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SOLON THE ATHENIAN

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PREFACE

THE present work falls into two distinct parts, a biography of Solon and an edition of the fragments of his poems. The biographical essay should not be regarded as an introduction to the text of the poems and the commentary upon them. Since our knowledge of Solon's life is not extensive and since the fragments of his poems are few, it is possible to include within one small book two things which in other cases would offer material for two separate books. This is in one sense a happy circumstance, because the reader can have before him in brief space all that can be brought together about Solon.

The biographical essay presents the results of a critical study of all the evidence available on the life of Solon. A sceptical attitude has been adopted alike toward ancient legend and modern hypothesis. If the attitude seems oversceptical, this is not much to be regretted; it is better in such a business to tell nothing but the truth than to risk falsehood through fear of not telling the whole truth. But whatever has been rejected has received due consideration in footnotes or appendices.

No critical discussion is offered of Solon's code of laws; indeed, it is not certain that such a discussion would be really fruitful. None at any rate has yet been made.¹ No one has even taken the first step in the investigation and subjected to critical examination all the laws which in ancient times passed as the laws of Solon, with a view to determining just which are authentic and which are not. It may be that so few would be recognized as genuinely Solonian that the next step in the investigation would be impossible. But even if a small body of

¹ Cf. p. 71, footnote 2.

genuinely Solonian laws were recovered, an estimate of their value and significance would still be extremely difficult because of our ignorance of conditions before and after the establishment of the code. If such a study could be successfully carried through, it should yield results of great value for the biographer of Solon, but it must be left to special students of the history of Athenian law.

The reader will miss the extended treatment of certain topics which occupy much of the attention of historians in writing of the period of Solon. The biography does not pretend to offer a comprehensive discussion of the social and economic conditions of Athens, of the state of Athenian law, or of the forms of Athenian government. What is known of the reforms of Solon is the most valuable single piece of evidence for this wider study; there is, indeed, no other direct evidence. It is the task of the general historian and of the student of constitutional and legal antiquities to use this evidence and, with the help of analogy, combination, and conjecture, to attempt to restore the history of pre-Solonian and Solonian times. We cannot say that we have anything more than a hypothetical understanding of the events and institutions of the period. If our knowledge were fairly sure and complete, the biographer of Solon would have no excuse for neglecting the study of the larger movements in which he played a part. A proper biography of a statesman is also a history of his times. In the present instance such a proper biography is impossible. Either one must enter on the broad field of history with scanty evidence and fearless conjecture as his guides; or he must confine himself to the career of Solon and hold fast to sound evidence.

In the arrangement of the poetical fragments editors have usually aimed to observe the chronological order of composition. But no two have adopted the same arrangement, because it is impossible to determine the true chronological order. I have therefore not attempted an arrangement of this sort, pre-

ferring not to leave the reader with an impression of certainty about a thing which is only a matter of opinion. On the other hand, it is very important that the fragments should be read with the context of the passages in which they are quoted; the recognition of this principle leads naturally to an arrangement according to the chronological order of the quoting authors, which is the one adopted.

The text of the fragments has been independently constructed on the basis of the text and critical apparatus of the editions from which the citations are made.¹ The statement of manuscript variants which is given in these editions is accepted as authoritative,² and the same abbreviations and symbols are employed. There are recorded in the textual notes: (1) all cases in which the reading adopted differs from the reading of the edition from which the citation is made; (2) all cases in which the reading adopted, though it is the same as that of the accepted edition, is nevertheless not supported by any good manuscript or is the result of pure conjecture; and (3) all cases in which the reading adopted differs from the reading of the testimonia. Therefore, to put it in summary form, it is to be assumed that the text of this book, the text of the accepted edition of the author who quotes the fragment, at least one good manuscript of that author, and the testimonia (if there are any) are in entire accord, unless divergences are indicated in the textual notes. The only exception to this rule is in matters of spelling. The spelling of the text of Hiller-Crusius has been followed throughout without comment. The principles on which Crusius determined the correct spelling may be found on page v of the *Anthologia Lyrica*. No conjectural emendations, except those which have been admitted into the text, are recorded in the textual notes.

¹ A list of these editions and the editions of the authors from whom the testimonia are drawn will be found in Appendix 9.

² Except in the case of Diogenes Laertius (see commentary on xxxiv).

One remark should be made about the commentary. The many parallel passages which are quoted are not introduced simply because of some curious similarity of form or idea, but because they are thought to contribute to the proper understanding of Solon's verse. Quotations from Homer, Hesiod, and the elegiac poets, in particular, are intended to illustrate forms of thought or speech which were conventional in Solon's time or which he borrowed from others.

I desire to express here my obligation to my friend and colleague, Mr. Torsten Petersson, for the generous assistance which he has afforded me. He has not only read the manuscript through and offered many most valuable suggestions, but, better than this, he has come to my aid with his wise counsel at many perplexing moments during the writing of the book. For these things I am deeply grateful.

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BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

CHAPTER I

RECORD OF SOLON IN ANTIQUITY

1

Lawgiver, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, founder of the Athenian democracy — these are the titles which are associated with the name of Solon in the minds of well informed persons of the present day. If they are pressed a little, these same well informed persons may recall at least one good story about him, the famous story of his interview with Croesus, king of Lydia; and if they are urged to tell how they know these things, they will say without much hesitation that they learned them from the incomparable Plutarch or perhaps read of Croesus in Herodotus. Some, but probably not all, will remember that Solon was a poet as well as a statesman and therefore doubly a representative of the city whose glory springs in large measure from her matchless poetry and her indomitable love of liberty. These random recollections are all true and well founded, and they are enough to show that the man of whom such things can be said deserves to be better known. Whither shall we turn in order to learn more about him? ¹ We can read Plutarch's life again; but can we believe all he tells us? And are there no other ancient records by which we can supplement and correct the account which Plutarch gives? If, in order to answer these questions, we survey the record of Solon in the ancient authors, we shall find that many besides Plutarch had something to say of him. We shall also find that the ancient tradition followed certain well defined lines, which were fixed partly by the historical facts of his career and partly by legends which had become attached to his name. But before

¹ On the sources for Solon in general, consult Busolt (1895, pp. 1-65, especially 39-49 and 58 ff., and 255 ff.); Gilliard (1907, pp. 16-28)

we examine the nature of the ancient record itself, we should first inquire about the character of the foundations upon which it rests, in order that we may know what measure of confidence may be placed in it as a true report of the actual facts of Solon's life. We certainly cannot push back the possibility of a written record of any sort beyond the middle of the fifth century B.C. at the earliest; but Solon himself lived in the first half of the sixth century. By what means could knowledge of events in the early part of the sixth century have been transmitted through the one or two centuries that intervened before men began to write the history of them? If there had been no means, we should be forced to confess that all that has been told us about Solon is mere unreliable tradition. But fortunately there were a few bridges across the gulf.

The firmest of these was Solon's own poetry, a concrete structure reinforced with the bonds of meter, which was unshaken by the lapse of time. The poems must have come down through the years substantially in the form in which they were originally composed, and they were a clear and intelligible voice out of the past. Furthermore, these poems were a historical document of great value; for many, if not most of them, were occasional poems, dealing with the events in which Solon himself played a part. There can therefore be little room for doubt about their authenticity. The fragments which survive afford us a surprising amount of information; the whole body of Solon's poetry, which was available in ancient times, must have yielded much more.

A second source of information which was freely drawn upon by the ancient writers was found in the laws which were attributed to Solon. Here their footing was much more insecure. The authenticity of the laws is open to very grave question, as we shall see.¹ But in the hands of critical scholars they could have been made to yield some information of great value.

¹ Appendix 4.

A third source of precise information about the past was to be found in the official records of the state. These were, indeed, very meager, and for the early part of the sixth century probably did not go beyond the official list of archons. But this was something. And outside of Athens, there was the list of victors in the Pythian games at Delphi from which, we are told,¹ Aristotle derived some information about Solon's share in the Sacred War.

Lastly, there were the frail strands of oral tradition leading back into the past. And oral tradition is not to be scorned as a source of historical information, though it must be handled with a most delicate critical judgment. In some things it can tell the truth, in others it is a mere conscienceless myth-monger. Unfortunately Greek annalists and biographers did not deal critically with their sources, and it is difficult for us to separate those of their statements which rest upon sound evidence from those which are only hanging in the air. In examining reports of events in the first half of the sixth century we must be suspicious of all stories which are told with much circumstantial detail. Such small baggage is easily lost in a voyage of a hundred years and is just as easily replaced by fresh inventions. But it is perhaps even more important that we should not yield to uncritical agnosticism, flatly denying the validity of all oral tradition. The main facts are likely to come through, and should be accepted without too much hesitation, especially if there is some collateral support for them.

These are the four ways in which the ancient authors could learn something of Solon and his times. We have no knowledge of any other.² No assertion which was not founded upon one or

¹ Plut. *Sol.* xi.

² Cf. Beloch (1912, p. 364): "Glaubwürdig ist diese Ueberlieferung (*i.e.*, *Const. of Ath.*, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius) nur insoweit, als sie auf die Gedichte Solons und seine Gesetze zurückgeht. Von diesen Gesetzen sind aber diejenigen, die sich auf die Sozialreform und die Neuordnung der Verfassung bezogen, zum grössten Teil schon früh verloren gegangen, da sie keine praktische

the other of these lines of evidence can be accepted as true. And even in cases where the ancient writers had such evidence at hand, we must still question their critical judgment in the use of it. If they have preserved for us the poem or the law upon which their statements are based, we are in a position to test and verify; otherwise we cannot be sure. But even when statements are made which are not supported by any law or poem which we, too, have before our eyes, we must still admit that they may be justified by evidence which the ancient authors had and which we have not.

For us at the present day the evidence which is available for the determination of the truth about the life and works of Solon falls into two main divisions. The first, in which we can put great confidence, includes the actual extant writings of Solon himself, the poems mainly, and, as far as we can believe them authentic, the laws. The second is the ancient tradition, preserved through a long line of writers, overlaid with legend, resting ultimately on the same poems which we have and others besides, on a large body of doubtful laws, on meager official records, and on vague popular report. This ancient record we can trust just so far as we can satisfy ourselves that it is based solidly on the four original foundations, and just so far as we can satisfy ourselves that the foundations themselves in each case were secure. This means that we can accept little besides what we know was learned from the poems and the official records. We do not need to trouble ourselves overmuch with the confused relationships between our ancient authorities. The earliest of them were scarcely in a better position for learning the facts than the latest. The poems told the tale, and all who could read them with discernment knew all that could be truly known about their author.

Bedeutung mehr hatten . . . Andererseits galt später ja manches Gesetz als solonisch, das erst lange nach Solon gegeben war. So beruht das Bild, das uns von Solons politischem Wirken überliefert ist, zum grossen Teil auf Combinationen."

We shall now proceed to examine in greater detail these two main sources of information: first, the poems themselves, both those which we still possess and those of whose former existence we have some trace; and then, in a cursory way, the development of the biography of Solon in the ancient writers.

2

The fragments that survive, and which are attributed to Solon by the authors in whose works they appear, number some two hundred eighty-three verses.¹ Some of these so-called fragments are probably complete poems; most of them, however, are manifestly only portions of longer poems. In only one case have we any information concerning the actual length of the whole poem from which portions are quoted: the poem called "Salamis" was one hundred verses in length, and of these one hundred verses we have only eight, four in one fragment and two in each of two others.²

Besides what we can learn from the extant fragments, we have very little precise information concerning Solon's poetical works. Diogenes Laertius,³ in a brief and carelessly written list of his works, includes "Salamis," poems of self-counsel, and political poems, all in elegiac verse; and other poems in iambic and epodic verse. He mentions the number of five thousand verses, but it is not clear whether this number is intended to include all the poems, or only those in elegiac verse, or only the "Salamis" and the political poems. But in any case the number seems excessively large for a man who did not make poetry his principal occupation.

¹ The elegiac fragments, of which the two longest (xl and xii) are respectively 76 and 40 lines in length, number 215 verses; the iambic fragments, of which the longest (ix) consists of 27 verses, number in all 42 verses; the trochaic fragments, 20. Besides these there are two hexameters and four or five lines in lyric meter.

² xx, xxxiv, xxxv. See pp. 40 ff. and Appendix 1.

³ i 61.

Plutarch¹ divides the poetical works into two classes. The earlier poems, he says, were written for diversion and amusement; these are probably the ones he has in mind when he says that Solon speaks of pleasure with more freedom than becomes a philosopher. The later poems are devoted to moral and political questions: some contained exhortations, admonitions, and rebukes addressed to the Athenians; others were written in defense of his public acts as a statesman.

In a few cases definite poems seem to be referred to by ancient authors which are not actually quoted.

Plato, in the *Timæus*,² says that Solon frequently alludes to the intimacy which existed between himself and the family of Dropides, the great-grandfather of Critias. A single line³ survives which apparently belonged to one of the poems containing such an allusion.

Aristotle refers to poems, which he does not quote, in which Solon expressed his unwillingness to soil his reputation by attempting to make himself tyrant of Athens;⁴ and to others, besides those which he quotes himself, in which Solon laid the blame for the civil disorder in Athens on the rich.⁵ And it is possible that in one place⁶ he is quoting indirectly from a poem in which, after his archonship, Solon announced his intention of going abroad for ten years.⁷

¹ *Sol.* iii.

² 20 e; cf. also *Charmides* 157 e.

³ xxxix.

⁴ *Const. of Ath.* vi 4. Fragments xxi and xxii probably belong to this group.

⁵ *Const. of Ath.* v 3. Fragments xii, xvii, xl probably belong to this group.

⁶ *Const. of Ath.* xi 1.

⁷ Bekker thought he found a bit of verse embedded in Plutarch's narrative (*Sol.* xv). The prose runs as follows: φοβηθεῖς μὴ συγχέας παντάπασι καὶ ταραξᾶς τὴν πόλιν ἀσθενέστερος γένηται τοῦ καταστήσαι πάλιν καὶ συναρμόσασθαι πρὸς τὸ δριστην. From this he constructs the following trochaics:

συγχέας ἀπαντάπασι καὶ ταραξᾶς τὴν πόλιν
ἀσθενέστερος γένομαι τοῦ καταστήσαι πάλιν.

Bergk thinks the words are Plutarch's own; Wilamowitz recognizes them as

Most of the fragments owe their preservation to their importance as historical documents. It may be that if we had all of Solon's poetical works we should not find the political poems so largely preponderating. There would undoubtedly be a larger proportion dealing with lighter themes.

We cannot, of course, expect to date the fragments with any precision and recover the exact circumstances of their composition.¹ But certain ones were manifestly written before the archonship and certain ones after. The lines are too few in number to enable us to detect any change in style or increase in skill. It is interesting to observe that the longer elegiac poems belong to the earlier period and the principal iambic and trochaic fragments to the later. But this may be a mere accident in the preservation. There is undoubtedly a marked change in Solon's political opinions: before he put his reforms into effect, he was disposed to lay the blame for the misfortunes of Athens on the greed of the rich; later he was equally convinced of the folly and incapacity of the lower classes.

It seems almost necessary to believe that Solon's poems were recorded in writing by himself.² Many of them, being occasional

by Solon. It is not likely that Plutarch would thus quote two lines without indicating that they are a quotation. In *Sol.* ii he quotes i indirectly, but the quotation is very brief; Aristotle in *Const. of Ath.* v 3 and Plutarch in *Sol.* xiv 5 quote v, a single pentameter. But in the present case we must recognize the trochaic rhythm as accidental; and after all nothing is gained by adding so uncertain a fragment to the collection of genuine fragments. The idea which is expressed in the sentence we may safely believe to have been in Solon's mind, because it really lay at the bottom of his whole policy.

¹ Wilamowitz (1893, II, 304 ff.) undertakes to piece together like a puzzle the fragments of Solon's poems, and, with the help of what he takes as indirect quotations from the poems in Plutarch and Aristotle, to restore the several poems in their entirety, to outline the course of thought in each, and to assign them to the several periods in Solon's life. It is an ingenious study, but unconvincing; indeed its plausibility is deceptive, because it leaves in the reader's mind seeming-true ideas which are after all only guesses. Many of the shorter fragments are arbitrarily assigned to Solon's later years without a shred of justification. There is no such degree of certainty about Solon's career as the reader of this chapter would be led to believe.

² Heinemann (1897, pp. 45 ff.) thinks that an edition of the poems was prepared either by Solon himself or soon after his death. But he concludes, justly,

and in the nature of apologies for his own acts, would hardly have survived in the popular memory alone. Dissatisfied as they were with the results of Solon's reforms, the Athenians would not naturally have committed to memory, or encouraged their rhapsodists to commit to memory, the poems which Solon wrote in his own defense. Furthermore, some of his poems are addressed to individuals,¹ and it seems natural that they should have been sent to the persons for whom they were intended.

There is only one hint in the ancient authors of any method of publication, and this is untrustworthy. Solon is supposed to have memorized the "Salamis" and recited it publicly in the market place. Though we cannot accept this particular tradition, it seems likely that this was the regular method of publication.² But public recitation before various groups of citizens by the author himself was probably only the first step in the dissemination of the poems. They would then be repeated by others; and a few written copies would be made.

What may fairly be regarded as the earliest allusion to poems of Solon is found in Plato's *Timaeus*.³ Critias, the oligarch, who is a speaker in the dialogue, says that when he was a lad of ten years it was a common thing for the boys who took part in the competitive recitations at the festival of the Apaturia, to recite the poems of Solon, which were new at the time. There is no reason to doubt the truth of this statement — it was a thing about which Plato could easily have definite knowledge — and we may take it as proof that there was a well recognized collection of poems by Solon in the first half of the fifth century. One is struck by the

that there is little probability that the names of the poems which are recorded and which appear in modern editions were actually given by Solon (pp. 35 ff.).

¹ xxi, xxii, xxvi, xxxvii, and possibly xxxix.

² On the recitation of elegies at social gatherings, see Croiset (1903, pp. 583, 584).

³ 20d–21d. There is a quotation from xiv in a play of the comic poet Cratinus (see commentary on xiv), which was probably even earlier. Critias was born about 460 B.C.

remark that they were new at the time, when as a matter of fact they had been written between fifty and one hundred years before. The explanation probably is to be found in the fact that these poems would have been thought of as modern in contrast with Homer and Hesiod. Plato may also have been led to speak as he does by the fact that in his own day Solon's poems were no longer recited on such occasions, having become old-fashioned in the midst of the abundant Athenian poetry of the fifth century. So there was for Plato a certain propriety in calling them new, both by contrast with the oldest Greek poetry on the one hand, and with the more recent poetry of his own day on the other.

There is abundant evidence for the existence of the collection in Herodotus, Plato, Demosthenes, and Aristotle, and it seems probable that it continued in existence throughout antiquity. Of course many of the quotations in the later authors could have been drawn from the works of earlier writers.¹ But some of these quotations are of a kind which could hardly have been made except from the collection itself. The grammarians and lexicographers quote passages as examples of the use of particular words. Athenaeus has a quotation² which he says was "in the iambics," as if he was acquainted with a collection of the iambic poems. Proclus³ makes some very judicious comments on Solon's style, which he could hardly have made unless he had read a considerable number of the poems; and there was certainly no collection of *fragments* like ours in his day. Lastly, the longest extant poem of Solon is not found earlier than the anthology of Stobaeus, and this poem, of seventy-six lines, Stobaeus could hardly have found already quoted in the text of an earlier author, — though it may have been contained in some earlier anthology.

¹ *E.g.*, the poems quoted by Aristides (second century A.D.) are all believed to be taken from the *Const. of Ath.*; see Platt (1896).

² xxxiii.

³ *Ad Plat. Rep.*, vol. i, p. 65 Kroll; *Ad Plat. Tim.*, vol. i, p. 93 Diehl.

Fortunately, the greater part of the extant verse can be recognized as the authentic work of Solon with the utmost confidence, because it is concerned with the public events in which he played a principal part. As for the fragments which deal with general subjects, there is no reason to deny his authorship. The whole amount of Solonian poetry which we possess is too meager to justify us in rejecting this or that fragment on inner grounds of style and spirit. Only two of the fragments must be definitely set aside as late forgeries: ¹ one, the two hexameter verses which were supposed to be the introduction to a metrical version of the laws; the other, the lyric fragment which is drawn from a group of spurious scolia forged by Lobon of Argos and ascribed to the Seven Wise Men.

The principal difficulty in the matter of authenticity lies in the fact that a number of the Solonian fragments are also found among the poems which are ascribed to Theognis; and we must ask ourselves which of the two poets has the better claim to them.

It is generally recognized that the collection of elegiac poems which goes under the name of Theognis is something in the nature of an anthology, though there is considerable difference of opinion concerning the exact amount that is to be attributed to Theognis himself. Practically all scholars are agreed that the lines in Theognis which are elsewhere attributed to Solon are actually the work of Solon, and that, in one way or another, they have been included in the Theognidean collection. In view of the definite ascription to Solon and the composite nature of the Theognidean collection this is a just conclusion. And it is not shaken by the fact that a few verses which are ascribed to Solon and also included in Theognis are quoted by later authors as from Theognis.² This accident is due to the fact that the quotations were actually

¹ xviii and xxxviii. See commentary.

² xvi and xvi-a in Stob. iv 33, 7.

drawn from the Theognidean collection and the authors did not know that they were really by Solon. In one case Stobaeus assigns some verses to Theognis which he has already in another place assigned to Solon.¹ There are in all some twenty-six verses by Solon which are also found in Theognis.² The extent and character of the differences between the two versions are discussed in the commentary.

Since we have evidence to show that as many as twenty-six verses in Theognis properly belong to Solon, it is reasonable to suppose that there are still other poems by Solon imbedded in the Theognidean collection, if we only had the means of detecting them. Many attempts have been made to show that particular verses belong to him, but with a single exception none is convincing.³ Language, versification, style, and ideas offer very frail criteria in the case of two authors whose work is in many ways so similar and whose extant poems are so inconsiderable in amount.

3

The earliest appearance of Solon's name in extant Greek literature is found in a fragment of two lines from a comedy of Cratinus,⁴ who lived about the middle of the fifth century B.C. Solon himself is represented as the speaker, and he alludes to the popular belief that his own ashes had been scattered over the island of Salamis. The significance of this curious notion

¹ xl 65-70 in Stob. iii 9, 23 and iv 47, 16.

² ii = 1253 f. ; vii 3 f. = 153 f. ; xvi = 719-724 ; xvii 1-4 = 315-318 ; xl 65-70 = 585-590 ; xl 71-76 = 227-232. The extent and character of the differences between the two versions are discussed in the commentary. Cf. also Heinemann (1897, pp. 16 ff.).

³ The exception is found in vss. 725-728. Vss. 719-728 form a complete unit ; vss. 719-724 are ascribed to Solon by Plutarch ; it is altogether probable therefore that the four lines 725-728 should be included in Solon's poem. These four lines are printed in the present edition as an appendix to xvi and are numbered xvi-a. In view of the many divergences between the text of Plutarch for xvi and the text of Theognis we cannot assume that xvi-a is in exactly the form in which it was written by Solon.

⁴ Diogenes Laertius i 62. This is not the same fragment as that referred to on page 10, footnote 3.

will be better understood later when we have learned what Solon did for the Athenians in Salamis. But in the meantime it is interesting to observe that this first allusion to the great Athenian, separated from his own lifetime by a century and more, presents him to us almost in the guise of a mythological hero. In the history of Herodotus, which was composed about the same time, Solon is mentioned on several occasions:¹ the longest passage is an account of his legendary meeting with Croesus; but besides this there is recorded at least one real fact in his life. Thucydides is entirely silent on the subject of Solon; but Aristophanes and Plato, a little later, speak of him in a number of places as a legislator, a poet, and a Wise Man. In Demosthenes and the orators he is a familiar name, being accepted by them as typical of all that is best in Athenian government and law; in their minds and in the minds of their auditors he had come to represent the ideal form of democratic government, equally removed from obnoxious oligarchy and from the fierce democracy which ruled in Athens toward the close of the fifth century. He typified a vague ideal which all parties could unite in applauding. Aristotle, too, as a student of political institutions, was a warm admirer of Solon, and, as we shall see, has much to tell us about him.² Thereafter frequent allusions to him are found in all kinds of books, — in the learned writers of the fourth century and later ages, in the lexicographers and grammarians, and in the anonymous commentaries which are preserved on the margin of ancient manuscripts.

Among all these authors there were some who dealt with the life and works of Solon more particularly and at greater length, not in the form of brief references, but in connected narratives. Some of these accounts, like that of Plutarch, happily still sur-

¹ i 29-34, 86; ii 177; v 113.

² Outside of the *Const. of Ath.*, the principal passages are in the *Politics* (ii 12, 1273 b, 34 ff.; ii 7, 1266 b, 17; iii 11, 1281 b. 32).

vive ; others we know nothing about except through indirect report. But in order that we may understand the character of the ancient record, we must not be satisfied merely with an examination of the extant books ; we must also try to recover something of those that are lost. The list of authors in whom we can still read short accounts, a page or two in length, of various circumstances in Solon's career is fairly long and includes many names besides the writers already mentioned.¹

More important than these, however, are the more extended accounts which have been left us by Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius. These four constitute our principal source of information. They are widely separated in time, and it is only through accident that they are the only important extant accounts out of all the literary and scholarly works of many centuries. It is not to be supposed that there is necessarily any chain connecting the four in such a way that each is to be regarded as dependent upon his predecessor. The study of their sources has been pursued with great diligence, and we know that they drew their material from many writers whose books are now lost. We shall examine these four accounts a little more carefully and attempt to restore from them some of the missing links in the biographical tradition. Since our knowledge of the lost writers is derived only from allusions to them in subsequent literature, it will be convenient to begin with the latest of the four extant accounts, that of Diogenes Laertius, and proceed from him to the earlier.

Diogenes Laertius' life of Solon, about six pages in length, was composed in the early part of the third century A.D. and is

¹ The following may be noted : Aeneas Tacticus, *Comm. Pol.* iv 8 ff. ; Justinus, ii 7 f. ; Frontinus, *Strateg.* ii 9, 9 ; Aelian, *V. H.* vii 19 and viii 16 ; Polyænus, *Strateg.* i 20 ; Suidas, s.v. Σόλων, etc. Short summaries of the principal features of Solon's life are also to be found in an anonymous *Vita Solonis* (in *Biographi Graeci*, ed. Westermann, p. 113) and in the scholia to Plat. *Rep.* x 599 e and Demosthenes xlv 64.

to be found in the first book of his *Lives of the Philosophers*. It is an altogether uncritical compilation of scattered scraps of information concerning Solon and his work. Besides the traditional matter, it contains a few of Solon's poems, many sayings and apophthegms attributed to him, and some spurious letters supposed to have been written by him to Periander, Epimenides, Pisistratus, and Croesus. Diogenes mentions a few of his authorities by name, among whom the most important seems to have been one Sosicrates of Rhodes who lived early in the Christian era. But it is generally assumed that his principal sources were the same as Plutarch's,¹ which will be discussed presently.

Plutarch's biography, the longest and fullest account which we possess of Solon and his times, consists of about thirty-five pages, and was written in the second century A.D. Little is to be found in other authors which is not also given by him. Many poems are quoted; and much that he has to tell us is demonstrably true. But large portions of the biography are legendary in character; and frequently small matters which are known to be true in themselves are expanded into long narratives, charming in style but unreliable in substance. Plutarch's fondness for anecdote and his well known preoccupation with the moral implications of his subject detract from his historical accuracy, here as elsewhere. But the total impression of the character of Solon which he leaves with the reader is entirely harmonious with his true character as far as it is revealed in his own poems. Besides the poems of Solon which he quotes as evidence, Plutarch mentions during the course of the biography some fourteen or fifteen writers as authorities for various statements, but he had probably not consulted them all directly. Among them are Androtion, Aristotle, Heracleides Ponticus, Demetrius of Phalerum, Theophrastus, Phantias of Lesbos, Hecaeus of Megara. But modern investigation has shown that his principal sources, out-

¹ See Busolt (1895, p. 59).

side of Solon's own poems, were the learned writers, Didymus and Hermippus.¹

Hermippus of Smyrna lived about 200 B.C. He was the author of *Biographies of Illustrious Men* (βίοι τῶν ἐν παιδείᾳ διαλαμψάντων), of which large work the names of certain portions are known. Among these are sections "Concerning the Seven Wise Men" and "Concerning Lawgivers." Solon might have found a place equally well under either of these heads. The work of Hermippus, which must have been an uncritical collection of traditional lore, is known to have been widely used as a source by later writers, and probably Plutarch derived from it most of his biographical material. It is supposed, furthermore, that Plutarch's acquaintance with Androtion, Herodotus, Theophrastus, and other early authors came through Hermippus. There is some doubt whether either Hermippus or Plutarch used Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*.

Didymus of Alexandria was an extraordinarily prolific writer who lived at the very beginning of the Christian era. Among the numberless works in which he gathered up the learning of his predecessors was one on the laws of Solon (περὶ τῶν ἀξόνων τῶν Σόλωνος ἀντιγραφή πρὸς Ἀσκληπιάδην), which is mentioned by Plutarch,² and from which he probably learned what he has to tell us in the long section of his biography which he devotes to Solon's laws.

Earlier than Plutarch, but infinitely less important, is the brief account of Solon which is preserved in the fragmentary ninth book of the history of Diodorus Siculus, who lived just at the dawn of the Christian era. Most of what Diodorus has to say of Solon is legendary in character and of little value. He gives no hint of the sources of his information about Solon; but it is known that he derived some of his material at least, directly or indirectly, from Ephorus and Hermippus.³ The biographer Hermippus, as

¹ See Busolt (1895, p. 58).

² *Sol.* i.

³ See Busolt (1895, p. 59).

we have seen, lived some two centuries earlier than Diodorus. Ephorus lived a century and a half before Hermippus. He was a pupil of the school of Isocrates and wrote a universal history of the Greeks from the return of the Heracleidae to about the middle of the fourth century B.C. This work consisted of no less than thirty books; but this is little enough for the history of so long a period, and we cannot suppose that the space given to Solon and his times was very considerable.

We come now to the fourth and earliest account of Solon's career, which consists of about twelve pages near the beginning of Aristotle's treatise on the *Constitution of Athens*, which was composed about the middle of the fourth century B.C. This treatise, which was discovered and published only in the last decade of the nineteenth century, has given us some fragments of Solon's poems which we did not have before; but otherwise it does little more than corroborate or slightly modify information which we already possessed. The general conception of Solon which had been previously entertained has not been altered by Aristotle's account. He gives most of his attention to Solon's economic, legislative, and political reforms, and quotes a number of passages from the poems as evidence for the truth of his statements. In the pages devoted to Solon, Aristotle mentions no earlier writer by name, but he permits us to see whence he derived his information. First and most important as a source were Solon's own poems, both those which he quotes and no doubt others which he was familiar with; a considerable part of Aristotle's account is substantiated and verified by these quotations, and we have reason to believe that other statements, too, rest upon poems which are not quoted. Second, a number of laws are referred to, which Aristotle regarded as the work of Solon. These laws are used by him as evidence for certain political institutions which he attributes to Solon. Third, some conclusions concerning Solon's constitution are drawn from customs which still survived in

Aristotle's day. Fourth, there are indications that he derived some information from certain conflicting traditions concerning some features of Solon's career. He refers expressly to the "account given by the popular party" (ὁ τῶν δημοτικῶν λόγος), and by implication gives us to understand that there was also an aristocratic or oligarchic account.¹ There is nothing in the text to show whether these two accounts were written down or merely oral traditions.²

These four sources are the only ones that can be discerned in the text itself. Are we to suppose that Aristotle owed nothing to earlier writers? There is very little doubt that there was such a source, which, though not mentioned by Aristotle, may have been more directly useful to him than the four sources which are apparent.³ This was the work of the Athenian chroniclers, the so-called Ἀτθιδογραφαί, who had been busying themselves for some years before Aristotle's time with the composition of prose accounts of early Athenian history.⁴ Among these the one to whom Aristotle was most indebted appears to have been Androtion, like Ephorus a pupil of Isocrates, and an older contemporary of Aristotle, whose name is familiar to us from the well known speech which was delivered against him by Demosthenes. The book of Androtion is generally assumed to be the first written

¹ *Const. of Ath.* vi 3.

² Cf. Wilamowitz (1893, I, 55): "Ich meine, es ist klar geworden, dass Aristoteles es sich mit der behandlung Solons recht leicht gemacht hat. die person des gesetzgebers, wie sie in den gedichten leibhaft ihm entgegentrat, interessirte ihn, und sie stellte er mittelst dieser unverfälschten zeugnisse in ein helles und reines licht. aber das antiquarische detail einer verschollenen gesetzgebung war dem philosophen sehr wenig interessant. er hat weder sich selbst noch seinen lesern ein bild jener verfassung zu entwerfen versucht, sondern sich begnügt eine sehr kurze und ungleichförmig gearbeitete skizze fast ausschliesslich auf grund der darstellungen zu liefern, die er bei den attidographen fand. dagegen hat er seine auge scharf auf das ziel gerichtet, die ausgebildete demokratie, die er nachher darstellen will: die hat Solon begründet, schon allein durch aufhebung der schuldknechtschaft; die weiteren demokratischen grundrechte erörtert cap. 9."

³ For the sources of the *Const. of Ath.* see Busolt (1895, pp. 39-49), Seck (1904), Sandys (1912, pp. lxx ff.).

⁴ On Androtion and the other Attic chroniclers see Busolt (1895, pp. 7 ff.).

account of Solon and his age, and all later accounts are supposed to rest upon it, directly or indirectly. But his account of Solon was probably very brief, and no doubt all he had to tell is preserved for us in one or another of the later authors. His sources were probably the same as those which we have discovered in Aristotle.

This brief sketch is enough to show that our four principal accounts of the life and works of Solon and the lesser contributions to our knowledge which are scattered through the ancient authors are inconsiderable in extent when they are compared with the many writings no longer extant of which Solon was the subject. A few parts of the structure of ancient literature still stand above the waves; but most of the foundations and supports on which these parts rest have been overwhelmed by time. We have been able to catch glimpses of a little of the substructure where it lies just below the surface. The names of many other authors who support the tradition of Solon, but whose works have sunk still deeper into oblivion, might be recounted if it were profitable to do so. But enough has been said to give a fair impression of the nature of the record of Solon in antiquity. If we review once more the names of the authors who had a major part in the transmission of our knowledge of Solon — Androtion, Aristotle, Ephorus, Hermippus, Diodorus, Didymus, Plutarch, and Diogenes — we observe that there were two causes in particular which led them to give special attention to Solon. One was the fact that he was the reputed author of the first Athenian code of law; the other was the fact that he was numbered among the Seven Wise Men. These were the two circumstances to which in the past, as in the present, Solon chiefly owed his fame, and it is worth while for a moment to push our investigation a little farther along one of the two lines which were followed by the ancient record, the legend of the Seven Wise Men.

4

From the time of Aristotle onward, many men devoted themselves to the study of the laws and the political constitutions of the Greek states, and many books were written on these subjects. In most of them, it is fair to presume, the Athenian laws and political institutions which were attributed to Solon must have received their share of attention. The works of Didymus and Hermippus, in which we know there was much about Solon, have already been mentioned. Theophrastus, the pupil of Aristotle, is supposed to have written a book *Concerning Laws* (περὶ νόμων): and his pupil, Demetrius of Phalerum, wrote a book *Concerning Legislation at Athens* and another *Concerning the Political Constitutions of Athens*. These last named works may very likely have been the source of Didymus, and therefore ultimately the source of that portion of Plutarch's biography which deals with the laws of Solon. The names of other writers on laws and lawgivers are also known, and they, together with the writers already mentioned, probably assisted in the preservation of whatever information men had about Solon as a lawgiver.

However much, or however little, writers such as these may have known about Solon's contribution to the legal and political institutions of Athens, there was at least a foundation of fact to their undertakings. Solon unquestionably wrote laws and modified more or less the Athenian constitution. But the conception of Seven Wise Men was an arbitrary invention; and though we have a little sound information about these Wise Men as individuals, all that is related about them as a group is purely legendary. Indeed most, though not all, of the stories about Solon which can be set apart as legends lacking historical foundation are attached to his name as one of the Seven.

It is not known when the Greeks first began to talk of a group

of Seven Wise Men.¹ But the notion was evidently a familiar one by the time Plato wrote the *Protagoras*. In this dialogue,² Socrates gives a list of the Seven and allows us to see that it was not one constructed by himself, but rather one which was already recognized. The names in this list are Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Solon of Athens, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chene, Chilon of Sparta. In the lists which are given by later authors some of these names are replaced by others. Only four names appear in all lists. Thales, Bias, Pittacus, and Solon. In most lists Myson is omitted, and Periander of Corinth is put in his place. In all, there are some twenty-two names which are found in one or another of these ancient lists of Seven Wise Men.

Almost all the men whose names found a place at one time or another in this group of seven were historical characters, and almost all, like Solon, lived in the sixth century B.C. The wisdom for which they were celebrated was the wisdom of men of affairs who were experienced in the ways of the world and in the fortunes of men. They were not supposed to be gifted with the mysterious lore of the sage. None but Solon was the author of any literary works.³ Almost all took an active part in public life and were benefactors of their countries. Their wisdom was supposed to have found expression in the pithy maxims which were attributed to them and of which considerable collections were made. The most famous of these maxims were: *γνώθι σαυτόν; μηδὲν ἄγαν; μέτρον ἄριστον; ἐγγύα παρὰ δ' ἄτα*. A collection of them was made by Demetrius of Phalerum, and many have been preserved in Diogenes Laertius and other writers. Indeed, it has been suggested⁴ that the conception of a group of seven wise men may have had its origin in such a collection,

¹ For the Seven Wise Men see Zeller, *Phil. der Griech.*, vol. I, 5. Aufl., pp. 110 ff.; Wulf (1895); Meyer (1893, p. 717); Beloch (1913, pp. 352-360).

² *Protag.* 343.

³ Hiller (1878).

⁴ Christ, *Gesch. d. griech. Literatur*, 3. Aufl. 1890, Munich, p. 133.

containing the maxims grouped under seven names. This is only a conjecture. But at any rate the familiar maxims served to give substance to the conception. Socrates speaks with approval of the laconic brevity of these utterances, in which were summed up the results of long experience and profound observation. Undoubtedly in attributing these proverbs to Seven Wise Men the Greeks were only following their unfailing instinct of searching for some definite personal author for every feature of their civilization. The Seven Wise Men were men of real distinction and ability who lived in the sixth century; the proverbs and maxims were well known principles of conduct in the Greek world: legend united the two and made the Wise Men the authors of the proverbs.

When once the conception of the Seven had been formed, legend was soon busy decking it out with circumstantial details. The Seven were soon thought of as exact contemporaries and personal friends; banquets were described at which they met and conversed with the wit and sagacity which was to be expected of them;¹ they were the guests of foreign kings and in their interviews with them exhibited the superior intelligence of the Greeks; a golden tripod was offered as prize to the wisest among them, and after each had modestly declined it in turn, they united in offering it to Apollo himself at Delphi; they also made an offering to Apollo of the maxims which they had composed, inscribing them on the temple at Delphi. Besides these fables in which they all had a share, each individual had a legend of his own which credited him with many clever deeds and sayings. The first book of Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers* contains biographies of eleven men whose names appear in the lists of Wise Men.

Legends cluster thick about the name of Solon, as a member of this illustrious group. He, too, rejected the tripod and refused

¹ Cf. especially Plutarch's *Convivium Septem Sapientium*.

to admit that he was the wisest of men; he feasted with the others and contributed his share of wisdom to the conversation; he is credited with the authorship of many clever moral sayings. But besides these there are certain legends which are told of him in particular which deserve a word of consideration.

The most famous story about Solon relates to his interview with Croesus, king of Lydia.¹ We are told that Solon visited the Lydian court, and that Croesus tried to dazzle him with the splendor of his riches. Asking Solon whom he considered the happiest man in the world, Croesus expected him to answer that the king of Lydia was the happiest. But Solon mentioned the names of three unknown Greeks, two Argives and an Athenian, who were already dead, and told of the noble manner of their death. Upon this, Croesus became angry and asked if he was not himself to be reckoned as one of the happiest of men. Solon replied that no man can be called happy until he has lived his life through without disaster. Thereupon Croesus dismissed him with scorn and indignation. But in later years, when his kingdom had been conquered by the Persian Cyrus, and he was himself about to be burned on the pyre, the words of Solon came again to his mind, and he called on his name three times in a loud voice. When Cyrus heard these cries and learned the cause, he was so much impressed with the wisdom of Solon and so strongly reminded of the uncertainty of his own fortunes that he spared the life of Croesus and made him his friend and counselor.

This tale was told again and again by ancient writers. The earliest version we have is found in the first book of Herodotus,² who narrates the events with all the art of the prince of story-tellers. He has so expanded and embellished it, and imparted to it so great a moral dignity, that it has become one of the best-known and most admired portions of his whole work. The story appears again, also well told, both in Diodorus and in

¹ On Solon and Croesus see Busolt (1895, p. 300).

² i 29-34.

Plutarch,¹ and is briefly alluded to by Diogenes Laertius, who refrains from telling it at length because, as he says, it is so hackneyed (*τὰ θρυλούμενα*).

The truth of the story was doubted even in ancient times. Plutarch introduces his narrative with a remarkable statement in which he mentions these doubts, and which throws much light at the same time on his critical judgment in matters of historical accuracy. He says:²

As for his [Solon's] interview with Croesus, some think to prove by chronology that it is fictitious. But when a story is so famous and so well-attested, and, what is more to the point, when it comports so well with the character of Solon, and is so worthy of his magnanimity and wisdom, I do not propose to reject it out of deference to any chronological canons, so called, which thousands are to this day revising, without being able to bring their contradictions into any general agreement.

Now the chronological objections are serious, but not absolutely insuperable. Croesus came to the throne about the year 555. Solon's death is generally fixed at about 559, but there is nothing to prove that he did not live for many years after this date. The interview, therefore, might have been held soon after Croesus' accession. But the really insuperable objections to our acceptance of the story are: first, that there is no known way in which it could have been transmitted; second, that the legendary character of it is unmistakable; and, third, that it forms a part of the larger tradition of the Seven Wise Men with its many unquestionably legendary interviews.

Plutarch is right when he says that the story comports well with the character of Solon. This must be said to the credit of the authors of the legend; but it does not, of course, prove its truth. There are two moral principles by which Solon is moved in the legend: one is scorn and contempt of great riches; the other is the belief that human happiness cannot be judged till the

¹ Diodorus ix 2 and 26 f. ; Plut. *Sol.* xxvii f. ; Diog. Laert. i 50.

² Plut. *Sol.* xxvii (Perrin's translation).

will of the gods has been fulfilled to the end. There is abundant evidence even in the few remaining poems of Solon that these two principles were strongly characteristic of his thought. Expressions of the former are to be found scattered all through the fragments. The latter is enunciated in the noble poetry of his longest elegy.

Good stories are also told of interviews, equally legendary in character, between Solon and three other men who were included in various lists of the Seven Wise Men: Anacharsis the Scythian, Thales of Miletus, and the mysterious Epimenides of Crete.¹ In each of these cases it is the wit and shrewdness, not of Solon, but of his interlocutor, which is displayed. The stories probably belonged originally to the legends of the three other men, and Solon was introduced into them because of the association of the Seven.

Such, then, was the reputation of Solon in the ancient world, and such was the written record of his career. It is apparent that we must stand incredulous before many stories which are told of his exploits. As stories they have their value; but they will not be retold here. We must be willing to sacrifice the picturesque and romantic inventions which add so much to the definiteness and charm of Plutarch's biography. We must keep our minds unflinchingly on the ultimate sources of information which have already been described, and reject all that cannot be traced to them. But when all subtractions have been made, there still remains for us a noble career which is clear at least in its main outlines, and a personality of sterling worth. Fortunately not a little of sound fact stands the test, and we need not despair of knowing Solon in some sort even as he was.

¹ Anacharsis: Plut. *Sol.* v; Diog. Laert. i 101 f. Thales: Plut. *Sol.* vi. Epimenides: Plut. *Sol.* xii; Diog. Laert. i 109 ff.

CHAPTER II

BEFORE THE ARCHONSHIP

1

No precise date is known for any event in Solon's life. Even the year of his archonship cannot be fixed, and we can only say that it fell within the period between 594 and 590 B.C.¹ There is no statement in the ancient authorities concerning the date of his birth; about the date of his death, there are conflicting assertions. According to one of these, he died in the archonship of Hegestratus, which was in the year 560-559; according to another, he was eighty years of age at the time of his death.² Neither of these statements can be accepted as certainly true; they were probably based upon chronological calculations of a sort which are not to be trusted. But if we take them for what they are worth, we find that the year of his birth would be 640-639. In this case he would have been somewhere between forty-five and fifty years of age at the time of his archonship — just the period of life at which perhaps men would have been most willing to entrust to him grave public responsibilities, though he might well have held the office ten years earlier or ten years later. But we shall not be far wrong if we think of the life of Solon as occupying the greater part of the second half of the seventh century B.C. and the greater part of the first half of the sixth century and bisected approximately by the year 600.

That Solon was an Athenian by birth we should not think of

¹ See Appendix 2.

² Archonship of Hegestratus: Phanias ap. Plut. *Sol.* xxxii 3. Eighty years of age: Diog. Laert. i 62.

doubting if we did not discover that he is twice called a Salaminian.¹ But we must regard this as an error when we recall his own words, — “May I be no longer an Athenian,” in the poem entitled “Salamis.”² The error was probably due to the renown of Solon’s leadership in the Athenian conquest of the neighboring island, in connection with which this very poem was composed. It is even possible that Diodorus and Diogenes were not really in error, but were only applying the name Salaminian to Solon as the Roman Scipio was called Africanus.

Let us stop to consider for a moment what it meant to be an Athenian at the dawn of the sixth century B.C.³ The name of Athens rouses in the mind so many memories of the glories of her prime, and the sixth century is an epoch about which our recollections are so vague and insubstantial, that we are in danger of holding a false conception of the Athens in which Solon lived. Almost all the achievements to which Athens owes her fame still lay far below the horizon of the future. The brilliant development under the rule of Pisistratus, the principle of democracy, the deathless glory of the Persian wars, the growth of empire, the white heat of genius during the long war with Sparta, the mellow age of philosophy, — men could not even have dreamed of these wonders in the rocky land of Attica at the beginning of the sixth century. The old fortress of the Acropolis was not yet crowned with the noble buildings which to our eyes form the chief feature of the Attic scene. Art and literature were still unknown. Solon himself was the first of Attic poets, and was to have no notable successor for fifty years and more. Sculpture was still in a rude stage of advancement. Probably even the primitive statues which were overthrown by the Persians and which have been discovered in the debris of the Acropolis were still unwrought.

¹ Diod. ix 1 ; Diog. Laert. i 45. Elsewhere always an Athenian.

² xxxiv.

³ For early social and economic conditions in Athens see especially Wilbrandt (1898) and De Sanctis (1912).

The painted pottery, found in the graves of this early period, has as yet little promise of the exquisite art of the future. All the glories which the Athenians of a later time pointed to with pride and we contemplate with admiration did not yet exist as an incentive to loyal emulation.¹

One of the most signal characteristics of Athens throughout the sixth century, as contrasted with the fifth, is her inland position. Themistocles and Pericles made Athens an island state, facing the sea and depending for her prestige and for her very existence upon sea-borne commerce and naval defense. In the sixth century Athens was only just beginning to be aware of this mighty neighbor and ally, waiting just off her coasts. Her people were mostly occupied with internal affairs. The social institutions which are rooted in agricultural life still prevailed. Landholders were the dominant class in the community. There were nobles with hereditary estates, peasants and serfs with no estates at all. Men were bound together by the religious bonds of clan and family. Not only their livelihood, but their religion and their habits of life were drawn from the soil. In later times, it was the sea that fashioned men's lives and habits; and since no individual can own a portion of the high seas, there emerged an equality of opportunity in industry and commerce which tended to break down the feudal distinctions between landlords and landless folk, between nobles and commons. This change had begun in Solon's time. Men whose wealth consisted of money

¹ Wilamowitz (1893, II, 60) : "aber ganz abgesehen von dem formalen studium, das seine gedichte zur voraussetzung haben, hat er sein ganzes denken und empfinden ionisch machen müssen, menschlich, modern für seine zeit. halten wir doch die attischen werke etwa der gleichen periode neben ihn : wie gross ist der abstand. die köstliche darstellungsfreude mit der der bildner des Typhongiebels seine scheusale in aller derbheit aus seinem weichen stein schnitzt, das ist das alte Athen, dasselbe, das ein paar generationen früher leichenzüge und seeschlachten mit kindlichen mitteln auf die tonkrüge pinselte, ungeschlacht autochthonisch, aber mit ächt attischer *έναργεια*." One should not forget, however, that sculpture and painting were arts of a much slower growth in Greece than poetry; and the real state of culture in Athens might be measured by Solon's poetry as well perhaps as by the Typhon pediment.

accumulated in foreign trade began to take their places by the side of the men whose wealth was in land. But the new source of wealth was not yet open to any but the old landed nobility who had the means for new enterprise. Such changes as these are of slow growth, and we must not think that there was at any time a conscious transition from the old order to the new, at least until Themistocles built the long walls. Roughly speaking, the age of Solon was characterized by the old order, the age of Pericles by the new.

Athens, however, was not shut off from contact with the outside world. There is evidence that during this period she was adopting some of the customs of the Ionian Greeks who dwelt in Asia. The ancient dress of Attica was discarded for the Ionian fashion; the Ionian practice of cremating the dead was taking its place beside the old Attic custom of burial; a knowledge of the Ionian mythological epic is revealed in some of the pictures painted on Attic pottery. Trade, too, was carried on with other communities. Fragments of early Athenian pottery have been found in Cyprus and as far west as Etruria; and on the Acropolis there have been discovered broken bits of vessels which had been made in Crete or at Naucratis in Egypt.

In that far-off day the city which was later to be the school of Hellas and the chief city of Greece in art and letters, in industry and commerce, was a place of little account in the world. The main currents of Hellenic life did not flow through Attica. The focus of Hellenic life was across the Aegean Sea. Miletus was the greatest city of the Greek world. Her close rivals were Samos, Ephesus, Smyrna, and other cities whose names are less well known to-day, lusty champions of the Greek spirit, not yet enervated and corrupted by the laxity of the Orient. Ionia was the first school of Hellas. Even on the western side of the Aegean there were many cities more notable than Athens: Corinth on the isthmus; Chalcis and Eretria on the island of Euboea;

Megara, which Athens later came to despise; and Aegina, whose proud Dorian lords were in the end forced to bend to Athens. These were the cities which had played a part in the vast projects of colonization which marked the eighth and seventh centuries. They had established flourishing outposts of Greek civilization from the Black Sea to Spain and from Thrace to the northern coast of Africa. Athens had not a single colony. Athenian merchants made use of money, the wonderful invention of the age; but they used the coinage of other cities. Athens probably minted no coins of her own before the time of Solon.

It is not difficult to discover what characteristics would be absent in a true portrait of Athens at the beginning of the sixth century. They are, in point of fact, generally identical with all the notable features of the more prominent Greek communities of the same epoch and of Athens herself at the period of her greatness. But though we recognize that these characteristics must be eliminated, it is not easy to form and preserve a true conception of what Athens actually was. There is little that is positive to put in the place of what we know we must omit. If we try to create a picture of Attica and of the people who dwelt there as they appeared to the eyes of Solon, we find that material is almost wholly lacking. There are many scattered scraps of information concerning the religious, social, and political institutions of early Athens; but they cannot be united into any comprehensive picture of the city's life. We know that the scattered villages of the land were already associated together in that remarkable community which recognized all residents of Attica as Athenians. The people who lived about the Acropolis were not more truly Athenians than those who dwelt in the mountains or along the sea or farmed the more fertile valleys. The city of Athens did not dominate Attica, but all Attica was Athens. This was a momentous circumstance for the development of the state; and though the city of Athens never spread beyond the bounds of

Attica, yet this political organization was as significant for Athens herself as a similar organization was for the city of Rome, which ultimately became coterminous with the Roman empire. In this larger community of Athens, Eleusis also already formed a part. This little village which lay beyond the low range of hills to the west of the Acropolis had already been incorporated into the Athenian state, bringing to the common life of Athenians participation in the noble religious usages and ideas which there had their home.

Solon himself, in the longest of his extant poems, gives us an account of the principal occupations of the men of his time. He shows us the trader, the husbandman, and the artisan; the minstrel, the prophet, and the physician. A busy, bustling world it seemed to him, in which all were working blindly with little thought of the future. Money-making, he tells us, filled men's minds; and in his day a deep social and economic unrest pervaded society, as a result of the unequal distribution of wealth. Society fell into two conflicting classes: the one was composed of the "best" people (*ἄριστοι*), by which were meant the people of wealth and noble birth; the other consisted of the folk at large (*δῆμος*). Political power lay entirely in the hands of the former class, and the magistrates were chosen only from their number. The restlessness, however, of the lower classes seems to have been due not so much to political inequality as to cruel economic conditions. Of all this we shall learn more later, because it was to remedy the disorder that Solon was chosen to the archonship. But since the disorder must have been long in growing, it is necessary that we should glance thus for a moment at the state of the world in which Solon lived.

2

If now we return to Solon, we may perhaps comprehend something of the significance of the two facts about him which have already been presented. He was an Athenian whose years of

maturity fell in the first half of the sixth century. But what was his position in this old feudal society of Athens which was slowly outgrowing its ancient molds? What was his family, and what were the formative influences of his early life? There will be no temptation to protract the story of his childhood and his youth in the somewhat pointless manner which is generally inevitable in the biographies of men about whom much is known. Little is told us about this period in his life; and even this is open to question because we cannot be sure that it rests upon secure evidence. But there are some things of which we can be sure, and fortunately they are things of whose importance we shall be convinced when we come to the principal work of his life.

The name of Solon's father, we are told,¹ was Execestides. The authorities all agree in this, with one exception: a certain Philocles, otherwise unknown, is reported by Plutarch² as giving the name Euphorion for Solon's father. But Plutarch himself believed Execestides to be the correct name. The name of Solon's mother is unknown; according to Heracleides Ponticus,³ who probably had no means of knowing anything about it, she was a cousin of the mother of Pisistratus.

In any case Solon was of noble birth. His father was supposed to be descended from Codrus, the early king of Athens, or even from Neleus and Poseidon.⁴ But this does not enable us to decide which of the great Athenian families Solon belonged to, even if we admit the truth of the tradition, because several families claimed descent from Poseidon through the mythical line of Neleus, Melanthus, and Codrus. We may be fairly certain, however, on other grounds, that Solon was a member of the aristocracy. He was later chosen archon, and in a day

¹ Diod. ix 1; Plut. *Sol.* i; Diog. Laert. i 45; Schol. Plat. *Rep.* x 599 e; Schol. Dem. xlv 64.


² *Sol.* i.

³ Ap. Plut. *Sol.* i.

⁴ Plut. *Sol.* i; Diog. Laert. iii 1; *Vita Platonis*, ed. Westermann, p. 396.

when only men of noble birth could fill this office it is not likely that he would have been elected if he had not possessed this qualification.¹

If, in the eyes of the Greeks, the ancestors of Execestides were illustrious, there were reckoned among his descendants personages whom the modern world would deem more illustrious still. Plato himself and the notorious Critias, his mother's uncle, were supposed to be the descendants of Dropides, the brother of Solon. Socrates says, in the *Charmides* of Plato,² that Charmides and Critias inherit gifts of poetry and philosophy from Solon; and Plutarch also alludes to the kinship between Solon and Plato.³ The genealogy is given as follows:⁴



Unfortunately there are two flaws in this genealogy: in the first place, there must be at least two more generations between the oligarch Critias and Execestides the father of Solon; and in the second place, it is not certain that Solon had a brother named

¹ At this time the archons were chosen ἀριστινῶν καὶ πλουτινῶν (*Const. of Ath.* iii 1).

² 155a.

³ *Sol.* xxxii.

⁴ *Diog. Laert.* iii 1. Cf. also *Vita Platonis*, ed. Westermann, p. 388. According to Olympiodorus (*Vit. Plat.*, p. 1), it was Ariston, the father of Plato, who was descended from Solon. In the *Critias* of Plato (113 a) Critias says that his great-grandfather Dropides possessed a manuscript which had belonged to Solon.

Dropides.¹ Plato² makes Critias say that Solon was a relative and close friend of his own great-grandfather Dropides, and we still have a couplet³ addressed by Solon to Critias, the son of Dropides, bidding him follow the counsel of his father. We further know that Dropides was the name of one of the archons who held office within a few years after Solon.⁴ Beyond this we have no definite information. One would be glad to know for certain that the blood of Solon flowed in the veins of Plato, but the evidence is too scanty to support the belief. It matters very little for a true understanding of the life of Solon, whether the belief in the relationship between Solon and Plato is true or false. But the fancy of the modern reader is stirred more by the kinship between Solon and a person so illustrious as Plato than by his descent from a mythical Poseidon and a mythical Codrus. Yet the influence upon Solon's own life and thought which was exercised by a belief in his royal descent and his relation to the royal house must have been of no little significance.

We do not find that any Athenian ever claimed descent directly from Solon, nor is there any statement recorded that he was ever married. Plutarch does indeed tell a story about an interview between him and the philosopher Thales,⁵ in which Thales, to point a moral, pretends to have heard of the death of Solon's son in Athens. But the story is quite unhistorical, and the son is undoubtedly a fictitious person.

Though Solon was of noble birth, his father, according to Plutarch,⁶ was possessed of only moderate means. Aristotle tells us,⁷

¹ Busolt (1895, p. 255) says Dropides was not a brother of Solon. It is hardly a matter about which one can be so positive. Cf. also xxxix, Solon's warning to Critias, the son of Dropides.

² *Timaeus* 20 e.

³ xxxix.

⁴ Cf. Wilamowitz (1893, I, 7, footnote 9): "Δρωπίδης, δε μετὰ Σόλωνα Ἀθηναίος ἤρξεν bei Philostratos *vit. soph.* i 16 wird dagegen mit zu scharfer interpretation auf das nächste Jahr nach Solon bezogen. es reicht vollkommen hin, dass der Name irgendwo bald nach Solon in der Liste stand. sonst müsste man wol gar Φορμίων μετὰ Σόλωνα ἄρξας schol. Ar. Fried. 347 ebenso fassen."

⁵ Plut. *Sol.* vi.

⁶ Plut. *Sol.* i.

⁷ *Const. of Ath.* v.

in almost the same words that are used by Plutarch in his statement about the father, that Solon himself belonged to the middle class in point of wealth. It is more likely that there was evidence in Solon's poems concerning his own station in life than that there was evidence about his father, and we must regard Plutarch's statement rather as an inference from the prevailing view about Solon himself.

It appears that early in life Solon embarked in commerce. He was forced to this, according to Plutarch,¹ by the impaired state of the family fortune, which had been brought about by the excessive generosity of his father: belonging to a family which was accustomed to help others, he was unwilling, when he was in financial straits, to ask aid of his friends, who would have been glad to render it to him. Others found the motive for his voyages in his desire to acquire learning and experience rather than to make money. Obviously both these excuses were offered to save the reputation of Solon from the stain of trade. Plutarch goes to the trouble of explaining at considerable length that in earlier times trade brought with it no social inferiority. But whatever the reasons may have been, the fact may be accepted as true even though no direct evidence can be quoted in support of it. In the first place, a thing which must be apologized for is not likely to be invented; Solon probably revealed his business experience more or less explicitly in his own verse. Indeed, in the fragments that remain he shows an acquaintance with economic affairs which may well have been drawn from his own experience: he had a business man's understanding of things. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that if Solon had not gone abroad into the wider air of the Greek world, he would have attained to the breadth of view and the sympathetic comprehension which characterize his public career.

Whither was he carried by his commercial ventures? At

¹ Plut. *Sol.* ii.

this period Athens had begun to trade not only with the neighboring coasts and islands of Greece, but also with Asia Minor and the Pontus, with Crete, Cyprus, and Egypt, and with Sicily and Italy in the west. It is impossible to say certainly whether Solon made his way to all or any of these regions. But it seems altogether probable that he should have been often in Ionia and for somewhat prolonged periods. This assumption is almost necessary in order to explain his ability to use the Ionic language and the elegiac verse of Ionia as his natural medium of expression. Solon must have carried many a cargo of oil or pottery from his own rocky Attica to the wealthy cities across the Aegean, and in spite of his love for his own native land (*πρεσβυτάτην γαίαν Ἰαονίαν*)¹ he must have been charmed by the brilliant society which he found in Asia. It was here that he learned the pleasures of Aphrodite, Dionysus, and the Muses, whose attractions he frankly acknowledged.² He may have been tempted into luxury and prodigality, as Plutarch supposed when he offered in excuse for such habits the trials and dangers of his mercantile career.

There must have been some years of this wild and merry life. Good songs, good wine, and a lass in every port lightened the toil of the sea. But it was a good school for Solon. He learned to know men as they lived outside the limits of the society of the best Athenian families; he learned self-reliance, resourcefulness, and courage; his natural instinct for poetical art was developed by contact with the refinement of the east.

It is clear that he did not grow rich through trade. No doubt he provided himself with a competence. But there were two things he preferred to money: one, as we have seen, was the good things that money can buy, the other his own personal worth (*ἀρετή*), which, he says himself, he would not sell for any amount of money.³ Speaking of the time when Solon became archon, Aristotle says⁴

¹ iii.² xxviii.³ xvi and xvii.⁴ *Const. of Ath.* v. Cf. also Arist. *Pol.* vi (iv) 11, 1296 a, 19, where Aristotle says again that Solon belonged to the class of *μέσοι πολῖται*, and refers to his poems in proof of the fact.

that by birth and reputation he ranked among the highest in the city, but that his limited means and his manner of life placed him in the middle class. And yet in order to be eligible to this office, the law required that he should be sufficiently well off to claim a place in the census of the wealthiest class in Athens.¹

Whether he was in fact rich or poor, he showed himself capable of adopting the views of a true moderate as thoroughly as if he had been born to that class.² His conviction that the love of money is the root of all evil, appears again and again in fragments of poems which must have been written before his archonship but after he had had considerable experience of the world.³ He believed at this time that the rich men of Athens were entirely responsible for the civil disorder which was yearly growing more threatening. Together with his condemnation of the rich went a sympathetic recognition of the hardships of the poor.⁴ He reveals himself in the character of an ardent social reformer, outraged and shocked by the heartless excesses of the moneyed class, stirred with pity and commiseration for the oppressed. Fortunately the time was to come when he could act upon his generous impulses and bring relief where relief was needed; unfortunately he was also to suffer disillusionment and learn that if the rich are greedy and rapacious, the poor, too, have their characteristic vices of ingratitude and discontent.

¹ Gilliard (1907, p. 153) says that the tradition which made Solon a man of moderate means rests upon his own poems (xvi, xvii, xl). The proof, he maintains, is not convincing. The poems may not be a revelation of his personal position, but simply the expression of a fairly common thought, which is also found in Theognis. xvi and xvii are even attributed to Theognis (315 ff., 719 ff.).

² Cf. the whole passage in Aristotle's *Politics* just referred to. Solon could not strictly be numbered with the middle class which Aristotle believes should rule in an ideal state. True *μεσότης* implies the absence of *ὑπερκαλόν*, *ὑπερσχυρόν*, *ὑπερευγενή*, and *ὑπερπλούσιον*. A man who was connected by blood with the noblest house in Athens could never satisfy the full definition. But Solon as an individual could choose his own political ideals; and, choosing as he did the ideal of *μεσότης*, he could not but be benefited by his sympathetic understanding of the *εὐγενής*.

³ *E.g.*, iv, v, xii, xvi, xvii, xl.

⁴ xii.

3

Our information concerning the first half of Solon's life is unfortunately very meager. We can only say that he must have risen steadily in popular esteem; and it is much to be regretted that we cannot trace in detail the course of events through which he ultimately attained to a position of leadership in the state. We have seen that he gave serious thought to the problems by which Athens was beset, and fearlessly published his opinions in poetical form. But there must have been something more than thought, however sound, and something more than speech, however persuasive, to induce the Athenians, embittered as they were by party strife, ultimately to resign to him full control of their destinies. There must have been deeds as well as words. Things must have been done in the public service which won for Solon the admiration and confidence of his fellow-citizens. But there is only one such event of which we have any record, and this unfortunately is a matter which is involved in much obscurity. The evidence for it, as far as it went, was of the best, for it was provided by Solon's own poems, but it is difficult to determine how much of the information found in the ancient biographers was actually certified in this way.

The event in question was the acquisition by Athens of the island of Salamis.¹ This island lies in the Saronic Gulf close to the shore of Attica westward from Athens, shutting in the little bay of Eleusis. It thrusts itself out also as a menacing barrier toward Nisaea, the port of Megara. In the rivalry between Athens and Megara, which had probably begun long before this time and which was to continue intermittently for hundreds of years, the possession of Salamis was a matter of crucial importance. The credit for the conquest was awarded to Solon by almost the unanimous voice of antiquity. It was generally be-

¹ For a critical discussion of the affair of Salamis see Appendix 1.

lieved that he was the military captain who carried the matter through to success. If this had been the fact, the exploit would certainly have done much to secure for Solon the affections of his fellow-countrymen. Like many another military hero, he might have won political preferment through success on the field of battle. Although the name of Solon is inextricably involved in the affair of Salamis, all the records of his military participation are open to very grave suspicion. We must look elsewhere to discover his real part in the business.

The poem which offered the best evidence for the affair was the one entitled "Salamis," which has already been mentioned.¹ Plutarch narrates with some detail the circumstances of its composition and of the results to which it led; but though he might have learned from the poem something as to why it was written and what had happened before it was written, it is clear that it could have told him nothing of what happened after its publication. If there is any truth in the latter part of the story, it must have come from some other source. In Plutarch's own words the story is this:²

Once when the Athenians were tired out with a war which they were waging against the Megarians for the island of Salamis, they made a law that no one in future, on pain of death, should move, in writing or orally, that the city take up its contention for Salamis. Solon could not endure the disgrace of this, and when he saw that many of the young men wanted steps taken to bring on the war, but did not dare to take those steps themselves on account of the law, he pretended to be out of his head, and a report was given out to the city by his family that he showed signs of madness. He then secretly composed some elegiac verses, and after rehearsing them so that he could say them by rote, he sallied out into the market place of a sudden, with a cap upon his head. After a large

¹ Page 7.

² Plut. *Sol.* viii-x. Perrin's translation is quoted. For the poem and the circumstances under which it was composed and recited, see also Dem. xix 252 (and schol.); Cicero *de off.* i 30, 108; Philodemus *de mus.* xx 18; Justinus ii 7 f.; Aristides *Or.* xxxvii, vol. I, p. 708 and *Or.* xlvi, vol. 2, p. 361 Dindorf; Polyænus *Strateg.* i 20; Paus. i 40, 5; Diog. Laert. i 46 ff.; Porphyrius *ad Hom. Il.* ii 183.

crowd had collected there, he got upon the herald's stone and recited the poem which begins :

“Behold in me a herald come from lovely Salamis,
With a song in ordered verse instead of a harangue.”

This poem is entitled “Salamis,” and contains a hundred very graceful verses. When Solon had sung it, his friends began to praise him, and Pisistratus in particular urged and incited the citizens to obey his words. They therefore repealed the law and renewed the war, putting Solon in command of it.

After this there follow two different accounts of the conduct of the campaign and the strategies that Solon employed to capture the island.¹ Both of these accounts are legendary. But in the second account there are two circumstances recorded which do not seem to form an integral part of the legend and which may have some historical value: the first of these is the statement that Solon had under his command five hundred volunteers and that a decree was passed that these should be supreme in the government of the island if they took it; the second is the statement that near the spot where the Athenians effected a landing there was a temple of Enyalios which had been erected by Solon.

What can we conclude from all this?

Clearly the possession of Salamis was at stake. Either Athens held the island and was in imminent danger of losing it; or she had now given up, or was about to give up, the struggle. This is plainly revealed by the portions of the poem which are extant. We know that it was generally believed by Athenians of a later day that Salamis had belonged to them by right from the beginning of time, but had once or twice slipped from their power; we also know that, as a matter of fact, Salamis had been originally independent and had come at different times under the domination of Megara and Aegina.² During the seventh century,

¹ For Plutarch's *first account* of the campaign, see also Aeneas *Comm. Poliorc.* iv 8 ff.; Justinus ii 8; Frontinus *Strateg.* ii 9, 9; Polyænus *Strateg.* i 20. For his *second account*, Aelian, *V. H.* vii 19.

² Toepffer (1886, pp. 34 ff.). Beloch, however, thinks (1913, p. 310) that before Solon's time Salamis must have belonged to Athens because the strong

Megara, which was then at the full tide of its prosperity as the mother of colonies, must have been in control of the island, which in the hands of another would have blocked her seaport. It is probable, therefore, that at the time of Solon's poem Salamis had never yet been in the possession of Athens; but it must be recognized that it *may* have changed masters several times within the preceding decades. However this may be, the immediate situation which moved Solon to address his fellow-Athenians in verse was discreditable to Athens and not to be tolerated by patriotic citizens. Solon exhorts them to go and fight for the island.

As for the circumstantial account of the composition and recitation of the poem, we must admit that it has a legendary aspect. The picturesque description of the dramatic scene in the market place is almost unquestionably fiction, suggested perhaps in the first instance by Solon's figure of the herald. But we should not forget the lost ninety-two lines of the poem. Plutarch may have found in them sure authority for some of his statements. The protracted war, the death penalty, the discontent of the younger men, the rashness or even insanity of Solon's defiance of the law may well have been facts, revealed more or less directly by the poem itself. At any rate, it is as uncritical to reject, as it is to accept, them unreservedly.¹

expressions in the poem would be appropriate only if the island had been lost by Athens. *Σαλαμιναφετῶν* is meaningless, he argues, unless Athens had a claim to Salamis, and the claim could rest only on previous possession. But this word may mean with equal propriety either that Athens, having once possessed Salamis, had now lost it, or that, never having actually possessed it, she was now disposed to resign her claims. It may be remarked here that Beloch's restoration of the history of Salamis throughout the sixth century, ingenious as it is, is nevertheless entirely conjectural. It assumes that we have a record of all the vicissitudes in the fortunes of the island, and that each piece of evidence refers to a separate event. All the allusions cannot be fitted into a convincing scheme: the fragments of the puzzle picture are too few, and they can be arranged in many ways.

¹ Demosthenes (xix 252) evidently had Solon's poem before his eyes, as we can see by his language. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the poem was his authority for the statements which he makes in the immediate connection, viz.,

What happened after the publication of the poem? Did Solon do anything more toward the success of the Athenians than to rouse them to energetic activity? In later times the renown of the achievement was almost universally attached to his name. We have already seen that he was called a Salaminian by Diodorus and Diogenes; there was also a tradition that his ashes were scattered over the island.¹ We learn from the orator Aeschines that there was in his day a statue of Solon standing in the market place of the town of Salamis.² It is conceivable that the glory for the whole affair might have been given to Solon simply on the strength of the poem. The poet Tyrtaeus was credited with the success of the Spartan arms in the wars against the Messenians because of the martial verse by which he stirred them to the fight. Solon's poem may have been such another trumpet call. But Tyrtaeus was only a poet and, according to the story, lame besides. Solon was more of a statesman than a poet; and it is probable that he did more than a poet could do. We can be sure, at any rate, that he did as much as Tyrtaeus; but we should be surprised if his aid was limited to poetical exhortation. Let us see if we can discover a hint of anything else that he may have done to bring about the conquest of the island.

At the time when the island of Salamis was slipping from her grasp, Athens, as we have seen, was suffering from a grave economic disorder, which was aggravated by social and political conditions which were crying for reform. Solon's thoughts were much occupied with the unhappy state of his country, as his poems show plainly enough, and he now saw her threatened with disgrace abroad as well as disaster at home. In this perplexing situation, the possibility occurred to him of neutralizing one evil with the other. Domestic troubles have been frequently remedied

that Salamis had revolted from Athens, that Athens had set up the death penalty, that Solon had exposed himself to danger in composing and reciting the poem.

¹ Plut. *Sol.* xxxii; Diog. Laert. i 62.

² i 25.

by a vigorous foreign policy. The energetic prosecution of the campaign against Salamis would turn men's minds from their anxieties at home, and unite the opposing parties, for a time at least, in one common struggle. To accomplish this result, it was necessary for him both to fire their enthusiasm and to hold out a reasonably sure promise of success. The first he accomplished through the stirring exhortations of his poem, in which he appealed both to their sense of shame and to their longing for the island. The second he compassed by laying before them the proposal that five hundred volunteers should be called for, and that as a reward for their success the volunteers should be promised full economic and political freedom on the newly won soil. Relying upon the longing for liberty which possessed the hearts of many Athenians who were little better than serfs of the rich, he believed that he could, at one and the same time, assure the conquest of the island and draw off a little blood from the fevered body politic. The promise of political independence in the land which was to be won was the strongest inducement which he could offer to secure the support of the lower classes. Downtrodden as they were by the Athenian aristocracy, nothing would have stirred them as much as the vision of a life freed from the burdens and restrictions by which they were oppressed. Five hundred such men, stimulated at once by their loyalty to Athens and her gods and by the prospect of the immediate attainment of their political and economic aspirations, were sufficient to wrest the coveted island even from powerful Megara. By this single shrewd stroke, Solon could bring permanent relief to five hundred unhappy Athenians and their families, and so far lighten the pressure within the state as to postpone the conflict for some years. The plan was adopted and put into effect. Salamis was won, not so much by the prowess of the Athenian leaders, whoever they were, as by the irresistible *élan* of the men who were fighting for their liberty in a new land which should still be a piece of Attica. When all

was over, Solon, who had been the soul of the enterprise, dedicated a precinct in Salamis to the god Enyalios as a thank-offering for the victory, and ever after he was thought of as the benefactor, not only of the Athenian state, but more especially of those Athenians who dwelt in Salamis. It was natural that legend, which is inevitably romantic, should invent tales of the military stratagems by which Solon won the island; the clever stratagems of a *statesman* are not the stuff for popular stories.

This conjectural restoration of the incident rests, after all, in spite of its plausibility, upon few and slender supports. It cannot be quite admitted within the bounds of sober history. But the nucleus of it, the fact that Solon was in some sort the hero of Salamis, is scarcely open to question. And this was no slight thing in those days of small beginnings. It was a public service which stirred men's admiration, and which, added to their other knowledge of his character and capacity, made them ready a few years later to appoint him supreme dictator in Athens.

We have no record of Solon's activities between the conquest of Salamis and his election to the archonship. It may be that the beginning of the Sacred War which the Amphictyonic League waged against the people of Cirrha fell in this interval; if so, the part which Solon played in the counsels of the league is an indication of the growing esteem in which he was held even beyond the confines of his native city. His part, however, in this war, which, whenever it may have begun, undoubtedly came to an end after his archonship, will be more appropriately discussed on a later occasion.¹

¹ See pp. 98 f.

CHAPTER III

THE ARCHONSHIP

1

At some time between 595 and 590 Solon was elected to the archonship.¹ We are told that he was intrusted with extraordinary powers during his term of office: that he was made a mediator between the two hostile parties; and that he was given special legislative powers, with liberty to remodel at his own pleasure the whole machinery of government.² Undoubtedly these statements are true; that Solon actually addressed himself to these tasks and accomplished them with more or less success, we know from his own poems and from the common Athenian tradition, which in a matter of such importance was unquestionably sound. Furthermore, we can be equally sure that these high powers had been granted to him by an authority which he himself regarded as sovereign in the state: and this sovereign authority could only have been the joint will of all the conflicting elements. Otherwise he could have done his work only as a tyrant, and a tyrant he steadfastly refused to be, as his poems clearly show.

That Solon should have been chosen to fill the office of archon requires no explanation. An archon was elected every year, and no extraordinary ability was required to win this civic honor. But the additional powers which were granted to him made him a

¹ For the date see Appendix 2.

² *Const. of Ath.* v 1, vi 1; Plut. *Sol.* xiv, xvi. Cf. also Plut. *Amatorius* 18, p. 763 e, and *Praec. Ger. Reip.* 10, p. 805 d. That the duty of revising the constitution was intrusted to him only after the *Seisachtheia*, as Plutarch represents, is probably an unwarranted assumption.

dictator plenipotentiary in the state. This was indeed an extraordinary thing; it must be remembered that the Athenians in those turbulent days did not choose a man whose historical reputation was already secure. They would be guided in their choice only by the achievements of Solon in the past and his promise for the future. It is worth while to review those achievements, and to weigh that promise. But first it will be necessary to consider just what the circumstances were which drove the Athenians to the perilous expedient of resigning their liberties to a temporary autocrat.

Fortunately we have some fairly precise information about the state of affairs in Athens at the moment when Solon entered upon his office.¹ After what has been previously said, this will not be misunderstood to mean that we are in a position to command a comprehensive view of all aspects of the city's life. The greater part of the scene is dark. But some real illumination is thrown upon certain parts of it—and those, for our purpose, the most significant parts—by Solon's own poems. In some of the poems written before his archonship and in some written after, he has given reasonably clear indications of the abuses of the day, and it is not difficult to discern the conditions out of which these abuses grew.² No doubt we should know more if we had more of the poems; but even Aristotle and Plutarch, who had more, add little to what we can easily infer from the extant remains.

The outstanding feature of the times was a bitter dissension between the rich and the poor. The population was sharply divided into two hostile groups. It would be misleading to call these groups parties, because there could have been nothing like genuine political rivalry between them, such as is implied by the word "parties" in the modern world. It cannot be supposed that

¹ For an admirable and thorough discussion of the social and economic disorder in Athens and the curative measures adopted by Solon see Gilliard (1907). Cf. also p. 28, footnote 3.

² iii-xii, xl.

the poor had united themselves even in the semblance of a labor party which could energetically and systematically push its claims in the struggle with the rich. It was one of Solon's chief claims to glory among the Athenians of a later day that he had been the first of the distinguished line of statesmen who had championed the rights of the people and resisted the rule of special privilege. There was certainly justice in this claim; before Solon the lower classes in Athens could only have been helpless and inarticulate, lacking the means of either aggression or defense.

But if the poor had nothing which may be properly called a political organization, they were nevertheless bound together by common suffering and oppression, and they were clearly and consciously opposed to the rich by whom they were oppressed. They were not moved to a desire for new things by theoretical propaganda and the requirements of abstract justice. Every man knew from his own misery that there was something wrong in the organization of society which must be put right.¹ Men had suffered till they could endure no longer. They were ready to strike out blindly and fiercely against the thing that hurt them and destroy it. Revolution was at the door. We do not hear that the opposing parties had met in armed conflict. It seems to have been recognized, however, that affairs had come to such a pass that the only settlement would be found in a resort to force.

Solon tells us plainly of the overt abuses in his own day.² A large part of the soil of Attica had come into the possession, or at least under the control, of the rich; many Athenians were suffering under a load of debt; some of these debtors, helpless to relieve themselves, had been forced into exile and had been living so long abroad that they had forgotten the good Attic speech; others, free-born though they were, had become the slaves of their creditors or had sold their children as slaves; and of these, many had been sold into slavery abroad and so were in the worst

¹ xii 27-30.

² Cf. especially ix, xii, xl.

case of all. Broadly speaking, the land and the greater part of its products belonged to the rich ; and the poor were constrained to toil for them as their slaves without mercy or redress. Here were causes enough for bitterness and discontent. While the rich enjoyed their ease and all the luxuries and comforts that the times afforded, the poor were condemned to a life of hopeless drudgery at home or to that worst of evils in the ancient world, exile in a foreign land.

The causes of revolution are always long and slow. We cannot hope to trace through the darkness of the centuries preceding the archonship of Solon the insensible movements of society that led to the crisis. It is probable that certain well known changes that had been taking place throughout the Greek world produced, when they came into contact with the old social order in Athens, the reaction which precipitated the appalling conditions which have been described. There is much to show that this old social order had resembled in a degree the feudal conditions of the Middle Ages. Wealth and power had belonged to the nobles or Eupatridae, and families of humbler birth were attached to their lords and bound to certain obligations of service.¹ As long as the temper of the nobles is mild and that of the common people submissive, such a relation as this does not breed discontent ; indeed the mutual advantages may be such as to make it desirable. But when the lords become arrogant and overbearing, the lot of their vassals soon becomes hard. Solon has much to say of the pride and greed and arrogance of the upper classes in Athens.² This change of temper, together with other changes in Athenian society, tending to destroy the old content-

¹ In later times the words *ἐκτόμοροι*, *πελάται*, and *θήτες* were applied to men who occupied the position of vassals and serfs in early Athenian history ; but no definite information about them is available. For a discussion of the words see Busolt (1895, pp. 108-110) ; Gilliard (1907, pp. 92-97) ; De Sanctis (1912, pp. 195 ff.)

² See iv, v, xii, xvii, xl.

ment, were probably produced by the widely operative reagents that have just been alluded to.

The general character of the seventh and sixth centuries in the history of Greece is well known. It was an age of colonization, of rapidly growing commerce, of sudden riches and sudden losses. The old traditional life of isolated Greek communities was undergoing a transformation: the old noble families embarked on new enterprises of money making; the lower classes saw opportunities for advancement which did not depend on the ownership of the soil. The mass of the people began to be aware of hopes and possibilities which had never before entered their heads. The world was suddenly opened to them. A spirit of adventure, an eagerness for a larger and fuller life marked the whole age. One single, concrete thing had an incalculable influence in making over the world: it was at this time that coined money began to be used in Greece. Commerce demanded a medium of exchange, and money fostered commerce. One was impossible without the other. But the existence of money completely upset the old relations between men in single communities. In order to live together without money, men must come very close to one another; barter and exchange, whether of goods or of labor, is direct and personal. Money has the same value everywhere; it may be earned in one place and spent in another. It is not necessary to tell the old familiar story. The fundamental transformation in human society wrought by the invention of money is sufficiently well known.

With these general characteristics of the age in mind we can now see what probably took place in Athens during the seventh century. The new opportunities of trade and commerce were open first to the nobles because they alone held any considerable property; they began to collect money; payment in kind was no longer acceptable; since money is the form of wealth which most quickly engenders avarice, the nobles became greedy and

avaricious. No distinction is made by Solon, or by Aristotle, between the noble and the rich, who are also called indifferently the few, the distinguished, or the powerful. Often enough, with a singular directness, but without any thought of moral distinction, the upper classes are called the good, and the lower classes the bad; but this habit of expression is common enough among the Greeks, who were never blind to the fact that high birth and wealth enable men to attain a higher standard of human worth than can be reached by those who are not blessed with these advantages. Meanwhile the lower classes had no money with which to pay; no longer able to fulfill their old obligations by payment in kind, they were forced to borrow; men who held land were forced to give up part of their right to its products; the only security which others could offer was their personal liberty or the liberty of members of their family. Once their liberty was forfeited, they were in danger of being sold abroad for money. Thus the old order was transformed merely by the conjunction of circumstances.

Meanwhile political power and the administration of justice lay in the hands of the nobles. Aristocratic rule may have begun already to breed discontent; now at any rate when the new abuses that afflicted the community could only be righted through the agency of law and government, the very part of the community which profited by the abuses held control of both. All Athenian magistrates, it is safe to say, were chosen from among the wealthy class. The laws which they administered were the unwritten laws of custom and precedent. What recourse had a poor man under these circumstances, now that the new, baleful influence of money had transmuted a benevolent aristocracy into a rapacious oligarchy? Public property and even the sacred holdings of temples were not spared;¹ and if men had the audacity to lay hands on such things as these, they would certainly have felt no

¹ xii 12 f.

scruple in seizing upon the lands and the persons of poor debtors, to which they had a certain right according to the terms of custom and tradition.

These were the deplorable conditions which compelled the Athenians to seek some radical remedy. Positive pressure came, of course, from the lower classes. It was they who demanded a change.¹ But the upper classes, too, perceived the danger that threatened, and were themselves eager that peace and calm should be restored. Just what the demands of the lower classes were, we cannot say. Indeed, they were probably not formulated at all; or, if the vague dissatisfaction and distress came to some coherent expression, it was probably in the radical and revolutionary terms which are characteristic of such popular clamor. It appears that an equal distribution of the soil was talked of,² and no doubt other short-sighted and impracticable schemes filled men's minds. But there seemed to be no escape from the irrepressible conflict.

2

Such was the problem which Solon was called upon to solve. Both factions, divided in all else, were united in their belief that he alone could find a way.³ What was it that gave all Athenians such confidence in him alone? We have not been able to trace the steps by which he had risen to the position of the accepted statesman of the day. But we can discern three causes at least, which, though they may not have been the only ones, would at any rate have been sufficient to win for him the public confidence.

In the first place, he occupied a unique position in his relation to the parties, having bonds of relationship with all the principal groups in the state. A member of one of the best families of Athens, he belonged indisputably to the highest social class; he knew their ways and he understood their thoughts. Possess-

¹ iv.² viii 8 f.³ *Const. of Ath.* v 1; *Plut. Sol.* xiv.

ing no large estates, he was thrown by circumstances into association with the landless men in the community; he appreciated their difficulties and sympathized with their aspirations. A successful trader and a traveler of wide experience, he had made himself one with the new industrial and commercial element in the population; he saw the change which was inevitably coming in the constitution of Athenian society.¹ Surely there were not many men in Athens who had enjoyed such opportunities for learning the temper of the people. All parties alike could trust him as one who knew them and could survey the problem from their point of view. The poor saw in him the champion of their liberties; the rich believed that he would be the defender of their privileges — *noblesse oblige*. It is not likely that when through compromise Solon was made dictator by the united action of both parties, either party really thought of him as an impartial administrator. In such cases neither party really desires a compromise; in the present instance, we may be sure the lower classes fully expected a redistribution of the land, and the rich expected a preservation of the *status quo* with only slight modification.² This is clear from the loudly expressed dissatisfaction on both sides which is echoed in the poems composed by Solon after his archonship.³ If either party had really believed that Solon was the inflexible mediator that he eventually showed himself to be, he would never have been appointed to his high office. A compromise candidate is one whom each party thinks it can bend to its own uses.

In the second place, he was the victor of Salamis. When in

¹ Lehmann-Haupt (1912, p. 17) observes: "Als Grosskaufmann von höchster staatsmännischer Begabung und weitem Blicke ist er, als die Stunde rief, daran gegangen, Athen aus wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Nöten zu befreien und durch den Handel auf den Weg der Grösse zu führen." Cf. also Lehmann-Haupt (1900, p. 638, footnote 1). This opinion, however, is not well supported, resting, as it does, mostly on the reform in the monetary system and the system of weights and measures which is attributed to Solon. See Appendix 5.

² *Const. of Ath.* xi 2; *Plut. Sol.* xvi 1.

³ vi-xi.

the mind of the Athenian people factional disputes were merged in the common emotion of patriotic devotion to the fatherland, their grateful loyalty naturally rested in him. He was in a certain sense the national hero of the day. And not only this. There were good grounds for his popularity. If we have judged aright his conduct of the Salaminian affair, he had not only guided it to a successful conclusion, but in his settlement of the island he had shown wisdom and sagacity. We may well believe that there was much in what he had done to inspire confidence in his ability to handle the more difficult task of reconstituting Athenian society.

Thirdly, Solon was a writer on public questions who had given expression to opinions which were acceptable to the people at large. Considerable fragments remain of the elegiac verse which he composed in the period before his archonship, and they are sufficient to give us a fair understanding of his political creed.¹ He denounces the greed of the rich, he sympathizes with the hardships of the poor; therefore, he is the accepted leader of the popular party, the first *δημαγωγός* in the history of Athens. The policy, moreover, with which he proposes to correct the abuses of the day is far from being subversive and radical. It was a policy which the upper classes could readily subscribe to, particularly at a moment when some conciliation at least must be made to the restless masses. Solon did not propose to take away the property of the rich and give it to the poor; he did not propose to throw open the magistracies of the city to the plebeians; he did not propose to throw down the social barriers in the community. The panacea which he offered to Athens was *εὐνομία*, a beneficent reign of law, which should remove all causes for dissension and foster harmony and contentment. Obviously this was an ideal which all could acclaim. It might mean much or it might mean little. Both parties were wrong, as the event

¹ iv, v, xii, xl.

proved: Solon meant precisely what he said,¹ and what he said was the wise utterance of a man whose view is not circumscribed by the wall which shuts in a party. But for the moment all were content, and Solon was intrusted with the destinies of the state.

The influence of Solon's poetry is not to be regarded as insignificant. Ringing verse has great advantages over the sober pamphlet in stirring the emotions, and political action springs more often from emotion than from reason. We may well believe that many a rousing couplet from Solon's elegies was repeated in the market place and at the crossroads; and the noble description which he gives of the ideal blessings of Euno-mia must have convinced many who were oppressed with the realities of life, that Solon was the man to bring the state into order. Furthermore, it appears that Solon had something of the gift—invaluable to politicians—of coining watchwords which like magnets drew to his cause the unsettled opinions of the community. Plutarch reports one such phrase, which, whether it is authentic or not, serves at any rate as an illustration:² "Equality breeds no war" (τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ)—a stimulating sentiment, especially to unthinking persons, well adapted to serve as the nucleus for a political movement. That the phrase has no precise meaning does not diminish its value as a rallying cry. Plutarch himself observes, very neatly, that the two parties put different interpretations upon it, the rich thinking that the equality was to be based on ability and worth, and the poor thinking it was to be based on measure and count.

It would not be fair to conclude an estimate of the causes which led to the choice of Solon as the dictator of Athens without mentioning also the power of his personality. Certain qualities stand out as characteristic of the man, demonstrated both in his poetry and in the whole conduct of his life. Wisdom, surely, he possessed in full measure: geniality we can infer from the tone

¹ viii 6 f. ; cf. ix 15 ff.

² Plut. *Sol.* xiv 2.

of his utterances and from the mellowing effects of travel and experience; kindness unquestionably is revealed at many points; and best of all he was a man of unflinching integrity and loyalty. Such qualities as these, coupled with the *savoir faire* of a man of birth and breeding, must have had their effect upon the minds of Athenians. What they did not suspect was that he also possessed an indomitable will and an unwavering purpose. They wanted a leader who should do what they individually thought was best for them; they found a leader who did what he himself knew was best for them, without fear or favor.

3

The extraordinary office which Solon was called upon to fill carried with it functions which had to be performed by some one in every Greek state at some point in its transition from aristocratic to democratic government. The readjustments throughout the Greek world which were made necessary by the rise of the lower classes and the growth of trade and industry, did not come about automatically, but generally required more or less violent procedure. In some cases a great lawgiver made over the machinery of government so that it would work under the new conditions; but in most cases the change came through the arbitrary assumption of power by some single individual who commanded the support of the commons because he overthrew the government of the aristocracy. Such a person, called by the Greeks a tyrant, made himself sole master of the state and administered the government at his own pleasure, maintaining his power till overthrown by force. His office was unconstitutional and he was himself an outlaw in the literal sense of the term. Actually the motives of the tyrant in setting himself against the established order of things were personal ambition and lust for power; but he served at the same time, unconsciously, another purpose. He freed the common people from the domination of the hereditary aris-

ocracy, and, by making all citizens equal under his own despotic sway, prepared the people for the assumption of the sovereignty when the time came to cast off his yoke. Such tyrannies were of varying duration; and they were of varying merit. Some tyrants acted like tyrants in the modern sense of the word; others did much for the prosperity of their cities. Tyrants rose to power, here and there, in the Greek world throughout the course of Greek history. But it was in the seventh and sixth centuries, when tyrannies first appear, that they performed this special and peculiar function in the constitutional development of the Greek city-state.

If ever a state was ripe for a tyranny, it was Athens at the beginning of the sixth century. Conditions had reached such a pass that no less heroic remedy, apparently, would suffice. Undoubtedly the remedy would have been applied if Solon had not resolutely set himself against it. He could easily have put himself at the head of either of the two opposing parties and won his way to a dominant position in the city. The lower classes fully believed that the mild policies which he publicly expressed were only a cloak to conceal his real ulterior purpose, and that he intended, when the fruit of his plans was ripe, to seize by a stroke of force the supreme power in the state.¹ Such action was eagerly awaited by the common people, who hoped to secure large advantage for themselves through the triumph of the man who they thought would give them all they wanted. He held within his grasp the opportunity that most men covet most. Another man, of less rigid principle, would have given the people their way, and allowed himself to be carried to a position of supremacy by the unrestrained violence of the mob. Plutarch reports² (and there may have been some authority for his statement in the lost poems), that even neutral persons, who belonged to neither of the two parties, felt that the peace and prosperity of the city could best

¹ viii, xxi, xxii.

² Plut. *Sol.* xiv 3.

be secured if Solon became tyrant. Some even jeered at him for refusing so enviable a position.¹

But Solon was inflexible. His political principles, resting upon *Eunomia*, were absolutely inconsistent with the lawless tyranny. He had confidence in the power of the people to adjust themselves to a lawful form of government which would provide for their perfect happiness and security. He would not yield to the temptation of personal advancement; he remained steadfastly loyal to the best interests of the state. He took more pride in his renunciation of the doubtful honor than he would have felt in the attainment of it.² For this, Solon deserves the highest praise from all believers in democracy. He himself believed so firmly in the capacity of the people to govern themselves, if the obstructions to good government were removed, that he refused to undertake the government himself; yet he must have felt that he could guide the affairs of Athens well, if it had been best that any one but the Athenians should guide the affairs of Athens. The thing was thrust upon him which most men long to possess; Athens besought him to be her ruler; and he refused because he knew it was better for Athens that she should rule herself.³

Just when this demand was made that Solon should accept the tyranny, we do not know. It may have been before he was elected archon; it may have been during his term of office; it may have been when his legislation was complete. To judge from his own allusions to it in his poems, the people must have

¹ xxii.

² viii, ix 20 ff., xi, xxi.

³ Beloch (1912, p. 367) says: "Er hat es nicht gewagt (*i.e.*, to make himself tyrant); er wusste zu gut, dass ihm die unentbehrliche Grundlage fehlte, ein fester militärischer Rückhalt, und dass er auch selbst nich der rechte Mann dazu war, den Tyrannen zu spielen." To this degradation of Solon's motives by the German historian an effective reply may be found in the words of a distinguished French Hellenist. Solon may have been aware, says Croiset (1903, pp. 594, 595), of the dangers and deceptions incident to the tyranny; but, he continues, "nous n'avons aucune raison pour ne pas croire qu'à cette sagesse naturelle se soient associés les motifs élevés qu'il laisse deviner dans ses vers. Il considérait la tyrannie comme une violence, et la violence lui répugnait, parce qu'il avait foi dans la justice et la liberté."

been very persistent; probably they long refused to take "No" for an answer. But finally they became quiet and he was allowed to accomplish his task in his own way.

He had refused to be tyrant, but in order to prevent civil war and restore quiet in the state, he needed temporarily the arbitrary power of a tyrant. This he did not hesitate to assume. Having once accepted office at the hands of his fellow-citizens, he immediately showed his complete independence and his determination to carry out the measures which he conceived to be necessary for the relief of the situation. He exhibited no weakness; he made no concessions to the powerful; he was guilty of no truckling to his electors. He had been chosen mediator between two hostile parties, and a mediator is expected by each party to champion its cause. This is what Solon undertook to do. He strove to defend each party from the vindictiveness of the other. In his own words, he cast his shield over both parties alike.¹ It was inevitable under these circumstances that each party should feel that it was getting only half the support of the man whom it had counted upon to be its champion. Neither party was satisfied. But Solon did not allow himself to be turned from his settled course. He fulfilled his promises, no more, no less; he used such a measure of force as was necessary to support the dictates of justice; he strove to give every man, high and low, his due.² He did not aim to cut a new constitution out of new cloth. He adhered to the old where the old was sound: he let well enough alone. But he endeavored to make the changes which were essential to the peace of Athens and the well-being of all the citizens.³ Such a plan, conceived and executed in a spirit of moderation and fair dealing, was not likely to please either the extreme left or the extreme right. He says himself he was like a wolf hemmed in by a pack of hounds.⁴ But he held true. He was as sure at the end as he was at the beginning that

¹ vi 5 f.

² ix 15 ff.

³ vi.

⁴ ix 26 f.

he had done the best thing for Athens, and he was proud of his unflagging resolution.

Upon an examination of the reforms which Solon himself claims to have introduced, one is struck by a notable consistency in his policy. In certain of his earlier poems, as we have seen, he had put his finger on what he believed to be the chief vices of that society. Now, after his term of office was over, it was precisely these vices which he claimed to have corrected. He knew from the first just what he intended to do. He asserts explicitly that he had fulfilled his promises.¹ He may have been referring to definite promises, or he may have had in mind the well known views to which he had been giving public expression, probably for some years past. However this may be, it is certain that during his administration he did exactly the things which he had led the Athenians to expect he would do, the things which, he firmly believed, both before and after his archonship, were the things which above all others ought to be done. There was no reason for surprise or disappointment, on the part of the Athenians at any rate; it was Solon himself who was both surprised and disappointed when the people received with dissatisfaction the very reforms which they had appointed him to carry out.

Solon makes a double claim for the value of his reforms. He insists that he had accomplished more good for the lower orders than they could have dared to hope for; but at the same time he asserts with equal positiveness that he was acting in the interest of the upper classes.² Such statements as these are susceptible of but one interpretation. Solon believed that the safety and happiness of each class lay, not in its own complete triumph over the other, but rather in a wisely adjusted social, political, and economic order which would assure to all men their full deserts. He was a statesman who was concerned for the good of all Athenians, not for the ascendancy of one group over another. He refused alike

¹ viii 6 f. ; ix 15 f.

² x. •

to humiliate the nobles and to exalt unduly the common people.¹ Naturally, since the need for reform was due to the distresses of the common people, the measures which Solon actually adopted were taken in their interest. The complaint of the nobles, therefore, was that he had done too much. The common people, on the other hand, were angry because he had not done more. In particular, they demanded a redistribution of the land. This extravagant demand may have taken shape in men's minds as a result of the positive but limited advantage which they had won through Solon's administration; or it may have been an old cry which had been raised before his term of office and which they had fondly thought he would hear and answer. It is certain that Solon had never intended or promised to take away the land of the nobles and distribute it equally among the population.² No doubt his steadfast refusal to do this was one of the reasons why he claimed to have acted in the interest of the upper classes. But one cannot believe that this was the only reason. He must have been convinced in his own mind that the condition of the nobles would be altogether happier and more secure if the lower classes were peaceful and contented as a result of an equitable administration of fair and impartial laws. Evidently this ideal was too high for the heated partisans of the day, who, on both sides alike, were too selfish and short-sighted to see its worth.

4

What, now, were the measures adopted in order to bring the community of Athenians into a state of order and contentment? Like a good physician, he understood that quick and powerful remedies were needed to cure the acute disorder from which Athens was suffering, and that when the crisis was past and convalescence had begun, a sound regimen was required to safeguard the health which had been restored. The first of these require-

¹ vi.² viii.

ments he met by issuing certain executive orders, which, however deeply they cut, the city had given him the power to enforce. Then, when these had been put into effect, he proceeded to draw up a body of written laws calculated to prevent the recurrence of so grave a situation in the future. The reforms which were secured by these two separate acts would be described to-day as social and economic, legal and constitutional; but in the simpler organization of society which prevailed in the sixth century, such a classification as this would not have been thought of. To Solon and his fellow-Athenians no other classification would have been apparent than that which divided the reforms into temporary expedients and permanent regulations. We shall examine first the one and then the other.¹

Solon himself tells us of four things which he did to bring immediate relief to the oppressed classes:² he freed the land, he restored to their homes Athenians who had been sold into foreign slavery, he brought back those whom destitution had driven into exile, and he set at liberty those who were the slaves of Athenian masters. Freedom, plainly, was the dominant motive in his procedure, and we may be sure that the freedom which was granted by a moderate statesman like Solon was neither excessive nor undeserved.

What did Solon mean when he said he had freed the land? His statement is cast in a poetical form, sufficiently clear for his readers, who knew exactly what he was referring to, but somewhat obscure to us. "I removed," he says, "the stones of her bondage, and she who was a slave before is now free." The word which is translated "stones of bondage" is one which in later times was

¹ Two reforms are attributed to Solon which it would be difficult to classify as executive or legislative: namely, the modification of the currency and of the system of weights and measures, and the reform of the calendar. But since there is nothing to justify us in believing that Solon was personally responsible for these changes, we do not need to concern ourselves with them here. For a discussion see Appendix 5.

² ix.

applied to small stone tablets which were set up on lands or houses which rested under a mortgage, bearing the names of the owner and the creditor and the amount of the loan. There may have been similar mortgages and similar records of them in Solon's time.¹ If there were, we must infer that the result of Solon's action was the cancellation of all debts for which real property was held as security. But some scholars claim that the sale of land, unknown in primitive society, was only just coming into use in the first part of the sixth century and that when families held inalienable rights in their land, the institution of mortgage could not yet have appeared. If this contention is sound, we can only conclude that the stone tablets were set up as proof that the creditor could claim a certain fixed portion of the produce of the soil. This is equivalent to saying that while a creditor could not claim in return for a loan the land which served as security, he could nevertheless exact regular interest upon it, in the form of natural produce, until the debtor was able to discharge the debt. If this was the situation, we can easily recognize the justice of Solon's statement that the earth had been a slave. He indicates plainly that a large part of the soil of Attica had come under the control of wealthy creditors, and the very presence of the stones, everywhere visible, kept before men's minds the unequal distribution of wealth. Whatever may have been the exact character of the financial transaction which was recorded by the stones,² in any case it is clear that the rights of the creditors were summarily annulled and the poor who had been laboring under a grievous obligation were restored to the full enjoyment of their own land. It cannot be supposed that the creditors were reimbursed out of the public treasury, because at this stage in the development of the state there could not have been a sufficiently

¹ On the question of mortgages see De Sanctis (1912, pp. 194 ff. with the footnotes).

² For a fuller account of these stones (*ἄροι*) see Gilliard (1907, pp. 129-136) and Sandys (1912, p. 46).

large accumulation of public moneys to redeem debts of such magnitude; thus the only persons upon whom a tax could be levied were the very ones who might have profited by it. We cannot escape the conclusion that Solon's order, while it brought great relief to the poor, must have caused a considerable loss to the rich.

If the removal of the encumbrances which rested on the soil of Attica was accomplished only at the cost of the rich, the same must have been equally true of the liberation of Athenians who had sunk into slavery. The personal freedom of these unhappy creatures, which had been pledged as security for debts contracted by themselves or their relatives, had been forfeited. Failing to recover from destitute debtors the sums which they had lent them, the wealthy citizens had taken over the debtors themselves to be their slaves and to work for them without remuneration. If now these slaves were restored to liberty and nothing was paid for their redemption, their creditors must have suffered no slight loss. Those creditors who having seized upon the persons of their debtors had sold them abroad (as they might legally do)¹ may have been in better case, because having already received the value of their slaves they were not now affected by their liberation. But it is not certain that they were. For if these slaves were to be redeemed from their foreign masters, Solon must have provided money for their purchase, and, though we can only conjecture how he obtained the money, it may be that he forced the original owners to provide it.

It is not clear what Solon had to do in order to bring back to Athens citizens who had not been enslaved but had been forced into exile by reason of their poverty. Probably they had fled from threatened slavery, and the same cancellation of debts which liberated the slaves would have made it safe for them to return to their homes. It is possible that they had emigrated

¹ ix 9 f.

from Athens not because they were oppressed by a load of debt but because living conditions were so hard that they could not rise above the level of sheer destitution; in this case, however, nothing short of a general amelioration of economic conditions could have brought them back; whereas the tone of Solon's words implies that he had made it possible for them to return immediately. Again, possibly these unhappy exiles owned land in Attica which had fallen into the power of wealthy creditors; in this case, the liberation of the soil would have restored to them the opportunity of earning an independent livelihood.

We cannot hope, after all, to know the exact terms of these several measures, and it is unwise to carry conjecture too far. We can see that much of the land and many of the men of Athens had come, according to the iniquitous custom of the time, into the power of the rich, and that they were rescued from their clutches. The only conceivable way of accomplishing this result, as far as we can see, was by canceling all debts which had been contracted on the security of the land or the persons of the debtors. Farther than this we cannot go, on the evidence which is afforded by Solon's own words.

This cancellation of debts, either alone or in connection with supplementary legislation, was known in the later Greek world under the name *Seisachtheia* or "disburdenment."¹ Plutarch informs us² that this supplementary legislation took the form of a law prohibiting loans on the security of the person of the debtor. Aristotle does not expressly include this law in the *Seisachtheia*, but he mentions it in immediate connection with it.³ There can be little doubt that Solon instituted such a law immediately after the promulgation of the order providing for the cancellation of debts. If he had not taken such a step, there would have been nothing to prevent a prompt return of the same deplorable con-

¹ For *Seisachtheia* see Appendix 3 and Busolt (1895, pp. 259-261).

² Plut. *Sol.* xv.

³ *Const. of Ath.* vi.

ditions which had only just been dispelled. We must, therefore, include in our survey of Solon's social and economic reforms this beneficent law which was calculated to perpetuate the personal liberty of Athenians. Never after, in the history of Athens, do we read of the enslavement or even the imprisonment of free men for debt, except in certain rare instances where vagrant and irresponsible persons had to be summarily dealt with.¹ Unfortunately we know nothing of the means adopted by Solon to prevent the rich from again getting into their power the land which belonged to impoverished debtors. There was the same need of permanent and effective legislation in this matter as in the matter of personal liberty. But the problem was infinitely more complicated. Land must still continue to serve as security for debts. What was needed was equitable regulation of the practice. But we know neither the procedure by which the rich had previously got the land into their power, nor the legislation by which Solon put a stop to it; we must, therefore, content ourselves with the little which we have been able to gather from Solon's own statements.

When by a few bold strokes Solon had rid Athenian society of the deplorable effects of long-standing abuses, it remained for him to establish the new order on a secure foundation. We have seen that he had very definite ideas of the best way to insure the happiness of the state. *Eunomia* was the name which he applied to his ideal of civic order. The field was now clear for him to inaugurate a reign of law which would provide for the Athenians all the blessings which he had described in his earlier poem.

Now, in order that a state may thrive and prosper under a reign of law, two things are essential: on the one hand, the laws

¹ Speaking of the abolition of slavery for debt, Glotz remarks (1904, p. 368): "Dès les premières années du sixième siècle avant notre ère, Athènes a ainsi placé sa législation à une hauteur qui n'est atteinte aujourd'hui encore, et depuis peu de temps, que par quelques codes des nations les plus civilisées." This action may be credited to Solon without doubt.

must be wisely framed and impartially administered; on the other hand, the people must be loyal in their obedience to them and wise and patient when the need arises for a modification of them. Of these two essentials, Solon, at the best, could provide only one. He could do no more than build the machine and set it in motion; thereafter its success or failure would be only in part dependent on the skill and ingenuity with which he had constructed it. Unless the people were endowed with the capacity for self-government, the machine would soon be broken and useless.

Though only one of the two essentials could be provided wholly and completely by Solon, it should not be forgotten that he had done everything in his power to provide the other. In the early poem, which has just been mentioned, he had done what he could to direct the attention of the Athenians to the beauty of *Eunomia*. And we cannot but believe that he had bent every effort to implant in their minds a love and respect for the true freedom which a reign of law guarantees. Such admonitions must have formed the subject of other poems which are now lost; and he must have embraced every opportunity offered by daily intercourse with his fellow-citizens to establish a sound public opinion. But the dissemination of such ideas is a slow business; no single individual, however wise he may be, can assure the wisdom of a whole community. The very nature of popular government forbids even an ardent advocate of its doctrines to exert any pressure upon the will of the citizens other than that of his own moral influence.

Probably, at the beginning of the sixth century B.C., Solon could not foresee the dangers and difficulties of free institutions. The experiment had never yet been tried. Solon's chief claim to glory lies in the fact that, at a moment when Athens was in sore need of good government, he rejected the manifest opportunity to provide such government by making himself a benevolent autocrat and, acting on the faith that was in him, insisted that

the Athenians undertake the task of governing themselves. He prepared the way for them. Without such preparation nothing could have been done. He swept away all that he believed to be a hindrance to freedom, and provided the people with the necessary instrument for the preservation of their freedom. The future lay with the Athenians.¹

5

What was the nature of the instrument which he provided? In his own words, a body of written laws providing the fair administration of justice for every individual.² Just how much or how little is meant by these words, it has been hitherto beyond the power of scholars to determine. At the most, they imply that Solon was the first to provide the Athenians with a written code; at the least, they would signify that he had simply added to a written code already in existence a limited number of laws which were essential for the establishment of an impartial administration of justice. It was the universal belief of antiquity that Draco was the first to provide the Athenians with a written code and that Solon had repealed all of Draco's laws except those relating to homicide, and had created a new code in its place.³ But this is manifestly an assumption which could not rest on any real evidence. Whatever Greeks of a later age knew about the laws of Solon, they could certainly know nothing of a code which preceded that of Solon and which Solon had abolished. They did know, as we learn from inscriptions, that the laws relating to homicide which were still in force at the end of the fifth century were recorded under the name of Draco.⁴ This fact probably led them

¹ "Solon a mérité sa gloire moins par son action sur les partis, qu'il ne put jamais maîtriser, ou par sa constitution, qui ne résista pas cinq ans à l'assaut des mécontents, que par les principes qu'il introduisit dans la législation pour toujours, par les prescriptions où ses concitoyens ne cessèrent plus de voir le résumé de la sagesse humaine." — Glotz (1904, p. 326).

² ix 18-20.

³ *Const. of Ath.* iv 1, vii 1; *Plut. Sol.* xvii 1.

⁴ *C. I. A.* i 61. Furthermore, Plutarch suggests (*Sol.* xix 2) that Solon founded the Areopagus and supports the theory by the fact that Draco

to the inference that Draco had drafted a full code of laws and that since all early laws then extant were attributed to Solon, the still earlier code of Draco, with the exception mentioned, had been repealed. We cannot accept this inference without evidence that some substantial proof of it existed. Nor, on the other hand, can we deny flatly that there was a full written code of laws before Solon. It is a significant fact that a strict construction of Solon's own words suggests that he himself believed that the good effect of his work was due, not primarily to the quality of his laws, but rather to the fact that he had reduced them to writing.¹ One should not insist too strongly upon this clue, but at the same time it should not be overlooked.

If Solon was indeed the first to reduce the laws of Athens to writing, we must put a far higher estimate on his services to the people. As long as justice was administered solely on the basis of unwritten custom and precedent, there was no limitation on the power of the magistrates who were themselves the depositary of the law; and since the magistrates without exception were chosen among the rich and noble, the lower classes were entirely in their hands.² The most arbitrary and oppressive procedure might pass under the name of justice, because the magistrates could maintain that their judgments were given in accordance with the law of the land. But if the law of the land was recorded in writing, so that it could be consulted by all who could read, the magistrates could not pervert justice to their own purposes without open defiance of the law. The importance of such a change cannot be overestimated. The reduction of the

nowhere mentions the Areopagites but always addresses himself to the Ephetae in cases of homicide. There must, therefore, have been a set of laws relating to homicide which were accepted as the work of Draco. Elsewhere we learn that these laws of Draco were incorporated into the first of the Axones which were supposed to contain the laws of Solon. Evidently there was no documentary evidence to show exactly what Solon had done in a constitutional way.

¹ Appendix 4.

² Cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 186 f. οἷδ' ὄτι τραχὺς (i. e., Ζεὺς) καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ δίκαιον ἔχων.

laws to writing was a democratic reform of the first magnitude. If the thing had been done by Draco, it must have been done in the interest of the common people; and it is difficult to understand why his work should have had to be annulled in so short a time. The temptation is strong to deny the credit to Draco and give it to Solon, but unfortunately the matter lies beyond the reach of real proof.

Whether the code of Solon was the first written code in Athens or not, we can be sure that it marked an important departure from conditions which had previously prevailed. Solon makes the explicit claim that it assured an impartial administration of justice for all, high and low alike. If this claim was well founded, the achievement certainly deserves unlimited praise; in any case Solon himself deserves unlimited praise for so high a purpose. Was his claim really justified? Have we any information on which an answer to this important and fundamental question can be safely based?

As we might expect, there is no allusion to any particular law in the extant poems of Solon. Probably none of the poems contained any such allusion. Prosaic as the matters are with which he sometimes deals, we should be surprised to find anything like the terms of a law appearing in his verse. But among later Greek and even Roman authors we may collect a large number of laws which were attributed to him. One or two appear as early as Herodotus and Aristophanes.¹ Aristotle mentions a few; there are many in Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius; others are scattered among other authors. But the largest number are contained in the speeches of Demosthenes and the other Attic orators. Many of the laws attributed to him manifestly belong to a later period; a few can be definitely connected with his name; the majority are such as might have been written by any early legislator. In order to know what confidence can be placed in

¹ Herodotus ii 177; Aristophanes *Birds* 1660.

the authenticity of this considerable body of supposedly Solonian laws, it is necessary to inquire how the laws which were written by Solon at the beginning of the sixth century could have been preserved as his recognizable work during the century and a half that intervenes before the first mention of a Solonian law by a Greek author. Such an inquiry leads to the conclusion (stated more fully elsewhere),¹ that we have no right to accept any of these laws as genuinely Solonian unless there is some internal or external proof other than the mere ascription of them to him by the Greek writers. The nucleus, the original cell, of the great body of Athenian law was created by Solon; this cell contained within itself all the characteristics of the mature organism; but in the course of time the original cell expanded and multiplied, until in the end, though the original life-principle had never been lost, Athenian law was a thing infinitely greater and more complex than it had been at the beginning of its long life of two hundred years. This biological analogy, though slightly misleading, is fundamentally true. Undoubtedly much of the original tissue of Solon's code still survived in the fourth century, but it was so imbedded in later accretions that it is practically impossible for us to isolate it. With a few exceptions, therefore, the many laws which pass under the name of Solon cannot be used as evidence of the character of his code. They are of the highest interest and importance to the student of Athenian law, but since the work of Solon cannot be distinguished from the laws which were in force before his time or from the laws which were passed subsequently, one who is curious primarily about the life and career of Solon himself finds little in them to assist him to a clearer view.²

¹ See Appendix 4.

² For Solon's revision of the legal code, in addition to the standard works on constitutional and legal antiquities, see Busolt (1895, pp. 287-295) and the excellent discussion by Gilliard (1907, pp. 28 ff.) of the authenticity of the laws attributed to Solon. Sondhaus's dissertation (1909) is a collection of the laws attributed to Solon, classified under the several magistrates whose province it was to administrate them. He accepts almost all the laws as authentic, differing

Perhaps the law which may be assigned to Solon with the least hesitation is that prohibiting loans on the security of the person of the debtor. We have seen that a law of this tenor was necessary in order to prevent the recurrence of the evils which had been corrected by executive order. Besides this, two laws are recorded which bear within them the date of the archonship of Solon. Of these one, whose authenticity is generally recognized, legalized the practice of leaving property by will to persons unrelated by blood.¹ This is a step common to all communities which pass from the primitive condition which recognizes only family rights and not personal rights in property. The other of the two laws provided for the reënfrenchisement of all persons who had been disfranchised before the archonship of Solon, with certain specified exceptions; ² but even this law, which seems so well attested, is open to grave suspicion.

fundamentally from Gilliard, who refuses to recognize more than a few. Glotz (1904, pp. 325 ff.) discusses at considerable length the effect of Solon's legislation upon the solidarity of the family; but one is disposed to doubt whether all that is attributed to Solon by him is actually Solon's own work. It may be that reforms that were supposed to have been achieved by Solon were not actually his alone, but rather the results of prolonged effort on the part of the Athenians. Glotz's study, however, is one of the most important contributions to the early history of Athenian law.

¹ On the laws of inheritance and certain other laws whose authenticity is comparatively sure, see Glotz (1904, pp. 325 ff.) and De Sanctis (1912, pp. 211 ff.). The following passage from Glotz may also be quoted in this connection (p. 397): " Dans la période de la transition qui nous a menés de la famille souveraine à l'État souveraine, tandis que nous suivions les progrès de l'individualisme dans le droit grec, petit à petit tout l'intérêt de cette étude s'est concentré sur Athènes. Ce n'est pas seulement parce que cette ville bénéficie de la gloire acquise plus tard et des documents plus nombreux qu'elle a laissés. C'est que réellement, à partir du sixième siècle, en un temps où toutes les cités avaient également supprimé la responsabilité familiale en droit commun, elle surpassa les autres par la vigueur des coups dont elle frappa l'organisme interne et l'action sociale des γένη. L'homme ici fut libre plus tôt que partout ailleurs. A un progrès jusqu'alors continu, mais lent comme une fatalité, Solon donna une poussée décisive. Et c'est ainsi qu'il fit passer sa patrie au premier rang, et que l'histoire des améliorations introduites dans les lois grecques se confond avec l'histoire même de la législation attique."

² Plut. *Sol.* xix; cf. Andocides i 77 f.

6

It may be a matter for surprise that in our examination of the measures which Solon adopted for the amelioration of conditions in Athens no account has been taken so far of the changes which he may be supposed to have introduced in the political organization of the state. It is the habit in modern times to believe that the chief remedy for the discontent of the lower classes lies in the enlargement of their political rights. And yet in all that survives to us of Solon's own words we find but one obscure hint of political reform. Are we to suppose that he made little or no change in the constitution? Or are we to suppose that though he did bring about changes of importance he has omitted any mention of them in his poems? There is much talk among ancient writers and modern scholars of the Solonian constitution, and there can be little doubt that he was responsible for modifications of some sort. Probably the explanation of his silence is to be found in the fact that in the ancient world there was no distinction between constitutional law and statutory law; his allusions to law in general must be understood to cover his reforms in the governmental machinery as well as in the laws which the government was designed to administer. It is probable that if we had a full copy of Solon's laws, we should have as full a statement as ever existed of Solon's constitutional measures.

All that Solon himself has to tell us about his changes in the form of government is to be found in a single fragment which is quoted by Aristotle.¹ He says :

To the common people I have given such a measure of privilege as sufficeth them, neither robbing them of the rights they had, nor holding out the hope of greater ones; and I have taken equal thought for those who were possessed of power and who were looked up to on account of their wealth, careful that they too should suffer no indignity. I have taken a stand which enables me to hold a stout shield over both groups, and I have allowed neither to triumph unjustly over the other.

¹ vi.

These words certainly imply that changes of some sort had been made; but they chiefly emphasize the fact that the changes had been slight. Whether our judgment of the extent and importance of these changes, or the judgment of Solon's contemporaries, would have been the same as his own, of course we cannot say. If Aristotle's verdict is sound,¹ that Solon had actually transferred the sovereignty from the nobles to the common people, or rather to the people as a whole, we must admit either that Solon's changes were more far-reaching than he knew or that he was minimizing their effect. But perhaps he is not here discussing the total effect of his reforms. The words which he actually uses imply, though they do not assert, that he is thinking of the right to hold office. If this is the case, they contain a fair judgment of the provisions concerning eligibility to office which we shall find later in Aristotle's description of the constitution. More than all else, this statement of Solon reveals in a very striking way his own view of the extent to which it is wise to grant political rights to the lower classes. He does not for a moment believe that they should enjoy the same rights as the upper classes. "Such a measure of privilege as sufficeth them" evidently means in his mind a measure of power sufficient to defend them against the injustice and abuse of the upper classes, from which alone the magistrates were chosen. Similar words might have been used in Rome of the portentous institution of the tribunate; but whereas the Roman tribunate culminated in the principate, the defensive power of the Athenian plebs led ultimately to the most extreme form of democracy. However, such an outcome as this unquestionably lay far beyond the range of Solon's prophetic vision.

Excepting this single obscure allusion to political change which is made by Solon himself, our information on this very important subject is all derived from Greek writers of later times.

¹ *Const. of Ath.* ix; cf. *Arist. Pol.* ii 12, 1273 b, 34 to 1274 a, 23.

principally from Aristotle and Plutarch. Aristotle devotes several pages to the subject in the *Constitution of Athens* and a page or two in the *Politics*.¹ Plutarch adds little to what may be learned from Aristotle. From these authorities we derive certain categorical statements about some features of the Solonian constitution, some critical observations on its tendencies, but nothing like a detailed description. Aristotle himself probably learned what he knew about Solon's constitutional reforms partly from his own researches and the researches of his pupils, and partly from the works of his predecessors, especially Androtion and the other students of Athenian history.² But what was the ultimate source of authoritative information? Whatever political changes Solon brought about, he must have promulgated either by executive order or in his completed code of laws.³ Documentary evidence, therefore, of a reliable nature must have been completely lacking at the end of the fifth century. As far as we can see, the opinions of Androtion and Aristotle must have rested upon the evidence of extant laws which were attributed to Solon,⁴ upon inferences drawn from the political institutions of the time, and to a certain extent upon tradition. At the best,

¹ *Const. of Ath.* v-xii; for references to the *Politics* see p. 14, footnote 2; *Plut. Sol.* xvii-xix.

² Cf. pp. 18 ff.

³ The ancient confusion between the two conceptions of constitutional and statutory law is often exhibited, as in Aeschines iii 38 τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆν δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαντι; 257 τὸν καλλίστοις νόμοις κοσμήσαντα τὴν δημοκρατίαν; Isocrates vii 16 ἐνομοθέτησε δημοκρατίαν. Lysias (xxx 28) ranges Solon with Themistocles and Pericles as one of the great democratic νομοθέται, and elsewhere the name of Solon is found in groups including these names and the names of Clisthenes and Aristides. Other passages in which Solon is referred to as the first leader of the popular party are: *Const. of Ath.* xxviii 2, xli 2; Aristophanes *Clouds* 1187; Isocrates vii 16, xv 232; Andocides i 81 ff., 95, 111; Lysias xxx 2; Demosthenes xviii 6; Aeschines iii 257.

⁴ An example of this method may be seen in *Const. of Ath.* viii 3. Here Aristotle infers the function of the ναύκραροι from the frequent appearance in Solon's laws of the words τοὺς ναυκράρους εἰσπράττειν and ἀναλίσκειν ἐκ τοῦ ναυκραρικοῦ ἀργυρίου. These phrases, he says, are found in laws no longer in use. In *Const. of Ath.* viii 4 he determines one of the powers of the Areopagus on the testimony of a law attributed to Solon relating to the process of εἰσαγγεῖλαι against men who conspired to overthrow the state.

only very uncertain conclusions can be drawn from evidence of this kind, especially in a subject like constitutional law which requires great precision of terms. But we are not in a position to control the results of Aristotle's study of the evidence; we cannot be sure how far his statements were justified even by the meager facts at his disposal.

Furthermore, if Aristotle knew comparatively little about the constitution of Solon, he knew even less about the constitution which was in use before the period of reform. We are embarrassed by the spectral constitution of Draco. It is a matter of endless dispute whether Draco, besides what he is supposed to have done towards the codification of the laws, also made changes in the constitution of the state. Until the discovery of Aristotle's treatise on the *Constitution of Athens*, there was not a shred of evidence for a Draconian constitution. Now that we have this pamphlet before our eyes, we are scarcely better off, because Aristotle appears to have drawn his information from an oligarchic writer who might have found it to his advantage to forge a constitution of Draco.¹ Aristotle's very brief account of Draco's reforms includes, furthermore, allusions to several features which are also attributed to Solon. If we could examine in their completeness the measures which Solon adopted for the government of Athens, and if we could set them by the side of the institutions which had preceded them, we should be able to form a just conception of the political principles by which he was actuated and of the sagacity and skill which he brought to his task. But this we cannot do. We must be content with the brief critical estimate of his work which we find in Aristotle and Plutarch, and with the common opinion of antiquity, and recognize frankly that any real corroboration of the ancient account is impossible.²

¹ Busolt (1895, pp. 36 ff.).

² For the features of the Solonian constitution, in addition to the standard works on constitutional and legal antiquities, see Busolt (1895, pp. 264-287); Lehmann-Haupt (1906); the chapter of De Sanctis (1912) on "La prima costi-

7

One of the most striking features of Solon's legislation is that he did not pretend to believe that all men are equal. Founder of the Athenian democracy though he was, he nevertheless based his system of government upon clearly defined classes. It appears that there already existed in the state four classes of citizens, openly recognized and plainly named. These were the Pentacosimedimni, the Hippeis, the Zeugitae, and the Thetes. The literal meaning of these words is clear: the first were men whose income amounted to five hundred measures; the second were knights, men who owned and were able to support a horse; the third were men who owned a yoke of oxen for farm work; and the fourth were common laborers. Undoubtedly the names of the classes bore these meanings in the beginning. The last three are common nouns, and it was no doubt through popular usage that they came to be applied to three several classes in the economic scale. The name of the first class has an artificial appearance, as if it had been coined by a theorist or a legislator. But it may have been as much a popular invention as the word "millionaire." However this may be, we may assume that three of the names at any rate were old. Whether they had been used in a technical sense before Solon, to denominate four classes officially recognized by the state, we cannot tell. It would be interesting to know whether he was the first to recognize them officially, or whether he was merely continuing, in a modified form perhaps, dispositions which had been made before his time. Whenever it was that the four classes were first recognized by the Athenian constitution, it appears that they were given at some time a more precise definition than the meaning of the words themselves would imply. The Pentacosimedimni included all

tuzione scritta"; Sandys (1912), who gives a copious bibliography; the chapter of Beloch (1913) entitled "Zur Verfassungsgeschichte Athens."

Athenian citizens whose land produced annually five hundred or more measures of corn and oil, the Hippeis, all whose land produced from three to five hundred measures, the Zeugitae, all whose land produced from two to three hundred measures; and all below the Zeugitae belonged to the class of Thetes.¹ It will be observed that this division into classes was made entirely on an agrarian basis. It was a frank recognition of the landed aristocracy. The wealthy manufacturer or trader could not claim a place in the upper classes on the basis of his income. The ownership of Attic soil was the only key to these exclusive groups. We cannot positively assert that under Solon the class distinctions were exactly as they have been described; but at any rate there is no evidence for supposing that they were not.

It is very difficult to understand how membership in the several classes was determined. The distribution could not be made once for all, because there must have been considerable fluctuation in the size of the crops from year to year. But how could an annual census of the population be taken? Possibly no census at all was taken. Possibly only those citizens who were actually nominated for office were required to prove that their land had during the previous year produced enough to place them in the class eligible for the office in question. Again, if only those men were eligible for office who gathered from their own land large enough crops to admit them to the required class, what are we to think of the increasingly large group of men whose income was derived from manufacture or trade? This was the class to which Solon belonged, and this was the class which during the next ten or twenty years were the chief supporters of his policies. Only two answers present themselves. Either the successful manu-

¹ *Const. of Ath.* vii 4. Aristotle was uncertain of the requirements for the class of the Knights and presents several pieces of indirect evidence. Manifestly neither he nor his sources had any direct documentary evidence. For a discussion of the four classes, see Busolt (1895, pp. 180 ff.), and Gilliard (1907, pp. 221-240).

facturer or trader must invest his money in land, if he was not already a landholder — a requirement which with the development of commercial and industrial life must soon grow irksome — or the census was not based actually upon the produce of the soil, but upon incomes from all sources, measured in terms of the produce of the soil. This is contrary to the express language of Aristotle — ὅς ἀν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ποιῆ πεντακόσια μέτρα¹ — which is so explicit that if we deny the truth of it we must also admit that Aristotle himself was in error.

In what way did Solon make use of this division into classes? One naturally expects to find that the higher classes were called upon to perform special duties and that they enjoyed in return certain rights and privileges. One thinks of the later Athenian system of liturgies and of the modern income tax. But in Solon's government, as far as we know, the classes served only to define the eligibility of the citizens to the several public offices. The highest officials of the state might be chosen only from citizens of the first class; the next highest from the second class; the lowest from the third. Members of the Thetic class were not eligible to office.²

At first sight there is little that is democratic in such a system. One learns with a slight shock of disappointment that the father of democracy did not establish a democracy at all, but an aristocracy, or rather a timocracy, in which wealth was a requisite for a share in the government. But the case is not complete yet. We have not yet discovered the sovereign power in the Solonian state. Let us postpone judgment for a time. In the meanwhile it is fair to ask whether the timocratic arrangements marked any advance over previous conditions. It is not fair to judge Solon's achievement solely by the standard of perfect democracy.

In the first place, let us inquire who was actually excluded

¹ *Const. of Ath.* vii 4.

² *Const. of Ath.* vii; *Plut. Sol.* xviii 2; *Arist. Pol.* ii 12, 1274 a, 18 ff.

from office by Solon's plan. Only members of the lowest class; only men who owned no land or who owned so little that they derived from it less than two hundred measures a year; only those who, as a general rule, were so lacking in enterprise and intelligence that they could not rise above a very humble station in life; only those who were manifestly unfit to hold a responsible post in the government. Men of this type rarely hold office even in a real democracy, and when they do, it is regarded as a public calamity. Probably by far the larger number of Athenian citizens were included in the three upper classes. Probably these classes included all who were fit to hold office. And let us recall that by the *Seisachtheia* and by the law which forbade lending money on the person of the debtor, Solon had opened a fair field for all honest endeavor. Economically all men were equal; any man who could show his worth in the ordinary business of life received his proper portion of political rights. There was a certain justice in the property requirement. In an age when education was not universal, only those persons who enjoyed the advantages of good birth and at least moderate wealth could attain to such a measure of cultivation and experience as would properly prepare them for public life. Solon saw things as they were and made his plans accordingly. He was indeed an idealist in some ways: without idealism he could have accomplished nothing. But he was not the man to wreck his ship upon a rock because his eyes were on the distant haven.

Was the new arrangement better than the old? Alas, we know so little of Athens before the archonship of Solon that we cannot say for certain. But we may guess at the nature of the change, with some probability that we shall not go very wide of the mark. The affairs of Athens, since the abolition of the kingship, had been in the hands of the hereditary nobility. Little by little, with the changing conditions of the world, the benevolent rule of the nobles had given way to greedy and rapacious

exploitation of the lower classes; the mass of the people, no longer acquiescent and contented, became more and more turbulent and revolutionary. Civil war had been threatening for fifty years. Under these circumstances it is only reasonable to conclude that until the time of Solon the public offices of Athens were the monopoly of a narrow oligarchy. We are told that officials had been appointed from year to year by the council of the Areopagus,¹ and the council of the Areopagus was the organ of the dominant families in the state. If this had really been the state of affairs in Athens (as it probably had been), we should be ready to admit that the constitutional regulations of Solon, preceded by the Seisachtheia and the abolition of slavery for debt, which were the necessary preliminary, introduced a political order infinitely more liberal than anything which had yet been known.

We have now examined the significance of the first feature of the Solonian constitution: all officials were to be chosen from among the members of the three upper classes. Who were these officials? Did Solon introduce new offices? Apparently not. All offices mentioned are earlier institutions² — the nine archons, including the Eponymous Archon, the King Archon, the Polemarch, and the six Thesmothetae; the Tamiae, the Poletae, the Colacretae, the Eleven.³ There seems to have been no change in any of these offices, except that the circle of eligibility was widened.

The next important question concerns the manner in which officials were chosen. Aristotle says explicitly that the method was a combination of election and sortition.⁴ Each of the four tribes chose a list of candidates and from these combined lists the required number were selected by lot. In the case of the ar-

¹ *Const. of Ath.* viii 2.

² On the pre-Solonian Athenian magistracies see Busolt (1895, pp. 153 ff.).

³ *Const. of Ath.* vii 3.

⁴ *Const. of Ath.* viii; cf. *Plut. Comp. Sol. et Publ.* ii.

chons, for example, each tribe chose ten candidates, and from the total number of forty, the nine archons were selected by lot. These statements are open to great suspicion, especially since they seem to be inferences drawn from the practices of later times. Originally the appointment of archons was in the power of the Areopagus, and since this method had at some time been replaced by the method which has just been described, Aristotle assumes that the change was introduced by Solon. But whether the assumption is true or not, it throws very little light on the working of the government. Undoubtedly the lot is the foe of special privilege, and was later a characteristic of the Athenian democracy. In the absence, however, of any information concerning the method employed in the primary choice of candidates, we cannot decide what advance Solon may have made over the oligarchic rule of the past.¹

This is the sum of our knowledge concerning the modifications which were introduced by Solon in connection with the magistracies of the state. We turn now to the councils.

Aristotle announces with the utmost brevity that Solon created a Council of Four Hundred composed of one hundred members from each of the four tribes.² What the duties and privileges of this council were, how the members were chosen, what classes of citizens were eligible to membership in it, — to these questions

¹ Cf. Arist. *Pol.* ii 12, 1274 a and iii 11, 1281 b. It appears that ancient scholars were generally agreed that Solon had given to all citizens without distinction certain powers of control over the magistrates. It is not certain exactly what these powers were; they are stated in different forms in different places. And there was a difference of opinion concerning the merit of the innovation: some regarded Solon's polity as an ideal mixture of oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; others thought the democratic element had killed the other two. Aristotle does not hold Solon responsible for the radical democracy of the fifth century. One might judge from his account that he felt that it was generally known what changes Solon had made in the constitution and that it was not necessary to describe them. But one does not get the impression that he had documentary evidence. Manifestly Solon was generally regarded as the founder of the *πάτριος δημοκρατία*, that is, the democratic form of government obtained by eliminating the democratic excesses of the fifth century.

² *Const. of Ath.* viii 4.

he supplies no answers. Unfortunately, a few pages earlier in his essay, he has ascribed to Draco a Council of Four Hundred One,¹ and we are completely baffled in any attempt to reconcile the conflicting statements. Plutarch is more communicative.² He represents this council as an addition to the governmental arrangements which was necessary in order to secure political equilibrium between the classes. The Council of the Areopagus, we may safely believe, was an ancient institution, the old council of elders, the Athenian house of lords. This council Solon retained, but he apparently introduced certain modifications in its composition and its prerogatives. Exactly how it had been constituted in the past we do not know, but the explicitness with which we are told about the organization of it under Solon argues that the features which are expressly described were thought to be novel.³ In the first place, it was to be composed of all men who had served as archons. This means, of course, that all Athenians belonging to the property-class whose members were eligible to the archonship were also eligible to the Areopagus. We may believe that this new definition of membership is an indication of much more narrowly restricted membership in the past. If noble birth had been the requisite for admission to the Areopagus before Solon's time, the new requisite was the ownership of a certain amount of the soil of Attica. But the council still remained the conservative element in the state. It was to act as the governor in the political machine, which was to exercise control over wild and revolutionary procedure. It was expressly designated the guardian of the laws. No doubt it had been the guardian of the laws in the past; but it had been also the sovereign executive of the laws. It had been the steam box and the driving wheel as well as the governor in the engine of state. The magistrates had been appointed by the council; now, the council was

¹ *Const. of Ath.* iv 3.

² *Plut. Sol.* xix; *Comp. Sol. et Publ.* ii.

³ *Const. of Ath.* viii; *Plut. Sol.* xix; *Comp. Sol. et Publ.* ii.

composed of past magistrates who had been chosen by a larger electorate. The council now played a subordinate part in the administration of the state, but a part which it was eminently fitted to play, both because of its historic dignity and because of the naturally conservative temper of the class from which its members were drawn.

Let us now return to the Council of Four Hundred. Plutarch tells us that the Council of the Areopagus was not sufficient to meet the needs of the time. The Seisachtheia had given the people a taste of liberty, and they were in a mood to demand more liberty and greater political privilege. Besides, they were probably suspicious of the Areopagus, the ancient bulwark of special privilege. Though its sting had been drawn, they were still afraid of its bite. This was the need which, according to Plutarch, the Council of Four Hundred was created to meet. It was to be a house of commons, larger and more widely representative than the upper house, and its part in the government was to give expression to the more progressive and liberal aspirations of the community.

There was still another council in Athens, as ancient as the Council of the Areopagus itself. The Ecclesia, or popular assembly, had probably always been a vital element in Athenian government, and was destined in the future to become all-powerful. In a city as small as Athens the method of representative government was not necessary, or at any rate it was not practiced; the people managed their own affairs without intermediary. Now we may imagine that the economic reforms of Solon, though they had not transformed the people of Athens into a fierce democracy like that which Cleon harangued at the end of the fifth century, had nevertheless aroused in them political ambitions which might easily wreck the state if they were not controlled. The new council, in the words of Plutarch, "was to deliberate on public matters before the people did, and was not to allow

any matter to come before the popular assembly without such previous deliberation." Its function, therefore, was to control the exuberant activity of the Ecclesia; to stand in the same relation to the Ecclesia as the Areopagus to the state as a whole. But—and here we revert to the character of the council as a popular organization—the people were not distrustful of it, because it was their own and not associated with a hereditary aristocracy. "The city with its two councils," says Plutarch, "riding as it were at double anchor, would be less tossed by the surges, and would keep its populace in greater quiet."

It has been assumed throughout this discussion that the Council of Four Hundred was open to the majority of Athenian citizens. The Council of the Areopagus was composed of past archons; the Ecclesia was open to any Athenian of any class. We do not know whether any property qualification was required for eligibility to the Four Hundred. But it is extremely likely that all Athenians of the three upper classes were eligible, even if the members of the Thetic class were excluded.

Two political privileges alone were allowed to the class of Thetes. One has just been mentioned, namely, membership in the Ecclesia. The other was the privilege of membership in the Dicastèrion, or popular court.¹ In later times this popular court was multiplied into a larger number of courts which sat in judgment upon practically all legal disputes in Athens. It came to be one of the most characteristic institutions of democratic Athens. Just how it was organized in Solon's time we do not know, nor do we know the extent of its prerogatives. We cannot even say categorically that it was instituted by Solon. But we may say, on the authority of Aristotle, first, that Solon allowed an appeal from the decision of the magistrates to the popular court, and, second, that he permitted members of the Thetic class to sit in it.

¹ *Const. of Ath.* vii 3, ix; *Plut. Sol.* xviii.

Here at last we find the sovereign power in the state: "the people, being master of the juryman's ballot, became thereby master of the state."¹ With this powerful instrument in their hands, the people need never again fear the partial judgment of oligarchic despots. They were masters of their own fate. It is not necessary to assume, as some do, that the popular court had the right to call a magistrate to account at the close of his term of office: this practice, again highly characteristic of democratic Athens, may have been instituted by Solon; but we have no definite knowledge that it was. Even without this prerogative, the popular court was already a safeguard of popular liberty.

Little more can be said about the constitution which Solon established. We have seen that the changes which he introduced were few in number, but far reaching in effect. There is nothing violent in his measures. Most of the old tools with the old names are still in use. But beneath the surface a deep political revolution was enacted. Nobility of birth and hereditary privilege were quietly set aside, and in their place was put equality of rights. But the whole transformation was carried through with so much moderation that in describing it one fears to slight its conservative qualities if he praises its liberality, and to do less than justice to its liberality if he insists on its cautious conservatism. If Louis XIV could say, "I am the State," Solon might with equal truth say, "I am the Revolution."

Let us try to avoid any misunderstanding concerning the form of this constitution which the ancients attributed to Solon. There is no evidence whatever that he drew up a constitution in documentary form. Indeed, probably neither Athens nor any other Greek state ever had a formal constitution. The magistracies and the various governmental practices seem to have grown out of custom and tradition, or out of statutory legislation. We do not know just how Solon promulgated and recorded the meas-

¹ *Const. of Ath.* ix; *Plut. Sol.* xviii 3.

ures which affected what we should call the constitution. Probably most of them took the form of special laws prescribing the action of certain magistrates under certain conditions.¹ It was the laws of Solon that were recorded and which were regarded as the charter of Athenian liberties. These laws seem to have been arranged under the heads of the several magistrates in whose province they lay. It may be that prescriptions touching the eligibility to the various offices, the method of election to them, and other such matters were recorded together with the laws that were to be administered by them.

When Aristotle comes to sum up Solon's most important contributions to the development of the Athenian democracy,² it is interesting to observe that two of the three are legal rather than constitutional enactments. The first is the famous law which prohibited the loan of money with the personal liberty of the borrower for security. The second is a law granting to any one who so desired, the right to bring an action in defense of any persons who are wronged. This was a powerful blow at the feudalism which had prevailed in the past. The nobles alone had been judges in disputes between citizens, and the nobles alone could carry the complaints of their clients before the judicial authorities. The result of this was that all citizens who were not members of the ruling oligarchy were entirely in the hands of their landlords or patrons and were unable to seek redress for their wrongs except through their landlords, whether the wrongs proceeded from outside sources or from the landlords themselves. The third is the right of appeal to the popular court.

Our ancient authorities have something to say about the disposition of the laws when Solon had completed the formulation of them.³ Aristotle says they were inscribed and set up in the King's Stoa and that all swore to abide by them; that the nine

¹ Busolt (1895, p. 48, footnote 1).

² *Const. of Ath.* ix.

³ *Const. of Ath.* vii; Plut. *Sol.* xxv; Herodotus i 29.

archons took a solemn oath to set up a statue of gold if they transgressed any of the laws; and that the laws were ratified for a hundred years. Plutarch adds that the council swore that they would support the laws; he attributes the oath of obedience to the thesmothetae and not to the archons. Herodotus states that the laws were to stand for ten years.

We are evidently dealing here with traditions for which there could be no real evidence. The oath of the archons was inferred from a later practice;¹ and the divergence between ten and a hundred years indicates that there was no certain information on the subject.

We can be sure that the laws were inscribed on wood, stone, or possibly metal, and set up in some public place where they would be accessible to all.² It is altogether likely that Solon had insured a fair trial of his measures by binding the citizens to observe them for a certain period, or until they were amended according to a definitely prescribed procedure. Beyond this we cannot go.

In modern times Solon is known chiefly as a legislator. His legislative activities have so far overshadowed all other circumstances in his life, and have so far obscured the character and personality of the man himself, that his very name is in a fair way to become, in our popular speech, a common noun meaning a member of a legislative body. Even among the Greeks themselves, though his other services to Athens were not forgotten, there was a tendency to think of him first as the great Athenian law-giver. No doubt there is some justice in thus emphasizing his work in the codification of Attic law. It may be that this work had a more far reaching and abiding influence than anything else that he did. But this is not by any means beyond question.

¹ Cf. *Const. of Ath.* iv 5.

² For ancient opinions concerning the form of the tablets on which the laws were inscribed, see Appendix 4.

His economic reforms and the example of his integrity and of his disinterested statesmanship may have meant more to Athens, and therefore to the world, than his labors in Athenian law.

If no categorical judgment is hazarded here concerning the true merits of the Solonian reforms, this is due to the fear of seeming to know what is really not known. The opinions of scholars range from scant approval to high praise.¹ The reason for this variation is to be found partly in the diversity of their standards of judgment, but still more in the diversity displayed in their

¹ The following may be taken as typical. Wilamowitz (1893, II, 66) says: "dass er ein grosser staatsmann gewesen wäre, wird sein gewissen geneint haben, so gut wie wir es verneinen müssen. und doch hat Aristoteles ihn einen einzigen unter allen staatsmännern genannt, der allein das wol des ganzen zur richtschnur sich genommen. und doch hat er in der tat die demokratie Athens, wenn auch nur als vorläufer des Kleisthenes, und die athenische poesie, wenn auch nur als vorläufer des Aischylos begründet. dass er beides vermochte, dass seine person sowol den Drakon wie den Peisistratos, ja noch den Kleisthenes in den schatten gestellt hat, das dankt er der Muse. ihn allein von ihnen hörte die nachwelt und hören auch wir noch. ein grosser dichter war er nicht, aber ein weiser und frommer und guter mensch, was denn doch mehr ist." Adler (1896, p. 129) takes the opposite view: "Ich glaube im Gegensatz zu diesen Autoritäten (*i.e.*, Aristotle and Wilamowitz) die Ansicht verfechten zu müssen, dass Solon — trotz seines Idealismus — als wahrhaft genialer Staatsmann anzusehen ist und als sozialer Reformator grossen Stils im Gedächtnis aller Zeiten fortzuleben verdient. Die Kritiker haben viel zu sehr jenen augenblicklichen Misserfolg, der zur Aufrichtung der Alleinherrschaft führte, im Auge, während eine tiefer grabende soziologische Geschichtsbetrachtung die ganze einzige Kulturentwicklung Athens mit der politischen und sozialen Reform Solons in enge Verbindung bringen und für die fortgesetzten Wirren eine genügende Erklärung herbeischaffen wird. Solon war ein grosser Staatsmann: denn er hat die schweren Gebrechen der Zeit klar erkannt und die Mittel zu ihrer Heilung mit starker und sicherer Hand durchgeführt; seine Massregeln stellen die gewaltigste soziale Reform dar, die jemals in der Weltgeschichte auf *friedlichem* Wege zur Ausführung gelangt ist. Durch ihn ist thatsächlich eine wahrhafte Bauernbefreiung grossen Stils durchgeführt und damit der Grundstein zu der attischen Kultur, wie wir sie kennen, das Fundament zu Athens künftiger Grösse gelegt worden . . . Dass aber Solon wirklich als *Schöpfer* der Grösse Athens, wenn dieser Ausdruck auf eine einzelne Person überhaupt anwendbar ist, angesehen werden muss, lässt sich beinahe strikte beweisen." It is well to add also the wise words of Croiset (1903, p. 596): "Toutefois, l'oeuvre de Solon, oeuvre législative et poétique à la fois, ne fut pas stérile. Elle resta, dans la vie publique, comme un idéal, que les meilleurs citoyens aimaient à invoquer et qui leur prêtait son autorité; et elle devint, dans la vie morale et intellectuelle, comme une source de bonnes pensées, que de grands esprits accurrent peu à peu, et qui, peut-être, attendent encore leur réalisation."

hypothetical restoration of circumstances for which there is no direct historical evidence. Whatever may have been the virtue or success of Solon's political acts, the principles and ideals by which he was moved in his public career are clear for all to understand, and, it is to be hoped, for all to admire.

CHAPTER IV

AFTER THE ARCHONSHIP

1

When the strenuous term of Solon's office finally came to an end and all the momentous changes which he had planned were finally accomplished, he himself felt content with his work. "What I promised," he says, "with the gods' help, I fulfilled."¹ It may be that his own approval would have been less pronounced if he had not been called upon to defend vigorously the measures he had adopted. What he has to say in his own support is called forth by the hostile criticism which was brought against him from all sides. In such a situation it was natural that he should emphasize the good in what he had done and be silent about the misgivings he may have had concerning his success.

There was, as a matter of fact, considerable popular dissatisfaction.² Men kept coming to him with inquiries, criticisms, and complaints. In general, the rich were angry because his reforms cut too deep, the poor because they did not cut deep enough. The lower classes had supposed that his professions of moderation were insincere and had believed that when he once got the power in his hands he would permit them to glut themselves on the good things of the rich. The rich on the other hand expected him to allay the popular clamor without despoiling them of any of their cherished privileges and pleasures.

These complaints were met by Solon with clear-cut statements in his own behalf. As before his archonship he had made public

¹ viii 6.

² *Const. of Ath.* xi ; *Plut. Sol.* xxv.

his views concerning the needs of the state through the instrumentality of verse, so now when he was assailed with criticism he adopted a similar means of defense. In a considerable number of poems he described and justified the steps he had taken for the amelioration of Athenian affairs. Of these poems not a few fragments remain,¹ and, as we have seen, they provide us with our best information concerning the nature of his reforms. This whole group of poems must have been written and published during the first year or two after his archonship, when the issues involved were still uppermost in men's minds. He says again and again that he had done just what he had said he would do, no more and no less. If people had formed false expectations, he was not to blame. As a matter of fact, the poor had been given more than they could ever have hoped for in their wildest dreams; the rich, if they could only see the magnitude of the peril from which the city had been saved with comparatively little loss to themselves, would feel unbounded gratitude. "But in great undertakings," says Solon, somewhat wistfully, "it is difficult to please all."² It may be that the people had some just cause for dissatisfaction. But it is manifest that many, if not most, of the complaints which were raised were due to the narrowness and prejudice of the various groups of citizens; and though we may be disposed to be cautious and to withhold an altogether favorable judgment of Solon's work, we must at any rate give him our whole-hearted applause for his excellent intentions and the unselfishness, moderation, and impartiality with which he carried them through.

Such an attitude as that exhibited by both parties at the close of Solon's archonship did not augur well for the future well-being of the state. It has been remarked³ that his ideal of *Eunomia* depended not only on the existence of good laws but also on the disposition of the people to obey them loyally and con-

¹ vi-xi.

² xxiii.

³ Pp. 66, 67.

tentedly. The real worth of Solon's institutions could only be tested by a patient trial over a number of years. Such a trial apparently the people were not ready to give them. At any rate, we are told that after an interval of peace lasting for only three or four years, party strife was again so violent that a whole year passed without the election of an archon.¹ A similar period of anarchy occurred again a little later. But this continued discord does not prove that Solon's work was of no avail. The beneficent effects of the Seisachtheia were not undone; the written code of laws still stood as a cornerstone of future reconciliation; the momentous changes in the direction of popular government were not rescinded. It was too much to expect that a single year's work would suffice to make over Athenian society and appease all the discordant elements. The long history of democratic development was only just beginning. Solon no doubt suffered disappointment as every champion of popular government must suffer whose ideals run ahead of the ability of the people to comprehend and realize them.

2

Sooner or later during the years which followed his archonship Solon made up his mind to leave Athens for a time.² According to Aristotle, he announced that he would not return for ten years, thinking that he ought not to stay in Athens and expound his laws in person, but that the Athenians should simply obey them as they were written. It has been supposed that in this passage Aristotle was quoting indirectly from some poem in which Solon announced his departure and declared the reasons for it. This is a reasonable conjecture; but after all it is only a conjecture, and we cannot be sure that Aristotle had such direct evidence for his statements. There can be no question

¹ *Const. of Ath.* xiii. ² For a discussion of Solon's travels, see Appendix 6.

about the fact that Solon went abroad; but we do not know just when he went, whether within a few months or a few years of the close of his archonship, nor can we be sure that his reasons were those which Aristotle gives. We are not justified, therefore, in seeking causes either for praise or for blame in his action. We cannot say that Solon was playing the part of a coward in abandoning the field, nor can we assert positively that he showed real courage in leaving his legislation to prove its worth without defense or support from himself. The latter supposition is, indeed, entirely in harmony with his settled policy. It was always his aim that the Athenians should live under the government of their own laws: he had refused in the past to usurp the place of the law by making himself tyrant, and it may well be that he refused with equal firmness to serve as a meddling administrator of a finished code. If the laws were good they required no special interpretation in special cases. We should be grateful for something more definite than these guesses at fact and motive; but we cannot even be sure that there was any connection between the effects of Solon's legislation and his determination to go abroad for a period of foreign travel.

Aside from the possible political reasons which induced Solon to go abroad, he had two definite personal motives, as our authorities tell us. He went partly on commercial business and partly to see the world. Even if the biographers did not learn these facts from a poem, they could be easily guessed. Solon's intellectual curiosity lasted through life, as he tells us himself (*γῆράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος*),¹ and there would have been much to tempt him in foreign travel, even in those days of uncertain and even dangerous communication. Moreover, if he was to go at all, it was almost necessary that he should provide for his passage by some small commercial venture at the same time. Plato is said to have carried a cargo of oil when he went to Egypt,

¹ i.

and it would not be surprising if Solon did the same thing. His earlier experiences in trade would stand him in good stead and overcome any reluctance he might have in middle life to embark in new and untried undertakings.

How extended his travels were we do not know. It is certain that he went to Cyprus, and there is little doubt that he also went to Egypt. Visits to Sardis, Miletus, and Cilicia are also recorded, but there are excellent reasons for believing that these are legendary.

Egypt, to the Greeks, was the Old World. The civilization of the Nile had had a continuous existence for more centuries than men could count, and in comparison with it the life of the Greeks even in the fifth century seemed new and unsettled. Egypt was a land of ancient monuments and ancient traditions, and in the eyes of the Egyptians the Greeks were but as children whose memory ran back only a brief space. Until about the middle of the seventh century B.C. this ancient land, like modern Japan, had been closed to foreigners. King Psammetichus had departed from the customs of the past and thrown open the country to foreign traders. Immediately Greek merchants from Asia Minor and Aegina began to resort to Egypt in great numbers, and it was not long before there was a permanent Greek settlement, called Naucratis, on the Canobic channel of the Nile. Thus there were two attractions for Solon in the land of Egypt at the beginning of the sixth century: one was the lure of the ancient civilization, the other was the novelty of Egyptian friendliness to the outside world. Many Greeks during recent decades must have brought back wonderful tales of the newly discovered country which was already infinitely old. Such tales were still interesting to the Greeks more than a century later when Herodotus in writing his history devoted two books to an account of Egyptian history and customs. Solon, therefore, desiring to travel, went to Egypt as a matter of course. Mesopotamia was remote and inaccessible

without great toil; the Greek cities of Ionia, and probably Sardis, he had visited before. There was nothing in the western Mediterranean but frontier settlements. It was to Egypt that he turned without question.

We know nothing definite of what he did there. He probably spent some time at Naucratis, and visited Sais, Heliopolis, and other cities of the Delta. Plutarch says he studied for some time with the priests in Sais; but this is probably only an inference from a famous story which is told by Plato.¹ In the dialogue called the *Critias*, which forms a sequel to the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, Critias himself is the principal speaker. This Critias, it will be recalled,² was the great-uncle of Plato, and supposed to be a descendant of Solon's brother. In order to fulfill his part in the large plan of Plato's tetralogy, Critias makes use of a tale about a lost island called Atlantis, which many ages before lay far in the western sea and was the home of a powerful state. This tale, he tells us, his ancestor Solon had learned from the priests in Sais; Solon had related it to the elder Critias, and he, when he was an old man of ninety years, had told it to his grandson, the younger Critias of the dialogue. Solon is supposed to have written down the Greek forms of the Egyptian proper names, intending later to compose an epic poem on the subject. He was prevented from carrying out his plan by the civil disorder in Athens; but his written notes had come into the hands of Dropides, the father of the elder Critias, and having been carefully preserved in the family had passed eventually into the possession of the younger Critias and were even now still in existence.

Now the source of this story has been discovered in Egyptian hieroglyphic inscriptions which record the victory of the Egyptians under Rameses over some powerful people of the west.

¹ *Timaeus* 20 d ff.; *Critias* 113 a. The story is repeated by Plutarch (*Sol.* xxvi; cf. also *De Is. et Os.* 10, p. 354 e) and alluded to by Strabo (ii 102).

² See p. 34.

There is small doubt, however, that it was Plato and not Solon who brought back this story from Egypt. The circumstantial account of its transmission through the elder Critias is simply a graceful bit of fiction designed to serve as a realistic setting for the dialogue. There is nothing to be learned from it about Solon's experiences in Egypt, and we cannot believe on this kind of evidence that he ever entertained the purpose of composing an epic poem.

We can do no more, then, than carry Solon to Egypt and away again; of his sojourn there we know nothing. On his visit to Cyprus a slender ray of light is thrown by an extant fragment of a poem. In this fragment, which is part of a farewell addressed to Philocyprus, the young king of Soli in Cyprus, Solon prays for the prosperity of the king and his family and his people, and for a safe return for himself to Athens. This seems to indicate that Solon came from Egypt to Cyprus and received there a friendly and hospitable welcome from Philocyprus, and continued his homeward journey with warm expressions of regard at parting.

3

It is not to be supposed that Solon's trip abroad marked his final retirement from public life. More than thirty years elapsed between his archonship and his death. At some time during this period (just when we do not know, but probably near the beginning) he was away from Athens for an unknown length of time. But he must certainly have been living at home for twenty or twenty-five years. Even if we had no evidence for the fact, we should still be sure in our own minds that public affairs were not a matter of indifference to him during all these years. Though he took no active part in politics, we should still expect to find him giving much thought to it and expressing his opinions in his familiar medium of verse. And this is precisely what he did. The evidence is slight; but it is enough perhaps to reveal the

nature of the part he played in this period. But before we turn to it, there is one small matter which must not be overlooked.

During the early part of the sixth century trouble had been brewing about Delphi, the seat of the oracle of Apollo. This locality, which lies on the steep southern slope of Mount Parnassus, was within the domain of the flourishing city of Crisa, to the west, which commanded the valley of the Peneus and the whole rich plain which stretches down to the Corinthian Gulf. Crisa had long been levying tolls on the merchants and merchandise which passed back and forth under her walls on the long journey between the thriving cities of Euboea and their colonies in the far west. She had also interfered with pilgrims to the shrine of Delphi and committed depredations on the sacred property itself. As a result of this, Delphi appealed for aid to the Amphictyonic Council. This ancient organization was the executive body of a religious league composed of a group of Greek peoples living in the neighborhood of Thermopylae and Delphi, who united in the common worship of Demeter at Thermopylae and (later at any rate, if not from the beginning) in the administration of the oracle at Delphi. The Athenians were one of the constituent peoples and sent one delegate to sit in the Amphictyonic Council. When the appeal of the Delphians came to the council it was decided, upon the motion of the Athenian delegate, to espouse the cause of Delphi; and the Athenian delegate at this time was none other than Solon.¹ The war was entirely success-

¹ This statement rests upon fairly direct evidence. Plutarch (*Sol.* xi) reports it on the authority of Aristotle's list of the victors in the Pythian games (*ἡ τῶν Πυθιονικῶν ἀναγραφὴ*). It is also attested by Aeschines in his speech against Ctesiphon (iii 108). De Sanctis, however, does not regard the evidence as reliable (1912, p. 261): "È però incerto quel che afferma Eschine e Aristotele ripete, che la guerra fu deliberata su proposta del rappresentante ateniese Solone. La testimonianza d'Eschine è qui tanto meno degna di fede in quanto un tal precedente poteva scusare, se non giustificare, il suo modo di comportarsi nella pilea autunnale del 340, quando propose la guerra sacra contro Anfissa. E rispetto alla testimonianza d'Aristotele, la scoperta della Repubblica ateniese ha dimostrato che buona parte delle asserzioni storiche dello Stagirita non è fondata sui documenti come prima in generale si credeva; onde ben può darsi che egli

ful; the city of Crisa was blotted out of existence and the broad plain below was made sacred to Apollo for all time. The Pythian games, too, were instituted in celebration of the victory and were held every four years thereafter. The date of the fall of Crisa has been much disputed. It may have been 590 or 586 or even later. We do not know how long the war lasted. Consequently the date of the session of the council at which Solon was present is quite beyond our reach. It may have been within the decade after his archonship; it may even have been before the archonship; and it may have been either before or after his sojourn abroad. The whole matter would no doubt be interesting and important enough if we had sufficient material for a full and orderly biography. But, as things are, we can do no more than mention this single unrelated circumstance and leave it without comment. How much distinction the office of delegate to the Amphictyonic Council carried with it; whether the Delphian issue caused any serious debate; whether Solon took an active part in it or not: such questions as these, which contain the gist of the matter, cannot be answered.

4

In the domestic affairs of Athens, to come now to what must be the closing scene in Solon's life, we find that the old question of the tyranny was one of the things which occupied his attention. This much we know from extant fragments of his poems.¹ More than one aspiring politician essayed to make himself tyrant of Athens, and Solon stoutly opposed them. He rebuked the people

abbia accolto una tradizione o un' invenzione diffusa ad arte da Eschine o da' suoi amici per coonestare cio che avevano operato in Delfi con poco riguardo agl' interessi della patria." On the Amphictyonic Council, the Sacred War, and Solon's part therein, see Busolt (1893, pp. 672 ff., especially p. 693) and Wilamowitz (1893, I, 10 ff.).

¹ xiii and xiv. For a discussion of Solon's activities during this period and his relations with Pisistratus see Appendix 7.

sharply for their folly in allowing themselves to be deceived by these specious individuals, and warned them against resigning to them so much power that there would be no further hope of recovering their liberties. Who these pretenders to a tyrant's throne were, we do not know. But we find Solon maintaining his principles with the same resolution and giving public expression to them with the same vigor and fearlessness as in the past. It is easy to believe that in the unsettled years which, according to Aristotle, followed Solon's archonship there should have been many abortive attempts at the tyranny.

In the end, thirty-two years after the archonship of Solon, the thing happened which was diametrically opposed to Solon's political ideals.¹ A tyranny was finally established in Athens. What Solon had steadfastly refused for himself was won by another through clever intrigue. Pisistratus was the man who finally made himself master of Athens. There are picturesque legends of Solon's efforts to prevent his usurpation, but they are not to be accepted as historical. The fact, however, that Solon did oppose Pisistratus's machinations cannot be doubted for a moment. He had unmasked similar plots in the past, and it is not likely that Pisistratus was clever enough to deceive him even at his advanced age. But whatever Solon may have said or done, his efforts were unavailing. Pisistratus became tyrant of Athens. And in this high position, it must be confessed, he conducted himself with great moderation and accomplished much for the glory of the city. Nothing would be more profitable than a detailed comparison of the ideals and achievements of these two men if we only had sufficient evidence for it. The one was a champion of free institutions, but his plans did not lead apparently to the

¹ De Sanctis (1912, pp. 257 ff.), in a page of criticism on the value of Solon's constitutional reforms, attributes the failure of the constitution to the lack of a strong central power. He betrays some disapproval of what he regards as Solon's weakness, and some admiration for the strong government of Pisistratus. So those who admire Caesar condemn Cicero.

immediate demonstrable success of political calm and material well-being; the other was a benevolent autocrat who developed the resources and power of the state. It is a contrast which tries one's faith in democracy. And yet in later times Solon was looked upon as the founder of all that the Athenians cherished most; while Pisistratus and his sons were thought of with hatred and reprobation. Conditions in the sixth century were not right for a fair trial of the comparative merits of autocracy and democracy. The people were only just emerging from a state of feudal subservience; they were ignorant and unprepared for the duties and responsibilities of self-government. Athens like other Greek states had to pass out of the old order by the way of the popular tyranny. She was fortunate in having a wise and benevolent despot. But it was no small thing that the principles of democracy had been enunciated with so much clearness and force at the beginning. These principles were never forgotten, and ultimately they bore fruit. The marvelous thing is that at so early a day, in the midst of the corruption of a declining aristocracy and the ignorance of an unintelligent populace, Solon should have discerned with such clear insight and maintained with such resolute faith the true principle of equality before the law. He was as one born out of due time, and his true worth could not be understood until men had grown to his stature.

There is something melancholy and depressing about the circumstance that in the last days of his life Solon should have seen the triumph of the thing against which he had struggled so valiantly, both when it came as a temptation to himself and when it came as a menace from other men. But it serves at the same time to throw into sharper relief what we must have recognized as the chief ornament of his character. The unselfishness and perseverance with which he struggled to hold the people free from the domination of lawless masters, even though he could himself

have been the master, are enough to merit our high regard ; and if his legislation and the instigation of his own example and of his inspiring precepts did not immediately avail to realize for Athens his noble ideal, we should not be blinded by this to the true worth of the man.¹

¹ For the traditions concerning Solon's death and burial, see Appendix 8.

CHAPTER V

THE POEMS

1

The life of Solon, as we have seen, was known to the ancients and is known to us only through his poems. In tracing the events of his career we have been listening constantly to his voice; or, when his own voice can be heard no longer, we have learned sometimes from the ancient biographers something of what he had said. The character of many of the poems, whose very subjects were drawn from the circumstances of the time, has facilitated this use of them. But it is not right to treat them solely as historical documents. We must now come to them with the wider appreciation and criticism which are the due of poetry.¹ We must search them for the thoughts and the emotions of their author; we must discern the artistic skill with which he has expressed these thoughts and emotions in measured language. For Solon was a life-long poet. Not that poetry was his chief business. He seems to have turned to the Muses partly for amusement in his lighter hours, partly for aid in the sterner tasks which he undertook for the good of Athens. But they responded to him with their favor, even though he refused to give his whole heart to them. Plato² represents an admirer of Solon declaring that if he had chosen to devote himself wholly to poetry he might even have rivaled the great masters. But this was no doubt a partial critic; and it does little good to conjecture what Solon would have accomplished if he had not been the man he was. He had a

¹ On the poems, see also pp. 7-13.

² *Timaeus* 21 c.

genuine poetical gift, but he chose to use it mostly in moral exhortations and political pamphlets. An Anacreon must make amends for the laxity of his morals by the exquisite purity of his art; Solon atones for the occasional prosaic quality of his verse by the nobility of his character and his unselfish devotion to the public weal.

We must recognize at the start that in attempting a criticism of Solon's poetry we are beset by the difficulty which arises from the fragmentary character of the remains, and by the danger of drawing general conclusions from material which comprises only a fraction of his whole work. There is always a temptation to find a larger significance in isolated lines than would be justified by the whole poem if we had it before us. Fortunately among the extant fragments there are, as we have seen, three which from their greater length hold out the promise of a better understanding of Solon's art. It is safe to say that they exhibit the development of his thought during the most active years of his life. We do not know whether they were really the longest of his poems, but for us they are the most significant. We cannot do better, therefore, than to begin our account of his ideas and his art by a somewhat detailed study of these three poems.

There can be little doubt that the order in which these poems are here discussed is also the order in which they were composed. The sentiments expressed in the longest of the three are such as to lead us to assign it to the earlier half of Solon's life, before his archonship, when he was especially distrustful of the rich.¹ It

¹ Cf. Croiset (1903, p. 583): "Il ne semble pas douteux qu'elle n'appartienne à la première partie de sa vie. La politique n'y tient encore aucune place: l'auteur est manifestement étranger aux préoccupations qui devaient, plus tard, l'absorber tout entier . . . il s'agissait d'orienter sa vie. Plus tard, elle (*la question: Est-il désirable de s'enrichir?*) lui aurait paru oiseuse et peu digne de son attention." Wilamowitz (1893, II, 314) regards the poem as a work of Solon's old age, though he seems to have no evidence for this conclusion except what he regards as an old man's spirit pervading the piece: "jenes wunderbare gedicht, in dem der fromme des lebens und des strebens summe zieht, will ich hier nicht erläutern. das würde zu viel worte fordern, denn es ist nicht leicht,

must have been written at a time when he was interested in general moral questions and had not yet become involved in the particular difficulties of Athens which were his business during his term of office. The stage of growing interest in public affairs is marked by the second longest elegiac poem. It was in the third stage, after the archonship, that the longest iambic poem was composed as a defense of his actions in office.¹

The elegiac poem preserved by Stobaeus is,² with a single exception, the longest Greek poem which has survived from the period which intervened between the age of epic composition and the beginning of the fifth century. It is nearly twice as long as the next longest fragment of Solon. It affords us a welcome opportunity to study, in a more extended expression, his characteristic ideas, and to judge his poetical powers as they are exhibited in a more sustained effort.

A multitude of questions present themselves to the reader of this poem, some touching its proper interpretation, others touching the correct estimation of its literary and philosophical worth. An attempt to answer such questions must, of course, proceed from interpretation to criticism; we must be sure we understand before we presume to praise or blame. Let us consider, then, first, what Solon actually says.

falls man mehr als einzelne disticha verstehen will. dem modernen aber wird es sauer, von allem rhetorischen disponiren abzusehen, auch von allen den künsten der Kallimachos und Properz und Ovid, und sich zutraulich vor die knie des alten zu setzen und seiner Muse zu lauschen, die ihn nach greisenart bald hierhin, bald dahin lockt, aber immer wieder in die bahn zurückführt, die ihm die alles beherrschende empfindung weist. 'mensch, lerne, dass es mit unserer macht nicht getan ist, und dass der gott, der deine geschicke lenkt, wie es ihn beliebt, einmal abrechnung hält: mensch, lerne dich bescheiden.' zum verständnis des baues hilft Tibull, der an der ächten elegie gelernt hat; bequemer noch hilft Goethe."

¹ Croiset (1903), in an admirable and most suggestive essay, describes the change in Solon's moral attitude which is displayed in the poems composed in the three periods of his life. The real subject of the essay is the development of moral ideas through the experiences and trials of the whole community, as it is illustrated in Solon's poems.

² xl.

The poem opens with an address to the Muses, which takes the form of a prayer. Solon prays that the Muses will grant him certain blessings which he evidently regards as essential to human happiness. He makes no appeal for poetical inspiration. He turns to the Muses to ask for things which were generally thought to be bestowed by Zeus or some other of the greater gods. The address, therefore, is different from that at the beginning of the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. Is it merely a literary form, or is it a sincere expression of faith in the power of the Muses to grant the boon which was asked? Certainly it was mostly the latter; but, perhaps, at the same time a little of the former. Though Solon does not say explicitly, in the manner of the Homeric hymn-writers, that he takes his beginning from the goddesses, yet unquestionably the solemn apostrophe is an open avowal that the poet is acting under their inspiration. He must have believed that he enjoyed an unusually intimate relation with these divinities, if he was moved to turn to them for aid in the general conduct of his life; poetry and the works of the Muses must have played a large part in his life; he must have felt that in some very special sense he lived under their patronage and protection; during the period in which this elegy was written, at any rate, poetry must have been something more to him than a pastime for idle hours.

What does he desire at the Muses' hands? Two things, of which one must come from the gods, the other from men. The first is happiness, especially the happiness which is produced by comfortable resources; the second is a good name among men. It is curious to observe that both these things, which the modern world regards as the achievement of a man's own endeavors, are thought of by Solon as unattainable without external aid. We shall see later that the principal thesis of the poem is implicit in this conception.

There is a corollary to the main petition. If he enjoys prosperity and a fair esteem, he expects to be in a position to help

his friends and harm his enemies, returning good for good and evil for evil. This desire is expressed openly and without shame and was not in any way repugnant to the Greek moral sense.

The prayer is complete in six lines. It would be hazardous to assume that Solon is trying to state in this brief space the complete formula for human life. But the lines are evidently carefully phrased to give a fairly comprehensive definition of Solon's ethical position; and when we come to review these lines after studying the rest of the poem, we are surprised to discover that there is latent in them a fundamental article of Hellenic faith.

After the first six lines, instead of petitions addressed to the Muses, we find direct statements of fact and opinion concerning various circumstances of human life. Solon is simply writing down his own reflections in elegiac verse, aided, no doubt, by the inspiration of the Muses, but no longer speaking to them directly.

It is immediately apparent even to a hasty reader of the poem that the mind of the author is much occupied with the question of money and its influence on human life and character. That this should have been a matter of great concern to him is not surprising when we recall the abuses which prevailed in Athens in the seventh century. Thoughtful men of the day must indeed have believed that the love of money is the root of all evil. Instinctively, therefore, having prayed for happiness and prosperity, Solon is moved to define his position in the matter of money, which is indispensable in that form of happiness for which he has prayed. Without hesitation he proclaims frankly that he does desire money. But there are two ways of getting it: a man may get it justly and through the gift of heaven, or he may get it unjustly and contrary to the will of heaven. Of money got in the latter way Solon will have none; the former is safe and sure. There seems to be no doubt in his mind that heaven smiles upon justice and frowns upon injustice. To say that a man's wealth

has been won through just means is the same as to say that it has been given him by the gods; and, conversely, unjust methods in the pursuit of riches will inevitably bring upon the offender the enmity of heaven.

Solon says little of the financial fortunes of the just man. Two lines suffice for this. But he describes in some detail the operation of the punishment which overtakes the unjust money-getter. If a man grows rich through unjust means, he soon becomes afflicted with that mental disorder which the Greeks called *ἄτη*; he becomes blind to the truth about himself and the world in which he lives; he miscalculates his own powers in relation to the power of the gods; he grows headstrong and reckless; he loses the regulating force of reason and sound sense. The disease is slight at the start, but rapidly grows worse. The victim's behavior becomes more and more wild, more and more outrageous, and final and ultimate disaster is not long delayed. What the actual punishment is, we are not told.

It would seem as if Solon were describing a course of events in which one circumstance follows another by the impersonal law of cause and effect. But it is not so that he conceives the matter. The whole affair is the work of Zeus, who uses the operations of nature as the means of accomplishing his own will. The eye of Zeus is upon the culprit from the very beginning, and when the proper time comes he strikes.

But there is an objection which can be raised to the truth of this moral law. It is a matter of common observation that sinners are not always overtaken by the consequences of their guilt. They sometimes enjoy their ill gotten gains in peace and go down untroubled to the grave. How is this to be explained? Not by maintaining that punishment awaits the guilty wretch in the life after death; this doctrine of the Orphic sect had not yet become current in the Greek world. To Solon, as to the Hebrew lawgiver, it seemed that the unexpiated sins of the fathers

were visited upon the innocent children of succeeding generations. Early or late the blow is bound to fall.¹

At this point Solon's reflections take a wider sweep. He has traced the operation of the moral law in the matter of the acquisition of wealth. And the law is that men's endeavors must conform to the will of the gods. Happiness and success will attend him who acquiesces in their rule; downfall and failure is the portion of all who run athwart their will. But in the mad rush of money-making men forget this law; they forget the inexorable power of the gods; they believe that they can do as they will with their own; they live without god in the world. But are they alone in this? Solon looks out upon the world and finds that men of every walk in life are guilty of this same forgetfulness. They are blind to things as they are. They struggle and strive and fret, heedless of the certain truth that the outcome of their efforts lies with the gods alone. Solon leads before us in review the various trades and professions, and shows us the world bustling over its affairs, oblivious of its impotence. Toil as they will, men will receive no more and no less than the gods will give.

As he contemplates the spectacle of human fortunes, Solon is led to assume a more pessimistic attitude. Men are not always to blame, after all, if they fail. They move forward into the darkness of the future, danger besets them on every side, they cannot know the proper course. One man, who strives to live well according to his lights, comes to grief; while the gods shower their favors upon another who offends against every standard of human conduct.

But though Solon fails to discover the divine law that governs the world at large, he feels confident about one portion of ethical

¹ Girard (1869, p. 203), after quoting this portion of the poem, says: "Voilà dans sa sincérité le sentiment païen, nullement détaché de la vie réelle, amoureux des biens qu'elle comporte, mettant dans le nombre les biens d'opinion et même, puisqu'il faut avoir des ennemis, le plaisir d'être redouté par les siens, mais se représentant sous une grande image la justice divine et en adorant avec soumission la sanction nécessaire jusque dans ses effets les plus impitoyables."

theory. Returning to the subject which occupies the earlier part of the poem, he repeats, in different words, his account of the course which is inevitably followed when a man is smitten with the lust for money. But, this time, there is no distinction between honest and dishonest riches. Wealth itself, though it is given by the gods, is a poison which works subtly in the system and brings about moral dissolution in the end. With these observations the poem comes to a close.

In this poem Solon does not present a consistent philosophy nor an adequate solution of the riddle of human life. He does not even attempt to do this. There are certain tacit assumptions in his mind which serve as points of rest in his reflections upon the fortunes of men. These assumptions we fairly recognize as the commonly accepted creed of the day. If we try to formulate this creed, we shall be better able to estimate the originality and independence of Solon's own thought.

The efforts of men in the world are properly directed to the attainment of their own happiness. They are restrained, however, by certain moral principles from complete liberty of action: some actions are good, some are bad, and abiding happiness cannot be secured through methods which are discountenanced by society. But aside from this negative restriction, men must steer their way through life without a compass. The sovereign control over their fortunes lies with Zeus and the hierarchy of the gods. Mortals cannot know the mind of the gods nor the ultimate outcome of any course of action. Undoubtedly the gods frown upon behavior which is reprobated by men; that is, the divine government follows the moral laws which are recognized by humanity. But this tenet in the creed demands a robust faith, and men are constantly baffled by the inscrutability of divine purposes. One thing alone is certain: men must take what the gods send. By an exercise of faith they may believe that the rule of the gods is wise and regular and consistent, and that

man's problem is to discover the wisdom and regularity of their rule, and to order his life in harmony therewith. But in general we may suppose that the harmony of divine purposes was beyond the sight of most Greeks of that time, and that they recognized higher powers who, though they might be benevolent, were largely capricious.

This is a fair statement of the common Greek view of life so far as it is presented in this poem. Does Solon make any modification in these current opinions, or any addition to them? I should say that he does not. He exhibits the normal attitude of pious perplexity. He makes no penetrating study of the problem of human destiny; he proposes no substitute for the time-honored rule of unresisting acquiescence to the decrees of heaven; he reaffirms the helpless dependence of humanity. The poem, I repeat, was not written to present a new philosophy of life. What then can we regard as the essential thing for which the poem was written?

The moving impulse, I take it, which prompted Solon to write the poem was the desire to set forth the results of his observation on the moral effects of riches and the acquisition of riches. He had, in his mercantile career, abundant opportunity to watch the results of the passionate money-making of the day. He had formed certain definite opinions concerning the inevitable moral degradation which seemed to him to attend that form of activity. These opinions he imparts to us in no uncertain language, and he reveals the depth of his study by the poetical fervor of his expression. On this matter he speaks with the energy and conviction of a Hebrew prophet. But he does not confine himself to this single ethical problem. He is led by it to a discussion of the larger topic of human helplessness. Unquestionably the moral vigor of the poem is impaired thereby; he himself feels the instability of the opinions which he expresses in the second part of the poem, and returns at the end to the sure ground of his

special theme which he has worked out thoroughly. But though there may be a loss in moral vigor, we cannot but admire the lively picture of the world at work which he paints in the second half of the poem.

Is the poem complete as we have it? Of this there is little doubt. We have evidence in Clement of Alexandria to show that the poem actually began with the verse which stands first in Stobaeus's quotation.¹ And though there is no positive evidence for the end, it is not unreasonable to believe that we have the closing lines. The theme is completely developed and the poet recurs at the end to the subject which occupied him at the beginning. For a moral discourse, the poem is long enough; more could easily be added to a composition so loose in texture, but one feels that there would be genuine loss if the poem were further protracted.

There has been some difference of opinion concerning the merit of the poem.² Some have found in it nothing but an aggregation of disjointed scraps; others have regarded it as a splendid work of genius. As a matter of fact it is not a splendid work of genius, and there is some excuse for the charge that it is an aggregation. The habit of sententious utterance which is incident to the composition of elegiac verse, and a certain abruptness of transition give one the impression of a work which, as Solon him-

¹ See commentary on vs. 1.

² Bernhardt (*Griech. Lit.* II, 357) expressed his disapproval in these words: "Ein eigenthümliches aggregat liegt in fr. 5 (= 12 Bergk = xl) vor, welches erstlich fremdartige, durch kühlern ton gezeichnete schlusssätze aus Theognis empfangen hat, denn durch die matten distichen 39-42 verwässert ist; endlich fordert der zusammenhang, dass v. 37. 38 vor 59 eingeschoben werden." Schneidewin (1848, p. 110) came to the poet's defense, and spoke of the "einfach schöner gedankengang des herrlichen gedichts." He finds the closing lines of the poem highly appropriate, and does not admit for a moment that they were composed by Theognis. Furthermore, he believes the poem to be complete. Leutsch (1872) brings forward evidence to show that this was one of the poems of Solon which became famous early, but he maintains that poetically it is one of the least successful. He charges especially that the exposition is incomplete. Rost, on the other hand, asserts (1884) that it belongs "zu dem hervorragendsten . . . was Solon als dichter geschaffen hat, und uns den geist desselben besonders getreu abspiegelt." For Wilamowitz's opinion, see p. 104, footnote 1.

self might say, is not *ἔμπειδος ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος ἐς κορυφήν*.¹ At the same time, it unquestionably springs from a single impulse and possesses a genuine unity of conception. This, I trust, has been made clear in the analysis of the thought which has already been given.

The poem is not a work of profound inspiration. It is not characterized by deep poetical feeling or bold imagination; nor does it contain moral and philosophical views of great weight or originality. Nevertheless, it is an entirely meritorious performance. It is well written; it exhibits a power of trenchant utterance; it is graced by truly Hellenic balance of phrase; it reveals a ready instinct for metaphor and personification; and above all, it includes an extended simile of great beauty, of which even Homer would not be ashamed. We may justly be grateful to Stobaeus for its preservation, both because of its own intrinsic worth, and because it is one of the most important documents for the history of Greek ethical thought in the sixth century.

The next longest of Solon's poems, the elegy quoted by Demosthenes to shame his rival Aeschines with a picture of the sturdy morality of the first Athenian statesman, forms a striking sequel to the poem which has just been discussed. In the first of the two poems Solon gives utterance to broad philosophical reflections without any particular application of them. It is an exposition of his theory concerning the curse of riches. There is nothing to indicate that the poem is a result of his observations in Athens alone. In the second poem he comes directly to the state of affairs in Athens and shows how the theory which he had previously expounded finds practical application within his own unhappy city.

¹ Wilamowitz (1913, p. 257) attributes the difficulty of interpretation to the paratactic structure and the absence of illuminating particles. "Dass die Fähigkeit zu denken," he says (p. 258), "der Ausdrucksfähigkeit so weit voraus ist (was die Erga des Hesiodos ebenfalls so schwer macht) erhöht den Reiz dieser Erstlingsfrüchte moralischer Dialektik."

Athens is threatened with impending ruin. But, says Solon, the gods are not to blame; Athena is faithful and just in her devotion. The responsibility lies with the men of Athens themselves. Avarice and greed, and the moral degradation which they entail, are bringing the state to destruction. Thereupon Solon describes with burning indignation the rapacity of the rich and the sufferings of the poor. It is not a question of abstract ethics now, but an appalling reality which he sets before the reader. And he has discovered, he thinks, both the cause and the cure.

The poem was written with the definite purpose of urging upon the Athenians the only remedy which would restore the health of society. Lawlessness is the cause of the mischief and a law-abiding spirit will be its cure. He proclaims with great eloquence the virtues of *Eunomia* as a panacea for the evils which afflict the state. The poem is not a querulous lament over an inevitable decline. It offers a constructive policy which will lead to better things. His program includes the recognition of sound laws, both moral and civil, equitable administration of them, and loyal obedience to them. It may seem as if Solon's recommendations were still vague and intangible. But we know that he made proposals definite and concrete enough to lead to his appointment as dictator. Meanwhile in the present poem he enunciated the broad policy which should be the guide in the reconstruction of society.

This poem is more forcible and vigorous and better constructed than the first. Here there is no doubt and uncertainty in the reader's mind. The thought proceeds by logical steps from the beginning to the end. The philosopher is now the statesman but still the poet. Passing from the universality of *Δίκη*, he now preaches the practical expedient of *Νόμος*.

The third poem of the group shows Solon in the midst of his work, putting into practice the principles which he had proclaimed in the second. Dictator of Athens, he had had the

opportunity to right the wrongs which he had described with so much energy. This he claims to have done. There is no place now for philosophical reflection. In terse iambic meter, in concrete and vigorous language, he recounts the steps he has taken for the amelioration of Athenian affairs. Poetic imagination does not fail him: he can still conceive of the august figure of Δίκη as a witness at the bar of time. And he writes with an assured mastery of composition. But the contrast in tone and spirit between the first long elegy and this later iambic poem is striking enough. This later style, as far as we can see from the extant poems, is most characteristic of Solon. The intimate association between his poetry and the public life of Athens is the thing which chiefly distinguishes him from the other elegists who wrote of human fortunes in general.¹

2

Though Solon did not fail to observe the essential unhappiness of human life, he did not yield to the despair of the pessimist. He felt that there was a way in which men could adjust themselves to their environment so as to save themselves from much of the suffering with which they were afflicted. Lack of wisdom, of intelligence, of foresight, of self-control, he believed to lie at the bottom of human unhappiness. Men failed to see things as they were. They were themselves to blame for much of their suffering. Others laid the blame for human suffering and the injustice which prevails in the world on the gods. Some, like Theognis, cried out bitterly against the capricious cruelty of the gods. Not so Solon. He did not, indeed, make the rash boast that he had discovered the divine purpose which guides the action of the gods. The

¹ Girard (1869, p. 190), speaking of the martial elegies of Tyrtaeus and the political poems of Solon, observes: "Quel fait inouï dans l'histoire! et quel peuple que celui où cet art d'imagination, que la civilisation des âges suivants devait reléguer parmi les jouissances littéraires, se retrouve ainsi à deux siècles d'intervalle comme l'arme la meilleure du patriotisme!"

will of the gods is inscrutable, and their ways are past finding out. But Solon had faith to believe that the gods are just. Their workings are long and slow; they alone can discern the end. Man's condemnation of the gods is due to hasty judgment of uncompleted work. The gods sometimes let men have their way for a space, and then men blame the gods for the results of their own folly. The mind of Zeus is not quick to wrath for each offense. But sooner or later punishment comes for transgression. Since it is only too evident that punishment does not always come within the lifetime of the transgressor, Solon, like the author of the Hebrew decalogue, found the explanation in the fact that children suffer for the sins of their fathers. Everywhere he shows full respect for the gods, and the gods are the ancient gods of the Greeks. There is no allusion in his poems to the crude and worldly myths which were attached to their names. How Solon was affected by these tales we have no way of knowing. The gods whom he knows are omnipotent, inscrutable, just, scarcely personal. There is no evidence that he had passed through the travail of religious doubt in order to reach this pure conception, stripped as it was of popular absurdities. Pindar, Aeschylus, and Euripides were going to find perplexities enough. But Solon seems to have held instinctively a dignified faith and not to have troubled his head over the puzzles of theology.

Human error springs from ignorance and folly. Failing to discern the incontrovertible order of things, men refuse to acquiesce in their own drab existence. What the gods give, they refuse, and they seek something different from what destiny has allotted them. They are stirred with hopes which they themselves have no power to fulfill. They defy the established principles of society, sanctioned alike by gods and men. Spoiled by success, they yield to temptation, defy the law, and seize ruthlessly whatever they desire. One form of error is mere passive stupidity; the other is active defiance of the law of moderation:

but both alike are folly. The common path of moral degeneration leads from extravagance and excess, through insolence and arrogance, to madness and infatuation. One can save himself from this headlong descent only by moderation and self-control. The path of righteousness is indeed a strait and narrow path: on the one side are the dangers of a stunted existence, on the other the dangers of excess. Between the two, man can be saved only by the guiding principle of moderation and self-control. Solon held to this principle consistently throughout. In his earlier years he emphasized the evils of extravagance and avarice and the disaster which results from them; after his archonship he thought more of the folly of stupidity. But it was always ἀφροσύνη which lay at the root of Athenian troubles.

As men are led into error by folly, so they are saved from error by wisdom. Salvation comes by ἔκλυσις ἀφροσύνης. Through wisdom men can understand their own powers and limitations; they can understand the orderly course of the universe and see that it may not be safely transgressed; wisdom will not, indeed, assure them happiness; but it will assure them the largest measure of happiness which the gods and fate will allow. With this they must be content. Any effort to force an increase is presumption and leads to moral decline and eventually to ruin. Men may strive for all good things so long as they conduct themselves in accordance with the divinely appointed order. In this way they will win the approval of the gods and the praise of men. Disobedience to the moral law, ἀδικία, is inevitably punished by the higher powers.

In the famous interview between Solon and Croesus, Herodotus put into the mouth of Solon a speech which reads like a paraphrase of Solon's philosophical opinions. He must have borrowed directly from the poems the ideas of which the speech is composed. The sources of many of them can still be seen in the extant fragments; others he may have drawn from poems

which are now lost. It seems fair to suppose that the speech is something in the nature of an informal summary of Solon's doctrine as Herodotus found it in his own poems, and, as a summary, we cannot afford to overlook it :¹

Oh! Croesus, thou askedst a question concerning the condition of man, of one who knows that the power above us is full of jealousy, and fond of troubling our lot. A long life gives one to witness much, and experience much oneself, that one would not choose. Seventy years I regard as the limit of the life of man. In these seventy years are contained, without reckoning intercalary months, twenty-five thousand and two hundred days. Add an intercalary month to every other year, that the seasons may come round at the right time, and there will be besides the seventy years, thirty-five such months, making an addition of one thousand and fifty days. The whole number of the days contained in the seventy years will thus be twenty-six thousand two hundred and fifty, whereof not one but will produce events unlike the rest. Hence man is wholly accident. For thyself, oh! Croesus, I see that thou art wonderfully rich, and art the lord of many nations; but with respect to that whereon thou questionest me, I have no answer to give, until I hear that thou hast closed thy life happily. For assuredly he who possesses great store of riches is no nearer happiness than he who has what suffices for his daily needs, unless it so hap that luck attend upon him, and so he continue in the enjoyment of all his good things to the end of life. For many of the wealthiest men have been unfavoured of fortune, and many whose means were moderate have had excellent luck. Men of the former class excel those of the latter but in two respects; these last excel the former in many. The wealthy man is better able to content his desires, and to bear up against a sudden buffet of calamity. The other has less ability to withstand these evils (from which, however, his good luck keeps him clear), but he enjoys all these following blessings: he is whole of limb, a stranger to disease, free from misfortune, happy in his children, and comely to look upon. If, in addition to all this, he end his life well, he is of a truth the man of whom thou art in search, the man who may rightly be termed happy. Call him, however, until he die, not happy but fortunate. Scarcely, indeed, can any man unite all these advantages: as there is no country which contains within it all that it needs, but each, while it possesses some things, lacks others, and the best country is that which contains the most; so no single human being is complete in every respect — something is always lacking. He who

¹ Herodotus i 32 (Rawlinson's translation).

unites the greatest number of advantages, and retaining them to the day of his death, then dies peaceably, that man alone, sire, is, in my judgment, entitled to bear the name of "happy." But in every matter it behooves us to mark well the end: for oftentimes God gives men a gleam of happiness, and then plunges them into ruin.

In this speech there seems to be only one false note, and that is at the very beginning. There is nothing in the poetry of Solon which we still possess to justify us in believing that he regarded the power above us as "full of jealousy and fond of troubling our lot." He may have entertained this belief; but there is something in it repugnant to the general conception of the world and of the gods which is revealed in the poems. It seems far more likely that Herodotus himself, consciously or unconsciously, imported into his paraphrase of Solon's thought, the idea which is so characteristic of his own philosophy. He attributed to Solon, says Plutarch,¹ his own view concerning the nature of the gods. But with this exception, the resemblance between the speech in Herodotus and Solon's own poems will be manifest to all.

On the model of the orderly universe and contented human acquiescence therein, Solon conceived his ideal of political salvation. That men may live together happily, it is necessary that they should establish a system of wise laws and give them their ready obedience. Selfishness, arrogance, and caprice have no place under a reign of law. We have seen how Solon endeavored to provide for Athens this utopian state, and how, to a great extent, he failed. But he did not fail because his ideal was wrong. He failed because the problem which he set himself was so great a one that though the world has puzzled over it for twenty-five centuries the solution has not yet been found. But the world is more sure than ever that the means which Solon proposed for its solution is the right one. A reign of law, in which there shall be wise

¹ *De Herodoti malignitate* 15, p. 858 a.

laws and prompt and ready obedience to them, is the goal towards which men have more and more consciously directed their efforts. It is no slight thing that Solon discovered the formula for the organization of human society which is still applied to-day with ever increasing success.

The common habit of the great Greek poets, of Homer, Pindar, and the tragedians, was to allow their reflections on human life and men's relation to the higher powers that govern the universe to reveal themselves through concrete and vivid mythical narratives. Or, at least, they provided ample mythical illustration of their ideas. In the main, the substance of Greek poetry is Greek mythology, infused with a spirit of philosophical reflection. But in Solon's poems, in the extant fragments at least, myths have no place. He does not read his lessons of morality and religion in the legendary adventures of the heroes of the race. Nor yet does he present his ideas concerning personal and social virtue as an abstract ethical system. They appear in dramatic setting in the poems which deal with the conditions which prevailed in Athens. They are not merely moral maxims flung out in a void, but a set of practical principles which guided him in his public life. We miss the charm of personal character and personal incident which legend supplies, but we have in place of it a vivid contemporaneousness which serves the same purpose of imparting to Solon's poetry the necessary life and reality.¹

The fair-minded reader will not fail to perceive a genuine poetical inspiration in the fragments of Solon's poetry. He will be embarrassed to some degree by the occasional nature of some

¹ Cf. Wilamowitz (1893, II, 60): "die Françoisvase entzückt uns durch die epische erzählungskunst ihrer bilder; der abglanz der ganzen grossen sagenherrlichkeit ruht auf ihr, die im mutterlande noch alle herzen beherrschte. in Ionien war sie schon verblasst; die demokratie hatte die nachkommen der heroen zurückgedrängt, und Minnemos konnte die sage bereits, ein vorläufer der Alexandriner, zu spielendem schmucke verwenden. bei Solon tritt sie ganz und gar zurück. dem pompösen wesen des rittertumes ist sein einfacher sinn vollends abgeneigt."

of the poems and Solon's preoccupation with contemporary affairs. This is no doubt a hindrance to the universality which characterizes all great poetry. But it has just been remarked that this very circumstance gives to Solon's work a certain dramatic reality, the lack of which makes Theognis's sententious poems, for example, somewhat dry reading. One of the chief merits of Solon's poetry is its intense moral earnestness and the undoubted importance of the issues involved. It is instinct with the strong feeling and true emotion of a generous-minded patriot. It is not the light product of a politician's idle moments nor yet the mere instrument of a place-seeker. It is the sincere and unaffected outpouring of feelings which sprang from the very core of his existence. Solon the statesman and Solon the poet were not two men but one and indivisible. The moral vigor of the statesman was the inspiration of the poet. Such conditions may not produce the greatest poetry, but they may produce poetry of a high merit even though of a humbler sort.

All the moral earnestness in the world, however, could not have made real poetry if there had not been something of poetic vision, some fire of imagination to kindle in the reader some warmth responsive to the glow in the heart of the poet. Such imaginative power Solon possessed even in a notable degree. It shows itself principally in the wealth of metaphor which is to be found in the fragments: a demagogue extracts a profit from political agitation as if he were getting the butter from the milk; shrewd men walk with the tread of a fox; a political schemer gets power into his hands as a fisherman catches fish in his net; wealth follows dishonest men with reluctance; public disaster issues from ambitious and unscrupulous men as lightning flashes from a thunder cloud; social demoralization climbs over the garden wall and brings affliction into the life of private citizens. Here are examples enough of Solon's open eye and keen vision. And we should not forget the two fine passages which are perhaps the best in the

poems that survive: the splendid comparison of the justice of Zeus with the sudden spring wind which drives away the clouds and vapors and makes the world clean again; and the glowing eulogy of Eunomia with its series of striking images. Solon could not match perhaps the poignant vividness of Archilochus, but he is superior in this regard to all the other elegiac and iambic poets of the early age. Furthermore, this imagery is not an artificial embellishment; it is spontaneous and unaffected. Solon has no tricks and graces of style. His poetry is sincere, straightforward, intent upon the serious business in hand, and no effort is wasted on ornamentation.

There is a marked versatility in Solon's manner of expression. He has equal skill with the trenchant epigram, which is characteristic of the elegiac couplet, and with the longer graceful phrase which is not bound either at the beginning or the end by the exigencies of the meter. At times he writes with something of the condensed suggestiveness of Sophocles; again his utterances remind one of Archilochus by their force and bluntness.¹ With true Attic ease and grace his style adapts itself naturally and without constraint to changing moods.

The language of the elegiac poems was the conventional modified epic speech which was employed by all elegiac poets of the period. Countless words and phrases are taken from Homer. The direct successor of epic poetry, elegiac poetry still adhered closely to the old style in spite of the wide difference in tone and purpose. But one feels no constraint or lack of ease in Solon's employment of the conventional speech. He uses it naturally and handily as a tool to which he had grown well accustomed. The course of his thought is never dominated by

¹ Cf. Wilamowitz (1893, II, 61): "der rechte nachfolger Homers und der rechte Athener ist er vollends in dem was ihn von dem Ionier Archilochos scheidet, dem unvergleichlich grösseren aber an den persönlichsten irdischen lebenden dichter: der sinn für die durcharbeitung der zufälligen wirklichkeit zur typischen wahrheit."

the epic tradition. When the language of Homer is inadequate to his new uses, he easily mingles with it words out of the natural speech of the day. In the iambic and trochaic fragments he passes almost entirely from under epic control. In these we recognize the forerunners of the perfected speech of the Attic drama of the fifth century.¹

When one reflects upon Solon's work as a poet in Athens in the sixth century, certain questions thrust themselves forward for which it is difficult to find satisfactory answers. Was Solon the only man in Athens who was using poetry for political purposes? Where did he acquire the habit of expressing his views on public affairs in verse? Was political controversy regularly carried on by means of partisan poems? There is not the slightest hint that other men in Athens were writing poetry. Solon never speaks as if he were replying to the written statement of an opponent. Poets are indeed mentioned by him in the list of professions which he gives in his longest elegiac poem. It may be that the making of verses was common among the Athenians of the day: or it may be that Solon was alone in his use of this powerful instrument. At any rate we know nothing of any poetry but Solon's. Possibly his early travels had given him a unique opportunity to master the art of composition in its home in Asia Minor, so that he could bring it back and use it among his own people. These are only conjectures; but it is well to pose the

¹ The judgment of Nageotte (1888, p. 166) on the poetical art of Solon deserves to be quoted for its justice and its moderation: "Ce qui était bien à lui encore, c'est le caractère calme, serein, de son exposition, la facilité amiable avec laquelle il manie ses pensées. On sent tout de suite, en le lisant, qu'on a changé de région et qu'on est sous le ciel de l'Attique. Point de tension ni d'effort, une grande sobriété d'images, de comparaisons, une langue saine, claire, un style sans prétention qui ne craint pas de descendre parfois jusqu'aux limites de la prose; et sous cet extérieur simple, une grande expérience des choses, un esprit avisé, une âme élevée et droite, un cœur profondément humain, voilà ce qu'est la poésie de Solon, qu'il ne faut ni placer trop haut ni mettre trop bas. Quoi qu'en aient pu penser quelques Athéniens, ce qui lui manqua pour égaler Homère, ce ne fut pas seulement le loisir, mais le talent. Solon n'est pas un grand artiste, pas plus de reste que Tyrée. Il n'a pas le génie créateur d'Archiloque, mais c'est un honnête homme qui sait écrire en vers."

questions at least, if only to show how slight our knowledge of Solon's world is after all.

It is often said that Solon used poetry to accomplish results which would in the modern world be effected by prose pamphlets. Since the art of composition in prose was not yet known, it did not occur to him to express his ideas and publish them otherwise than in verse. There is truth in this; but there is something more to be said. The counterpart in the ancient world of the modern pamphlet was the harangue. Men defended their policies and attacked their opponents in public speeches. The ancient Greek political instrument was oratory. In later times, when prose pamphlets were issued, they still took the form of speeches. Solon himself says at the beginning of the poem called "Salamis" that he has come with a poem instead of a speech. The notable thing is, not that he employed verse instead of written prose, but that he appealed to the people through poetry rather than oratory. He may have been an orator, too. We know nothing about this. In public life, he must have found it necessary often to make public addresses. But the question remains why he made use of verse at all. The skill had been gained through his practice of writing poems on the subjects which were common among the elegiac poets — love, the fortunes of men, the ways of the gods, the shortness of life, human follies. Possessing this skill he chose to use it for political ends. Certain advantages are manifest in this practice. The persuasive power of a speech extends no farther than the speaker's voice and ends with the speech itself. A poem may be repeated again and again; it may be carried everywhere; its rhythmical sentences linger in the mind. It is especially valuable for the slow molding of popular opinion. It makes a permanent appeal to the feelings. It was no doubt Solon's most effective instrument in the gradual propagation of the ideas which must be implanted in men's minds if the reforms which he had in view were to be successful.

It is surprising that the ancient authors made so little of the fact that Solon was the first Athenian poet. One would think that in view of the primacy of Athenian letters in the fifth century, Athenian writers would have spoken with interest, if not with pride, of the poetical work of their great lawgiver. There may have been, undoubtedly there were, other poets in Athens in the sixth century; but they were comparatively insignificant. Solon, preëminent as a statesman, was also in some measure preëminent as a poet. He is one of the few elegiac poets whose poems have been preserved. And yet no attempt was ever made by the Athenians to claim him as peculiarly a poet of Athens and the first of an illustrious line. His poems were not neglected: they were sung at festivals and took their place by the side of the other great poetry of the past. It would seem as if the Athenian abandonment of any claim to proprietorship was an example of what may be called the Panhellenic attitude of the Greeks toward their literature. In politics, union and harmony were impossible among the jealous Greek states; but in literature there seemed to be always an instinctive internationalism. All great Greek poets and philosophers belonged to the whole Greek world in common. Greek writers moved easily from place to place. Their books enjoyed equal favor and equal authority throughout the world. Ionian Homer, Boeotian Hesiod, Lesbian Sappho, Spartan Tyrtaeus, Sicilian Empedocles, Macedonian Aristotle, belonged to all Greeks in common. Literature, like language, was a bond which held together politically discordant communities. Literature embodied the spirit of the race, and however much they quarreled among themselves, the Greeks always felt that in spirit they were more closely related to one another than they were to any foreign people. Solon's poetry forms a part of this common Greek possession; when one thinks of him as a poet it seems almost accidental that he was an Athenian — and this in spite of the fact that so much of his poetry was bound up with

Athenian affairs. "Our Solon," the Athenians might say when they thought of their great lawgiver and the founder of their democracy; but as a poet they did not look upon him as the founder of an Athenian school or the first of a line of Athenian poets.

On one occasion, at the celebration of the Apaturia, according to Plato's story in the *Timaeus*, some of the poems of Solon had been recited in the prize contests for boys. As it happened, the elder Critias was present, and one of the bystanders remarked to him that in his opinion Solon had not only been the wisest of men but also the noblest of poets. In saying this he may have been expressing his own real opinion, or he may simply have wished to say something agreeable to the old man who was proud of his relationship to Solon. At any rate, Critias was much pleased, and asserted that if Solon had carried out his plan of composing a poem on the story of Atlantis, he would easily have made a place for himself by the side of Homer and Hesiod.

Now Plato, whose attitude toward the poets has always been a subject of discussion, was criticized in antiquity for this extravagant praise of Solon. But Proclus pointed out,¹ what is perfectly obvious, that the favorable judgment was not his own, but merely put into the mouths of certain characters in his story. Not satisfied with this, however, Proclus goes on to show that the epithet which has been translated "noblest" really belonged to Solon by good right. This Greek word, ἐλευθεριώτατος, is untranslatable in its connotation. It is related to the word which means "free," ἐλεύθερος, as the Latin *liberalis* is related to *liber*, and it describes the ideal character which can only be attained by a free man in contrast with a slave. The English word "noble" has a similar connotation in contrast with "mean." Proclus maintains that Solon deserves the title by virtue of his fearless freedom in thought and expression. Most poets, he says, in their strug-

¹ See references on p. 11, footnote 3.

gle for the *mot juste*, only succeed in distorting their lines; and some through the variety of their conceits lose the real point of what they are trying to say. Solon is not guilty of either offense, and so deserves the title, even though Critias is the judge.

It is hardly possible that Plato chose the word *ἐλευθέριος* as an epithet, whether it expresses his own judgment or not, without some recollection of Solon's lifelong struggle in the cause of freedom. It unites in the happiest manner what is best in Solon's work as a statesman and as a poet. In the one capacity, he was a high-minded, loyal, and unselfish supporter of the principle of political and economic freedom; in the other he was a frank, sincere, and unaffected artist, who instead of being a slave to his technique wielded it with supple dexterity. Our remembrance of Solon will not be far wrong if there lingers in our minds, in connection with his name, the epithet which Plato chose —
Σόλων ὁ ἐλευθέριος.

THE FRAGMENTS OF SOLON'S POEMS

I. TEXT AND TRANSLATION

I

Plato *Amatores* 133 c: Οἷσθ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ τι ἔστιν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Τί οὖν ἔστιν; ἔφην ἐγώ. Τί δ' ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ τὸ Σόλωνος; Σόλων γάρ που εἶπε—

I γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος·

καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως αἰεὶ χρῆναι εἶναι γέ τι μαυθάνειν τὸν μέλλοντα φιλοσοφήσειν, καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρῆσβύτερον, ἔν' ὡς πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθη.

II

Plato *Lysis* 212 de: Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. Οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιπποὶ εἰσὶν οὐδ' ἂν οἱ ἵπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλωσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδ' αὖ φιλόκυνες γε καὶ φίλοινοι καὶ φιλογυμνασταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, ἂν μὴ ἢ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλή. ἢ φιλοῦσι μὲν ταῦτα ἕκαστοι, οὐ μέντοι φίλα ὄντα, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεθ' ὁ ποιητής, ὃς ἔφη

II Ὀλβιος, ᾧ παῖδες τε φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι
καὶ κύνες ἀγρευταὶ καὶ ξένος ἀλλοδαπός;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὄς. Ἄλλ' ἀληθῆ δοκεῖ λέγειν σοι; Ναί. Τὸ φιλούμενον ἄρα τῷ φιλοῦντι φίλον ἐστίν. ὡς ἔοικεν. ᾧ Μενέξενε, ἔάν τε φιλή ἔάν τε καὶ μισῇ. οἶον καὶ τὰ νεωστὶ γεγονότα παιδιά, τὰ μὲν οὐδέπω φιλοῦντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ μισοῦντα, ὅταν κολάζηται ὑπὸ

I

TESTIMONIA. — Schol. Sophocles *Antigone* 711. Schol. Plato *Republic* viii 536 d. Plutarch *Solon* ii 2; xxxi 3. Suidas, s.v. γηράναι. John Siceliotus in Walz *Rhetores Graeci* vi 201. Zenobius iii 4. Diogenianus iii 80. Gregory of Cyprus ii 69. Apostolius v 40. Tatian *Oratio ad Graecos* 35 ad fin.

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ: αἰεὶ γηράσκω Schol. Plat. *Rep.* δ': om. B, Diogenianus, Greg. of Cyprus, Apostol. δ' αἰεὶ: γάρ αἰεὶ John Sic. πολλά: πάντα reading of L in Schol. Soph. *Ant.*

II

TESTIMONIA. — Theognis 1253-6. Lucian *Amores* 48. Hermias *In Plat. Phaedr.* p. 38.

1. φ: ᾧ Hermias MSS. (corrected by Ast.). φίλοι: νέοι Lucian. 2. καὶ κύνες ἀγρευταὶ: θηρευταὶ τε κύνες Theognis. ξένος ἀλλοδαπός: ξένοι ἀλλοδαποὶ Theognis.

I

"Do you know, then," said I, "what is meant by the pursuit of wisdom?"

"Certainly," said he.

"What is it?" I asked.

"Is it not the sort of thing which is implied in the saying of Solon? He said, you remember, 'As I grow old I am ever I learning many things that are new.' I, too, believe that a man who is engaged in the pursuit of wisdom, should follow Solon's example and always have in hand some particular subject of study, both in his youth and in his later years, so that during the course of his life he may learn as great a variety of things as possible."

II

"Then nothing is dear to a lover unless it returns the lover's affection?"

"Apparently not."

"Then men are not fond of horses unless the horses are fond of them, nor of quails nor of dogs nor of wine nor of gymnastics, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom returns their love. Or perhaps we should say that men are fond of all these things, but that the things are not dear to them; in which case the poet is wrong who sings: 'Happy is he who hath children II dear and horses of uncloven hoof and dogs for the chase and a friend to receive him in a foreign land.'"

"I do not think so," said he.

τῆς μητρὸς ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅμως καὶ μισοῦντα ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πάντων μάλιστα ἔστι τοῖς γονεῦσι φίλτατα. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν.

III-V

Aristotle *Constitution of Athens* 5: τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς τάξεως οὔσης ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἀντέστη τοῖς γνωρίμοις ὁ δῆμος. ἰσχυρὰς δὲ τῆς στάσεως οὔσης καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀντικαθημένων ἀλλήλοις, εἴλοντο κοινῇ διαλλακτὴν καὶ ἄρχοντα Σόλωνα καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτῷ ποιήσαντι τὴν ἐλεγεῖαν ἧς ἔστιν ἀρχή

- III Γινώσκω, καί μοι φρενὸς ἔνδοθεν ἄλγεα κεῖται,
 πρεσβυτάτην ἔσορῶν γαῖαν Ἰαονίας
 κλινομένην·

ἐν ἣ πρὸς ἑκατέρους ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρων μάχεται καὶ διαμφισβητεῖ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κοινῇ παραινέει καταπαύειν τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν φιλονικίαν. ἦν δ' ὁ Σόλων τῇ μὲν φύσει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ τῶν πρώτων, τῇ δ' οὐσία καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τῶν μέσων, ὡς ἔκ τε τῶν ἄλλων ὁμολογεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ποιήμασιν μαρτυρεῖ, παραινῶν τοῖς πλουσίοις μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν·

- IV ὑμεῖς δ' ἡσυχάσαντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερόν ἦτορ,
 οἱ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰς κόρον ἠλάσατε,
 ἐν μετρίοισι τίθεσθε μέγαν νόον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς
 πεισόμεθ', οὔθ' ὑμῖν ἄρτια ταῦτ' ἔσεται.

καὶ ὄλως αἰεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς πλουσίοις· διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐλεγεῖας δεδοικέναι φησὶ

- V τὴν τε φιλαργυρίην τὴν θ' ὑπερφηανίην,
ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἔχθρας ἐνεστῶσης.

III

3. κλινομένην Wilcken: καινομένην Sandys: καρφομένην Diels.

IV

4. ταῦτ: πάντ' Sandys.

"You think the poet is right?"

"Yes."

"Then that which is beloved, is dear to the lover, apparently, whether its own feelings be those of love or even of hate. Babies, for instance, who do not yet love any one and who even hate their mothers and fathers when they are punished by them, are nevertheless just at the moment when they hate their parents, more dear to them than at any other time."

"It seems to me to be so."

III-V

The organization of the state being such as I have described, the many were the slaves of the few, and, in consequence, the people rose in opposition to the upper classes. The feud was a violent one, and the opposing factions were pitted against one another for a long time. In the end, by common agreement, they elected Solon as archon, to act as arbitrator between them, and they intrusted him with the task of revising the constitution. His elegiac poem had already appeared which begins: "I am not unaware; and pain lies heavy at my heart as I watch the oldest of Ionian states sinking lower and lower." It is this same poem in which, presenting arguments for both sides, he champions first one party and then the other, and ends by counseling both alike to put a stop to the prevailing spirit of contention. Solon himself was a man who by birth and reputation belonged to the highest class; but his business activities and his limited means place him in the middle class. The main evidence for this statement, which is generally recognized to be true, he gives himself in this same group of poems, where he urges the rich not to be greedy:

III

V

TESTIMONIUM. — Plutarch *Solon* xiv 2: ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁ Σόλων ὀκνῶν φησι τὸ πρῶτον ἄψασθαι τῆς πολιτείας καὶ δεδοικῶς τῶν μὲν τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν.

VI-XI

Aristotle *Constitution of Athens* 12: ταῦτα δ' ὅτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔσχεν οἷ τ' ἄλλοι συμφωνοῦσι πάντες καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μέμνηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖσδε·

- VI δῆμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ,
 τιμῆς οὐτ' ἀφελῶν οὐτ' ἐπορεξάμενος·
 οἱ δ' εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
 καὶ τοῖσ' ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν·
 5 ἔστην δ' ἀμφιβάλων κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισιν,
 νικᾶν δ' οὐκ εἶασ' οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.

πάλιν δ' ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ὡς αὐτῷ δεῖ χρῆσθαι·

- VII δῆμος δ' ὦδ' ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο,
 μήτε λίην ἀνεθεὶς μήτε βιαζόμενος.
 τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ἔταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπηται
 ἀνθρώποισιν ὅσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦ.

καὶ πάλιν δ' ἐτέρωθί που λέγει περὶ τῶν διανείμασθαι τὴν γῆν βουλομένων·

- VIII οἱ δ' ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇ συνῆλθον, ἐλπίδ' εἶχον ἀφνεάν,
 κἀδόκουν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὄλβον εὐρήσειν πολύν,
 καί μ'ε κατίλλοντα λείως τραχὺν ἐκφανεῖν νόον.
 χαῦνα μὲν τότε' ἐφράσαντο, νῦν δέ μοι χολούμενοι

VI

TESTIMONIUM. — Plutarch *Solon* xviii 4.

1. γέρας : κράτος Plutarch. ἀπαρκεῖ : ἐπαρκεῖ Plutarch (corrected by Coraes).

VII

TESTIMONIA. — 1.2. Plutarch *Comparison of Solon and Publicola* ii 3. 3. Clement of Alexandria *Strom.* VI ii 8, 7 f. Diogenianus viii 22. Schol. Pindar *Ol.* xiii 12. 3.4. Theognis 153 f.

2. βιαζόμενος : πιεζόμενος Plutarch. 3. γὰρ : τοι Theognis, Diogenianus, Schol. Pindar. πολὺς : κακῶ Theognis, Schol. Pindar. πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπηται : κακῶ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖη Diogenianus. 4. ἀνθρώποισιν ὅσοις : ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὄντων Theognis.

“Calm the eager tumult of your hearts. You have forced **IV**
 your way forward to a surfeit of good things. Confine your
 swelling thoughts within reasonable bounds. For we shall not
 comply with your present disposition, and you yourselves will not
 find it meet for your own interests.” In general, he puts the
 blame for the dissension upon the wealthy class, and that is why
 he says, at the very beginning of the poem, that he fears their
 “covetousness and insolence,” implying that the hostile feelings **V**
 which were prevalent were due to these causes.

VI-XI

All the authorities are agreed that the results of Solon's re-
 forms were as I have described them. But he has alluded to
 them himself in several of his poems. One such passage runs
 as follows :

“To the common people I have given such a measure of **VI**
 privilege as sufficeth them, neither robbing them of the rights
 they had, nor holding out the hope of greater ones ; and I have
 taken equal thought for those who were possessed of power and
 who were looked up to because of their wealth, careful that
 they, too, should suffer no indignity. I have taken a stand
 which enables me to hold a stout shield over both groups, and
 I have allowed neither to triumph unjustly over the other.”

In another passage he explains what he believes to be the
 right way of dealing with the people :

“The populace will follow its leaders best if it is neither **VII**
 left too free nor subjected to too much restraint. For excess
 giveth birth to arrogance, when great prosperity attendeth
 upon men whose minds lack sober judgment.”

Again in another place he speaks of those who desired a re-
 distribution of the land :

“They who gathered to share in the spoils entertained vast **VIII**
 hopes. Every one of them expected to make his fortune, and
 thought that I, though I might prattle mildly now, would reveal

- 5 λοξὸν ὀφθαλμοῖσ' ὀρώσι πάντες ὥστε δήιον
οὐ χρεῶν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶπα, σὺν θεοῖσιν ἦνυσσα,
ἄλλα δ' οὐ μάτην ἔερδον, οὐδέ μοι τυραννίδος
ἀνδάνει βία τι ῥέζειν, οὐδὲ πιείρας χθονὸς
πατρίδος κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοὺς ἰσομοιρίαν ἔχειν.

πάλιν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποκοπῆς τῶν χρεῶν καὶ τῶν δουλευόντων
μὲν πρότερον, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ διὰ τὴν σεισάχθειαν

IX

- ἐγὼ δὲ, τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον
δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;
συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ' ἂν ἐν δίκῃ χρόνου
μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων
5 ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε
ὄρους ἀνείλον πολλαχῆ πεπηγότας·
πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα.
πολλοὺς δ' Ἀθήνας πατρίδ' εἰς θεόκτιτον
ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,
10 ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς δ' ἀναγκαίης ὕπο
χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλώσσαν οὐκέτ' Ἀττικὴν
ιέντας, ὡς ἂν πολλαχῆ πλανωμένους.
τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
ἔχοντας, ἦθη δεσποτῶν τρομευμένους,

VIII

TESTIMONIA. — 4.5. Plutarch *Solon* xvi 2. 6.7. Aristides, vol. 2, p. 536 (Dindorf).

1. ἀρπαγῆ συνῆλθον Richards : ἀρπαγαῖσιν ἦλθον Sandys. 6. ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶπα : ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἀελλπα (Gaisford omits γὰρ) Aristides. 7. ἄλλα : ἄμα (ἄλλα Gaisford) Aristides.

IX

TESTIMONIA. — 3-27. Aristides xlix 397 f., vol. 2, pp. 536-538 (Dindorf). 6.7. Plutarch *Solon* xv 5. 11-14. Plutarch *Solon* xv 5. 16. Plutarch *Solon* xv 2.

5. τῆς : ἧς Aristides (corrected by Scaliger and Brunck). 11. χρειοῦς φυγόντας : χρησμὸν λέγοντας Aristides. οὐκέτ' : οὐκ Plutarch. 13. δουλίην : δουλείην 3 MSS. of Plutarch : δουλοσύνην vulg. of Plutarch : δουλείης (corrected to δουλίην by Brunck, to δουλείην by Canter) Aristides. 14. ἦθη δεσποτῶν : ἦδη (ἦθη conj.) Bergk)

a nature stern enough in the end. Idle were their notions then, and now they are all angry with me and look at me with side-long glances as at an enemy. They have no reason to do so. What I promised, with the gods' help I fulfilled; other things I did not thoughtlessly undertake. I should find no pleasure in a thing which was achieved through the exercise of a tyrant's power, nor should I be glad to see the rich soil of the fatherland divided equally among the good and the bad."

In still another passage he speaks of the cancellation of debts and of those who from their former state of servitude had been restored to liberty by the act of disburdenment:

"Turning now to my own case, and considering first the IX
objects for which I brought the people together, you ask me why I stopped before I had achieved those objects? The answer to this question may be found in the corroborative evidence which will be given before the tribunal of Time by the black Earth, the supreme mother of the divinities of Olympus. I removed the stones of her bondage which had been planted everywhere, and she who was a slave before is now free. I brought back to their own divinely founded home many Athenians who justly or unjustly had been sold into slavery in foreign lands, and I brought back those whom destitution had driven into exile, and who, through wandering long abroad, no longer spoke the Attic tongue; and I restored to liberty those who had been degraded to slavery here in their own land and trembled at their masters' whims. These things I accomplished through arbitrary action, bringing force to the support of the dictates of justice, and I followed through to the end the course which I promised. On the other hand, I drafted laws, which show equal consideration for the upper and lower classes, and provide a fair administration of justice for every individual. An unscrupulous and avaricious man, if he had got the whip hand of the city as I had, would not have held the people back. If I had adopted the policy which was advocated by my opponents

- 15 ἔλευθέρους ἔθηκα. ταῦτα μὲν κράτει,
 ὄμου βίην τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας,
 ἔρεξα καὶ διήλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην.
 θεσμοὺς δ' ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε καὶ γαθῷ,
 εὐθείαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἀρμόσας δίκην,
 20 ἔγραψα. κέντρον δ' ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβών,
 κακοφραδῆς τε καὶ φιλοκτῆμων ἀνὴρ,
 οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον· εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον
 ἅ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἦνδανεν τότε,
 αὖθις δ' ἅ τοῖσιν οὐτεροι φρασαίατο,
 25 πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἦδ' ἐχηρώθη πόλις.
 τῶν οὐνεκ' ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιούμενος
 ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλῆσιν ἐστράφην λύκος.

καὶ πάλιν ὀνειδίζων πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον αὐτῶν μεμφιμοιρίας ἀμφοτέρων·

- X δῆμῳ μὲν εἰ χρῆ διαφάδην ὀνειδίσαι,
 ἅ νῦν ἔχουσιν οὐποτ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἂν
 εὔδοντες εἶδον.
 ὅσοι δὲ μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες
 5 αἰνοῖεν ἂν με καὶ φίλον ποιοίατο.
 εἰ γὰρ τις ἄλλος φησὶ ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἔτυχεν,
 XI οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον οὐδ' ἐπαύσατο,
 πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα.
 ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταιχμῷ
 ὄρος κατέστην.

δεσπότης Aristides. 16. ὄμου: νόμου Sandys. 18. ὁμοίως: ὁμοίους Aristides.
 24. οὐτεροι φρασαίατο: ἀτέροις δρᾶσαι διὰ Aristides. 26. ἀλκὴν: ἀρχὴν Aristides.
 ποιούμενος: κυκεύμενος Aristides. 27. πολλῆσιν: πολλαῖσιν Aristides.

then, or if thereafter I had consented to the treatment which *their* opponents were always planning for *them*, this city would have lost many of her sons. This was the reason why I stood out like a wolf at bay amidst a pack of hounds, defending myself against attacks from every side."

Again he reproves the complaints which were made by both parties at a later time:

"The common people (if I must give public utterance to my rebuke) would never have beheld even in their dreams the blessings which they now enjoy. . . . All the stronger and more powerful men in the city would sing my praises and seek to make me their friend." X

For if another man, he said, had obtained this office, "he would not have held the people back, and he would not have rested until by continued agitation he had got the butter from the milk. But I set myself up as a barrier in the debatable land between the two hostile parties." XI

X

1. διαφάδην Condos : διαφράδην papyri.

XI

TESTIMONIUM. — 1.2. Plutarch *Solon* xvi 2.

2. ἀνταράξας : ἄν ταράξας Plutarch. πῖαρ Plutarch : πναρ papyri. ἐξείλεν : ἐξέλεη Plutarch.

XII

Demosthenes *De falsa legatione* 254 ff.: Λέγε δὴ μοι λαβῶν
καὶ τὰ τοῦ Σόλωνος ἐλεγεία ταυτί, ἵν' ἴδῃθ' ὅτι καὶ Σόλων ἐμίσει
τοὺς οἴους οὗτος [*i.e.*, Aeschines] ἀνθρώπους . . .

ΕΛΕΓΕΙΑ

- XII Ἡμετέρῃ δὲ πόλις κατὰ μὲν Διὸς οὐπὸτ' ὀλεῖται
αἶσαν καὶ μακάρων θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων
τοίῃ γὰρ μεγάλθυμος ἐπίσκοπος ὀβριμοπάτρη
Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίῃ χεῖρας ὑπερθεν ἔχει
5 αὐτοὶ δὲ φθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν ἀφραδίῃσιν
ἀστοὶ βούλονται χρήμασι πειθόμενοι,
δήμου θ' ἡγεμόνων ἀδίκος νόος, οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον
ὑβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν·
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας
10 εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ.

πλουτοῦσιν δ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι
οὐθ' ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίῳ
φειδόμενοι κλέπτουσιν ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος,
οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ θέμεθλα Δίκης,
15 ἢ σιγῶσα σύννοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,
τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη.
τοῦτ' ἤδη πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἀφυκτον·
εἰς δὲ κακὴν ταχέως ἦλυθε δουλοσύνην,

XII

13. κλέπτουσιν ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇ: 'iure suspecta' Butcher (marks with daggers):
ἀφαρπαγῇ FBQYP. 14. θέμεθλα Δίκης Bergk: Δίκης θέμεθλα codd. 16. ἀποτει-
σομένη: ἀποτισομένη B corr.: ἀποτισαμένη codd. cett. 18. ἦλυθε: desperavit

XII

Read, if you please, these elegiac verses of Solon. You will see from them, gentlemen, that Solon, too, despised men of his sort :

“The ruin of our state will never come by the doom of Zeus or through the will of the blessed and immortal gods ; for Pallas Athena, valiant daughter of a valiant sire, is our stout-hearted guardian, and she holdeth over us her protecting arms. It is the townfolk themselves and their false-hearted leaders who would fain destroy our great city through wantonness and love of money. But they are destined to suffer sorely for their outrageous behavior. They know not how to hold in check their full-fed lust, or, content with the merriment the banquet affords, to take their pleasure soberly and in order. . . . They are rich because they yield to the temptation of dishonest courses. . . . They spare neither the treasures of the gods nor the property of the state, and steal like brigands one from another. They pay no heed to the unshaken rock of holy Justice, who, though she be silent, is aware of all that happeneth now or hath happened in the past, and, in course of time, surely cometh to demand retribution. Lo, even now there cometh upon the whole city a plague which none may escape. The people have come quickly into degrading bondage ; bondage rouseth from their sleep war and civil strife ; and war destroyeth many in the beauty of their youth. As if she were the prey of foreign foes, our beloved city is rapidly wasted and consumed in those secret conspiracies which are the delight of dishonest men. XII

“These are the evils which stalk at home. Meanwhile the poor and needy in great numbers are loaded with shameful bonds and sold into slavery in foreign lands. . . . Thus public calamity cometh to the house of every individual, and a man is no longer safe within the gates of his own court, which refuse him their protection. It leapeth over the garden-

ἢ στάσιμ ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ' εὐδοντ' ἐπεγείρει,
 20 ὃς πολλῶν ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίην·
 ἐκ γὰρ δυσμενέων ταχέως πολυήρατον ἄστν
 τρύχεται ἐν συνόδοις τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι φίλαις.
 ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά· τῶν δὲ πενιχρῶν
 ἰκνοῦνται πολλοὶ γαῖαν ἐς ἄλλοδαπὴν
 25 πρᾶθέντες δεσμοῖσί τ' ἀεικελίοισι δεθέντες.
 οὕτω δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ' ἐκάστῳ,
 αὐλαιοὶ δ' ἔτ' ἔχειν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι θύραι,
 ὑψηλὸν δ' ὑπὲρ ἔρκος ὑπέρθορον, εὔρε δὲ πάντως,
 εἰ καὶ τις φεύγων ἐν μυχῶ ἦ θανάμου.
 30 ταῦτα διδάξει θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει,
 ὡς κακὰ πλείστα πόλει δυσνομίη παρέχει,
 εὐνομίη δ' εὐκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια πάντ' ἀποφαίνει,
 καὶ θ' ἅμα τοῖς ἀδίκουσ' ἀμφιτίθησι πεδας·
 τραχέα λειαίνει, παύει κόρον, ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ,
 35 αὐαίνει δ' ἄτης ἀνθεα φύόμενα,
 εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιὰς, ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα
 πρᾶννει, παύει δ' ἔργα διχοστασίης,
 παύει δ' ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον, ἔστι δ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς
 πάντα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἄρτια καὶ πιυντά.

Ἄκουέτ' ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων οἷα
 Σόλων λέγει, καὶ περὶ τῶν θεῶν οὓς φησι τὴν πόλιν σφῆζειν.

Butcher ("fort. ἡγαγε — ἤλυθε ex 16 repetitum"). 19. ἐπεγείρει vulg.: ἐπεγείρειν BQ: ἐπαγείρειν FQ. 22. φίλαις Bergk: φίλοις QY: φίλους vulg. 28. πάντως correctum ex cod. Bodleiano: πάντας vulg. 29. καὶ anonymus in margine libri Lessingiani: γε codd. ἦ θανάμου Schneidewin: ἦ θανάμῳ vulg. 33. καὶ θ' ἅμα O. Schneider: καὶ θαμὰ Butcher.

wall, however high it be, and surely findeth him out, though he run and hide himself in the inmost corner of his chamber.

“These things my heart prompteth me to teach the Athenians, and to make them understand that lawlessness worketh more harm to the state than any other cause. But a law-abiding spirit createth order and harmony, and at the same time putteth chains upon evil-doers; it maketh rough things smooth, it checketh inordinate desires, it dimmeth the glare of wanton pride and withereth the budding bloom of wild delusion; it maketh crooked judgments straight and softeneth arrogant behavior; it stoppeth acts of sedition and stoppeth the anger of bitter strife. Under the reign of law, sanity and wisdom prevail ever among men.”

You hear, gentlemen of Athens, what Solon has to say about men of this kind, and about the gods, to whom, in his opinion, we owe the preservation of the state.

XIII-XIV

Diodorus Siculus ix 20 [Exc. Vat. p. 21]: λέγεται δὲ Σόλων
καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὴν ἐσομένην τυραννίδα δι' ἐλεγείων'

- XIII ἐκ νεφέλης πέλεται χιόνος μένος ἠδὲ χαλάζης,
βροντὴ δ' ἐκ λαμπρῆς γίγνεται ἀστεροπῆς·
ἀνδρῶν δ' ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὄλλυται, εἰς δὲ μονάρχου
δῆμος αἰδρεΐη δουλοσύνην ἔπεισεν·
5 λίην δ' ἐξάραντ' οὐ ράδιόν ἐστι κατασχεῖν
ὑστερον, ἀλλ' ἤδη χρῆ (περὶ) πάντα νοεῖν.

καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τυραννοῦντος ἔφη·

- XIV εἰ δὲ πεπόνθατε λυγρὰ δι' ὑμετέρην κακότητα,
μὴ θεοῖσιν τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμφέρετε·
αὐτοὶ γὰρ τούτους ηὔξησατε ῥύσια δόντες,
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κακὴν ἔσχετε δουλοσύνην.
5 ὑμέων δ' εἰς μὲν ἕκαστος ἀλώπεκος ἵχνεσι βαίνει,
σύμπασιν δ' ὑμῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος·
εἰς γὰρ γλῶσσαν ὀράτε καὶ εἰς ἔπος αἰόλον ἀνδρός,
εἰς ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν γιγνόμενον βλέπετε.

XIII

TESTIMONIA. — 1.2. Plutarch *Solon* iii 5. 1-4. Diogenes Laertius i 50; Apostolius vi 93 c. 3.4. Diodorus Siculus xix 1, 4.

1. πέλεται: φέρεται Diogenes Laertius, Apostolius. χαλάζης Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Apostolius: θαλάττης cod. Diodori. 3. δ': om. Diodorus xix 1, 4. εἰς . . . δουλοσύνην Diodorus xix 1, 4, Diogenes Laertius, Apostolius: ἐκ . . . δουλοσύνης cod. Diodori ix 20. μονάρχου: τυράννου Diodorus xix 1, 4. 4. αἰδρεΐη: αἰδρις ἑὼν Diogenes Laertius (ap. Bergk): αἰδρις ὦν Apostolius. 5. λίην Schneidewin: λείης cod. ἐξάραντ' οὐ Schneidewin: ἐξεραντα cod.: ἐξαρθέντ' οὐ Becker-Dindorf-Vogel (ex coniectura Schneidewini). 6. περὶ supplevit Dindorf.

XIII—XIV

It is said, furthermore, that Solon foretold to the Athenians the tyranny which was imminent, in the following elegiac verses:

“Out of the cloud come snow and hail in their fury, and the thunderbolt springeth from the lightning’s flash : so from great men ruin issueth upon the state, and the people through their own folly sink into slavery under a single lord. Having raised a man to too high a place, it is not easy later to hold him back : now is the time to be observant of all things.” XIII

Afterwards, when the tyranny was established, he said :

“If ye have suffered the melancholy consequences of your own incompetence, do not attribute this evil fortune to the gods. Ye have yourselves raised these men to power over you, and have reduced yourselves by this course to a wretched state of servitude. Each man among you, individually, walketh with the tread of a fox, but collectively ye are a set of simpletons. For ye look to the tongue and the play of a man’s speech and regard not the deed which is done before your eyes.” XIV

XIV

TESTIMONIA. — 1-8. Diogenes Laertius i 51 f. Nicetas Choniates *De rebus post captam urbem gestis* 772 (Migne *Patrologia Graeca* cxxxix 968). 1-4. Plutarch *Solon* xxx 6. 5-7. Plutarch *Solon* xxx 2. Clemens Alexandrinus *Stromata* I ii 23. 1.

1. λυγρὰ : δεινὰ Diogenes Laertius, Nicetas. 2. θεοῖσιν : τι θεοῖς Plutarch, Diogenes, Nicetas. τούτων Plutarch, Diogenes, Nicetas : ταύτην Diodorus, Becker-Dindorf-Vogel. μοῖραν : μῆνιν Plutarch. 3. ῥύσια Diogenes, Nicetas : ῥύματα Diodorus, Plutarch, Becker-Dindorf-Vogel. 4. τοῦτο : ταῦτα Plutarch, Diogenes, Nicetas. ἔσχετε : ἴσχετε Diogenes : ἔσχετε Nicetas. 5. μὲν : omisit Clemens. 6. χαῦνος Plutarch, Clemens : κοῦφος Diodorus, Becker-Dindorf-Vogel. 7. ἔπος αἰόλον : ἔπη αἰμύλου Plutarchus, Diogenes, Clemens : ἔπος αἰόλον Nicetas. Hic versus a Plutarcho ante distichum praecedentem positus est.

XV

Philo *De orificio mundi* 104: τὰς ἡλικίας ταύτας ἀνέγραψε
καὶ Σόλων ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων νομοθέτης ἐλεγεία ποιήσας τάδε:

- XV Παιῖς μὲν ἀνηβος ἔων ἔτι νήπιος ἔρκος ὀδόντων
φύσας ἐκβάλλει πρῶτον ἐν ἔπτ' ἔτεσιν
τοὺς δ' ἐτέρους ὅτε δὴ τελέση θεὸς ἔπτ' ἐνιαυτούς,
ἧβης ἐκφαίνει σήματα γιγνομένης·
5 τῇ τριτάτῃ δὲ γένειον ἀεξομένων ἔτι γυίων
λαχνούται, χροίης ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης·
τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἑβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος
ἰσχύν, ἦντ' ἄνδρες † σήματ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετῆς·
πέμπτη δ' ὄριον ἄνδρα γάμου μεμνημένον εἶναι
10 καὶ παίδων ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσω γενεήν·
τῇ δ' ἕκτη περὶ πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ἀνδρός,
οὐδ' ἔρδειν ἔθ' ὁμῶς ἔργ' ἀπάλαμνα θέλει·
ἑπτὰ δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλώσσαν ἐν ἑβδομάσιν μέγ' ἄριστος
ὀκτώ τ' ἀμφοτέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκ' ἔτη·
15 τῇ δ' ἐνάτῃ ἔτι μὲν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δ' αὐτοῦ
πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν γλώσσά τε καὶ σοφίῃ·
τὴν δεκάτην δ' εἴ τις τελέσας κατὰ μέτρον ἴκοιτο,
οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος ἔων μοῖραν ἔχοι θανάτου.

XV

TESTIMONIA. — Clemens Alexandrinus *Stromata* VI xvi 144, 4 ff. Apostolius xiv 94. Anatolius *περὶ δεκάδος* p. 37. Codex Parisinus 1843 ap. Cramer *Anecd. Graeca* i 46.

1. ἔτι: ἔστι Anatolius. 2. ἐν ἑπτ': ἑπτ' ἂν Cramer. 3. τελέση Schaefer: τελέση Philo (FG): τελέσει Philo (ceteri), Clemens, Apostolius, Anatolius, Cramer. 4. ἐκφαίνει: δὲ φαίνει Apostolius, Cramer: δὲ φανεύσης Clemens: δ' ἐφάνη Anatolius. σήματα: σπέρματα Clemens. γιγνομένης: γινομένης Apostolius, Anatolius: γεινομένης Cramer: γινομένων Clemens. 5. τριτάτῃ: τρίτῃ Cramer. γένειον: γένεια Apostolius: γένει Cramer: γόνιον Anatolius. ἀεξομένων: ἀεξόμενου Clemens: ἀιζομένων Anatolius. ἔτι Bergk: ἐπι Philo et testimonia omnia. γυίων: γυίων Anatolius, Cramer: γενύων Clemens. 6. λαχνούται χροίης: λάχρου τ' ἔχνη εἰς Anatolius. 7. πᾶς Clemens, Anatolius: παῖς Philo, Apostolius, Cramer. ἑβδομάδι μέγ' Clemens: ἑβδομάδεσιν Philo (FG), Cramer: ἑβδομά-

XV

These periods in human life are also recognized by Solon, the lawgiver of Athens, in the following elegiac verses :

“A boy, before he cometh to man's estate, and while he is still a child, getteth and loseth his rampart of teeth within the first seven years. When god bringeth the second seven to a close, the signs of budding manhood begin to show. In the third period, a downy beard appeareth, though the limbs have not reached their full growth, and the boyish bloom of the complexion fadeth. In the fourth period of seven years, every man is at the prime of his physical strength. . . . The fifth period is the season for a man to bethink him of marriage and seek offspring against the future. In the sixth, experience of every sort carrieth his mind on to perfection, and he feeleth no longer the same inclination to the wild pranks of youth. In the seventh seven, he is at his prime in mind and tongue, and also in the eighth, the two together making fourteen years. In the ninth period, though he still retaineth some force, he is feebler both in wisdom and in speech and faileth of great achievement. If a man attaineth to the full measure of the tenth period, the fate of death, if it come upon him, cometh not untimely.”

δεσιν Anatolius : ἐβδόμασιν Philo (AB), Apostolius : ἐβδομάδ' ἐστίν Brunck, Cohn. 8. ἦν τ' Clemens : ἦ τ' Philo (MHF¹G¹), Anatolius : ἦ τ' Philo (ABF²G²), Apostolius : οἷ τ' Philo (L) : ἦ τ' Cramer. σήματ' ἔχουσι : μετέχουσι Anatolius. 9. ὠριον : ὠρη Apostolius. 10. εἰσοπίσω Clemens : ἐξοπίσω Philo, Apostolius, Anatolius, Cramer, Cohn. 11. περὶ : κατὰ Cramer. καταρτύνεται : καταρτύνεται Clemens, Apostolius. 12. οὐδ' : ἐν δ' Cramer. ἔρδειν ἔθ' ὁμῶς : ἐσιδεῖν ἔθ' ὁμοίως Clemens. ἀπάλαμνα θέλει : ἀπάλαμν' ἐθέλει Apostolius : (ἔργα) μάταια θέλει Clemens : (ἔργα) ἀπάλαμνα Anatolius. 13. μέγ' ἀριστος : μετ' ἀρίστοις Apostolius, Cramer. 14. ὀκτώ τ' Mangey : ὀκτώ δ' Philo, Clemens, Apostolius, Cramer : εἰς ὀκτώ δ' Anatolius. ἀμφοτέρων Mangey : ἀμφότερα Philo, Apostolius :

ἀμφοτέρον Cramer : ἀμφο^{τρ} Anatolius. τέσσαρα καὶ δέκα : τεσσαρεκαίδεκα Cramer : τέσσαρες καὶ δεκα Anatolius. 15. μὲν : μὴν Philo (M), Cohn. μαλακώτερα : μετριώτερα Clemens : μαλακῶ^{τρ} Anatolius. 16. πρὸς : ἔστι πρὸς Anatolius. γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη : σῶμά τε καὶ δύναμις Clemens. τε : τὸ Anatolius. 17. τῇ δεκάτῃ δ' ὅτε δὴ τελέση θεὸς ἔπτ' ἑνιαυτούς Clemens. τὴν δεκάτην : τῇ δεκάτῃ Apostolius (vel τῇ δεκατῇ), Cramer. δ' εἴ τις : δὲ ὅστις Anatolius. 18. ἐὼν : ἔη Anatolius. ἔχει : ἔχει Clemens, Apostolius : ἔχων Anatolius.

XVI

Plutarch *Solon* ii 2: *πλούτων δ' οὐκ ἐθαύμαζεν* [sc. *ὁ Σόλων*],
ἀλλὰ καὶ φησιν ὁμοίως πλουτεῖν ᾧ τε

XVI

πολὺς ἄργυρός ἐστιν
καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ γῆς πυροφόρου πεδία
ἵπποι θ' ἡμίονοί τε, καὶ ᾧ μόνα ταῦτα πάρεστιν,
γαστρί τε καὶ πλευρῇ καὶ ποσὶν ἄβρὰ παθεῖν,
 5 *παιδὸς τ' ἠδὲ γυναικός, ἐπὴν καὶ ταῦτ' ἀφίκηται,*
ἦβη, σὺν δ' ὥρη γίγνεται ἁρμόδια.

XVI a

ταῦτ' ἄφενος θνητοῖσι· τὰ γὰρ περιώσια πάντα
χρήματ' ἔχων οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀίδεω,
οὐδ' ἂν ἄποινα διδοὺς θάνατον φύγοι οὐδὲ βαρείας
 10 *νούσους οὐδὲ κακὸν γῆρας ἐπερχόμενον.*

XVI

TESTIMONIUM. — Theognis 719-724 (quoted also by Stobaeus iv 33, 7).

1. *Ἴσόν τοι πλουτοῖσιν ὄτω* (ὅσοις Stobaeus) *πολὺς ἄργυρός ἐστιν* Theognis.
 3. *μόνα ταῦτα* : *τὰ δέοντα* Theognis (*τάδε πάντα* Stobaeus). 4. *πλευρῇ* : *πλευραῖς*
 Theognis. 5. *ἐπὴν καὶ ταῦτ'* : *ὅταν δέ κε τῶν* Theognis. 6. *ἦβη* I. M. L. : *ἦβη*
 Plutarch, Sintenis. *ἦβη σὺν δ' ὥρη* : *ἦβη σὺν δ' ὥρη* Plutarch, Sintenis : *ὥρη σὺν δ'*
ἦβη Theognis. *ἁρμόδια* Bergk : *ἁρμονία* Plutarch : *ἁρμόδια* Theognis (*ἁρμόδιον*
 Vatic. 915), Sintenis.

XVI a

TESTIMONIUM. — These four verses follow immediately after Solon xvi in Theognis and may be fairly regarded as part of Solon's poem. All ten verses are quoted by Stobaeus (iv 33, 7) under the name of Theognis.

8. *Ἀίδεω* : *αἰδην* Stobaeus.

XVI

He was never dazzled by riches. Indeed, he says that the riches of him who "hath much silver and gold, fields of wheat-bearing land, horses, and mules, are no greater than his whose only possessions are these : stomach, lungs, and feet that bring him joy, not pain ; the blooming charms, perhaps, of boy or maiden ; and an existence ever harmonious with the changing seasons of life." XVI

In these things is the true wealth of mortal men ; for no man, when he passeth to Hades' realm, carrieth with him all his vast hoard. No ransom that he can give enableth him to escape death or dire disease or the creeping evil of old age. XVI a

XVII-XIX

Plutarch *Solon* iii : ὅτι δ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν πενήτων μερίδι μάλλον ἢ τῇ τῶν πλουσίων ἔταπτε, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τούτων·

XVII πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται·
ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς' οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔμπεδον αἰεὶ,
χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

. . . ἔνιοι δὲ φασιν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχείρησεν ἐντείνας εἰς ἔπος ἐξευεγκεῖν, καὶ διαμνημονεύουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτως ἔχουσαν·

[XVIII] Πρῶτα μὲν εὐχόμεσθα Διὶ Κρονίδῃ βασιλῆι
θεσμοῖς τοῖσδε τύχην ἀγαθὴν καὶ κύδος ὀπάσσαι.

. . . ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀπλοῦς ἐστὶ λίαν καὶ ἀρχαῖος, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τούτων·

ἐκ νεφέλης πέλεται χιόνος μένος ἠδὲ χαλάζης·
βροντὴ δ' ἐκ λαμπρᾶς γίνεται ἀστεροπῆς.

XIX ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταρασσεται· ἦν δέ τις αὐτὴν
μὴ κινῆ, πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη.

XX

Plutarch *Solon* viii 2 : ἐλεγεία δὲ κρύφα συνθεῖς καὶ μελετήσας, ὥστε λέγειν ἀπὸ στόματος, ἐξεπήδησεν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἄφνω πιλίδιον περιθέμενος. ὄχλου δὲ πολλοῦ συνδραμόντος ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ κήρυκος λίθον ἐν ᾧδῃ διεξῆλθε τὴν ἐλεγείαν, ἧς ἐστὶν ἀρχή·

XX Αὐτὸς κήρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ' ἡμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος,
κόσμον ἐπέων ᾧδῆν ἀντ' ἀγορῆς θέμενος.

τοῦτο τὸ ποίημα Σαλαμῖς ἐπιγέγραπται καὶ στίχων ἑκατόν ἐστι, χαριέντως πάνυ πεποιημένον.

XVII

TESTIMONIA. — 1-4. Theognis 315-318. 2-4. Plutarch *De tranquillitate animi* 13, p. 472 c. Plutarch *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 6, p. 78 c.

XVII-XIX

That he rated himself a member of the class of persons in moderate circumstances rather than among the rich, is clear from the following :

“ Many undeserving men are rich, while their betters are poor. But we will not exchange what we are for what they have, since the one abideth while the other passeth from man to man.” XVII

. . . Some say that he attempted to write his laws in hexameter verse before publishing them, and these are given as the opening lines :

“ First pray we to King Zeus, son of Cronus, that he grant good luck and glory to these ordinances.” [XVIII]

. . . In scientific matters he held simple and old-fashioned views, as one may see from the following :

“ Out of the cloud come snow and hail in their fury, and the thunderbolt springeth from the lightning's flash.”

“ The sea is tossed by the winds : but if no wind stir it, it is of all things the most peaceable.” XIX

XX

He secretly composed a poem in elegiac verse. Then, after he had committed it to memory, he rushed out suddenly into the market place, with a small cap on his head, and when a great crowd had gathered, he mounted the herald's rostrum and chanted the poem which begins :

“ As my own herald have I come from beloved Salamis, to sing you a poem I have fashioned in lieu of a speech.” XX

This poem, which is one hundred lines long, is entitled “ Salamis,” and is a very beautiful composition.

Basilii Magni *Sermo de legendis libris gentilium* ii 177 (= vol. 31. p. 575 Migne). 2.3. Plutarch *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate* 11, p. 92 e.

1. γὰρ : τοι Theognis. 2. αυτοῖς : τούτοις Theognis.

XXI-XXII

Plutarch *Solon* xiv 5 f. : τούτων οὐδὲν ἐξέκρουσε τὸν Σόλωνα τῆς αὐτοῦ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους εἶπεν, ὡς λέγεται, καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα χωρίου, οὐκ ἔχειν δὲ ἀπόβασιν, πρὸς δὲ Φῶκον ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι γραφῶν

XXI

εἰ δὲ γῆς, φησίν, ἐφεισάμην
πατρίδος, τυραννίδος δὲ καὶ βίης ἀμειλίχου
οὐ καθηψάμην μιάνας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος,
οὐδὲν αἰδεῦμαι· πλέον γὰρ ᾧδε νικήσειν δοκέω
5 πάντας ἀνθρώπους

ᾧθεν εὐδηλον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῆς νομοθεσίας μεγάλην δόξαν εἶχεν. ἂ δὲ φυγόντος αὐτοῦ τὴν τυραννίδα πολλοὶ καταγελῶντες ἔλεγον, γέγραφεν οὕτως·

XXII

οὐκ ἔφην Σόλων βαθύφρων οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνὴρ·
ἔσθλα γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδέξατο·
περιβαλὼν δ' ἄγραν, ἀγασθεῖς οὐκ ἐπέσπασεν μέγα
δίκτυον, θυμοῦ θ' ἀμαρτῆ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλεῖς.
5 ἤθελον γὰρ κεν κρατήσας, πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβῶν
καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηνῶν μόνον ἡμέραν μίαν,
ἀσκὸς ὕστερον δεδάρθαι κάπιτετριῖθαι γένος.

ταῦτα τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ φαύλους περὶ αὐτοῦ πεποίηκε λέγοντας.

XXIII

Plutarch *Solon* xxv 5 :

XXIII

ἔργμασι γὰρ ἐν μεγάλοις πᾶσιν ἀδεῖν χαλεπόν,
ὡς αὐτὸς εἶρηκε.

XXII

5. ἤθελον Xylander : ἤθελεν Plutarch, Sintenis. 7. ἀσκὸς Bergk (ex codicibus quibusdam a Sintenis neglectis) : αὐτὸς codices plurimi, Sintenis.

XXI-XXII

None of these things shook Solon from his resolution. He remarked to his friends, as the story goes, that the tyrant's seat is a fine place, but that there is no way down from it; among his poems there is one addressed to Phocus, in which he says :

“If I spared my fatherland and did not lay hold upon a despotism of harshness and force, staining and defiling my reputation thereby, I feel no shame for that. I believe that in this way I shall so much the more show my superiority over other men.” XXI

This passage shows clearly that he enjoyed considerable distinction even before the adoption of his laws. When he turned his back on the tyranny, many people ridiculed him in language whose tone he has preserved in the following lines, which he puts into the mouth of one of his critics :

“Solon is not gifted with wisdom and sagacity. God put good things into his hands, but he failed to grasp them. He cast his net and caught his fish, but, in his wonder and delight, he did not draw it in : both his courage and his wit were unequal to the occasion. If I could seize the power, acquire vast wealth, and be lord of Athens for but a single day, I would give my body to be flayed for a wineskin and consent to the annihilation of my race.” XXII

This is the opinion which, in Solon's own poem, the ignorant majority is supposed to express concerning him.

XXIII

For, as he says himself, “in great undertakings it is difficult to please all.” XXIII

XXIV-XXV

Plutarch *Solon* xxvi: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀφίκετο καὶ διέτριψεν, ὡς αὐτὸς φησι,

XXIV Νειλου ἐπὶ προχοῇσι Κανωβίδος ἐγγύθεν ἀκτῆς.

. . . καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ μέμνηται τοῦ συνοικισμοῦ [sc. τοῦ τῶν Σόλων τῶν ἐν Κύπρῳ]: προσαγορεύσας γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐλεγείαις τὸν Φιλόκουπρον

XXV

[ἀνάσσω]
 νῦν δέ, φησί, σὺ μὲν Σολίοισι πολλὸν χρόνον ἐνθάδ'
 τήνδε πόλιν ναίεις καὶ γένος ὑμῖτερον·
 αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ ξὺν νηὶ θεῶν κλεινῆς ἀπὸ νήσου
 ἀσκηθῆ πέμπτοι Κύπρου ἰσοστέφανος·
 5 οἰκισμῷ δ' ἐπὶ τῷδε χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάξοι
 ἔσθλόν καὶ νόστον πατρίδ' ἐς ἡμετέρην.

XXVI

Plutarch *Comparison of Solon and Publicola* i 4: ἔτι τοίνυν οἷς πρὸς Μίμνερνον ἀντιπῶν περὶ χρόνου ζωῆς ἐπιπεφώνηκε,

XXVI

μηδέ μοι ἄκλαυστος θάνατος μόλοι, ἀλλὰ φίλοισιν
 καλλείπομι θανὼν ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς,

εὐδαίμονα τὸν Ποπλικόλαν ἄνδρα ποιεῖ.

XXV

TESTIMONIUM. — 1-4. *Vita Arati* (Westermann, p. 53).

XXVI

TESTIMONIA. — Stobaeus IV liv (περὶ πένθους) 3. Cicero *Tusculanae Disputationes* i 49, 117 (a Latin translation of the couplet).

2. καλλείπομι Stobaeus, Cicero (*linquamus*): ποιήσομαι Plutarch, Sintenis.

XXIV-XXV

First he went to Egypt and spent some time (to borrow his own words) "at the outpouring of the Nile, hard by the Canobic shore." XXIV

. . . He mentions the consolidation* himself in the elegiac poem addressed to Philocyprus, in which he says :

"Now mayest thou reign long over the people of Soli, and may their city long be the dwelling-place of thee and of thy race. And may Cypris of the violet crown carry me in a swift ship unscathed from the illustrious isle, shedding upon these habitations glory and honor, and granting to me safe return to my native land." XXV

XXVI

Furthermore, the lines which form a part of the reply which he addressed to Mimmernus concerning the duration of human life — "May my death come not unlamented, and may I leave to my friends when I die a heritage of grief and tears" — argue that Publicola was a happy man. XXVI

* *I.e.*, of the city of Soli in Cyprus.

XXVII-XXVIII

Plutarch *Amatorius* 751 c: ὁ Δαφναῖος 'εὐ γε νῆ Δί'' ἔφη 'τοῦ Σόλωνος ἐμνήσθης καὶ χρηστέον αὐτῷ γνώμονι τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ ἀνδρός,

XXVII

ἔσθ' ἤβης ἐρατοῖσιν ἐπ' ἄνθεσι παιδοφιλήσῃ
μηρῶν ἱμείρων καὶ γλυκεροῦ στόματος.

. . . ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ ὁ Σόλων ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἔγραψε νέος ὧν ἔτι καὶ 'σπέρματος πολλοῦ μεστός' ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησί· ταυτὶ δὲ πρὸς βύτης γενόμενος, —

XXVIII

ἔργα δὲ Κυπρογενοῦς νῦν μοι φίλα καὶ Διονύσου
καὶ Μουσέων, ἃ τίθησ' ἀνδράσιν εὐφροσύνας, —

ὥσπερ ἐκ ζάλης καὶ χειμῶνος καὶ τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρώτων ἔν τιτι γαλήνῃ τῇ περὶ γάμον καὶ φιλοσοφίαν θέμενος τὸν βίον . . .'

XXIX

Pollux *Onomasticon* x 103: καὶ ἴγδι δὲ αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν θυεῖαν] κεκλήκασι Σόλων τε ἐν τοῖς ἰάμβοις λέγων,

XXIX

σπεύδουσι δ' οἱ μὲν ἴγδι, οἱ δὲ σίλφιον,
οἱ δ' ὄξος,

καὶ ἔτι σαφέστερον 'Ἀντιφάνης κτλ.

XXVII

TESTIMONIA. — 2. Athenaeus xiii 602 e. Apuleius *De magia* 9.

XXVIII

TESTIMONIA. — Plutarch *Solon* xxxi 3. Plutarch *Septem sapientum convivium* 13, 155 f. Hermiae Alexandrini in *Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, p. 38 (Couvreur) (= p. 78 Ast). *Volumina Herculeana* xi 52 (vid. Gomperz, *Wiener Studien* ii 7 f.).

1. Κυπρογενοῦς: ΚΥΠΡΟΤΕΧ . . . *Vol. Herculan.* 2. τίθησ': τίθησιν Hermias.

XXIX

1. σπεύδουσι δ' Casaubon: πευσίδ' Dindorf (MSS. reported by Bergk thus: πευσίδ' vulgo, C: σπευσίδα B: σπευδ' A).

XXVII-XXVIII

“Your allusion to Solon,” said Daphnaeus, “is entirely apropos. He may be taken as an authority on amorous men. You recall the lines :

‘While, in the fair garden of youth, one is stirred by the love of boys, burning with desire for sweet lips and rounded limbs.’ XXVII

. . . For this reason I believe that Solon wrote the verses which I have just quoted when he was still quite young and, as Plato says, ‘teeming with life.’ These others he must have produced in his later years :

‘In the works of Dionysus and the Muses and of her who was born in Cyprus now is my delight, for they bring men joy and cheer.’ XXVIII

He had escaped from the surge and tempest of the love which men feel for boys and brought his life into the still waters of wedlock and philosophy . . .”

XXIX

It [*i.e.*, a mortar] is also called *ἵγδισ* by Solon, who says in his iambics—

“Some are devoted to reels, some to highly flavored dishes, and some to sour wine”— XXIX

and still more clearly by Antiphanes, etc.

XXX

Phrynichus the Grammarian *Ecloga* ccelxxiv: καὶ γὰρ πῖντος τὸ ἐκκεκοκισμένον ἔτι καὶ νῦν κόκκωνα λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρθῶς. καὶ γὰρ Σόλων ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι οὕτω χρῆται, —

XXX κόκκωνας ἄλλος, ἄτερος δὲ σήσαμα.

XXXI

Clement of Alexandria *Stromata* V xii 81, 1: σοφώτατα τοίνυν γέγραπται τῷ Σόλωνι ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ·

XXXI γνωμοσύνης δ' ἀφανὲς χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι νοῆσαι μέτρον, ὃ δὴ πάντων πείρατα μῶνον ἔχει.

XXXII

Clement of Alexandria *Stromata* V xiv 129, 6: εἰκότως ἄρα Σόλων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν ταῖς ἐλεγείαις, καὶ αὐτὸς κατακολουθήσας Ἡσιόδῳ,

XXXII πάντη δ' ἀθανάτων ἀφανῆς νόος ἀνθρώποισιν, γράφει.

XXXIII

Athenaeus *Deipnosophistae* xiv 645f: ΓΟΥΡΟΣ ὅτι πλακοῦντος εἶδος ὁ Σόλων ἐν τοῖς Ἰάμβοις φησὶν·

XXXIII πίνουσι καὶ τρώγουσιν οἱ μὲν ἴτρια, οἱ δ' ἄρτον αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ συμμεμιγμένους γούρους φακοῖσι· κείθι δ' οὔτε πεμμάτων ἄπεστιν οὐδέν, ἄσσα τ' ἀνθρώποισι γῆ
5 φέρει μέλαινα, πάντα δ' ἀφθόνως πάρα.

XXXI

TESTIMONIUM. — Theodoretus i 73.

2. πάντων: πάντα Theodoretus.

XXX

The kernel which is extracted from a pine-cone is still called *κόκκων* by most people, correctly; for Solon uses the word so in his poems:

“Pomegranate-seeds one, and another sesame.”

XXX

XXXI

Very profound, therefore, is the following observation of Solon concerning God:

“Difficult indeed is it to conceive the inscrutable measure of his wisdom, within which alone abideth the power to bring all things to fulfillment.”

XXXI

XXXII

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Athenian poet Solon, too, should say in one of his elegiac poems, following Hesiod:

“At every turn the mind of the immortals is hid from men.”

XXXII

XXXIII

That a *gouros* is a sort of flat cake is apparent from the following iambic lines by Solon:

“They drink their wine, and with it they nibble *itria*, or *artos*, or *gouroi* mixed with lentils. There one finds no lack of sweetmeats or of all the other good things which the black earth bears for men: everything is at hand in abundance.”

XXXIII

XXXII

TESTIMONIUM. — Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* xiii 688 c.

πάντη: πάμπαν Eusebius.

XXXIII

4. *οὐδέν, ἄσσα τ'* Ahrens: *οὐδ' ἐνασσειν* MSS., Kaibel (*οὐδέν ἄσσ ἄν* VL, according to Bergk).

XXXIV-XXXV

Diogenes Laertius i 47 : ἦν δὲ τὰ ἐλεγεία τὰ μάλιστα καθαψάμενα τῶν Ἀθηναίων τάδε·

XXXIV εἶην δὴ τότε ἐγὼ Φολεγάνδριος ἢ Σικινίτης
ἀντί γ' Ἀθηναίου, πατρίδ' ἀμειψάμενος·
αἶψα γὰρ ἂν φάτις ἦδε μετ' ἀνθρώποισι γένοιτο
Ἄττικὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ τῶν Σαλαμιναφετῶν.

εἶτα·

XXXV ἴομεν εἰς Σαλαμῖνα, μαχησόμενοι περὶ νήσου
ἱμερτῆς χαλεπὸν τ' αἰσχος ἀπωσόμενοι.

XXXVI

Diogenes Laertius i 49 : καὶ ἡ βουλή, Πεισιστρατίδαι ὄντες, μαίνεσθαι ἔλεγον αὐτόν· ὅθεν εἶπε ταυτί·

XXXVI δείξει δὴ μάνην μὲν ἐμὴν βαιὸς χρόνος ἀστοῖς,
δείξει ἀληθείης ἐς μέσον ἐρχομένης.

XXXVII-XXXVIII

Diogenes Laertius i 60 f. : φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ Μιμνέρνου γράψαντος,

Αὐτὸν γὰρ ἄτερ νόσων τε καὶ ἀργαλέων μελεδωνέων
ἐξηκουταέτη μοῖρα κίχου θανάτου,

ἐπιτιμῶντα αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν·

XXXVII ἀλλ' εἴ μοι κἂν νῦν ἔτι πείσειαι, ἔξελε τοῦτο,
μηδὲ μέγαιρ' ὅτι σευ τοῖον ἐπεφρασάμην,

XXXIV

TESTIMONIUM. — 1.2. Plutarch *Præcepta gerendae republicae* 17, 813 f.
4. Σαλαμιναφετῶν Is. Vossius et Hermann : Σαλαμῖν ἀφέντων vulg. : Σαλαμῖν' ἀφέντων Stephani codd.

XXXIV-XXXV

The elegiac verses which most stirred the feelings of the Athenians were as follows :

“Then may I change my fatherland and become a native of Pholegandros or Sicinos instead of an Athenian. For I should soon be hearing men say : ‘He is of Attica, one of those who gave up Salamis !’” XXXIV

And again :

“Let us go to Salamis and fight for the island of our hearts and rid ourselves of the bitter shame.” XXXV

XXXVI

The council, which was composed of partisans of Pisistratus, said that he was mad ; whereupon he spoke as follows :

“This madness of mine a little time will reveal to the men of the city in its true meaning, when the truth itself cometh out into the open.” XXXVI

XXXVII-XXXVIII

This story also is told of him. Mimmernus had said in one of his poems :

“May it be my lot to live a life untroubled by illness and anxiety and to die in my sixtieth year.”

XXXV

TESTIMONIA. — Apostolius ix 6 b. Arsenius xxxi 52. Schol. Demosthenes *De falsa legatione* 251 (ed. Dindorf, vol. viii, p. 438).

2. τ' : omisit Schol. Demosthenes. ἀπώσόμενοι : ἀπώσάμενοι Apostolius, Arsenius, Schol. Demosthenes.

XXXVII

1. τούτο BF¹ : τούτων PF², Cobet, Diels (sc. στήχον). 2. τοίων MSS. : λῶφον

καὶ μεταποιήσου, Λιγναστάδη, ὦδε δ' ἄειδε·
ὀγδωκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου.

τῶν δὲ ἄδομένων αὐτοῦ ἐστι τάδε·

[XXXVIII]

Πεφυλαγμένος ἄνδρα ἕκαστον ὄρα
μὴ κρυπτὸν ἔγχος ἔχων κραδίῃ
φαιδρῶ προσενέπη προσώπῳ,
γλώσσα δέ οἱ διχόμυθος ἐκ
5 μελαίνης φρενὸς γεγωνῆ.

XXXIX

Proclus *On the Timaeus* 25 f: ἡ μὲν ἱστορία ἢ κατὰ τὸ Σόλωνος γένος καὶ τὴν Πλάτωνος πρὸς αὐτὸν συγγένειαν τοιαύτη τίς ἐστίν· Ἐξηκεστίδου παῖδες ἐγένοντο Σόλων καὶ Δρωπίδης, καὶ Δρωπίδου μὲν Κριτίας, οὗ μνημονεύει καὶ Σόλων ἐν τῇ ποιήσει λέγων·

XXXIX

εἰπέμεναι Κριτίῃ ξανθότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν·
οὐ γὰρ ἀμαρτινώω πείσεται ἡγεμόνι·

Κριτίου δὲ Κάλλαισχος καὶ Γλαύκων, Καλλαίσχου δὲ ἀδ Κριτίας οὗτος.

XXXVII

Bergk, Cobet. 3. Λιγναστάδη Bergk ex Suida: ναιγιασταδη B: αγιασταδι P¹: αἰγιασταδι F.

XXXVIII

2. ἔγχος MSS.: ἔχθος Cobet ("Casaubonus Menagiusque coni." — Hübner).
5. μελαίνης: μελανῆς Cobet.

XXXIX

TESTIMONIA. — 1.2. Schol. Plato *Timaeus* 20 e. 1. Aristotle *Rhetoric* i 15, 1375 b.

1. εἰπέμεναι: εἰπεῖν μοι Aristotle. ξανθότριχι: πυρρότριχι Aristotle.

Whereupon Solon rebuked him in the following lines :

“ But if even now thou wilt be persuaded by me, strike this out and take no offense because I find matter in thee to criticize. XXXVII
Change thy poem, thou seion of sweet song, and let the strain run thus : ‘ May it be my lot to die in my eightieth year.’ ”

Among his lyrics is the following :

“ Watch, with caution, every man, lest he have a sword [XXXVIII]
hidden in his heart while he speaketh to thee with glad countenance, and lest out of a black soul his tongue utter words of double meaning.”

XXXIX

The prevailing view concerning the family of Solon and his relationship to Plato is substantially as follows. Excecestides had two sons, Solon and Dropides ; and Dropides' son was Critias, whom Solon himself mentions in the poem containing the verses :

“ Say to Critias of the golden locks that he should hearken to his father ; if he follow *his* advice, he will find him no lack-brained guide.” XXXIX

The sons of Critias were Callaeschrus and Glauco, and finally Callaeschrus' son was the Critias of the present passage.

XL

Stobaeus *Elogiae* iii 9 (περὶ δικαιοσύνης), 23 : Σόλωνος.

XL

- Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζητὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,
 Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλυτὲ μοι εὐχομένῳ·
 ὄλβον μοι πρὸς θεῶν μακάρων δότε καὶ πρὸς ἀπάντων
 ἀνθρώπων αἰεὶ δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθὴν,
 5 εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοισ', ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρὸν,
 τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν.
 χρήματα δ' ἰμείρω μὲν ἔχειν, ἀδίκως δὲ πεπᾶσθαι
 οὐκ ἐθέλω· πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη.
 πλοῦτον δ' ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρὶ
 10 ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος εἰς κορυφήν·
 ὃν δ' ἄνδρες μαίωνται ὑφ' ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
 ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκοισ' ἔργμασι πειθόμενος
 οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται· ταχέως δ' ἀναμίσγεται ἄτη·
 ἀρχὴ δ' ἐξ ὀλίγου γίγνεται ὥστε πυρός,
 15 φλαύρη μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνηρῆ δὲ τελευτᾷ·
 οὐ γὰρ δὴν θνητοῖς ὕβριος ἔργα πέλει.
 ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος, ἐξαπίνης δὲ
 ὥστ' ἄνεμος νεφέλας αἶψα διεσκέδασεν
 ἠρινός, ὃς πόντου πολυκύμονος ἀτρυγέτιο
 20 πυθμένα κινήσας, γῆν κατά πυροφόρον
 δηώσας καλὰ ἔργα, θεῶν ἔδος αἰπὺν ἰκάνει
 οὐρανόν, αἰθρίην δ' αὔτις ἔθηκεν ἰδεῖν·

XL

TESTIMONIA. — 1. Clement of Alexandria *Strom.* VI ii 11, 2. 7.8. Plutarch *Solon* ii 3; *Comp. Sol. and Publ.* i 5. 65–70. Theognis 585–590; Stobaeus iv 47 (περὶ τῶν παρ' ἐλπίδα), 16 (the verses are here assigned to Theognis); Boissonade *Anecd. Graeca* vol. 4, p. 455. 71–76. Theognis 227–232. 71. Aristotle *Politics* i 8, 1256 b, 34; Plutarch *De cupiditate divitiarum* 4, 524 e; Basilius Magnus *Sermo de legendis libris gentilium* 183.

11. μαίωνται I.M.L.: τιμῶσιν S M⁴A, Hense. 13. ἄτη A²: ἀτη other

XL

O ye fair children of Memory and Olympian Zeus, ye Muses XL
of Pieria, hear me as I pray. Grant, that I may be blessed with prosperity by the gods, and that among all men I may ever enjoy fair fame; that I may be as a sweet savor to my friends and a bitterness in the mouth of my enemies, by the ones respected, by the others feared. Wealth I do indeed desire, but ill-gotten wealth I will not have: punishment therefor surely cometh with time. Wealth which the gods give, cometh to a man as an abiding possession, solid from the lowest foundation to the top; but that which is sought with presumptuous disregard of right and wrong, cometh not in the due course of nature. It yieldeth to the persuasion of dishonest practices and followeth against its will; and soon there is joined thereto blind folly which leadeth to destruction. Like fire, it taketh its beginning from small things; but, though insignificant at first, it endeth in ruin. For the works of unprincipled men do not continue long. Zeus watcheth all things to the end. Often, in the spring season, a wind riseth suddenly and disperseth the clouds, and, stirring up the depths of the surging, barren sea, and laying waste the fair works of the husbandman over the surface of the corn-bearing earth, cometh to the lofty habitation of the gods in heaven and bringeth the blue sky once more to view; the sun shineth forth in his beauty over the fertile earth, and clouds are no longer to be seen. Like such a sudden wind is the justice of Zeus. He is not, like mortal men, quick to wrath for each offense; but no man who hath an evil heart ever escapeth his watchful eye, and surely, in the end, his justice is made manifest. One man payeth his penalty early, another late. If the guilty man himself escape and the fate of the gods come not upon him and overtake him not, it cometh full surely in aftertime: the innocent pay for his offense — his children or his children's children in later generations.

λάμπει δ' ἠελίοιο μένος κατὰ πίοια γαῖαν
 καλόν, ἀτὰρ νεφέων οὐδὲν ἔτ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν·
 25 τοιαύτη Ζητὸς πέλεται τίσις, οὐδ' ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ,
 ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ, γίγνεται ὀξύχολος·
 αἰὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέληθε διαμπερές ὅστις ἀλιτρὸν
 θυμὸν ἔχει, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη·
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτίκ' ἔτεισεν, ὁ δ' ὕστερον· οἱ δὲ φύγωσιν
 30 αἰτοὶ μηδὲ θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιούσα κίχη,
 ἧλυθε πάντως αὐτίς· ἀναίτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν
 ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω.
 θνητοὶ δ' ὦδε νοεῦμεν, ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε,
 ἐντείων αὐτὸς δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχειν,
 35 πρὶν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ' αὐτίκ' ὀδύρεται ἄχρι δὲ τούτου
 χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα.
 χῶστις μὲν νοῦσοισιν ὑπ' ἀργαλέησι πιεσθῆ,
 ὡς ὑγιῆς ἔσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο·
 ἄλλος δειλὸς ἐὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ,
 40 καὶ καλός, μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων.
 εἰ δέ τις ἀχρήμων, πενήτης δέ μιν ἔργα βιᾶται,
 κτήσεσθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ.
 σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος· ὁ μὲν κατὰ πόντον ἀλάται
 ἐν νηυσὶν χρήζων οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγειν
 45 ἰχθυόεντ', ἀνέμοισι φορεύμενος ἀργαλείοισιν,
 φειδωλὴν ψυχῆς οὐδεμίαν θέμενος·
 ἄλλος γῆν τέμνων πολυδύδρεον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
 λατρεύει, τοῖσιν καμπύλ' ἄροτρα μελεῖ·

MSS., Hense. 27. οὐ ἐ Hermann, Hense; οὔτε S. 31. αὐτίς Brunck, Hense; αὐτίκ' S. 32. ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω correction by second hand in cod. Par. 1985, Hense: ἠγευδύων ὀπίσω S. 34. ἐντείων I. M. L.: ἐν δηνην S¹: ἐν δην ἦν S², Tr., Voss: ἐν δηνην Hense. ἔχειν I. M. L.: ἔχει MSS., Hense. 35. αὐτίκ' Bamberger, Hense: αὐτίς S. 42. κτήσεσθαι Bergk, Hense: κτήσασθαι S. πάντως conjecture in margin of Gesner¹, Hense: πάντων S. 48. τοῖσιν: τοίοις S. μέλει

Thus all we men of mortal mold, good alike and bad, think, by straining every nerve, to win a fair name, each man for himself by his own unaided efforts, until something befall him from without : then straightway cometh pain. Till then like gaping fools we amuse ourselves with empty dreams. He who is worn by cruel disease pondereth ever how one day he will be whole ; another, who is a coward, thinketh himself brave ; another still counteth himself handsome, though he have no beauty of body ; if one be penniless and subject to the toils of poverty, he assureth himself that he will sometime win great riches.

One man seeketh wealth from one source, another from another. This one wandereth in ships over the fishy deep in his eagerness to bring home a profit, the sport of the cruel winds, staking his life ungrudgingly. Another, whose labor is with the curved plow, cleaveth the fertile soil, drudging the year round like a slave. Another learneth the arts of Athena and skillful Hephaestus and gathereth a livelihood by the work of his two hands. Another, trained by the grace of the Olympian Muses, understandeth to the full the sweet art of minstrelsy. Another hath been endowed by the Lord Apollo, who worketh from afar, with the gift of prophecy ; and, if the gods attend upon his ways, he discerneth, while it is still far off, the evil which approacheth his fellow. But it is sure that neither bird nor sacrificial victim will avert what Fate ordains. Others are physicians and practice the craft of Paeon, who knoweth many drugs. But no success crowneth their work : often great suffering groweth out of a little pain, and none can bring relief by administering soothing drugs ; often, again, one who is overcome by cruel disease may be straightway restored to health merely by the touch of a hand.

Destiny bringeth to mankind both good and evil, and the gifts which come from the immortal gods are not to be refused. Danger, we may be sure, followeth all the works of men, and none knoweth, at its beginning, which way an undertaking will

ἄλλος Ἀθηναίης τε καὶ Ἡφαίστου πολυτέχνεω
 50 ἔργα δαεὶς χειροῖν ξυλλέγεται βίοντον,
 ἄλλος Ὀλυμπιάδων Μουσέων πάρα δῶρα διδαχθεῖς,
 ἱμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος·
 ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων,
 ἔγνω δ' ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον,
 55 ᾧ συνομαρτήσωσι θεοὶ τὰ δὲ μόρσιμα πάντως
 οὔτε τις οἰωνὸς ρύσεται οὔθ' ἱερά·
 ἄλλοι Παιῶνος πολυφαρμάκου ἔργον ἔχοντες
 ἱητροί· καὶ τοῖσ' οὐδὲν ἔπεστι τέλος·
 πολλάκι δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης ὀδύνης μέγα γίγνεται ἄλγος,
 60 κοῦκ ἂν τις λύσαιτ' ἥπια φάρμακα δούς·
 τὸν δὲ κακαῖς νούσοισι κυκώμενον ἀργαλαῖς τε
 ἀψάμενος χειροῖν αἴψα τίθησ' ὑγιή·
 μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν·
 δῶρα δ' ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων.
 65 πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν,
 ἧ μέλλει σχήσειν, χρήματος ἀρχομένου·
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
 εἰς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν,
 τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν
 70 συντυχήην ἀγαθὴν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.
 πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται·
 οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον,
 διπλασίως σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας·
 κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖσ' ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι·
 75 ἄτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὀπότεν Ζεὺς
 πέμψη τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

conjecture in margin of Gesner¹, Hense : μένει S. 50. ἔργα δαεὶς cod. Par. 1985²,
 Hense : ἔργαλα εἰς S, Frob. : ἔργαλα εἰν Tr. : ἔργαλαεὶς Voss. 51. Μουσέων Brunck,

turn. One man, though he is trying to acquit himself well, falleth unaware into great and dire misfortune. Another, who playeth his part ill, is blessed with good luck by the gods and granted release from his folly.

No visible limit is set to wealth among men. Even now those among us who have the largest fortune are striving with redoubled energy. What abundance of riches could satisfy us all? Increase of goods cometh to mortals by the gift of the gods. But out of it appeareth the madness which leadeth to destruction, and when Zeus sendeth this madness as a punishment to men, it lighteth first upon one and then upon another.

Hense: Μουσάων S. 65. *πᾶσι δέ: πᾶσιν* Theognis, Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. *οἶδεν: οἶδε* Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. 66. *ἦ or ᾗ* S, Tr.: *τί* Voss: *πῆ or ποῖ* Theognis, Stobaeus iv: *ποῖ* Boissonade. *μέλλει σχήσειν: σχήσειν μέλλει* Theognis, Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. *χρήματος: πρήγματος* Theognis, Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. 67. *εὐ ἔρδειν: εὐδοκμεῖν* Theognis, Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. 69. *κακῶς* S¹: *καλῶς* S², Tr., Voss, Theognis, Hense: *καλῶν* Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. *ἐρδοντι: ποιῶντι* Theognis: *ποιῶντι* Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. *περὶ: καλὰ* Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. *δίδωσιν: τίθησιν* Theognis: *τίθησι* Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. 70. *ἀγαθὴν: ἀγαθῶν* Stobaeus iv, Boissonade. *ἐκλυσιν: ἐκδυσιν* Stobaeus (SA), Boissonade. 71. *ἀνδράσι κείται: ἀνθρώποισι (ν)* Theognis, Plutarch. 72. *ἡμέων: ἡμῶν* Theognis. 73. *διπλασίως: διπλάσιον* Theognis. 74. *κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὤπασαν ἀθάνατοι: χρήματά τρι θνητοῖς γίνεται ἀφροσύνη* Theognis. 75. *αὐτῶν: αὐτῆς* Theognis. *ὅπταν: ὅποτε* Theognis. 76. *τεισομένην: τισομένην* S, Hense ('*recitius ei*', he says): *τειρομένοις* Theognis. *ἄλλοτε* Theognis: *ἄλλοτέ τ* S (one inferior MS. has *ἄλλοτ' ἂν ἄλλος ἔχει*): *ἄλλοτεν* Hense.

XLI

Stobaeus *Eclōgiae* iv 34 (περὶ τοῦ βίου ὅτι βραχὺς κτλ), 23 :
Σόλωνος.

- XLI οὐδὲ μάκαρς οὐδεὶς πέλεται βροτός, ἀλλὰ πόνηροι
πάντες, ὅσους θνητοὺς ἡέλιος καθορᾶ.

XLII

Choricus ἐγκώμιον εἰς Μαρκιανὸν ἐπίσκοπον Γάζης, Λόγος β'
(ed. Boissonade, p. 107): γῆ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν ἐπίσταται
φέρειν ὅσα τίκτουσιν ὄραι, ὑπτία τε πᾶσα καὶ καθειμένη, καὶ, τὸ τοῦ
Σόλωνος,

- XLII λιπαρὴ κουροτρόφος.

XLIII

Photius, s. v.

- XLIII κιγχάνειν· τὸ ἐπεξιέναι· οὕτως Σόλων.

XLIV

Photius, s. v.

- XLIV ῥοῦν· τὸ ἡδυσμα· Σόλων.

XLV

Diogenianus ii 99 :

- XLV Ἄρχων ἄκουε καὶ δικαίως κἀδίκως :
ἐκ τῶν τοῦ Σόλωνος ἐλεγείων παραινετική.

XLVI

Schol. [Plato] *de iusto* 374 a: Ἄλλὰ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ ἢ
παλαιὰ παροιμία ἔχει, ὅτι πολλὰ ψεύδονται αἰδοῖ.] παροιμία,
ὅτι

- XLVI πολλὰ ψεύδονται αἰδοῖ.
. . . ἐμνήσθη ταύτης καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν Ἀτθίδος α' καὶ Σόλων
'Ἐλεγείαις καὶ Πλάτων ἐνταῦθα.

XLI

1. μάκαρς Stephanus; μάκαρ MSS., Hense. πόνηροι Grotius, Hense: πονηροι
(without accent) S: πονηροὶ M Δ Tr.

XLI

Perfect bliss is a state denied to mortal men ; wretched are all they upon whom the sun looks down. XLI

XLII

The land skilleth to bear for them who dwell therein all that the seasons yield, sloping gently down, with smooth, wide-stretching lawns, and, as Solon hath it, "an abundant nurse of children." XLII

XLIV

ῥοῦν : the seasoning. Solon. XLIV

XLV

"Obey the magistrates whether their commands be just or unjust" : a hortatory proverb from Solon's elegiacs. XLV

XLVI

But the old proverb is a sound one, you know, Socrates, that bards are guilty of many falsehoods.] Proverb: "Bards are guilty of many falsehoods." . . . It is quoted by Philochorus in his *History of Attica*, Bk. i, by Solon in one of his elegiac poems, and by Plato here. XLVI

XLV

TESTIMONIA. — Apostolius iv 3. Arsenius v 69. Kramer (qui incerti auctoris collectionem proverbiorum Vaticanam ipsius manu descriptam ad Scheidewinum misit) ii 32.

¹Ἀρχῶν Apostolius, Arsenius, Kramer : Ἀρχῶν Diogenianus. καὶ δίκαιως καὶ δίκως : κἂν δίκη κἂν μὴ δίκη.

XLVI

TESTIMONIA. — Aristotle *Metaphysica* i 2, 983 a, 2. Plutarch *Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat* 2, 16 b. Gregorius Cyprius, *Cod. Mosq.* v 100, 2. Macarius vii 19. Apostolius xiv 41.

THE FRAGMENTS OF SOLON'S POEMS

II. COMMENTARY

I

This line was often quoted, as may be seen from the number of Testimonia, and, like other famous sayings, often incorrectly. The sentiment, with explicit reference to Solon, recurs in two other passages of Plato, besides the one in which it is directly quoted. In the *Laches* (188 ab) Nicias expresses his opinion that the observance of Solon's principle, like the Socratic dialectic, tends to keep a man's mind alert: old age alone will not bring wisdom. Again, in 189 a, Laches accepts the truth of Solon's words, but he desires a slight amendment: γηράσκων πολλά διδάσκεσθαι ἐθέλω ὑπὸ χρηστῶν μόνον. Socrates himself, in the *Republic* (vii 536 d), denies the truth of the words: Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλά δυνατὸς μαθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἦττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι. Dio Chrysostom (xviii 254 M) evidently had the words in mind when he said: καὶ γὰρ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ ἄριστοι οὐ μόνον ἀκμάζειν μαθάνοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γηράσκειν ἔφασαν. Cicero (*De Senectute* 8, 26) puts an allusion to the saying into the mouth of the elder Cato: "ut et Solonem versibus gloriantem videmus, qui se cotidie aliquid addiscentem dicit senem fieri, et ego feci, qui litteras Graecas senex didici." Valerius Maximus (viii 7, 14) borrows Cicero's translation with a slight variation.

διδασκόμενος, which is paraphrased twice in Plato by μαθάνειν and in Cicero by *addiscentem*, is used as in Tyrtaeus xi 27 διδασκέσθω πολεμίζειν; Soph. *Ant.* 356 ἀστυνόμους ὀργὰς ἐδιδάξατο, and *Phil.* 1387 διδάσκον μὴ θρασύνεσθαι κακοῖς. The middle voice of this verb more commonly means "to provide for the teaching of another."

II

The mistake referred to by Socrates (ψεῦδεθ' ὁ ποιητής) would lie in saying that a man is happy by virtue of possessing things which are not dear to him. This quotation persuades Menexenus that things which are incapable of returning love may still be dear. Jowett, in his translation of Plato, has misunderstood the passage and mistranslated the couplet. His translation

runs as follows: "Or shall we say that they do love them, although they are not beloved by them; and that the poet was wrong who sings, 'Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single hoofs, and dogs of the chase, and the stranger of another land.'" This makes nonsense of the verses: a man is happy, not because he is fond of children and horses and dogs, but because he possesses them. But it is clear that both Socrates and Menexenus think the verses both reasonable and true. It is hard to discover what relation Jowett perceives between the quotation and Socrates' rather whimsical argument; and the matter is made still more puzzling by his mistranslation of the phrase *οὐ μέντοι φίλα ὄντα*, "although they are not beloved by them." This translation begs the question: we do not know whether *τὰ φίλα* is equivalent to *τὰ φιλοῦντα*.

A correct understanding of the passage must be based upon three observations: (1) *τὸ φίλον* is a *tertium quid*, not identical with either *τὸ φιλοῦν* or *τὸ φιλούμενον*; (2) *ἀλλά* shows that the quotation is intended to give the positive aspect of the negative in *οὐ μέντοι φίλα ὄντα*, "these things are *not* dear, *but* the reverse of what the poet claims for them"; (3) *φίλοι* in the first line of the couplet can be naturally taken only as an attribute and not as a predicate.

Hermias definitely attributes the couplet to Solon; but he takes it in an erotic sense: *ὡς καλοῦ τοῦ ἐρᾶν μνημονεύει λέγων ὄλβιος ᾧ παῖδες κτλ.* Lucian quotes the first line with a slight change which gives it a distinctly erotic turn: *ᾧ παῖδες νέοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι.* But in the *Lysis* there seems to be no erotic implication; indeed, the reference which Socrates makes to the love of parents for their babies seems to indicate that *παῖδες φίλοι* means a man's own children. But where did the erotic notion first come from? In the second book of *Theognis*, among his other erotic verses, we find the following (1253-6):

"Ὀλβιος, ᾧ παῖδες τε φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι
 Θηρευταί τε κύνες καὶ ξένοι ἀλλοδαποί.
 "Ὅστις μὴ παῖδάς τε φιλεῖ καὶ μώνυχας ἵππους
 Καὶ κύνας, οὗ ποτέ οἱ θυμὸς ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ.

Here the second couplet makes it certain that *φίλοι* in the first couplet must be taken as predicate and that *παῖδες* are not the happy man's own children. In both of these points *Theognis'* understanding of the words differs from

what may on a fair analysis be regarded as Plato's understanding of them. What is the explanation? Theognis saw the possibility of a *double entendre* in Solon's lines, and, to bring out the vulgar sense, wrote a neat couplet of his own and tacked it on to Solon's lines to make a quatrain, slurring everything in the line but *παῖδες* and *φίλοι* in order to make his joke by means of a syntactical pun. Even in this passage in Theognis, T. Hudson Williams (in his commentary) insists that *φίλοι* is at first naturally taken as an attribute, and that it is the second couplet which gives the syntax an unexpected twist. But I cannot agree with him that in Plato's quotation also *φίλοι* is to be taken as predicate.

Heindorf's note is as follows: "Videlicet ut exeat sententia, quam Solon ne somniavit quidem, versuum horum structuram, neglecto plane sermonis usu, hanc statuit: Ὀλβιος ᾗ παῖδες τε εἰσὶ φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι εἰσὶ φίλοι etc. Cuiusmodi interpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in *Alcibiad.* ii 147 d, antiqui certi auctoris, licet non Platonis, libro." Ast (*Platons Leben und Schriften*, Leipzig, 1816, p. 432) speaks of the "unerträgliche sophistische Verdrehung der so verständlichen Solonischen Verse." Stallbaum says: "Recte vero Heindorf observavit praeter mentem ipsius poetae *φίλοι* etiam ad *ἵπποι* et *κύνες* referri. . . . Talia ingeniosi vel protervi lusus exempla in Platonis sermonibus multa inveniuntur, ut miremur Astium l. c. p. 432 in ea re haesisse."

The verses could hardly have been taken in the sense advocated by Steindorf without some protest from Menexenus or some indication of the perversity. Furthermore, this construction of the verses is not necessary for Socrates' argument, as has been shown. He is reminded of the line by his own words *φίλιπποι* and *φιλόκυνες* and quotes it as something universally believed. If a novel construction was to be put on the quotation in order to make a point in the argument, we should certainly have been given some warning.

2. *κύνες ἀγρευταί*: the commoner word (which is used by Theognis) is *θηρευταί*, which appears in Hom. *Il.* xi 325 *κυσὶ θηρευτῆσι*, and xii 41 *κύνεσσι καὶ ἀνδράσι θηρευτῆσι*. *ἀγρευτής* is not used by Homer or Aeschylus. Sophocles (*Oed. Col.* 1091) has *τὸν ἀγρευτᾶν Ἀπόλλω*. In *Anth. Pal.* vii 171 *ἀγρευτὰ κάλαμοι* means a hunter's trap of reeds.

2. *ξένος ἀλλοδαπός*: *ἀλλοδαπός* more commonly means a foreigner in a foreign land. Here it is a man who, though he is at home, is a foreigner

from the point of view of the writer. Cf. Hom. *Il.* iii 48 *μυχθεὶς ἀλλοδαποῖσι* (of Paris' sojourn among strangers in Sparta), and xix 324 (said by Achilles) *ὁ δ' ἀλλοδαπῶ ἐνὶ δῆμῳ | εἶνεκα ῥιγεδανῆς Ἑλένης Τρωσὶν πολεμίζω.*

III — XI

References: Bergk (1860, 1881); Croiset (1903); Crusius (1891); Fracca-
roli (1893); Haupt (1859); Hiller (1883, 1886, 1888); Hude (1891); Jebb (1897);
Keil (1892); Larsen (1900); Leutsch (1872); Ludwich (1903); Lugebil (1884);
Murray (1889); Niemeyer (1891); Piccolomini (1892); Platt (1896, 1898);
Richards (1893); Sitzler (1879, 1894, 1897, 1900, 1907); Stadtmüller (1882);
Wilamowitz (1893, 1902); Wilcken (1895); *Class. Rev.* (1891).

III — V

These three fragments are probably from the same poem, or at any rate from the same group of poems, in which Solon gave expression to his views concerning the causes of the desperate conditions in Athens, which he later tried to remedy during his archonship. Possibly VII belongs to this group, as well as XII and XVIII. For the historical circumstances, see pages 40 ff. Crusius thinks that V is to be taken closely with III: "intellego res Atheniensium dilabentes aspiciens omnium malorum quasi radices esse avaritiam et superbiam." This is unlikely because, according to Aristotle, Solon says that he *fears* these things. It is a mere guess without any real support.

III

There is a slight anacoluthon in these lines: the participle *ἔσορῶν* is attached in sense to *καί μοι φρενὸς ἔνδοθεν ἄλγεια κείται*; in construction to *γιγνώσκω*, which fixes the subject of the sentence as the first person. The turn which the sentence takes sets off *γιγνώσκω* and gives it a certain solemnity as of a warning or a threat.

1. *ἄλγεια κείται*: cf. Hom. *Il.* xxiv 522 *ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ κατ' ἄρ' ἕξει ἐπὶ θρόνου, ἄλγεια δ' ἔμπης | ἐν θυμῷ κατακείσθαι ἑάσομεν ἀχνύμενοί περ.*

2. Thucydides (i 2 and 12) speaks of Athens as the mother-state of the Ionians in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands. In Homer also (*Il.* xiii 685) the Athenians are called *Ἰάονες*. Cf. Keil (1892, p. 39, footnote 1): "Die Worte dieser Elegie . . . sind übrigens eine recht erhebliche Instanz gegen die Annahme, dass die Athener erst im 5. Jahrh. infolge des

Bundesreiches die ionische Dodekapolis als ἀποικία Athens beansprucht hatten. So alt wie die μητρόπολις kann keine ἀποικία sein; sie ist die *πρεσβυτάτη*."

3. γαῖαν . . . κλινομένην: a rather violent figure to express the decline of the fortunes of a state; "urbs inclinari potest," says Blass, "non terra item." But he himself compares Aesch. *Pers.* 929 f., Ἀσία δὲ χθῶν . . . ἐπὶ γόνυ κέκλιται.

IV

In these lines Solon has the quality of μεγαλοφροσύνη in mind. The rich and successful persons in the state are men who form large plans and have the ability to carry them through (μέγαν νόον), who are energetic and aggressive (καρτερόν ἦτορ). Such persons are admirable except when they exercise no restraint over their powers.

1. ἡσυχάσαντες: this verb, normally intransitive, is transitive in this tense alone, says Sandys, comparing Plato *Rep.* 572 a: ἡσυχάσας μὲν τῶ δύο εἶδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας.

2. Cf. Tyrtaeus xi 10 (Bergk) ἀμφοτέρων δ' εἰς κόρον ἠλάσατε; Her. ii 124 ἐς πᾶσαν κακότητα ἐλάσας.

3. ἐν μετρίοισι τίθεσθε μέγαν νόον: there seems to be no exact parallel to this. The general sense is clear, but it is by no means certain what should be done with τίθεσθε. (1) It may be used in its fundamental sense, "put," "place," "put your mind in moderate affairs," i.e., "confine your mind, etc." The figure, however, seems rather violent. (2) It may have a suggestion of the idiom πόλεμον τίθεσθαι, the emphasis being upon μέγαν. Cf. Plat. *Menex.* 243 e τὸν τε πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἐλευσίῃ πόλεμον ὡς μετρίως ἔθεντο. "In temperate ways calm the tumult of your ambition." But neither of these parallels is decisive for the interpretation of the present passage.

4. ἄρτια: a favorite word with Solon; found also in vii 4, xii 32, 39. It appears to have a meaning something like that of ὑγιής in its figurative senses.

V

If Plutarch (*Sol.* xiv 2) is thinking of the same poem from which Aristotle is quoting, his words would imply that Solon had already been thinking of the office of dictator before composing the poem and that he was personally

afraid of the rich. Aristotle seems to think he was afraid of the rich as persons dangerous to the public welfare. Aristotle uses the quotation as proof that Solon blamed the rich entirely for the civil disorder; Plutarch thinks it is an indication of Solon's reluctance to accept the office. Aristotle takes both *φιλαργυρίαν* and *ὑπερηφανίαν* as qualities of the rich; Plutarch accuses the rich of *φιλοχρηματίαν* and the poor of *ὑπερηφανίαν*. In this probably Aristotle is right, because Solon recognized the *ὑπερηφανίαν* of the lower classes only after his legislation had been adopted. On this fragment, see Wilamowitz (1893, I, 303, footnote 22).

VI

This fragment belongs to one of the group of apologetic poems composed after the archonship. For the circumstances see pages 91 ff.

1. *γέρας*: properly a special privilege conferred upon a king or a noble: Hom. *Od.* vii 150 *γέρας θ' ὅ τι δῆμος ἔδωκεν*; Thuc. i 13 *πρότερον δ' ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι*. Solon speaks of the rights of the people as a *γέρας* bestowed by the lawgiver. *τιμὴ* in the next line means practically the same thing. Both words are used collectively.

2. *ἐπορεύμενος*: the active appears in Hom. *Il.* v 225 *εἴ περ ἂν αὐτε | Ζεὺς ἐπὶ Τυδείδῃ Διομήδῃ κῦδος ὀρέξῃ*; the middle commonly means "stretch out towards," "reach for."

4. The infinitive with *ἐφρασάμην* in the sense of "plan" or "contrive" is found also in Hom. *Il.* ix 347 *ἀλλ', Ὀδυσσεύ, σὺν σοί τε καὶ ἄλλοισιν βασιλεῦσι | φραζέσθω νήεσσιν ἀλεξέμεναι δῆϊον πῦρ*. The commoner construction is *ὅπως* with the future indicative.

5. Solon's figure is a little vague. He represents himself as offering to both parties the protection of the same shield. This could only be protection against outsiders. But what Solon evidently intends to express is that his laws are for the common service of both parties and make it impossible for either one to take an unfair advantage of the other. There is no thought of danger from the outside, but true harmony within the state is best displayed by presenting a united front to external aggression.

VII

These lines might have been written either before or after the archonship. But the fact that they are quoted by Aristotle in immediate connection with

vi and viii, which unquestionably were composed after the archonship, makes it likely that they too belong to the later group. Besides, they seem to have been written at a time when Solon was no longer disposed to hold the rich responsible for all that was wrong. The passage is an indication of astonishing moderation in the popular reformer. Previously the leaders of the state had forced the people to do their will; it would have been natural for the reformer to go to the other extreme and give the people undue power, but Solon here points out the danger of putting unlimited power in irresponsible hands.

2. That Solon felt the first of these two warnings to be rather more important than the other is shown by the trend of the next two lines.

3 f. This idea, in the same or similar words, may have been proverbial even before Solon, as it surely was afterward (see the passage in Clement referred to in the Testimonia). The scholiast on Pindar, in quoting the line, refers it to Homer. Diogenes Laertius (i 59) quotes, among the apophthegms attributed to Solon, the following: *καὶ τὸν μὲν κόρον ὑπὸ τοῦ πλοῦτου γενῶσθαι, τὴν δὲ ὕβριν ὑπὸ τοῦ κόρου.*

4. *ἄρτιος*: see note on iv 4. *ὅσοις νόος ἄρτιος ἦ = τοῖς ἀπίφροσιν = τοῖς σώφροσιν.*

VIII

These trochaics and the two other trochaic fragments, xxi and xxii, may belong to the same poem. They are all in defense of Solon's refusal to deal with the political situation in a more high-handed and arbitrary manner.

1. *ἔφ' ἀρπαγῇ συνῆλθον*: for *ἔφ' ἀρπαγῇ* cf. xii 13; Her. i 68 *ἐπὶ κακῶ*; iv 164 *ἐπὶ διαφθορῇ*. The plural, *ἔφ' ἀρπαγαῖς*, which is probably the reading of the papyrus, is not satisfactory. For *συνῆλθον*, cf. *ξυνήγαγον* in ix 1; both verbs seem to refer to some united action on the part of the common people under the leadership of Solon.

1. Bucherer says: "*ἀφνεάν*, reiche Hoffnung, d. h. Hoffnung auf Reichthum." This is surely wrong.

3. *κωτίλλοντα λείως*: cf. Theogn. 852 *ὃς τὸν ἑταῖρον | μαλθακὰ κωτίλλων ἐξαπατᾶν ἐθέλει.*

5. *λόξον ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀρῶσι*: cf. Anacreon 79 (Bergk) *πῶλε Θρηκίη, τί δή με λόξον ὄμμασιν βλέπουσα | νηλεῶς φεύγεις, δοκεῖς δέ μ' οὐδὲν εἰδέναι σοφόν*;

IX

For the subject of this poem see p. 114 f. It is possible that ix, x, and xi all belong to the same poem.

In 1880 two sheets of papyrus were discovered, containing, on both sides of both sheets, what are now known to be four fragments of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*. These sheets are now in Berlin. One of the four pages contains the greater part of the present poem, as it was already known from the oration of Aristides. There was some uncertainty at first in identifying the four fragments, and it is not necessary now, since the discovery of the London papyrus, to recall the philological ingenuity which was displayed in the criticism of these slight forerunners. One observation made by Bergk, however, should not be overlooked. Writing in 1881, he expressed the opinion that in so condensed a work as the *Constitution of Athens* Aristotle would not have given a whole page to a citation from Solon's poems, and that the citation must have been introduced by a later reader in support of Aristotle's statements. This opinion is not disproved by the fact that the same citation appears in the London papyrus, but it is rendered more improbable. Perhaps it would be more reasonable to infer that Aristotle set an extraordinarily high value on Solon's poems as historical documents, since he was willing to include so many extracts from them in so brief a work.

In the translation of the words of Aristotle which are introductory to ix, I have employed Professor Perrin's happy rendering of *σεισάχθεια*, "disburdenment," for which I express obligation.

1 f. These two lines have been a battle ground of conjecture. The chief difficulty lies in the last word of vs. 1, where the reading of the papyrus is not absolutely certain. Kenyon read *ἀξονήλατον*; Blass, *ξ[υ]νήγαγον*; Wilcken (1895) says *ξυνήγαγον* is "unzweifelhaft." Buchholtz-Peppmüller adopt the reading of Wilamowitz-Kaibel's second edition of the *Constitution of Athens*, though the latter editors did not retain it in their third edition :

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν εἴνεκ' ἀξονηλατῶν
 δῆμόν τι τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν, ἐπασάμην,
 συμμαρτυροίη κτλ.

The best defense of this is given by Wilamowitz (1893, II, 310): "Weswegen ich, als ich den wagen des staates lenkte, aufgehört habe, ehe der demos etwas hiervon bekam, das soll mir vor dem richterstuhle der ewigkeit die mutter Erde bezeugen;" to which is added in a footnote, "Der aufbau der gedanken wird durch die paraphrase deutlich; ἀξονηλατεῖν wird nicht bezweifeln, wer κέντρον λαβών am schlusse dieser gedankenreihe 20 beachtet."

Since it is now generally admitted that ἀξονήλατον is not the actual reading of the papyrus, it seems hardly reasonable to maintain unnecessarily in the text a reading like ἀξονηλατῶν which manifestly is now no better than a conjectural emendation. The verb does not, I believe, exist elsewhere. Furthermore, Jebb points out that the first two verses probably do not belong to the same sentence as συμμαρτυροῖη, because Aristides begins his quotation with συμμαρτυροῖη.

Hiller-Crusius adopt a suggestion of Wessely which ingeniously combines the figure of the chariot with the sounder reading:

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκ' ἄξον' ἤγαγον,
δῆμόν τι τοῦτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην.

It will be observed that the change from οὐνεκα ξινήγαγον to Wessely's reading involves a change of only one letter, the one given doubtfully by Blass as υ.

Crusius' translation is as follows: "Ego vero earum rerum quarum causa currum mihi vexerant priusquam aliquid plebs adepta esset, iugum retinui." This becomes properly intelligible only if we suppose, with Crusius, that the thought in the lines which immediately preceded vs. 1 of the present fragment ran as follows: "Etiam in aliis urbibus fuere qui plebem e miseria et servitute servarent, sed iidem rerum potiti optimates e terra eiecerunt atque, quo magis vulgus novae rerum condicioni addictum esset, bona et praedia exulum sectatoribus distribuerunt."

The difficulties in this reading are: (1) It is not clear what Wessely takes as subject of ἤγαγον. That it is to be regarded as a third person plural is clear from Crusius' translation *vexerant*. But who are these persons, the plebs or the optimates? Furthermore, what does the phrase really mean? So far as I know, it is unparalleled. (2) It is very uncertain what is to be proved by the testimony of Mother Earth. Crusius says: "συμμαρτυροῖη

κτλ. cum versibus l. 2 non tam apte coniuncta esse, sed ad universum poematii exordium spectare crediderim." This is an entirely safe opinion since we know nothing of the exordium of the poem; but it does not seem likely that Aristotle would have made so mutilated a quotation as such a supposition would involve.

Blass prints the two lines as follows:

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξ[υ]νήγαγον
 δῆμον, τί; τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;

This form of question, implying the answer "No," fits the context admirably; and the testimony of the earth is very naturally invoked to prove that Solon had not stopped with his work undone. But I cannot venture to accept the rhetorical τί, which though Blass supports it by Dem. xx 160, seems to me to have little probability.

The reading that I have adopted is the same as that given by Sandys in his edition of the *Constitution of Athens*. The question propounded in the two lines is supposed to have been asked by some critical opponent of Solon's policy; Solon states the question in half indirect form; then, instead of answering directly, he invites the attention of his critic to the real accomplishments of his administration. "You ask me why I did not finish my task. I cannot tell you why I did *not* finish, because I maintain that I did." Sitzler recognizes this as the most probable reading and interpretation of the passage.

Many emendations have been proposed, in almost every syllable of the two lines, most of which may be found in Sitzler (1894).

1. ἐγὼ δέ: it is of course impossible to say what the antitheton to ἐγὼ was. When a man is surrounded by opponents as Solon was, there were many opportunities for antithesis. Crusius supposes that the contrast was between Solon and the popular reformers in other states, which is merely an unsupported guess.

1. τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον δῆμον: this first element of an antithesis is resumed in vss. 15-17, ταῦτα μὲν . . . ἔρεξα καὶ διήλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην and the contrast appears in vs. 18, θεσμοὺς δ' ὁμοίως κτλ. The arbitrary measures for popular relief were extra-legal and preceded the establishment of the Solonian constitution.

1 f. ξυνήγαγον δῆμον: Sandys offers two interpretations for this phrase:

"I formed the popular party, or (less probably) gathered the people into one (by healing the divisions which separated the various orders in the state)." Undoubtedly the former is right. Cf. *συνήλθον* in viii l. Platt quotes aptly Aristotle *Pol.* iii, 1285 b: *διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρῶτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγίνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριον* (referring to the monarchy in the heroic age).

2. The question in this line is supposed to be repeated by Solon after one of his critical opponents who was dissatisfied with his policy. *τί*, "why," is to be construed with *ἐπαισάμην* and *τούτων* with *τυχεῖν*. Bucherer's interpretation is manifestly impossible: "Bevor ich welches von den Zielen, derentwegen ich das Volk um mich scharte, erreicht hatte, hörte ich auf?"

3. *συνμαρτυροῖη*: "in addition to my own arguments in justification of myself, I appeal also to the corroborative testimony of the earth"—the italicized words show the force of *συν*-. Xenophon may have had this passage in mind when he wrote *Hell.* iii 3, 2 *συνεμαρτύρησε δὲ ταῦτ' αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ ἀληθέστατος λεγόμενος χρόνος εἶναι* (quoted by Sandlys).

3. *ταῦτα*: the truth about the matters raised by your question.

3. *ἐν δίκη χρόνον*: several attempts have been made to amend this phrase, but there is no need of altering it. The figure is not impossible for Solon. The virtue of Solon's policy will not be appreciated until some time has elapsed to watch its operation; therefore time sits in judgment and renders a just verdict. The "bar of history" is a slightly different conception. Peppmüller compares Pindar frag. 159 (Bergk) *ἀνδρῶν δικαίων χρόνος σωτήρ ἄριστος*, and Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 614 *χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος*. To which Jebb (on *Oed. Tyr.* loc. cit.) adds Pindar *Ol.* x 53 ὄ τ' ἐξέλεγχων μόνος ἀλάθειαν ἐτήτυμον χρόνος. Cf. also the passage from Xenophon just quoted.

4. The genitive *δαιμόνων* is taken more naturally with *μήτηρ* than with *μεγίστη*. Schneidewin reads *Κρόνου* for *χρόνον* in vs. 3 and punctuates as follows: *Κρόνου μήτηρ, μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων, ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα*. But *χρόνον* is not to be rejected, and *without Κρόνον*, the comma after *μήτηρ* is certainly impossible.

4 ff. Here, as elsewhere, *Ge* is not thought of as the personality of the whole round earth, but is the earth as conceived by a resident of Attica.

The stone tablets set in the soil of Attica had enslaved Earth herself. A very interesting expression of the same sentiment is found in Plato *Laws* 740 a (quoted by Sandys): δεῖ τὸν λαχόντα τὴν λήξιν ταύτην νομίζειν μὲν κοινὴν αὐτῆν τῆς πόλεως ξυμπάσης, πατρίδος δὲ οὐσίας τῆς χάρας θεραπεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ μειζόνως ἢ μητέρα παῖδας, τῷ καὶ δέσποιναν θεὸν αὐτὴν οὖσαν θνητῶν ὄντων γεγονέναι.

4. The phrase μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων is a curious one for several reasons: the use of the superlative μεγίστη with μήτηρ is somewhat illogical, though exactly parallel to the epistolary "My dearest mother"; Ge is not often spoken of as the mother of the gods; she is never, so far as I know, called the mother of the Olympians.

In Hesiod's theoretical cosmogony (*Theog.* 116 ff.), she is represented as the mother, not only of the gods, but of all things living; and in the following passages also, she appears as the mother of the gods: *Hom. Hymn* xxx (εἰς Γῆν μητέρα πάντων) 1 f. Γαῖαν παμμήτειριν αἰείσομαι ἠΰθ' ἐμεθλον | πρεσβίστην, ἣ φέρβει ἐ.ὶ χλοὴν πάνθ' ὅπως ἔστιν; 17 χεῖρε, θεῶν μητῆρ, ἄλλοχ' Οὐρανοῦ ἀπτερόεντος. *Eur. frag. Chrysiirr.* 836 Γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς Αἰθῆρ, ὁ μὲν ἀνδράπων καὶ θεῶν γενέτωρ, ἣ δ' ὕγροβόλους σταγόνις νοτιάς παραδέξαμένη τῖκτει θνητοῦς, τῖκτει δὲ βορὰν φῦλά τε θηρῶν ὅθ' οὐκ ἀδίκως μήτηρ πάντων νενόμισται. "Die Göttermutter ist für Solon die Erde, dem alten Glauben und Kulte gemäss; die Gleichsetzung dieser hellenischen μήτηρ θεῶν mit der phrygischen Kybele, der *μητέρα mater*, hat er noch nicht gekannt. Die Person ist ihm aber von ihrem Elemente noch durchaus nicht getrennt: wenn er aus der μήτηρ μεγίστη Hypothekensteine zieht, ist das keine künstliche Redefigur, wie bei römischen Dichtern, sondern die Erde, in der die Steine stecken, ist wirklich der Leib der Göttin, die ja die Seele dieser Erde ist" (Wilamowitz).

6 f. Plutarch (*Sol.* xv 5) introduces his quotation of these two lines with these words: σεμνύνεται γὰρ Σόλων ἐν τοῦτοις ὅτι τῆς τε προῦποκειμένης γῆς ὄρουσ ἀνέλε κτλ., "for Solon boasts, in his poems, of having removed the stone tablets from the land which had previously been mortgaged."

6. For ὄρουσ, see pp. 62 f.

8. The change from the conception of Mother Earth in vss. 4-7 to that of the fatherland in the present verse is no less striking than the same change in the Platonic passage quoted on vs. 4 above.

8. Cf. *Soph. Electr.* 707 Ἀθηρῶν τῶν θεοδμήτων.

9. Cf. xii 23 ff.

9. ἐκδίκως and δικάως are here used with reminiscence of the primitive meaning of δίκη, the custom of the community. They mean, therefore, "legally" and "illegally," not "deservedly" and "undeservedly." Solon does not express an opinion through these words concerning the absolute justice or injustice of selling men into slavery for debt.

10 f. Cf. Hom. *Il.* viii 56 f. μέμασαν δὲ καὶ ὧς ὑσμῖνι μάχεσθαι, | χρειωὶ ἀναγκαίῃ, πρό τε παίδων καὶ πρὸ γυναικῶν. "Inde Ionisimus," says Blass.

11 ff. Plutarch introduces his quotation of vss. 11-14 as follows: καὶ τῶν ἀγωγίμων πρὸς ἀργύριον γεγονότων πολιτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀνήγαγεν ἀπὸ ξένης κτλ., "of the citizens who had been enslaved for debt, some he brought back from abroad, etc."

12. ὡς ἂν πολλαχῆ πλανωμένους: "a thing which might well happen in the case of persons who had traveled much;" cf. Lucian *Charon* 1, 488 δειξίεις ἕκαστα ὡς ἂν εἰδὼς ἅπαντα, and Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 4 πρίσθαι . . . ὡς ἂν δεόμενος.

14. ἤθη δεσποτῶν τρομευμένους: these words describe a condition which would appear especially deplorable to the mind of Solon whose guiding principle was that human rights and human liberty should be safeguarded by just and impartial laws.

15. ταῦτα μὲν resumes the antithesis instituted in vs. 1 τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον, which is complete in vs. 18 with θεσμοὺς δέ. See note on vs. 1.

16. βίην τε καὶ δίκην: βίην repeats the idea of κράτει, and the line is an apology of the lawgiver for resorting to force at all; ordinarily a thing done βία is not done δίκη, but Solon had united the two antagonistic principles, and since he acted in accordance with justice, he could not be blamed if he used force at the same time.

17. The same assertion is made in viii 6.

17. διήλθον: "I finished my course." Bergk said that διήλθον can only be a synonym of ἔρεξα and that this is a meaning foreign to the word; he therefore read διήνυσ'. But διήλθον need not be a synonym of ἔρεξα. In the sentence ταῦτα μὲν κράτει . . . ἔρεξα, κράτει contains the important idea; the method of his achievement, rather than the achievement itself, is emphasized. But ἔρεξα, standing at the beginning of its line, wins a secondary emphasis for the idea of thoroughness in achievement, which is then made more explicit by the words διήλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμεν. ἔρεξα and διήλθον are not

a pair of synonyms. *ἔρεξα* is transitive, *διήλθον* intransitive; and there is a slight pause after *ἔρεξα*.

18. *θεσμούς*: Andocides (*de myst.* 81) calls the laws of Draco *θεσμούς* and those of Solon *νόμους* (*χρησθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις καὶ Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς*). In Aristotle *Const. of Athens* iv 1 we find *Δράκων τοὺς θεσμούς ἔθηκεν*; and Aelian (*V. H.* viii 10) says the laws of Draco were called *θεσμοί*. But Solon uses the word *θεσμούς* of his own laws, not only here, but even in one of the laws attributed to him (*Plut. Sol.* xix 3 *ὅτε θεσμὸς ἐφάνη ὄδε*). In the common Greek usage, *θεσμοί* were ancient laws which were supposed to be sanctioned by the gods.

18. *τῷ κακῷ τε κἀγαθῷ*: manifestly the difference between the two classes is social and political, not moral. Such language is natural in the mouth of a Tory like Theognis, but sounds strange when coming from an impartial lawgiver like Solon. But the use is common enough in Greek, and it is sufficient to quote Hom. *Od.* iv 64 *ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν γένος ἔσπε διοτρεφένω βασιλῆων | σκηπτούχων, ἐπεὶ οὐ κε κακοὶ τοιούσδε τέκονεν*; and Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 1063 *σὺ μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' ἔαν τρίτης ἐγὼ | μητρὸς φανῶ τριδουλος ἐκφανεῖ κακή*; 1397 *νῦν γὰρ κακός τ' ὦν κάκ κακῶν εὐρίσκομαι*.

19. *εἰθέϊαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἀρμόσας δίκην*: there is something Sophoclean in the intricate suggestiveness of this line, which uses old phrases in new ways. The key to the correct interpretation is to be found in the political change from unconstitutional oligarchy to constitutional democracy. In Hesiod (*W. and D.* 225, 226) we find the operation of the former type of government: *οἷ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν | ἰθείας καὶ μὴ τι παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίον, | τοῖσι τέθλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθεύσιν ἐν αὐτῇ*.

In such a polity as this, all disputes are brought before the *βασιλεῖς* who judge them on their merits (*δίκας ἰθείας* — or *σκολιάς* — *διδόουσιν*). Now when Solon came to write this present line, he was confronted by a new political condition: disputes were now to be settled, not by the personal decision of a magistrate, but in accordance with the written law. He had to write, therefore, not *εἰθείας δίκας*, but *εἰθέϊαν δίκην*, not “just decisions,” but “impartial justice.” Solon, being a legislator and not a judge, substitutes the abstract singular *δίκην* for the concrete plural *δίκας*. Very good; but what verb can he use with *εἰθέϊαν δίκην* in this new sense? The *βασιλεῖς* gave decisions: what did Solon do? He created a flexible instrument which could be trusted to provide just decisions on all occasions for all kinds of

people. So with a flash of literary skill, he uses the word *ἀρμόσας* to indicate the adaptability of the new constitution to its multifarious purposes. In the end he has produced a line of real distinction, which is none the worse for the touch of paradox given by the rather sinister phrase *ἀρμόσας δίκην*, which, if the reader happens to think of it, will sound like manipulating justice. The translation given by L. and S. (s.v. *ἀρμόζω*) is certainly wrong: "*ἀρμ. δίκην εἰς τινα* to bring judgment upon him." The passage in Hesiod quoted above disproves it, as do also the following: xii 36 *εὐθύνει δίκας σκολιάς*; Pindar *P.* iv 153 (Christ) *εὐθυνη λαοῖς δίκας*; Aesch. *Eum.* 433 *κρῖνε δ' εὐθείαν δίκην*; and the word *εἰθυδικία*. Wilamowitz is also surely wrong when he says (1902) that *εὐθείαν δίκην ἀρμόσας* is a figure from the plumb line.

20. Solon had the same power over the people that a driver with a goad in his hand has over his animals; but it was his duty to use the curb quite as much as to ply the lash.

20. *κέντρον*: cf. Soph. frag. 683 (Pearson) *λαβὼν | πανουργὰ χερσὶν κέντρα κηδεύει πόλιν*.

21. *κακοφραδῆς*: "wrong-minded"; if intentionally, "malignant," "unscrupulous"; if unintentionally, "ill-advised," "foolish." Here, as in the one Homeric passage where the word appears (*Il.* xxiii 483), it has the former meaning.

22 ff. In Aristides' quotation of this fragment, there is a break after the words *οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον*. But after the brief remark, *εἶτα τί φησιν ὁ Σολων*, he gives the rest of the quotation, *εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον κτλ.* Bergk prints this latter part *εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον . . . ἐστράφην λύκος* as a separate fragment, and attaches to the longer fragment in Aristides the two lines which are found in Plut. *Sol.* xvi 2 (= xi 1 f.) The arrangement of the verses in Aristotle makes it certain that Bergk was wrong, and we may be fairly sure that the succession as given in Aristotle is correct. Platt, however, insists on a lacuna between *οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον* and *εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον*. But this is unnecessary. Solon says: "I drew up impartial laws. Any other man, holding such power as I held, would have favored the *δῆμος*, and would have failed to exercise any check upon their passions, which would have gone to great lengths. For partiality to either side, in his case as in mine, would have cost the city many lives." *γάρ* means: "I know what would have happened in his case, *because* I know what would have happened if I had acted in a similar fashion."

22 ff. The interpretation of these verses has given rise to considerable discussion and to several attempts at emendation. The real difficulty lies in the two questions: who were *τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν*? and when was *τότε*? οἱ ἐναντίοι I take to be the aristocrats who opposed Solon's policies. *τότε* was the period during which Solon's reformatory measures were introduced and his constitution adopted. V. 23 is in the nature of an afterthought, and refers to the opposition which Solon met throughout his career from both parties: *τοῖσιν* are the aristocrats; *οὔτεροι*, the popular party. "If I had consented to the course which my opponents favored at that time, or if thereafter I had consented to the treatment which *their* opponents were always planning for *them*, etc." This is also Bucherer's view, who says: "Und dann wieder, was die anderen (*οὔτεροι* = οἱ ἕτεροι), die extreme Volkspartei, gegen diese, die Regierenden, jedesmal ins Werk setzen wollten." For the use of ἤθελον with an accusative, which Platt says is impossible, cf. Thuc. v 50, 2 ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἤθελον, where the accusative as in Solon is a neuter plural. The optative φρασαίετο, making a conditional relative clause of the past general type, is highly appropriate: the pressure from the aristocratic party came at only one time, but when Solon was once established as the champion of the popular party, he must have been called upon frequently to say "no" to the vindictive demands of his constituents.

25. Cf. Herodotus vi 83 Ἄργος ἀνδρῶν ἐχηρώθη.

26. ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιούμενος: "putting forth my strength to defend myself against attacks from all quarters." Such periphrases with the middle ποιῆσθαι are very common. Cf. Soph. Oed. Col. 459 εἰδὼν γὰρ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ξένοι, θέληθ' ὄμον | προστάτισι ταῖς σεμναῖσι δημοῦχοις θεαῖς | ἀλκὴν ποιῆσθαι (to succor the stranger). Peppmüller's interpretation is different: "Um drohenden inneren Kriegen willen nahm Solon die Hilfe, wo sie sich ihm zu zeigen schien." But ἀλκὴν ποιῆσθαι surely cannot mean "seek aid"; and, furthermore, the comparison in the last line shows that Solon could not rely for aid upon anyone but himself.

26. Cf. vi 5 ἔστην δ' ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερόν σάκος ἀμφοτέρωσιν.

27. ἐν κυσίν . . . ἐστράφη: cf. Hom. Il. xii 43 ἐν τε κύνεσσι . . . κάπριος ἦε λέων στρέφεται.

X

See the introductory note on ix.

1. *δήμῳ*: given an emphatic position as the true subject of *εἶδον* in contrast to *ὅσοι μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες*, but attracted into the dative with *ὄνειδίσται* and so made grammatically a part of the rhetorical parenthesis.

1. *διαφάδην*: this word is found also in Pollux ii 129, and, in the form *διαφάδαν*, in Aleman v 56 (Hiller-Crusius).

2 f. Evidently an allusion to the clairvoyant power of the mind in sleep. Cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 104 f. *εὔδονσα γὰρ φρῆν ὄμμασιν λαμπρύνεται, | ἐν ἡμέρῃ δὲ μοῖρ' ἀπρόσκοπος βροτῶν*. On this passage in Aeschylus, the scholiast says: *ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν ὁ νοῦς ἀκριβέστερον ὀρᾷ, μὴ παραπλανώμενος τῇ θέᾳ*. Pindar (frag. 131) expresses a similar thought: *εὔδει δὲ πρᾶσσόντων μελέων ἅτᾳρ εὐδόντεςσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις δείκνυσι τερπνῶν ἐφέροισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν*; and Cicero (*de div.* i 30, 63): "eum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus." In Dem. *F. L.* 275 (quoted by Sandys) *ἃ μῆδ' ὄναρ ἤλπισάν ποποτε*, the word for "dream" appears, but in Solon nothing is said about dreams.

3 f. Two explanations are offered for the incomplete line. Crusius, evidently thinking that the second half of the line has been lost in transmission, proposes to restore it by writing *ἐν πύλῃσ' ὀνειράτων*, a phrase which is paralleled in Hom. *Od.* iv 809 and Babrius *fab.* 30, 8. Kenyon thinks that Aristotle broke off his quotation with *εὔδοντες εἶδον*, and that vs. 4 did not follow immediately after vs. 3 in Solon's poem. Now, though the phrase proposed by Crusius is quite possible, it seems equally strange that Aristotle should have failed to quote these words if they were in the original poem, and that a scribe should have lost them in copying. On the other hand, Kenyon's proposal is both plausible in itself and at the same time relieves the awkwardness of the optative *αἰνοῖεν ἄν* succeeding the indicative *εἶδον ἄν*. If the verbs follow one another closely as they are given in the quotation, then it seems impossible not to take *αἰνοῖεν ἄν* as parallel to *εἶδον ἄν*, the two things which would have happened if Solon had not been strictly impartial. This use of the potential optative is not uncommon in Homer, but Monro (*Hom. Gram.* p. 273) says it is confined to Homer. It would not

be impossible, I think, in Solon, and the sequence of εἶδον ἄν . . . αἰνοῖεν ἄν is not absolutely intolerable. But the whole difficulty disappears if we accept Kenyon's suggestion, which he made on quite other grounds. Furthermore, the two potentials, as a matter of fact, do not depend upon the same condition. The implied condition for εἶδον ἄν is "if I had not supported the popular cause as I did." If this condition were also assumed for αἰνοῖεν ἄν, then the rebuke would be directed only against the complaints of the popular party; whereas the words with which Aristotle introduces the quotation indicate that the rebuke is intended for both parties. We must suppose, then, that the condition for αἰνοῖεν ἄν is "if the nobles were to learn the real moderation in my plans for reform."

XI

See the introductory note on ix.

1. This fragment begins with the same words that are used in ix 22 — οὐκ ἄν κατέσχε δῆμον. Before the discovery of the London papyrus, Bergk printed xi 1. 2 after ix 21 and regarded ix 22 (εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον) to 27 as a separate fragment. Even now, with the text of Aristotle in hand, some scholars have attempted to fit the fragments together in some order different from that in which they are given by Aristotle. But it seems hardly likely that Aristotle or anyone else would have torn the poem apart in order to quote in so extraordinary a fashion. It is more likely that similar ideas and similar expressions recurred in the whole series of poems which Solon composed at this period in his career. Whether all three of these iambic quotations come from the same poem or not, it is impossible to say, but it is highly probable that they do.

2. Of the textual variations in this line, only one has any serious effect upon the interpretation. Plutarch gives πῖαρ, the papyrus πῦαρ. Both are Greek words: πῖαρ means "fat" (substantive or adjective); πῦαρ means "beestings," the milk given by a cow immediately after calving. The reading πῦαρ is defended by Platt, who maintains that πῦαρ was regarded as a dainty in Athens, as well as in modern England; that a thick crust rises on it when it is stirred (this he has on the authority of a farmer's wife); and that the metaphor refers to the division of the people into factions, as πῖαρ is divided by shaking. This is ingenious, but fantastic. Even supposing the statements about πῦαρ are true, how does ἐξείλεν γάλα harmonize

with this interpretation? If we read *πίαρ*, several constructions are possible: (1) *γάλα* may be the object of *ἀνταράξας*, and *πίαρ* the object of *ἐξείλεν*; (2) *γάλα* may be the object of the composite verb *πίαρ ἐξείλεν* (a suggestion of Sandys); (3) *πίαρ* and *γάλα* may both be objects of *ἐξείλεν* on the principle of the double accusative with verbs meaning "deprive." In all of these it is assumed that *πίαρ* is a substantive. Another possibility is (4) to take *πίαρ* as an adjective with *γάλα*, and *γάλα* as the object of *ἐξείλεν*. There is nothing decisive to be said in favor of any one of these. *πίαρ* is regularly, if not invariably, a substantive; it seems to me impossible to take *γάλα* with *ἀνταράξας*, not because it is too far removed, but because the order favors the combination *ἀνταράξας πίαρ* and *ἐξείλεν γάλα*; a composite verb like *πίαρ ἐξείλεν* requires very definite support. On the basis of these observations, I prefer the third possibility.

There is a further difficulty in the passage. The only kind of fat which is obtained from milk by shaking is butter, and butter was practically unknown in classical Greece. We do hear something, however, of a butter made from mare's milk among the Scythians. Herodotus (iv 2) describes how this butter was made by shaking the milk in a wooden vessel; and Hippocrates (*de morbis* i 508 Foes.) in speaking of the same process uses the word *βούτυρον*, which we may gather was of Scythian origin: *καὶ τὸ μὲν πῖον, ὃ βούτυρον καλέουσι, ἐπιπολῆς διάσταται ελαφρὸν ἔόν.* We must conclude that Solon became acquainted with this Scythian practice in the course of his travels, and referred to it in a rather obscure metaphor; or that butter-making, though not mentioned in literature, was not unknown to Attic peasants. See Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, ed. 7, p. 154, 1902.

2. For the moods in vss. 1 and 2, cf. Plato *Meno* 86 d: *οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅ τι ἐστὶ πρῶτον ἐζητήσωμεν αὐτό* (Sandys).

3 f. The figure is similar to those in vi 5 and xi 26.

3 f. *τούτων*: evidently the opposing factions. There is something a little inharmonious in the combination *μεταιχμίω*. . . *ὄρος*. *τὸ μεταίχμιον* is the space between two opposing armies; *ὄρος* is the boundary, or the stone marking the boundary, between adjoining countries or estates. The word *ὄρος* probably came to Solon's mind for two reasons: (1) because he had much to do with *ὄροι* (in another sense) during the course of his legisla-

tion (cf. ix 6); and (2) because there is no word which would properly carry out the figure begun in *μεταιχμίω*; indeed there was no such thing as a barrier set up between two armies to prevent them from joining conflict: and yet this was just the function that Solon claimed to perform. Aristides paraphrases the passage in the following words (xlvii 278): ἔσθη δ' [*i.e.* Σόλων] ἐν μεθορίῳ πάντων ἀνδρείοτατα καὶ δικαιοτάτα, ὥσπερ τινὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐκ γεωμετρίας περιγραπτὸς φυλάττων ὄρους. Here Solon is compared to a man who is guarding a surveyor's stones or stakes by which the boundaries of an estate are indicated.

XII

References: Bergk (1881); Croiset (1880, 1903); Diels (1888); Göttling (1850); Hecker (1850); Hiller (1888); Keene (1885); Leutsch (1872); Meyer (1893); Sitzler (1879, 1894); Wilamowitz (1893)

This poem is not given in S and L, the two best manuscripts of Demosthenes; in A there are only a few verses. In the other manuscripts the 39 verses are given without any indication of a lacuna. It will be observed that at vs. 10 there are three pentameters in succession, and that at vs. 25 there are two hexameters. To mend the latter passage Göttling introduced into the text a pentameter from Planudes (Iriarte, *Cod. Matrit.*, p. 113) as follows: *παίκακα δουλοσύνης ζυγὰ φέρουσι βία*. Some have tried to make this verse tolerable by emendation; most reject it as a Byzantine product. At vs. 10 attempts have been made to restore the passage by importing hexameter lines from other fragments of Solon; and Bergk, observing that the words *ἀδίκουσ' ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι* are also found in xl 12, reconstructed the passage as follows, leaving a lacuna of only half a line:

εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ.
πλουτοῦσιν δ' ἄδικως . . .
οὔθ' ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων
φειδόμενοι, κλέπτουσι δ' ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος.

But these attempts at restoration, however ingenious, are not convincing, and we have a better chance of reading Solon's own words if we leave the text as it is and merely indicate the lacunae.

Wilamowitz asserts that only the first sixteen lines were read by Demosthenes' direction before the Athenian audience, and that the remainder of

the poem was added by an early editor of Demosthenes' speeches. This is, of course, possible, but uncertain; and for Solon at any rate unimportant.

Are we to suppose that the verse *ἡμετέρῃ δὲ πόλις* is the actual beginning of the poem as it was composed by Solon? There is no decisive evidence on this point. Voemel points out that the particle *δέ* is no obstacle to regarding this as the beginning (cf. Xen. *Anab.* v 5, 13); indeed he thinks it highly likely that we have the opening of the poem: "Imo optime convenit commoto atque elato Solonis animo relicta sententia 'Aliae quidem urbes interierunt et interibunt,' sic incipere: 'sed Athenae sunt perpetuae.'" This is not impossible; and if it is true, as Wilamowitz supposes, that the *end* of the poem was added by an editor, it is not probable that the same editor would have left his quotation incomplete at the beginning, unless the poem was very long.

See the discussion of this poem on pages 105 ff.

1 ff. The theological views revealed in these lines are noteworthy. The fortunes of the state depend upon both gods and men. The favor of the gods can be assured if the state has a powerful champion among them. But even though the gods show no hostility, ruin may come through the perversity of men. The whole passage is imbued with the Homeric feeling about the government of the world, which recognizes the human and the divine as partners in the administration. In this partnership men indeed do not possess equal power, but they have a responsibility similar to that of the gods. Meanwhile men and gods alike are under the sway of a dark and unscrutable fate which even the Greeks could not transform through personification into either god or man. Cf. Hom. *Od.* i 32:

*Ἦ πόπιοι, οἶον δὴ νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται .
ἔξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
σφῆνιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπέρμορον ἄλγ' ἔχουσιν.*

1. *κατὰ Διὸς αἴσαν*: cf. Hom. *Il.* ix 608 *φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴσῃ*; *Od.* ix 52 *τότε δὴ ῥα κακὴ Διὸς αἴσα παρέστη | ἡμῖν αἰνομόροισιν, ἴν' ἄλγεα πολλὰ πάθοιμεν*. The phrases *κατ' αἴσαν*, *παρ' αἴσαν*, and *ὑπὲρ αἴσαν* are frequent in Homer, but the combination *κατὰ Διὸς αἴσαν* is not found there.

2. *μακάρων θεῶν ἀθανάτων*: cf. Hom. *Il.* iv 127 *θεοὶ μάκαρες ἀθάνατοι*; Hes. *Theog.* 881 *μάκαρες θεοί*; Theogn. 759 *ἄλλοι ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοί*.

3. Cf. Hom. *Il.* v 828 *τοίη τοι ἐγὼν ἐπιτάρροθός εἰμι* (said by Athena to Diomed).

3. *ἐπίσκοπος*: the regular word for a tutelary divinity. In Hom. *Il.* xxiv 729 Hector is called the protector of Troy — ἦ γὰρ ὄλωλας ἐπίσκοπος, ὅς τέ μιν αὐτῆν | ῥύσκειν.

3. *ὀβριμοπάτρη*: a frequent epithet of Athena in Homer, where, as here, it always closes the verse.

4. This figure of the hands raised in protection is found several times in Homer, e.g., *Il.* ix 420 *μάλα γάρ ἔθεν εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς | χεῖρα ἐὼν ὑπερέσχε, τεθαρσῆκασι δὲ λαοί.* In Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 916 Clytemnestra uses the same phrase in her supplication to Achilles, the "son of a goddess" — ἦν δὲ τολμήσεις σύ μιν | χεῖρ' ὑπερτεῖναι, σεσφόμεθα. Aristophanes probably had Solon's words in mind when he wrote the following passage in the *Knights* (1173 ff.):

ΑΛ. ὦ Δῆμ', ἐναργῶς ἢ θεός σ' ἐπισκοπεῖ,
καὶ νῦν ὑπερέχει σου χύτραν ζωμοῦ πλέαν.
Δημ. οἶε γὰρ οἰκεῖσθ' ἂν ἔτι τήνδε τὴν πόλιν,
εἰ μὴ φανερώς ἡμῶν ὑπερεῖχε τὴν χύτραν.

χύτραν ζωμοῦ πλέαν is, of course, put *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* for *χεῖρα*.

5. *αὐτοί*: this word, standing at the beginning of its sentence, contrasted with Zeus and the other gods, carrying no meaning of its own but simply intensifying the subject, which we discover only in the next line, presents a contrast between things of visible and concrete reality and divine beings whose existence we know only through faith. It is a contrast similar to that between the real body and the invisible soul in Hom. *Il.* i 2 f.

5. *ἀφραδίῃσιν*: this word is commonly used by Homer in the plural to mean "rash and imprudent acts."

6 f. Who are *ἄστροί*? Who are *δήμου ἡγεμόνες*? And to whom does *δήμου* refer? The answer to each question has been disputed. Since Solon's poems, and the present poem in particular, are the chief source of information concerning social and political conditions in Athens at the end of the seventh century, there is little assistance to be found outside the poem itself. Von Leutsch asserts that the *ἄστροί* and the *δήμος* are the nobility, claiming to find evidence for this in the narrative of Diogenes Laertius i 49. What this evidence is I cannot discover. Bergk assumes that

ἄστοί are the nobles, and Weil defines them explicitly as “les vrais citoyens ou Eupatrides, opposés au δῆμος, à la plèbe.” It seems to me unlikely that at so early a period a *political* distinction of this sort would be made between the two classes in the community; the difference between them was still social and economic. All alike were *ἄστοί*, and the equilibrium of political rights was a problem for the future. On the other hand, *ἄστοί* never, so far as I know, means the nobly born or the rich in contrast to the lower classes. In the present passage *ἄστοί* are contrasted with *θεοί* and are precisely those special *ἄνθρωποι* whose home is the city of Athens, the *human* population of Attica. Wilamowitz, apparently interpreting *ἄστοί* in this way, complains that *χρήμασι πειθόμενοι* is improperly connected with it: not the *ἄστοί* as a whole, but the *δήμον ἡγεμόνες* are guilty of avarice; therefore *χρήμασι πειθόμενοι* is to be rejected as an “übles Füllsel.” But cannot a whole people be accused of lawlessness, avarice, corruption, luxury, or any other social disorder, even though only a small number among them are actually guilty of the offense? To Solon it appeared that the people of Athens were too fond of money-making; but he would not have denied that many among them were of a more admirable sort. Meyer finds a contrast between people of the town and people of the country: “Im übrigen zerfällt in diesem Gedicht die Schilderung der Missstände in zwei scharf gesonderte Theile: (1) Habgier und Ungerechtigkeit der *ἄστοί*, besonders der *δήμον ἡγεμόνες*, vss. 5–22, zusammengefasst in den Worten *ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά*, also die Verhältnisse der regierenden Bürgerschaft, der städtischen Bevölkerung; (2) vss. 23–26 Notlage der *πειχιροί*, der abhängigen Landbevölkerung.” I see no justification for this view whatever, either in particular words and phrases or in the spirit of the whole poem. *ἄστν* does indeed mean the town in contrast with the country in classical Greek. But in Homer, Hesiod, the elegiac and iambic poets of the seventh and sixth centuries, with which last group *ἄστοί* is a common word, it never means townfolk in contrast with countryfolk. Again, *τῶν πειχιρῶν* in vs. 23 cannot be properly confined to country people. There was need and distress among the *δημιόεργοι*, as well as among the agrarian serfs. The real contrast lies between *ἐν δήμῳ* (23) and *γαίαν ἀλλοδαπὴν* (24), the condition of Athenians at home and the condition of Athenians abroad. *τῶν πειχιρῶν* comes to the front in its sentence, because it is the greater destitution of this class that has brought about their banishment to foreign lands. *δήμον* may mean

either the whole people of Athens, οἱ ἄσται, or the lower classes as contrasted with the nobility. The one thing it cannot mean, as I believe all will admit, is what von Leutsch claims for it — “the nobility.” Probably in the oligarchical order of the early sixth century δῆμος would have sounded like the “masses,” the undifferentiated people. δῆμου ἡγεμόνες, as all recognize, are not “leaders of the democratic party.” There was as yet no democratic party; it was Solon himself who first created it. The “leaders of the people” are the oligarchic counterpart of the kings of the earlier régime, who in the epic are often enough called ἡγεμόνες. In Athens at the beginning of the sixth century they were the members of the upper class, which was determined partly by birth and partly by wealth, and, in particular, those who for the time being held the public offices, all of which were reserved to the upper class. Bergk’s claim that the ἡγεμόνες are the πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων is unfounded. Cf. vii 1 δῆμος δ’ ὧδ’ ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο; xiii 3 ἀνδρῶν δ’ ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὄλλυται; Theogn. 41 f. ἄστοι μὲν γὰρ ἔθ’ οἷδε σαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δὲ | τετράφαται πολλὴν ἐς κακότητα πεσεῖν; 855 f. πολλὰκι δὴ πόλις ἦδε δι’ ἡγεμόνων κακότητα | ὥσπερ κεκλιμένη ναῦς παρὰ γῆν ἔδραμεν.

7. ἐτοῖμος: cf. Hom. *Il.* xviii 96 αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι ἔπειτα μεθ’ Ἑκτορα πτόμος ἐτοῖμος.

9. Cf. Pindar *Isth.* iii 1 ff. εἴ τις ἀνδρῶν εὐτυχῆσαις ἢ σὺν εὐδόξοις ἀέθλοισι ἢ σθένει πλούτου κατέχει φρασὶν αἰανῆ κόρον, ἄξιος εὐλογίας ἀστῶν μεμίχθαι. Cicero *pro Murena* 9, 21 ego mei satietatem magno meo labore superavi.

9 f. οὐδὲ παρούσας . . . ἡσυχίη: the passage should be construed as follows: “to enjoy (εὐφροσύνας) in an orderly (κοσμεῖν) and quiet (ἐν ἡσυχίῃ) manner the good things which actually lie before them (παρούσας) on the banquet-board (δαιτός).” There are several meanings of κοσμεῖν to be noted: (1) The most usual meaning in Homer is “to marshal” an army — a use so common that it is not necessary to quote instances. (2) It means “to prepare by careful arrangement,” and is used idiomatically of the preparation of a meal. Hom. *Od.* vii 13; Pindar *Nem.* i 22; Xen. *Cyr.* viii 2, 6. Cf. also Hom. *Πυγμαλ.* vii 59 γλυκερὴν κοσμησάμενοι ἀοιδῆν; and Solon xx 2. (3) It means also “to conduct in an orderly manner,” “govern,” “rule.” Herodotus i 59 ἔνεμε τὴν πόλιν κοσμέων καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ; 100 ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τὰς δίκας ἐποίεε, τὰδε δὲ ἄλλα ἐκεκοσμέατό οἱ; Soph. *Ant.* 677 οὕτως ἀμυντέ’ ἐστί τοῖς

κοσμουμένοις, | κούτοι γυναικὸς οὐδαμῶς ἤσσηγέα, "the regulations made by οἱ κοσμοῦντες, the rulers; meaning here, his own edicts" (Jebb); *Ajax* 1103 f. οὐδ' ἔσθ' ὅπου σοὶ τόνδε κοσμήσαι πλέον | ἀρχῆς ἔκειτο θεσμὸς ἢ καὶ τῷδε σέ. (4) The meaning "adorn" or "embellish" is too common to require illustration. Now, in the present passage, the first and last meanings are manifestly impossible; the second cannot be allowed because the εὐφροσύνας are already παρούσας. Indeed, I do not think there is any reminiscence of the Homeric δόρπον ἐκόσμει in spite of the juxtaposition of κοσμεῖν and δαιτός. It is apparent, therefore, that the only meaning admissible is "to conduct in an orderly manner," and it is not by any means unlikely that there was some political connotation which suggested the word to Solon. At any rate, as Jebb points out (*Soph. Ant.* 677), the word κόσμος was used of a constitution, especially an oligarchical constitution (*Thuc.* iv 76 μεταστῆσαι τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἐς δημοκρατίαν . . . τρίψαι; viii 72 μένειν ἐν τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ κόσμῳ). Furthermore, the Cretan κόσμοι, referred to by Aristotle (*Pol.* ii 10, 1272 a), were oligarchical magistrates with military as well as civil powers. Peppmüller's translation, "sich hingeben," which is accepted by Bucherer, is out of the question. If κοσμεῖν is properly understood, it only remains to observe that δαιτός is to be construed with εὐφροσύνας and that the whole sentence is to be taken in a figurative sense. Concerning both points there is some difference of opinion. Bergk construed δαιτός with ἡσυχίη and assumed that the line referred to the meals which were served to the magistrates in the Prytaneion at the public expense. Others suppose that Solon is thinking of the convivial meetings of the political clubs (ἔρανοι) where demagogues fan the flames of discontent. In answer to these contentions, it may be said: (1) we are, presumably, at too early a period for democratic propaganda in the clubs; (2) it is not likely that official meals in the Prytaneion were called "festivities" (εὐφροσύνας); (3) if this sentence is to be taken in its literal sense, referring either to the Prytaneion or to clubs, then οὐκ ἐπίστανται κατέχευ κόρον must also be understood literally, which would make the δήμου ἡγεμόνας guilty of literal gluttony. The fact is that Solon is speaking metaphorically. As men of unrestrained appetite conduct themselves at dinner, so the leaders in the state conduct themselves in their uncontrolled greed for riches.

11. "They yield to the temptation of dishonest practices." Cf. xl 12

ἀλλ' ἀδίκους' ἔργμασι πειθόμενος | οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται [sc. ὁ πλοῦτος]. The phrase is more natural with πλοῦτος as its subject, than with a personal subject, and it seems to me unlikely that Solon wrote these words so soon after vs. 6.

12. κτεάνων: not in Homer, but Hesiod uses it (*W. and D.* 315).

13. Weil says that κλέπτουσι looks like a gloss and that he would prefer μάρπτουσι; Butcher marks κλέπτουσι ἐφ' ἀρπαγῆ as a *locus desperatus*. This seems to me hypercritical. κλέπτουσι hardly requires justification, and for ἐφ' ἀρπαγῆ the following quotations afford adequate support: Hom. *Il.* xxiii 574 ἐς μέσον ἀμφοτέροισι δικάσσετε μηδ' ἐπ' ἀρωγῆ; Dem. xviii 273 οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' εὐνοίᾳ γ' ἐμοὶ παρεχώρεις ἐλπίδων καὶ ζήλου καὶ τιμῶν; Thuc. i 37, 2 φασὶ δὲ ξυμμαχίαν διὰ τὸ σῶφρον οὐδενός πω δέξασθαι τὸ δ' ἐπὶ κακουργίᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἀρετῇ ἐπετήδευσαν.

13. ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος: "one from one source, another from another."

14. "They have no fear of Dike, that august being upon whom, as upon a rock, human society rests." Two other passages should be read in connection with this, and the three will be found to throw light upon each other: (1) Pindar *Ol.* xiii 6 ff. ἐν τᾷ [Corinth] γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει, κασιγνήτα τε, βᾶθρον πολιῶν ἀσφαλές, Δίκα καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰρήνη, ταμίαι ἀνδράσι πλοῦτου, χρύσεια παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος; (2) Aesch. *Choeph.* 646 f. Δίκας δ' ἐρείδεται πυθμὴν προχαλκεύει δ' Αἴσα φασγανουργός. Evidently θέμεθλα Δίκης is equal to Δίκας πυθμὴν, and the θέμεθλα or πυθμὴν is Dike herself — a βᾶθρον πολιῶν ἀσφαλές. Pindar, praising Εὐνομία as well as Δίκη, must certainly have had Solon's words in mind; and the startling mixture of metaphors — Justice, the sister of Eunomia and the foundation of cities — reminds one of the personification of Ge in ix. Indeed, the figure of Ge is instructive in the present connection. As Ge is the material basis of human life, so Dike is its spiritual basis; but both alike are possessed of divine personality and both are sacred (σεμνά). To use a familiar modern metaphor, Dike might be called the "corner-stone of society." The passage from Aeschylus, for which a variety of interpretations have been offered, means, I believe, "Dike is now being established as the foundation," for the changed fortunes of the children of Agamemnon. Here, as elsewhere, Δίκη is a negative principle, personified as a being who either *restrains* men from certain actions or punishes them if they commit them. Cf. Aesch. *Seven* 670 f. ἡ δὴτ' ἂν εἴη πανδίκως ψευδώνυμος Δίκη, ξυνοῦσα φωτὶ παντόλμω

φρένας. Cf. Croiset (1903, p. 587): "Cette déesse de la justice n'est plus tout à fait, comme on le voit, celle d'Hésiode, la vierge faible et craintive, maltraitée par des mains brutales, et qui criait à son père pour obtenir protection. Elle a maintenant une force patiente, elle attend parce qu'elle est sûre de ses fins, et, dans le silence effrayant où elle s'enveloppe, elle ressemble aux lois mystérieuses et inéluctables de la nature, que rien ne presse, mais que rien non plus n'arrête ni ne retarde."

15. τὰ γιγνόμενα . . . έόντα: cf. Hom. *Il.* i 70 (= Hes. *Theog.* 38)
τά τ' έόντα τά τ' έσσόμενα πρό τ' έόντα.

16. ἦλλθ': a gnomic aorist.

16. Cf. Plut. *Sol.* v: "To this Solon is said to have answered that men kept their agreements with each other when neither party profits by the breaking of them, and he was adapting his laws (*ἀρμόζεται*) to the citizens in such a manner as to make it clear to all that the practice of justice was more advantageous than the transgression of the laws."

17. τοῦτο refers to the moral corruption of the leaders in the city, which has been described in vss. 5-15. Starting from them, this corruption is beginning to spread (*ἦδη ἔρχεται*) like a sore over the whole city. ἔλκος ἄφυκτον is in apposition to τοῦτο. Weil explains τοῦτο as "cette apparition vengeresse de la Justice," an idea which the neuter τοῦτο would hardly suggest and with which ἔλκος ἄφυκτον is incompatible. Furthermore, he makes this same pronoun the subject of *ἐπεγείρει* in vs. 19 (reading ἦ for ἦ—"une correction irréflectie"). This requires that vs. 18 be taken as a parenthetical, which seems too awkward for consideration.

17 ff. ἔρχεται (17), ἦλυθε (18), ἐπεγείρει (19), describe the actual state of affairs in Athens. The whole city, under the blight of corruption, has sunk into servitude; civil war, though still asleep, is about to wake. ἄλεσεν (20) is a gnomic aorist like ἦλυθε in vs. 16.

18. The subject of ἦλυθε is ἡμετέρη πόλις understood from πόλει in the preceding line and uppermost in the mind of Solon throughout the poem. Solon uses the word δουλοσύνην elsewhere of the state of the Athenian people (xiii 4; xiv 4).

19. ἦ: i.e., δουλοσύνη. Other commentators hold different opinions: Weil (see on vs. 17) understands Δίκη as the subject of ἐπεγείρει. Wolf inquired, "Utrum ἦ δίκη an ἡ πόλις?" and Schaefer replied, "Mira dubitatio Wolfii. De urbe dici quis ambigat?" The simple verb ἐγείρειν is com-

mon in Homer with *πόλεμον* and such words. For the idea that the enslavement of a part of the citizens leads to war, cf. Arist. *Pol.* ii 12, 1274 a 17 *μηδὲ γὰρ τοῦτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος δούλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος* and *passim*.

20. *ἐρατὴν*: only once in Homer—*Il.* iii 64 *μή μοι δῶρ' ἐρατὰ πρόφερε χρυσέης Ἀφροδίτης*, but common in the Homeric hymns and in the elegists; cf. Tyrtaeus viii 28 *ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς ἤβης ἄγλαον ἄνθος ἔχη*; Theogn. 1131 *ἀλλ' ἤβην ἐρατὴν ὀλοφύρομαι, ἦ μ' ἐπιλέπει*.

21 f. The difficulties which are presented in these lines lie in the interpretation of the words *δυσμενέων* and *συνόδοις* and in the uncertainty of the reading *τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι φίλαις*. (1) *δυσμενέων*. Are these enemies internal or external? Certainly not external. It would not be true to say that Athens was being rapidly destroyed by external enemies. Megara indeed was a menace, but not formidable. Furthermore, the whole poem is concerned with the social and economic condition of Athens; foreign relations are not mentioned. If, then, they are internal enemies, who are they? Clearly the persons described in vs. 5-16, the men who shrink from nothing in their lust for wealth. But *δυσμενέων* means something more than "the persons hereinbefore mentioned." It is an ugly word and in effect predicative in the present sentence: "those who are bringing about the ruin of the state" may not unjustly be denominated the enemies of the state. What Solon chiefly wishes to assert is not the decline of the city, not the rapidity of its decline, but the venomous hostility of the men who are responsible for its decline. (2) *συνόδοις*. Two meanings are suggested for this word. The first is "conflicts" or "combats." Schaefer says "*ἐν συνόδοις* verito *in conflictu*: *τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι* autem est dative quem dicas incommodi." Shilleto's note is: "Wastes away in conflicts with those who wrong their kindred and friends [reading *φίλους*]. I conceive the dative *τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι* is appropriately governed of the verbal *σύνοδος*, as *πότμον κλεινοῖς λαβδικ'δισιν* Soph. *Antig.* 860." Grammatically it is not impossible to take *συνόδοις* thus, though both explanations of the dative *τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι* are a little strained. But what are these conflicts? They are not with external foes; and civil dissension with its bloodshed is only just beginning (vs. 19). It is, therefore, generally recognized as better to take *συνόδοις* in the other sense of "gatherings" or "unions." "Ces *congressus*," says Weil, "qui plaisent aux mauvais citoyens, ne sont peut-être pas, comme on ex-

plique généralement, des combats, mais des réunions factieuses, des associations (ἑταιρίαι), foyers de conspiration et de guerres civiles." This I believe to be the right view. But it is not necessary or even desirable to assume that these σίνοδοι were primarily political in purpose. Undoubtedly the men who attended these meetings were of the ruling class; they had no political object to achieve; they were absorbed in money-making. They may, indeed, have sought to manipulate the political situation to their own profit. But they had no definite political propaganda, neither a tyranny nor a democracy.

(3) τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι φίλαις. φίλαις is Bergk's conjecture; the manuscripts give φίλοις or φίλους. Emendations are numerous, but Bergk's is the simplest and the best. σίνοδοι, such as have just been described, are properly said to be dear to mischief-makers. Men who are occupied with their own selfish purposes, regardless of the good of the community, are accustomed to hold secret meetings in which they plot for their own advancement; honest and loyal ambitions, on the other hand, do not seek the dark. One of the other proposed emendations of the line deserves special consideration. Diels is offended by the sound of the diphthong and vowel in juxtaposition in τρύχεται ἐν, a thing which is not allowed, he maintains, by the elegiac poets in the first foot of the pentameter unless there is also a sense-pause at the same point. Therefore he demands a sense-pause in the present line, and rewrites it as follows: τρύχεται, ἐν συνόδοις τ' ἴσ' ἀδικοῦσι φίλοι. Now I am not disposed to give much weight to the metrical argument; the elegiac remains are too scanty to justify any generalization. But even supposing we accept Diels's law, there is no serious breach of it in the reading adopted in the present text. Though the pause after τρύχεται is not sufficiently important to be marked by a comma, there is nevertheless a pause. The sense is complete with the word τρύχεται and the remainder of the line is added to explain the nature of the hostile acts by which the city is being brought to ruin (cf. the note on δυσμενέων above). What is the meaning of Diels's version? The δυσμενέων, he says, are the optimates; the φίλοι, Solon's friends, the leaders of the popular party. But supposing δυσμενέων could be readily understood in this sense, is it possible to believe that any reader would recognize who the φίλοι are and whose friends they are? Solon is not concerned in this poem with the difficulty of restraining both parties from excess and he is not identified with the popular party. Diels discovers something else in the two lines which I do not believe any open-minded reader

would have suspected: ἄστν is contrasted with σίνοδοι in a chiasmic arrangement: "inimici potentia abusi in publicis bonis praedantur, sodales item in rebus privatis inhonestum lucrum facessunt." But ἄστν, alone, without emphasis by position, is the last word a Greek poet would choose in order to contrast public with private affairs; and σίνοδοι are just as likely to be concerned with public affairs as private. If φίλοι are to be contrasted with δυσμενέων, then surely they must be friends and enemies of the same person, who can only be Solon; and Diels does not claim that the δυσμενέων are enemies of Solon. The following emendations may also be mentioned: τρύχεται, ἐν συνόδοις θ' οὐδ' [= suos] ἀδικούσι φίλους (Hiller); ἐν συνόδοις τῆς ἀδικησιφίλους (Ahrens); τῆς ἀδικ' ἐστὶ φίλα (Bergk); τῶν ἐτάρων ἀδίκους (Hecker); τοῖς ἀδικούσι φίλους (Keene).

21 f. The figure of disease, which was first suggested in ἔλκος ἄφυκτον (vs. 17), is still in the poet's mind. τρύχεται is often used of a physical decline. The city which hitherto has possessed the charms of ruddy health (πολυήρατον) has fallen ill of a wasting sickness.

23 ff. Cf. ix 8-12. xii was written before, ix after, the adoption of Solon's remedial measures.

23. στρέφεται: ordinarily this word is used in its present sense only with persons as subjects, and it is not common with them; here it undoubtedly produces a slight personification. Cf. *Hom. Hymn to Apollo* 175 ἡμεῖς δ' ἑμέτερον κλέος οἶσομεν ὄσον ἐπ' αἶαν | ἀνθρώπων στρεφόμεσθα πόλεις εὐναιεταώσας; *Soph. Electr.* 516 (Clytemnestra to Electra) ἀνεμένη μὲν, ὡς εἰκας, αὐτὸ στρέφει; *Aeschro* 2, 2 (Hiller-Crusius) στενόν καθ' Ἑλλήσποντον, ἐμπόρων χώραν, | ναῦται θαλάσσης ἐστρέφοντο μύρμηκες.

25. ἀεικελίοσι: "degrading."

26. Thus the social disorder affects the personal life of every individual.

27. A man's house is no longer his castle.

27. The inversion of οὐκέτι is found elsewhere, e.g., *Soph. Trach.* 161 νῦν δ' ὡς ἔτ' οὐκ ὦν εἶπε; *Phil.* 1217 ἔτ' οὐδὲν εἶμι; *Aristoph. Plut.* 1177 θύειν ἔτ' οὐδεὶς ἀξιοῖ; but it is natural only where the two elements of the compound, though inverted, form a close phrase. In the present line the separation is justified by the idiomatic combination οὐκ ἐθέλουσι, meaning "they refuse."

27. ἔχειν: equivalent to ἀμύνειν, "ward off," "repel," the object being τὸ δημόσιον κακόν. Cf. *Hom. Il.* xi 820 ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τόδε εἶπε, διοτρεφεῖς

Εὐρύπυλ' ἤρωσ, | ἧ ῥ' ἔτι που σχήσουσι πελώριον Ἐκτορ' Ἀχαιοί, | ἧ ἤδη
φθίσονται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δουρὶ δαμέντες; xxi 309 φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος
ἀμφοτέροί περ σχῶμεν.

28 f. ὑφέρθορεν, εὖρε: not gnomic aorists in the strict sense of the term, but aorists describing what has come to be the regular course of events in Athens at this particular time.

29. In Homer εἰ is more frequent than εἰάν in conditions with the subjunctive; in the Attic poets it is very rare.

30. ταῦτα: referring to what precedes. Vss. 32–40 sum up in more general terms the lesson which is to be learned from the particular observations in the earlier part of the poem.

32. According to Hesiod (*Theog.* 902) Eunomia was one of the Horae:

δεύτερον ἠγάγετο [sc. Ζεὺς] λιπαρὴν Θέμιν, ἧ τέκεν Ὀρας,
Εὐνομίην τε Δίκην τε καὶ Εἰρήνην τεθαλυῖαν,
αἰ ἔργ' ὠρέουσι καταθνήτοισι βροτοῖσι.

The three sisters appear again in Pindar *Ol.* xiii 6 ff. (quoted on vs. 14). In the present passage Eunomia is plainly not a person, but a rhetorical personification. One of the poems of Tyrtaeus is called Eunomia by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1307 a, 1).

32. ἄρτια: see on iv 4.

32. ἀποφαίνει: "render"; Aristoph. *Knights* 817 σὺ δ' Ἀθηναίους ἐζήτησας μικροπολίτας ἀποφῆναι; *Wasps* 1028 ἵνα τὰς Μούσας αἰσιν χρῆται μὴ προαγωγὸς ἀποφῆγη. Parallels in prose are not uncommon, but the use is very rare in poetry.

35. Cf. Soph. *Trach.* 1000 μανίας ἄνθος; Aesch. *Pers.* 823 ὕβρις γὰρ ἐξανθοῦσ' ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν | ἄτης, ὅθεν πάγκλαυτον ἐξαιμᾶ θέρος.

36. εὐθύνει δίκας σκολιάς: i.e., puts an end to corruption and introduces impartiality and even-handed justice in judicial decisions. Cf. ix 19 and the note. Cf. also Hesiod *W. and D.* 261 ff. . . . βασιλέων, οἱ λυγρὰ νοεῦντες | ἄλλη παρκλίνωσι δίκας σκολιῶς ἐνέποντες. | ταῦτα φυλασσόμενοι, βασιλῆες, ἰθύνετε † δίκας | δωροφάγοι, σκολιῶν δὲ δικέων ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθεσθε; Pindar *Pyth.* iv 153 εὐθύνε λαοῖς δίκας.

38. Cf. Hom. *Il.* xvii 384 ἔριδος ἀργαλέης.

39. πινυτά: this word is not found in the *Iliad* but appears a number of times in the *Odyssey*. It is used, almost without exception, of persons,

as in Theogn. 501 ἀνδρὸς δ' οἶνος ἔδειξε νόον, | καὶ μάλα περ πινυτοῦ; Lucian (*Bacch.* 8) has it in the neuter: εἰ δὲ πινυτὰ δόξειε τὰ λεγόμενα, ὁ Σειληνὸς ἄρα ἦν ἴλεως.

XIII-XIV

References: Hadley (1903); Heidenhain (1882); Heinemann (1897); Hiller (1883); Murray (1889); Piccolomini (1895); Sitzler (1879, 1894, 1900); Stadtmüller (1882); Wilamowitz (1893). On these two poems see pp. 99 ff.

XIII

1. χιόνος μένος ἡδὲ χαλάζης: μένος is thus used of natural forces by Homer: *Il.* v 524 ὄφρ' εὐδῆσι μένος Βορέου καὶ ἄλλων | ζαχρηῶν ἀνέμων; vi 182 δεινὸν ἀποπνείουσα πυρὸς μένος αἰθομένοιοι; xii 18 ποταμῶν μένος εἰσαγαγόντες.

3. μονάρχον: a similar use of the genitive is found in Thuc. i 8, 2 οἷ τε ἧσσοις ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν. The word *μόναρχος* appears first here, unless Theognis 52 is earlier, where it appears in the Ionic form *μούναρχος*.

3 ff. The verbs ὄλλυται, ἔπειν, ἐστὶ are general in sense, making statements of universal application; ἡδὴ χρῆ applies to the actual state of affairs in Athens.

5. ἐξάραντ': it is more likely that this is intended for ἐξάραντα, than for ἐξάραντι, since the elision is easier and the need of a dative is not felt till οὐ ῥ' αἰδιὸν ἐστὶ is heard. The δῆμος should be understood to be the subject of the participle, and the ambitious politician its object.

6. The need of this admonition is seen from the last line of xiv. The Athenians must watch closely every symptom of the times and so be ready to defend their rights before it is too late. Cf. Plut. *Sol.* xxx 5: ὅτε καὶ τὸ μνημονεύμενον εἶπεν, ὡς πρώην μὲν ἦν εὐμαρέστερον αὐτοῖς τὸ κωλύσαι τὴν τυραννίδι συνισταμένην, νῦν δὲ μείζον ἐστὶ καὶ λαμπρότερον ἐκκόψαι καὶ ἀνελεῖν συνεστῶσαν ἡδὴ καὶ πεφυκυῖαν.

XIV

1. The same insistence on human responsibility for disaster is found in the opening lines of xii.

1. λυγρὰ: cf. Hom. *Od.* xviii 134 ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυγρὰ θεοὶ μάκαρες τελέσωσι | καὶ τὰ φέρει ἀεκαζόμενος τετλητότι θυμῷ.

2. *τούτων μοῖραν*: the genitive is appositional. Cf. xv 18 *μοῖραν θανάτου* and Theogn. 356 *τόλμα, Κίρνε, κακοῖσιν ἐπεὶ κάσθλοῖσιν ἔχαιρες, | εὐτέ σε καὶ τούτων μοῖρ' ἐπέβαλλεν ἔχειν*; 592 *ἀμφοτέρων τὸ λάχος*.

3. *ῥύσιι δόντες*: "giving pledges or hostages," thereby putting themselves in their power. Soph. *Oed. Col.* 858 *καὶ μείζον ἄρα ῥύσιον πόλι τάχα | θήσεις*, where, as Jebb points out, *ῥύσιον θείναι* is equivalent to the regular phrase *ἐνέχυρον θείναι*. When one recalls the mortgaged lands which had been set free by Solon (cf. ix), the figure seems a very natural one for the poet to have employed to describe exactly what the *δημος* must have done in its relations with Pisistratus. This reading seems to have more point than the one adopted by most editors — *ῥύματα δόντες*, which is given by Diodorus and Plutarch. These two evidently understood *ῥύματα* to refer to the bodyguard which the people had granted to Pisistratus. But Wilamowitz has pointed out that since *τούτους* in this line is in the plural, the poet is not thinking of Pisistratus alone; and I might add that since *ῥύματα* is in the plural, it must refer to something more than the bodyguard alone. The phrase must mean, then, "giving them the means of defense"; and it is not easy to see just what this refers to. Peppmüller explains *ῥύματα* as "Schutz" or "Stütze," by which he would seem to imply that the phrase means "lending them their support," or something of the kind; and this strains both the concrete *ῥύματα* and the literal meaning of *δοῦναι*.

3. *τούτους*: the particular *ἄνδρας μεγάλους* who were in power at the time. If the poem was written after the usurpation of Pisistratus, the reference must be to Pisistratus and his party. Wilamowitz (1893, II, 312) insists that there is no reason to believe that this is true.

5. *ἀλώπεκος ἔχνεσι βαίνει*: "walks with the tread of a fox"; *ἔχνος* here means a "foot-fall," as in Eur. *Or.* 140 *σίγα σίγα, λεπτὸν ἔχνος ἀρβύλης τίθετε, μὴ κτυπέτ'*; *Phoen.* 105 *ὄρεγέ νυν ὄρεγε γεραιῶν νέα χεῖρ' ἀπὸ κλιμάκων ποδὸς ἔχνος ἐπαντέλλων*. The interpretation "follow the footsteps of a fox" (so Peppmüller, Bucherer, Kynaston) offers a metaphor which does not properly describe the cunning of the Athenians. The shrewdness of the fox was proverbial in the sixth century: cf. Archilochus 96 (Hiller-Crusius) *τῷ δ' ἄρ' ἀλώπηξ κερδιλῆ συνήμετο | πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον*; Semonides 7, 7 (H.-C.) *τὴν δ' ἐξ ἀλιτρῆς θεὸς ἔθηκ' ἀλώπεκος | γυναικα, πάντων ἴδριν· οὐδέ μιν κακῶν | λέληθεν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀμεινόνων*. Piccolomini compares Cratinus frag. 128 Kock *ὑμῶν εἰς μὲν ἕκαστος ἀλώπηξ δωροδοκεῖται*

(emending the last word to δωροδοκεῖ δέ), and Aristoph. *Knights* 752 ff. οἴμοι κακοδαίμων, ὡς ἀπόλωλ'· ὁ γὰρ γέρον | οἴκοι μὲν ἀνδρῶν ἐστι δεξιότατος, | ὅταν δ' ἐπὶ ταυτησὶ κάθηται τῆς πέτρας | κέχηεν ὄσπερ ἐμποδιζῶν ἰσχάδας.

6. χαῖνος νοῦς: cf. Pindar *Pyth.* ii 61 χαῖνι πραπίδι παλαιμονεῖ κενεά; Solon viii 4 χαῖνα μὲν τότ' ἐφράσαντο. One hundred and fifty years later the Athenians were still afflicted with this open-mouthed stupidity, but Aristophanes claims to have cured them: *Acharn.* 633 ff. φησὶν δ' εἶναι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄξιος ὑμῖν ὁ ποιητής, | παύτας ὑμᾶς ξηνοκοῖσι λόγοις μὴ λίαν ἐξαπατᾶσθαι, | μήθ' ἤδεσθαι θωπευομένους μήτ' εἶναι χανοπολίτας.

7. αἰόλον: this word suggests admirably both the nimble eloquence which fascinates the auditors and the shifty wiles which delude them. Aeschylus has the compound αἰολόστομος in *Prom.* 661 used of the obscurity of an oracle. The suggestion of trickiness and deceit is found in Hesiod's compound αἰολόμητις (*Theog.* 511) and in Pindar *Nem.* viii 25 μέγιστον δ' αἰόλω ψεύδει γέρας ἀντέταται.

XV

References: Hiller (1888); Sitzler (1879); Stadtmüller (1882); Weil (1862); Wilamowitz (1893).

This poem, which is manifestly preserved in its complete form, is ascribed to Solon, not only by Philo, but also by the four other authors by whom it is quoted; Diogenes Laertius also, though he does not transcribe the poem, states that Solon fixed the limit of human life at seventy years; and Herodotus (i 32), in telling the story of the interview between Solon and Croesus, puts into Solon's mouth the words: ἐς ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτα οὖρον τῆς ζῆς ἀνθρώπῳ προτίθημι. Furthermore, Aristotle refers to certain poets who divide the space of human life into periods of seven years: *Pol.* 1335 b, 32 ff. (speaking of the age limits within which a man should beget children) διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν. αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἤνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν; 1336 b, 38 ff. δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρησθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ μέχρις ἤβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ, τὴν ἀφ' ἤβης μέχρι τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσι διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς, δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλείπον τῆς φύσεως

βούλεται ἀναπληροῦν. It is extremely probable, therefore, that the poem is a genuine composition of Solon. Its authenticity, however, has been disputed. Porson rejected the poem on two grounds: first, because of its prosaic and unpoetical character; second, because in xxxvii Solon asserts that a man ought to be glad to live till his *eightieth* year. Ahrens bluntly declared the poem spurious. Usener said that πᾶς τις in vs. 7 is an impossible combination, and condemns the whole poem on this ground. These are very slender arguments. πᾶς τις, as Wilamowitz points out, is found in Theognis, Aeschylus, Pindar, and Herodotus. As for the limit of human life, Solon may well have recognized that seventy years was the general rule, and yet, in his healthy attitude toward the world, it is only natural that when the pessimist Mimnernus fixed the limit at sixty, or ten less than seventy, *he* should have insisted that eighty, or ten more, was better. The argument from style leads nowhere. The poem is not an inspired production. But it is characterized by neatness, precision, symmetry; a certain measure of variety is attained in spite of a forbidding subject. Judged by internal evidence, it is as likely to be the work of Solon as of another. The fact that he did not attain to the measure of poetical excellence displayed by Shakespeare in *As You Like It* when he was dealing with a similar theme, proves nothing. Solon was not a Shakespeare.

The interest which the poem possessed for later writers was based on two circumstances: it attempts something like a scientific division of the space of human life, and it is an illustration of the significance of the number seven. Hippocrates (περὶ ἑβδομάδων 5 = viii p. 636 Littré) in a passage which is quoted by Philo immediately after Solon's poem, divides the life of man into seven ages: from the first year to the seventh, παιδίον; from the eighth to the fourteenth, παῖς; from the fifteenth to the twenty-first, μαιράκιον; from the twenty-second to the twenty-eighth, νεάνισκος; from the twenty-ninth to the forty-ninth, ἀνήρ; from the fiftieth to the fifty-sixth, πρεσβύτης; and from the fifty-seventh till death, γέρον. Pollux (ii 4) repeats Hippocrates' seven ages; and the subject of the division of the life of a man is discussed frequently (cf. Censorinus, *de die natali*, 14; Boissonade, *Anecdota*, II, 455; Daremberg, *Notices et extraits de manuscrits médicaux*, 1853, p. 141). Clement and Anatolius, on the other hand, as well as Philo, are led to quote Solon because they are discussing the properties of the number seven.

Weil (1862) discovers strophic composition in the present poem, as he does in xl: "Das menschliche Leben, auf siebzig Jahre veranschlagt, wird in zehn Hebdomaden geteilt. Da aber die siebente und achte Hebdomade zusammengefasst sind, so ergeben sich nur neun Altersstufen, deren jeder ein Distichon gewidmet ist. Die drei ersten gehören der Jugend, die drei letzten dem Greisenalter an, und das ganze zerfällt in drei Strophen von je drei Distichen." The same arguments can be brought against this proposal as have been advanced in the notes to xl.

1. ἔρκος ὀδόντων: a common Homeric phrase.
2. πρῶτον: adverbial.
5. τῇ τριτάτῃ: sc. ἐβδομάδι.
5. Cf. Hom. *Od.* xi 319 πρὶν σφωῖν ὑπὸ κροτάφοισιν ἰούλους | ἀνθῆσαι πυκάσαιτε γένυς εἰανθείϊ λάχνη; and Aesch. *Seven* 664 ff. ἀλλ' οὔτε νιν φυγόνα μητρόθεν σκότον, | οὔτ' ἐν τροφαῖσιν οὐδ' ἐφηβήσαντά πω, | οὔτ' ἐν γενείου συλλογῇ τριχώματος.
6. Cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 22 f. σταθευτὸς δ' ἡλίον φοίβῃ φλογὶ | χροῖās ἀμείψεις ἄνθος.
7. Cf. Hom. *Il.* xiii 484 καὶ δ' ἔχει ἥβης ἄνθος, ὃ τε κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον.
8. *Locus desperatus.*
- 9 f. Hesiod (*W. and D.* 695) and Plato (*Rep.* 460 e and *Laws* 772 e) also regard thirty as the right age for a man to marry.
9. μεμνημένον: cf. Hesiod *W. and D.* 616 τότε' ἔπειτ' ἀρότον μεμνημένος εἶναι | ὠραίων; 641 ἔργων μεμνημένος εἶναι | ὠραίων πάντων.
10. εἰσοπίσω: cf. *Hom. Hymn* v 104 ποίει δ' εἰσοπίσω θαλερὸν γόνον.
- 11 f. Cf. Horace *Ars Poetica* 166: Conversis studiis aetas animusque virilis | quaerit opes et anicitias, inservit honori, | commisisse cavet, quod mox mutare laboret.
11. περὶ πάντα: a phrase found also in xiii 6 and xl 69.
11. καταρτίζεται: probably the earliest appearance of this verb in the sense of "train" or "educate." Homer has only the simple verb ἀρτῶω and uses it with ὕ; the compound always has ὑ except in the present verse.
13. ἐπτά . . . ἐν ἐβδομάσιν . . . ὀκτώ: obviously an effort to secure variety and avoid the repetition of the phrase which has been used four times already. The meaning is the same as if ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ ἐβδομάδι had been

written, and the phrase is not parallel to ἐν ἑπτ' ἔτεσιν of vs. 2, which means "in the course of seven years."

15. *μαλακώτερα*: this word is not found in the present sense in Homeric or early elegiac poetry; but an excellent parallel is furnished by Thucydides (ii 18, 3): αἰτίαν δὲ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (i.e., from the methods employed by him at Oenoe), δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξύναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειος, οὐ παραινῶν προθύμως πολεμεῖν.

17. It is interesting to recall that the Hebrew Psalmist also fixed the limit of human life at "three score years and ten."

17. κατὰ μέτρον ἔκοιτο: i.e., καθ'κοιτο τὸ μέτρον αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς δεκάτης ἐβδομάδος); τὸ μέτρον is the "full measure" or the "end."

XVI

References: Daremberg (1869); Hiller (1888); Madvig (1871); Platt (1896); Sitzler (1879, 1900).

On xvi and xvi—a see page 13, footnote 3.

The two kinds of riches described in these lines may be called separable and inseparable riches, and Solon maintains that the second are at least as good as the first. Separable riches are such possessions as are enumerated in the first two lines—money, land, horses. Inseparable riches are those which are inherent in the person of the owner, and, as here conceived, they are purely physical. Perfect health and a sound body insure not only immunity from pain, but also afford the means of positive enjoyment through the satisfaction of the normal appetites. But human appetites are not fixed and unalterable throughout life: each age brings its own desires and capacities. The formula, therefore, for inseparable human wealth (to speak in mathematical language) varies as the desires and capacities of the subject vary with the advancing years. Here is a whole philosophy of life. Confronted by the three allied enemies of the human race, disease, old age, and death, which is the better viaticum for a man to choose, separable or inseparable wealth? The choice is easy: material possessions will avail against none of the foes, personal well-being will render at least one of them powerless. This is a slight amplification of Solon's thought, and presents the large principle upon which he bases his disparagement of material riches.

3. *μόνα ταῦτα*: *i.e.*, ἀβρὰ παθεῖν and σὺν δ' ὥρη γίγνεται ἀρμόδια.

4. *γαστρί τε καὶ πλευρῇ καὶ ποσίν*: datives of means with ἀβρὰ παθεῖν; the three parts of the body stand, by synecdoche, for the whole physique.

4. Cf. Horace *Ep.* i 12, 5: Si ventri bene, si lateri est pedibusque tuis, nil | divitiae poterunt regales addere maius.

4. Daremberg (1869, p. 9): “. . . il (sc. Solon) a placé la vraie richesse, je veux dire la vraie santé, dans un bon estomac, dans une robuste poitrine et dans des pieds agiles; s'il ne dit rien de la tête, c'est que dans l'antique médecine cette partie, dont la poitrine avait usurpé les fonctions, ne jouait pas encore le rôle important que lui accordent la physiologie et la pathologie modernes.”

4. ἀβρὰ παθεῖν: this phrase is ordinarily used to mean the enjoyment of such luxuries as money can buy, and comes as a surprise after three such humble sources of pleasure as *γαστρί*, *πλευρῇ*, and *ποσίν*.

5. *παιδός τ' ἡδὲ γυναικός*: the genitive is to be taken with ἡβη.

5. ἐπὶν καὶ ταῦτ' ἀφίκεται: ταῦτα refers vaguely and somewhat guardedly to the pleasures of love, which have already been suggested by *παιδός τ' ἡδὲ γυναικός* and which are more definitely named in ἡβη. From the tone of this clause and the presence of καί one may judge that such pleasures were not regarded as indispensable to happiness.

6. ἡβη: parallel with the datives *γαστρί τε καὶ πλευρῇ καὶ ποσίν* and another source of the pleasures of the simple life.

6. σὺν δ' ὥρη κτλ.: this is still part of the relative clause introduced by φ in vs. 3.

6. ὥρη: every season of human life from childhood to extreme old age. Each one of the ἐβδομάδες described in xv may be called a ὥρη.

6. ἀρμόδια.: personal powers and external opportunities appropriate to each age. Perrin (1914), printing ἡβη and ὥρη in vs. 6, translates vss. 3–6 as follows: “While to the other only enough belongs | To give him comfort of food, and clothes, and shoes, | Enjoyment of child and blooming wife, when these too come, | And only years commensurate therewith are his.” This translation seems to me quite wrong for the following reasons: it leaves ταῦτα (vs. 3) out of account; *γαστρί* and *ποσίν* might suggest food and shoes, but *πλευρῇ* could hardly suggest clothes; ἡβη belongs to *παιδός* as well as to *γυναικός*, and it is hardly likely that the boy should be the man's own son; ὥρη does not naturally mean the whole stretch of a man's life;

and "commensurate therewith" is not clear — commensurate with what? Some of these errors are found also in Schneidewin and Hartung. Humbert has it correctly: ". . . celui qui n'a que les biens suivants : les jouissances que procurent un bon estomac, de vigoureux poumons, des jambes solides, l'amour pendant sa jeunesse ou des plaisirs en rapport à son âge."

7. *περιώσια* : a rare word ; found in a somewhat similar sense in Apoll. Rhod. *Arg.* ii 394 *περιώσια φύλα Βεχέρων*.

XVII

Reference : Wilamowitz (1893).

Aristotle seems to have had in mind the whole poem of which these four lines are a fragment when he wrote (*Eth. Nic.* 1179 a, 9 f.) : *καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἔκτος κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ κάλλιστα, ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἂ δέει.*

1. *κακοί, ἀγαθοί* : not primarily a moral distinction. The *ἀγαθοί* are the persons of good family who have had the benefit of training, education, and environment, and who are possessed therefore of that general human excellence which was called *ἀρετή* ; the *κακοί* are persons of the lower classes, inferior in all points of human excellence. The *ἀγαθοί* are the élite ; the *κακοί*, the vulgar. *ἀρετῆς* in vs. 3 is not virtue or merely moral excellence, but rather that high development of the physical, mental, moral, and æsthetic endowments which are included in the whole human complex. Such *ἀρετή*, embracing the full measure of a man, is attainable only through birth and breeding in the first instance and personal endeavor besides. One of these sources is rarely sufficient without the other. Furthermore, *ἀρετή* is not for the poor and needy ; normally a competence, if not wealth, is necessary for its attainment. And yet *ἀρετή* and wealth are not identical ; Solon himself is an example of a man who had one without the other. Wilamowitz (1893, II, p. 305) asserts : "Die *ἀρετή* ist bereits die der seele, nicht die des blutes für ihn (Solon). Die moralische bedeutung der begriffe *ἀγαθός* und *κακός* gilt bereits für Solon." This he says in order to justify the contention, which is probably true, that the poem was written in criticism of the timocratic constitution which prevailed in Athens. But it is unnecessary to insist that *ἀρετή* and *ἀγαθός* must refer to *either* birth *or* morality. The philosophic conception of virtue was still far in the future at Solon's time.

On the other hand, there was probably a moral ingredient in the composition of ἀρετή from the beginning.

1. πένονται: "are poor." The word is not found in this sense in Homer and Hesiod, but it is common in Attic.

1. ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται: subordinate in thought to πολλοὶ πλουτοῦσι κακοί; αὐτοῖσ' in the next line refers to κακοί.

2 f. Cf. Plato *Laws* 728 a: πᾶς γὰρ ὁ τ' ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς χροσὸς ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἀντάξιος.

4. Cf. Eur. *Electra* 941-944 ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιος, οὐ τὰ χρήματα. | ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ παραμένουσ' αἴρει κακά | ὁ δ' ὄλβος ἀδίκως καὶ μετὰ σκαίων ξυνὸν | ἐξέπτατ' οἴκων, συμμικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον.

XVIII

It is difficult to say whence these two rather insignificant verses came or why Plutarch and his authorities saw fit to preserve them. The legend is preserved in several places (see Meyer, 1893, II, 568) that the laws of Zaleucus were directly inspired by Athena, in which case they might well have taken poetical form; and Hermippus (Athenaeus xiv 619 b) reports that the laws of Charondas were sung at banquets in Athens. The present lines, therefore, may have formed the introduction to a poetical version of some early code. But it is unlikely that Solon himself wrote them, because if he had written no more than this, it would have gone into the wastebasket; if he had written his whole code in verse, we should have had fragments of it in that form.

2. τύχην ἀγαθῆν: a common Attic formula, especially in the dative.

2. κῦδος ὀπάσσαι: a Homeric phrase; cf. Hom. *Il.* vii 205, viii 141, xii 255; *Od.* iii 57, etc.

XIX

Reference: Sitzler (1897).

It is probable that the two couplets here quoted by Plutarch are derived from different poems and are brought together as evidence for Solon's scientific ideas. That it is unfair to deduce his ideas from them is manifest. The first couplet appears also in xiii, preserved by Diodorus, where it is followed by four other lines. The second couplet (xix) probably formed part of a longer passage in which Solon drew the comparison between the δῆμος

and the sea, as in xiii he compares the strong men in a state to a storm cloud. Cf. *Frag. iamb adesp.* 11 (H.-C.): *δημος ἄστατον κακὸν | καὶ θαλάσση πάνθ' ὁμοῖον ὑπ' ἀνέμου ῥιπίζεται, | καὶ γαληνὸς ἦν τύχη, πρὸς πνεῦμα βραχὺ κορύσσεται, | κῆν τις αἰτία γένηται, τὸν πολίτην κατέπιεν.* Herodotus vii 16 *τὰ σὲ καὶ ἀμφότερα περιήκοντα ἀνθρώπων κακῶν ὁμίλια σφάλλοισι, κατάπερ τὴν πάντων χρησιμωτάτην ἀνθρώποισι θάλασσαν πνεύματά φασι ἐμπίπτοντα οὐ περιορᾶν φύσι τῆ ἔωντῆς χρῆσθαι.* Polybius xi 29 *ὄθεν αἰεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περὶ τε τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν. καθάπερ γὰρ κἀκείνης ἢ μὲν ἰδίᾳ φύσις ἐστὶν ἀβλαβῆς τοῖς χρωμένους καὶ στάσιμους, ὅταν δ' εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέσῃ τὰ πνεύματα βία, τοιαύτη φαίνεται τοῖς χρωμένους, οἳ οἱ τινες ἂν ᾤσιν οἱ κυκλῶντες αὐτὴν ἄνεμοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αἰεὶ καὶ φίνεται καὶ γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς χρωμένους, οἷους ἂν ἔχη προστάτας καὶ συμβούλους.* Dionys. Hal. xvii 12 *παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχουσιν αἱ δημοκρατοῦμεναι πόλεις τοῖς πελάγεσιν' ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων ταράττεται φύσιν ἔχοντα ἡρεμεῖν [sic.], αὐταὶ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν δημαγωγῶν κυκλῶνται μηδὲν ἐν αὐταῖς ἔχουσαι κακόν.* Cicero *pro Cluentio* 49, 138: *Ex quo intelligi potuit id quod saepe dictum est: ut mare, quod natura sua tranquillum sit, ventorum vi agitari atque turbari, sic populum Romanum sua sponte esse placatum, hominum seditiosorum vocibus, ut violentissimis tempestatibus concitari.*

2. *δικαιοσύνη*: "well-regulated," "law-abiding."

XX

References: Dümmler (1894), Leutsch (1872).

For the circumstances of the composition of this poem see pages 39 ff. There is probably no special significance in the opening words, which should not be taken literally. If Solon had really been a herald, he certainly would not have made his proclamation in verse. He is a herald only in a figurative sense, intending to accomplish through his poem the same kind of result that a herald would have accomplished through his spoken proclamation. As a herald comes from a city which is in danger and distress to implore the aid of a neighboring city and delivers his plea before the assembled citizens, so Solon makes himself the champion of imperiled Salamis and pleads her cause in verse. The suspicions of Leutsch (1872, p. 137) concerning the authenticity of this couplet are sufficiently answered by this interpretation.

2. *κόσμον ἐπέων*: a literary composition, in which art governs the choice and combination of words; here the object of *θέμενος* (= *ποιήσας*). Cf. Thuç.

iii 67 λόγοι ἔπεισι κοσμηθέντες; Pind. *Ol.* 11, 14 κόσμον . . . ἀδυμελῆ κελαδῆσω; Philetas of Cos, 8, 3 (Schneidewin) ἀλλ' ἐπέων εἰδὼς κόσμον καὶ πολλὰ μογήσας | μύθων παντοίων οἶμον ἐπιστάμενος.

2. ᾠδὴν: a poem to be sung, here used in apposition to κόσμον ἐπέων.

2. ἀγορῆς: a speech; this meaning is rare, but it is found in Hom. *Il.* ii 788.

XXI-XXII

References: Hiller (1886); Mekler (1895); Platt (1896); Shorey (1911); Sitzler (1879, 1900); Wilamowitz (1893).

XXI and XXII almost certainly belong to the same poem, from which also viii is possibly drawn. For the circumstances see pp. 56 ff.

XXI

2. ἀμειλίχου: cf. Semonides vii 35 (H.-C.) ἀμείλιχος δὲ πᾶσι κάποθυμή | ἐχθροῖσιν ἴσα καὶ φίλοισι γίγνεται.

3. καταισχύνας κλέος: cf. Eur. *Hel.* 845 τὸ Τρωικὸν γὰρ οὐ καταισχυνῶ κλέος.

3. There is some difference of opinion about the interpretation of μίανας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος. What stain upon Solon's reputation is meant? Wilamowitz, followed by Bucherer, thinks that the stain is that which Solon's reputation actually incurred in the minds of the majority when he refused to seize the tyranny. The other view is that the stain was that which his reputation would have incurred if he had seized the tyranny. Wilamowitz claims that xxi and xxii belong to the same poem and that xxii precedes xxi; the first line of xxii, then, seems to him to justify his interpretation of xxi 3. This is extremely improbable, for two reasons. (1) The participles μίανας and αἰσχύνας fall most naturally under the influence of the negative οὐ, and therefore cannot be taken in Wilamowitz' sense. Bucherer tries to parry this argument by saying that the οὐ belongs closely to καθηψάμην, making with it a single idea, "verschmähte"; and by this he explains why we have οὐ and not μή. But οὐ is, of course, the proper negative in this sentence, which is not a conditional, but a causal or objective clause with αἰδεῖμαι. For the idiom of the negative which is extended to the two participles, see Shorey (1911). (2) The words μίανας and καταισχύνας are far too strong, for even Solon's critics, to use of his failure to

seize the tyranny, whereas they express exactly Solon's conception of the disgrace which would have fallen upon him through such an attempt. Humbert is right here as usual — "si je n'ai pas voulu, dans la crainte de flétrir ma gloire, avoir recours à la tyrannie," etc. Shorey points out that there is nothing in this fragment or the next to justify the interpretation that they are Solon's serious apology for not having seized and used the tyranny in the interests of either of the two political parties. The apology which they contain is not a political apology at all. "It is at the most the ironical apology of the higher morality to the lower morality of the man of the world—the apology of a Socrates to a Callicles (Plato, *Gorg.* 522 d)" (Shorey).

4 f. Solon here refuses to be judged by the ordinary standards of his day, and therefore feels no *αἰδώς* in disregarding them. He sets up a new moral principle not hitherto recognized, and, by acting in accordance with it, he justly claims superiority over the rest of the world, which has not yet recognized the principle.

XXII

Not only the thought of these lines, but the tone of the language as well, are characteristic of the common man (*τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ φαίλους*, to use Plutarch's words). The last line in particular is distinctly Aristophanic.

1. Cf. Soph. *Ant.* 79 τὸ δὲ | βία πολιτῶν δρᾶν ἔφην ἀμήχανος.

1. *βαθύφρων*: cf. Pind. *Nem.* vii 1 Εἰλείθνια, πάρεδρε Μοιρῶν βαθυφρόνων; Aesch. *Pers.* 142 φροντίδα κεδνήν καὶ βαθύβουλον.

1. *βουλήεις*: a very rare word.

3. Cf. Herod. i 141 λαβεῖν ἀμφίβληττρον καὶ περιβαλεῖν τε πλῆθος πολλὸν τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ ἐξειρῦσαι.

3. *ἐπίσπασεν*: "drew the net tight," as in Dem. xxiv 139 τέθνηκεν ἐπισπασθέντος τοῦ βρόχου (of a death by hanging).

4. *θυμοῦ . . . καὶ φρενῶν*: these qualities are thought of as necessary for one who would usurp the tyranny, not for a fisherman drawing in his net.

4. *ἀμαρτῆ*: "at the same time."

5 ff. Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 503 ff. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδέν, μήτερ, ἀποκρύψας ἐρῶ | ἄστρον ἂν ἔλθοιμ' ἡλίον πρὸς ἀντολὰς | καὶ γῆς ἐνερθεν, δυνατὸς ὦν δρᾶσαι τὰδε, | τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὥστ' ἔχειν Τυραννίδα.

7. ἀσκὸς δεδάρθαι : cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 439 ff. νῦν οὖν ἀτεχνῶς ὁ τι βούλονται τουτὶ τοῖμὸν σῶμ' αὐτοῖσιν παρέχω, τύπτειν πεινῆν διψῆν αἰχμεῖν ῥιγῶν ἀσκὸν δέριεν κτλ. ; *Knights* 370 δερῶ σε θύλακον κλοπῆς ; Plat. *Euthyd.* 285 d ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτὸς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἔμαντὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ ἐὰν βούλωνται δέριεν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἴ μοι ἢ δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἀσκὸν τελευτήσῃ ὥσπερ ἢ τοῦ Μαρσίου, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετήν.

7. ἐπιτετριφθῆναι : evidently a word of the popular speech, not found in the earlier poets (though Sophocles has ἐπίτριπτος in *Ajax* 103), but common in Aristophanes. In δεδάρθαι κάπιτετριφθῆναι the perfect tense describes the eternal state which the speaker is willing to accept in return for one brief day of glory.

7. γίνος : subject of ἐπιτετριφθῆναι ; not, as Bucherer says, accusative of reference.

XXIII

Plutarch is here quoting parenthetically the second line of an elegiac couplet ; γάρ is not part of the verse, and ἔργμασι must have been ἔργμασιν. The occasion of the quotation is the description of the dissatisfaction and criticism which prevailed after the establishment of Solon's laws. Whether the line belongs to a poem which was composed at that time is uncertain ; the sentiment would harmonize well with that of vi. Bergk says that possibly the poem from which this line is quoted contained also Theogn. 801-804 : Οἰδέεις ἀνθρώπων οὔτ' ἔσσειται οὔτε πέφυκεν, | ὅστις πᾶσιν ἀδὼν δύσεται εἰς Αἶδεω | οὔδ' ἐ γὰρ ὣς θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσει, | Ζεὺς Κρονίδης, θνητοῖς πᾶσιν ἀδὲν δύναιται. But it seems certain that Solon would not have written verses of so cynical a strain.

XXIV

References : Koehler (1892) ; Sitzler (1897).

See pages 95 ff.

The lines refer probably to a sojourn in Naucratis as well as in Sais and other Egyptian cities. Koehler (1892, p. 345), indeed, feels so certain that Naucratis is referred to that he regards the verse as a proof that a Greek commercial settlement existed at Naucratis before the time of Amasis (569-526).

προχοῆσι : used thus commonly in the plural of the mouth of a river ; cf. Hom. *Il.* xvii 263 ; *Od.* v 453, etc.

XXV

For Solon's visit to Philocyprus, king of Soli in the island of Cyprus, see pages 95 ff.

These lines formed a part, probably the close, of the poem referred to by Herodotus (v 113), in which Solon praised Philocyprus more highly than all other tyrants (*ἐν ἔπεσι αἶνεσε τυράννων μάλιστα*). With Solon's farewell to Philocyprus may be compared the farewell of Odysseus to Alcinous in Hom. *Od.* xiii 38 ff., where Odysseus, like Solon, bespeaks prosperity for his host and a safe return for himself: ἀμύμονα δ' οἴκοι ἄκοιτιν | νοστήσας εὐροίμη σὺν ἀρτεμέεσσι φίλοισιν. | ἡμεῖς δ' αὖθι μένοντες εὐφραίνοιτε γυναῖκας | κούριδισ καὶ τέκνα· θεοὶ δ' ἀρετὴν ὀπάσειαν | παντοῖην, καὶ μὴ τι κακὸν μεταδῆμιον εἴη.

4. Κύπρις ἰοστέφανος: cf. *Hom. Hymn* vi 18 εἶδος θανμάζοντες ἰοστέφανον Κυθρεΐης; *Theogn.* 1304 οὐκέτι δηρὸν | ἕξεις Κυπρογενοῦς δῶρον ἰοστέφανου.

5. οἰκισμῶ: properly an abstract noun, "the founding of a settlement," here used for the settlement itself. The word is uncommon, but it is found in Plat. *Laws* 708 d πόλεων οἰκισμοί.

XXVI

References: Blass (1888); Crusius (1895); Sitzler (1894).

The reply to Mimnernus which is here referred to has been preserved by Diogenes Laertius (see xxxvii), and most editors regard the two fragments as parts of the same poem. Some go even farther. Bergk remarked that vss. 1069 f. in *Theognis'* collection —

Ἄφρονες ἄνθρωποι καὶ νήπιοι, οἷτε θανόντας
κλαίουσ', οὐδ' ἤβης ἄνθος ἀπολλύμενον, —

were probably written by Mimnernus; Schneidewin pointed out that Solon's couplet may be a reply to them; and Blass (1888, p. 742) thinks there is no doubt but that we have two complete poems, one by Mimnernus, consisting of *Mimn.* frag. vi (B.) and *Theogn.* 1069 f., the other by Solon, consisting of xxxvii and xxvi. I cannot accept this reconstruction. In the first place, Solon's lines are not really a reply to the lines in *Theognis*; in the second place, they do not easily follow *immediately* after xxxvii. There is an air of epigrammatic finality in xxxvii, which will not tolerate the addition of such a sentiment as that expressed in xxvi. It

seems to me not improbable that xxxvii formed the close of a longer poem addressed to Mimmernus and that xxvi is a quotation from the earlier portion of that poem. These lines attracted the attention of Cicero, who alludes to them in two places. In the *Tusculan Disputations* (i 49, 117) he translates them into a Latin couplet: "Mors mea ne careat lacrimis, linquamus amicis | Maerorem, ut celebrent funera cum gemitu." In the *Cato Major* (20, 73) he compares them with a verse of Ennius in which the opposite sentiment is expressed: "Solonis quidem sapientis est elegium, quo se negat velle suam mortem dolore amicorum et lamentis vacare. Volt, credo, se esse carum suis, sed haud scio an melius Ennius: 'Nemo me lacrimis decoret, neque funera fletu | Faxit.'" On this opinion of Cicero Nageotte (1888, p. 167) remarks: "Il (*i.e.*, Cicero) trouve plus de courage dans le Romain que dans le Grec. J'en suis fâché pour Cicéron, mais il n'a pas compris les vers de Solon. Solon ne se lamente pas du tout, comme il le croit, à l'idée de la mort; ce qu'il veut seulement, c'est que son souvenir soit cher à ses amis, que son départ les attriste. J'aime mieux ce besoin d'affection qui se prolonge même au-delà du tombeau, que le stoïcisme un peu pédant d'Ennius."

XXVII

Allusion had been made by the previous speaker in Plutarch's dialogue to Solon's law forbidding intercourse between slaves and boys.

1. ἡβης ἐρατοῖσιν ἐπ' ἀνθεσι: cf. Hom. *Il.* xiii 484 καὶ δ' ἔχει ἡβης ἄνθος, ὃ τε κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον; Mimmernus 1, 4 ἡβης ἄνθεα γίγνεται ἀρπαλέα | ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξίν; Tyrtaeus 10, 28 ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς ἡβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχη; Theogn. 1348 παιδείης ἄνθος ἔχοντ' ἐρατόν.

XXVIII

Reference: Gomperz (1880).

ὄθεν: this refers to the arguments which have been advanced by the speaker in support of his view that the love of men for women is a nobler thing than the love of men for boys. Devotion to wine, women, and song is not at the present day regarded as a characteristic of the calm of middle life, still less of advancing age (*πρεσβύτης*); but to the Greek it was natural to believe that the gifts of Aphrodite, Dionysus, and the Muses were the decent pleasures of the normal man.

1. Κυπρογενούς: cf. Κύπρις xxv 4.

XXIX

This line may have belonged to the same poem as xxx and xxxiii. See the note on xxxiii.

ἴγδιν: this word, which properly meant a "mortar," was also, according to Pollux (*loc. cit.*), the name of a kind of dance (ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἴγδιν καὶ ὀρχήσεως σχῆμα), in which sense it was used by Antisthenes and probably also by Solon.

XXX

Phrynichus points out in the passage immediately preceding the quotation the impropriety of using the word *στρόβιλος* for either a pine nut or a pine tree, the proper words being *πίτυς* and *πίτυος καρπός*. "The words from *καὶ γάρ* to the end," says Rutherford, "may well be a spurious addition made by some one who happened to have heard *κόκκων* so used by the vulgar. The remark is awkwardly introduced, and contradicts τὸ δὲ ἐδώδιμον *πιτύων καρπός*. There is no reason for assigning to *κόκκων* in Solon's iambs the meaning of *στρόβιλος*, 'the edible kernel of a pine cone.'" See note on xxxiii.

XXXI

1. *γνωμοσύνης*: a very rare derivative, formed from *γνώμων* as *σωφροσύνη* is formed from *σώφρων*. It means "the ability to see and comprehend." For *γνωμοσύνης ἀφανὲς μέτρον*, cf. *ἀθανάτων ἀφανὲς νόος* in xxxii.

2. *πάντων πείρατ' ἔχει*: the meaning of *πείρατα* here as in many other instances is uncertain. In Homer it has at least two well defined meanings, "ropes" or "cables," and "end" or "bounds"; besides the passages where either one or the other of these is applicable, there are many others where there is room for doubt. In such a place as *Il. vii 102 αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε | νίκης πείρατ' ἔχονται ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν*, it is not impossible that the poet was thinking of a figurative use of *πείρατα* in the sense of "ropes"; the gods may hold the strings which control the course of human events. On the other hand, the word may mean here "the consummation" or "power of accomplishment," as *τέλος* frequently does. Whichever figure lies at the back of this idiom, it is obvious that we have the same idiom in Archilochus 52 (H.-C.) *νίκης δ' ἐν θεοῖσι πείρατα*; in Theogn. 1171 f. *Γνώμη, Κύρνε, θεοὶ θνητοῖσι διδοῦσιν ἄριστον | ἀνθρώποις· γνώμη πείρατα παντὸς ἔχει*; and

in the present passage in Solon. Now if we put by the side of these Hesiod *W. and D.* 669 ἐν τοῖς γὰρ [*i.e.*, ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς] τέλος ἐστὶν ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε, and Semonides 1, 1 f. τέλος μὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει βαρύκτυπος | πάντων ὅσ' ἔσται, it seems fair to assume that πείρατα ἔχειν with the genitive is equivalent to τέλος ἔχειν with the genitive and that both mean "to possess the power of bringing to fulfillment," "to be sovereign over." This conclusion is corroborated by Soph. frag. dub. 1028 (ap. Clem. *Strom.* V xiv 128, 2) οὐδὲ θεοῖς ἀθαίρετα πάντα πέλονται, | νόσφι Διός' κείνος γὰρ ἔχει τέλος ἡδὲ καὶ ἀρχήν, in which not only consummation but also initiation is ascribed to Zeus. Furthermore, τέλος ἔχειν came to have a political sense, "to be endowed with plenary powers," as in the treaty quoted by Thuc. iv 118. If we conclude, then, that πείρατ' ἔχειν means "to be sovereign over," whatever may have been the origin of the use, there is still another question to be raised. The subject of ἔχει is not personal; ὅ is a neuter pronoun whose antecedent is μέτρον. We may say, of course, that the real subject is γνωμοσύνης μέτρον, or, going one step farther back, God himself, who possesses γνωμοσύνης ἀφανὲς μέτρον. This is probably true. But can we suppose that Solon was unaware of the suggestive relationship between the words μέτρον and πείρατα? We shall not be accusing Solon of a philosophical abstraction, nor do we need to impute to him any of the doctrines of the later schools, if we insist that there hovered before his mind the very concrete figure of the infinite wisdom of God containing and comprehending within itself all things of finite dimensions. This figure, however, is only an overtone, I believe, enriching the familiar idiom which is employed. The lines quoted above from Theognis give a curious twist to the thought and the language of Solon's couplet. Theognis makes human wit supreme, though he deigns to acknowledge that this wit is the gift of heaven. The difference between these two couplets is typical of the difference in the philosophy of the two men.

XXXII

The lines of Hesiod which are here referred to are quoted by Clement immediately before the present passage (Hesiod *Melampodie*, frag. clix Rzsch²): μάντις δ' οὐδέίς ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, | ὅστις ἂν εἶδε ἢ Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο.

XXXIII

References: Hammer (1902); Sitzler (1894, 1907).

It seems probable that this fragment and xxix and xxx belonged to the same poem. What the subject of it was, we can only conjecture. Hartung's suggestion that it was a satire on the gluttony of the rich is the most plausible one. Crusius remarks that the present fragment recalls the fabulous world of pleasure and delight which the comic poets were fond of describing, and hazards the guess that Solon relegated to this world the ungrateful persons mentioned in x. Cf. Anacreon, frag. 13 (H.-C.): ἡρίστησα μὲν ἰ-ρίου λεπτοῦ μικρὸν ἀτοκλάς, | οἴνου δ' ἐξέπιον κάδον, νῦν δ' ἀβρῶς ἐρόεσσαν | ψάλλω πηκτίδι τῆ φέλλῃ κωμάζων παῖδ' ἀβρῆ.

1. πίνουσι καὶ τρώγουσιν: the regular phrase for a Greek symposium, when the banqueters drank their wine and ate with it sweetmeats, cakes, and bonbons of all kinds. Cf. Dem. *Fals. Leg.* 197 ταύτην τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὕτωσὶ πίνειν ἤσυχῆ καὶ τρώγειν ἠνάγκαζον οὔτοι; Aristoph. *Peace* 1324 σῦκά τε τρώγειν; Herodotus iv 143 ὀρμημένου Δαρείου ροιὰς τρώγειν; i 71 πρὸς δὲ οὐκ οἴνω διαχρώνται [*i.e.*, the primitive Persians], ἀλλὰ ὑδροποτόεσσι, οὐ σῦκα δὲ ἔχουσι τρώγειν, οὐκ ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδ' ἔν.

1. ἴτρια: one of the countless varieties of small cakes which were made by the Greeks. Cf. Athen. 646 d ἴτριον πεμμάτιον λεπτόν διὰ σησάμου καὶ μέλιτος γινόμενον.

2. ἄρτον: bread made of wheat flour.

4. ἄσσα γῆ φέρει: *e.g.*, figs and pomegranates.

XXXIV-XXXVIII

No modern critical edition of Diogenes Laertius exists. The quotations have been made from Cobet's edition, and the textual notes have been supplied from the edition of Hübner, from Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, and, for xxxvii, from Diels (1902, p. 480).

XXXIV

For the circumstances referred to in this and the following fragment, see pages 39 ff. These two fragments evidently belong to the poem called "Salamis," from which xx also is derived. Lehmann-Haupt (1912, p. 19) says without any authority whatever that the poem *closed* with the couplet of xxxv.

1. *τότ'* : *i.e.*, if we give up the attempt to recover Salamis.
1. Pholegandros and Sicinos were two small islands south of Paros among the Cyclades.
2. *ἀντί γ' Ἀθηναίου* : *γε* is an indication of the scornful tone in which Solon would have uttered the name of the city which had disgraced itself.
3. *φάτις ἦδε κτλ.* : "this remark would become current in the world."
4. *ἀνὴρ* : with *Ἀττικός*. *Ἀττικός ἀνὴρ* is one predicate of *οὗτος*, and *τῶν Σαλαμιναφετῶν* is another.
4. *Σαλαμιναφετῶν* : a characteristic Greek compound, admirably conceived to signify the contempt which Athens would bring on herself. Such catchwords, crystallizing the spirit of a party, are dangerous weapons of offense in political controversies.

XXXV

1. *ῖομεν* : the vowel of the stem (*i*) is lengthened under the ictus, as in Hom. *Il.* ii 440, ix 625, xii 328 ; in all these passages *ῖομεν* forms the first foot.

1. *περὶ νήσου* : cf. Tyrtaeus x 13 (B.) : *θυμῶ γῆς περὶ τῆσδε μαχώμεθα καὶ περὶ παίδων | θνήσκωμεν.*

2. *χαλεπὸν τ' αἰσχρὸς ἀπωσόμενοι* : Demosthenes, speaking of Solon's success in rousing the Athenians to recover Salamis, paraphrases these words (*Fals. Leg.* 252) : *καὶ τὴν μὲν χώραν ἀνέσωσε τῇ πόλει, τὴν δ' ὑπάρχουσαν αἰσχύνην ἀπήλλαξεν.*

XXXVI

References : Hiller (1883) ; Leutsch (1872) ; Zacher (1882).

For the occasion on which these verses were supposed to have been uttered, see Appendix 7. They may belong to the same group of poems as xiii and xiv.

1. Solon claims that the madness of which he is accused will shortly be revealed, insinuating thereby that when it is revealed it will be found to be not madness at all.

1. *ἀστοῖς* : Leutsch (1872, p. 262) claims that the *ἀστοί* here are the nobles, evidently basing his opinion on the fact that the popular party supported Pisistratus and might be supposed to be already acquainted with his ambitions. But Zacher and Hiller insist that the *ἀστοί* are all the townsfolk, and they are certainly right.

2. Conspirators have been deceiving the people and concealing the truth

from them; but when they put their plans into effect, the truth will come out of her hiding-place into the midst of the people where all can see her.

2. ἐς μέσον: cf. Soph. *Phil.* 609 δέσμιόν τ' ἄγων | ἔδειξ' Ἀχαιοῖς ἐς μέσον, θήραν καλήν.

Immediately after this couplet, Diogenes quotes the four lines of xiii with the assertion that they also relate to the usurpation of Pisistratus. Bergk thinks that the two fragments belong to the same period in the life of Solon, but that they are not derived from the same poem.

XXXVII

References: Diels (1902); Sitzler (1907).

See the notes on xxvi.

1. εἰ . . . πείσειαι: not equivalent to a condition with a subjunctive, but bearing the meaning, rather, of εἰ ἐθέλεις πείθεσθαι (see Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, 407); the ἄν, therefore, of κἄν probably has nothing to do with the verb. κἄν throws its emphasis on νῦν alone, "even now," "even at this late hour"; for which use the following passages may be compared: Aristoph. *Acharn.* 1021 μέτρησον εἰρήνης τί μοι, κἄν πέντ' ἔτη; *Clouds* 1130 ὥστ' ἴσως βουλήσεται | κἄν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τυχεῖν ὄν μᾶλλον ἢ κρίναι καλῶς; *Ilysiatr.* 671 εἰ γὰρ ἐνδώσει τις ἡμῶν ταῖσδε κἄν σμικρὰν λαβήν; Soph. *Electra* 1483 ἀλλά μοι πάρες | κἄν σμικρὸν εἰπεῖν.

2. ὅτι σευ τοῖον ἐπεφρασάμην: for the genitive σευ, cf. Xen. *Mem.* i 6, 1; Plat. *Phaedo* 89 a; for the enclitic at the end of the first half of the pentameter, Theogn. 706; Mimn. 1, 2.

2. Cf. Hom. *Od.* viii 94 Ἀλκίνοος δέ μιν οἶος ἐπεφράσατ' ἦδ' ἐνόησεν; *Il.* v 665 τὸ μὲν οὐ τις ἐπεφράσατ' οὐδ' ἐνόησε, | μηροῦ ἐξερύσαι δόρυ μείλινον.

3. Λιγυστάδης: this complimentary epithet has been restored to the text by Bergk from Suidas s.v. Μίμνερνος: Λιγυρτιάδου . . . ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ καὶ Λιγυστάδης διὰ τὸ ἐμμελὲς καὶ ἡδύ (λιγύ Bekker). Diels (p. 480) derives the word from λιγύς and ἄδειν, "a member of the family or guild of clear-voiced singers," comparing Σαλαμιναφετῶν and the comic compounds in Aristophanes; but Sitzler, though he allows the word the same meaning, thinks a compound with ἄδειν impossible for Solon's time and derives it directly from λιγύς.

4. μοῖρα κίχου θανάτου: the same phrase appears in Callinus 1, 15; Tyrtaeus 7, 2; and Theognis 340. Cf. also Solon xv 18 and xl 30.

XXXVIII

References : Diels (1889) ; Hiller (1878).

Metrical scheme :

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∠ | 4 |
| 2. | — | ∠ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∠ | 4 |
| 3. | ∠ | — | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∠ | — | | | | | | | 4 |
| 4. | ∠ | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∠ | | | | | | 4 |
| 5. | ∪ | ∠ | ∠ | ∪ | ∠ | ∪ | ∠ | — | | | | | | | 4 |

Flach (1884, p. 362) maintains that this fragment is authentic, but it is generally regarded as spurious, on the following grounds. For each one of the Seven Wise Men, Diogenes Laertius records the number of lines of poetry that he had written, the elegiac couplet which was inscribed on his grave, and a fragment of lyric verse composed by him. These three items are always given together (Thales, i 34 f. ; Solon, i 61 f. ; Chilon i 68, 71, 73 ; Pittacus i 78 f. ; Bias, i 85 f. ; Cleobulus, i 89, 91, 93 ; Periander, i 97. For Periander alone no lyric is preserved). In the case of Thales, Lobon of Argos is explicitly mentioned as the authority from whom they are derived. Now since the number of lines of poetry is demonstrably fictitious, most of the Seven Wise Men having written nothing at all, and since the epitaphs, being all cast in the same mold, are manifest forgeries, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the lyric fragments, too, were composed by Lobon or some other compiler from whom he borrowed them. For the whole matter, see Hiller.

1. *πεφνυλαγμένος* : cf. Hom. *Il.* xxiii 343 ἀλλά, φίλος, φρονέων πεφνυλαγμένος εἶναι. ἄνδρα ἑκάστον is the object of ὄρα.

3. *προσενέπη* : used without an accusative of the person addressed, as in Pind. *Pythl.* iv 97 κλέπτων δὲ θυμῷ δέϊμα προσένεπε, and Aesch. *Agam.* 241 προσενέπειν θέλουσα.

XXXIX

Reference : Heinemann (1897).

For the relationship between Solon and Critias, see page 34. Aristotle (*Rhet.* i 15, 1375 b) quotes the first line of this couplet in the following connection (he is speaking of the employment of the poets as a source of historical evidence) : καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου τοῦ Σόλωνος ἐλεγείους ἐχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι πάλαι ἀσελγῆς ἢ οἰκία' οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλων εἰπεῖν μοι

Κριτία πυρρότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν. It is quite clear that the demagogue Cleophon is twisting the meaning of the words to suit his own purposes; he takes them as a proof of the depravity of Critias, as Cope remarks in his note on the passage, though they were really intended by the poet as a compliment to the father. That this is true may be seen from Plato's words in the *Charmides* 157 e ἡ τε γὰρ πατρώα ὑμῖν [*i.e.*, Critias and Charmides] οἰκία, ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπ' Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν ποιητῶν ἐγκεκωμιασμένη παραδ'δοται ἡμῖν, ὡς διαφέρουσα κάλλει τε καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένη εὐδαιμονία.

1. εἰπέμεναι: the grammatical construction cannot be determined, but as the fragment stands, the infinitive must be taken as equivalent to an imperative. Cf. Hom. *Il.* vii 372 ff. ἠῶθεν δ' Ἰδίου ἴτω κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας | εἰπέμεν Ἀτρείδης, Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ Μενελάω, | μῦθον Ἀλεξάνδροιο, τοῦ εἵνεκα νεῖκος ὄρωρε | καὶ δὲ τόδ' εἰπέμεναι πυκινὸν ἔπος κτλ.

2. ἀμαρτινῶ: cf. Hesiod *Theog.* 511 ἀμαρτίονον τ' Ἐπιμηθέα; Aesch. *Suppl.* 542 ἐνθεν Ἴω οὔστρω ἐρροσσομένα φεύγει ἀμαρτίνοος.

XL

References: Clemm (1883); Croiset (1914); Daremberg (1869); Gomperz (1880); Hense (1874); Hiller (1886, 1888); Larsen (1900); Van Leeuwen (1904); Von Leutsch (1872); Linder (1858); Murray (1889); Platt (1896); Rost (1884); Schmidt (1847); Schneidewin (1848); Sitzler (1879, 1894, 1900); Stadtmüller (1882); Tucker (1887); Weil (1862); Wilamowitz (1893, 1913).

See also pages 105 ff.

1. Clement of Alexandria, who quotes the first verse of this poem, introduces the quotation with these words: Σόλων τῆς ἐλεγείας εἶδε ἄρχεται. This indicates that Solon's poem actually opened with the lines which are preserved in Stobaeus. The words τῆς ἐλεγείας, standing as they do without explicit reference, might suggest that the present poem was known as *the elegy of Solon par excellence*. Immediately before the quotation from Solon Clement gives the following verse from Eumelus (frag. 16 Kinkel): Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἐννέα κούραι. It is impossible to say whether Solon is imitating the epic poet, or whether the resemblance is accidental. At any rate, the same parentage of the Muses is well established in Hesiod: *e.g.*, *Theog.* 52 ff. Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κούραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο, | τὰς ἐν Πιερίῃ Κρονίδῃ τέκε πατρὶ μίγείσα Μνημοσύνη; and 915 ff. Μνημο

σύνης δ' ἐξάυτις ἐράσσατο καλλικόμοιο, | ἐξ ἧς οἱ Μοῦσαι χρυσάμπυκας ἐξεγένοντο | ἐννέα.

1. ἀγλαά: a frequent epithet of children in Homer, as in *Il.* ii 871, xviii 337; *Od.* xi 249.

1 ff. The opening lines of this poem were parodied by the Cynic philosopher Crates in the following passage, which has been preserved by Julian (frag. 1 Bergk):

Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,
Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλυτὲ μοι εὐχομένῳ
χόρτον ἐμῇ συνεχῶς δότε γαστέρι, ἦτε μοι αἰεὶ
χωρὶς δουλοσύνης λιτὸν ἔθηκε βίον.

* * * * *

ὠφελιμον δὲ φίλοις, μὴ γλυκερὸν τίθετε.
χρήματα δ' οὐκ ἐθέλω συνάγειν κλυτά, κανθάρου ὄλβον
μύρμηκός τ' ἄφενος χρήματα μαιόμενος,
ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνης μετέχειν καὶ πλοῦτον ἀγίνειν
εὐφορον, εὐκτητον, τίμιον εἰς ἀρετήν.
τῶν δὲ τυχῶν Ἐρμῆν καὶ Μούσας ἰλάσομ' ἀγνάς
οὐ δαπάναις τρυφεραῖς, ἀλλ' ἀρεταῖς ὀσίοις.

2 f. Solon prays the Muses to grant him ὄλβος and ἀγαθὴ δόξα, but the ὄλβος is to come from the gods and the δόξα is to come from men. The latter contrast is a suggestive one: it is true that happiness and prosperity, on the one hand, are the gift of the gods, and a fair reputation, on the other hand, the gift of human society. But both these things Solon desires of the Muses. This would seem to indicate that the Muses will be the prime cause of Solon's happiness, the gods and society the proximate causes. Weil (1862, p. 2) calls attention to the fact that we have here the typical prayer of a wise man of Greece, equally removed from asceticism and excess. He also points out that Euripides had this passage in mind when he was writing the portion of the lost *Erechtheus* which has been preserved by Stobaeus iii 3, 18 (frag. 362 N). Note especially vss. 11-13: ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ κτῶ χρήματ', ἦν βούλη πολλὴν | χρόνον μελάθροισ ἐμμένειν· τὰ γὰρ κακῶς | οἴκουσ ἐσελθόντ' οὐκ ἔχει σωτηρίαν.

2. *μοι*: for the dative cf. Hesiod *Theog.* 474 οἷ δὲ θυγατρὶ φίλη μάλα μὲν κλῦον ἢ δ' ἐπίθοντο; Theogn. 4 σὺ δέ μοι κλῖθι; 13 εὐχομένῳ μοι κλῖθι.

3. *πρὸς θεῶν δότε*: cf. Hom. *Od.* xi 302 τιμὴν πρὸς Ζητὸς ἔχοντες; Pindar *Ol.* vii 90 (165) δίδοι δέ μοι αἰδοίαν χάριν | καὶ ποτ' ἀστῶν καὶ ποτὶ ξένων. If the words *πρὸς ἀνθρώπων δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθὴν* were not preceded by *δλβον πρὸς θεῶν*, *πρὸς ἀνθρώπων* would mean without question "in the eyes of men." But *πρὸς θεῶν* certainly must mean "through the agency of the gods"; therefore *πρὸς ἀνθρώπων* would probably have to the Greek ear the meaning "through the agency of men."

5. *γλυκύν*: cf. Pindar *Pyth.* vi 52 ff. γλυκεῖα δὲ φρῆν | καὶ συμπόταισιν ὀμιλεῖν | μελισσᾶν ἀμείβεται τρητὸν πόνον.

5. ὦδε: i. e., ὄλβιος καὶ ἔνδοξος ᾧν.

6. *αἰδοῖον . . . δεινόν*: four times in Homer these two adjectives are joined to qualify the same noun: in *Il.* iii 172 αἰδοῖός τε μοὶ ἔσσι, φίλε ἔκυρέ, δεινός τε; xviii 394 ἦ ρά νύ μοι δεινὴ τε καὶ αἰδοίη θεὸς ἔνδον; *Od.* viii 22 ὧς κεν Φαίηκεσσι φίλος πάντεσσι γένοιτο | δεινός τ' αἰδοῖός τε; xiv 234 δεινός τ' αἰδοῖός τε μετὰ Κρήτεσσι τετύγμην. It seems fairly certain that in the present passage Solon has the familiar phrase in mind and that he is endeavoring to draw a distinction between the two words and to define them with more precision.

7. *μὲν* is logically placed: the positive desire for money is contrasted with the unwillingness to enjoy ill-gotten gains (*ιμείρω μὲν . . . ἀδίκως δὲ οὐ*).

7 ff. Similar ideas are expressed by Hesiod *W. and D.* 322 ff. and Theognis 197 ff.

8. ἦλθε: gnomic aorist.

9. ὄν . . . δῶσι: ᾧν is omitted in accordance with the regular Homeric practice in general conditional sentences.

9. *παραγίγνεται*: cf. Theogn. 139 οὐδέ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραγίγνεται, ὅσσ' ἐθέλησιν.

9 ff. Cf. Hesiod *W. and D.* 320 χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἄρπακτὰ, θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω; Pindar *Nem.* viii 17 σὺν θεῷ γάρ τοι φντευθεὶς ὄλβος ἀνθρώποισι παρμονώτερος; Pindar *Pyth.* v 4; Eur. *Electra* 943, *Ion* 378, frag. 354 N.

11. *μαίωνται*: the manuscript reading *τιμῶσιν* is generally admitted to be meaningless here; but no explanation is offered for its presence in the

text, and no really satisfactory emendation is proposed. One circumstance leads me to think that the word may perhaps belong where it is, bearing a meaning which has not yet been recognized: Euripides clearly had the present passage in mind when he wrote frag. 354 (quoted above). But *τιμᾶν* is not, after all, used by Euripides in any unusual sense and does not offer any real proof that *τιμῶσιν* is right in Solon's line. There is a clearly marked contrast between *ὄν μὲν δῶσι θεοί* in vs. 9 and *ὄν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν* in vs. 11. The contrast is further emphasized by the phrases *ὑφ' ἕβριος* and *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον*, which both describe a process exactly the reverse of that indicated by the words *ὄν μὲν δῶσι θεοί*. Furthermore, in vss. 11 f. we see wealth figuratively represented as following reluctantly those whose methods are dishonest. We need some word which will harmonize with this situation. Ahrens' conjecture *μετίωσιν* has met with the most favor, being adopted by Hartung, Hiller-Crusius, and Buchholtz-Peppmüller. Other conjectures are *διφῶσιν* (Emperius), *συλῶσιν* (Linder), *κτίσσωσιν* (Weil), *τέτρωσιν* (Sitzler), *μῶσιν* (Bergk), *τίνωσιν* (Tucker, "but the money which men *pay under tyrannous compulsion*"). Stadtmüller refers to Leutsch's emendation, *ἀνάγωσιν* for *τιμῶσιν*, and says he does not know why he did not prefer *συνάγωσιν* which is found in Crates i 5. Stadtmüller himself proposes *κινῶσιν*, because (1) Solon himself (xii 12) shows that the kind of wealth which must be most avoided is the property of sacred shrines or of the state; (2) *κινεῖν* is the regular word for tampering with such moneys (Thuc. vi 70; ii 24; i 143). The reading adopted in the text is my own conjecture and was suggested by vs. 7 of Crates' parody, which is quoted in the note on vs. 1. Nothing is more likely than that Crates should have taken this word from Solon's poem, and no word could be more appropriate in the present place.

11. *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον*: a Homeric phrase. Solon uses it here to mean "irregularly," "unnaturally," "contrary to the regular course of nature." Such a procedure is likely to weaken the fabric of things; orderly and regular methods, on the other hand, produce a structure compact and solid *ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος ἐς κορυφήν*.

12. Bucherer observes that the poet represents wealth as a person virtuous at bottom, who is misled by wicked men and follows them against his will.

13. *ἀναμίσγεται*: the personification of the preceding lines continues,

when *πλούτος* follows a man reluctantly, it is not long before *ἄτη* "joins the party." The true meaning of the verb in this passage is indicated by Dem. liv 8 *καὶ τοῦτοις περιτυγχάνομεν. ὡς δ' ἀνεμίχθημεν, εἰς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἀγνώσ τις, κτλ.* — two groups of persons unite. Cf. also Herodotus : 199 *οὐκ ἀξιεύμεναι ἀναμίσγεσθαι τῆσι ἄλλησι*, "refusing to associate with the others."

13. *ἄτη* : the nominative, which has less manuscript authority, is the reading of Hartung, Bergk, Hiller-Crusius, and Buchholtz-Peppmüller. Hense prefers the dative. The nominative is better, because, as is shown by the quotations given above, *ἀναμίσγεσθαι* is properly used of joining a group. In the present instance the group consists of *τῷ πλούτῳ* and *τῷ πλουσίῳ*, and *ἄτη* is naturally taken as the subject.

14. *I.e., ἐξ ὀλίγον γίγνεται ἢ τῆς ἄτης ἀρχὴ ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πυρός.*

15. *φλαύρη, ἀνηρή* : agree with *ἄτη* understood. *ἄτη*, mild and gentle at the start, leads to *ὑβριος ἔργα*; *ὑβριος ἔργα* bring the punishment of heaven; therefore *ἄτη* is *ἀνηρή* in the end.

16. *δῆν* : almost exclusively an epic word; also found in one line which appears twice in Theognis (597, 1243).

17. *πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος* : cf. Soph. *Electra* 175 *ἔτι μέγας οὐρανῶ | Ζεὺς, ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει*. Zeus does not fail to observe all that happens upon the earth, but he sees all things in their proper relations; and he waits till the sequence of events is closed before interfering to adjust the wrong (see vss. 25–28).

17. *ἐξαπίνης* : wind and justice come alike unexpectedly.

20. *πυροφόρον* : a familiar epithet; cf. xvi 2 and Hom. *Il.* xii 314; *Od.* iii 495; Theogn. 988.

21. Since the home of the gods has been concealed by clouds from the eyes of men, and since the boisterous effect of the wind is first seen upon land and sea, it is natural to represent the wind as rising upon the earth and making its way upward, dispersing the clouds in its path, till it comes to heaven itself. Wilamowitz (1913, p. 264) remarks : "Der Sturm kommt aus der Tiefe : denn nach allgemein griechischer Vorstellung wehen ja die Winde im Erdinnern (*Τυφωέως ἐνναί*).” But I doubt if this conception was so common that we can assume that it was in Solon's mind here.

23. *ἡελίοιο μένος* : see note on xiii 1.

27. *αἰὲ . . . διαμπερές* : a familiar combination in Homer and therefore

to be taken together ; cf. Hom. *Il.* xv 70 ἐκ τοῦ δ' ἂν τοι ἔπειτα παλιώξιν παρὰ νηῶν | αἰὲν ἐγὼ τεύχοιμι διαμπερές. οὐ negatives the meaning of the verb, not the predication. The adverbial phrase modifies the affirmative which is produced by the double negative οὐ λέληθε.

27. λέληθε : this perfect is not found in Homer but later became common. It appears in Semonides vii 9 (H.-C.) : τὴν δ' ἐξ ἀλιτρῆς θεὸς ἔθηκ' ἀλώπεκος | γυναῖκα, πάντων ἴδριν' οὐδέ μιν κακῶν λέληθεν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀμεινόνων ; Theogn. 121 εἰ δὲ φίλου νόος ἀνδρὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι λελήθη | ψυδρὸς ἐών. In meaning it is not to be distinguished from the present.

27. ἀλιτρόν : cf. the passage from Semonides just quoted.

28. ἐς τέλος : cf. Soph. *Phil.* 409 ἔξοιδα γάρ νιν παντὸς ἂν λόγον κακοῦ | γλώσση θιγόντα καὶ πανουργίας, ἀφ' ἧς | μηδὲν δίκαιον ἐς τέλος μέλλοι ποεῖν.

29. οἱ δὲ φύγωσιν : it is not necessary to change this to εἰ δὲ φύγωσιν as most of the editors do. After ὁ μὲν and ὁ δὲ the poet would be led by the sound to write οἱ δὲ even though οἷ is relative and not demonstrative. The fact that no grammatical antecedent for οἷ appears in vs. 31 offers only a slight anacoluthon.

30. μοῖρα . . . κίχρη : see note on xxxvii 4.

31. ἔργα τίνουσιν : τίνειν is used with the accusative of the thing atoned for in Hom. *Il.* i 42 τίσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν ; and *Od.* xxiv 352 εἰ ἐτεὸν μνηστῆρες ἀτάσθαλον ὕβριν ἔτισαν. In the verb τίνειν the ι is regularly long in epic, but short in Attic.

31. ἀνάτιοι κτλ. : if the text is sound, the expression is awkward but not impossible. ἔργα, standing alone without a modifier, can hardly mean "their guilty deeds." Feeling, therefore, that ἔργα is incomplete, the reader waits for a complement and finds it in τοῦτων, which, in spite of the strong attraction of παῖδες, must be taken with ἔργα. This interpretation makes it unnecessary to resort to emendation.

32. Cf. Tyrtaeus xii 30 (Bergk) : καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω ; Hom. *Od.* xiii 144 σοὶ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐξοπίσω τίσις αἰεί.

33 ff. With this whole passage compare the following fragment of Semonides (85 Bergk ; 69 H.-C.), which Wilamowitz (1913, p. 273) thinks is by Semonides :

ἐν δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον Χίος ἔειπεν ἀνὴρ
'οἴη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.'

παῦροι μὴν θνητῶν οὔασι δεξάμενοι
 στέρνοις ἐγκατέθεντο· πάρεστι γὰρ ἐλπὶς ἐκάστα,
 ἀνδρῶν ἥτε νέων στήθεσιν ἐμφύεται.
 θνητῶν δ' ὄφρα τις ἄνθος ἔχη πολυήρατον ἤβης,
 κοῦφον ἔχων θυμὸν πόλλ' ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ·
 οὔτε γὰρ ἐλπιδ' ἔχει γηρασέμεν οὔτε θανείσθαι,
 οὐδ' ὑγιῆς ὅταν ἦ, φροντίδ' ἔχει καμάτου.
 νήπιοι, οἷς ταύτη κείται νόος, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν
 ὡς χρόνος ἔσθ' ἤβης καὶ βιότοι' ὀλίγος
 θνητοῖς· ἀλλὰ σὺ ταῦτα μαθὼν βιότου ποτὶ τέρμα
 ψυχῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τλήθῃ χαριζόμενος.

34. This verse offers the chief textual difficulty in the poem and Hense marks it as a *locus desperatus*. Many methods of restoring it have been proposed: for the meaningless ἐς δηνην, Ahrens suggested εὐθηνεῖν, Hartung εὐθενεῖν, Bergk δηνεῖν or ἐν δήειν, Hermann αἰνῶν ἦν, Schneidewin εὐρεῖν εἰς, Linder ἦδειν ἦν, Valekenauer ἦνδανεν ἦν, Emperius κεδὴν εἰς αὐτοῦ, Rost εὐσχίσειν αὐτως, Tucker εὐδὴ ἔχειν αὐτός, Murray ἐνδύειν αὐτός ("indigere sibi videtur"), Riedy εἰς ἀνέδην αὐτός, van Leeuwen δεινὴν εἰ' αὐτοῦ, Leutsch εὐδεινὴν (cf. εἰδία), ἐν δ' ἦξεν αὐτῷ δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει. The favorite emendation, which has been adopted by Hiller-Crusius and Buchholtz-Peppmüller, is that of Buecheler: εὐδεινὴν, "every man holds a high opinion of himself." Reasons why this is unsatisfactory will be offered shortly. First let us consider the movement of thought and the grammatical relations in the three lines. (1) ἀγαθός and κακός are in the singular number, whereas if they were to be taken closely with νοεῖμεν they would naturally be in the plural. It is probable, therefore, that they belong rather with the distributive ἕκαστος and that the second half of vs. 33 is closely connected with vs. 34. (2) The phrase δόξαν ἔχειν means properly "have a reputation," not "have an opinion." Bergk claims that it is equivalent to δοκεῖν and may bear either meaning. This may be true; but it is not certain that the meaning "have an opinion" is possible and therefore it is less likely to be right here. Compare vs. 4 above. (3) The whole of the second half of the poem (excepting the two doubtful lines 39 f.) is occupied with an account of the vain efforts of men to mold their own destiny. Undoubtedly an exaggerated estimate of their own powers accom-

panies their efforts. But, as I said, men's misapprehension of the truth about themselves is not mentioned elsewhere except in the one doubtful passage. It will be seen that none of the requirements implied in these considerations is met by Buecheler's emendation. Furthermore, it seems to me highly improbable that *δεινὴν* could be used with the sense which is here intended. The reading which I have adopted in the text seems to me to satisfy all conditions. *ἔχειν* depends upon *νοεῦμεν* (cf. Linder, p. 503: "Accedit sermonis error his coniecturis omnibus communis, *modum finitum* dico (*ἔχει*) post ὦδε *νοεῦμεν*. Nam quum dictum sit, ὦδε *νοεῦμεν* (*sic sentimus*), expectatur *infinītivus*, quo id enunciatur et uberius explicetur, quod per particulam ὦδε ante significatum est."); the participle *ἐντείων*, preceding *ἔχειν* and agreeing with its subject, bears greater emphasis than the infinitive, according to the familiar Greek idiom; and *αὐτός* is taken closely with *ἐντείων*. ὦδε refers to a thing which is implicit in the earlier part of the poem, namely the disposition of men to disregard the all-seeing eye of Zeus and to forget that they cannot really be masters of their own destiny. *νοεῦμεν* with the infinitive means "we intend"; cf. Hom. *Il.* xxii 235 καὶ μάλλον νοέω φρεσὶ τιμήσασθαι, and xxiv 560 νοέω δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς | Ἐκτορά τοι λῦσαι. The words ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε mark the transition to the larger theme which is dealt with in the succeeding part of the poem. The subject up to this point has been the inevitable retribution which comes upon the evil-doer though he may be oblivious and feel himself secure. Now the poet expands his law to include all men, good and bad alike, and makes it read: No man knows what the future may hold nor can he affect his destiny in any important way; his hopes are vain and spring from his ignorance of the impotence of man and the omnipotence of God. *ἐντείων* means "straining every nerve"; cf. Eur. *Orestes* 698 εἰ δ' ἡσύχως τις αὐτὸν ἐντείοντι μὲν | χυλῶν ὑπέικοι καιρὸν εὐλαβούμενος, | ἴσως ἂν ἐκπνεύσειεν. δόξαν ἔχειν means "have a name," "be somebody"; cf. vs. 4.

35. Cf. Soph. *Ant.* 615 ff. ἅ γὰρ δὴ πολὺπλαγκτος ἑλπίς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνασις ἀνδρῶν, πολλοῖς δ' ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων.

36. *χάσκοντες*: a somewhat coarse word, more appropriate to iambic poetry; it suggests silliness and stupidity, as well as open-mouthed anticipation; cf. xiv 6.

36. *κούφαις ἑλπίσιν*: "idle dreams of the future."

37. ἀργαλέησι : a standing epithet of νοῦσοι (Hom. *Il.* xiii 667 ; Hesiod *W. and D.* 92, *Scut.* 43).

38. κατεφράσατο : a rare word, not in Homer ; once in Hesiod (*W. and D.* 248 ὦ βασιλῆες, ὑμεῖς δὲ καταφράζεσθε καὶ αὐτοὶ | τήνδε δίκην). It is evidently used by Solon with the same meaning as ἐφράσατο, "plan," "contrive," with the object clause ὡς ὑγιῆς ἔσται. And yet the hope of success that prompts the effort is ill-founded ; human effort will have little effect one way or the other.

39 f. Bergk proposed to bracket this couplet as foreign to the thought of the context. He maintained that it was originally a marginal note on vs. 31 and was later introduced into the text. Hense does not bracket the lines. Most scholars agree with Bergk — Schneidewin, Hiller-Crusius, Buchholtz-Peppmüller. Linder retains the lines, but says they belong immediately after vs. 34 ; in order to make them fit this place he changes ἄλλος to ἄλλως and καὶ καλός to καὶ δὲ καλός. The couplet is defended by Schmidt and Rost. The former discovers in the whole passage a train of thought which I cannot follow and which he himself does not pretend is possible without certain unjustifiable emendations. Rost shows clearly by his analysis of the passage that the couplet is not impossible ; but he does not convince Hiller, who still maintains that though the lines are not absolutely impossible it is really better to remove them. Weil agrees that the lines are undesirable ; but his strophic arrangement would not suffer by their removal, because he would then indicate a lacuna after vs. 48, where it would afford a welcome relief to a somewhat strained situation. The objections to the couplet are apparent. Solon is speaking of κοῦφαι ἐλπίδες and he gives many concrete illustrations of them. These two lines alone refer to the mistakes which men make, not about the future, but about the actual state of affairs in the present. They are true and characteristic of Greek thought ; but they are not entirely in place in the present passage. In spite of all this I cannot convince myself that they should be bracketed. The texture of the whole poem is very loosely woven, and it is not at all impossible that Solon himself, quite as well as an interpolator, should have introduced them into the composition.

41. Cf. *Mimn.* ii 12 πενίης δ' ἔργ' ὀδυνηρὰ πέλει.

43. σπύδιει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος : human effort springs from various causes and follows various paths.

45. ἰχθυόεντ' : a Homeric epithet quite unworthy of the important place

it occupies, unless it is intended to suggest the dangers to which sailors are exposed from man-eating fish! This meaning of the word is denied by Ebeling for Homer, having been suggested by Goebel (see Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.* s. v.). Tucker also feels that the word is "quite out of place" (meaning, I suppose, "inappropriate") and thinks that it is probably a corruption from *ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθ'*. This is very ingenious and I am almost persuaded to adopt it in the text. Leutsch thinks the word is given its prominent position to indicate that the people referred to are not traders but fishermen. Wilamowitz (1913, p. 261) remarks: "Dass das leere homerische Epitheton *ἰχθυόεντα* so nachklappt, dass der Pentameter, der auch entbehrlich ist, ganz übersprungen wird, ist das stärkste Zeichen davon, dass Solon die fremde Technik doch nicht beherrscht."

46. *φειδωλῆν*: once in Homer (*Il.* xxii 244 *μηδέ τι δούρων | ἔστω φειδωλή*). For *φειδωλῆν θέμενος* cf. Hom. *Od.* i 116 *σκέδασιν θείναι*; Soph. *Ajax* 13 *σπουδῆν ἔθου τήνδ'*; *Antig.* 151 *τῶν νῦν θέσθαι λησμοσύναν*; Eur. *Med.* 66 *σιγῆν . . . τῶνδε θήσομαι πέρι*.

47. *γῆν τέμνων*: this phrase almost invariably means "destroy the trees and crops," and only two or three passages are quoted in which it means "cultivate the soil," as it does here; e.g., Hom. *Il.* xiii 707 *τέμει δέ τε τέλσον ἀρούρης*; Aesch. frag. 196 *ἴν' οὐτ' ἄροτρον οὔτε γατόμος | τέμνει δέ κελλ' ἀρούραν*.

47. *πολυδένδρον*: with *γῆν*; this word is used frequently in Hom. *Od.* xxiii and xxiv as an epithet of *ἀγρός*, Odysseus' farm outside the town. In ancient agriculture there was no strict division into field and orchard.

47. *εἰς ἐνιαυτόν*: "throughout the year," "the year round"; cf. Hom. *Il.* xxi 444 *ὄτ' Ἀγήγορι Λαομέδοντι | παρ Διὸς ἐλθόντες θητεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν | μισθῶ ἐπὶ ῥητῶ*. There is no adequate support for taking the phrase in the sense "year after year," "year in, year out."

48. *λατρεύει*: properly "work for hire," but probably Solon is not thinking only of laborers employed by others. He means rather to suggest the drudgery which is forced upon the farmer by his relentless occupation.

48. *τοῖσιν*: the relative pronoun, its antecedent being *ἄλλος*; cf. Plat. *Rep.* 554 a *Λύχμηρός γε τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὢν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος, θησανροποῖς ἀνὴρ' οὓς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος*.

48. *καμπύλ' ἄροτρα*: found also in Hom. *Hymn to Dem.* 308.

48. *τοῖσιν καμπύλ' ἄροτρα μέλει*: "plowmen," a generic term for

farmers or husbandmen. Their special task is to till the soil (γῆν τέμνειν) whether with a plow or a spade or a hoe. It is not possible to discern two types of farm labor here, as some do — work in the orchard and work in the field (τοῖσιν being taken as demonstrative and equivalent to ἄλλοις δέ).

49. Cf. Hom. *Od.* vi 232 ὡς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνὴρ | ἴδρις, ὃν Ἥφαιστος δέδαιεν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη | τέχνην παντοίην, χαρίεντα δὲ ἔργα τελεείει.

51. Cf. Archilochus frag. 1, 2 (H.-C.) καὶ Μουσέων ἐρατὸν δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος.

51. ξυλλέγεται βίον is to be understood as the predicate of ἄλλος in vs. 51 as also of ἄλλος in vs. 50. "Natürlich ist das eine Härte," says Wilamowitz, who first proposed this construction (1913, p. 261), "wieder ein Zeichen unvollkommener Technik." Bergk claims that ἐπιστάμενος is equivalent to a finite verb (ἐπιστάμενός ἐστι or ἐπίσταται) and justifies the construction by Hom. *Od.* xi 606; he thinks πάρα is a corruption for an original φίλα or καλά but he prints πάρα in his text. Hense thinks that the efforts to restore a finite verb have been futile, and mentions with approval the suggestion made to him personally by Erwin Rohde that a whole couplet has fallen out after ἐπιστάμενος. Linder keeps Μουσάων and removes πάρα as an intruded gloss. But it is hard to see how πάρα could be a gloss upon anything, and the rhythm of the line ἄλλος Ὀλυμπιάδων Μουσάων δῶρα διδαχθεῖς is objectionable. Various emendations have been offered: διδάχθη for διδαχθεῖς (Grotius), λάβε for πάρα (Hermann), etc. Hartung's δέδεκται for διδαχθεῖς has much to recommend it. It supplies a finite verb and removes the awkward phrase δῶρα διδαχθεῖς; and Hartung points out that διδαχθεῖς may be a gloss on δαείν in vs. 50. But we are not justified in resorting to emendation.

52. σοφίης μέτρον: "the fullness of art." The English word "art," used without an attributive, frequently means the particular art of painting; similarly the Greek word σοφία means the art of poetical and musical composition. This meaning is not found in Homer or Hesiod; but Theognis has it (770): χρῆ Μουσέων θεράποντα καὶ ἄγγελον, εἶ τι περισσὸν | εἰδείη, σοφίης μὴ φθονερόν τελέθειν. It is also common in Pindar (*e.g.*, *Ol.* i 120). The phrase σοφίης μέτρον appears also in Theogn. 876 τίς δ' ἂν ἐπαινῆσαι μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης; in a couplet which has been preserved in a fragment of Aristotle, and which has been unreasonably attributed to Pindar (Pindar frag. 328 Christ):

Χαῖρε δις ἡβήσας καὶ δις τάφου ἀντιβολήσας, | 'Ἡσιόδ', ἀνθρώποις μέτρον ἔχων σοφίας; and again in a couplet which is inscribed on the Tabula Iliaca in the Capitoline Museum ὦ φίλε παῖ Θεοδ]ώρηον μάθε τάξιν 'Ομήρου, | ὄφρα δαεῖς πάσης μέτρον ἔχης σοφίας. There is a somewhat similar phrase in the couplet which is assigned by Suidas to Pigres (s. v.): Μῆνιν αἶειδε, θεία, Πηληϊάδεο 'Αχιλλῆος, | Μοῦσα, σὺ γὰρ πάσης πείρατ' ἔχεις σοφίης. Homer has the phrase ἡβης μέτρον a number of times (e.g., *Il.* xi 225), and it is regarded as little more than a periphrasis for ἡβη. Evidently μέτρον means something like "a definite amount"; not an incomplete or imperfect thing; a real whole, however small.

54. ἔγνω: sc. ὁ μάντις. Though Ἀπόλλων is the grammatical subject of the preceding sentence, μάντιν is the most prominent word and readily becomes the grammatical subject of the new sentence.

54 f. It should be observed that Solon does not question the ability of prophets to foretell the future; but he maintains that such foreknowledge is powerless to thwart the course of fate.

55. συνομαρτήσωσι: a very uncommon word and apparently without parallel in this figurative sense. The simple verb is used in a somewhat similar way by Euripides in *Bacch.* 923, where Dionysus says to the crazed Pentheus ὁ θεὸς ὁμαρτεῖ, πρόσθεν ὃν οὐκ εὐμενής, | ἔνσπονδος ἡμῖν. There are probably two meanings intended here, one for Pentheus and the other for the audience. The audience understands the words to mean "the god is our companion," as indeed he was; Pentheus understands them to mean "the god is favorable to us." The figure is a particularly happy one when it is applied to the inspiration of a prophet.

56. τὰ μόρσιμα ῥύσεται: this meaning of ῥύεσθαι, "prevent," "hinder," is not common, but it is found in Hom. *Od.* xxiii 244 νύκτα μὲν ἐν περάτῃ δολιχὴν σχέθεν, Ἡῶ δ' αὖτε | ῥύσατ' ἐπ' Ὀκεανῶ χρυσόθρονον; in Pindar *Isth.* viii (vii) 53 ταί μιν ῥύοντό ποτε μάχας ἐναριμβρότου | ἔργον ἐν πεδίῳ κορύσσοντα; and in Thuc. v 63 (he promised) ἔργω ἀγαθῷ ῥύσεισθαι τὰς αἰτίας στρατευσάμενος.

56. ἱερά: "sacrificial victims," evidently used with the post-Homeric implication that omens were drawn from the internal organs.

57 ff. Daremberg (1869, p. 8) has the following to say concerning the present passage: "C'est donc parmi les métiers, ou, si l'on trouve le mot trop dur, parmi les arts que Solon range la médecine; loin de lui accorder

une très grande puissance, il voudrait la soumettre à la décision aveugle du Destin ou à la volonté plus éclairée des dieux ; il réserve même une partie de sa confiance pour ces attouchements magiques auxquels les anciens attribuaient tant d'efficacité dans la guérison des maladies."

57. Παιῶνος: Παιήων, the Olympian physician, is mentioned three times by Homer (*Il.* v. 401, 899; *Od.* iv 232), and in the *Odyssey* he is the progenitor of the race of physicians. He is not identical with Apollo in Homer, though in later times his name becomes an epithet of Apollo. Cf. also Pindar *Pyth.* iv 270 ἐσσι δ' ἰατρῆρ ἐπικαιρότατος, Παιῶν δέ σοι τιμῆ φάος.

57. πολυφαρμάκων: cf. Hom. *Il.* xvi 28 ἱητροὶ πολυφάρμακοι.

58. ἱητροί: predicate to ἄλλοι.

58. τέλος: "control of the issues."

58. Cf. Theogn. 660 θεοὶ γάρ τοι ν-μεσῶσ', οἷσιν ἔπεισι τέλος.

60. λύσαιο: the middle means "bring about their relief," *i.e.*, through the medium of curative agents, rather than actually "relieve," which is the meaning of the active.

61. τὸν δέ: substantive, as if τὸν μὲν had preceded.

61. κυκώμενον: this was emended to κακούμενον by Lobeck in a note on Soph. *Ajax* 309. Hiller-Crusius and Buchholtz-Peppmüller print κακούμενον without a comment. Hense retains κυκώμενον. There is no sufficient argument for the change; and the last touch of certainty is given to the manuscript reading by a comparison of Archilochus frag. 62, 1 (H.-C.) θυμέ, θύμ', ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε.

62. Cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 848 f. ἐνταῦθα δὴ σε Ζεὺς τίθησιν ἔμφρονα | ἐπαφῶν ἀταρβεῖ χειρὶ καὶ θιγῶν μόνον, and my discussion of the meaning of this passage in "Eraphos and the Egyptian Apis," Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Phil. II, 81 ff.

64. A familiar sentiment, admirably expressed. The irony of δῶρι ἄφουκτα is thoroughly Greek.

65-70. These lines reappear, with certain variants, in the corpus of Theognis, and Williams regards the Theognidean version as a popular revision of Solon's poem. He further remarks that "the verses in their original form (*i.e.*, Solon's) are more in keeping with the views of Theognis himself."

65. οὐδέ τις οἶδεν κτλ.: this idea is a commonplace in Greek literature.

The closing anapests of Sophocles' *Ajax* may be quoted as a succinct expression of it: ἦ πολλὰ βροτοῖς ἐστὶν ἰδοῦσιν γνῶναι πρὶν ἰδεῖν δ' οὐδεὶς μάντις τῶν μελλόντων, ὃ τι πράξει.

66. ἦ μέλλει σχήσειν: there is difficulty in determining what idiom is employed here, and what is to be understood as the subject of μέλλει. The possibilities are presented in the following passages: (1) Hom. *Il.* xvi 378 Πάτροκλος δ' ἦ πλείστον ὀρινόμενον ἴδε λαόν, | τῆ ῥ' ἔχ' ὀμοκλήσας; xxiii 422 τῆ ῥ' εἶχεν Μενέλαος; here ἔχειν with an adverb like ἦ or τῆ means "to direct one's chariot in a certain course"; (2) Hom. *Od.* ix 279 ὄπη ἔσχεσ . . . εὐεργέα νῆα; Aristoph. *Frogs* 188 Χάρων. ταχέως ἔμβαινε. Διόνυσος. ποῖ σχήσειν δοκεῖς; ἐς κόρακας ὄντως; here ναῦν σχεῖν or σχεῖν alone means "to land," "to touch at a certain point in a voyage," a common nautical expression; (3) Soph. *Phil.* 1336 ὡς δ' οἶδα ταῦτα τῆδ' ἔχοντ' ἐγὼ φράσω; *Ajax* 684 ἀλλ' ἀμφὶ μὲν τούτοισιν εἶ σχήσει; here ἔχειν is used in the familiar idiom with an adverb of manner. The first of these three may be immediately ruled out because it implies *intentional* direction of the course, an idea which is inappropriate in the present passage. The second idiom is the one generally accepted. Schneidewin significantly compares the passage from the *Frogs*; Bucherer paraphrases, "wohin er steuern, zu welchem Ziel er gelangen wird"; Kynaston, "where they come to shore." Two things are to be said in favor of this interpretation: ἦ is primarily an adverb of direction, giving the *course* to be followed; and σχήσειν is the aoristic future, corresponding to the very form (σχεῖν) which is used in the nautical phrase. But it seems extremely doubtful whether Solon would have used this nautical metaphor without making sure that it would be understood; there would have been some hint in the context to guide the reader's thought. As it is, there is none; and the idiom of the type οὕτως ἔχειν is too familiar to be gainsaid. Furthermore, the propriety of both the adverb ἦ and the aoristic σχήσειν is neatly proved by the two quotations from Sophocles. It is to be concluded, then, that Solon is using the same idiom which appears in the passage from the *Ajax*, the verb in each case being regarded as impersonal. Cf. Herodotus i 32 σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτήν κῆ ἀποβήσεται.

66. Gomperz thinks that the last word is wrong. An undertaking does not begin; a man begins an undertaking. He would change ἀρχομένου to ἀρχόμενος referring to Soph. frag. 747 N. ἔργον δὲ παντὸς ἦν τις ἀρχηται

καλῶς, | καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκός ἐσθ' οὕτως ἔχειν. He seems to think the word *σχήσειν* refers to driving, "die Zügel unserer Hand entgleiten können."

67. οὐ προνοήσας: "unawares," not "because he fails to use foresight."

69. *περὶ πάντα*: a common phrase in Solon, "in every regard" (xiii 6, xv 11).

70. *ἐκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης*: since *ἀφροσύνη* is the cause of *ἄτη*, the removal of *ἀφροσύνη* prevents the development of *ἄτη*. Compare Christ's words to the man suffering from a physical disease: "Thy sins be forgiven thee."

71-76. See pages 12 ff.

71. *τέρμα*: the "goal" towards which men strive in the race for wealth.

71. *πεφασμένον*: i.e., *φανερόν*; cf. Lysias x 19: "Ὅσοι δὲ πεφασμένως πολοῦνται (quoted from the laws of Solon) . . . τὸ μὲν πεφασμένως ἐστὶ φανερώς, πολεῖσθαι δὲ βαδίζειν."

71. "In the pursuit of wealth there is no fixed goal visible from the start." The distant object of one's effort constantly recedes while one gives chase.

71. Cf. Plut. *de cupiditate divitiarum* 4, 524 e: *τὴν δὲ ψυχικὴν ἐκείνην (i.e., πένιαν, "imaginary poverty") οὐκ ἂν ἐμπλήσειαν ἅπαντες οὔτε ζῶντες οὔτ' ἀποθανόντες. ὁθεν εἶδ' πρὸς τούτους λέλεκται ὑπὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος 'πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν κτλ.'*

72. *βίον*: "means of living," "wealth."

73. *τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας*: "what amount of wealth would be sufficient to satisfy the greed of all?" A reflection upon the appalling magnitude of the sum produced by uniting the desires of all individuals in the community. There is a full stop at the end of this line. The next three lines repeat in a brief and pointed manner the principle enunciated in vss. 11 ff.

74 f. Wealth does indeed come as a gift from the gods; but it is not an unmixed blessing. Not infrequently the rich man is punished for his greed by Zeus who employs as his instrument the *ἄτη* which is bred out of the riches themselves. Such *ἄτη*, whose chief symptom is a limitless lust for money, is infectious, and when one case appears in a community, it is certain that others will soon appear. Thus *ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει* repeats the idea suggested by *ἅπαντας* in vs. 73, that avarice is often epidemic.

75. *ἐξ αὐτῶν: ἐκ τῶν κερδῶν*. Some find the antecedent of *αὐτῶν* in

θνητοῖσ', and claim that the pronoun is emphatic here: "good gifts come from the immortals," says Kynaston, "but mischief and infatuation from men's own willfulness." But the unemphatic position of the αὐτῶν, the ease with which it is referred to κέρδεα, and the statement which follows (ἦν ὀπότεν Ζεὺς πέμψῃ), all argue against this view.

75. ἀναφαίνεται: cf. Hom. *Il.* xi 174 τῆ δέ τ' ἰὴ ἀναφαίνεται αἰπὺς ὀλεθρός.

76. ἄλλοτε ἄλλος: that this phrase is sound in spite of the hiatus is shown by xvii 4, Hom. *Od.* iv 236, Hesiod *W. and D.* 713, Theogn. 318, 992. Cf. also Archilochus frag. 9, 7 (H.-C.) ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλος ἔχει τᾶδε (*i.e.*, misfortune).

ON THE STROPHIC STRUCTURE OF XL

In 1862 Henri Weil published in a German periodical an article in which he claimed to have discovered in the longest of Solon's elegiac poems unmistakable evidence of strophic structure, and maintained that it was highly probable that other elegies, if they had survived, would show the same characteristics. In the present poem he discovers the following divisions: part I, consisting of vss. 1-32; part II, vss. 33-64; part III, vss. 65-76. It will be observed that the first two parts are of equal length, each consisting of 32 verses; the third part, of 12 verses, is an epode. Furthermore, he discerns subdivisions within these parts. The first and second parts are composed each of four groups of four elegiac couplets; the third part is composed of two groups of three couplets.

Now the symmetry of this apparent structure is extremely attractive in itself and is recommended to the favor of scholars in an essay characterized by the author's usual grace. One is disposed at first to accept it unreservedly.

The first effect of Weil's discovery was an unfortunate one. If Weil could find a symmetrical structure in the poem, why should not another scholar discover another symmetrical structure therein, of a different kind? This is what was done by von Leutsch in 1872. The German scholar begins by pointing out that there is no good reason why the divisions in the poem should be where Weil had found them: they could be placed equally well elsewhere. Then he proceeds to demonstrate at great length that the poem is really a νόμος καθαρωδικός with seven parts, of the type invented by

Terpander. The absurdity of this suggestion will be apparent to any one who reads the argument of its erudite but stupid author, and has been rejected with ridicule by all.

Two years later, in 1874, Otto Hense came to the defense of Weil's scheme, but he really presented no new argument. He proposed an emendation (*ποθεῖ* for *δοκεῖ* in vs. 39) in order to save the couplet which was necessary for the symmetry, but which Weil, following Bergk, had been disposed to reject as spurious.

Bergk, in his fourth edition (1882), rejected Weil's scheme, explicitly but without argument; and Wilhelm Clemm, in an article published the next year, heartily approved of Bergk's decision. Clemm's reason for rejecting the plan was that Weil had not really divided the poem in the right places. The introductory prayer, for example, ends not with vs. 8, but with vs. 6; the second part consists of vss. 34-63, not 33-64; and the couplets of this second part may be readily grouped in other ways than that proposed by Weil.

What are we to think of Weil's scheme? First of all, it has not been pointed out by any of these scholars that it is essentially improbable, I think I may say impossible, for any strophic arrangement in a Greek poem to be based primarily on divisions in the subject matter and its grammatical expression. Metrical structure is independent of subject matter and grammar, though, of course, not inharmonious with them. As for the divisions of the nome, we do not know on what principle they were made; but it is almost certain that they were based upon musical, if not metrical form, and not upon the substance of the thought. This observation seems to me sufficient to convince us that there is no truth in the proposed scheme, that is, that Solon did not consciously produce the symmetrical arrangement which Weil saw and which we can see, like a picture in the flames, when Weil points it out. The true divisions of the poem, which are not always just as Weil constitutes them, correspond to the paragraphs in prose discourse. No Greek could compose a poem without a certain architectonic sense which would produce a symmetry sometimes indefinable but always perceptible. But Greek metrical form is not so vague a thing as that: it is precise and unmistakable. The only metrical form in the present poem is that of the elegiac couplet. Croiset has shown, with fine critical insight, both the truth and the falsehood of Weil's theory. His statement leaves nothing more to be said.

XLI

The chapter in which Stobaeus records this fragment contains many other quotations from the poets in which the same melancholy view of human life is expressed. Note especially Theogn. 167 f. "Ἄλλ' ἄλλω κακὸν ἔστι, τὸ δ' ἀτρικῆς ὄλβιος οὐδεὶς | ἀνθρώπων ὀπόσους ἦελος καθορᾷ; and 441 οὐδεὶς γὰρ πάντ' ἔστι πανόλβιος.

1. *μάκαρς*: an Aeolic form which was restored by Stephanus in order to justify the long ultima; the word is found in Alcman frag. 42 (H.-C.). The quantity might be obtained by prolonging the liquid ρ, but in Homer this license is allowed only in cases where the final syllable of a word ending with a short vowel is made long before the initial liquid of the next word.

XLII

Reference: Clapp (1910).

λιπαρή: this adjective was a common epithet of Athens in the fifth century, and the Athenians took particular satisfaction in it. The first appearance of it in association with the name of Athens is in Pindar *Isthm.* ii 20 *ταῖς λιπαραῖς ἐν Ἀθήναις*; and frag. 76 (Christ) *ὦ ταῖ λιπαραὶ καὶ ἰοστῆ φανοὶ καὶ αἰοίδιμοι, | Ἑλλάδος ἔρεισμα, κλειναὶ Ἀθῆναι, | δαιμόνιον προλιέθρον.* If, as seems likely, the present quotation from Solon is drawn from a passage descriptive of Athens, the famous epithet is a hundred years older than has previously been suspected. The exact meaning of the word as an epithet of Athens is doubtful; Clapp argues that it refers to the brilliance of the atmosphere; but the present fragment may lend some weight to the opinion that it refers to the soil as the source of life.

κουροτρόφος: this word is used of Ithaca in Hom. *Od.* ix 27 *τρηχεῖ' ἀλλ' ἀγαθῇ κουροτρόφος.* Whether in Solon's poem it was an epithet of the personified Earth (Γῆ), of course it is impossible to say. For the personified *κουροτρόφος*, see Jane E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, pp. 267 ff.

XLIII

Photius states that *κιγχάνειν* was used by Solon in the sense of *ἐπειείναι*, while Suidas' statement is that it was so used *in the time of Solon* (*οἱ περὶ Σόλωνα*). In what way the words are synonymous is not clear. Though *κιγχάνειν* or *κιχάνειν* is not infrequent in elegiac and iambic poets, it

never seems to bear any of the recognized meanings of *ἐπεξίέναι*. Probably, as Bergk remarks, the word was used in an ancient law. It may have meant "to catch one's enemy," "to bring about his conviction," a common meaning of *ἐπεξίέναι*.

XLIV

ῥοῦς was the name of a small tree, the sumach, or its fruit. Apparently the word is here a neuter, which may have been the form used for seasoning which was made from the fruit. It may have been in the poem from which xxix, xxx, and xxxiii are all probably drawn.

XLV

This fragment is included in the collections of Gaisford, Schneidewin, and Hartung, but not in those of Bergk and Hiller-Crusius. It consists of a single iambic trimeter, and cannot, of course, be part of an elegiac couplet as the *Paroemiographi* assert. Hartung is probably right in saying that though these words themselves are not Solon's own, a similar sentiment was expressed in one of his elegiac poems. Gaisford, however, thinks *ἐλεγείων* is a corruption for *ιάμβων* or *ὑποθηκῶν*.

XLVI

This fragment is included in the collections of Hartung, Bergk, and Hiller-Crusius, but not in those of Gaisford and Schneidewin. The name of Solon is not mentioned in connection with it in any of the testimonia, and the assignment of it to Solon by the scholiast on Plato is uncertain.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

SALAMIS

There is no difference of opinion about the fact that Salamis came into the power of Athens at some time early in the sixth century. The questions at issue are these : Did this important event happen before or after the cardinal date of Solon's archonship? Had Athens ever been in possession of the island before? Was the conquest effected by Solon or by Pisistratus or by some other? What is to be thought of the ancient tradition which related with full circumstantial detail the manner of its acquisition through the efforts of Solon?¹

The most important text bearing upon these matters is in Plutarch's *Life of Solon* (chaps. 8-10).

From this passage we learn, in the first place, that there was known in ancient times a poem by Solon, in elegiac verse, entitled "Salamis," consisting of one hundred lines. It is probable that it was still extant in the time of Plutarch, because Plutarch's judgment of its merit seems to rest upon his own reading. He quotes the first two lines; three other couplets, of which two are successive, are preserved by Diogenes Laertius. We have, therefore, only eight verses, or four couplets, from the entire poem; but Plutarch and his predecessors had the whole hundred.

This poem was probably the most authoritative document in the possession of ancient historians concerning the Athenian

¹ A condensed review of the whole subject may be found in Busolt (1895, pp. 213-222, 247, 248), with full bibliographical references. The most important monograph is that of Toepffer (1886). Kirchner (1903), Lehmann-Haupt (1912), and De Sanctis (1912), adopting various views advocated by earlier writers, have not contributed anything of importance to the discussion. Reference to Beloch (1913) will be made later.

efforts to capture Salamis. The eight verses which are still before our eyes tell us something ; the ninety-two lost verses must have told much more. If we are tempted to reject hastily certain features of the story, we should remember that this authentic document could have preserved inviolate, under the seal of metrical form, a more or less circumstantial record of the conditions under which the poem was composed. What we learn from the extant fragments and what we are to think of the events which preceded the publication are questions which have been discussed elsewhere (pp. 39 ff.). It remains to examine the rest of Plutarch's narrative.

It will be observed that Plutarch's two accounts of the campaign against Salamis are highly circumstantial and of an unquestionably legendary cast. There is no known way in which such stories as these could have been transmitted from the age of Solon to the Attic chroniclers of the fifth century, except by irresponsible oral tradition. Each story, as a whole, must be rejected. But there may be embedded in them fragments of truth which have a better claim on our credence.

The first story appears in several other authors besides Plutarch. The earliest of these is Aeneas Tacticus of Stymphalus (circa 362 B.C.), who tells what is manifestly the same story, but with very striking differences (*Comm. Pol.* iv 8 ff.). In Plutarch, Solon is the commander and Pisistratus is his lieutenant ; in Aeneas, Pisistratus is in command and there is no mention whatever of Solon. In Plutarch, the scene is laid at Cape Colias, a promontory southeast of Piraeus and Phalerum ; in Aeneas, it is laid at Eleusis. In Plutarch, the Athenians, after the success of their stratagem, sail forth and capture Salamis ; in Aeneas, they sail for Megara, and, pretending they are Megarians bringing back the Athenian women as captives, deceive the Megarians and inflict great losses upon them. Thus, in the earliest extant form of the story, all connection with Solon and Salamis is absent.

Justinus, in his epitome of Pompeius Trogus, tells the story again (ii 7 f.). Here, as in Aeneas, the initiative is taken by the Megarians, who desire to avenge themselves for the capture of Salamis, which has already occurred. Again the scene is laid in Eleusis, and Pisistratus is in command. Justinus adds that Pisistratus almost succeeded in capturing Megara, and that the glory of this achievement served him as a stepping stone to the tyranny.

A version similar to that of Aeneas and Justinus appears also in the *Strategemata* of Frontinus (ii 9, 9).

Plutarch's version, on the other hand, with Cape Colias, Solon, and Salamis, is found again in the *Strategemata* of Polyænus (i 20, circa 163 A.D.). But here Pisistratus is not mentioned at all, not even as Solon's lieutenant.¹

Evidently we have in this story a commonplace of strategy which could be told as well of one captain as of another, and no argument is needed to prove that it is of no historical value. It could be told equally well of Pisistratus, who, as we know, captured Nisaea, the port of Megara (Herodotus i 59), and of Solon, who was the reputed conqueror of Salamis. To which name it was first attached, it is impossible to say with assurance.

The search for the genesis of such a legend is alluring but likely to be futile. Toepffer (pp. 22 ff.) offers a solution of the problem as follows: He cites a number of texts to show that events similar to those which form the basis of the story were supposed to have occurred at Brauron on the east coast of Attica, and since Brauron was the home of Pisistratus, he concludes that the story was first told of Pisistratus at Brauron. Later, when Pisistratus had distinguished himself in the war with Megara, the scene was transferred to Eleusis. Still later, when the fame of Solon had been greatly augmented by the

¹ For the interdependence of these ancient authorities, see Toepffer, pp. 6 ff. He takes for granted (p. 22) that the version of Aeneas, Trogus-Justinus, and Frontinus is the earlier, and that of Plutarch and Polyænus the later. This is probable but can hardly be regarded as certain.

tradition that he was the conqueror of Salamis, the story was transferred to him. The several steps by which this last transference was effected are explained by Busolt (1895, p. 219, footnote) as follows. The Thesmophoria which were celebrated at Halimus, near Cape Colias, bore sufficient resemblance to the ritual of the women at Eleusis to carry the story over to Halimus. Then, since Megara was not accessible from Cape Colias, the object of the Athenian attack was changed from Megara to Salamis. Lastly, since Solon was the reputed conqueror of Salamis, he became the leading figure in the new version of the story and Pisistratus, who could not be left out, was degraded to the rank of his lieutenant.

This is highly ingenious but quite unconvincing and unsupported by any real evidence. Furthermore, the events which took place at Brauron bear only a superficial resemblance to those at Eleusis or Cape Colias. The essential feature — the disguise of young men in women's garments — is entirely absent. The only point of similarity is that in both cases the women were engaged in a religious ceremonial; but in the one case, at Brauron, they were actually seized and carried off; in the other, the attempt to seize them was made the occasion for a clever ruse.

Until its origin can be more convincingly demonstrated, it is reasonable to assume that the story is a folk tale which could be told of any military hero, and that it has no discoverable foundation in fact. It was localized at Eleusis and Cape Colias probably because women's festivals were held in those places. It may conceivably have originated in some piece of ritual which required that men should be disguised as women,¹ but it is quite as likely that the stratagem of the disguise was an

¹ One is reminded of the *δσχοφόροι*, the two boys who were dressed in women's clothes and marched at the head of the procession from Athens to Phalerum at the festival of the Oschophoria. It is significant that the cult of Athena Sciras, in connection with which the festival was celebrated, was brought to Phalerum from Salamis.

original invention, either of the story teller or of some unknown captain. In any case, it must be ruled out of court as evidence for the history of the conquest of Salamis.

Plutarch's *second* account is of a different sort, and though it contains a legend like that in the first account, it contains more besides.¹

Toepffer (pp. 7 ff.) claims that the legend came into existence at a time long subsequent to the conquest of Salamis. His argument may be summarized as follows: The city of Salamis on the northeastern shore of the island was founded by the Athenians after their occupation. The old city of Salamis lay on the south side of the island facing Aegina. But Solon's landing is supposed to have been made on the coast facing Attica. Now since the attack on the city, in order to be successful, must be sudden and unexpected, the author of the story must have been thinking of new Salamis. Therefore, since old Salamis, the city actually seized by the Athenians, was forgotten, the story must have been invented long after the conquest.

Two criticisms may be brought against this argument. In the first place, if Athens was fighting to *recover* Salamis, which, as we have seen, may have been the case, the new city might already have been built during a previous Athenian occupation. In the second place, there is nothing to prove that Solon was supposed to have landed nearer the new city. The only evidence for this is Wilamowitz' proposed reading of *Θυμοιταν* for the manifestly corrupt reading *Εὐβοιαν* which appears in the manuscripts. Furthermore, Toepffer himself claims to prove (pp. 11 ff.) that the promontory of Sciradium lay on the south side of the island, and it was here that the ceremony was performed which Plutarch accepts as a confirmation of the whole story.

¹ The stratagem which forms the kernel of this second account is also reported by Aelian *V. H.* vii 19. According to Toepffer (p. 4), his narrative is derived from the same source which was used by Plutarch.

It is not necessary, however, to resort to such fine-drawn arguments in order to convince ourselves that we are dealing with a legend. Plutarch himself betrays the truth, as Toepffer himself saw (p. 18), by his citation of the religious ceremony in support of the credibility of the legend, which may be set down without hesitation as an aetiological myth. It is altogether natural that this piece of martial ritual should have been associated with Solon and the capture of the island where the ritual was performed, especially in view of the temple of Enyalios, about which more will be said later.

The Delphic oracle need not detain us. It can be rejected immediately as a forgery. But it is interesting to note that it must have been composed at a time when the method of burial was regarded as important evidence in support of the Athenian claim to the island. Now Plutarch informs us in the next chapter that this very evidence was adduced by Solon before the Spartan board of arbitration. If, as is probable, the arguments which were advanced by the Athenians in the court of arbitration, and indeed the arbitration proceedings themselves, belong to a much later period, it is reasonable to conclude that the oracle was an invention of the fifth century or later.

We are now left with two features in this second account which cannot lightly be set aside as fictitious: the Athenian decree calling for five hundred volunteers for the campaign and promising them complete autonomy in the government of the island in the event of its capture, and the foundation by Solon of a temple in honor of Enyalios. Neither of these statements is involved in the legend itself, and both deserve independent consideration.

The decree calling for five hundred volunteers is a thing for which Greek historians could have had authentic testimony.¹ In the first place, there may well have been a stone, set up in

¹ Toepffer (p. 19, footnote 1) thinks that the number of cleruchs (500) is a true record of some settlement. But it is uncritical suspicion for him to say, as he does, without proof that it had anything to do with Solon.

Athens or in Salamis, bearing a decree passed by the Athenians after the conquest of Salamis, in which was formally recorded the political status of the five hundred men who had offered themselves as volunteers. It is difficult otherwise to account for the exact number five hundred, and for Plutarch's inclusion of a comparatively unpicturesque detail like this in the midst of a more lively narrative, which is otherwise altogether religious in its origin. In the second place, if five hundred volunteers *were* called and given their political independence in Salamis, their descendants would inevitably have formed the aristocracy of the island and would have sedulously preserved the tradition of the origin of their high estate, whether orally from father to son or in written records, similar to those of Athenian phratries. The statement, therefore, about the five hundred volunteers is not to be rejected on the ground that there could have been no authentic record of such a matter. That there was such a record, of course we cannot say; but it is much, where our footing is so uncertain, to be able to discern a possible path by which reliable information concerning the event in question could have descended to the time of written history.¹

Now if we are convinced that Plutarch's statement is not necessarily a legendary specter, but may possibly be real flesh and blood, we should next consider whether or not it is historically probable. If the conquest of Salamis was really carried through by the efforts of Solon, is it likely that the method employed would have been that indicated by the decree calling for five hundred volunteers and offering political independence in the event of success? The answer is emphatically in the affirmative. In the first place, a foreign war at this moment would have done much to relieve the tensity of domestic affairs in Athens. We *know* that Solon urged the prosecution of the campaign; conjecture need go no farther than to suggest what

¹ The words *ἄσοι μὴ διεφθάρησαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ πάντας ὑποσπόνδους ἀφήκεν* suggest the possibility of an inscribed record.

may have been his motives. In the second place, an army recruited in this way, fighting at once for their own personal advantage and for the glory of Athens, would have thus offered a double hope of success. Salamis could be held for Athens, the Megarians could be shut inside their own port of Nisaea, and the sea would be open for Athenian commerce. The extraordinary compatibility of these two statesmanlike aims justifies us in attaching the greatest importance to Plutarch's statement about five hundred volunteers.

We now come to the other feature of Plutarch's second account of the campaign. Near the spot on the coast of Salamis where the religious ceremonial was performed, says Plutarch, stands the temple of Enyalios which was founded by Solon. The form of this sentence deserves attention: a definite temple is referred to (*τὸ ἱερόν*) as if it were well known, and the verb is in the present tense. Either Plutarch had seen it, or, at any rate, he had no doubt of its existence. The foundation of it by Solon is mentioned as if that, too, were a matter of common knowledge. It is the locality of the temple which Plutarch emphasizes: its proximity to the scene of the ritual is proof to him that Solon, who founded the temple, also had a part in the proceedings which engendered the ritual. The temple and its foundation stand quite outside the aetiological myth.

But how could Plutarch or his sources know that this temple had been founded by Solon? Surely nothing is simpler. Literary evidence or tradition need not be called on here. A dedicatory inscription set up within the precinct would be the best proof of all. And if the temple was so founded by Solon, such an inscription could hardly have been lacking. Of course we cannot be sure. There may have been simply a popular tradition in Salamis that Solon was the founder of the shrine. But, at any rate, this temple again cannot be overlooked in assembling the evidence touching the question whether Solon was concerned in the conquest of Salamis or not.

After the two accounts of the campaign which have just been examined, Plutarch (*Sol.* x) describes another episode in the fortunes of Salamis. The war between Athens and Megara continued, he says, causing much hardship to both sides. In the end, the two cities called in the Lacedaemonians to serve as arbitrators and decide which was the lawful owner of the island. A board of five Spartans, whom Plutarch mentions by name, decided in favor of Athens. Solon was the Athenian advocate in the trial, and we are told of the evidence which he laid before the court in support of the Athenian claim. Now Beloch has shown (1913, pp. 312, 313) that the settlement of the rival claims through Spartan arbitration could not have taken place till the end of the sixth century and that there is good reason for fixing its date precisely at 508-7. If we accept Beloch's conclusions, which are altogether convincing, we recognize that there is no connection between Solon and the arbitration, and that he was brought into the matter by tradition simply because of his poem and his reputation as the conqueror of Salamis.

A few pages later Plutarch says (*Sol.* xii 3) that during the disturbances incident to the trial of the Alemeonidae the Megarians attacked Athens, recovered Nisaea, and drove the Athenians out of Salamis again. Plutarch's chronology is so unreliable that we cannot say for certain just when this event took place, if it took place at all. Some think that the loss of Salamis referred to is that which Solon had in mind when he spoke of the *Σαλαμινιαφειτῶν*, and that it preceded the supposed recovery by him. But we do not know that Athens ever held Nisaea until it was won by Pisistratus, and for this reason the loss of Nisaea and Salamis would have to be dated long after Solon's archonship. If the Salaminian controversy was still burning at the end of the century, it is probable that the loss referred to by Plutarch was only one of many vicissitudes in the fortunes of the island.

This completes the examination of the tradition connecting Solon with Salamis, as it is reported by Plutarch and by other ancient authors who have something to say concerning the circumstances which are included in Plutarch's narrative. To these texts we should add the following. Diodorus (ix 1) says that Solon was of Salaminian family (a manifest error); and Diogenes Laertius (i 45) applied to him the epithet *Σαλαμίνιος*, as if he had been born in the island. From Aeschines (i 25) we learn that in his time there was a statue of Solon in the market place of the city of Salamis. The comic poet Cratinus (ap. Diog. Laert. i 62), in his play called *Χείρωνες*, represents Solon himself as speaking the two following lines:

*οἰκῶ δὲ νῆσον, ὡς μὲν ἀνθρώπων λόγος,
ἔσπαρμένος κατὰ πᾶσαν Αἴαντος πόλιν.*

The meaning of these lines is made clear by Plutarch (*Sol.* xxxii 4), who reports the story that Solon's body was burned and his ashes scattered over the island of Salamis. He believes the story to be merely a legend, though he admits that it has the authority of Aristotle. Whether the body of Solon was disposed of in this way or not, the legend, which became current before the middle of the fifth century B.C.,¹ must have been founded on a popular belief that Solon was in some sense the heroic founder of a colony in Salamis. If Solon obtained a decree from the Athenians calling for five hundred volunteers and promising them political independence, and if these same five hundred men succeeded in their attempt and enjoyed the fruits of their success, there was justice in their regarding him in some sort as their *οἰκιστής*, and in course of time the story might easily come into existence that his ashes had been scattered over the island. At any rate, the two circumstances corroborate one another in a striking way, especially as they do not appear together in any artificially constructed ancient account.

In only three places do we find any divergence from the

¹ Cratinus flourished about 454 B.C.

universal belief that Solon was the conqueror of Salamis. Daimachus of Plataea (ap. Plut. *Comp. Sol. et Publ.* iv 1) and certain writers referred to by Aristotle in the *Constitution of Athens* (xvii 2) deny that Solon won any *military* glory in the war with Megara.¹ This modification of the ancient tradition we are justified in accepting. Neither of the stories of Solon's military prowess in the fight for Salamis has any real foundation; and, furthermore, there is nothing in his character or in his whole career, as we know it, which would lead us to suppose that he had any talent for arms. All the more reliable evidence supports his skill as a statesman rather than as a general. The third dissentient voice is that of the Megarians themselves, who, according to Pausanias (i 40, 5), claimed that Salamis had been betrayed into the hands of the Athenians by Megarian traitors. This again concerns the strictly military aspect of the conquest. Either the story was a Megarian invention to lessen the discredit attaching to themselves in the loss of the island, which is most likely; or Megarian treason served as an auxiliary to the Athenians on one of the occasions when they were fighting for the island. It does not touch Solon's real part in the business, even if it occurred during the campaign which resulted from Solon's exhortations.

We have now examined all the evidence concerning the relation between Solon and the conquest of Salamis. We have seen that antiquity with scarcely a dissenting voice ascribed the glory of the achievement to him and no other. We have found reason to reject some details in the tradition, and to recognize in others the possibility or even the probability of truth. It now remains to consider the views of some modern scholars who resolutely deny the ancient tradition. These

¹ Meyer (1893, p. 647) says that Daimachus was led by the apocryphal nature of the story which Plutarch gives as his second account of the campaign, to doubt the reality of the war. But Daimachus did not doubt the reality of the war, and it is a mere fancy to find the source of Daimachus' opinion in the second account.

views vary in details, but they are united in the common assertion that the credit for the conquest of Salamis belongs, not to Solon, but to Pisistratus. Our best approach to these views will be through an examination of the texts which bear on the connection of Pisistratus with the conquest.

Only two passages explicitly connect Pisistratus' name with Salamis. One we have already seen in Plutarch, who says that Pisistratus supported Solon's plea that the effort to conquer Salamis should be renewed and took part with him in the expedition which sailed from Cape Colias after the success of Solon's stratagem.¹ In Aeneas, however, and Justinus and Frontinus, we find the stratagem itself attributed to Pisistratus with no mention of Solon whatever. But the scene of Pisistratus' stratagem is Eleusis, and not a word is said of Salamis. Indeed, both Aeneas and Justinus say that after the execution of the stratagem, Pisistratus proceeded to attack Megara itself.

Herodotus, in his account of the rise of the Athenian tyranny (i 59), informs us that before Pisistratus asked the Athenians for a bodyguard he had distinguished himself in the campaign against Megara, capturing Nisaea and performing other great deeds. We have, therefore, by the side of the generally attested tradition that Solon was the conqueror of Salamis, this new statement that Pisistratus too fought against the Megarians and conquered Nisaea. If we accept both at their face value, we shall have to assume that there were two wars, or one long-continued war, between Athens and Megara, and that the conquest of Salamis belongs to an earlier, the conquest of Nisaea to a later, stage of it. This is also the view of Aristotle (*Const. of Ath.* xvii) who says that Pisistratus had greatly

¹ Toepffer thinks that Pisistratus' name is omitted by Polyænus because his account is primarily concerned with Solon. Hug and Bohren think he omitted it because he saw the chronological discrepancy. It is more likely that he omitted it because it is of no significance in the story; to Toepffer, specialist in the history of Pisistratus, the omission looms large.

distinguished himself in the war against Megara before he attempted to seize the tyranny, but that chronological considerations show the impossibility of Pisistratus having been in command in the fight for Salamis, as some claim that he was.¹ From these last words—“as some claim that he was”—we see that even before Aristotle’s time there had been some to say that Pisistratus had been the military commander in the Salaminian campaign. This is the other of the two texts referred to above which connect Pisistratus with Salamis.²

The case for Pisistratus rests upon this evidence.³ The arguments which may be drawn from it have been most recently and most effectively presented by Beloch (1913, pp. 309 ff.), as follows:

1. It was believed in later times that Solon had recovered Salamis. But, considering the nature of the tradition, there is not the slightest proof of the truth of this. It is manifestly only a conclusion based on the poem.

2. Athens, in Solon’s time, was not in a condition to think of foreign conquest.

3. There were critical doubts even in ancient times whether Solon had really held the military command against Salamis. Daimachus of Plataea expressed such doubt; and, Beloch might

¹ Wilamowitz (1893, I, 268) considers Aristotle’s evidence of no special value because he was only copying from the *Atthis*. But admitting that he was copying from the *Atthis* (which, of course, cannot be proved), there is no reason to believe Aristotle wrong simply because he accepted the statement of an earlier authority.

² Strabo (ix 394) says that according to some authorities it was Pisistratus, according to others Solon, who forged the Homeric line which was quoted before the Spartan board of arbitration in support of the Athenian claim to Salamis. But we have seen that the arbitration belongs at the end of the sixth century, long after the death of both Solon and Pisistratus.

³ It is surprising, says Toepffer (p. 41), that so important a matter as the capture of Salamis should not have been definitely attached in early times to some name: Solon was not credited with it till a comparatively late period, and no ancient author attributes it to Pisistratus. This is rather a staggering blow, one would think, for Toepffer’s argument. But he disarms criticism. Probably the true account of the acquisition of Salamis, he says, is given by Pausanias (i 40, 5): Salamis was betrayed into the hands of the Athenians, and there was no Athenian conqueror!

have added, the unknown persons referred to by Aristotle expressly gave the credit of the military success to Pisistratus.

4. Pisistratus appears by the side of Solon in Plutarch's first account of the campaign. It is chronologically impossible, as Aristotle points out, that both men should have had a part in it. If Salamis was conquered when Pisistratus was old enough to hold a high military command, Solon was too old to fight. The poem, to be sure, could have been written by Solon late in life, but there is not the slightest reason for this assumption: it was probably merely a "Schlag ins Wasser" like other chauvinistic productions of the same sort. It is to be concluded then, that not both men, but only one took part in the military campaign: which was it? If Salamis had been conquered by Solon, it would never have occurred to any one to bring Pisistratus' name into the business; but if Pisistratus was the conqueror, it is only natural that the credit should have been ascribed to Solon because of the poem. Therefore the conqueror was Pisistratus. Plutarch's narrative is an unsuccessful attempt to harmonize the two versions. The conquest of Salamis was accomplished in the same war in which Pisistratus captured Nisaea; but Herodotus does not mention it because tradition had already transferred it to Solon.¹

The following may be said in reply to these arguments:

1. If the tradition is unreliable in Solon's case, it is equally unreliable for Pisistratus. But in a matter so important to Athens as the acquisition of Salamis, it is more than probable that people would remember accurately who deserved the credit for it; and the ancient tradition, beginning, as Beloch points out, at a period earlier than Herodotus, was unanimous in favor of Solon. It is a significant thing that the only ancient authorities who raise the slightest question, Daimachus of Plataea and the persons mentioned by Aristotle, refer solely to the military command; no one denies that Solon was the guiding statesman,

¹ According to Toepffer (p. 29), Herodotus knew nothing as yet of the connection between Solon and the Megarian war. This is a good example of the way in which the argument from silence can be used on both sides.

and the very fact that these two expressly deny his military leadership tacitly corroborates the rest of the tradition.

2. In the second argument Beloch exaggerates both the disorder in Athens and the magnitude of the effort required to conquer Salamis. Athens was not in a state of civil war. There was indeed profound discontent among the lower classes due to the economic stringency and the restraint upon personal liberty. It would have been an act of wise policy to distract the minds of the people from their personal grievances by uniting citizens of all classes in a concerted effort against Megara. And the population, so united, would have been powerful enough to wrest the island from the neighboring city.

3. Daimachus, as we have seen, may well have been right. Aristotle himself, though he asserts that Pisistratus could not have been the captain, does not expressly say that Solon *was*; and yet he directly connects the war with Solon. Solon fired the people to make the attempt; the campaign was probably conducted by the polemarch who was in office at the time.¹

4. We may admit that if Pisistratus was really the conqueror of Salamis, the authorship of the poem might have operated to deprive him of the credit of it and give it to Solon. But, on the other hand, the fact that Pisistratus was known to be the conqueror of Nisaea, coupled with the fact that Solon was not famous for military exploits, would have been sufficient to cause some writers to conjecture that it was Pisistratus and not Solon who conducted the campaign. The Solonian authorship of the poem cannot properly be used as evidence that some one else carried the undertaking through. The only real ground for giving Pisistratus the credit is to be found in Herodotus' report that he captured Nisaea and otherwise distinguished himself. But it is quite unreasonable to suppose

¹ Toepffer (pp. 4 ff.) seems to think that by discrediting the legendary accounts of the campaign, he proves that Solon had no part in the conquest. But the refutation of these circumstantial accounts leaves the more serious arguments in support of Solon's participation untouched.

that there was only one brief war between Athens and Megara,¹ and that since Nisaea was captured at a time when Pisistratus was old enough to hold a military command, Salamis must therefore have been captured at the same time. If there is one fact which is abundantly proved by ancient tradition and by inherent probability, it is that the feud between Athens and Megara lasted for decades, indeed almost for centuries. Beloch himself recognizes that the legal proprietorship of Salamis was still in dispute at the end of the sixth century.

When did these signal events occur?² The ancients, without exception, believed that they occurred before Solon's archonship, which fell at some time between 594 and 590. If there were really inscriptions relating to several circumstances in the affair, as we have surmised, there was probably sound reason for putting the conquest at this time. There is no reason whatever for dating it after the archonship. Furthermore, if the course of events was substantially as we have described them, and if they actually preceded the archonship, we have a plausible explanation of the extraordinary measure by which Solon as archon was made supreme dictator in Athens. There was nothing else in Solon's earlier life, so far as we know, to justify the state in conferring such unbounded power upon him. But the affair of Salamis would have won for him the enthusiastic confidence of all; he had led the state in a patriotic enterprise; he had earned the admiration of the poor without alienating the respect of the rich; and he had shown a statesmanlike comprehension of the internal problems for which Athens must sooner or later find a solution.

¹ This is made abundantly clear by Meyer (1893, p. 646) and Busolt (1895, p. 221, footnote).

² For the date of the poem, Busolt (1895, p. 217, footnote 2) quotes with approval Gudschmid's observation that there is a youthful vigor about the fragments of Solon's poem, and claims that it is monstrous to attribute the poem to a man seventy years of age and a recognized leader in the state. But the poems which are known to belong to his later period show as much spirit; and Wilamowitz' words are worth repeating (1893, I, 268): "das stilgefühl, zehn versen anzurichten, dass sie nur ein jüdling geschrieben haben kömte, ist etwas was ich auch nur von den göttern zu erbitten für überbehung halten würde."

APPENDIX 2

DATE OF THE ARCHONSHIP

There are several direct statements in the ancient authors concerning the date of Solon's archonship. Sosicrates (ap. Diog. L. i 62) fixes it at *Ol.* 46.3 (594/3). Tatian (*adv. Graecos* 41) and Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* i 65) assign it to *Ol.* 46 (596/3) without more precise specification of the year. Suidas (*s.v.* Σόλων) states: γέγονε ἐπὶ τῆς μζ' Ὀλυμπιάδος (*Ol.* 47 = 592–589) οἱ δὲ νς' (*Ol.* 56 = 556–553). The records of the date which was accepted by Eusebius do not agree with one another: the Armenian version gives Abr. 1426 (= *Ol.* 47.2 = 591); various MSS. of Jerome give Abr. 1421, 1423, 1426 (= *Ol.* 46.1.3.; 47.1.2 = 596, 594, 592, 591).

Besides these direct statements, there are two indirect ways of coming at the date, as follows:

Aristotle (*Const. of Ath.* xiv 1) says that Pisistratus became tyrant in the archonship of Comeas, which fell in the thirty-second year after the legislation of Solon. Now, according to the Parian Marble, Comeas was archon 297 years before Diognetus (264/3). If 297 is exclusive, the date was 561/0, if it was inclusive, 560/59.

Again, the length of the tyranny in Athens is variously given at 49 years (*Arist. Const. of Ath.* xix 6), 50 years (Eratosthenes ap. Schol. *Aristoph. Wasps* 502; *Marmor Parium* 56 and 60; Aristotle *Const. of Ath.* xvii 1, where the reign of Pisistratus is given as 33 years, and *Const. of Ath.* xix 6, where the tyranny of his sons is given as 17 years), and 51 years

(Arist. *Pol.* viii 1315 b, 30 ff., where Pisistratus' rule is given as 33 years, and the rule of his sons as 18 years). The Pisistratidae were expelled in 511/10. Therefore, according as the figures 49, 50, 51, are regarded as inclusive or exclusive, the archonship of Comeas fell in 562/1, 561/0, 560/559, 559/8.

Proceeding from these dates, we find, according as we take the figure 32 as inclusive or exclusive, that the date of Solon's legislation was 594/3, 593/2, 592/1, 591/0. If we accept one or other of the dates of the Parian Marble (561/0 and 560/59), and assume that the figure 32 is inclusive, which is more probable, the date of Solon's legislation was either 592/1 or 591/0.

The following passage appears in *Const. of Ath.* xiii: Σόλωνος δὲ ἀποδημήσαντος, ἔτι τῆς πόλεως τεταραγμένης, ἐπὶ μὲν ἔτη τέτταρα διήγον ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ: τῷ δὲ πέμπτῳ μετὰ τὴν Σόλωνος ἀρχὴν οὐ κατέστησαν ἄρχοντα διὰ τὴν στάσιν, καὶ πάλιν ἔπει πέμπτῳ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν ἀναρχίαν ἐποίησαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων Δαμασίας αἰρεθεὶς ἄρχων ἔτη δύο καὶ δύο μῆνας ἤρξεν, ἕως ἐξηλάθη βία τῆς ἀρχῆς.

Now we know from the Parian Marble (53 f.) that the first Pythian ἀγὼν στεφανίτης occurred in the archonship of Damasias, and it is fairly certain that the date of this first occurrence was 582. Since Damasias held office for two years and two months, he must have been elected not earlier than 584 nor later than 582.

It now remains to discover the interval between Solon and Damasias. This problem is complicated by the fact that τῷ πέμπτῳ ἔπει may in each case be taken as either inclusive or exclusive, and by the difficulty in the interpretation of διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων.

Two meanings have been proposed for διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων: (1) "after the lapse of the same length of time"; (2) "immediately." Others delete the phrase as an interpolation. The normal meaning of διὰ with the genitive in expressions of time is "at the end of an interval of," and if we had here διὰ τοῦ

αὐτοῦ χρόνου it would unquestionably be equivalent to τῷ πέμπτῳ ἔτει πάλιν. Aristotle probably used the plural because he was thinking of the several terms of office included in this thrice-recurring period. There is no convincing argument in favor of the meaning "immediately"; and deletion is a counsel of despair.

Now a survey of the passage as a whole leads one to suppose that Aristotle is indicating three equal divisions in the time which elapsed between the archonship of Solon and the first year of the archonship of Damasias, marked by two years of anarchy. How long were these divisions? If πέμπτῳ was inclusive they were four years each, if exclusive, five years. According to the regular usage of Aristotle in the *Const. of Ath.* ordinals are inclusive, and we should regard them as inclusive here without hesitation if it were not for the four years of peace spoken of in the first sentence. But it should be observed that in spite of these four years Aristotle takes pains to add the phrase μετὰ τὴν ἀρχήν after τῷ πέμπτῳ, which suggests that he is following his usual practice of inclusive reckoning. The easiest explanation of the number four is that Aristotle had first in his mind the threefold division into periods of four years, and, wishing to say that there was peace in Athens up to the beginning of the *fifth* year after Solon's archonship (reckoning inclusively), he carelessly but naturally said that peace lasted for *four* years. The most probable interpretation of the passage may be presented as follows:

1. Three years of peace
2. First year of anarchy
3. Interval of three years
4. Second year of anarchy
5. Interval of three years
6. First year of archonship of Damasias

Total, 12 years.

Now since the first year of the archonship of Damasias fell in 584/3, 583/2, or 582/1, the archonship of Solon must have been in 596/5, 595/4, or 594/3.

Various ingenious attempts have been made to manipulate the several lines of evidence in order to make them lead harmoniously to some single date, but none of them is convincing. The whole structure of argument is essentially unstable because there is no single point of support which can be accepted as fixed.

For the whole subject consult Busolt (1895, II, 258, footnote 3, 301, footnote 3, 311, footnote 2); Beloch (1913, pp. 160-166); and Sandys (1912, pp. 50 ff.).

APPENDIX 3

THE SEISACHTHEIA

Plutarch says (*Sol.* xv. Cf. also *Comp. Sol. et Publ.* iii) that Solon's first official act¹ was a cancellation of debts and a prohibition of further loans ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, and that Solon had applied to this measure the euphemistic term Seisachtheia,² or "disburdenment."

Aristotle (*Const. of Ath.* vi) limits the measure to the first of the two clauses, viz., the cancellation of debts, but he says expressly, "they call this measure Seisachtheia" (καλοῦσιν, with no subject expressed).³ Now if Aristotle had seen the word in a poem or a law of Solon he would have said, "he called this measure Seisachtheia." It is necessary to conclude therefore that Aristotle did not find it in Solon's own writings; and if Aristotle did not find it there, it is probable that it was not there at all.

Again, we observe that there was considerable variation among the ancients in their opinion of the meaning of the word.

Androtion and a few others (ap. Plut. *Sol.* xv) said that the relief which was termed Seisachtheia had been brought about

¹ Wilamowitz (1893, II, p. 62) conjectures that the proclamation ordaining the cancellation of debts was substituted by Solon for the usual proclamation made by an archon on assuming office, in which he promised that he would protect all Athenians in the possession of the property which they held at the time of his inauguration (*Const. of Ath.* lvi 2). It is not certain, however, that this proclamation was the rule so early as the time of Solon.

² A similar definition of Seisachtheia is found in Diog. Laert. i 45 (λύτρωσις σωμάτων τε καὶ κτημάτων); Apostolius xv 39; Philochorus ap. Suidas s.v. Σεισάχθεια (= frag. 57, *F. H. G.* I, 393); Heraclides Ponticus περὶ πολιτειῶν i 5 (*F. H. G.* II, 208); Diodorus i 79.

³ Cf. Plut. *Sol.* xv who quotes Androtion as saying that the poor had given the name Seisachtheia to Solon's measures of relief.

by the reduction of the legal rate of interest and by a modification of the currency and the prevailing system of measures.

Plutarch, after his account of the means of relief adopted by Solon, goes on to say that though both parties were dissatisfied at first, they later saw the advantages in the plan and made a sacrifice together, calling the sacrifice *Seisachtheia*.

Apostolius (xv 39) reports a proverb — *Σεισάχθειά σοι μηδέποτε γένοιτο* — which was quoted to people who owed money and had not yet paid it.

Now if Solon had used it with definite reference to some particular measure, it is probable that any reader of the poem or law where it appeared could have known with some certainty from the context just what measure was meant, and we should not have such divergent explanations of the word as we actually find — a cancellation of *all* debts, a cancellation of *some* debts, a modification in the currency, a reduction in the legal rate of interest, and a festival in celebration of a popular reform. It is, of course, conceivable that Solon should have used it in a poem with reference to his reforms in general, so that the context would not throw any light on what the reforms really were. But in this case it would not have referred to any particular measure.

It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Solon did not use the word at all, or that if he did, he did not use it as a name for some particular measure. In either case we do not need to ask the question what measure Solon called *Seisachtheia*. We should say rather that others applied the term to some part or the whole of Solon's reforms, and that it was not proper to any measure in particular. Most people applied it to the cancellation of debts; some to the cancellation of debts together with the supplementary law abolishing loans *ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν*; a few to other financial reforms which Solon was supposed to have introduced. Our proper inquiry is to discover the nature of the reforms which Solon actually accomplished, not to

decide which one of them has the best right to be called Seisachtheia.

Where the word came from we cannot tell. We may conjecture that it came into existence to voice the demands of some radical democratic party in Athens who looked back to Solon as the founder of the popular party, applied the term Seisachtheia to the services which he had rendered to the people, and made it a rallying cry for new ventures in reform. It is an apt expression for the aspirations of the lower class, and once born it was destined to live.

We should now proceed to consider whether any or all of the several performances to which the word Seisachtheia was popularly applied may justly be attributed to Solon.

To begin with, we may safely reject the statement that it was the name of a festival instituted in honor of Solon's services to the state. There is no likely way in which such a fact as this could be known to Plutarch or his sources; neither of the two parties in the state was disposed to rejoice over Solon's measures, because both were disappointed in them; and the notion that Seisachtheia was the name of a festival arose easily in the case of a word of ill-defined meaning like Seisachtheia because of the similarity of its formation to that of well-known names of festivals.

We are left, therefore, with the statements that Solon cancelled some or all of the outstanding debts in Athens, that he established a law prohibiting loans *ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν*, that he reduced the legal rate of interest, and that he introduced modifications in the currency and in the system of weights and measures.

Now these last two statements, which we have on the authority of Androtion, will require more extended investigation. But it should be observed in passing that they were made by Androtion because he thought the word Seisachtheia referred to some particular thing which required definition and because he rejected for some reason the other and more widely accepted be-

lief that the Seisachtheia was a cancellation of debts. These considerations cast a little suspicion on Androtion's testimony.

The first two statements are on a different footing. We know beyond a doubt that Solon did something which produced precisely the results which would have been produced by a cancellation of debts (pp. 62 ff.). Whether he canceled *all* outstanding debts our evidence does not permit us to say.¹ Such an act as this, calculated to meet an extraordinary emergency, could hardly have been written into the permanent body of laws which were drawn up by Solon, and it is idle to conjecture how such an order was promulgated. But the other action which is recorded as supplementary to this first sweeping order, namely, the establishing of a law prohibiting loans *ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν*, we should confidently expect to find in his finished code, and there is no doubt that our ancient authorities knew of it from that source. It goes without saying that the act of cancellation preceded the more extensive undertaking of remodeling the Athenian constitution; but this particular law may well have been published in advance and later given its proper place in the completed code. The act of cancellation would have had no more than a momentary value, if there had

¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus (v 65) reports a speech of M. Valerius Publicola in which he refers to the fame which Athens and Solon had won by remitting the debts of the poor. No one had blamed the city for this measure nor called the author of it a demagogue. De Sanctis (1912, pp. 206 ff.) not only rejects Androtion's theory of the Seisachtheia, but also claims that it could not have meant the remission of all debts: "Ripugna affatto d'altronde il credere che Solone, il quale si atteggiava a rappresentante della giustizia e in nome della giustizia rifiutava di procedere ad una nuova divisione del suolo, si sia permesso un provvedimento così rivoluzionario come una piena abolizione dei debiti, provvedimento il quale senza dubbio scalzava la 'base veneranda' della giustizia; egli che nelle sue leggi dava amplissima facoltà di prestare ad interesse. È quindi evidente che il legislatore non abolì i debiti, ma impedì la esecuzione personale e dichiarò semplicemente nulle per sempre le ipoteche prese sulle persone dei cittadini e sui beni. Gli è che secondo lui nessuno può per ragione di denaro essere privato della libertà trasmessa dagli avi, nè di quel terreno dov'è la sua casa col focolare domestico, che il padre gli ha lasciato e che egli deve rimettere ai figli; onde insomma il cancellare le ipoteche era per Solone non altro che un atto di giustizia. S'intende che, abolite le ipoteche sulle persone e sui beni, cadevano con esse i crediti che n'erano guarentiti." See De Sanctis' whole discussion of the Seisachtheia.

not been associated with it a law which was framed to prevent the recurrence of a situation requiring so drastic a remedy.

The following story is told by Aristotle (*Const. of Ath.* vi). When Solon was on the point of proclaiming the cancellation of debts he communicated his purpose to certain persons belonging to the upper classes. These men immediately borrowed large sums of money and bought large tracts of land. Then when debts were declared void, they were left wealthy without the obligation of returning the money they had borrowed. This was the origin of the group of men who were later called Palaeopluti. According to some authorities, says Aristotle, Solon was privy to this plan and shared in the spoils; but writers with democratic sympathies claim that it was done without Solon's knowledge, and Aristotle accepts their view on the ground that a man who had steadfastly refused the tyranny would not have soiled himself with so petty an affair as this. Plutarch (*Sol.* xv. Cf. also *Praec. Ger. Reip.* 13, p. 807 d) tells the same story, adding the names of some of the men whom Solon acquainted with his plans — Conon, Clinias, and Hipponicus. These men won the permanent nickname Chreocopidae. He further relates that Solon had cleared himself of blame by immediately relinquishing the debts due to himself, which amounted to the sum of five talents.¹

It is clear both that this story could not have been transmitted in Solon's poetry and that it is precisely the sort of scandal which would be invented by those who were desirous of detracting from Solon's reputation. The milder version exculpating Solon from any personal advantage was probably put forth by the democrats in answer to the more damaging version. One may guess that the families of the Palaeopluti, who are probably the same set of persons who are called by Lysias (xix 49) Archaeopluti, were accused of having made their fortune in some crooked way, and that Conon, Clinias, and Hipponicus

¹ In other versions this sum was given as 15 talents (Polyzelus of Rhodes ap. Plut. *Sol.* xv) and 7 talents (Diog. Laert. i 45).

were known to be the ancestors of certain prominent members of the set.¹

¹Conon, Clinias, and Hipponicus were the ancestors of Conon, Alcibiades, and Callias, who were therefore probably reckoned among the men who were called Palaeopluti. The word Chreocopidae recalls the significant word Hermocopidae. See Busolt (1895, p. 42, footnote).

APPENDIX 4

THE LAWS AND THE AXONES

If we are disposed to doubt the fact that Solon wrote laws we find sufficient testimony for it in his own words in ix 18 ff.

That he himself here uses the word *θεσμούς* shows that any distinction between *θεσμοί* and *νόμοι*, by which the former is applied to the laws of Draco and the latter to the laws of Solon, is the invention of a later age.¹

What is meant by the phrase *θεσμούς γράφειν*? In later times *νόμον γράφειν* meant "to propose a law," as *ψήφισμα γράφειν* meant "to offer a resolution." But it is not likely that this technical sense is to be found in Solon's phrase. It cannot be supposed that in the rudimentary state of parliamentary procedure the word *γράφειν* had yet acquired any technical sense. Furthermore, Solon is speaking of his definite accomplishments: merely to have proposed laws without carrying them through would not have been worth recording in his poetic *apologia pro vita sua*. When he says he "wrote laws," he gives the reader to understand that he did something of considerable importance. We must take him at his word: *γράφειν* means "to record by incised or written characters."

Now it should be observed that nothing is said in the sentence about the character of the laws: they are not called *θεσμούς δίκαιους* or *θεσμούς ὁμοίους τῷ κακῷ τε κάγαθῷ*. The emphasis of the thought seems to lie on *ἔγραψα* rather than on *θεσμούς*. The notable achievement was to draw up a written code rather than to conceive and promulgate certain new and

¹ For the use of the words *θεσμός* and *νόμος* see Busolt (1895, p. 173, footnote 2).

wise laws. The codification (he does not say the laws) was in the interest of both classes of citizens.¹ Undoubtedly a written code is the first requisite for the administration of impartial justice. There is no reason to believe that Draco had compiled the first code and that Solon had annulled all his laws excepting those relating to bloodshed (*Const. of Ath.* vii 1; *Plut. Sol.* xvii 1). The fact is that certain laws relating to bloodshed and attributed to Draco were known in the fifth century, but that all other early laws were attributed to Solon. It is probable, therefore, that Draco had done nothing but formulate, and possibly record in writing, the laws relating to bloodshed. Hence the fiction that he had imposed the death penalty for all kinds of offenses. The Thesmothetae, if their office had been instituted before Solon's time, had probably done no more than record the *θέσμια* which were pronounced by the magistrates when they sat in judgment (*Const. of Ath.* iii 4). These *θέσμια* would serve as precedents, and the collection of them which had accumulated could hardly be regarded as a written code in the proper sense of the term. It remained for Solon to draw up a genuine code and earn the name of father of Athenian laws (*Plat. Symp.* 209 d).

What was the source of the laws which Solon formed into a written code? In the first place, it is clear that they could not have sprung a new and perfect birth from his own brain. The Athenians were an old community and had lived long under the authority of recognized, though unwritten, rules of custom. These rules for the life of the community could not have been altogether bad; they were unstable, indeed, and ill-defined, but they must have enjoyed the authority at least of the *ἀγραφοὶ νόμοι* of a later day.² It was Solon's task, as a legislator plenipotentiary, to grasp these unsubstantial forms of procedure, to

¹ See note on this passage in the commentary.

² That *ἀγραφοὶ νόμοι* were held to be valid before the archonship of Euclides (403 B.C.) is shown by the law which was passed at that time expressly forbidding their recognition in the future (*Andocides* i 86).

embody them in precise terms, and to fix them in a permanent record. Neither the Athenians nor any other community would have tolerated a complete subversal of their veteran forms of procedure. Many of the laws, therefore, in the completed code must have been identical in spirit with customs already long in force.¹

Though we must believe that the earlier unwritten laws of Athens formed the core of Solon's code, we must recognize quite as fully the broad editorial powers with which Solon was intrusted. In dealing with a mass of formless rules, it would have been beyond Solon's ability to preserve his formulation free from any modification due to his own personal opinion and judgment, even if he had desired to do so. Though he had tried to do no more than write at the dictation of the past, he could not have avoided the necessity of choosing between conflicting precedents, and his own judgments would have formed no inconsiderable part of his finished code.

But we cannot suppose that Solon desired, nor that he was expected, merely to transcribe mechanically. He was endowed with dictatorial powers to take counsel for the safety of the state. There were abuses in plenty to be righted, and it was a firm belief with Solon that as abuses came by *δυσνομία*, so peace and happiness came by *εὐνομία*. He would therefore have regarded it as his bounden duty both to revise old precedents that needed revision and to set up such new laws as were called for by the times, to the end that *εὐνομία* might prevail in Athens.

Finally, then, the code must indubitably have contained three kinds of laws: (1) those which were identical with laws or precedents previously in force; (2) old laws modified or revised; and (3) new laws for which Solon was himself responsible.

¹ Plut. *Sol.* xv 1: ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἀριστόν ᾗν, οὐκ ἐπήγαγεν ἰατρῆαν οὐδὲ καινοτομίαν, φοβηθεὶς μὴ συγχέας παντάπασι καὶ τάρᾳς τὴν πόλιν ἀσθενέστερος γένηται τοῦ καταστήσασθαι πάλιν καὶ συναρμόσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀριστόν. This observation is both shrewd and true.

When the important task of codification, conceived and executed by Solon in the manner described, was finally completed, it remained to put the written laws before the world so that they should be accessible to all men at all times. This could be done only by inscribing them on tablets of wood or stone or metal and setting them up in a public place.

What was the fate of these tablets and the laws inscribed upon them?

It is not to be doubted that an instrument, so serviceable and so hard-won, would have been jealously guarded. But we cannot suppose that in the tumultuous civic life of Athens, and in an age when reverence for the inviolability of constitutional law had not yet been born, the laws which were written by Solon could have continued in use decade after decade without supplement and revision. The tradition that Solon bound the Athenians by oath to maintain his laws unchanged for a certain period of time, ten years according to some (Herodotus i 29), one hundred years according to others (Plut. *Sol.* xxv 1), is a testimony that the ancients recognized the inevitability of change.¹ New laws must have been written, some consistent, some inconsistent, with those already standing. And these laws, according to the new fashion of inscription, would have been set up on tablets by the side of the old. And so, at the end of the sixth century, after the rule of Pisistratus² and his sons and the democratic reforms of Clisthenes, we may believe that there existed in Athens a body of written laws which resembled the code of Solon only as the man resembles the child he used to be. It might have been possible still for a critical investigator to distinguish the laws of Solon in the larger mass, and with the interest of an antiquarian to have restored them as a curious

¹ The inevitability of change and modification is further demonstrated by the tradition that Solon left Athens in order not to be compelled to make changes himself (Plut. *Sol.* xxv 4; *Const. of Ath.* xi).

² Herodotus (i 59) says that Pisistratus made no change in the *θέσμοι*; but this is inherently improbable, and Herodotus could not have had any sure knowledge of the matter.

historical document. But it goes without saying that this was not done. Men looked forward to the future, not backward to the past, and troubled themselves no longer with the earlier stages of their course. It is, indeed, possible, though not likely, that the tablets of Solon were accorded special honor and kept intact and apart from the tablets on which subsequent legislation was recorded. But, on the whole, it is more than probable that at the end of the sixth century no one, even with the acuteness of modern scholarship, could have determined just what laws had been the product of Solon's own mind: they were lost forever in the mass of pre-Solonian unwritten laws which he had formulated and post-Solonian laws which had been passed after the institution of his code. There may have been, indeed, certain laws which because of their subject or some inherent distinguishing mark could have been safely attributed to him; but in the nature of things they must have been very few.

Let us now proceed with the history of Athens in the fifth century. Within twenty years after the beginning of the century Athens was overwhelmed by a catastrophe which, while it only served to temper the national spirit to hard steel, destroyed almost completely at the same time the material city and all that was in it. When the Athenians evacuated the city before the battle of Salamis, they carried with them to the island of Salamis and to the Peloponnesian coast much of their public and private property. It is not inconceivable that they saved with the rest the tablets on which their laws were inscribed, but it must be admitted that this is altogether improbable. The sacred objects of religious cult and the necessaries of private life would surely have come first; and in the confusion and terror of the moment men would not have thought of the written laws, which could easily be replaced if the Athenians really survived the threat of annihilation. It is too much to assume that when the Athenians found themselves reëstablished in their

own city and set themselves to repair the ruin wrought by the Persians, they still possessed intact and in order the written code which had existed before the invasion. But surely they would have lost no time in restoring this code as best they could from such fragments as survived and from memory; the old laws, except those which had become obsolete and inoperative, were surely inscribed again, in similar if not the same terms, upon tablets which were set up in a public place to be used as they had been used in the past. There is no record that they were subjected to any sort of formal revision, but we cannot suppose that the lawyers of the day were restrained by undue reverence for the sanctity of a text from making obvious corrections and improvements, at any rate in those laws which they transcribed from memory.

Whatever may have been the form of the written laws of Athens after the Persian storm had passed, it is certain that the old order began anew: the body of jurisprudence was still alive and the processes of life imply the constant death of old laws and the birth of new. The code was steadily transformed and enlarged to meet the changing requirements of the times. The tablets containing laws which had fallen into disuse were not always destroyed, but were still preserved in the archives of the state, to be later unearthed by antiquarians and made the subject of learned researches. Probably the old laws of the sixth century, as they had been redrafted after the battle of Salamis, remained fairly discernible; but if the authentic work of Solon had been practically unrecognizable before the Persian wars, certainly we may be sure that by the middle of the fifth century there was very little indeed which could be attributed to him with any certainty whatever.

A hint as to the fate of some of the earlier laws is afforded by a fragment of the comic poet Cratinus (circa 453 B.C.) which is preserved by Plutarch (*Sol.* xxv 1): *πρὸς τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ Δράκοντος οἴσι νῦν φρύγουσι τὰς κάχρυσ τοῖς κύρβεσιν.* Envi-

dently some of the tablets on which the earlier laws attributed to Solon and Draco were inscribed had fallen into a sad state of disrepair and were not preserved with any particular care.¹

From this time on, we find the practice growing of attributing the older laws to Solon or to Solon and Draco. This should not surprise us or mislead us into thinking that the laws of Solon were actually extant as a whole and definitely recognizable. It was the universal Greek habit to attribute the great works of the past to definite persons without much critical regard to probability. The name of Solon came to stand for the body of early Athenian law. Herodotus (ii 177) and Diodorus (i 77, 5) report an Egyptian law which they say was borrowed by Solon and incorporated in the code of Athens. In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (1187 ff.) Pheidippides pretends that the name of the last day of the month (*ἔνη καὶ νέα*) was instituted by Solon as a relief to luckless debtors. In the *Birds* (1660) a law of Solon concerning inheritances is quoted verbatim. Finally, in the orators numberless laws are attributed to Solon, some of which may be old, but many of which bear unmistakable signs of later composition.

Before we come to the orators, however, there are two decrees, belonging to the end of the fifth century, which should be discussed for the light they throw on the history of Athenian laws.

An inscription of the year 409/8 is preserved (*C. I. A.* i 61) which records the psephisma of a certain Xenophanes. The resolution of Xenophanes which was adopted and which is here recorded was that the *ἀναγραφεῖς τῶν νόμων* should make a copy of Draco's law concerning homicide and set it up before the

¹ Professor W. K. Prentice suggests that Cratinus may be referring to a practice similar to one which is common in Syria. The Syrian bread is made of meal and water without leaven. The ingredients are mixed into a paste, which is then spread on a sheet of metal made hot for the purpose, and is thus cooked or parched. The word *φρύγουσι* would be appropriate for such an operation. All this indicates that the *κύρβεις* may have been made of metal and not necessarily of wood. Cf. Pollux viii 128 *Δέλτοι χαλκαὶ κτλ.*; Schol. Aristoph. *Birds* 1354 *κύρβεις χαλκαὶ σανίδες κτλ.*

King's Stoa ; and the law itself, or part of it, is inscribed on the same stone immediately after the psephisma. Unfortunately the stone is so badly mutilated that we cannot tell where the original was from which the copy was made. But there is no question that the law was definitely believed to have been written by Draco.

In the year 403, after the restoration of the democracy, there was a complete revision of the laws, of which we are told by Andocides (i 81 ff.).¹ It appears that a measure was adopted to meet the immediate emergency, providing that a commission of twenty should direct the affairs of the city until definite laws could be established ; meantime the laws of Solon and the *θεσμοί* of Draco should be in force. But, Andocides continues, it was discovered that many persons were liable to punishment for offenses committed unknowingly against the laws of Solon and Draco because they had been ignorant of these laws. It was decided therefore to subject the whole body of laws to a careful scrutiny and to set up in the Stoa those laws which were finally passed and accepted. The psephisma of Tisamenus which appears in the text of Andocides, making the proposals which Andocides refers to, may be spurious or it may be authentic. But it adds little to what can be inferred from Andocides' own words. It appears from all this that laws which were known as the laws of Solon and Draco were still on record, but that they had sunk into disuse and were little known, and that a new and official code was set up, which, though it was founded on the earlier laws, had been subjected to a revision so thoroughgoing that it was practically a new creation. Though the original copies of the old laws may not have been destroyed they could hardly be quoted thereafter as valid in legal disputes.

It should now be clear what opinion we ought to hold of the

¹ The rule of the Thirty may have been as disastrous a period for the continuity of the Athenian laws as the period of the Persian invasion itself. Cf. especially Schol. Aeschines i 39.

laws quoted by the orators of the fourth century and attributed to Solon or Draco. It would be rash and even absurd to maintain that any one of these laws is identical with any one of the laws written by Solon two hundred years before.¹ Indeed, the orators themselves were probably not deceived in this matter.² They attribute laws often enough to Solon and Draco, but quite as often they speak of "the lawgiver" without a name, or of "the lawgivers of those times." The name of Solon is used as the collective term for the legislative activity of the past,³ and is introduced partly through the Greek desire for a personal hero, partly for the purpose of reënforcing the orator's argument before the court by the authority of the great name of the father of Athenian laws.

Besides the laws which are referred to by the orators and those which are incorporated in the text of their speeches, a large number of laws attributed to Solon are to be found in Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius and more still may be gathered here and there in Greek and Roman literature. We also have

¹ The following may be noted as examples of the confusion and uncertainty about laws. Diogenes Laertius (i 55) quotes a law of Solon and then adds that Lysias attributed it to Draco. Isocrates (xii 144) says that the laws are at present in a state of confusion and full of inconsistencies; it is impossible to tell at a glance which are serviceable and which are not. In Istros (frag. xxxv) there is an allusion to a law forbidding the export of figs, without any mention of its author; elsewhere it is attributed to Solon. Schol. Aeschines i 39 says that the laws of Draco and Solon were destroyed (*λυμάλνεσθαι*) by the Thirty; later the laws which had been lost were restored and new ones were set up. That even the *θεσμοί* were not a fixed and unchanging body of laws is shown by the ephobic oath in Pollux viii 106.

² Demosthenes (xviii 6) seems to have a clear idea of what Solon had done; *οἱ νόμοι οὓς ὁ τιθεὶς ἐξ ἀρχῆς Σόλων, εὖνους ὦν ὑμῖν καὶ δημοτικὸς, οὐ μόνον τῷ γράψαι κυρίου ᾤετο δεῖν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τοὺς δικάζοντας ὁμομοκέσαι*. The act of writing them down was the great thing. In Demosthenes xxiv 142 we seem to have a definition of the laws of Solon: *τοὺς τοῦ Σόλωνος νόμους τοὺς πάλαι δεδοκιμασμένους οὓς οἱ πρόγονοι ἔθεντο*. The implication is that the older laws of Athens were all included under the name of Solon, and that there was no real belief that they were all written by him, though it may have been thought that they were collected by him.

³ In [Demosthenes] lxi 49 f. the statement is made that the laws of Solon are used by the greater part of the Greek world. This can only mean that the laws of other states were modeled upon or resembled the laws of Athens, and "the laws of Solon" means "the ancestral laws of democratic Athens."

the names of a number of Greek writings now lost which must have been monographs on the very subject of the laws.¹

From this it appears that from the fourth century B.C. the laws of Athens received much attention from scholars. Are we to suppose that they had access to any authoritative source of information concerning the laws of Solon himself? Is it likely that after the checkered career of Athenian laws during the sixth and fifth centuries it was possible even for scholars to discern the veritable laws of Solon? Unquestionably no. We may admit that even after the revision of the code under Euclides they could still have consulted the earlier records on which the new code was founded. But this, as we have seen, would have brought them very little nearer the truth. A review of the laws discussed by Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, who must have drawn their information from Didymus and other earlier writers, is enough to convince the reader that they are not the work of a single lawgiver, but rather a collection of early laws dating from various times and springing from various conditions of society. That many of them were old is shown by the interest taken in them by the lexicographers, as well as by a passage in the *Daitaleis* of Aristophanes (fr. 222 Kock). Lysias also (x 15 ff.) quotes from several laws, which he attributes to Solon, passages containing obsolete words whose meaning he expounds.


It appears that the older laws in Athens were recorded on tables called *κύρβεις* and *ἄξωνες*. There are several descriptions of these objects in the ancient authors, lexicographers, and scholiasts, but they are not consistent with one another.² Apparently no one had taken the trouble to describe them as long as every one knew what they were. Later some thought the *κύρβεις* and *ἄξωνες* were identical; others distinguished them in various ways. It was generally agreed that an *ἄξων*, as its name implies, was a contrivance which revolved on an axis,

¹ See p. 21 and the list in Sondhaus (1909).

² On *κύρβεις* and *ἄξωνες* see Busolt (1895, p. 290, footnote 3).

vertical or horizontal, so that any one consulting the inscription could read it through without moving from his place. Such a device as this would naturally have been made of wood, or it might even have been made of metal plates set in a wooden frame. But there is evidence to show that there were also revolving tables of stone.

A curious wedge-shaped fragment of marble was found in Athens in 1885 which some think was part of an axon (*C.I.A.* iv 559). It is inscribed on two opposite faces, and though the inscription is too much mutilated to yield any meaning whatever it is possible to see that on one face the writing read from the top to the bottom and on the other from the bottom to the top. The character of the letters serves to prove that the inscription belongs to the first half of the fifth century. Kumanudis¹ very plausibly conjectures that the fragment was part of a stone imitation of the earlier type of wooden axones. According to his reconstruction, the axon was a contrivance revolving on a horizontal axis, so formed that a vertical cross-section would resemble a four pointed star, thus:



If the reader stood before this machine and turned it around as he read, it is easy to see why the writing should run from the top to the bottom on one face of each wedge and from the bottom to the top on the other. This was certainly a clumsy and heavy contrivance in stone, and the only reason people could have had for making it is that they were imitating in durable material a familiar and convenient wooden type.

¹ *Ἐφημερίς Ἀρχαιολογική*, III (1885) 215 ff.

The only important conclusion from all this is a corroboration of the claim previously made that there was no sure and continuous existence of the unmodified Solonian code from the beginning of the sixth century to the end of the fifth. When Aristotle says that the laws of Solon were immediately inscribed on the *κύρβεις* and Plutarch says they were immediately inscribed on *ἄξονες*, they were making assertions which could not be supported by any real evidence. Since many of the old Athenian laws were in Aristotle's time still preserved on *κύρβεις* and *ἄξονες* and since the whole body of early law was attributed to Solon, they naturally assumed that his laws had originally been published in this way.¹ Plutarch says (*Sol.* xxv 1) that fragments of *ἄξονες* were still preserved in his time, and there is no reason to doubt his statement. But it would be a piece of wild credulity to believe that these were fragments of axones on which the laws of Solon had been originally inscribed.

The general conclusion is as follows. The laws attributed to Solon by the orators, by Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, and by other ancient writers belonged to the body of ancient Athenian law which was still in existence at the end of the fifth century. This body of law was of two centuries' growth, and was the creation of many minds and of many times. Incorporated in it were no doubt some of the laws written by Solon, though probably in a greatly modified form. It is not only wrong to assume that all laws attributed to Solon are actually by his hand unless the contrary can be proved, but it is also rash and uncritical to admit the Solonian authorship of *any* law unless its authenticity can be shown by indubitable proofs.

¹ Plutarch (*Sol.* xix 3) quotes the exact words of the eighth law of the thirteenth axon, which begins *Ἀτιμῶν ὅσοι ἀτιμοὶ ἦσαν πρὶν ἢ Σόλωνα ἔρξαι*. The reference to a definite axon does not prove that this is a genuine law of Solon, but simply that it was one of the ancient laws recorded on the axones which were in existence at the end of the fifth century. Even the name of Solon does not prove its authenticity: indeed the law reads as if it were passed at some time subsequent to Solon in the interest of the descendants of Athenians who had been disfranchised before the archonship of Solon.

APPENDIX 5

CHANGES IN WEIGHTS, MEASURES, AND CURRENCY AND IN THE CALENDAR

The principal and only direct evidence for the reforms which Solon is supposed to have introduced in the Athenian currency and in the system of weights and measures, is to be found in the two following passages.¹

Const. of Ath. x: "These, then, would seem to be the democratic innovations which were embraced in the Solonian code. Equally democratic in their nature were the cancellation of debts, which was effected before the legislation, and the enlarged standard in weights, measures, and currency, which was introduced afterwards. Under Solon the measures were made larger than the Pheidonian measures, and the mina, which had previously been equivalent in weight to seventy drachmae, was brought up to the full standard by the addition of the necessary thirty. The coins of early times were two-drachma pieces. Solon also established a system of weights in correspondence with the coinage, so that sixty-three minae made a talent; and this increase of three minae was distributed proportionately among the stater and other divisions of the talent."

Plut. *Sol.* xv: "Some writers, of whom Androtion is one, say that the welcome relief which came to the poorer classes, was effected, not by a cancellation of debts, but by a reduction in the rate of interest, and that they gave the name *Seisachtheia* to this public benefaction and to two other acts which accom-

¹ On the reform in the weights, measures, and currency, see Busolt (1895, pp. 262-264); Seeck (1904, p. 181); Lehmann-Haupt (1906, p. 307, footnote 2); De Sanctis (1912, pp. 218 ff.); Beloch (1913, pp. 333 ff.).

panied it, the enlargement of the standards of measurement and the settlement of monetary values. Previously the mina had consisted of seventy-three drachmae; Solon ordained that it should consist of one hundred. The result of this was that the nominal value of the coins paid in discharge of a debt remained the same, but the real value was lowered; those who had debts to pay were greatly benefited, while at the same time the creditors suffered no loss."

Other evidence for early Attic currency and early systems of weights and measures is to be derived from scattered statements in ancient literature and especially from extant coins and metallic weights. It will be necessary first to discover just what Androtion and Aristotle understood these changes to be, and then to inquire whether their statements are in accord with the knowledge which we gain from other sources.

We observe, first of all, that there is a marked similarity between the two passages. The same words are used and the increase in the number of drachmae in a mina is described in the same way. It is fair to assume that Plutarch is quoting, in part at least, the exact words of Androtion, and that Androtion served as one of the sources of Aristotle. But, at the same time, there are striking divergences. Androtion declares that the reforms which he describes were an essential part of the *Seisachtheia*; Aristotle says explicitly that they were introduced even later than the publication of the laws. According to Androtion, the number of drachmae in a mina before the change was 73; according to Aristotle it was 70. Androtion speaks of an increase only in measures; Aristotle extends the increase to weights and coins. Aristotle adds details which are not in Plutarch's quotation from Androtion. The definiteness of the statements in both authors is sufficient to show that they were writing of something about which they believed they had definite knowledge, and they are evidently writing about the same thing. The questions then present themselves: First, what

were the facts about the weights, measures, and currency which they are attempting to convey? Second, whence did they learn these facts? Third, how can we account for the differences between the two reports? The attempt to answer these questions may lead us, for a moment, rather far from Solon and his policies, but it is necessary as a preliminary to a proper understanding of Solon's part in the matter.

How, then, could Androtion, and Aristotle after him, know anything about the precise nature of changes made by Solon in the first decade of the sixth century? We think first, as usual, of Solon's own poems. But there is no trace of evidence on this subject in the fragments that remain, and we must confess that Solon would have scarcely imposed on his Muse the drudgery of describing monetary and metrological reforms. Were the new regulations written into the laws and inscribed on the Axones? Aristotle says plainly that whatever was done touching weights, measures, and currency, was done after the codification of the laws was complete. Where else shall we turn? When these two sources fail us, we must be very cautious indeed about accepting the statements of the biographers. It is not beyond the range of possibility that there should have been preserved upon stone the standards of measurement employed at an earlier day; there may have been weights of stone or metal, preserved as curiosities; there were undoubtedly coins which had been minted two or three hundred years before Androtion's time. If all of these earlier standards were regarded as pre-Solonian, and if the standards of Androtion's day were regarded as the result of Solon's reforms, it was easy, by simple calculations, to determine exactly what the Solonian reforms were. We must conclude, then, that Androtion derived his exact information from an examination of the standards of weight, measure, and currency which prevailed in Athens and elsewhere in his own day, and of such ancient coins and weights as were preserved in private ownership or in temple treasures.

Let us now look more closely at the statements which are actually made about the changes.

According to Plutarch's quotation, the mina had first consisted of 73 drachmae and was then increased to 100 drachmae. Does this imply that drachmae were reduced in weight or that the mina was increased? Obviously the former, because Androtion claimed that the change would be of advantage to debtors. We may, therefore, draw up the following table:

| | |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| 73 old drachmae | = 1 standard mina |
| 100 new drachmae | = 1 standard mina |
| 60 standard minae | = 1 standard talent |
| 4380 old drachmae | = 1 standard talent |

Aristotle speaks of an increase in the currency. This increase must be either in the unit of weight or in the number of coins. If Aristotle holds the same view as Androtion, he must mean increase in the number of coins. Later he says that one talent will be equal to 63 minae. But a talent of 63 minae is quite unheard of, and unless we are compelled to recognize such a talent here we should be glad to explain the matter in another way. Besides, Aristotle himself, in the last sentence, tacitly assumes that the talent contains only 60 minae. Let us assume then what he means is that a talent, which consists of 60 new minae of 100 drachmae, is equal to 63 old minae of 70 drachmae. This may be presented in tabular form thus:

| | |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| 70 old drachmae | = 1 old mina |
| 100 new drachmae | = 1 new mina |
| 60 new minae | = 1 standard talent |
| 63 old minae | = 1 standard talent |
| 4410 old drachmae | = 1 standard talent |

Now, since 1 talent = 60 × 100 or 6000 drachmae,
we may write

4410 old drachmae = 6000 new drachmae
or 73½ old drachmae = 100 new drachmae

Here, then, we have substantial agreement between the two reports. Only, Aristotle allows an increase in the weight of the mina and implies an increase in the weight of the talent, while Androtion confines the change to a decrease in the weight of the drachma.¹ In order to see which theory of the change was the correct one, let us turn to external evidence.

In Greece in the sixth century there were two principal systems of currency, the Aeginetan and the Euboean. Coins of the Aeginetan standard, whether they were minted in Aegina or elsewhere, were in use throughout the Peloponnese, in the greater part of the mainland of Greece, and in the islands of the southern Aegean. Coins of the Euboean standard were current in the cities of Euboea and in their colonial domain, that is, the Chalcidice, Sicily, and Italy. It was formerly supposed that these two systems differed in the unit of weight, but that in both alike a talent consisted of 60 minae and a mina of 100 drachmae. But we know now, from an inscription discovered at Delphi, that the Aeginetan mina consisted of 70 drachmae.² Furthermore, it is now fairly certain that the silver mina was of a fixed value throughout Greece until the time of Alexander and that the Aeginetan, Euboean, and other systems of currency differed only in the division of the mina. We hear of Aeginetan drachmae and staters but not of Aeginetan silver minae and silver talents, which were identical with Euboean silver minae and silver talents. There was an Aeginetan commercial mina which differed from the Aeginetan and Euboean silver mina. But in Athens the commercial weights were brought into correspondence with the coin weights, as Aristotle was aware. As

¹ This method of reconciling the two passages is due to De Sanctis (1912, pp. 222 ff.). For the general subject see Hulstsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie* (ed. 2). This contains the ancient evidence and references to modern works which had appeared before the date of publication. For later studies of the Athenian currency see Head, *Historia Numorum*, ed. 2, and for systems of weights, Pernice, *Griechische Gewichte*, Berlin, 1894.

² For further proof see Beloch (1913, p. 336).

the Aeginetan mina was divided into 70 drachmae, so the Euboean was divided into 100.

Now it seems practically certain that both Androtion and Aristotle are describing a transition from the Aeginetan currency to the Euboean. Scholars had reached this same conclusion even before the discovery of the Delphic inscription. We know that the permanent Attic standard, which was widely adopted throughout the Greek world, was the same as the Euboean. And we must conclude from the passages now before us that Athens in earlier times had employed the Aeginetan standard. Aristotle seems to be correct in the figure 70, but wrong in the value of the mina; Androtion, conversely, gives the wrong figure 73, and keeps the mina at a fixed value. And yet they find almost the same number of drachmae in a talent. These irregularities have not yet been satisfactorily explained. The following explanation, which is offered by Beloch, is plausible. Androtion gave $73\frac{1}{2}$ as the number of old drachmae in a mina, deriving this figure from the weight of Aeginetan drachmae (or didrachms) current in his time or from the rate of exchange. Plutarch in quoting dropped the fraction. Aristotle read Androtion and misunderstood him, thinking that the mina and talent had been increased in weight, the mina from $73\frac{1}{2}$ to 100 drachmae, the talent from $60 \times 73\frac{1}{2}$ or 4410 to 6000 drachmae. But Aristotle knew that the Aeginetan mina was divided into 70, not $73\frac{1}{2}$ drachmae. So, in order to correct Androtion's statement, he said that the mina was raised from 70 to 100 drachmae, and the talent from 60 minae to 63 (old) minae. This gave him the same result—a talent of 4410 old drachmae.

Next Aristotle says that the coins of early times were two-drachma pieces. This statement is made because the standard Attic coin, possibly from the very beginning of coinage in Athens, was the tetradrachm. But does he mean that the didrachm was in use before Solon's time and that Solon introduced

the tetradrachm; or that the coins in use for a number of years after the Solonian reforms were didrachms? We cannot say. There are plenty of Aeginetan didrachms extant and plenty of Euboean didrachms. There are no coins which can be definitely assigned to Attica earlier than the tetradrachms, and it is not known when coins were first struck in Attica.

So much for the currency. What was done in the matter of the measures? Both Aristotle and Androtion assert that they were enlarged, and Aristotle adds that they were made larger than the Pheidonian measures (for the value of the Pheidonian measures, see Beloch, 1913, pp. 348, 349), which, he implies, were previously in use in Athens. Now concerning the relation between Athenian and Pheidonian measures Aristotle could not have been wrong, because the Pheidonian measures were still in use in some parts of Greece in his day, and it was a simple matter to compare them with the Athenian measures. It was formerly supposed that the Pheidonian and Aeginetan measures were identical; but since the Aeginetan measures were larger than the Athenian, they were unquestionably larger than the Pheidonian. Whether the Pheidonian measures were actually in use in Athens in early times is quite uncertain; Aristotle probably had no means of discovering the truth.

If we review the results of this discussion, we see that Solon was credited with the introduction into Athens of the Euboean custom of dividing the silver mina into 100 drachmae. He also established a system of commercial weights which was in correspondence with the coin weights, *i.e.*, a market mina was identical with a silver mina and a market talent with a silver talent. Larger market talents, we know, were also in use, but they too belonged to the same system, being equal to one and one half or two times the silver talent. The Athenian measures, which were the same as the Euboean measures, were also in correspondence with the weights, as follows:

1 ft. = 297 – 298 mm.

1 medimnos = twice the cube of the ft. = 52.4 l.

1 metretes = $1\frac{1}{2}$ times the cube of the ft. = 39.3 l.

1 talent (1st) = the water-weight of the cube of the ft.
= 26.2 kg.

1 talent (2d) = the water-weight of the metretes.

1 talent (3d) = the water-weight of the medimnos.

Before the introduction of this complete system, we are told that the Athenians used the Aeginetan coinage, presumably the Aeginetan weights, and the Pheidonian measures. The change was evidently a great step forward in the direction of orderliness and convenience. This may have been its only purpose. But there is undoubtedly something significant in the fact that the old order was Aeginetan and Peloponnesian, while the new was Euboean and Ionian. Aegina and Athens were inveterate enemies. Chalcis and Eretria were the friends of Athens. Scholars have seen, therefore, a shrewd stroke of policy in the change (see U. Koehler, *Mith. d. arch. Inst.* X, 1885, 151 ff.). The Chalcidice, Sicily, and Italy were under the Euboean influence, and Athens could extend her commerce to those regions far more successfully if she adopted their standards of weight and coinage. In return for their timber and grain, Athens could send them oil and manufactured goods. These are sound reasons for the change and they are far more plausible than the reason which Androtion offered and which must have been only a guess. These reasons might have been in the mind of a statesman like Solon who had had experience in trade. But is there anything to show that they were really the personal reasons of an economic reformer, and not simply the impersonal causes which grew out of the natural economic development of the state?

It has been the habit in ancient and modern times to call the system of weights and measures which was in use in Athens throughout the great period of her history, the Solonian system.

The psephisma of Tisamenus quoted by Andocides (*Myst.* 83 *πολιτεύεσθαι Ἀθηναίους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, νόμοις δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος καὶ μέτροις καὶ σταθμοῖς*) refers to the laws of Solon and his weights and measures. But the consideration of possible sources of Androtion and Aristotle showed clearly enough that there was nothing more tangible than tradition to connect the name of Solon with the changes which actually took place. It was evidently the Athenian practice to ascribe to Solon the system of weights, measures, and currency just as they ascribed to him any law which could not be ascribed to any one else. That Solon did not really do what they thought he did, seems likely on the following grounds:

1. Since there was actually a change, it was inevitable that it should be attached to the greatest available name, just as the earliest coinage of Athens was attached to Theseus, and a system of weights and measures to Pheidon of Argos.

2. It is much more likely that such a change should come about gradually, to meet new commercial needs, than that it should be effected with the definite purpose of bringing about a commercial change.

3. There would have been no great advantage for Athens in changing from the Aeginetan to the Euboean system. If Athens was commercially at a disadvantage in competition with Aegina, she would have been equally at a disadvantage in competition with Chalcis and Eretria.

4. It seems hardly likely that Solon could by formal decree have effected a change from one system of weights and measures to another, unless the change had really been working itself out naturally for some time; and if this was the case, Solon deserves no credit for the change. There were no machines or dies of standard size to interfere with a natural transfer from one system to the other. When trade had once been established with countries of the Euboean domain, it required no extraordinary statesmanship to provide for the coining of money which

would serve the new needs. The thing could be done on the motion of one man as well as another. The only effective form of arbitrary action would have been the actual issue of coins of the new standard. But there is no certainty that any coins of any kind were minted in Athens till after Solon's time.

On these grounds it must be concluded that the Solonian authorship of the reforms in the system of weights, measures, and currency is far too uncertain to justify us in letting it weigh in the balance in our judgment of the man and his career.

The Solonian authorship of the changes attributed to him by Aristotle has already been looked upon with suspicion by Otto Seeck. But his discussion includes much that is fanciful, with unjustified assumptions leading to unjustified conclusions.

Plutarch attributes to Solon certain changes in the Athenian calendar. "Observing," he says (*Sol.* xxv, Perrin's translation), "the irregularity of the month, and that the motion of the moon does not always coincide with the rising and setting of the sun, but that often she overtakes and passes the sun on the same day, he ordered that day to be called the Old and New, assigning the portion of it which preceded the conjunction to the expiring month, and the remaining portion to the month that was just beginning. . . . After the twentieth he did not count the days by adding them to twenty, but by subtracting them from thirty, on a descending scale, like the waning of the moon." This is obviously an invention to explain the two features of the calendar which are mentioned. Such things as these would not have found a place in any record, and there is no way, so far as we can see, by which Plutarch or his sources could have actually known that Solon made such innovations. The peculiarities, for which an origin was sought, were more likely the result of popular habit. The attribution of them to Solon may rest entirely on the fooling of Pheidippides in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (1187 ff.), who claims that the *ἔνη καὶ νέα* was devised by Solon as a popular measure to provide a respite for men who were threatened with a lawsuit.

APPENDIX 6

TRAVELS

The evidence for Solon's travels is as follows: (1) that he went abroad after his archonship: Herodotus i 29; *Const. of Ath.* xi, xiii; Plut. *Sol.* xxv; (2) that he went abroad because of the threatened tyranny of Pisistratus: Diog. Laert. i 50; Schol. Plat. *Rep.* x 599e; Schol. Dem. xlv 64; (3) that he visited *Egypt*: Herodotus i 29; Plat. *Tim.* 21e; *Const. of Ath.* xi; Plut. *Sol.* xxvi; Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 10, 354e; Diog. Laert. i 50; Schol. Plat. *loc. cit.* *Cyprus*: Herodotus v 113; Plut. *Sol.* xxvi; Diog. Laert. i 50; Schol. Plat. *loc. cit.*; Schol. Dem. *loc. cit.* *Cilicia*: Diog. Laert. i 51; Schol. Plat. *loc. cit.*; Schol. Dem. *loc. cit.* *Miletus*: Plut. *Sol.* vi. *Sardis*: Herodotus i 29; Diodorus ix 2, 26; Plut. *Sol.* xxvii; Plut. *quomodo adulator* 15, 58e; Diog. Laert. i 50; Schol. Plat. *loc. cit.*

Did he go abroad at all?

It is a familiar fact that foreign travel is often included in the ancient biographies of distinguished men, and that by this means meetings and interviews with distinguished foreigners were explained. One is inclined to suspect, therefore, that the travels of Solon were invented, partly for their own sake, partly to account for the interviews with Croesus and Thales. Consequently evidence from his own poems, direct or indirect, must be sought.

1. Aristotle's words in *Const. of Ath.* xi sound as if they were a paraphrase of statements made by Solon himself: "he went to Egypt, partly for the purpose of trade, partly for sight-seeing, saying that he would not return for ten years, and giv-

ing as his reason his belief that it was not right for him to stay and explain his laws, but that every one should do what was prescribed." Other reasons are added by Aristotle which he manifestly gathered from Solon's own writings. It is not improbable, therefore, that Solon wrote a poem in which he dealt with the conditions in Athens following his legislation and announced his determination to go abroad for ten years, for business and pleasure, and in particular to visit Egypt. There is nothing to prove the existence of such a poem. These several features had appeared previously in Herodotus, viz., an absence of ten years, sight-seeing as a motive, Egypt as a destination. The motive of trade is added by Aristotle with some emphasis, as if he had read Herodotus' words and felt that they were inadequate as a description of the occupations of Solon during his travels. The three features supplied by Herodotus might well be inventions: the number ten agrees with the number of years during which, according to Herodotus, the laws were to remain in force; sight-seeing is an easily invented motive for travel in the case of one of the Wise Men; Egypt was the place to which all wise men resorted. The whole case, therefore, hangs on the accuracy of Aristotle's words, "saying that he would not return for ten years": either this statement was found in a poem, or it was inferred from the tradition. This path, therefore, does not bring us to any sure evidence.

2. Plutarch states that Solon went to Egypt and "spent some time, as he himself says, 'at the outpouring of the Nile, hard by the Canobic shore.'" Does this mean that Solon *said* he spent some time in Egypt? Or is it Plutarch who says that he spent some time in a place which somewhere in his poems he describes in the words quoted? A literal interpretation of Plutarch's statement supports the former; but we cannot be sure that he did not mean the latter. If the first alternative is the true one, it would appear that Plutarch is quoting from a poem written after the visit to Egypt, and in that case it could

not be the poem which might have served as the source for Aristotle, unless Aristotle too derived his information from a poem written after Solon's visit to Egypt and not from one written before. Now since Solon might easily have written the line which Plutarch quotes without ever having left Athens, we are again left without any sure evidence.

3. Herodotus states that Solon visited Philocypus in Cyprus and that in an elegiac poem (*ἐν ἔπαισι*) he spoke in the highest terms of that prince. Here we have a definite reference to a poem by Solon. Can we believe that Herodotus learned of the visit to Cyprus in this poem? Let us turn to Plutarch's account of the matter. After describing what Solon is supposed to have done in Cyprus, Plutarch continues: "Solon himself makes mention of this consolidation. In his elegies, namely, he addresses Philocypus, and says," — here follows xxv. It can hardly be doubted that this quotation is a portion, probably the close, of the very poem referred to by Herodotus. Without the evidence of Herodotus, we might be tempted to think that Plutarch's quotation was a forgery based on the legend of a visit to the town of Soli in Cyprus. But with the mutual corroboration of Herodotus and Plutarch, we may safely assert that Solon visited Cyprus at any rate.

The question, then, whether Solon went abroad at all, must be answered in the affirmative.

Where did he go?

Since the fact of his travels has been established, it is reasonable to believe that the literal interpretation of Plutarch's statement which was quoted above should be accepted: Solon himself said that he spent some time in Egypt. That he went to Egypt before he went to Cyprus, is probable from the fact that in xxv he seems to contemplate a direct return to Athens. Herodotus says that Solon visited the court of Amasis in Egypt. But this is chronologically quite improbable since the reign of

Amasis fell between 569 and 525, and Solon was almost certainly at home again in Athens before the beginning of his reign. In ii 177 Herodotus says that Solon derived his law against idleness from a law of Amasis.

It has been shown that he went to Cyprus. Here, according to Plutarch (*Sol.* xxvi), he persuaded Philocyprus to move his city from an unfavorable location on a height to a more advantageous situation in the plain, and assisted him in the reorganization of the city. Out of gratitude to Solon, Philocyprus changed the name of the city from Aipeia to Soli. Where could Plutarch have learned these facts? Either from Solon's poem or from the record of some Cyprian tradition. He himself quotes the fragment of Solon's poem as evidence for Solon's reorganization of the city (*συννοικισμός*); but the only thing in the way of evidence afforded by the poem is the word *οἰκισμός* itself, which does not necessarily imply a reorganization of the city under Solon's guidance. If, therefore, Plutarch had the whole poem before him, it is fair to conclude that he could find no better evidence than the passage he quotes. He may, of course, have simply copied the fragment from his source; but it is more than likely that the quotation was made in the source for the same purpose. It is more than likely, then, that there was no real evidence for Plutarch's statements in the poem itself. That a Cyprian tradition is at the bottom of the thing is indicated by Plutarch's preliminary statement that the city had been founded by Demophon, the son of Theseus. It looks as if an account of the *κτίσις* of the city, of the familiar type, lay at the back of the whole story. If there had been any interesting information in the poem, it would have been natural for Herodotus to mention it in the passage where he alludes to the poem. If the story depends on a Cyprian tradition, we cannot accept it as true. It *may*, indeed, be true; but it is too easy to see how a tradition like this could have originated without any real foundation in truth, for us to accept

it as genuinely historical. The nucleus of the tradition may be found in the following. (1) The similarity between the name of Solon and the name of the city of Soli. It cannot be supposed that the city was actually named for Solon any more than Soli in Cilicia; the name would not take this form but would probably be Soloneia. Furthermore, Solon refers to the people of Soli, the *Σόλιοι*, in a way which would be a little unbecoming if the city had just been named for him. (2) The existence of the name Soli and the name Aipeia side by side for the same community. Aipeia was attached to an old abandoned settlement on the hill and may have been a Greek translation of an earlier Semitic name. (3) Solon's fame as an administrator and legislator. (4) The record in Solon's own poem of his actual visit to Philocyprus. The tradition, therefore, is untrustworthy; and the poem probably conveyed no definite information.

All that we can safely infer from the poem and from Herodotus and Plutarch is that Solon sojourned for some time with Philocyprus, the young king of Soli, in Cyprus, and that a warm mutual regard grew up between them. Considering Solon's recent legislation and his hatred of the tyranny, it is reasonable to suppose that he would not have admired Philocyprus if he had not found him an enlightened and high-minded ruler, and he may have done something to strengthen him in his policy of justice and benevolence.

The reports of his visits to Soli in Cilicia, to Miletus and to Sardis may be definitely rejected as legendary. The visit to Cilicia was invented because of the similarity between the name of Solon and the name of the city; the visit to Miletus was invented for the sake of the interview with Thales, which has no historical foundation; and the visit to Sardis was invented in order to bring about the interview with Croesus which is equally apocryphal. Of course it cannot be denied that Solon may have visited all these places; indeed a visit to Miletus would have been most natural. But we have no real knowledge of it.

When did he go abroad ?

There are three possibilities : before his archonship, when he was engaged in trade ; within a year or two after his archonship ; or just before the establishment of the tyranny of Pisistratus.

1. Herodotus states that the son of Philocyprus perished in battle against the Persians in 498 B. C. Supposing he was as old as sixty at this time, he must have been born not earlier than 558. If the father was as old as sixty at the time of the son's birth, he would have been born in 618. He must have been at least 25 at the time of Solon's visit, which would then have occurred in 593 at the very earliest. Since extreme figures have been employed in this calculation, it is safe to say that the visit must have taken place after the archonship. This disposes of the first of the three possibilities.

2. Now if Solon had left Athens just before the establishment of the tyranny of Pisistratus, he must have been a very old man. In the few years of life remaining to him, it is not likely that he could have been so far reconciled to Pisistratus as to speak cheerfully of a happy return to his fatherland. Yet this is just what he does in xxv. The late date is probably to be rejected : it may have originated in the legend of Solon's death and burial in Cyprus, which is practically contradicted by the poem ; in the belief that Solon, the stout opponent of tyrants, must have been hated by Pisistratus ; and in the effort to remove the chronological impossibility of the interview with Croesus, which was recognized before Plutarch.

We must conclude, therefore, that Solon's travels fell early in the interval between his archonship and the accession of Pisistratus.

APPENDIX 7

RELATIONS WITH PISISTRATUS

The evidence upon which we are to determine the character of the relations between Solon and Pisistratus is as follows: Arist. *Const. of Ath.* xiv; Diodorus ix 4, ix 20, xix 1; Plut. *Sol.* xxix f., *an seni* 21, 794 f.; Diog. Laert. i 49 ff.; Aelian *V. H.* viii 16; Aul. Gell. xvii 21, 4; Schol. Plat. *Rep.* x 599 e; Schol. Dem. xlv 64.

Certain features in these several accounts are manifestly legendary. Such is the story of Solon's claim to be wiser than some and braver than others; the story that he put on his full armor, or placed his arms before his door, and either called upon his fellow-citizens to join him in the defense of their liberties or at least proclaimed that he had himself done his utmost; the story, in its various forms, of Solon's reply when Pisistratus asked him what gave him confidence to oppose his plans; the story that Solon compared the machinations of Pisistratus with the wiles of Odysseus; the "famous saying" that it would have been easier for the Athenians to prevent the tyranny while it was in preparation, but now it was a greater and more glorious task to uproot and destroy it when it was already full grown. These things cannot be accepted as historical, because it is altogether improbable that they should have been recorded in Solon's poems.

What remains in the ancient accounts? That Solon opposed the request of Pisistratus for a bodyguard; that he tried to turn Pisistratus from his purposes; that he tried to persuade the people to overthrow the tyrant before he became strong;

that in the end Pisistratus treated Solon with consideration and made him his counselor. The last of these statements could hardly have been based upon a poem; it was probably a conclusion drawn from the well-known mildness of Pisistratus' rule, his preservation of the established laws, and the absence of any tradition that he had treated Solon harshly. The other statements may have rested upon some real evidence. But it should be observed that they could easily be invented on the basis of the poems in which in general terms Solon had proclaimed the insidious dangers of tyranny, and of Solon's well-known hatred of the tyrannical form of government.

There is practical unanimity among the ancient authors that xiii and xiv (see the Testimonia for these fragments) were concerned with the tyranny of Pisistratus, and that xiii was written before, and xiv after, his usurpation.

If we accept the form in which these poems are given by Diodorus (as we are justified in doing), we observe, in the first place, that there is nothing to show whether each of these poems is complete in itself or whether they were parts of longer poems. In the poems as we have them there is no allusion to Pisistratus.

xiii seems to be made up entirely of general statements. Certainly the sentences with *πέλεται*, *γίγνεται*, and *ἔστι* are universal in their application; *ἄλλυται*, *ἔπεσεν* (a gnomic aorist), and *χρή* sound as if they too were universal. If *ἔπεσεν* were a normal narrative aorist, the sentence would mean that Athens was already in the power of a tyrant; but all the authors hold that this was written before the tyranny; therefore they at any rate must have taken *ἔπεσεν* as a gnomic aorist. Furthermore, the emphasis in the sentence manifestly lies in *εἰς μονάρχου . . . δουλοσύνην*, whereas if *ἔπεσεν* were particular, the emphasis should be on *αἰδρείη*. The poem must have been written at a moment when certain men in the city were acquiring undue power and influence, and the people, blind to the danger threatening their own freedom and moved by admiration

for the men in whom the danger lay, were even disposed to increase their power. When did this danger threaten? Certainly not before Solon's archonship, because then the people had no freedom which could be imperiled. The poem must refer, therefore, to conditions subsequent to the archonship; but there is nothing to justify us in being more precise.

From xiv we learn that the people have already been deprived of some measure of freedom by the men whom they have themselves raised to power. This result is due to their own blindness towards the machinations of these ambitious men. The plural *τούτους* is significant. This could hardly have been used if Pisistratus had already made himself sole master of Athens. The men referred to must have been unscrupulous demagogues, but more than this we cannot say.¹

xiii sounds as if it were written at an earlier stage in the development of Athenian politics than xiv; but at the same time it must be admitted that xiii could easily form a part of the poem containing xiv. Verses 5-8 of xiv are as general in their intention as the whole of xiii. It should be remembered, moreover, that Plutarch quotes verses 5-7 of xiv for the period before the usurpation.

There is nothing in the poems as we have them to connect them with the usurpation of Pisistratus. What there may have been in the portions which are lost or in other poems, we cannot tell. But the single indication offered by the plural *τούτους* is enough to make us suspicious of the judgment of the ancient authors.

xxxvi shows clearly that Solon had been called mad because he claimed to see more than the people in general saw; and that he was confident of the vindication of his accuracy. This might well be a quotation from a poem proclaiming a threat-

¹ Beloch (1913, p. 353) refers *τούτους ηύξησατε ρύματα δόντες* to Pisistratus' bodyguard. Since Solon refers to *δουλοσύνη* as past, these lines, he says, must have been written after the expulsion of Pisistratus.

ened usurpation. It might even be a part of the poem to which xiii and xiv belonged, supposing they were drawn from the same poem. There is nothing to prove that the couplet belongs to this period; but Diogenes Laertius' quotation of it here makes it more than probable.

In the end we must conclude that there is no real proof of the traditional reports of Solon's opposition to the usurpation of Pisistratus.¹ But we can say positively that the Athenians were threatened with tyranny by various men (cf. *τούτους*) after the time of Solon's archonship and that Solon stoutly opposed it. It is easy to see in Aristotle's account of the decade after the archonship (*Const. of Ath.* xiii f.) that there may well have been many abortive attempts at a tyranny before Pisistratus was finally successful. But though it may not be possible to connect Solon's name and Solon's poems with any definite events, the poems nevertheless reveal the mind of the man during these troubled years. It is impossible to say whether the occasion of the poems preceded or followed Solon's travels. He must have remained in Athens long enough after his legislation

¹ On the relations of Solon and Pisistratus see Busolt (1895, pp. 299, 300, and 314, 315). Von Stern (1913, p. 437) concludes that the statements about Aristion's proposal to give Pisistratus a bodyguard of 50 men went back to the Attic chronicle. "Der Atthidograph, der zuerst diese Angabe gebracht hat, muss sich dabei auf vollständig authentisches Material gestützt, das Protokoll der Volksversammlung selbst eingesehen haben." Then he asserts that there could have been no doubt that Solon opposed this proposal. "Es ist ein geradezu zwingender Schluss, den ein neuer Historiker ganz ebenso machen würde, wie der alte Chronist, dass Solon bei seiner Kampfesfreudigkeit gegen diesen Antrag gesprochen habe. . . . Dass Solon bald nach der Begründung dieser Herrschaft im Archonjahr des Hegesistratos ruhig in Athen gestorben und mit allen Ehren bestattet war, hat der Chronist wohl einem Beschluss über die Beerdigung auf Staatskosten entnehmen können." That Aristion's proposal may have been known from a stone, I admit; that Solon opposed it is not unlikely, even at his advanced age; but it is quite as likely that the incident should have been invented. The suggestion concerning the public burial merits little consideration. Solon's "Kampfesfreudigkeit" is unknown to me. Von Stern's paper is chiefly valuable as a study of the development of the "solonisches Porträt."

for the dissatisfaction to manifest itself which we learn of in his apologetic poems and for him to compose these poems. This might have been a matter of a few months or a few years. Of the length of his absence we know nothing. Even if we were convinced that he wrote a poem in which he announced that he would not return for ten years, this would not justify us in believing that he actually did remain away for that length of time.

APPENDIX 8

DEATH AND BURIAL

According to Phantias of Eresos (ap. Plut. *Sol.* xxxii) Solon lived less than two years after the usurpation of Pisistratus; the usurpation occurred in the archonship of Comeas, and Solon died in the archonship of Hegestratus, the successor of Comeas. That the death of Solon was placed in a definite archonship is also apparent from *Const. of Ath.* xvii 2, although the name of the archon is not given. Aelian, also, says (*V. H.* viii 16) that Solon died at an advanced age soon after the usurpation. According to Heracleides Ponticus (ap. Plut. *Sol.* xxxii) he lived for a long time after the usurpation. Diogenes Laertius (i 62) states that he died in Cyprus at the age of eighty. Cyprus is given as the place of his death also by *Vit. Sol.* (Westermann, p. 113), Schol. Plat. *Rep.* x 599 e, Schol. Dem. xlv 64, Suidas s. v. *Σόλων*, and Valerius Maximus v 3, Ext. 3. That he was eighty years old is also stated by Schol. Plat. *loc. cit.*

Plutarch (*Sol.* xxxii) reports a story that his body was burned and his ashes scattered over the island of Salamis. He himself finds the story incredible; but it has the authority, he says, of Aristotle and other reputable writers. Diogenes Laertius (i 62) says that before his death in Cyprus, Solon had given directions that his bones should be carried back to Salamis and there burned, and that the ashes should be scattered over the country. This is the reason, he continues, why Cratinus in his comedy called *Χείρωνες* puts into Solon's mouth the words:

οἰκῶ δὲ νῆσον, ὡς μὲν ἀνθρώπων λόγος,
ἔσπαρμένος κατὰ πᾶσαν Αἴαντος πόλιν.

Aristides xlvi 172 (vol. 2, p. 230 Dindorf) alludes to the belief that Solon's ashes had been scattered over Salamis and that he was the guardian of the island. Aelian (*V. II.* viii 16) states that Solon was buried at the public expense close by the city wall (*i. e.*, of Athens) at the left of the gate as one enters, and that his grave was surrounded with a wall. Valerius Maximus (*L. c.*) says that Solon spent his old age in Cyprus and was not even buried in his native land, implying that he was buried in Cyprus; and he gives an anecdote of Solon's deathbed of which nothing need be said (viii 7, ext. 14).

We have found reason to believe that Solon visited Cyprus soon after his archonship, and in xxv he announced his return to Athens. It is probable therefore that the tradition of his death in Cyprus is to be rejected, together with the erroneous tradition that he went to Cyprus at the time of the usurpation of Pisistratus. It has been suggested that the date of his travels was pushed forward in order to provide chronological justification for the interview with Croesus; and it is also suggested that the tradition of his death and burial in Cyprus may have originated in the belief that he was in some sort the founder of Soli and in the desire of the people of Soli to have his bones buried in their land.

The legend of the scattering of the ashes over Salamis is at least as old as the middle of the fifth century B.C. (Cratinus). Its significance as a legend has been discussed above; but we cannot admit that it is more than legend. If, however, this legend was known in the fifth century, it seems unlikely that at the same time a grave by the walls of Athens should have been recognized as Solon's grave (Aelian). This grave must have been later identified, rightly or wrongly, as Solon's resting-place.

Is any special authority to be attached to the statement of Phantias of Eresos because he assigns the death of Solon to a definite archonship? There may have been some documentary

record of this fact, in the form of a grave inscription or an inscription on a statue. But it is perhaps more likely that general considerations led writers to conclude that Solon could not have lived long after the date of Pisistratus' usurpation, and therefore to assign his death to the very next year. We must conclude that the date of his death and his age at death cannot be exactly determined. At any rate no event in his life is recorded which can be placed later than the year of Pisistratus' usurpation, which is variously fixed at 561-60 and 560-59.

Towards the end of the fifth century a statue of Solon was set up in the market place of Salamis (Aeschines i 25 f.; Dem. xix 251). Aelian (*V. H.* viii 16) says that a bronze statue was set up in the market place, presumably the market place of Athens; and Pausanias (i 16, 1) saw a bronze statue of Solon in front of the Stoa Poicile.

APPENDIX 9

A. LIST OF THE ANCIENT AUTHORS IN WHOSE WORKS FRAGMENTS OF SOLON'S POEMS HAVE BEEN PRESERVED

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
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