

INTERP OF T&G D, SHIGENORI
11 MAR. 46 (1000-1300)

DOC 4115

(8)

(22)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

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5/11/46

Exhibit # 1207 (2d)
1207 A.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours (page 1)

- Q. Who would be considered responsible, who would you consider responsible for the composition of that note?
- A. That notification, as I have previously explained, was a summation of the results of the studies and discussions which took place at the liaison conferences regarding negotiations with the United States. The note itself was written by the Foreign Office, but the responsibility for the composition rests with the participating members of the liaison conferences. The responsibility for the contents of the notification rests with the members of the liaison conferences. Furthermore, the matter was also reported to the Cabinet and passed the Cabinet without objection.
- Q. Could you give me the names of the individuals at the liaison conferences and the Cabinet members who would be considered responsible for the contents of the note?
- A. As I have said at a previous meeting, members of a liaison conference who were responsible for the study and discussions on the matter were TOJO, SHIMADA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TSUKADA, ITO, KAYA, SUZUKI, and the three secretaries, HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA. As to the members of the Cabinet, under the constitution they are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, even on matters outside of the competence of their respective offices.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours (page 3)

- Q. I understood from you that the note was composed by the Foreign Office after the contents of what the note should contain had been decided upon at the liaison conferences. I also understand that after the note was composed by the Foreign Office it was presented for approval to the Cabinet on December 1, 1941, at which time the Cabinet approved it. Is my understanding correct?
- A. The first part of your understanding is correct, that is, that the writing of the note took place in accordance with the decision of the liaison conference as to its contents. However, I should like to make some correction as to the date. December 1 was the date of the Imperial Conference, at which the decision for war was made. However, previous to the Imperial Conference the main points of the note to be sent were reported to the Cabinet; but as to the drafting of the note, that came afterwards, and at a later Cabinet meeting the main points were further explained and the continuation of the explanation that was made at the former Cabinet meeting. I cannot recall definitely, but it seems to be around November 30, but I could have the date more definitely confirmed later.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours
(bottom of page 4 and top of page 5)

Q. From what you have stated would you consider that the members of the Cabinet and members of the liaison conference, whose names you have mentioned, are equally responsible with you as regards to the contents of the note and its delivery?

A. As to the contents of the note, I think it is but natural that all the members of the liaison conference are responsible. As to the Cabinet, they would have at least a final responsibility in that they expressed no objection, that is, from the legal point of view. Of course, it all depends whether you view the matter superficially or formally, or whether you would like to view it more profoundly. But, practically speaking, in the light of actualities it might be said that there is a difference in the degree of responsibility by the liaison conference and the Cabinet because not all the Cabinet members attended the liaison conference, but the situation was such that whatever was approved by the liaison conference was approved by the Cabinet. Although there may be a difference in degree of responsibility, the Cabinet might have at least a nominal responsibility.

Q. Who knew and approved of the details concerning the manner of the delivery of the note?

A. As to the delivery of the note, instructions were sent previously to the Embassy in Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1:00 PM, December 7, Washington time, as much as possible to the Secretary of State, and that all preparations be made for the purpose of delivering the note at the specified time. The instructions themselves were dispatched by the Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Office. Regarding the sending of such instructions, all members of the liaison conference knew. It is naturally a matter on which there should be no objections, and, therefore, it was approved as a matter of course.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours
(bottom of page 5 and top of page 6)

- Q. Why was England not advised of declaration of war?
- A. In the latter stages of the negotiations, when I became Foreign Minister, our relations with Britain were naturally considered. As a matter of fact, in case understanding was reached with the United States, agreements with Britain, the Netherlands, and other countries concerned would be necessary. Therefore, inquiry was made of the United States government on this matter. Regarding this point the Secretary of State informed Ambassador NOMURA that such matters would be handled by the United States and that the United States government would duly inform Britain and the other countries concerned. That being the case, it was not considered necessary to make any notification in London, since it would be going from Washington. However, on the morning of December 8, Tokyo time, shortly after the visit of Ambassador GREW at 7:00 AM, I asked for the visit of Ambassador CRAGIE of Britain. At that time I informed the British Ambassador the results of our negotiations with the United States and for reference gave him a copy of the Japanese note to the United States. Thereafter, around noon, the British Ambassador was duly notified, in writing, that a state of war existed between Japan and Britain. And, as I recall it, that notification was delivered before the commencement of hostilities with Great Britain.

Doc. No. 4115

Shigenori TOGO

11 March 1946
1000-1200 hours

Certificate of Stenographer:

I, Mildred Rich, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out herewith, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Mildred Rich

Certificate of Interrogator:

I, Roy L. Morgan, certify that on 11 March 1946 Shigenori TOGO personally gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth herein.

/s/ Roy L. Morgan

EP 4115

INTERROGATION OF

Shigenori TOGO

Date and Time: 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours

Place : Togo Residence, Tokyo

Present : Shigenori TOGO
Toshiro Shimanouchi, Japanese national, Interpreter
Fumihiko Togo, son of Shigenori TOGO
Mr. Roy L. Morgan, Interrogator
Mildred Rich, Stenographer

Questions by Mr. Morgan

- Q. As I understand, Mr. TOGO, that final note which was sent on December 7, 1941 (Tokyo time) to NOMURA in Washington was not a declaration of war but a final note breaking off negotiations.
- A. As I said before, the final notification of the Japanese government was to be delivered by the Ambassadors in Washington at the instructions of the Japanese government at 3 AM, December 8, Tokyo time. That notification did not contain the words, "declaration of war," but did state the cessation of negotiations and the severance of diplomatic relations, which in the light of the situation prevailing at that time was considered tantamount to a declaration of war.
- Q. Who would be considered responsible, who would you consider responsible for the composition of that note.
- A. That notification, as I have previously explained, was a summation of the results of the studies and discussions which took place at the liaison conferences regarding negotiations with the United States. The note itself was written by the Foreign Office, but the responsibility for the composition rests with the participating members of the liaison conferences. The responsibility for the contents of the notification rests with the members of the liaison conferences. Furthermore, the matter was also reported to the Cabinet and passed the Cabinet without objection.
- Q. Could you give me the names of the individuals at the liaison conferences and the Cabinet members who would be considered responsible for the contents of the note.
- A. As I have said at a previous meeting, members of a liaison conference who were responsible for the study and discussions on the matter were TOJO, SHIMADA, SUGIYAMA, HAGANO, TSUKADA, ITO, KAYA, SUZUKI, and the three secretaries HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA. As to the members of the Cabinet, under the constitution they are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, even on matters outside of the competence of their respective offices.

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Shigenori TOGO

11 March 1946

- Q. In discussing the contents of what the final notification note should contain, did all persons just mentioned by you take into consideration the international law prevailing or treaties that were in existence at the time.
- A. As I said in a previous meeting, when the question of procedure in giving notification was brought up in the liaison conference, I contended that a note declaring war or some final ultimatum was the best procedure. As against this contention of mine, the high command, more specifically the navy high command, ITO and NAGANO, declared that giving such notification was undesirable in giving the greatest possible effect to the opening of hostilities and requested that no notification be given. I recall NAGANO was having stressed the necessity of "surprise attack." However, as a result of my strong objection, the question was not settled then and there. Thereafter, ITO frequently approached me requesting my acceptance of the navy's point of view, but as the result of my continued objection, it was finally decided in the manner I explained previously: to carry on a surprise attack, but to give due notification to the United States government. The arrangement finally made was reported to the liaison conference, which approved of it without objection. There were no arguments against the arrangements agreed upon. The procedure was also reported to the Cabinet, which also approved of it without objection and no discussion.
- Q. I understand that all members of the liaison conference, and the Cabinet members who were not present at the liaison conference, were well aware of the international law and treaties then in existence. Am I correct.
- A. I presume also.
- Q. As Foreign Minister, you were well acquainted with the international law and treaties then in existence.
- A. I am not a specialist on international law, but I have fairly well rounded knowledge of the subject, or a general knowledge of the subject, and in settling various questions I have naturally consulted various reference books on international law and treaties and also, in this case, consulted international law scholars.
- Q. Naturally, from this, Japan, represented by all members of the Cabinet and those present at the liaison conferences, considered itself bound by international law and treaties to which Japan was a party.
- A. Of course. I can confidently say that all, whether at the liaison conference or the Cabinet, gave great importance on acting in conformance with international law and treaties to which Japan was a party, and to which Japan is bound.

Shigenori TOGO

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- Q. You have stated your reasons why Japan did not insert in the final note that a declaration of war existed, however, did you not personally feel that the United States was entitled to have received a declaration of war rather than the final note which you call an ultimatum.
- A. It is difficult to consider from the standpoint of law whether the United States was "entitled to", as you say, a declaration of war, for on that matter Japan had a different view. Since you have asked for my personal feeling on the subject, I will say from the very outset I had considered a note declaring war, or an ultimatum with time limit, more desirable. It thus becomes a question of policy, and if I am to speak on that, as I explained before, the attack took place about a half an hour after the time set for the delivery of the note; and, as I have said before, I protested to ITO that if the attack was to take place such a short time after the delivery of the note, why had the navy hesitated in the first place regarding the issuance of a notification of war. As I have said before, ITO's reply to my protest was evasive, and even to this day the navy attitude and their psychology remains unclear to me.
- Q. I understood from you that the note was composed by the Foreign Office after the contents of what the note should contain had been decided upon at the liaison conferences. I also understand that after the note was composed by the Foreign Office it was presented for approval to the Cabinet on December 1, 1941, at which time the Cabinet approved it. Is my understanding correct.
- A. The first part of your understanding is correct, that is, that the writing of the note took place in accordance with the decision of the liaison conference as to its contents. However, I should like to make some correction as to the date. December 1 was the date of the Imperial Conference, at which the decision for war was made. However, previous to the Imperial Conference the main points of the note to be sent were reported to the Cabinet; but as to the drafting of the note, that came afterwards, and at a later Cabinet meeting the main points were further explained and the continuation of the explanation that was made at the former Cabinet meeting. I cannot recall definitely, but it seems to be around November 30, but I could have the date more definitely confirmed later.
- Q. May I ask when the note was finally composed and approved. I mean by that, on what date.
- A. I think it was around the 5th of December.
- Q. I understand from what you have said that it was decided that the note should be delivered at 1:00 PM, December 7, Washington time, and since that is the case, why was it not sent to Admiral NOMURA on December 5 after it had been completely written and approved.

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- A. The composition of the note was completed on the 5th, and in my recollection it was reported to the Cabinet on the 6th and that the telegram was dispatched on the same day, that is the 6th. There were no delays in the sending of the telegram, but being a very lengthy note some amount of time was required in sending it off. These dates mentioned were Tokyo time.
- Q. Do you not think that the time in preparing the note after the details of what it should contain were decided on November 30 was too long.
- A. As you say, it seems that considerable time was consumed, but before the final draft was approved the note went through a series of many revisions. The two secretaries of the liaison conference, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, MUTO, and the Chief of the Navy Affairs Bureau, OKA, were in frequent contact with the Foreign Office in connection with the drafting of the note. They represented the driving force of the time, that is, the Army War Office and the Army General Staff and the Navy Office and the Navy General Staff; and on practical matters these two men represented these two fighting services in making frequent contacts with the Foreign Office in the making of the draft. As a consequence, many revisions were gone through. Being personally interested in the process and course of the revision that was gone through, I wanted to have some concrete materials on the subject, that is, the copies of the many revisions that were made at the time. But I found out that these materials, too, had been destroyed in the air raid; and, therefore, I am not able to offer substantial materials to explain my point. Had I had such materials, I could more clearly explain some of the reasons for the delay that was taken in completing the draft of the note.
- Q. Where were these revisions kept.
- A. I am not familiar with the details, but it is my understanding that they were kept in the files of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office.
- Q. Do you have any substantial reason to believe that the army and navy, through OKA and MUTO, caused the delay to be intentional by always making suggestions and revisions.
- A. No, I do not think so. The delays were caused by frequent revisions in phraseology and I do not think it proper to say that the army and navy had any such intentions.
- Q. From what you have stated would you consider that the members of the Cabinet and members of the liaison conference, whose names you have mentioned, are equally responsible with you as regards to the contents of the note and its delivery.

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- A. As to the contents of the note, I think it is but natural that all the members of the liaison conference are responsible. As to the cabinet, they would have at least a final responsibility in that they expressed no objection, that is, from the legal point of view. Of course, it all depends whether you view the matter superficially or formally, or whether you would like to view it more profoundly. But, practically speaking, in the light of actualities it might be said that there is a difference in the degree of responsibility by the liaison conference and the Cabinet because not all the Cabinet members attended the liaison conference, but the situation was such that whatever was approved by the liaison conference was approved by the Cabinet. Although there may be a difference in degree of responsibility, the Cabinet might have at least a nominal responsibility.
- Q. Who knew and approved of the details concerning the manner of the delivery of the note.
- A. As to the delivery of the note, instructions were sent previously to the Embassy in Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1:00 PM, December 7, Washington time, as much as possible to the Secretary of State, and that all preparations be made for the purpose of delivering the note at the specified time. The instructions themselves were dispatched by the Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Office. Regarding the sending of such instructions, all members of the liaison conference knew. It is naturally a matter on which there should be no objections, and, therefore, it was approved as a matter of course.
- Q. Did you know that the Emperor was angry about the manner in which the note was delivered.
- A. As explained before, the delivery of the note was delayed for technical reasons, and it is regarding this delay that the Emperor was dissatisfied and displeased.
- Q. Why was England not advised of declaration of war.
- A. In the latter stages of the negotiations, when I became Foreign Minister, our relations with Britain were naturally considered. As a matter of fact, in case understanding was reached with the United States, agreements with Britain, the Netherlands, and other countries concerned would be necessary. Therefore, inquiry was made of the United States government on this matter. Regarding this point the Secretary of State informed Ambassador NOMURA that such matters would be handled by the United States and that the United States government would duly inform Britain and the other countries concerned. That being the case, it was not considered necessary to make any notification in London, since it would be going from Washington. However, on the morning of December 8, Tokyo time, shortly after the visit of Ambassador CREW at 7:00 AM, I asked for the visit of Ambassador CRAGIE of Britain. At that time I informed the British Ambassador the results of our negotiations with

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Shigenori TOGO

11 March 1946

A. (con'd)

the United States and for reference gave him a copy of the Japanese note to the United States. Thereafter, around noon, the British Ambassador was duly notified, in writing, that a state of war existed between Japan and Britain. And, as I recall it, that notification was delivered before the commencement of hostilities with Great Britain.

Q. As I understand, that notification to Great Britain clearly stated that a state of war existed between Japan and Great Britain.

A. Yes.

Q. Why was not the Netherlands advised that Japan was at war with that country.

A. I think the Netherlands were informed. I think that notification was delivered to the Netherlands legation in Tokyo about the same time as the notification to Great Britain.

Q. Going back to the note which was sent to Washington. Were NOMURA and KURUSU informed before the delivery of the note that war had been decided upon at the liaison conferences, or at the Cabinet meeting, or at the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941.

A. No such terms as "declaration of war" were used, but they were informed that the negotiations may be ceased, or that diplomatic relations may be ruptured, or that the worst may come, and that some such decision may be forthcoming, and they sufficiently understood that the situation was such that it might lead to war.

Q. When were they so informed.

A. The decision for war was made on December 1, but even before then and about once or twice thereafter the Ambassadors were informed that some decision by the Imperial and other conferences ~~may~~ be forthcoming.

Q. After the final decision was made on December 1, 1941, why were NOMURA and KURUSU told to keep talking.

A. Because there was at least the slightest hope that at the last moment the United States might change its attitude, and on account of that hope efforts were made to urge such a change on the part of the United States. This was done in the hope that at the last minute some sudden change in the situation might occur.

Q. What information was given to the Emperor at the time of the delivery of the note.

A. That the delivery of the note was delayed and that the hostilities began before the delivery of the note we were informed by American short wave broadcasts. This information I myself reported to the Emperor, and I explained at that time that there was no way of knowing why the delay was caused until NOMURA returned to Japan, since communications, both incoming and outgoing, had been cut off.

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- Q. How early after hostilities began did you tell the Emperor about the note.
- A. I do not recall definitely, but I think it was on the first occasion I had for an audience, which was not less than a week after the outbreak of war. I think the Emperor was informed of the matter from other sources, as such information was obtainable by other sources.
- Q. What did the Emperor say at the time of this meeting.
- A. The Emperor expressed displeasure and said that it was unfortunate, and I said that since there were no means of knowing the details then at this time, I told the Emperor the necessity of making inquiries of NOMURA and his staff after their return to Japan.
- Q. When did TOJO discuss with you as to his knowledge of the late delivery of the note.
- A. I think TOJO was informed since such information was available, not only by short wave American broadcasts received by the Foreign Office, but by other means, such as Demci, and he most likely would have been informed by the Board of Information. Shortly after I learned it, I recall having spoken of the matter to TOJO saying that the American report said that the attack had taken place before the delivery of the note and that the President was utilizing this fact in order to enhance animosity against Japan. Since all informed circles were aware of these American broadcasts, and that such an unfortunate occurrence had taken place was known to all well informed circles, and there is no likelihood that TOJO did not know.
- Q. On what date was this.
- A. At least within a week a rather wide circle of people were informed.

No. 1

WX 1207-A

4/15

一九四六年三月十一日(十時ヨリ十二時)附ノ東郷茂徳
ノ訊問書ヨリノ抜萃

同ソノ覚書ノ作成ニ当ツテ誰ガ責任者デアルト考ヘラ
シルカ、由具カハセト思フカ?

答先ニ私が説明シタヤラ、アノ通告ハ合衆口トノ交
渉ニ関スル連絡会議ニ於テ討議研究シタ結
果ノ要點デアツタ。由具カハセテハ外務省ニヨツテ
書カレタガ、作成ノ責任者トシテハ、
タ人カニアル。

ソノ覚書ノ内容ニ対スル責任モ、連絡会議
議員ニカ、ツテ申ル。
更ニ、ソノ問題ハ閣議ニモ附シ異議無ク閣
議ヲ通過シタ。

同コノ覚書ノ内容ニモ責任アリト思ハレル連絡
会議ノ員及閣員個々ノ名前ヲ擧ゲラレルカ?

答先ノ全見ニ於テモ云ツタヤラ、ソノ問題ニツイテ
ノ研究、討議ニ責任アル連絡会議ノ員ハ、



東條、島田、杉山、永野、塚田、伊藤、賀屋、
鈴木、及三名ノ書記官星野、武雄、岡下
ア儿。閣員ニ関シテハ、彼等ハ、憲法上、閣議
決定ニ対シテ、假令其レが閣員ノ擔当以外ノ
事項デアツテモ之ニ対シテ責任カアル。

一九四六年三月十一日(一〇一—二物)附

東郷茂徳ノ訊問書ヨリ

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問、

私ハ貴方ニ伺ヒテ、ソノ覚書ガ、ソレニ含まレシ
ルベキ内容ガ連絡会議デ決定カレタ後、

外務省デ作成サレタモノデアルト解釈シタ。

同時ニ私ハ覚書ガ外務省ニヨツテ作成サレ

タ後、一九四一年/昭和十六年/十二月一日

承諾ヲ得ルタメ閣議ニ提出サレ、ソシテソノ

時閣議ガ之ヲ認可シタト解釈シタ。私

ノ解釈ニ同意シテイカ。

答、
貴方ノ解釈、最初ノ部分ニ正シイ、即チ

覚書作成シノ内容ニ関シテハ連絡會

議ノ決定事項ニ從ツテ爲サレタ。

併シ、日附ニ関シテ、多少訂正シタイ。

十二月一日ハ、閣議ヲ決定シタ序前會議

ノ日デアツタ。之カレ序前會議ノ行ハレル前

ニ送ラルベキ覚書ノ主要項目ハ閣議ニ報

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No 4

告サレタ。シカシ覺書ノ起草ニ関シテハソ
レハ後ニテサレ、ソノ後閣議ニ於テ、主要ナル
ハ更ニ説明サレ、前回閣議ニ於テナサレタ
説明が継続サレタ。私ハツキリ思出スコトハ出
来ナイガ、多分十一月三十日頃ダツタと思
フ。シカシ此ノ日附ハ後デハツキリ調べル
事が出来ル。

一九四六年三月十一日(一〇時—一二時)附

東郷茂徳ノ訊問書ヨリ

4/15

問、貴方が陳述ニテコトカス、貴方が名指シテ所ノ園

議員及連絡会議ニ員ハ、貴方ト同等ニ、覚
書ノ内容及交付ニ関シテ主責任アリト思フ。

答

覚書内容ニ関シテハ、連絡会議々員全員ニ
責任アルコトハ至極当然デアルト思フ。園議ニ

関シテハ、彼等ハ少クモ、何ラノ反対ヲ示サセカツタ
コトニ於テ取極ノ責任ハアルデアラウ。即チ法
律的見地ヨリスレバデアル。又論ッレハ凡テ貴

方がソノ問題ヲ皮相的、若シカハ形式的ニ見ルカ
或ハ、ソレヨリ深ク見ルカ方、ソテ中ルモノデア
ル。シカシ、事實ニ鑑ミテ實際的ニ云ハ、連

絡会議ニル責任ト、園議ニル責任トノ間ニ、
程度ノ差ガアルト云ヒ得ルト思フ。テセテラバ園
員スベテガ連絡会議ニ臨ンダレテ、イカ
ラデアルニカシテ、態ガ有態デアツタカス

答 問

連絡会議が可決サレタコトハ何ニヨラズ内
議がモ可決サレタノデアツタ。責任ノ程度
ニ差コソアルカモシナイガ、内議モソクトモ名
義上ノ責任分ルト思フ。

覚書交付ノ方法ニ関スル詳細ハ誰ガ知ツテ中
タカ、又誰ノ同意ヲ得タカ。

覚書ノ交付ニ関シテハ、豫メワシントンニ於ケ
ル大使館ニ訓示が發セラレ、即チワシントン
刻十二月七日午後一時ニ覚書が成ルベク國務
長官宛ニ渡サレルコト及び指定時刻ニリノ覚
書ヲ交付スル目的ノタメ、凡テノ準備がナサレ
ルコトト云フノデアル。訓示ノモノハ、外務省海陸
電信課長ニヨツテ發送サレタ。此ノ訓示發送
ニ関シテハ、連絡会議ノ全員ガ承知シテ在リ之ハ
当然反對スベキ事柄デハナク故ニ当前ノ事ト
シテ同意サレタワケデアル。

一九四六年三月十一日(一〇)ニ送付

東郷茂徳ノ詔問書ヨリ

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答 問

何故英口ハ宣戰ニ就テ通告サレナカツタカ。
交渉ノ後段ニ至リ、私が外務大臣ニサツタ當時、
我口ノ対英關係ハ自然考慮サレタ。實際
ノ問題トシテ、合衆口トシテ解ガ成止シタ場
合ニ、英、蘭ソノ他關係諸口トシテ協定ガ
必要トサツタ事ルソコデ、コノ問題ニ關シテ、
アメリカニ照会サレタ。コノ英ニ關シテ、口務長
官ハ野村大使ニ斯ル問題ハ合衆口ガ
取扱フシ又合衆口政府ガ正式ニ英口及
關係諸口ニ通告スルデアラウト答ゲタ。
斯ク云フ事情デアツタノデ、ワシントンカ
ラ通告ガ行クコトトシテ、ロンドンニハ何ノ
通告ヲ發スル必要モナイト考ヘラレシ
層ヲ、ニカシ、英ハ東京時刻十二月八日
朝、ブルーム大使ノ午前七時訪問ノ直

後 英口、ソノレ、大使、来訪ヲ請フ
 タ。ソノ時、私ハ、英口大使ニ合衆口トノ交
 渉ノ結果ニ就テ知ラセ、尚、参考ノタ
 メ、日本ノ合衆口ニ対スル覚書ノ寫シ
 ヲ彼ニ渡シタ。
 ソノ後、正午頃、英口大使ハ正式ニ文書
 ニヨツテ、日英ハ戦争状態ニアルコトヲ通
 告サレタ。
 ソシテ、私ノ記憶スル所、デハ、英口ト戦
 争ヲ交ヘル前、ニソノ通告ヲサレタト思
 フ。