detail and was put in order in the smallest detail, much before the beginning of the war. Everything was ready.

A deceptive measure was directed and organized from Norway and the coast of France. The purpose of a landing in England in June 1941 was to be pretended, and attention was to be diverted from the East through this pretense. Not only the operational carrying out, but the tactical surprise was planned well in advance. For instance, the prohibition of the boundaries before the beginning of the war means/possible losses and the loss was to be a sacrifice for the element of surprise. On the other hand, the element of surprise across the boundary from the enemy was not expected. ✓

All of these measures showed that a criminal attack was underfoot.

Q In what way did you determine the aims which were pursued by Germany in attacking Soviet Russia?

A The purpose of attacking the Volga Line, which was far beyond German strength, is characteristic of the boundless ambition of Hitler and of the nationalist regime. As far as strategy is concerned, the reaching of these aim would have been the destruction of the manpower of the Soviet Union, the ~~fighting~~^{fighting} forces of the Soviet Union. With the winning of this line there would have been conquered the chief areas of Soviet Russia, with the capital Moscow, and the political and ^{economic} center, the focal point of the Soviet Union.

Economically, the reaching of this line would have been significant. It would have meant the possession of the most important nutritional areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production of Russia, and also the communications not of Russia, that is, European Russia.

Hitler was very strong on the winning of economic aims in this war. Just how strongly he felt on this point I can cite through a personal example that I describe. In June of 1943, the first of June, at a conference regarding the army group south in Poltava, Hitler declared:

"If I do not get the oil of Maikob and Prosnia, then I must quit this war.

For the spoliation and the administration of the areas which were to be conquered, economic and administrative organs had been envisaged before the beginning of the war, and everything had been placed in readiness.

Then, in conclusion, as a comprehensive remark, I would like to state that the aims as mentioned meant the conquering, for the purpose of colonization, of Russian areas and territories, and through their use and spoliation, and through

the means gained therefrom, the war in the West was to be concluded with the setting up of German domination of Europe.

Q And the last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of the initiation of the criminal war against Soviet Russia?

A May I please have the question repeated?

GENERAL RUDENKO: May I repeat the question?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have just put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory, is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his opinion.

Is that what counsel for the defense wish to object to?

DR. LATERNSEER (Counsel for the General Staff): Yes, Mr. President, that was to be the observation.

GENERAL RUDENKO:

Q Then perhaps the Tribunal will permit me to put this question in another way.

Who of the defendants was an active participant in the initiation of war against the Soviet Union?

A As far as the defendants are concerned, I would say the most important military advisers to Hitler. That would be Chief of Staff Keitel, Chief of the Operational Branch Jodl, and Goering, in his duty as Reichsmarshal, as Commander of the Air Forces, and as Plenipotentiary for Armament Measures.

Q In conclusion, I will summarize what I concluded from your testimony, that long before the 22nd of June the Hitlerite Government and the High Command were planning an aggressive war against the Soviet Union for the purpose of colonizing the territory of the Soviet Union.

the means gained therefrom, the war in the West was to be concluded with the setting of German domination of Europe.

Q - And the last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of the initiation of the criminal war against Soviet Russia?

A - May I please have the question repeated?

GENERAL RUDENKO: May I repeat the question?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have just

A: I have no doubt of that according to the developments as I pictured them, and also in connection with all the directives as they were contained in the well-known Green file.

GENERAL RUDENKO: I have no more questions, Mr. President.

I. P. S. FILE UNIT

DATE: 22 Jan. 1918

I. P. S. Evidentiary Document Number 3332

has been received in the Office of the Clerk of the Court.

Signature: *H. Haine*
For Clerk of Court

CHARGE OUT CLIP

DATE: 11 Dec 1947

EVIDENTIARY I.C. NO. 3332

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT DOC. NO. _____

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

FILE NO. _____

PRESTRAID _____

U.S.S.F.S. _____

DEFENSE DOC. NO. _____

Signature H Petrov

Room # 358