

10. Record of Hitler's Conference with Matsuoka in Oshima's presence on March 27, 1941 during which Hitler gave to understand that Germany was preparing for a war against the USSR.

(Prosecution's Doc. No. 1340, Exhibit No. 790)

11. Record of Ribbentrop's Conference with Oshima on March 6, 1943 during which Oshima assured Ribbentrop that Japan did not join the war against Russia because Japan did not feel strong enough and added " ... he knew that for a long time Japan had already had the intention of turning against Russia" and that " in any case, however, the belief in an inseparable mutual victory of the allies was a foregone conclusion for Tokyo."

(prosecution's Doc. No. 2312, Exhibit No. 812-A)

12. Record of Ribbentrop's Conference with Oshima on April 18, 1943 during which Ribbentrop insisted that the current year was without doubt the best opportunity for Japan to attack Russia.

Oshima replied that "for the last 20 years all plans of the General Staff had been worked out for an attack on Russia and were still directed towards such an attack." (Prosecution's Doc. No. 520, Exhibit No. 839-A)

16. The knowledge of the Japanese Government as represented by Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, and Oshima, the Ambassador in Berlin, of the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR and taking this circumstance into consideration by the Japanese while concluding the neutrality Pact with the USSR as well as a promise to participate in the war on Germany's side.

3. Aggressive intentions of the imperialistic clique of Japan in regard to the USSR. (1928-1945)

17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the USSR and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact .

B) The tying up of large Soviet armed forces in the Far East due to the threat of Japanese attack as a means of helping Germany on the part of Japan.

18. Stubborn realization of the aims of conspiracy loyalty to the alliance with Hitlerite Germany and the unity of the aggressive war against the democratic states, and the USSR in particular (1941-1945).

3. Aggressive intentions of the imperialistic clique of Japan in regard to the USSR. (1928-1945)

17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the USSR and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact.

19. Plans of an aggressive war against the USSR from 1941 to 1944

13. The affidavit of Nohara Komakichi dated February 15, 1946 in which he admitted that the Japanese Embassy in Berlin supplied the German Government with the information about the military and political conditions in the USSR in the course of German-Soviet war and that this was done " by order from Tokyo and the personal order of Ambassador Oshima." (Prosecution's Doc.No.2074, Exhibit No.811.

14. Minutes of interrogation of Oshima dated April 22, 1946 in which Oshima admitted that Nohara actually worked in the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. (Prosecution's Doc. No. 4121, Exh. No. 776).

15. Memorandum of the Conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima on June 24, 1942 in the course of which Oshima furnished the German government with the information about the entry of Russian merchantment into Vladivostok and their cargo and assured Ribbentrop that those ships had been searched by units of the Japanese Navy. (Prosecution's Doc. No. 1372, Exh. No. 778).

16. Record of Ribbentrop's Conference with Oshima on March 6, 1943 during which Oshima told Ribbentrop that "...Japan allows the Russians to use only one seaway, and on this way all ships are searched for arms and ammunition". (Prosecution's Doc. No. 2312, Exh. No. 812-A)

17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the USSR and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact.

d) The provision of Germany with the information on military and political conditions in the U.S.S.R. and the employment for this purpose of military and diplomatic personnel.

17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the U.S.S.R. and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact.

e) Intentional hampering of Soviet trade shipping in the Far East. Imposition of restrictions in violation of the Portsmouth treaty.

17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the U.S.S.R. and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact.

e) Intentional hampering of Soviet trade shipping in the Far East. Imposition of restrictions in violation of the Portsmouth treaty.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

concerning the accused Oshima Hiroshi (to be checked and verified).

1. Oshima's statement praising the Tripartite Pact ("Japan Advertiser" on September 29, 1940).
2. Oshima's statement praising the Tripartite Pact and Hitler personally as a creator of "really popular state" (Magazine "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, February 1941).
3. Oshima's interview given to the correspondent of the newspaper " Berliner Berzenzeitung " on March 30, 1943 in which Oshima admired "heroic exploits of German armed forces on all the fronts" and put forward a slogan: " always in the attack"
4. In December 1942 in Berlin Oshima gave a reception in token of German-Japanese comradeship-in-arms at which addressing himself to the wounded who were present praised them and promised Japanese support (Communiqué of the German Information Bureau, dated December 16, 1942)
5. Oshima 's statement in which he boasted of the part he played in the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and said that he was in sympathy with Germany and with Goring personally (The newspaper Tsu-Gai a few days after Oshima's second appointment to the post of the Japanese Ambassador to Germany.

Compiled by the Russian Division

OSHIMA HIROSHI

ANALYSIS

of the responsibility of the accused arising out of his official position for the facts stated during prosecution's phase "Japanese Aggression against the USSR"

Official Position
(directly connected with the said phase.)

III 34 - IX 38 Military attaché in Berlin.

As one of the leaders of the Japanese military alliance, which was essentially directed by his having held responsible diplomatic posts for a considerable period of time, is responsible for the general policy of the Japanese government, which found its expression in specific aggressive acts.

X 38 - XII 39 Ambassador to Germany

XII 40 - II 45 Ambassador to Germany

Responsible
for the following facts:

14. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the USSR, in particular. The results of its enforcement as regards the USSR prior to the conclusion of the Tri-partite pact. (1936-1940)

Cc. 5, 17 of the Indictment.

8. Subversive activities of the Japanese military against the USSR and the employment, of white Russian emigrants for this purpose the violation of the Peking convention of 1928 - 1945 .

C. 17 of the Indictment.

15. The conclusion of the Tri-partite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states, and the USSR in particular.

Cc.5, 17 of the Indictment.

16. The knowledge of the Japanese government as represented by Matsuoaka, the Foreign Minister, and Oshima, the Ambassador in Berlin, of the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR and taking this circumstance into consideration by the Japanese while concluding the neutrality pact with the USSR as well as a promise to participate in the war on Germany's side.

C. 17 of the Indictment

17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the USSR and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact.

Specifically Item

d/ The provision of Germany with the the information on military and political conditions in the USSR and the employment for this purpose of military and diplomatic personnel.

C. 17 of the Indictment.

Specifically item

e/ Intentional hampering of Soviet trade shipping in the Far East. Imposition of restrictions in violation of the Portsmouth treaty.

C. 17 of the Indictment.

As one of the leaders of the Japanese ruling clique, which fact is especially proved by his having held responsible diplomatic posts for a considerable period of time, is responsible for the General policy of the Japanese government, which found its expression in specific aggressive acts against the USSR.

3/ Aggressive intentions of the imperialistic clique of Japan in regard to the USSR. (1928 - 1945)

Cc. 5,17 of the Indictment.

Name: OSHIMA, (Hiroshi, Lt. General)

File: 247

Age: 60

Interrogated: Yes.

Counts of Indictment:

Outline: Military Attache to Germany 1934-38;
Ambassador to Germany 1938-39, 1941-45.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Particulars</u>	<u>Witness</u>	<u>Doc.</u>	<u>Inter.</u>
1934 April		Went to Berlin as a Military Attache	For.Of. War Of.	Pers. Rec.	
1935 Aug.	5A	As military attache began talks privately with Ribbentrop which led to anti-comintern pact.			Admit. p.16
1935 Aug.	5A	Suggested to Ribbentrop a simple treaty in which both parties agreed to aid Russia in case of war.			Admit. p. 21
1935 Oct.	5A	Ribbentrop submits plan which Oshima transmits to GHQ, getting a reply of no over all opposition & Lt. Col. Wakamatsu comes to help him.			Admit. p. 21
1936 Apr.30	5A	Matter of anti-comintern pact passes to hands of Ambassador Mushakoyi.			Admit. p. 22
1936 June	5A	Oshima receives from Ribbentrop and transmits to Mushakoji the German official proposal.			Admit. p. 24
1936	5A	Attended many meetings in which official negotiations were carried on for anti-comintern Pact and secret pact in which both nations agree not to ease or relieve the U.S.S.R.			Admit. p. 25

OSHIMA, (Hiroshi, Lt. General)

File: 247

Year	Incident	Particulars	Witness	Doc.	Inter.
1937	6	At request of G.H.Q. he approached German military to have them approach German military advisers to Chiang Kai Shek with a view to bringing China Incident to close			Admit. p. 43
1938 Jan.	11	Ribbentrop opened discussion with Oshima as to a way in which Germany & Japan might be brought closer together by means of a treaty or otherwise and passed it on to GHQ			Admit. p. 42
1938 July	11	Ribbentrop's suggested a consultation agreement before any action was taken in case of an attack by Russia.			Admit. p. 44-5
1938 July	11	Sent on to GHQ Ribbentrop's suggestion of a mutual aid treaty aimed at all countries.			Admit. p. 44-5
1938 July & Aug.		Carried on negotiations			Admit. p. 49
1938 Oct. 8		Became Ambassador to Germany	For. Of.	Pers. Hist.	Admit. p. 50
1938 Oct.	11	Drew up with Ribbentrop general outline of treaty which he sent officially to Japan.			Admit. p. 50
1938 Dec.	11	Sent follow up letter because no answer was received to October message.			Admit. p. 52
1938 Dec.	11	At Germany's request obtained permission to approach Italy about a triparty pact and met with Mussolini.			Admit. p. 52
1939	11	Continued negotiations until August of 1939 to get official Japanese views and German views reconciled.			Admit. p. 55, 57, 58
1939 Jan. 31	11	Met with Himmler and advised him of projects set up by him against U.S.S.R.			

#172
(N.D 2195 PS)

OSHIMA, (Hiroshi, Lt. General)

File: 247

Year	Incident	Particulars	Witness	Doc.	Inter.
1939 June	11	Tells Ribbentrop of Japanese Government resolution to give German and Italy assistance in case of war even if Russia is not involved and of Japan's readiness to accept draft of Pact's secret clauses.		Doc. 536 (Env. V- 26/8/39)	
1939 Oct.		Resigned as Ambassador	For. Of.		Off.Rec.
1940 Oct.	11	Makes speech called "Actuate the Alliance and Show Diplomatic Passivity" in which he argues for Japan's preparation to carry out the obligations of the Tripartite Pact			Yomiuri Shimbun 10/27/40
1941 Feb. 1941 Feb. 23	16	Returned as Ambassador to Germany	For. Of.		Off. Rec.
		Conferred with Ribbentrop in which Oshima agreed that Japanese intervention in war with England would secure Japan's position in the Far East and agreed to do everything to carry out that policy; and discussed post war plans for the domination of each partner's respective sphere.			Doc. 172 (N.D 1834 PS)
1941 March	16	Spoke on several occasions with Ribbentrop about attack on Singapore.			Admit. p.155 159-160
1941 May or June	16	Brought to Hitler a map of Singapore at the latter's request and conferred with him.			Admit. p. 154
1941 Dec. 14	16	Hitler conferred on Oshima the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle for his work in achieving German-Japanese cooperation which has reached culmination		Doc. 172 (N.D 2195 PS)	
1942-43	11	Confers with Ribbentrop and latter urges him to have Japan enter war against Russia		Doc. 172 (PS 2911 PS 2929 PS 2954)	

OSHIMA, (Hiroshi, Lt. General)

File: 247

<u>Year</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>Particulars</u>	<u>Witness. Doc.</u>	<u>Inter.</u>
1943 Mar.	16 and Illegal Warfare.	Conferred with Ribbentrop about German U-boat order of September 1942 in regard to failing to rescue survivors of torpedoed merchant vessel and latter asked better use of Jap Submarines. Oshima says he referred only matter of two submarines as gift and intensification of submarine warfare to Navy		Admit. p. 7-9
1945 April		Ceased to be Ambassador to Germany - Captured.	Of. Rec.	Of. Rec.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi

Document File: Case No. 247

Born: 1886

Graduated from Military Academy 1906.
Attended Artillery Engineers School, War College and was attached to headquarters.

Went to Germany in 1921 as a member of the Military Attache's staff.
In 1923 transferred to Vienna as Military Attache.
Returned to Japan in 1925.

In 1925 became Battalion Commander of the 8th Artillery Regiment.
Instructor in the Artillery School.
Inspector General of Military Education.

August 1931 attached to the General Staff, 1st Division.

In 1934 returned to Berlin as Military Attache. Stayed in Germany as Military Attache until October 1938, and while there was appointed Ambassador. At that time, he was Lieutenant General. Resigned as Ambassador and left Berlin October 1939. Was returned to Germany as Ambassador in February, 1941. Served as Ambassador until 10 May 1945, when he was captured by American forces at Castein.

Oshima and Ribbentrop, in 1936, negotiated two treaties between Germany and Japan; one, the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was made public; the other a secret military alliance under which each agreed not to aid Russia in case of war with the other. Oshima's services in connection with these treaties apparently caused the Japanese military men to have him promoted to Ambassador. Ribbentrop and Oshima made trips to Rome to lay the ground work for the Tri-Partite Pact. The Government in Japan wanted the treaty in such manner as Russia would be the object. Ribbentrop and Oshima wanted the alliance to include Germany, Italy and Japan against the world. When the Tokyo government failed to go along with his ideas, Oshima resigned and returned to Japan.

Very valuable at the present time, would advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore.

Oshima, page 2

When Germany and Russia signed the Non-Aggression Pact in August, 1939, the Hiranuma Cabinet fell.

When the Tri-Partite Pact was finally signed, on September 27, 1940, it was the request of Tojo and Sujiyama that Oshima return to Berlin as Ambassador.

In his interrogation he states, "As a military man and as one who had worked for the Tri-Partite Pact originally, I felt that the Military wished to have someone in Germany who understood their position well."

Ribbentrop declared at Fuschl, Germany, on February 23, 1941, "Ambassador Oshima has been proven right in the policy he has pursued regarding Germany in the face of many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victories in the war, these policies have been fully vindicated Now the German-Japanese Alliance has been concluded, Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance, the question of its further development now stands in the foreground."

On February 28, Oshima presented his credentials and conferred with Hitler.

On March 5, 1941, Order No. 249 issued from Hitler's headquarters, Paragraph 1, "It must be the aim of the combination based on the three power pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be devoted to the Pacific."

On March 29, 1941, Matsuoka and Ribbentrop had a conversation, "Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the plot against Singapore, a subject which had been projected to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance. Ribbentrop replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. Maps of Singapore were requested in order that the Feuhrer, who probably must be considered the greatest exponent on military questions at the present time, could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore."

Oshima, page 3

Oshima, in his interrogations, admits delivering such a map to Hitler at the request of Ribbentrop, but insists that it was about May, 1941.

In addition to Singapore, plans with respect to attack on the Philippine Islands were discussed. Oshima favored attack on Russia and urged Matsuoka against the non-aggression pact with Russia.

In decorating Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle, "With cordial words, he (Hitler) acknowledges his (Oshima's) services in the achievement of a German-Japanese cooperation which has now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms."

General Oshima expresses his thanks for this great honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany and Japan."

the attending physician for Kenichi OSHIMA, has been placed on file in the records of the Tribunal, and that said certificate sets forth that the said Kenichi OSHIMA is ninety-one years of age and has been confined for two years with a heart condition, to-wit: Astoma Cardiale, and is so seriously ill at this time that from all appearances this may be his last illness; and

It further appearing to the Tribunal that the Prosecution Section in this case has no objection to the granting of this application, providing proper security measures for the safe conduct and return of the said accused Hiroshi OSHIMA be taken; and

The Tribunal hearing the representations of respective Counsel, and being advised in the premises, it is

ORDERED: That the said application be granted, and that the said accused Hiroshi OSHIMA be given a temporary emergency parole from his confinement in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan, for a period of time not to exceed four hours; said period of parole to be selected and designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and subject to such provisions for securing the proper custody and control of the said Hiroshi OSHIMA during the period of his said parole as may be directed by the Supreme Commander, and at the termination of the said parole the said accused Hiroshi OSHIMA shall be returned to and re-confined in Sugamo Prison; and it is further

ORDERED: That this order of the Tribunal shall be subject to the ratification and consent of the Supreme

Commander for the Allied Powers.

Dated at Tokyo, Japan, this 21 March 1947.

BY THE TRIBUNAL:

(Signed) W.F. Webb
PRESIDENT

6 July 1947

Memo to: Mr. Sutton
From: Floyd Cunningham
Subject: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

7-20

arguing

17 Oct - 1 copy given to
Mr. Lawrence
JCS

1. Herewith is summary of Prosecutions' witness on above subject.

2. I used 4 stenographs on this, and there are 3 or 4 pages which should be done over and substituted as a matter of form. I will have this done.

Floyd Cunningham

OSHIMA, Hiroshi

EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION

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Exhibit 121. So much of the Cabinet secretariat personnel record of OSHIMA, as introduced in evidence, as is necessary to bring the summary of evidence introduced against him to the point in the record where other evidence begins, is as follows:

He was born a Samurai on 19 April 1886 (now 61 years old). His domicile is Gifu Prefecture. He graduated from military schools and from the military academy, and was a career officer in the Japanese army, which career was merged into that of a diplomatic one.

26 June 1906: appointed 2nd Lt., Artillery.

30 June 1909: appointed 1st. Lt., Artillery.

7 Nov. 1915 : decorated with the 6th Order of Merit with the Single Ray of the Rising Sun; also with the War Medal of 1914 and 1915.

2 May 1916 : appointed Capt., Artillery, and attached to General Staff Headquarters.

25 Dec. 1919: decorated with the 5th Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.

1 Nov. 1920 : decorated with the 4th Order of Merit with the small Cordon of the Rising Sun, and granted 1100 yen in recognition of meritorious services in the war from 1915 to 1920.

16 May 1921 : appointed assistant attache to Imperial Embassy in Germany.

24 Jan. 1922: appointed Major, Artillery.

5 Feb. 1923 : appointed attache to Imperial Legation in Austria and also to Imperial Legation in Hungary.

29 Nov. 1924: returned to active military service at home where his service included instructing in Army artillery school and the Naval gunnery school.

6 Aug. 1926 : appointed Lt. Col., Artillery.

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765
(cont.)

15 April 1927 : appointed instructor at the Shimoshizu Army Air School.

10 June 1928 : appointed member of the Artillery Inspecting Bureau.

13 Nov. 1929 : decorated with the 3rd Grade of Merit with the order of the Sacred Treasure.

1 Aug. 1930 : appointed Colonel, Artillery, and appointed regimental commander of 10th Field Artillery Regiment.

1 Aug. 1931 : appointed Section Chief of General Staff Headquarters, and in addition appointed Staff Officer of Naval General Staff (where he served until 5 March 1934, when he went to Germany).

NOTE: On 18 Sept. 1931 (Mukden Incident) OSHIMA held the above Army and Navy GHQ positions.

8 July 1932 : appointed member of Army Munition Inquiry Committee.

1 Oct. 1933 : appointed in addition a member of Naval Gen. Staff.

5 March 1934 : appointed Military Attache to Imperial Embassy in Berlin, Germany.

25 Apr. 1934 : decorated with the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun (in recognition of meritorious services rendered in the Incident from 1931-1934).

15 March 1935 : appointed Major General.

5913

Exhibit 477. An excerpt from interrogation of OSHIMA, introduced for purpose of showing that at the time of the establishment of the Eastern Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council, November, 1935, as Military Attache, he continued to discuss the Japan-Germany Alliance. He stated he became acquainted with RIBBENTROP in 1935. In 1936 the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by MUSHAKOJI, but the accused had had many talks on matters with RIBBENTROP preceding the final settlement. He had discussed with Mr. Hack the subject matter of the proposed alliance against Russia with Germany. In May or June of 1935, Hack came to visit OSHIMA and stated that what he had to say was RIBBENTROP's own idea and had nothing to do with the German Government, but asked was there any possibility of some sort of defensive alliance against Russia between Germany and Japan. They knew that the Japanese Army had penetrated Manchuria and might have an interest in the alliance since the Army was on the border of USSR.

Record Page

5913
(cont.)

Naturally, he thought that Hack would carry anything said back to RIBBENTROP, but he could not definitely give any answer unless he knew how GHQ felt.

Subsequently, Ribbentrop stated that he wished to see OSHIMA and they met for the first time at Hack's home in October 1935. RIBBENTROP stated that the idea was his own. He did not know how HITLER felt, but believed there would be some possibility of it being put into effect. He asked what the attitude of the Japanese military would be and requested OSHIMA to find out. OSHIMA sent a telegram to GHQ about the matter. RIBBENTROP warned that OSHIMA should not feel badly in case the German Government did not back him up and OSHIMA warned RIBBENTROP likewise. This was the second communication to Tokyo about this proposal.

OSHIMA received a reply that there was no over-all opposition to the proposal, but they wished to look into the matter more fully before committing themselves and they would send Lt. Col. WAKAMATSU from GHQ. He arrived in Berlin in early December 1935, and during the interval OSHIMA had no communication with RIBBENTROP. He also had no communication with his own foreign office since this was simply a military matter.

Hack came to see him several times, but OSHIMA made him wait until the arrival of WAKAMATSU. When WAKAMATSU came OSHIMA took him to see RIBBENTROP and General Blomberg and WAKAMATSU stated that GHQ was in the favorable attitude for a general treaty, but they had to find out how the German Government felt about it. WAKAMATSU stated that while the Japanese Army favored it they would have to consult with the Government.

5917

Exhibit 478. Another excerpt from the interrogation of OSHIMA to show that negotiations for the military pact were conducted through military channels and that the Japanese Army was strong enough to force its will upon the Government. OSHIMA said that Japanese military and naval attaches are not under the jurisdiction of the Ambassador, but are respectively responsible to staff headquarters in Tokyo. At the Embassy they are under the Ambassador, but so far as duties go they are under their military superiors in Tokyo. If a matter is a strict military matter, they may discuss it without going to the Ambassador. They only sounded out the opinion of the Japanese Army. It is quite true that if the Army could be sold on the idea, it had enough power to sell the Pact to the Japanese Government. RIBBENTROP was not in a official capacity at the time, but watching the Manchurian Affair he had concluded that the Japanese Army would be in a stronger position to push a treaty of this type. No treaty could possibly have been made on this if the Army had not wished it.

5934

Exhibit 36. 25 November 1936, while OSHIMA was Military Attache in Berlin, the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by MUSHAKOJI for Japan and by RIBBENTROP for Germany. It is in substance as follows:
Admitting that the purpose of the Comintern is the destruction and oppression by force of existing nations, Japan and Germany, believing that the overlooking of this interference jeopardizes domestic peace and

Record Page

5934 (Ex. 36, cont.) and social welfare and menaces world peace, and de-
(cont.) siring to defend against it, concludes the pact. In Article 1, the parties
agree to inform each other of the Communist activities and to discuss
necessary measures for defense through cooperation. The parties will in-
vite a third nation whose peace is menaced by the Comintern to take de-
fense measures in the spirit of the pact, or to participate in it. Both
languages are official. The pact will be effective for five years from
the day of signing. Prior to the expiration of the term, the parties will
come to an understanding as to the form of cooperation to be used there-
after.

5936 Exhibit 480. 25 November 1936. Consolidated documents relating to
the Secret Attached Agreement to the Anti-Comintern Pact:

1. The Secret Agreement provided that the two governments, recognizing that the Soviet Union is working toward the realization of the goal of the Comintern and wants to use the Army for this cause, and that this fact threatens the existence of the parties and world peace in general, agree that should one of the parties be unprovokedly attacked or threatened by the USSR, the other party agrees not to carry out any measure which would in effect relieve the position of the USSR, but will immediately consult on measures to preserve their common interests. The parties will not, during the period of the agreement and without mutual consent, conclude political treaties with the USSR which do not conform to the spirit of this agreement. This was signed on 25 November by the same parties.
2. In a letter of the same date by RIBBENTROP to MUSHAKOJI, Germany stated that it does not regard the provisions of existing political treaties with the USSR, such as the RAPALLO Treaty of 1922 and the Neutrality Treaty of 1926, insofar as they have already become null and void, as contradictory of the present Secret Agreement and the obligations arising from it. The receipt of this letter is acknowledged by MUSHAKOJI. In a letter dated 23 October 1936 RIBBENTROP advised MUSHAKOJI of a receipt of his communication of the same date, enclosing a telegram sent to ARITA (Foreign Minister).

NOTE: 4 June 1937 the first KONOYE Cabinet came into office. At this time Major General OSHIMA was Military Attache in Berlin.

~~Item 2:~~ On Record Page 765, Exhibit 121, 6 April 1937 decorated with the Second Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.

~~Item 3:~~ Record Page 7916, Exhibit 776-A. Interrogation of OSHIMA shows that in June 1938 he received from the Japanese General Staff documents which gave him the task of probing the possibility of concluding

a military alliance whereby Germany would be under obligation to enter into war with the Soviet Union in case the latter attacked Japan, and vice versa.

At that time OSHIMA was military attache and at the beginning of July 1938 he visited RIBBENTROP to inquire privately about Germany's intentions. He told RIBBENTROP he had in mind concluding the pact of consultation of which in case of war with Russia the party attacked would consult with the other concerning the form of aid to be given. RIBBENTROP told him that if the military alliance was to be concluded, it must be complete and binding; that HITLER did not like pacts of consultations. Secondly, RIBBENTROP stated that Germany wanted a military alliance not only against Russia, but against other countries which might attack Germany and Japan, such as America, France and England. OSHIMA told him that the extension of such a pact to other countries would depend upon the readiness of the Japanese Army and Navy and such an extension would be very difficult for Japan. RIBBENTROP told him that Germany would not ask the impossible and that the particulars of each party's behavior would be discussed after the conclusion of the pact.

OSHIMA received a telegram that General KASAHARA had forwarded his message to the leading military officials, and all had concurred in agreeing to concluding the pact, and had reported to KONOYE, UGAKI, ITAGAKI, YONAI and IKEDA, the five ministers. They also approved the idea and the General Staff instructed OSHIMA to continue negotiations but to bear in mind that the military alliance should be mainly directed against Russia -- all other countries being included as minor objectives. Through ITO he received an instruction to the same effect, and that Japan should enter into war with other countries only if they were infected with Communism. This divergence of views led to further negotiations and the pact was not concluded in 1939. Negotiations continued until the signing of the Non-aggression Pact of Germany with Russia on 23 August 1939, at which time negotiations ceased.

6021

Exhibit 487. September or October 1938. Excerpt from interrogation of OSHIMA in which he said that at this time secret understandings existed, but not as treaties. Following the consummation of the Anti-Comintern Pact the armies of the two countries agreed to furnish each other with intelligence about Russian military. It was decided to further use white Russians who had already been used in such spots

Record Page

6021 (cont.) as Warsaw and Paris. There was no written agreement. This stopped in the signing of the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact. These were in the form of memoranda and not binding agreements.

6021 Exhibit 488. September-October, 1938. In interrogation OSHIMA stated that the Japanese military had previously been using white Russians in Warsaw and following the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact the General Staff thought it would be a good idea to exchange information with respect to the Soviet Union. OSHIMA received orders from the General Staff to approach Germany and did so. Actual exchange was handled by Lt. Col. USUI. In handling this problem OSHIMA approached Lt. General Keitel.

There were many white Russians in Berlin who were willing to sell information and it was decided to buy it. They used a Russian by the name of Bamard as a main source. This was conducted out of OSHIMA's office, except USUI operated independently under OSHIMA's supervision. His sole job was to gather intelligence and communicate it to the General Staff. The communications went through OSHIMA's office.

While OSHIMA did not own any property in Germany, in order to carry out Anti-Soviet propaganda he negotiated for the purchase of a place where the work could be carried on. However, the place was not in his name. The money came from his office. They printed propaganda at this place, which propaganda was given to Bamard who tried to get it into Russia. OSHIMA said he knew a Japanese officer who worked in Afghanistan. He had become friendly with a garrison commander there and suggested that they carry on Anti-Russian activities. This man passed the information on to his government and suggested that they get rid of the Japanese officer before they were suspected. OSHIMA had no connection with this man and did not intend to send someone to replace him.

765 Exhibit 121. 8 October 1938 Lt. General OSHIMA (having been promoted on 1 March 1938) was appointed Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Germany.

765 Exhibit 121. 2 November 1938, OSHIMA was decorated with the order of the Compound Light Rising Sun (for services in conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact).

6026 Exhibit 489. 31 January 1939. A memorandum from HIMMLER in which he discusses a conference with OSHIMA. They discussed the conclusion of the treaty by which the German-Italian-Japanese triangle would assume a firmer shape. OSHIMA said that together with the German counter-espionage he was undertaking long range work of disintegration in Russia from the Caucasus and the Ukraine to become effective in the event of war. He had sent 10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier with orders to kill Stalin. A number of other Russians had been shot at the frontier. OSHIMA also told him of the Japanese officer who had worked in Afghanistan, but had been expelled. HIMMLER stated that he had a police officer

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6026 officer there and the two could work together once Japan had another
(cont.) man there.

OSHIMA told him he had bought a piece of real estate at Falkensee in the name of a middle-man where six Russians were employed writing pamphlets which were sent from Poland to Russia by balloon. He had proof from Russia that they had arrived and were distributed. He had also purchased a motor boat to take leaflets from Rumania to the Crimea. This had met no success, but he would try again in the summer.

6623

Exhibit 596. 15 March 1939 OTT wrote a letter from Tokyo to WIEHL (Ministerial Director) in which he stated with respect to the question of Germany's preferential treatment in China, he learned that OSHIMA had actually telegraphed in accordance with Germany's interests. They are inclined not to admit in writing the preferential treatment. They are thinking of a de facto preferential treatment to be worked out by deeds without writing. However, actual deeds up to now are not very encouraging.

18990

Exhibit 2230. 28 May 1939. Telegram from the German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Tokyo stated that the formal communication made on 20 May that the Japanese Foreign Minister would inform Germany at the latest on Sunday, 21 May of the new decision of the Japanese Cabinet has proved without effect. The local Japanese Embassy is in no position to make any official communication.

OSHIMA reported yesterday in a strictly confidential and unofficial conversation that he had received a telegram from ARITA that Japan wishes to reserve entrance into war in case of a European conflict. OSHIMA has refused to pass this point of view on to the German government. The War Minister requested OSHIMA to hold off until later so as not to disturb the discussions among the factors in Tokyo. The Army is resolved to fight the matter out quickly, even at the risk of a Cabinet overthrow. The Ambassador, without making use of OSHIMA's confidential communication was to make it clear to the authorities that the absence of the communication has produced great astonishment in both Germany and Italy. It is unavoidable that Japan's silence is regarded with distrust. Germany can no longer understand what can be going on in Tokyo.

6122

Exhibit 486-L. 25 August 1939 OTT sent a telegram to the Reichsminister stating that OTT had visited the Foreign Minister (ARITA) after the Japanese press had been shaken by the text of the Non-Aggression Pact, and explained the German desire to preserve friendly relations with Japan and the reasons for the German action. The Foreign Minister reserved his answer. He handed to OTT copies of the instructions to OSHIMA to inform the German government that Japan had interpreted the Non-Aggression Pact as terminating negotiations between Japan and Germany or a Tri-Partite Pact with Italy, and that the Japanese government regarded the Pact with Russia as a serious violation of the Secret Agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Therefore Japan filed a solemn protest with Germany. The Foreign Minister added that while Japan had been forced to make this declaration, she was willing to find a suitable way for friendship with Germany.

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6082

Exhibit 498. 8 September 1939 OTT sent a telegram from Tokyo to State Secretary giving news that SHIRATORI will return from Rome where he had been for the purpose of concluding the Japanese-German military alliance. Reiteration of German confidence in OSHIMA inferred from this telegram.

6126

Exhibit 507. 9 September 1939 RIBBENTROP telegraphed OTT stating he had had a confidential, detailed discussion with OSHIMA regarding the future development of German-Japan relations. He told him that Japan's fate is linked with Germany's, and if Germany is defeated a coalition of Western democracies would oppose any expansion of Japan and take away her position in China. Japan's position would ultimately be secured by German victory, which can be expected if Japan maintains its existing relations.

That since Germany's present position depends upon an agreement with Russia, this approach is in the interests of Japan. Germany is ready to mediate for a settlement between Japan and Russia, which if successful would permit Japan to freely extend in East Asia towards the south, which is where in Germany's conviction Japan's vital interests lie. Germany had emphasized that Russia intended to foster its relations with Japan. The idea of close cooperation between Germany, Italy and Japan is not dead, and combined with a German-Russian understanding would direct itself against England, bringing the policy of all four powers into a uniform line. It is complete agreement between the Fuehrer and the Duce.

It was RIBBENTROP's intention to work with all haste to obtain an understanding between Japan and Russia and he hoped that the same idea would prevail in Japan. This should happen quickly so that the four power group might be realized during the present conflict with England.

OSHIMA agreed with all of this and stated that the Japanese Army appreciated the idea of an understanding with Russia, and there is a prospect that the alliance idea will soon be accepted in Japan's foreign policy. OTT has asked to talk this matter openly with Prince Konoyo. They also stated that he should make it known that it is of great importance that OSHIMA remain in Berlin because he knows most of Germany's policy and is in a better position to represent Japanese interests in Berlin, where he has the complete confidence of the Fuehrer and the German Army.

6124

Exhibit 506. A document signed by WEIZSACKER states that the Japanese ambassador congratulated him on the progress of the policy campaign. He also revealed to him that OSHIMA did not carry out his orders in making a sharp protest in regard to the German-Russian non-aggression pact, which he had been ordered to do by his government. That OSHIMA had believed it better to wait until the end of the Polish campaign. OSHIMA wished to explain the matter himself to the Reich Foreign Minister and let the paper disappear from their documents. WEIZSACKER believed that OSHIMA was honestly endeavoring to put an end to the matter.

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- 6124 Exhibit 506, 18 Sept 1939. A document signed by WEIZSACKER states that the Japanese ambassador congratulated him on the progress of the policy campaign. He also revealed to him that OSHIMA did not carry out his orders of making a sharp protest in regard to the German-Russian non-aggression pact, which he had been ordered to do by his government. That OSHIMA had believed it better to wait until the end of the Polish campaign. OSHIMA wished to explain the matter himself to the Reich Foreign Minister and let the paper disappear from their documents. WEIZSACKER believed that OSHIMA was honestly endeavoring to put an end to the matter.
- 6133 Exhibit 509, 20 Sept 1939. A meeting took place between TERAUCHI and the Reich Foreign Minister and also TERAUCHI and the Fuehrer. Both conversations were predominantly Germany's efforts towards closer Japanese-German-collaboration. At dinner at the Foreign Ministry later, OSHIMA said Japan would be ready for advance into South East Asia. He also gave opinion in favor of tearing Netherlands from England and gaining control of the Netherlands East Indies. The Reich Foreign Minister led it to be understood that he was ready and willing for Germany to collaborate with Japan against England.
- 6131 Exhibit 508, 27 Oct 1939. Telegram from WOERMANN to German Ambassador in Tokyo related to OSHIMA's return to Japan and the Reich Foreign Minister's request of support of OSHIMA since he will work further for Japanese-German friendship. All telegrams and letters delivered to the Embassy by OSHIMA will be transmitted in code and unopened.
- 765 NOTE: Exhibit 121, On 29 December 1939, OSHIMA resigned as ambassador to Germany.
- 6140 Exhibit 511, 23 February 1940. Telegram from OTT and STAEMER addressed to the Secretary of State states that after STAEMER's arrival he found that OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and others had a friendly attitude and were ready for every support. The present, domestic political difficulties occupy all groups and parties and foreign politics. The government was trying to stay out of an European confederation. The attitude towards England and America is friendly. The influence of the army is growing again, and will further increase. Recognized pro-German officials of the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff and War Minister have been transferred to China -- but this is going to be stopped. Public opinion is to a large extent pro-German and anti-British. At present it is not yet too active among court and financial circles. It will be advantageous if Russian readiness for an understanding with Japan could be made noticeable.
- NOTE: On 29 April 1940 OSHIMA received a decoration for meritorious service in the China Incident -- Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.
- 6152 Exhibit 516, 12 June 1940. The German Embassy in Tokyo cabled Berlin concerning German Embassy's attempt to stir up anti-American feeling among Japanese by subtle means. The German Ambassador made suggestions personally to KONOYE, SUETSUZU and KUHARA that American activities

in the Pacific area would make conflict in the long run unavoidable. That within Japanese circles OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were cooperating with these German attempts.

6170

Exhibit 522, 20 June 1940, Memorandum of Knoll of the German Foreign Ministry states that on 19 June he conferred with the Japanese ambassador. This conversation was about the visit of SATO the former Foreign Minister. The ambassador stated that Japanese welfare does not depend on the western powers but that an approach to Germany was significant to Japan. SATO's visit will be further material in winning over the circles which have had no interests in Germany. In Japan, building up of heavy industry is the most important task. Light industry of importance is ready. In the field of heavy industry, if close cooperation between Japan and Germany is possible, Japan will gain freedom of action against the United States. The question of raw material supplies from England and America is not dangerous since the raw material countries are under export pressure if England should blockade Europe. If economic circles see Germany's great industrial development and that it is not behind the United States, in view of the unfriendliness of the United States they will switch over to Germany.

However, the improvement of Japanese-Russian relations in the present war conditions, is a prerequisite for switching. TOGO and KURUSU are working hard for this, and it is becoming clear in Japan that her future lies to the South and that Russia must be made a friend. Certain military circles were opposed, but OSHIMA will have enlightened them. After the war the German-Italian, Russian, Japanese-Chinese and the American blocs will remain. It is important for both Japan and Germany that close relations be established. Germany, holding first place in the economic field, would give to Japan an important position in the postwar economic program.

Ambassador SATO could be told that Japan's contribution is to show a more willing attitude about Germany's wants for raw material in Japan and overseas areas. Japan should not fear boycott warnings or use this fear against Germany.

6179

Exhibit 524, 8 July 1940. Memo of conversation between RIBBENTROP, Japanese Ambassador SATO, KURUSU and Consul General STARNER, in which SATO stated that the parallel efforts of Germany and Japan to establish new orders have caused close cooperation between the two countries. By holding the attention of the English, French and the United States, for three years Japan has in a sense made Germany's task of establishing a new order in Europe easier. Germany and Japan could also cooperate in establishing friendly relations with Russia. SATO further stated that Japan, since the beginning of the China war, has drawn the United States' attention to it and tied up the American fleet in the Pacific. The United States must not overstep her zones of North and South America, and must not interfere in European or Far Eastern matters. On this, both countries could cooperate, and the cooperation must also include economic matters.

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Japan must endeavor to finish the China war in order to gain a free hand, and he pointed out that the public opinion in Japan is nervous with respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. RIBBENTROP noted that this cooperation is nothing new; that he himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSHIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Japan, without Germany's aid, could not have been able to penetrate so deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia.

Plans for very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy have been considered but have miscarried because Japan was not interested in European affairs. As a result of Germany's victory over France there would be a great revision of foreign policy and in the future there were further possibilities of cooperation with Japan in the new order in Europe. Since he was unfamiliar with Japan's political aims he could say nothing of the details of the form of this cooperation, and asked SATO for an explanation of the political lines which Japan intends to pursue. He asked if the cooperation was to be economic or otherwise. SATO acknowledged that it was difficult to understand Japanese policy, because although she had been trying for nine years to orient her policy in a satisfactory direction, she had been forced time and time again to moderate it.

With respect to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is primarily a question of a new China with which she could have friendly relations and thus guarantee peace in the Far East. To achieve this, Japan had for several years been fighting the Washington regime and the Nine Power Pact which gave the Anglo-Saxons ^{power} in the Far East. Japan did not wish to eliminate foreigners from the Far East, and was willing to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany and China.

Japan must be careful in its relations with America. Basic difficulty with America lies in Japan's struggle against the Nine Power treaty system. Japan was not fighting against the principle of the treaty. She respected the independence of China and believed in the Open Door, but she wished to be the host in the Far East, where other nations would be guests.

6261

Exhibit 536, 20 July 1940. Telegram from OTT states that KONOYE is building up a government in sections. He has appointed MATSUOKA Foreign Minister and TOJO has been called as War Minister and YOSHIDA as Navy Minister. There was a long discussion between them regarding the fundamentals of future foreign and domestic policies. An agreement was obtained although the details are not yet known. MATSUOKA's appointment is regarded favorably. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI likewise regarded favorably.

NOTE: On the advent of the second KONOYE Cabinet (22 July 1940) OSHIMA was again appointed ambassador to Germany.

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6265

Exhibit 538, 2 August 1940. Telegram from OTT stated that OHASHI former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, had been appointed Vice Foreign Minister for Japan.

NOTE: 27 September 1940 the Tri-partite Pact and Secret Letters were officially signed (Exhibit 43, for identification Record Page 513). On that date OSHIMA was ex-ambassador to Germany but was re-appointed 20 December 1940.

11754

Exhibit 1299-A, 27 October 1940. An article in Yomiuri newspaper written by OSHIMA justifying the Tri-Partite Alliance as a peaceful instrument and stating that Japan must establish a new order in East Asia, a relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity must be established with French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and South Sea Islands to be settled with the new order in Europe and consultations with Germany and Italy. The Axis must unite their efforts since the prosecution of the war in Europe is closely bound with the new order in East Asia.

6421

Exhibit 560, 13 December 1940. Telegram from OTT concerning the invaluable work of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI as ambassadors in Berlin and Rome, urging OSHIMA to once more accept post as ambassador to Germany because of his understanding of German-Japanese policy.

NOTE: On 20 December 1940 OSHIMA was reappointed Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Germany.

6450

Exhibit 568, 31 December 1940. Telegram from OTT stating he had transmitted to MATSUOKA on 24 December the information of RIBBENTROP, which delighted him. That MATSUOKA had reported to the Emperor who had received his plan but reserved decision. He hopes to get the most far-reaching authority from Cabinet, especially the War Minister. The final answer will be in the middle of January. He believes it expedient that before his arrival OSHIMA should have presented his credentials. OSHIMA will probably arrive at the end of January and MATSUOKA seven to ten days later.

6423

Exhibit 261, 15 January 1941. Address made by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on the occasion of a farewell party of OSHIMA on his departure for Germany, in which MATSUOKA wished him well and reiterated the confidence OSHIMA had gained from the German government, their pleasure at his appointment and the importance of his mission to further cement German-Japanese relations.

9826

Exhibit 1050, 15 February 1941. Telegram from OSHIMA to MATSUOKA stating that in an interview with RIBBENTROP he had stressed various matters concerning Japan-German relations and it had been pointed out that Japan is faithful to the Tri-Partite Pact and that this would be clear from the imperial rescript. This treaty was the keynote of foreign relations. RIBBENTROP had agreed that Germany felt it was 'in the same boat as Japan. OSHIMA had been appointed Imperial delegate to the Japan-German-Italy Special Council in Berlin on 23 January 1941.

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- 7867 Exhibit 769, 23 February 1941. Record of talk between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP in which it was stated that Japanese friendship enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded, whereas on the other hand Japan has been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere in China. Germany's victory on the continent brings great advantage to Japan.
- 9826 Exhibit 1050, 25 February 1941, OSHIMA informed MATSUOKA in a telegram that he had stressed various matters concerning Japanese-German relations with RIBBENTROP. He told the latter that Japan was absolutely faithful to the Tri-Partite Pact and everyone was moving forward to the realization of the national policy with the Pact as a keynote to foreign relations.
- 6459 Exhibit 571, 24 February 1941. Extract from report of conversation between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP. RIBBENTROP reviewed the political situation and was of the opinion that Germany was secure on the continent. The bombing of England had serious effect on English production and they hoped to destroy more than America could replace. The invasion of England was prepared. Germany desired the end of the war quickly and therefore cooperation with Japan was important, and Japan should attack as soon as possible, making the decisive blow on Singapore to eliminate England in East Asia and secure for Japan the position to win in war. OSHIMA replied that preparations for occupying Singapore would be completed by the end of May, but for safety's sake preparations had to be made not only against England but against the U. S.
- 6469 Exhibit 573, 3 March 1941. A directive issued by HITLER's Headquarters concerning collaboration between Germany and Japan in mobilizing the English forces and tying the United States' interest to the Pacific, but to keep the U. S. out if possible. Conquest of Singapore would mean a decisive success for the three powers.
- 6485
7943 Exhibits 577 and 590, 27 March 1941. Minutes of conference between HITLER and MATSUOKA with OTT and OSHIMA present. Outline of points favorable to an attack; MATSUOKA's mention of circles in Japan opposing this until actually forced to do so -- he believes it is only a matter of time till Japan will attack and cannot promise anything for his government, but will promote to the utmost the goals indicated. MATSUOKA insists that the three power pact was not concluded on a basis of expectation that Germany would win, but rather on belief in a new order. This belief was his life's labor and he devoted all his energies to it. MATSUOKA then wishes to discuss his visit to STALIN in Moscow. He impressed STALIN that Japan was opposed to Anglo-Saxon capitalism in China, also that the Anglo-Saxons were the greatest menace to a new order in Asia; that the Anglo-Saxons were a mutual enemy of Japan, Germany and Russia. The conference ended with MATSUOKA's praise of HITLER's leadership and the unity of the German people behind him.
- 6499 Exhibit 578, 27 March 1941. In a conversation between RIBBENTROP, OSHIMA, MATSUOKA and OTT, RIBBENTROP pointed out that Germany is in the final phase of its fight against England, and Germany stands completely ready to meet England everywhere she can be reached. Germany has 240

6500 divisions, including 24 armored divisions, ready to strike. The air force has been increased greatly * and in the future will be absolutely superior to any combination. Battleships under construction have been completed, so that even the last one of them can be commissioned in a short time. The German Navy does not stay in port, and is disturbing the supply routes between England and America with success. The number of submarines, in cooperation with the air force, during January and February sank 750,000 tons per month. This does not include the additional losses which England suffered * from mines. From the beginning of April the number of submarines will increase by eight to ten times, and the expected number of sinkings will probably be considerably more.

6501 On the continent, Germany had practically no enemy worth mentioning, except for small English forces in Greece. Germany will repel every English attempt to land on the continent, and will not tolerate her to remain in Greece. Militarily, the Greek problem is of secondary importance, and the only factor of practical importance * is that the advance towards Greece will obtain a dominating position in the Eastern Mediterranean. In Africa, Italy has had bad luck because her troops are not familiar with modern tank warfare and are not prepared for anti-tank defense. Hitler has sent General Rommel to Tripoli with sufficient forces. Unfortunately, General Wavell did not attack. There were only several outpost skirmishes. If England did attack Tripoli, they would meet an annihilating defeat. England will depart from North Africa faster than she came.

6504 * In the Mediterranean, the air force has accomplished good work in effecting heavy shipping losses. The Suez Canal has been blocked for a long time and will be blocked again. At the end of the year the Mediterranean would be blocked off, so that the English would no longer represent any danger, since their fleet would be tied down to protect the African position.

6505 The conclusion * is that the Axis is practically master of the situation in all of Europe, and has a vast army which is practically unemployed, and committed where Hitler deems necessary. The political situation is shown by the adherence of almost all the Balkans to the Tri-Partite Pact. They had heard about the change in government in Belgrade, but had no details. The situation has strengthened the Tri-partite powers, and Germany is working on the outside powers. Spain is at least in spirit with the Tripartite Pact, and demands will be made to win over Sweden and Turkey. Even if Turkey has an alliance with England, * it is not impossible that she would draw closer to the Pact.

6506 Although individual food items are temporarily scarce, no matter how long the war lasts there will be no food difficulties in Germany because she has enough space to produce the necessary food. In raw materials there are certain bottlenecks, such as rubber, but serious difficulty is out of the question. So much war material has been collected that German economy will proceed to reconversion. The ammunition stockpile

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6507 was so full that there would not be the slightest shortage for years to come. During the next few months the main power of war potential could be used for submarines and airplanes. * Since the German Army has no opponents on the continent except Russia, the productive capacity can be so used.

6508 The war has already been won by the Axis, and it can by no means be lost any more. England in time will admit the loss, but he could not predict the exact time when this would happen. It could happen quickly, and might happen in the course of a year. England would have given up the war a long time ago if Roosevelt had not given new hope to Churchill. Germany has clear information on this. It is hard to say whether Roosevelt wants to enter the war or not, but his armament assistance cannot be produced out of thin air. *It will take a long time until this help will become effective. Even then the question of quality will be problematical, especially in airplanes, where individual models become obsolete rapidly. German models are improved monthly, and it is doubtful whether a country not in the war can produce the highest quality. Whatever American machines have been met are considered junk. A long time would pass before American help could take effect, and Germany is striving to finish the war as soon as possible. The Tri-partite Pact has had the aim to keep America out. *The main enemy for the establishment of the New Order is England, for both Germany and Japan. America must be prevented by all means from entering the war actively. Hitler believes that it would be actually very advantageous for Japan to decide to participate actively in the war against England as soon as possible. An attack on Singapore would be a decisive factor for England's overthrow, and it will be possible to work from there more closely with Japan in the maritime and other fields.

6510 * The seizure of Singapore would be a serious blow to England in view of the already bad moral state at home, and it would be most appropriate to keep America out of the war because the navy would hardly risk sending the fleet into Japan's waters. If Japan succeeded, Roosevelt would be in a difficult position. It is difficult for him to attempt anything against Japan. If he did declare war on Japan, the solution of the question of the Philippines would be under Japan's control, which would mean a serious loss of prestige for him. By conquering Singapore, Japan could have her dominating position in East Asia and operate in a different manner. *This would solve the Gordian Knot in East Asia.

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Exhibit 790. 27 March 1941. Excerpt from the Record of Hitler's talk with MATSUOKA in the presence of OSHIMA, RIBBENTROP and OTT in which Hitler said: "On this it should be noted that Germany has made the known treaties with Russia, but still more important than this is the fact that Germany has 160 to 180 divisions at her disposal in case of emergency, for her protection against Russia. In case of this eventuality she (Germany) has, therefore, not the slightest fear and would not hesitate for a second to draw the consequences at once in case of danger. He, (the Fuehrer) however, does not think that this danger will occur."

"Japan is the strongest power in the East Asia sphere and Russia could not act since there are 150 German divisions standing at her Western border."

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Exhibit 789. 29 March, 1941. Ribbentrop's talk with Matsuoka was resumed. Ribbentrop discussed the ability of the German Army on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich to act and that should Germany enter into conflict with Russia the U.S.S.R. would be finished off in a few months, which would enhance Japan's opportunity to advance on Singapore. This should do away with Japan's fears of Russia. He pointed out the possibility of conflict with Russia, and that it would have to be considered possible and MATSUOKA could report such to the Emperor on his return. MATSUOKA finally agreed to this point of view and gave an assurance that Japan would also be a loyal ally who would devote herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the joint effort.

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Exhibit 1075. 20 May 1941. Telegram from OSHIMA to MATSUOKA in which he stated that he had heard many rumors concerning the problems of negotiations between Japan and the United States and he had learned from Ribbentrop that it was not a mere rumor. Says he is deeply troubled and believes it his duty to inform MATSUOKA of the opinion of the German staff and himself.

MATSUOKA had explained to him why he had not disclosed the matter to the Italian Ambassador, and while he has no intention of sounding out the problem of the confidence in OSHIMA he is not trying to sound out MATSUOKA's opinion for the practice and technique of diplomacy. OSHIMA stated he could not understand that MATSUOKA thought it unnecessary to have OSHIMA report the opinions of the staffs of Germany and Italy, when the Japanese-U. S. agreement, which has a very delicate relation on the Tripartite Pact, is to be concluded. From the standpoint of his duty as Ambassador to Germany, he could not keep silent.

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In a telegram, OSHIMA stated that on May 3 he met with Ribbentrop and was informed about the Japanese U. S. negotiations, which were supposed to be kept secret from OSHIMA and the Italian Ambassador. Ribbentrop was disclosing it for his personal understanding.

He showed OSHIMA the draft proposed by the U. S. on April 16, consisting of four articles. Ribbentrop stated he did not understand Japan's real intention. OSHIMA answered that Japan was observing the Tripartite Pact as the basis of its diplomacy, and that there was no reason to conclude a treaty between Japan and the U. S. contrary to the Tripartite Pact.

On May 9, Ribbentrop called and again showed OSHIMA Ott's telegram on Japan's intermediary answer to the U. S. and the telegraphic record of the conversation between MATSUOKA and Ott of May 6. Ribbentrop seems to have understood that the proposal was made by Japan. Ott seemed to think that MATSUOKA was compelled by a certain group to consent to it, and it is reported that MATSUOKA, in the conference, had stated that Japan will participate in a Russo-German war if it should break out. Although MATSUOKA, when in Germany, was going to attack Singapore, he seems to have changed his mind.

Ribbentrop stated he had doubts as to Roosevelt's true intentions. He further stated that if MATSUOKA was obliged to conclude the agreement to avoid participation in a possible war, the Tripartite Pact would become meaningless. He further felt that Japan would lose the chance to establish her right for leadership in East Asia. After considering the matter, he had thought of two plans from the German standpoint; one to refuse the proposal of the U. S., and two, to conclude the agreement under the condition that the U. S. maintain a neutral attitude without extending convoy patrol lines.

Ribbentrop asked OSHIMA's opinion, stating he thought plan (a) was the best. While OSHIMA had no instruction, he insisted upon plan (b), explaining that it would be more advantageous to Germany. He stated that if the second plan was adopted, Germany would be able to fight singly against Britain and end the war in a short time. While it might be wishful thinking, Roosevelt might recognize the fact that America's assistance to Britain would be useless and would stop it.

Even in case of failure, OSHIMA stated to Ribbentrop, it would be useful for ascertaining Roosevelt's actual intention concerning aid to Britain. It will enable the Japanese who want to cooperate with the U. S. to realize its impossibility. However, Ribbentrop pointed out that the U. S. could use the negotiations to estrange Japan from Germany, and the U. S. could utilize it as propaganda and convince the anti-war faction in the U. S. that the U. S. could now advance to the Atlantic because of freedom from fear in the Pacific, and the situation will become dangerous to Germany. He did not agree with OSHIMA, but stated that the matter had not been decided by the Fuhrer and felt he would report on the matter to him. He stated that Italy had received all the reports from its Ambassador, but he had not consulted directly but would do so upon receiving the Fuhrer's decision.

OSHIMA left for Rome on the 10th. The Fuhrer had made a different decision from that of Ribbentrop. On the 13th, Ribbentrop went to Rome and met with Mussolini and Ciano, and on the 14th OSHIMA met with Ribbentrop and showed him Ott's telegram concerning the interview of the 12th between MATSUOKA and the German and Italian Ambassadors. Ribbentrop was discontented at MATSUOKA's statement that he had been compelled to commence with American negotiations and had been unable to await the arrival of German and Italian opinions. He wanted to know why. OSHIMA replied that he did not know the circumstances, but felt that Japan was compelled to take these measures because it was necessary to conclude the agreement as soon as possible to maintain secrecy, and in Japan these important negotiations must be privately reported to the Emperor. OSHIMA stated that it was not made out of inconsideration for Germany and Italy. Ribbentrop did not want to accept this. He stated that when MATSUOKA was in Germany, in their many conversations the latter did not do anything substantial concerning a Japan-U. S. agreement closely related to the Tripartite Pact.

This came as a great surprise to him when he received the report soon after MATSUOKA returned, and he was afraid the agreement might make the Tripartite Pact automatically meaningless. Ribbentrop did not believe Roosevelt, although his opinion was to advise Japan to refuse the proposal he had to send a contrary telegraphic instruction. OSHIMA advised him that it was necessary to inform Ott of Ribbentrop's opinion. Ciano expressed the same views as Ribbentrop.

9927 On May 17, when OSHIMA returned to Berlin, Vice Minister Weisegger, by order of Ribbentrop, showed him a draft of Japan's answer to the U. S. and a draft of Germany's instruction to Ott concerning this answer. He stated that Germany was deeply concerned about the result of this problem, and attached great importance to MATSUOKA's statement to Ott that Japan would attack the Soviet in case of a German-Russian war. Weisegger asked whether MATSUOKA understood the true state of affairs between Germany and Russia when he returned home. OSHIMA stated he did not know what MATSUOKA had revealed concerning Japan's attitude in that case, but in Japan such an important matter would have to be decided by the Emperor, and MATSUOKA could only have given his personal opinion. He felt that MATSUOKA was aware of the real relationship between Germany and Russia.

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9929 In a separate telegram, OSHIMA reported that Germany was deeply dissatisfied about the problem of the Japanese-U. S. agreement and feared for the future of the Tripartite Pact. Since the U. S. is actually participating in the war, if Japan concludes the agreement, it will be natural for Germany to suspect that Japan is trying to check America's participation and to avoid her own obligation to participate in the war. Germany has a feeling that she has been betrayed.

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OSHIMA was well aware of Japan's desire to solve the China Incident quickly to have time for politics, economy, and other fields, but the European war is developing favorably to Germany and Italy, and in a few months important developments are expected. If Japan should lose the confidence of these nations, who will be the leaders in Europe, for an immediate profit, it is unfavorable. America seems to have proposed the agreement temporarily to estrange Japan from the alliance. Such two-faced diplomacy would lead Japan to international isolation during the post-war critical period.

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Aside from this, OSHIMA was apprehensive that if Japan lost this opportunity to expand southward and to attack Singapore, she will not only invite the contempt of U. S. and Britain, but also that of Germany and Italy, and if the U. S. should increase her aid to Britain, the European war would be greatly affected although the U. S. did not actually participate. Afterwards, Japan must suffer from some calamity. If Japan abandons her leadership in the southern regions for America's sake, it is clear that she cannot stress the leadership to Germany and Italy. This will mean the abandonment by Japan of her great mission to establish a New Order in East Asia.

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Last Autumn Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact, and the road was clear, but if Japan now concludes this agreement the Japanese will be bewildered, and friendly countries will despise Japan and not trust her. She will fall into international isolation and will gain nothing. He therefore hoped that Japan would include two points if concluding the agreement was unavoidable. One, it is absolutely necessary for Japan to make use of her situation over America and establish the idea of the Tripartite Pact by upholding the principle that Japan is to facilitate Germany's and Italy's battle against Great Britain, and she should demand the U.S. neutrality in the European war, making it clear that Japan has an obligation to participate. If America does not support the proposal, Japan must not conclude the agreement. Two, it is unfavorable for Japan to give the impression to the Axis that Japan is compelled to conclude the agreement because of a party in Japan that wants status quo. This will make the Axis suspect that Japan took the action to avoid her obligation to participate in the war. Therefore Japan must thoroughly convince the Axis about the meaning of the agreement.

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Exhibit 1076. (21 May 1941) OSHIMA cabled MATSUOKA and stated that the new agreement is thought to be an important change in Japan's policy and it is of great concern to the plans of the Japanese military and naval attaches in Germany. (Attaches received copies)
Note: OSHIMA was Ambassador.

9979

Exhibit 1084. 6 June 1941. KIDO's Diary referred to OSHIMA's report of interview with HITLER, that Germany had decided to attack Russia and HITLER had intimated a desire for Japanese participation. KONOYE called a liaison conference that morning to consider this. KIDO and MATSUOKA both had conferences with the Emperor. MATSUOKA told KIDO that he did not think an outbreak of war very likely in spite of OSHIMA's message, and the War Minister endorsed this.

5560

Exhibit 586. 10 June 1941. Secret memorandum from Woermann to RIBBENTROP stated that OSHIMA had asked to be received by RIBBENTROP in the near future and pointed out that the Japanese Army desired to obtain fleet bases in Southern French Indo-China. They desired to create for themselves a favorable strategic position for Singapore.

NOTE: The Court took judicial notice that on 22 June 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

7953

Exhibit 795. 22 June 1941. Telegram from OTT to Berlin. It was shown that on the first day of the German attack on the U.S.S.R., MATSUOKA refused hostile attitude to U.S.S.R. MATSUOKA received telegram from OSHIMA stating rumors that Russia had withdrawn her forces from the Far East; MATSUOKA explained he would immediately propose counter measures.

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Exhibit 1093. 22 June 1941. KIDO's Diary stated that SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, had notified him of the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany as did MATSUOKA, who had learned this officially from OSHIMA. MATSUOKA was to have an audience with the Emperor, but before the audience, KIDO spoke to the Emperor to present his opinion based on his talks with KONOYE and HIRANUMA the previous night. There had been a difference of opinion between KONOYE and MATSUOKA concerning Japan's foreign policy in case of war between Germany and Russia. It was desirable that the Emperor ask MATSUOKA whether he had consulted the Premier about it and tried to prevail upon him to follow KONOYE's opinion.

MATSUOKA had his audience with the Emperor, and thereafter KIDO had an audience. The Emperor pointed out that MATSUOKA's policy meant Japan's positive advance both to the North and South and it was quite doubtful whether or not the Government and the Supreme War Command would agree and whether the policy would ever be appropriate. The Emperor was anxious. KIDO asked HIRANUMA to pay careful attention to the matter and asked KONOYE to act with prudence at the Liaison Conference. KONOYE telephone that he had spoken to MATSUOKA and had explained that what he had reported to the Emperor was his prospect in the future and not a matter of immediate action.

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Exhibit 1096. 28 June 1941. Telegram from RIBBENTROP to OTT at German Embassy at Tokyo stating that RIBBENTROP had agreed with OSHIMA that he should influence his government towards speedy military action against Soviet Russia, and requesting German Embassy at Tokyo to use their influence to the same end. RIBBENTROP outlined arguments to be used.

8580

Exhibit 587. 28 June 1941. Telegram from RIBBENTROP to OTT stated that RIBBENTROP had obtained an agreement with OSHIMA that he will influence Japan towards speedy military action against Russia; and OTT was asked to utilize all possibilities to influence Japan and other influential circles. He was to make use of the following points: (1) The war between Germany and Russia will solve the Russian question in its entirety. (2) the destruction of Russian power in a short time will make German victory over England irrevocable. German possession of Russian oil and grain fields will assure failure of the English blockade and direct land connections with East Asia will be brought about. (3) Japan has a unique chance, through military action against Soviet Russia, to create the prerequisites for her new order. After Soviet power is removed the solution of the Chinese question will be achieved if Japan desires without difficulty. (4) The drive toward Singapore is of greatest importance and it lies in the urgent interest of Japan not to leave unused this chance to solve the Russian question in the Far East. She would be free in the rear to make a drive to the south. (5) Japan should come to a decision regarding military action against Russia without hesitation. (6) A swift overpowering of Russia, especially if Japan participates in the east, is the best means to convince the United States of the foolishness of entering the war on the English side.

10,034

Exhibit 1097. 28 June 1941. OTT cabled RIBBENTROP stating that so far no clear cut decision had been reached by the Cabinet regarding Japan's attitude to the German-Russo war. Preparations for an attack will take at least 6 weeks unless U.S.S.R. weakens. OTT asks for instructions regarding activity in the South in view of the fact that southern expansion may be limited to French Indo-China and thus hindering Japan's activity in the North; he also stated that OSHIMA had advised Japan to attack Russia soon.

10154

Exhibit 1111. On 3 July 1941 a report from WEIZSACKER to RIBBENTROP stated that when he had drawn OSHIMA's attention to a periodical describing Japan's attitude as iridescent, OSHIMA stated that he had received reports from Tokyo indicating that Japan wanted to continue fighting the communists with Germany, strengthen her military preparation, and bring pressure to bear on British and U. S. possessions in the southwest Pacific to tie them down. Japan's foreign policy was still based on the Tri-Partite Pact.

7972

Exhibit 776. July-August 1941. In his interrogation OSHIMA stated that at the end of July or beginning of August, 1941 he had learned of the slowing of the advance of the German army which was not according to plan. Moscow and Leningrad had not been taken. OSHIMA inquired of this from RIBBENTROP and RIBBENTROP invited KEITEL to explain. KEITEL stated that the slowness of the German army was caused by excessive length of communications and lagging of rear units, and that was the reason the German army was three weeks behind plans.

10291

Exhibit 1154. On 17 October 1941 KIDO stated in his diary that an ex-premiers conference (procedure as on 17 July 1941) attended by KIYOURA, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HAYASHI, HIROTA, ABE, YONAI AND HATA was held in which it was decided on KIDO's suggestion that he should recommend TOJO as the new premier with additional position of War Minister. OSHIMA THEN AMBASSADOR.

7117

Exhibit 655. 17 November 1941. ERDMANNSDORFF, former member of German Legation at Bangkok cabled Foreign Minister of Reich concerning conversation with OSHIMA on the possibility of Japanese action in northern and southern directions. After initial expression of ignorance, OSHIMA said there was a possibility of invasion of Thailand in order to secure a springboard for attack on Singapore, but increased Japanese troops in French Indo-China would have to be effected first.

6652

Exhibit 604. 1-2 December 1941, when the no-separate peace pact first came up, OSHIMA stated in his interrogation, that through a telegram from Japan to him it was stated that in case of Japan-U. S. conflict Japan desired Germany's participation and that a no-separate peace pact by signed. In November, OSHIMA had heard from Dietrich that HITLER would be in favor of entering the conflict in case of a U. S.-Japan war. Based on this, Japan stated that they desired to have OSHIMA approach HITLER in regard to Germany's entry in case of war.

6644

Exhibit 603-A. 29 November 1941, message from Berlin to Tokyo stated that OSHIMA had seen RIBBENTROP on 28 November, following a long conference with German Government and military officials. At this conference they had mapped the campaigns for the next year, and it is absolutely certain that they discussed Japan's moves. At the meeting, OSHIMA advised RIBBENTROP that he had no reports regarding U. S.-Japanese negotiations. RIBBENTROP again encouraged OSHIMA to have Japan declare war, as this was her great opportunity. There is no hope of Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded successfully. OSHIMA said he could not make the statement of any concrete intentions of Japan and asked if a state of actual war was to be established

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between Germany and the U. S. OSHIMA felt that Germany's attitude towards the U. S. was stiffening and that indications were that Germany would not refuse to fight the U. S., if necessary.

RIBBENTROP stated that Hitler had said that he was determined to crush the Soviet Union more than he had planned. He will completely wipe out the state. All of the main military objectives had been attained, and the greater part of the German troops could be brought back to Germany. In May of the following year the Caucasus campaign will be launched, and Germany will advance to and cross the Ural mountains and chase Stalin into Siberia. Germany has been considering the establishing of air connections between Germany and Manchukuo for some time, and believes that it will be possible to establish an air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo by next summer.

Before Germany begins landing operations in England, she will completely wipe out her influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean. Germany has made all necessary preparations for the English campaign, but she has received intelligence that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives there, that Churchill's influence has waned, and that Bevin is advocating revolutionary measures. It may be that Germany's various other campaigns may cause England to fall without a landing operation. In any event, Germany has no intentions of entering into peace with England. She is determined to remove all her influence from Europe. England's possessions will probably be divided by Germany, the United States and Japan. In Africa, Germany will take those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires most of all to control European Russia.

When asked what would happen in the event there is an expansion of the war to those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain, RIBBENTROP replied they would like to end the war in the next year but it may have to be continued until the following year. If Japan becomes engaged in a war against the United States, Germany would join immediately, and there is no possibility of her entering into a separate peace with the U. S. under such circumstances.

NOTE: Copies of this telegram were shown to Admiral NOMURA and ABE.

10469

Exhibit 1199. TOGO cabled OSHIMA on 30 November 1941 that the Tri-Partite Pact had "throughout" formed the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. Regarding the negotiations the question of evacuation of troops on which the negotiations rested had been violently opposed, and it had become clear that Japan could no longer continue negotiations. The American proposal of 26 November which aimed at attempting to "trick" Japan into agreeing that if the United States enters the European war Japan cannot assist Germany and Italy, has made their attitude clearer than ever. The United States is now in collusion with Australia, England, Holland and China and has decided to regard Japan, as well as Italy and Germany, as an enemy.

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6654

Exhibit 605. 2 December 1941. Telegram from OSHIMA to TOGO stated OSHIMA had been unable to get HITLER's opinion on the subject of German participation in American war with Japan - but would do so as soon as possible. OSHIMA had assured GAUS that the agreement would be mutual. OSHIMA suggested that a German-Italy-Japanese declaration of joint non conclusion of separate peace would be best.

NOTE: On 2 December TOGO ceased to be Overseas Minister, but retained other offices.

10701

Exhibit 1242. 8 December 1941. A secret telegram from Berlin to Tokyo (priority-limited distribution):

"At 1 p.m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. RIBBENTROP replied that HITLER was then in the midst of a conference at General Headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that we would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time RIBBENTROP told me that on the morning of the 8th HITLER issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them. It goes without saying that this is only for your secret info."

6667

Exhibit 51. 11 December 1941, the Announcement of the Board of Information concerning the no-separate peace pact stated that an agreement had been signed by OSHIMA, RIBBENTROP and ALFIERI, whereby the three governments agreed to prosecute the war forced on them by the United States and Britain, with all forceful means at their command until victory; that without complete understanding among themselves they would not complete an armistice or peace with either; that after the termination of the war they would cooperate closely for the purpose of realizing a new order. The Agreement is to be effective immediately and to remain in force as long as the Tri-Partite Pact. The parties, before the expiration, shall agree on the manner of subsequent cooperation.

6671

Exhibit 609. 14 December 1941, at a meeting between OSHIMA and HITLER he decorated OSHIMA with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in Gold. HITLER expressed his delight at the method Japan used to declare war. He stated that if the other party only puts one off when negotiating, then one should strike and not waste time declaring war. The entry of Japan into the war was a great relief to Germany; it facilitated her submarine warfare now that the United States' position was clear. HITLER excused the setback in Russia as due to weather and gave information on contemplated Mediterranean attack with U-boats. OSHIMA gave the Fuehrer a survey on the Pacific war situation, stating that after the fall of Singapore, Japan would turn on India. He also revealed that Japan had been carrying out landing exercises on Hainan Island for some time.

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7902-3

Exhibit 778-A. 24 June 1942 OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP discussed the character of the Tri-Partite Pact as an instrument of aggression. RIBBENTROP said: "It was the strength of the Tri-Partite(Pact) Powers that they had proceeded on the offensive from the outset, never waging a defensive war as England has done thus far." OSHIMA stated that he agreed to what the German Foreign Minister had said in every respect and asked him to be convinced that neither him nor his government believed in conducting the war defensively but that the victory could only be secured through further attacks.

15186

Exhibit 2106. March, 1943. In interrogation OSHIMA stated that he had spoken to RIBBENTROP about navy matters but that actual Navy and Army matters were always handled by Attaches. He did not remember if this was in March, 1943 or not, but he did recall that RIBBENTROP suggested that Japan institute submarine warfare as Germany had done and for this Germany would be willing to let Japan have a new type submarine. They did send two submarines.

The negotiations were handled by OSHIMA. The details were handled by the Navy and he believed that one was sunk before arrival in Japan. RIBBENTROP also discussed the difficulty of cutting down not only the number of merchant ships but also merchant sailors.

He also discussed the German U-boat order of September 1942 with respect to failing to rescue survivors of torpedoed vessels. The order was that they were not to rescue survivors. He did not think that the German order went so far as to order them to destroy survivors. He did not know anything about the order but he did not believe that the Japanese would put out such an order. He did not see it. He did not tell RIBBENTROP that he should stop doing this as it was not his business, but he did not encourage it. Some among the Germans did not see the order. He did, however, tell the Naval Attache about the German policy but he had no recollection of sending dispatches to Japan about the matter.

He did not believe that Japan ever did anything about it. He did not know of any protest on this matter filed by the United States, although he did know that they protested many times about P. O. W. treatment. He had never heard anything about the machine-gunning of merchant seamen. He did not know anything of the order of 20 March 1943, and if there had been such an order it would never have come into his hands. The order is like that of the Germans. If such an order had been issued it would have been done independently since the Japanese Army and Navy are not in the habit of taking suggestions from outside sources. If Japan had followed Germany, they would have sent OSHIMA a communication saying that they had done so, and he did not receive any. If there had been any communication it would have gone to the Naval Attache to be passed on to the German Navy. He knew nothing further about the sending of the two submarines since it was all handled by the Navy. There was some talk in the German Navy with Admiral Nomura about the necessity of Japanese submarine operations in the Indian Ocean.

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He knew nothing about the sinking of the Jean Nicdlet. RIBBENTROP said nothing to him about the request for a submering campaign appearing to be bearing fruit. His own opinion was that Japan was not successful in her submarine warfare. By the use of the words "intensified submarine warfare", he did not believe this included the destruction of survivors. RIBBENTROP did say that part of the German submarine warfare was a policy of destroying crews. OSHIMA did convey to the Naval representative the matter of the two submarines and the request to intensify submarine warfare but he did not recall whether he actually spoke to them about the order being stressed. Nomura or Yokoi could tell if he conveyed this to them or not.

In December, 1941 a joint military commission was set up to decide matters of tactics and operations but OSHIMA says he had nothing to do with it. If someone told him something military, he passed it on to the military commission. The commission consisted of Nomura, Yokoi and Lt. Gen. Banzai. The commission met in Berlin. The German members were Field Marshal Keitel and Admiral Doenitz.

8014

Exhibit 812-A. 6 March 1943. Excerpt from record of RIBBENTROP's talk with OSHIMA in which OSHIMA reported to the German Foreign Minister that the Japanese government did not feel strong enough to open up hostilities against Russia at that time, as such action might endanger operations on other fronts. Germany points out that all forces under the Tri-Partite Pact should join forces against Russia as well as England and America; Japan should make full use of her strength now as Germany is already strained to the limit. If Germany became weak, Japan alone would face a world coalition of not only England, America and Russia, but all Bolshevized Europe. OSHIMA replied that Japan did not have sufficient Army and materiel to successfully engage Russia and also did not wish to split her Army.

8175

Exhibit 839-A. 18 April 1943. Talk between Reich minister and OSHIMA shows that Germany considers this the best time for Japan's assault on Russia, who is now weakened by assault from the west. Germany estimates the Russian force in Siberia as considerably less than Japan's estimate (250,000 as against 800,000 soldiers). OSHIMA did not know his government's views on the subject - and for the past 20 years Japan had been preparing to attack Russia.

7994

Exhibit 811. 1939-1945. Affidavit of NOHARA, Komakichi, stated that documents in German and English found on him belong to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. Since he was a convinced anti-Fascist against Japan and Germany's war he deliberately kept these documents and intended to use them in the interest of the Allies since these documents would, to a certain extent, expose Japanese war criminals. He kept these documents and made no attempt to hide them or destroy them. On 21 April 1945 he handed them over to a Soviet officer in Strausberg. The greater part of these documents were kept secret. While it was not his duty as press agent to deal with documents of this kind, he was made to be concerned with secret work in the Embassy. His duty was to work with documents of military and other secret information. This was

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considered to be top secret and nobody but Ambassador OSHIMA, the counselor of the Embassy and the witness knew about it. The greater part of these documents are copies of memoranda containing secret information about the number and disposition of red army units, its equipment and supplies, Soviet war industries and production, Soviet planes, tanks and manpower. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin received similar information about the Soviet from Japanese Ambassador in Moscow in form of ciphered telegrams, at which the deponent and the counselor translated. Later the Embassy in Berlin passed this information to the German Foreign Affairs Ministry.

On being shown a document called "War Potential of the Soviet Russia", the witness stated that this document was drawn up by the counselor and himself in January 1945 on information received from Ambassador SATO in Moscow. The omission of figures was made by the counselor; he wrote them in by hand on the first copy and handed the copy to the Germans. When asked about a document entitled "On the Strength of the Red Army" and certain marks on it, the witness stated the document was a record of secret information received by the Japanese Embassy in Berlin by its Attache in Moscow on 21 January 1942. This was explained to him by the counselor of the Embassy and the record was reproduced into the present document. On 22 January the counselor handed it to the German Foreign Office.

From 1939 to 1945 the Japanese Embassy handed to the Germans about 40 communiques whenever they came from Moscow, London and Tokyo. They mainly referred to the war, economic power of the Soviet and her Allies. Part of the materials were summaries of investigation concerning definite problems and others were results of Japanese observations by people passing through the Soviet in wartime. The information was passed on to the German Foreign Office by a order from Tokyo and the personal order of Ambassador OSHIMA.

765

Exhibit 121. 19 February 1945, OSHIMA resigned his post as Ambassador.