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二〇七B

真珠湾攻撃ヲ審査ニ對スル議會共同委員會ノ
前ニ行ハレタル「ハル」國務長官ノ證言抜萃

一〇七六一一〇八三頁

一 一九四一年／昭和十六年ノ會談ノ背景

會談ニ對スル日本ノ提議ハ、極東ニ関スル日米間ノ協定ノ締結ニ
指向サレテ居タ。其レハ一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ初期ニ提起セタ。
此ノ提議ヲ受諾スル拒否スル前ニ、大統領ト余ハ此ノ問題ニ関シ
日本ノ國際的侵略ノ記録、日本ノ國際的行動ニ於ケル二重性
ノ記録、日本ト合衆國ニ依リテ傳統的ニ又現在遂行セラレテ
居ル兩國政策ノ確然タル相違及ビ極東、歐洲、並ビ合衆國
ニ於ケル現情勢等ノ原因ノ背景ニ對シ、十分ノ考慮ヲ拂ツタ。

A 日本ノ侵略記録

No. 1

WX 1106

大統領及余ハ日本ノ過去ノ侵略的記録ト同時代ニ極東ニ
於ケル發展的傾向ヲ念頭ニ置クト共ニ又之ヲ考慮ニ入レテ
レバナラナカッタ。

日本ハ近代の國家トシテ發生シタ殆ド最初カラ軍事的擴大
政策ヲ續行シテキタ。穩健派ガ勢力ヲ得タ或短期間ヲ除キ

其ノ大部分ノ期間中一侵略階段ト次ノ階段トノ中間期間ハ
單ニ鞏固整理ノ期間タルニ過ギナカツタ。

一八九五年(明治廿八年)日中ハ支那ニ對スル戰爭ニ成功シテ後
台灣ヲ併合シ高滿洲ニ於テ足場ヲ建設シヨウトシタガ之ハ失敗
シタ。

一九〇五年(明治卅八年)日露戰役ノ後日中ハ關東州ニ對シ租
借權ヲ獲得シ南滿洲鐵道ヲ領有シテ滿洲ニ確乎名地盤
ヲ築イタ。同時ニ日中ハ南樺太ヲ獲得シタ。

一九一〇年(明治卅三年)日中ハ多年ノ侵害ノ後壓迫ト陰謀ニヨリテ
朝鮮ヲ併合シタ。

一九一五年(大正四年)日中ハ歐洲聯合國ガ對獨戰年ニ夢中
ニテソナレテ利用シテカノ惡名アルニ一國條ノ要求ヲ中國ニ突キ
ツケタ。第一次世界大戰ノ終末ニ於テ日中ハ一九二一ニ二年(大正
十年一十一年)ノ華盛頓會議ニ參加シテ同會議ニ於テ締結セラレタ
諸條約ノ調印國トナツタ。是等ノ條約中ニハ中國ニ關スル原則
及政策ニ關連ヲ有スル各國條約ガ包含セラレテ居タ。コノ條約ハ
中國ガ實力ナル安定シタ政府ヲ育成シ且維持スル為メニ充分且ツ
最モ無障害ノ機會ヲ與ヘル狀態ガ創造セラレルトヲ期待シタ。

日本ハ各國條約ガ基礎ヲ置クトモロノ中國ニ對スル自制的政策ヲ
誓約シタ。然レシカガ一九二七年(昭和二年)田中内閣出現後、且ハ
一九二八年(昭和三年)ニハ中國ニ對シ所謂「積極」政策ヲ採用シテ
コノ政策ノ下ニ益々中國ノ内政ニ干渉スル傾向ヲ表シタ。

一九三一年(昭和六年)ニハ日中ハ滿洲ヲ侵略シ其地ヲ滿洲國ノ
名稱ノ下ニ之ヲ統治スル傀儡政府ヲ樹立シタ。九ヶ國條約ノ

極悪ナル違背アルコノ行為ニヨリ日本ハ華盛頓會議ノ諸條約ニ協定セラレタ協力政策ヲ完全ニ破棄シタリテアル。

一九三四年（昭和九年）ノ始メ日本ノ外務大臣廣田氏ニヨリテ覺書ノ形式デ（一九三四年二月二十日附）日本政府カ接近シテキコトヲ如何ニ余ガ歡迎シタカヲ想ヒ出ス。コノ覺書ニ廣田氏ハ「力カ合衆國ト日本トノ間ニハ「友誼的解決」が根本的ニ不可能ナル問題ハ存在シテイコトヲ確信スルト言ハレタ。余ハソレニ對スル回答（一九三四年三月三日附）ニ於テ廣田氏ノ意見ニ賛同シ、且我が政府ハ平和的方法ヨリ諸問題ノ調整ヲ確信スルコトヲ強調シタ。

然ルニコノ覺書ヨリ交換シテ間エテ日本ハ再ビ國內ノ強力ナル政策樹立者違背終始一貫固執スル侵略ノ根本目的ヲ暴露シタ。

一九三四年四月十七日、日本外務省ノ代辯者ハカ「支那二年ヲ出スベカラス」聲明トシテ知ラレタトコロノ野蠻的公式聲明ヲナシタ。コノ聲明ニ於テ日本ハ中國ヲシテ日本ノ指圖ニ從フコトヲ強制シ且日本ガ許容スル場合ニ限り他ノ國ト中國トノ交渉ヲ許スト言フ目的ヲ明カニシタ。

一九三四年/昭和九年/十二月二十九日日本ハ一九三六年/昭和十年/末ニ、
一九三三年/大正十四年/二月六日「ワシントン」ニ於テ調印セラレタル
海軍制限條約ヨリ脱退スル意圖ヲ公式ニ通告シタ。
其ノ通告ハ、征服ノ行程ヘ向テ明瞭且ニ意議アル動キデアツタ。
其ノ通告ノ提出次ニ日本ハ中國侵略ノ開始ヲ志シテ、其ノ軍備
增強ニ邁進シタ。

其頃日本ハ「獨逸」會談ニ入り、ソノ結果、

一九三六年/昭和十一年/十月二十五日防共協定ハ兩國ヨリ締結セラレタ。
一九三七年/昭和十二年/伊太利ガ調印シタ。同協定ノ表面ニハ共產
主義ニ對スル自己防衛デアツタガ、實際ハ其ノ後ノ匪賊國家ニ依
ル武力的發展ノ手段、為ノ準備工作——所謂「樞軸」ノ創造ノ
第一歩——デアツタ。

一九三七年/昭和十二年/七月、日本ハ北京附近ノ一地点ニ於ケル中國軍隊
ト日本軍隊ノ間ニ起ツタ小サナ事件ヲ故意ニ利用シ、大規模ノ中國侵略
ヲ非道ニ開始シタ。日本ハ尠大ナ軍隊ヲ中國ニ注ギ込ミ、ソレハ、
産業其他ノ重要中心地ヲ含ム廣大ナ地域ニ扇狀ニ擴ガタ。是等
ノ軍隊ハ凌辱、掠奪、殺人其他凡ソ不法行為ヲ犯シタ。特ニ野蠻
カッタハ、一九三七年/昭和十二年/十二月十三日日本軍隊ノ南京占領ニ次
テ行ハレタ同市ニ於ケル暴虐デアツタ。

一九三七年/昭和十二年/十二月十二日、日本航空機ハ揚子江ニ於テ合衆國軍艦
「バネー」ヲ爆撃シ之ヲ撃沈シタ。

軍事的發展ノ計画ニテ、日本ニ於イテ國民ノ支持ヲ得ンガ為「大東亞新秩序」
又ハ「東亞共榮團」ト云フヤラテ標語ガ用ヒラレタ。合衆國其他ノ國ハ日本ノ
發展ヲ抑圧シテ居ルトイフ非難ヲ受ケタ。

一九四〇年昭和十五年八月及び九月ニ、日本ハ獨逸ニ援助ナシ「ワイセイ」
佛蘭西ト協定ヲ無理ニ結ビ、其協定ノ下ニ日本軍隊ハ北部印度支那
ニ進入シタ。

一九四〇年昭和十五年九月、日本ハ獨逸及び伊太利ト三國同盟ヲ
締結シタ。右同盟ハ直接合衆國ヲ目的トシタモテアル。ソレハ日本ト獨
逸兩國ガ亞細亞及び歐羅巴征服ノ計画ヲ完了シテ兩國ガ獨立ノ合衆國
ニ立テ向フコトガ出来ルニテハ、合衆國ガ充分ナル自衛手段ヲ採ル事ヲ妨ゲル
為ニ企圖サレタヲアツタ。

一九四〇年昭和十五年十月四日、近衛首相ハ三國同盟ニ関スル声明中ハ、
一部次ノ如ク言ツテ新聞ニ書カレタ。

「合衆國ガ日本獨逸及び伊太利ノ真意ヲ理解スルコトヲ拒否シ、執拗
ニ挑戰的態度及び行為ヲ續ケルニ於テハ、是等諸國ハ戰ハザルヲ得
ナクナルヲ望ム。日本ハ目下日露ノ政治及び經濟關係ヲ調整スル為ニ努力シテ
居リ、又日本ト露西亞トノ間ノ摩擦ヲ減ズル為ニ凡テ努力ヲ為ステアロウ。
日本ハ今露西亞、英國、及び合衆國ガ彼等ノ蔣政權援助行動ヲ中止
スル様彼等ヲ諒導スルため外交工作ヲ行ツテ居ル」

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B. 日本ノ表裏的言動ノ記録

大統領ト余ト亦日本ハ國際關係ニ於テ表裏的言動ヲ爲シタ長
イ記録ヲ有スル事實ヲ考ヘタ。コノ表裏的言動ハ日本軍部が彼自
身ノ法律デアリ日本ノ文官が約束シタ事ヲ終始一貫シテ蹂躪シテキ
タト云フ事實ニ大イニ起因スルモデアル。

一九〇四年(明治卅七年)日本ハ朝鮮ノ獨立ト其ノ領土保全トヲ保證
シタ。一九〇五年(明治四三年)ニ日本ハ朝鮮ヲ併合シタ。

一九〇八年(明治四一年)日本ハ「アメリカ」合衆國ト共ニ中國ノ獨立ト保
全及ニ中國ニ於ケル機會均等ノ原則ヲ支持スルコトヲ誓約シタ。

一九一五年(大正四年)ニ日本ハ「カノ」惡名アル「二十一箇條」要求ヲ中國ニ
突キツケタ。

一九一八年(大正七年)ニ日本ハ露西亞軍が其ノ後必要トスルカモ知レヌ
軍需品ヲ保護スル爲、露西亞人自身ノ自衛機關ノ組織ヲ援助
スル爲、及ビ「シベリア」ニ於ケル「チエツコスロキア」軍ノ撤退ヲ救援ス
ル爲、各國ハ夫々七千人ヲ超ヘサル兵力ヲ「シベリア」ニ派遣スルト言フ
聯合國間ノ取極メニ参加シタ。日本軍部ハ「コノ事業ニ東部「シ
ベリア」併合ノ好機アリト見テ(結局成功シナカッタガ)七万人以上ノ兵
力ヲ派遣シタ。

No. 6
一九二三年(大正十一年)ドノ九ヶ國條約ニ於イテ日本ハ中國ノ主權
獨立及ビ領土の行政的保全ヲ尊重スルコトニ同意シタ。日本ハ
亦中國ニ於テ機會均等ノ原則ヲ樹立スルコトニ盡カスルコトニ同意
シタ。一九三三年(昭和六年)以降中國ニ於ケル日本ノ軍事的占領及
經濟的支配ノ全課程ハ是等ノ誓約侵犯デアッタ。
一九三三年(昭和七年)十一月二十日、當時國際聯盟へ派遣ノ日本代表デ

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アツク松岡氏ハ「我々ハコレ以上ノ領土ヲ欲セズ」ト言ツタ。一九三三年（昭和七年）ノ末迄ニ日本軍ハ滿洲全キヲ占領シ其後ノ歲月ニハ南方及西方ニ行動シテ廣大ナル中國ノ地域ヲ占領スルニ至ツタ。

一九三七年ノ昭和十二年ノ七月二十七日當時ノ日本首相近衛公爵ハ「北支ヘノ軍隊派遣ニ當ツテハ政府ハ最近ノソノ聲明ニモ述ベタル如ク東亞ノ平和維持以外勿論何等ノ目的モ有スルモノデハナイ」ト述ベテナル。東亞ノ平和ヲ維持スルタメ日本軍ハ四々年ニ亘ツテ中國ノ大部分ノ地域ニ戰爭ト苦難ヲ齎シタ。

一九三七年ノ昭和十二年ノ十月二十八日日本外務省ハ「日本ハ決レテ中國民衆ヲ敵ト視ルモノデハナイ……」ト述ベテナル。日本ハ中國ニ對スルソノ友情ヲ一般中國民衆ヲ爆撃シ中國ノ諸都市ヲ燒キ幾百萬ノ中國人ノ家ヲ奪ヒ生計ノ道ヲ絶テ一般人ヲ虐待殺戮スルコトニ依ツテ又恐怖ト慘虐ノ行為ニ依ツテ示シタ。

一九四〇年ノ昭和十五年ノ四月十五日當時ノ日本外相有田氏ハ「日本政府ハ蘭領東印度ノ現状ニ影響ヲ及ボスベキ如何ナル進展……ニ對シテモ深ク憂慮セザルヲ得ナイ」ト述ベタ。ソノ春ノ独逸ニヨル和蘭陀占領ニ次イテ日本ハ商業使節團ヲ蘭印ニ送り若シソレカ容レラレル場合ハ蘭印ヲシテ實際上日本ノ一殖民地トシテモルカ如キ讓歩ヲ要求シタ。

No. 7

一九三七年ノ昭和十二年ノ七月中國ニ對スル日本ノ宣戰ノ布告ナキ戰爭勃發後モ日本ノ民間指導者達ハアメリカノ權利ハ尊重サルベキ日屢々保證シタ。日本陸軍ハ屢々予保證ニ違背

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スル行動ニ由ル。

自一〇八四頁一〇八八頁

日本ハ屢々中國ニ於ケルアメリカ人ノ生命及ヒ財産ハ尊重サルベ
キ日保證シタ。

シカモアメリカ人ノ生命ノ損失ト危險ヲ伴フアメリカ財産爆撃
事件ハ確實ニ増加スル數ヲ以テ報告セラレツ、アツタ。

日本ハ屢々中國ニ於ケルアメリカノ條約上ノ權利ハ尊重サルベキ旨
保証シタ。コレヲノ權利ヲ侵犯スル無數ノ措置ハ日本占領地域ニ於
テ實施セラレタ。通商独占カ行ハレ差別的ナ稅カ課セラレ、ア
メリカ財産ガ差押ヘラレタ等々。加フルニアメリカ人ハ襲撃
サレ、不法ニ抑留サレ侮辱ヲ受ケタ。

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C. 日本ノ政策ト米國ノ政策トノ相違

米國ト日本トハ非常ニ懸隔セル概念ト政策トヲ有スルヲ實
ヲ大統領ト余ハ深ク念頭ニ置イテ居ク。吾々ハ我が政府ガ
日本ヲシテ平和的政策ヲ採ルヤウニ任向ケル爲ニ順次採リ来
ウク手段ヲ検討シク。

五〇〇ハ一九三一年(昭和六年)ニ日本ガ武力ト條約無視トニヨル
侵略及擴張ノ行動ニ乘出シク。行動ハ侵略的勢力ト平和
維持ヲ希望者ト向ニ益々広マル衝突ノ先驅ヲ爲シクモ、
「アルコトヲ思ヒ出シク。滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ行動ニ對スル我が
政府ノ反對ハ一九三三年(昭和七年)一月七日附宣付ノ國務
長官スキムソン氏ヨリ日本政府宛ノ通達及一九三五年
(昭和十年)二月二十五日附國際聯盟事務局長宛ノ
通達ニモ述ベラレク。

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一九三三年ノ昭和八年ノ一月十七日選出大統領ルーズヴェルト氏ハ或ル質問ニ對スル回答トシテ、次ノ如キ声明書ヲ出スコトニ依ツテ彼ノ國際條約神聖原則支持ヲ明カニシタ。
「余ハ、アメリカノ外交政策ハ國際條約ノ神聖ヲ支持セネバナラヌトイフコトヲ茲ニ進ンデ明カニスル。コレコソ國家間ノ凡テノ關係ガ依ツテ以テ立ツベキ礎石デアル。
ルーズヴェルト大統領ハ一九三三年三月四日ノ最初ノ就任演説ニ於テ彼ハ善隣政策ノ領野ニ於テユ一國ヲ善隣政策ニ断乎トシテ自己ヲ尊重シソレガ故ニ他ノ權利ヲモ尊重スル隣人ノ自己ノ義務ヲ尊重シ隣人ノ世界ニ於ケル又ハソレトノ間ノ彼ノ協定ノ神聖ヲ尊重スル隣人ニ捧ゲルニ日ヲ述ベタ。

カクシテ一九三一年ノ昭和六年ノヨリ一九三三年ノ昭和八年ノ三且ツテ日本ガソノ侵略計畫ヲ進メツツアツタ時、アメリカ政府ハ條約ト平和的方法ノ神聖ヲ世界的ニ支持スルコトヲ提唱シテ着實ニ前進シツツアツタデアル。
一九三四年五月十六日余ハ日本大使齋藤ト一般的會談ヲ行フツソレハ余ガ日本側ニ彼等ノ最大ノ利益ハ平和政策ニ從フコトデアルコトヲ説得シヤウト努メタ跡ノ多クノ會談ノ一ツデアツタ。

No. 10
三日後ニ余ハ再び日本大使ト會談シタ。會談中大使ハ日本政府ガ日本ハ东亚ノ平和維持ニ關シテ優越セル特殊ノ任務ヲ持ツテキルトイフ趣旨ヲ數週間ニ亘リ公ニ提唱シテ居タ

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常套語ヲ繰返シタ。近隣諸國ト領土ニ對シ西霸權ヲ振ハ
ソトスルハ日本側ノ意圖デアルトイフ意味ガ明瞭ニ日本側ノ
常套語ニ含マレテ居ルヲ日本大使ノ注意ヲ喚起シタ。

昭和十一年六月十日駐英日本大使ト今談ノ際日本ハ
東亞ヲ始メ次イデリノ外ニ好々地域ニ對シ經濟的支配ヲ及
ボサントシテ年々然シテ以上ハ結局軍事的支配ノミニテナク
政治的支配ヲモ意味スルトイフハ米國市民ノ受ケタ印象
デアルトイッタ。余ハ大使ニ平和的且建設的計畫ニ自ラ意
シムルヲ日本ニ利益ナル所以ヲ力説シタ。

我カノ凡ユル説得ヤ努力ニモ拘ラズ日本ハ一九三七年七月
 支那侵略ヲ開始シタリシテ七月十六日合衆國政府ハ平和的方
 法ヲ支持ニ対シ凡レ國ヲ糾合セントスル國際的政策ノ根本原則ニ關スル
 聲明書ヲ出シタリ。

更ニ一九三七年八月二十三日、聲明書於テ私七月十六日、聲明
 書ノ原則ヲ明白ニ支那ニ於ケルテ態ニ適用シタリ。

余ハソノテ變ニ當ツテ、合衆國ガ関心スル論争莫ク米國國民並
 ビニ米國利権ノ保護ト云フ目下ノ問題ヨリ遙ク以上ノモノナルト述ベ
 重テテ戰鬥狀態世界ノ如何ナル部分ニ於テモ凡レ國同ノ関
 心ヲテアツタリ。故ニ余ハ中國並ビニ日本兩政府ニ對シ敵對行為ヲ
 制止スル様勸告シタリ。

一九三七年昭和十二年十月八日米國政府ハ支那ニ於ケル日本
 行動ハ國家同ノ關係ヲ律スベキ原則ニ合致セズ又九ヶ國條
 約及ビワシントンケロッグ協定ノ規定ニ背クモノナルヲ聲明シタリ
 一九三七年十一月、合衆國ハ他ノ十八ヶ國ト共ニ極東ニ「蔓延スル
 遺憾ナル鬭争ノ終熄ヲ促進スル平和的ノ手段ヲ研究スル」クメ
 「ブラッセル」ニ於テ開催カレタル會議ニ參加シタリ。右會議ハ
 一九二二年ノ九ヶ國條約ノ規定ニ從ヒ開催カレタリ。右會議ニ參
 加ニ對スル日本政府再ニ拒否ハ調停ト和解ニ依リ鬭争

2007B

終息ヲ飛倒ラサントスル努力ヲ事の上阻害シテ十一月二十四日會議
シノ開會ヲ停止シテ

一千九百四十年/昭和十五年/四月十五日日本外相ハ南洋
地域殊ニ南領東印度日本ノ支配ヲ擴張セントスル根本目的ヲ顯ハ
ス聲明ヲ發表シテ四月十七日ニ余ハ其ノ聲明ヲ知ツタ余ハ國際関
係ニ於ケル南領印度ノ重要性ヲ指摘シテ

余ハ平和的方法ニ依リテ南領東印度ノ内政問題ニ干渉シ又ハ其ノ現狀
ヲ變更セシムルコトハ南領東印度ノ地域ニ於ケルノミナラズ全太平洋地域ニ於
ケル安定平和及び安全ノタメ有害ナル可キヲ述ベテ余ハ平和
諸原則ガ太平洋ノ各域ニ於テノミナラズ世界ノ各域ニモ適用セラレ
可キヲ主張シテテアル

千九百四十年/昭和十五年冬カラ千九百四十一年/昭和十六年
春ニ於テ余ハ日本軍部ノ指導者達ニ布哇ノ數百哩西方ヨリ南
洋及び印度ニ至ル全太平洋地域征服ノ使命ニ發足シツアル様
様デアルコトヲ心ニ銘記シ且ツ其旨國會議員及ビ余ヲ接觸シテ
其ノ他ノ米人説明シテ居テ日本人ハ世界新秩序ヲ建設スル
為ニヒットライト合作テ武力ヲ以テ立上ツテ而シテ彼等ハ彼等ガ自己
ノモト僭稱スル世界ノ半分ヲ於ケル新秩序ノ下ニ全平和的國家
ヲ參加セシムル力ヲ持ツト思フ

No. 13

余ハ一九三三年（昭和八年）カラ余ガ對日關係ヲ解決スルタメノ組織的且堅実ニシテ眞摯ナル努力ヲ開始シテキタコトヲ夫等ノ米人ニ語シテ居タ。余ハ日本人ニ接近シ此ノ征服ノ行動ヲヤメル梯ニ彼等ヲ説服スル何等カノ方途ヲ見出スコトガ人智デ出来得ルコトカ否カヲ知ラウト試ミテ居タ。我々ハ日本人ニ對シテ政治經濟及ヒ社會的見地カラ彼等自身ノ將來ヲ考慮スル様強調シテ居タノデアール。

大統領ガ千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）一月六日議會ニ對スル彼ノ演說中、米國ノ安全ガ今日程外部ヨリ由々シク脅威ヲ受ケタコトハ曾テ無イト公言シタ時彼ハ極東ノ情勢ニ着眼シテキタ。大統領ハ民主主義的生命ノ全型式ガ驚ク程多數ノ獨立國家ニ於テ抹殺サレタ而シテ侵略者ハ他、大小諸國家ヲ脅カシツツ更ラニ行進ヲ續ケテ居ルト述ベタ。

千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）一月十五日下院ノ外交委員會ニ提出ノ武器貸與法案ヲ支持スル陳述中余ハ左ノ如ク述ベタ。

日本ガ西太平洋ノ全域ニ於テ支配的地位ニ自己ヲ確立セントスル廣汎ニシテ霸氣滿々タル計畫ニ依ツテ最初カラ活動シ来レルコトハ終始一貫シテ明白デアール。日本ノ指導者達ハ武力ニ依リ其ノ地位ヲ獲得維持シ斯クテ自己ヲ世界全人口ノ約二分一ヲ含ム地域ノ支配者タラシメントスル彼等ノ決意ヲ公然ト宣言シタ。其ノ結果トシテ彼等ハ其ノ地域ニ於ケル海上航路及ヒ通商路ノ專斷的支配ヲ獲得スルコトニテアロウ。

余ハ着々トシテ擴大スル征服ノ組織的残忍且ツ執拗ナル行動ニ人類ガ直面シテ居ルコト並ヒニ法ヲ遵守スル諸國家ニ依ル公海ノ支配ガ西半球ノ安全ノ鍵デアアルコトヲ指摘シタ。

自一〇三頁至一〇九頁

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月以前ノ會議及ビ展開

一九四一年／昭和十六年／二月十日 大統領ハ新日本大使野村大將ヲ衷心ヨリ喜ビ迎ヘ二人ハ率直ニ語り合フコトが出来ルト云ヒマシタ。彼ハ日米間ノ關係カ悪化シツアルコトヲ指摘シ日本ノ南進ヤ三國同盟加入ニ云及シマシタ。大統領ハ大使カ國務長官ト日米關係ノ重大局面ヲ再檢討シ率直ニ協議スルカ望マシイコトデアルト申シマシタ。

三月八日日本大使トノ最初ノ長時間ノ會談ニ於テ余ハドイツ及ビ日本カ身勝手ニ太平洋及ビ諸大陸ヲ支配セントシテ進軍シ且犧牲者達ノアラユル幸福ヲ無ニシテ利益ヲ得ントスル活動ニ對シ米國民ハコト上モナク激昂シテキルトイフコトヲ強調シマシタ。三月十四日日本大使ハ大統領ト私ニ會見シマシタ。大統領ハ我々ニ國間ノ問題ヲ武力的ニ衝突スルトナシニ解決出來ルト言フ大使ノ暗示ニ賛成シ先ツオノ手續ハ日本ノ意圖ニ関スル疑惑ヲ除去スルトデアラウトカ説シマシタ。日本外相松岡氏カ華々シク豪語シテベルリンニ向ッヤラ日本ノ海空軍部隊カ漸次泰國ノ方ニ移動シツアルヤラテ重大ナル關心ヤ疑惑カ存シテ居タノハ言迄モナイノデス。

四月十六日 松ハ日本大使ト更ニ会談ヲ重ネマシタ。

余ハ我が政府が関心ヲ有スル最モ主要ナ前提問題ハ日本政府が武
力ニ依ル征服トイフ現在、主義ヲ潔ク抛棄スル意志トカラ持テ
且我が政府が各國民關係ノ依ルギ根柢ト見做シテ平ル次、如キ
四綱領ヲ採用スルト云フ明瞭ナ事前ノ保證テアルコトヲ指摘シタ。
一) 各國民及以テル國民ノ領土ノ保全及以テ主權ヲ尊重スルコト。
二) 他國ノ内政ニ関シテ不干渉ノ原則ヲ守ルコト。
三) 商業ノ機會均等ヲ含ミ均等主義ヲ守ルコト。
四) 平和的手段ニ依ル現状変更以外、太平洋ニ於ケル現状ヲ攪乱
セヌコト。

余ハ日本大使ニ我が政府ハ以上ノ原則ニ沿フ如キモノナラバ日本政府、
如何ナル提案コモ喜テ考慮スル旨ヲ傳ヘシタ。

五月十二日、日本大使ハ一般ノ解決ニ對スル提案ヲ出シマシタ。

ソノ提案ノ要領ハ合衆國ハ蔣介石ニ日本ト和平交渉ヲスル
梯要請スベキテアリ、モレ高ニ蔣が合衆國ノ右勸告ヲ受テ入レシイ
場合ニ、合衆國ハ蔣政府ヘ援助ヲ停止スベキナル。又日米間ノ正
常ナル通商關係ヲ復活スベキテアリ、且、合衆國ハ日本ヲ助ケテ南
西太平洋地域ノ天然資源——例ハ石油、ゴム、錫、コニッケルト云フ
如キ——ヲ開發スル便宜ヲ得セラルベキナルト云フコトヲシタ。其ノ地
日本ハ後ニ之ヲ撤回シシタガ「ソリッピン」ノ獨立ニ對スル合衆國ト日本
ノ共同保障ノ要求、無差別待遇ヲ以テスル合衆國ヘノ日本人移住
ヲ考慮スベキ要求及合衆國ト基ト提携條約「品バ」戦争ノ擴大防
止並ニ「ヨロシバ」ニ於ケル平和ノ迅速ナル解決ノ要求、梯ノ條項モ
アリマシタ。

右提案中ニ尚日本ガ三國同盟ヲ遵守スベキコトカ確言セラレ、又「ソビエト」聯邦ハ特ニ除外サレテチルガレ以外テ當時「ヨーロッパ」戦争或ハ日支紛争ニ参加シテチナイ國ウラ同盟調印國、何レガ攻撃ヲ受ケタ場合ニテ援助スベキ日本ノ義務ニ就テ特ニ言及セシテチマシタ。

「十頁」

日本が中國ニ提出シタ和平條件ハハッキリシク用語ヲ明確ニ規定サセハキナカク、シカガラ丹念ニ吟味スルト、ソレヲ條件ニ一見何ノ差障モナイヤウナキマシタ、假面ヲカズク規約デアルガソレニヨリテ日本ハ中國ニ於ケル様々ノ戰略資源、便宜、諸事業、支配ヲ保持シ、又表面上ハ「共產主義ニ対スル共同防衛」トシテ無期限ニ中國全土及内蒙古ニ於テ廣範圍ノ要衝地域ニ日本軍、大部隊ヲ駐屯セシムル權利ヲ獲得セシトスル「デール」事ガ判明シタ。

コノ日本側申出ハ偏狭テ且ツ一方的ナルニ拘ラス我々ノ廣範圍ノ解決ヲ感シテモ可能性ヲ見ツケ出ス為ニ出發矣トシテ、申出ヲ取リテ「ソビエト」ノ解決ハ此ノ國ガ則ツテチル処、原則ニ一致シテ線沿テ全太平洋地域ヲ包括スルモノデアリタ。

五月十四日日本外相松岡氏ハ「ソビエト」大使ト對談、際近「衛首相」トシテ、余ハ日本、南ヲ進出ハ、只管平和的手段ニヨリテ遂行サルベキナルト。

Doc. 2007 B

決意シタト云ツガ同代ハ事態ガソレヲ不可能ナラシメ又限リト意味深
長ナ言ヲ附加ヘテ。

ソノ事態トイフハ何ヲ意味シテキルカトノ大使ノ問ニ答ヘテ松岡
代ハ「イギリス軍」集結ソレ他「イギリス側對策ニ言及シテ。大使ガ斯
ル對策ハ何レモ防衛的ナモトアルトイフト外相ハ日本國民一般ハソレヲ一般
對策ヲ政府ニ何等クノ行動ヲ取ル事ヲ強ヒル拱発的ナモトアルト見
做シテキルト答ヘテ。

一九四一年五月二十七日、ルーズヴェルト大統領ハ「國家的超非常時」ナル事ヲ
宣言シ同日ラゲオ演説テ我々民主主義擁護策ハ總テ我國ノ保全ヲ
計ル事ニ基イテキルテアルトイフコトヲ言明シテ。大統領ハ「ソレガガ」勝利
ヲ占ム場合ニ發生スルト思ハレル事態ニ就テ警告告シテ。大統領ト余ハ
ソノ宣言ガ「ヒトラー」ニテズ日本軍部將官達ニモ留意サレタ事ヲ確信
シキル。五月二十八日私ハ我々非公式ニ會談カラ日本ト交渉ニ入ル前ニ中國政
府ト胸襟ヲ開イテ、申出ニ包含サレテキル一般事項ニ関シテ語リ合ハウト考
ヘテキルト日本大使ニ話シテ。

No. 18
引續キニ三週間ノ間ニ種々ノ点ヲ明ラカシメ喰違ヒラケクスル爲ニ何
回トナク會談ガ行ハレタ。我々ハ繰返シク、次、諸点ニ関スル我國ノ態
度ヲ説明シテ。即チ合衆國ガ自衛上歐洲戰爭ニ捲込コレタ場合ニ於
ケル日本ノ對樞軸關係ヲ明ラカニスル事、必要他國ノ國內問題ニ對
スル不干渉原則ノ適用及日本軍ノ中國領土カラ撤退、中國及ソレ地
太平洋諸地域ニ於テ通商關係ノ平等原則ノ適用及太平洋ニ於
テ日本ノ平和意圖ヲ確信スル事等我國ガホトキルモノハ平和手
段トテ物云々様ナ廣汎田ニ協定サレトイフコトヲ協辦シタ
日本側ハ五月十二日ニ彼等ノ申出ニ對スル完全ナル回答ヲ強要シテ
キタ。ソユテ六月二十一日大使ニ日本側申出ニ對スル假再成案ノ形式デ

No. 19

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我國ノ意向が託サレタ。ソノ再成案ニハモシ合衆國が自衛上歐洲戰ニ引
込マレテモ日本ハ合衆國ニ對シテ行動ヲ起スハ必要ハナイトイフ事ヲハツ
キリサセル爲メ方法が提議サレテアツタ。

中國ニ於ル日本軍駐屯ノ問題及中國ト日本トノ間ノ經濟協調ノ問題
ノ満足ナル解決ヲ成シトケル爲メ尚一層ノ努力カガ爲サルベキデアルトイフコト
が提言サレタ。又合衆國が中國政府ニ對スル援助ヲ中止スル意圖デ
アルトイフ様ニ提言ハ除去サレテアツタ。ソノ他種々提言サレタ變更ハ明確化
ノ爲乃至ハ我々が述べタ原則ト提示サレタ解決案トヲ一致サセル爲メニトサ
シタモノデアツタ。

EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF STATE
HULL GIVEN BEFORE THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

pp. 1076 to 1083

I. BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United States.

A. Japan's Record of Aggression:

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandisement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China on which the Nine Power Treaty rested.

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo". By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. On April 17, 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed.

On December 29, 1934 Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion in China.

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1936, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937

Italy adhered. While the Pact was ostensibly for self-protection against communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations -- the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis".

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937.

On December 12, 1937 Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as "the new order in Greater East Asia" and "the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development.

In August and September 1940 Japan with German assistance extorted an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indochina.

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone.

On October 4, 1940 Premier Konoe was quoted by the press as a statement on the Tripartite Pact has having said in part:

"If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts ... those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic manouvres to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime

B. Japan's Record of Duplicity:

The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands."

In 1918, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they roved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, said "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of East Asia," Japanese forces for four years had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.

On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy . . ." Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.

On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development ... that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies". Following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a Commercial Commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Japanese colony.

After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assurances...

pp. 1084- to 1088

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

C. Divergence between Japanese and American Policies:

The President and I have very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies.

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course of aggression, expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever widening conflict between forces of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace. Our Government's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1932 and in a further communication of February 25, 1935, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.

On January 17, 1933 the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, made clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international

treaties by writing out, in reply to a question, a statement as follows:

"I am ... wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."

In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

Thus in 1931-1933, while Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1934 I had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saiki, one of many conversations in which I endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories.

On June 12, 1936 in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, I told the Ambassador that the impression of the American people was that Japan sought economic domination first of eastern Asia and then of other areas such as it might select, and that this would ultimately mean political as well as military domination. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its associating itself in a peaceful and constructive program.

Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes.

In a further statement of August 23, 1937, I applied the principles of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated that the issues, in that situation, of concern to the United States went far beyond the immediate question of the protection of American nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part of the world were of concern to all nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities.

On October 6, 1937 the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In November 1937 the United States participated with eighteen other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings.

pp. 1089.

On April 15, 1940 the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. On April 17 I took cognizance of that statement. I pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. I urged that peaceful principles be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world.

p. 1090

During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind--and I was explaining to members of Congress and other Americans with whom I can in contact--that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects.

p. 1092

The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when on January 6, 1941 in his address to Congress he declared that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today". The President said that the whole pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the march threatening other nations, great and small.

p. 1093

On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, I said:

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region."

I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere".

pp. 1103 to 1109

II. CONVERSATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO JULY 1941.

On February 14, 1941 the President received the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned Japanese movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agreement. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations.

On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims.

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion.

On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

- (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
- (2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
- (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
- (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the

Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with these principles.

On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to his Government; that normal trade relations between the United States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources--such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel--in the southwest Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guarantee of independence of the Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

The proposal also contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted.

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against Communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia.

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gauge settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood.

On May 14, Mr. Matsuoka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both Prince Kono and he were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means, "unless," he added significantly, "circumstances render this impossible."

In reply to the Ambassador's inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind, Mr. Matsuoka referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When the Ambassador pointed out that such measures were of a defensive character, the Minister's reply was that these measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Government to act.

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and in a radio address on the same day he declared that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. He warned of the conditions which would exist should Hitler be victorious.

The President and I were sure that the proclamation would be noticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords.

On May 28 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had it in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any negotiations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals.

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points--the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of non-discrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles.

Ex. _____
Co. Ex. _____

44-2840

Excerpts requested and furnished for the defendants by order of Court from the testimony of former SECRETARY OF STATE CORDELL HULL given at hearing held before Joint Congressional Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, same being found in Volumes 7 and 9 of Report of Proceedings, IPS Document No. 2007:

(Vol. 7, pp. 1088-1089)

In the fall of 1937 our Government was confronted with the decision whether to apply the Neutrality Act to the hostilities between China and Japan. It was clear that the arms embargo authorized by the Act would hurt China and help Japan, since China needed to import arms and Japan manufactured a large supply. The President used the discretion provided by law and refrained from putting the Act into operation.

On July 26, 1939, our Government notified the Japanese Government of its desire to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911. It was felt that this treaty was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. The treaty therefore terminated on January 26, 1940, and the legal obstacle to our placing restrictions upon trade with Japan was thus removed.

Beginning in 1938 our Government placed in effect so-called "moral embargoes" which were adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. Following the passage of the Act of July 2, 1940 restrictions were imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing list of exports of strategic materials. These measures were intended also as deterrents and expressions of our opposition to Japan's course of aggression.

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(Vol. 7, pp. 1089-1090)

Throughout this period the United States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This took several different forms including diplomatic actions in protest of Japan's aggression against China and Japan's violation of American rights. Loans and credits aggregating some two hundred million dollars were extended in order to bolster China's economic structure and to facilitate the acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against Japan.

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Br. Ex. ---
Ct. Ex. ---
(PP. 1114-1115, Cont.)

In essence, the Japanese proposal was that:

1. The Japanese Government should undertake to refrain from stationing troops in regions of the southwest Pacific, to withdraw from French Indochina after "settlement of the China incident," to guarantee Philippine neutrality, and to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in east Asia essential to the United States; and

2. The United States should undertake to "suspend its military measures in the southwestern Pacific areas" and to recommend similar action to the Governments of the Netherlands and Great Britain, to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in the Southwestern Pacific essential to Japan, to take measures to restore normal commerce between the United States and Japan, to extend its good offices toward bringing about direct negotiations between Japan and the Chungking Government, and to recognize Japan's special position in Indochina even after withdrawal of Japanese troops.

Vol. 7, pp. 1119-1120)

On September 6 Prime Minister Konoé in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo indicated that the Japanese Government fully and definitely subscribed to the four principles which this government had previously set forth as a basis for the reconstruction of relations with Japan. However, a month later the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to the American Ambassador that while those four points had been accepted "in principle," certain adjustments would be necessary in applying these principles to actual conditions.

(Vol. 7, p. 1133)

In telegrams of November 3 and November 17, the American Ambassador in Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks which might make inevitable war with the United States.

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165)

VI. JAPANESE ULTIMATUM OF NOVEMBER 20 AND OUR REPLY

On November 20th the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as did other high officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied to me by the War and Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final Japanese proposition -- an ultimatum.

Ex. _____
Co. Ex. _____

44-2840

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(Vol. 7, p. 1091)

During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had always felt that if a government makes a threat it ought to be ready to back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as possible.

(Vol. 7, pp. 1101-1102)

We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful, fair, and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and beliefs of the American people. Moreover, the President and I constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line with our need to rearm for self-defense.

The President and I fully realized that the Japanese Government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's course of aggression. We realized that so much was involved in a reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to Japan but to all countries.

(Vol. 7 pp. 1114-1115)

Accordingly, on July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States. That order brought under the control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Chinese or Japanese interests were involved. The effect of this was to bring about very soon virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

On August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which he said was intended to be responsive to the President's proposal regarding neutralization of Indo China.

Dr. Ex. ...
Ct. Ex. ...
(PP. 1114-1115, Cont.)

In essence, the Japanese proposal was that:

1. The Japanese Government should undertake to refrain from stationing troops in regions of the southwest Pacific, to withdraw from French Indochina after "settlement of the China incident," to guarantee Philippine neutrality, and to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in east Asia essential to the United States; and

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(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165)

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(Vol. 7, pp. 1156-1157, Cont.)

The proposal read as follows:

"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indochina where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China."

The Plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral and material support from the unrecognized Chinese Government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until after either the restoration of peace between

Japan and China or the establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southwestern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina--for example, China and the Soviet Union. The proposal contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to revert to peaceful courses.

On November 21, Mr. Kurusu called alone upon me and gave me a draft of a formula relating to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. That formula did not offer anything new or helpful. I asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more to offer on the subject of a peaceful settlement as a whole. Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not.

On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon had been reporting extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina. We had information through intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese Government had decided that the negotiations must be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We know from other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not intend to make any concessions, and from this fact taken together with Kurusu's statement to me of November 21 making clear that his Government had nothing further to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was in fact their "absolutely final proposal."

The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her avowed movement of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental principles for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the world. By mid-summer of 1941 we were pretty well satisfied that the Japanese were determined to continue with their course of expansion by force. We had made it clear to them that we were standing fast by our principles. It was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance that we might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever they pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental principles, Japan would probably not have attacked for the time being--at least not until she had consolidated the gains she would have made without fighting.

There was never any question of this country's forcing Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggressions and of collaboration with Hitler.

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation.

The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a showdown.

There the situation stood -- the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.

The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws.

Three possible choices presented themselves.

Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese warlords could then have told their people that the American Government not only would make no reply but would also not offer any alternative.

Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In that event the Japanese warlords would be afforded a pretext, although wholly false, for military attack.

Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal.

The last course was the one chosen.

In considering the content of a counter-proposal consideration was given to the inclusion therein of a possible modus vivendi. Such a project would have the advantages of showing our interest in peace to the last and of exposing the Japanese somewhat in case they should not accept. It would, if it had served to prolong the conversations, have gained time for the Army and Navy to prepare. The project of a modus vivendi was discussed and given intensive consideration from November 22 to November 26 within the Department of State, by the President, and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy. A first draft was completed on November 22 and revised drafts on November 24 and 25. It was also discussed with the British, Australian, Dutch and Chinese Governments.

The projected modus vivendi provided for mutual pledges by the United States and Japan that their national policies would be directed

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(Vol. 7, pp. 1135-1165, Cont.)

toward lasting peace; for mutual undertakings against advances by military force or threat of force in the Pacific area; for withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from southern Indochina; for a modification by the United States of its freezing and export restrictions to permit resumption of certain categories of trade, within certain specified limits, between the United States and Japan; for the corresponding modification by Japan of its freezing and export restrictions; and for an approach by the United States to the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to their taking similar measures. There was also an affirmation by the United States of its fundamental interest that any settlement between the Japanese and Chinese Governments be based upon the principles of peace, law, order, and justice. There was provision that the modus vivendi would remain in force for three months and would be subject to further extension.

It was proposed as a vital part of the modus vivendi at the same time to give to the Japanese for their consideration an outline of a peace settlement which might serve as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacific area along broad and just lines. On November 11 there had been prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs for possible consideration a draft of a proposal along broad lines. This draft like others was drawn up with a view to keeping the conversations going (and thus gaining time) and to leading, if accepted, to an eventual comprehensive settlement of a nature compatible with American principles. This draft proposal contained statements of general principles, including the four principles which I had presented to the Japanese on April 16, and a statement of principles in regard to economic policy. Under this draft the United States would suggest to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they enter into peace negotiations, and the Japanese Government would offer the Chinese Government an armistice during the period of the peace negotiations. The armistice idea was dropped because it would have operated unfairly in Japan's favor.

A further proposal to which I gave attention was a revision in tentative form made by the Department on November 19 of a draft of a proposed comprehensive settlement received from the Treasury Department on the previous day. This tentative proposal was discussed with the War and Navy Departments. In subsequent revisions points to which objections were raised by them were dropped. A third proposal which I had under consideration was that of the modus vivendi.

What I considered presenting to the Japanese from about November 22 to November 26 consisted of our modus vivendi draft and an outline of a peace settlement which might serve as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacific area along broad and just lines. This second and more comprehensive part followed some of the lines set forth in the November 11 draft and in the November 19 draft.

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7. pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

While the modus vivendi proposal was still under consideration, I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at any time, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans. I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy.

In a message of November 24 to Mr. Churchill, telegraphed through the Department, President Roosevelt added to an explanation of our proposed modus vivendi the words, "I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon."

On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the modus vivendi aspect.

As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of November 24 and of November 25 contained two things: (1) the possible modus vivendi; and (2) a statement of principles, with a suggested example of how those principles could be applied -- that which has since been commonly described as the 10 point proposal.

I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding -- and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for --acceptance by our Government of their extreme, last-word proposal of November 20.

It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote.

So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.

The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort, in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I recommended to the President -- and he approved -- my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in the late afternoon of that day.

The document handed the Japanese representatives on November 26 was divided into two parts:

The first part of the document handed the Japanese was marked "Oral." In it was reviewed briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of reaching if possible a settlement of questions relating to the entire Pacific area on the basis of the principles of peace, law and order and fair-dealing among nations. It was stated that it was believed that some progress had been made in reference to general principles. Note was taken of a recent statement by the Japanese Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired to continue the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement.

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136 to 1165, Cont).

In connection with the Japanese proposals of November 20 for a modus vivendi, it was stated that the American Government most earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. Our Government stated that in its opinion some features of the Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted with the fundamental principles which formed a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government had declared that it was committed,

Our Government suggested that further effort be made to resolve the divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned. Our Government stated that with this object in view it offered "for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations."

The second part of the document embodied the plan itself which was in two sections.

In Section I there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. Those principles were stated as follows:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

"(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes."

This statement of policy and of principle closely followed the line of what had been presented to the Japanese on several previous occasions beginning in April.

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

In Section I there was also a provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles. These principles were enumerated. They were based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

This suggested provision for mutual pledges with respect to economic relations closely followed the line of what had previously been presented to the Japanese.

In Section II there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. One unilateral commitment was suggested, an undertaking by Japan that she would withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo China. Mutual commitments were suggested along the following lines:

- (a) To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area;
- (b) To endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indo China and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein;
- (c) Not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking;
- (d) To relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights;
- (e) To negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment;
- (f) To remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other;
- (g) To agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate with Japan and the United States each furnishing half of the funds;
- (h) To agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and

Br. Ex. _____
Cv. Ex. _____

(i) To use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's foreign policy. The practical application of these principles to the situation in the Far East, as embodied in the ten points contained in the document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the informal exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis for further conversations.

A vital part of our program of standing firm for our principles was to offer other countries worthwhile plans which would be highly profitable to them as well as to ourselves. We stood firmly for these principles in the face of the Japanese demand that we abandon them. For this course there are no apologies.

Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer.

We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task of statemanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter how slight. It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was given to the Japanese Government.

When handing the document of November 26 to the Japanese representatives, I said that the proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation which, however, had not been referred to in the outline for fear that they might give rise to misunderstanding. I added also that I had earlier informed the Ambassador of my ambition of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented me from realizing that ambition.

It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give a false meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an "ultimatum". This was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people and gain their support for militaristic depredations and aggrandizement.

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

VII. THE LAST PHASE

After November 25 the Japanese representatives at their request saw the President and me on several occasions. Nothing new developed on the subject of a peaceful agreement.

On November 26 following delivery of our Government's proposal to the Japanese Ambassador, correspondents were informed by an official of the Department of State that the Japanese representatives had been handed a document for their consideration. This document, they were informed, was the culmination of conferences during the recent weeks and rested on certain basic principles with which the correspondents would be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.

On November 27 I had a special and lengthy press conference at which I told the correspondents they were free to use the information given them as their own or as having come from authoritative sources.

I said that from the beginning I had been keeping in mind, and I suggested that the correspondents keep in mind, that the groups in Japan led by the military leaders had a plan of conquest by force of about one-half of the earth with one-half of its population. They had a plan to impose on this one-half of the earth a military control of political affairs, economic affairs, social affairs, and moral affairs of each population very much as Hitler was doing in Europe.

I said that this movement in the Far East started in earnest in 1937. It carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of justice or fair play.

From the beginning, we, as one of the leading free countries, had sought to keep alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing viewpoint in international relations, that is, government by law, government by orderly processes, based on justice and morals and principles that would preserve absolutely the freedom of each country; principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries; the preservation inviolate of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries; the peaceful settlement of disputes; equality of commercial opportunities and relations. These and other principles that go along with them have been, I pointed out, the touchstone of all of our activities in the conduct of our foreign policy. We had striven to impress them on other countries, to keep them alive as the world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy. We had striven to preserve their integrity. That was no easy undertaking.

I said that in the spring of 1941 there had come up the question of conferences with the Japanese on the subject of peace. The purpose was

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7. pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

to ascertain whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area was possible.

I mentioned that for a considerable time there had been two opposing groups in Japan. One was a military group, sometimes led by military extremists. They had seemed to be in the saddle when the China undertaking in 1937 was decided upon. As the Chinese undertaking went on, there was an opposing group in Japan, representing honest lovers of peace and law and order. Another portion of this group comprised those who personally favored the policy of force and conquest but considered that the time was not propitious, for different reasons, to undertake it. Some of this group were inclined to oppose Japan's policy because of the unsatisfactory experience of Japan in China and of what they regarded as Japan's unsatisfactory relations with Germany under the Tripartite Pact.

I said that our conferences with the Japanese during the preceding several months had been purely exploratory.

During that time I kept other countries who had interest in that area informed in a general way.

I pointed out that for the previous ten days or so we had explored all phases of the basic questions presented and of suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States as close together as possible, on the theory that that might have been the beginning of some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations of the Pacific, including our own.

During the conversations, I said we had to keep in mind many angles. We had to keep in mind phases not only of the political situation but of the Army and the Navy situation. As an illustration, I cited the fact that we had known for some days from the facts and circumstances which revealed themselves steadily that the Japanese were pouring men and materials and boats and all other kinds of equipment into Indochina. One qualified observer reported the number of Japanese forces in Southern Indochina as 128,000. That may have been too high as yet. But a large military movement was taking place. There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make attacks somewhere there around Siam, any time within a few days.

I told the correspondents that we were straining heaven and earth to work out understandings that might mitigate the situation before it got out of hand, in charge, as it was to a substantial degree, of Japanese military extremists.

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

Referring to Indochina, I said that if the Japanese established themselves there in adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they not only had a base for operations against China but they would be a distinct menace to the whole South Sea area. When we saw that this signified an extra danger, naturally we explored every kind of way to avoid that sort of menace and threat.

I said that we had had the benefit of every kind of view. Some charged us with appeasement, others with having let other countries down. All the time we had been working at just the opposite. All these various views were made in good faith and no fault attached to the proponents thereof. This was just a condition which was not without its benefits.

We had exhausted all of our efforts to work out phrases of this matter with the Japanese. Our efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general agreement. We wanted to facilitate the conversations and keep them from breaking down but at all times keeping thoroughly alive the basic principles that we had been proclaiming and practicing during all those years.

On November 26, I continued, I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go into a broad basic peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally preserving the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to examine everything possible but always to omit consideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the conversations and search for a general agreement for peace.

To a correspondent's question whether I expected the Japanese to come back and talk further on the basis of what I gave them on November 26, I said that I did not know but, as I had indicated, the Japanese might not do that. I referred to the military movements which they were making and said I thought the correspondents would want to see whether the Japanese had any idea of renewing the conversations.

Br. Ex. _____
 Et. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

In reply to a further question whether in order to conform to the basic principles of our Government's policy it would be necessary for the Japanese to withdraw the troops they were sending to the Southward, I said, "Yes". In reply to another question as to whether it would not mean withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indochina, I said that of course our program announced in 1937 covered all that. The question of getting the troops out of China had been a bone of contention.

In reply to a question whether the assumption was correct that there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept our principles and go far enough to afford a basis for continuing the conversations, I said that there was always a possibility but that I would not say how much probability there might be.

In reply to a question whether the Japanese had proved adamant on the question of withdrawing from the Axis, I replied that they were still in it.

In reply to a question whether the situation took action rather than words from the Japanese, I said this was unquestionably so, but it took words first to reach some kind of an understanding that would lead to action.

In reply to a question how the Japanese explained these military movements to the south, I replied that they did not explain.

On November 28, at a meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

On November 29 I expressed substantially the same views to the British Ambassador.

I said the same things all during those days to many of my contacts.

On November 25 the American Consul at Hanoi, Indochina, had communicated to the Department a report that the Japanese intended to launch an

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

attack on the Kra Peninsula about December 1, and he reported also further landings of troops and military equipment in Indo China in addition to landings he had previously reported from time to time. On November 26 the American Consul at Saigon had reported the arrival of heavy Japanese reinforcements in Southern Indo China, supplementing arrivals he had reported earlier that month. On November 29 the Department of State instructed its posts in southeast Asia to telegraph information of military or naval movements directly to Manila for the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet.

On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus.

In a message from Premier Tojo to a public rally on November 30 under the sponsorship of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the "Great Japan East Asia League" he stated among other things that:

"The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States.

"For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance."

On that day, Sunday, November 30, after conferring with our military regarding the Japanese Prime Minister's bellicose statement and the increasing gravity of the Far Eastern situation, I telephoned the President at Warm Springs and advised him to advance the date of his return to Washington. Accordingly, the President returned to Washington on December 1.

On December 2, the President directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the reasons for continued Japanese troop movements into Indo China.

On December 3, I reviewed in press conference certain of the points covered by me on November 27. I said that we had not reached any more advanced state of determining questions either in a preliminary or other way than we had in November.

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

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(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

On December 5, the Japanese Ambassador called and presented a reply to the President's inquiry of December 2, containing the specious statement that Japanese reinforcements had been sent to Indochina as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory.

On December 6, our Government received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a Japanese fleet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers and 20 destroyers from Indochina toward the Kra Peninsula. This was confirmation that the long threatened Japanese movement of expansion by force to the south was under way. The critical character of this development, which placed the United States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds, and was an important subject of my conference with representatives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day.

On December 6, President Roosevelt telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor of Japan that the "tragic possibilities" in the situation be averted.

On December 7, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

Throughout the critical years culminating in Pearl Harbor and especially during the last months, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the heads of our armed services kept in constant touch with each other. There was the freest interchange of information and views. It was customary for us to pick up the telephone and for the caller to ask one of the others whether he had anything new of significance to communicate whatever the caller may have had that was new. These exchange of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations.

As illustrative of the contacts which I had with officers of the War and Navy Departments during the especially critical period from November 20 to December 7, 1941, I attach a record of the occasions when I talked with such representatives as compiled from the daily engagement books kept by my office (Annex A). That record may, of course, not be complete.

In addition, I attach a statement of the record of the occasions on which I talked with representatives of the War and Navy Departments from October 1940 to December 7, 1941 (Annex B.)

I attach also a statement in regard to the arrangements for contacts during the years 1940 and 1941 between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments (Annex C).

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

In the foregoing I have endeavored to give a simple narrative and analysis of what happened in this country's relations with Japan, especially as they bear upon the inquiry of this Joint Committee. If I can throw light on any aspect of our relations not covered in this statement, I shall be glad to do so.

.....

(Vol. 7, pp. 1189-1190)

Mr. Gesell: Well now, at about this time Secretary Stimson reports that there was a meeting at the White House, on the 25th of November, at which you and Secretary Knox and himself were present, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

He says there:

"The President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, as soon as, perhaps, next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem."

Do you remember any conferences at that time or at about that time with the War Council as to what should be done about the general problem?

Mr. Hull: The main point I was making during these and subsequent days was the very great improbability that Japan would seriously continue to participate in any conversations. We had learned through the interceptions not only that they had determined on their ultimatum but that they had ordered that conversations cease on the 25th, and then finally they worried me almost sick after the 20th about getting a quick reply.

.....

(Vol. 9, p. 1472)

The Vice Chairman: Then you did regard the Japanese proposal of November 20 as nothing but an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull: Well, they said so both in writing and orally and we could only regard it as that from its very nature.

The Vice Chairman: Now, was your reply of November 26 in any sense an ultimatum?

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

Mr. Hull: Well, the truth is we were most anxious, as we have said here at different times, to go forward with the conversations, and we had every motive to desire to go forward with them, and we offered this, as I say, as an ordinary, normal plan for international relations, on these lines, and I think everybody in the State Department, the President and others, were in agreement; and, as I say, the Japanese would have found a way at once, all they had to do was to announce that they were through with conquest and aggression and automatically they would have become the beneficiaries of these proposals.

The Vice Chairman: Did you receive any information that the Japanese regarded your message of November 26 as an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull: Not until sometime afterward. They then had their fleet on its way, as I say, to Hawaiian waters. They themselves had ordered the discontinuance of conversations. We were satisfied, of course, that they would attack at any time. We didn't know what time. They had that solely within their own power. But it wasn't until they proceeded to manufacture a falsehood in order to dodge the effect of their own ultimatum, the old fraudulent cry, "Stop thief", they thought if they could pretend to their own people, they knew that that wouldn't travel far in this country, except at the hands of people who might be a little prejudiced or a little extreme in their views, but they felt that they could put over the idea in their own country just as Hitler put over one falsehood after another to shield and disguise his own plans and his own course to his armies of invasion.

The Japanese alibi was taken up and adopted by a few people in other parts of the world but not to any great extent.

(Vol. 9, p. 104)

The Vice Chairman: Did you receive any information that the Japanese regarded your message of November 26 as an ultimatum?
Mr. Hull: Well, the truth is we were most anxious, as we have said here at different times, to go forward with the conversations, and we had every motive to desire to go forward with them, and we offered this, as I say, as an ordinary, normal plan for international relations, on these lines, and I think everybody in the State Department, the President and others, were in agreement; and, as I say, the Japanese would have found a way at once, all they had to do was to announce that they were through with conquest and aggression and automatically they would have become the beneficiaries of these proposals.

2007-11

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米國議會第七卷ノ拔奉

経過報告、 眞珠灣攻撃委員會ノ前ニ行ハレタ審問

S. CON. RES. 27.

(一九四五年(昭和二十年)十一月二十三日)

證人ハル

(1076 頁)

2007-1

A 日本ノ侵略記録

大統領及余ハ日本ノ過去ノ侵略的記録ト同時代ニ
極東ニ於ケル發展的傾向ヲ念頭ニ置クト共ニ又之
ヲ考慮ニ入レナケレバナラナカッタ。

日本ハ近代の國家トシテ發生シタ殆ト最初カラ軍
事的擴張政策ヲ續行シテキタ。穩健派ガ勢力ヲ得
タ或ル短期間ヲ除キ其ノ大部分ノ期間中一侵略階
段ト次ノ階段トノ中間期間ハ單ニ鞏固整理ノ期間
タルニ過ギナカッタ。

一八九五年（明治廿八年）日本ハ支那ニ對スル戰
争ニ成功シテ後臺灣ヲ併合シ尙滿洲ニ於テ足場ヲ
建設シヨウトシタガ之ハ失敗シタ。

一九〇五年（明治卅八年）日露戰役ノ後日本ハ
東洲ニ對スル租借權ヲ獲得シ南滿洲鐵道ヲ領有シ
テ滿洲ニ植乎タル地盤ヲ築イタ。同時ニ日本ハ南
樺太ヲモ獲得シタ。

一九一〇年（明治四十三年）日本ハ多年ノ侵害ノ
後壓迫ト陰謀ニヨツテ朝鮮ヲ併合シタ。

一九一五年（大正四年）日本ハ歐洲ノ聯合國ガ對
獨戰争ニ夢中ニナツテキルノヲ利用シテ、カノ有
名ナル二十一ヶ箇條ノ要求ヲ支那ニ突キツケタ。
第一次世界戰争ノ終末ニ於テ日本ハ一九二一—二
二年（大正十年—十一年）ノ華盛頓會議ニ參加シ

テ同會議ニ於テ締結サレタ諸條約ノ訂印國トナツ
 タ。是等ノ條約中ニハ支那ニ關スル原則及政策ニ
 關連ヲ有スル九ヶ國條約ガ包含セラレテ居タ、コ
 ノ條約ハ支那ガ實力ノアル安定シタ政府ヲ育成シ
 且維持スル爲メニ充分且ツ最モ無障害ノ機會ヲ與
 ヘル状態ガ創造セラレルコトヲ期待シタ。日本ハ
 九ヶ國條約ガ基礎ヲ置クトコロノ支那ニ對スル自
 制的政策ヲ誓約シタ。然シナガラ一九二七年（昭
 和二年）田中内閣出現後、日本ハ一九二八年（昭
 和三年）ニハ支那ニ對シ所謂積極政策ヲ採用シテ
 コノ政策ノ下ニ益々支那ノ内政ニ干涉スル傾向ヲ
 表シタ。

一九三一年（昭和六年）ニハ日本ハ滿洲ヲ侵略シ
 其後「滿洲國」ノ名稱ノモトニ之ヲ統治スル傀儡
 政府ヲ樹立シタ。九ヶ國條約ノ違反ナル違背デア
 ルコノ行爲ニヨリ日本ハ華盛頓會議ノ諸條約ニ協
 定セラレタ協力政策ヲ完全ニ破棄シタノデアアル。
 一九三四年（昭和九年）ノ始メ日本ノ外務大臣廣
 田氏ニヨツテ覺書ノ形式デ（一九三四年二月二十
 一日附）日本政府ガ接近シテキタコトヲ如何ニ余
 ガ歓迎シタカヲ想ヒ出ス。コノ覺書ニ廣田氏ハ「
 アメリカ」合衆國ト日本トノ間ニハ「友誼的解決
 ガ根本的ニ不可能ナル」問題ハ存在シナイコトヲ
 確信スルト言ハレタ、余ハソレニ對スル回答（一

2007-3

九三四年三月三日附ニ於テ廣田氏ノ意見ニ贊同シ、且我が政府ハ平和的方法ニヨリ諸問題ノ調整ヲ確信スルコトヲ強調シタ。

然ルニコノ覺察ヲ交換シテ間モナク日本ハ再ビ國內ノ強力ナル政策樹立者達ガ終始一貫固執スル侵略ノ根本目的ヲ暴露シタ。

一九三四年四月十七日、日本外務省ノ代辯者ハカ
ノ「支那ニ手ヲ出スベカラズ」聲明トシテ知ラレ
テイルトコロノ野蠻的公式聲明ヲナシタ。コノ聲
明ニ於イテ日本ハ支那ヲシテ日本ノ指圖ニ從フコ
トヲ強制シ且日本ガ許容スル場合ニ限り他ノ國ト
支那トノ交渉ヲ許スト言フ目的ヲ明カニシタ。

2007-4.
B 日本ノ表裏的言動ノ記録

大統領ト余トハ亦日本ガ國際關係ニ於テ表裏的言動ヲ爲シタ長イ記録ヲ有スル事實ヲ考ヘタ。コノ表裏的言動ハ日本軍部ガ彼等自身ノ法律デアリ日本ノ文官ガ約束シタ事ヲ終始一貫シテ蹂躪シテキタト云フ事實ニ大イニ起因スルモノデアル。

一九〇四年（明治卅七年）日本ハ朝鮮ノ獨立ト其ノ領土保全トヲ保證シタ、一九一〇年（明治四三年）ニ日本ハ朝鮮ヲ併合シタ。

一九〇八年（明治四一年）日本ハ「アメリカ」合衆國ト共ニ支那ノ獨立ト保全、及び支那ニ於ケル機會均等ノ原則ヲ支持スルコトヲ誓約シタ。

一九一五年（大正四年）ニ日本ハカノ有名ナ「二十一年ケ箇條ノ要求」ヲ支那ニ突キツケタ。

一九一八年（大正七年）ニ日本ハ露西亞軍ガ其ノ後必要トスルカモ知レヌ軍需品ヲ保護スル爲、露西亞人自身ノ自衛機關ノ組織ヲ援助スル爲及び

シベリアニ於ケルチエツコスロバキア軍ノ撤退ヲ救済スル爲ニ、各國ハ夫々七千人ヲ超ヘザル兵力ヲ「シベリア」ニ派遣スルト言フ聯合國間ノ取極メニ參加シタ。日本軍部ハコノ事業ニ東部シベリア併合ノ好機アリト見テ（結核成功シナカツタガ）七萬人以上ノ兵力ヲ派遣シタ。

一九二二年（大正十一年）ドノ九ヶ國條約ニ於イテ日本ハ支那ノ主權、獨立、及ビ領土の行政的保全ヲ尊重スルコトニ同意シタ、日本ハ亦支那ニ於テ機會均等ノ原則ヲ樹立スルコトニ盡力スルコトニ同意シタ。一九三一年（昭和六年）以降支那ニ於ケル日本ノ軍事的占領及ビ經濟的支配ノ全課程ハ是等ノ誓約侵犯デアツタ。

一九三二年（昭和七年）十一月二十一日、當時國際聯盟ヘ派遣ノ日本代表デアツタ松岡氏ハ「我々ハコレ以上ノ領土ヲ欲セズ」ト言ツタ、一九三二年（昭和七年）ノ末迄ニ日本軍ハ滿洲全土ヲ占領シ、其後ノ歲月ニハ南方及西方ニ行動シテ廣大ナル支那ノ地域ヲ占領スルニ至ツタ。

2005-10
0 日本ノ政策ト米國ノ政策トノ相違

米國ト日本トハ非常ニ懸隔セル概念ト政策トヲ有
スル事實ヲ大統領ト余ハ深ク念頭ニ置イテ居タ、
吾々ハ我が政府ガ日本ヲシテ平和的政策ヲ採ルヤ
ウニ仕向ケル爲ニ順次探リ來ツタ手段ヲ検討シタ。
吾々ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）ニ日本ガ武力ト條
約無視トニヨル侵略及擴張ノ行動ニ乘出シタ行動
ハ侵略的勢力ト平和維持希望者トノ間ニ益々廣マ
ル衝突ノ先驅ヲ爲シタモノデアアルコトヲ思ヒ出シ
タ。

滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ行動ニ對スル我が政府ノ反對
ハ、一九三二年（昭和七年）一月七日附當時ノ國
務長官スチムソン氏ニヨリ日本政府宛ノ通達及一九
三五年（昭和十年）二月二十五日附國際聯盟事務
局長宛ノ通達ニモ述ベラレタ。

4 174
Excerpts from Vol. 7 Congress of
The United States.

Report of proceedings, Hearing held before Joint
Committee of the P. & H. Harbour Attack S. Con. Res. 27
November 2, 1945

(pp 1076 to 1085)

Witness Hull.

(p.1076)

Excerpts from Vol. 7, Congress of the United States
Report of Proceedings, Hearing held before
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack. S. Con Res. 27.
November 23, 1945.

(pp.1076 to 1085)

(Page 1076)

Witness Hull

A. Japan's Record of Aggression:

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandizement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendency, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China which the Nine Power Treaty rested.

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo". By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference Treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. On April 17, 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a tricolored official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed. *****

(Page 1081)

B. Japan's Record of Duplicity:

The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands".

In 1918, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

(Page 1084)

C. Divergence between Japanese
and American Policies:

The President and I had very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies.

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course of aggression (and) expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever widening conflict between forces of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace. Our Government's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1932, and in a further communication of February 25, 1935, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.

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DOC 2007 (for the Defense)

眞珠湾攻撃調査ニ関スル両院共同委員会ニ於テ
開催セラルル審理ニ於テ 前國務長官「コトデルハル」
ノ存シタル證言中コリ法廷ノ命ニヨリ被告ノ多クニ要請セ
提供サレタル拔萃。

同拔萃ハ議事録才七卷及才九卷、國際法部
書類才七卷中ニ在ルモノナル。

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361



(才七卷、才一〇八頁乃至才一〇八九頁)

元三七年(昭和十二年)秋、我が政府ハ、中国及日本
間ノ交戦ニ對シ、中立法ヲ適用スベキヤ否ヤ、決定ヲサス
羽目ニテツク。中国ハ、武器ノ輸入ヲ必要トシ、日本ハ
大量ノ軍需品ヲ製造シタリ以上、中立法ノ正當ト認
ムル武器輸出禁止ハ、中国ヲ損ジ、日本ヲ利スルモノ
ナルコトハ明カデアリタリ。大統領ハ、法ノ是ハル我断
ノ自由ヲ用ヒ、同法ノ實施ヲ控ヘタリデアリタリ。

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元三九年(昭和十四年)七月二十六日、我が政府ハ、日
本政府ニ對シ、元三二年(明治四十四年)ノ通商航
海條約ヲ廢棄スル意向ヲ告ギタリ。此ノ條約
ハ、日本ニ於テ又中国ノ日本領地ニ於テモ、合衆
國ノ通商ニ對シテ分ナル保護ヲ与ヘルモノナルト感セラレ、
才又同時ニ、同條約ノ最惠國條款ノ實施ハ、日本ノ
通商ニ對スル報復手段ヲ採擇ニ對スル障害トナルモノナ

アルト感セラレタテアツタ。

然レバ、同條約ハ、一九四〇年（昭和十五年）一月二十六日
失効トナリ、斯クテ、日本ト、貿易ニ我カ方ニ於テ加ヘル
制限ニ對スル法律上、障害ハ、除去セラレタテアル。

一九三八年（昭和十三年）ヨリ、我カ政府ハ、人道主義
的考慮ヲ基礎トシテ採用シタ所謂「道義的禁輸」
ヲ實施シタ。一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二日、法律
ヲ決後、国防ノ為、增加ノ一路ヲ此ル軍需資材輸
出ニ對シテ制限カ加ヘラレタ。

此等ノ對策ハ、又日本ノ侵略的ナ行キ方ニ對スル防
止策トシテ、且又我々ノ反對表示トシテ意圖セシ
タモノテアツタノテアル。

（オ七卷 オ一〇八九頁乃至オ一〇九〇頁）

此ノ期間中、合衆國ハ、中國ニ對シ、實行シ得ルアラ
ニル援助ト激勵ノ手ヲ益々ノル方針ヲトツタ。此ハ、中國
ニ對スル日本ノ侵略並ニ日本ノ米國權益侵害ニ對スル抗
議ニ於テノ外交的行動ヲ始メ、色々ナ異ハツテ形式デ
行ハレタ。大約合計ニ億弗ニ上ル貸付ト「クレディット」
ガ、中國ノ經濟機構支持ト中國ノ軍需品獲得ヲ
容易ナラシムル為トニ提供サレタ。而シテ、後ニハ貸付

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武器及び其、他ノ軍需品が、日本ニ對スル中國ノ抵抗ニ使用スル為、送ラレタリ。

(才之卷才一〇九一頁)

此ノ年月、間中、我々ハ、日本政府ノ前ニ此等ノ主義原則ヲ出来得ル限り如才ナク、且熱心ニ掲ゲテ来、且常ニ脅迫シナイ様ニ注意ラレテ来タリ、才アワタ、私ハ若シ一國ノ政府が、脅迫ヲスレバ、同政府ハ何時才モ直グ之ヲ支持スル覚悟ナサケレバ才アラスト、常ニ感じ才居タト、私ハ言ハタリ。我々ハ、短才直入才アワタガ、然シ出来得ル限り如才ナク振舞ハタリ。

以下次頁

No 3

(第七卷重一〇一頁乃至一〇二頁)

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太平洋全地域情勢、平和的ニシテ公平且安定的解決ヲ實現スルニ出来ル限リ、努力ヲシヨウト我々ハ思ツテ居ル。斯カル方策ハ、米國民、傳統的態度及ビ信念ニ致シテ居タリ且又、大統領ト私トハ、米國ノミナラス侵略ニ抵抗スル多ク、他國々ニモ緊要ヲ防禦ス軍備増進ニ時向ヲ得レトコトが絶体ニ必要ナルト我々ニ強調シ續ケタ我々が最高軍部当局勸告ヲ絶エ甚ダ深ク念頭ニ置イテイサーデアッタソレ故ニ日本政府ト会谈ヲ開始セントス我々決意ハ、自衛ノ為、再武装ニ必要ニ、合致シテ居タリテアル。

大統領ト私ハ、日本政府ハ、ヨシ願フテモ、日本ノ侵略政策ヲ突然ニ變更スルコトハ出来ナイコトヲ篤ト了解シテ居ル。日本ノ立場ノ建直シニハ多クコトが関係シテ居ル故、平和的政策ヲ採ルトノ約束ヲ日本が具體的ニ履行スルニハ多大ノ時向ヲ要スルト云フコトヲ我々ハ了解シテ居ル。

ソレ故ニ我々ハ日本ヲ説イテソノ侵略政策カラ転ジラセシ様、辛橋強ク努力シヨウト覚悟シテ居タリテアル。我々ハ喧嘩腰デハイカフタガ、然シ日本ノミナラス全國家ニ我々が通用シタ根本原則ニ基礎的立場ヲ守ラウト決意シテ居タリテアル。

(第七卷重一〇一四頁乃至一〇一五頁)

No 4

從ツテ一九四四年ノ昭和十六年ノ七月二十六日、コロリス

ベルト大統領ハ、在米ノ支那及ビ日本ノ資産ノ凍結
 実施命令ヲ發シタ。同命令ニ支那又ハ日本ノ權益、
 關係一切ノ經濟取引及ビ輸出入貿易ノ取引ヲ
 政府ノ管理下ニ置イタ。此趣旨トスルコロハ、日米貿易
 易ヲ凍カニ事實上停止セシムニアツタ。

八月六日、日本大使ハ、印度支那ノ中立南スル大
 統領ノ提議ニ答ルニ爲、モト稱シ提議ヲ出シタ。實
 質的ニハ、日本ノ右提議ハ、次ノ通りデアツタ。

一、日本政府ハ、西南太平洋地域ニ軍隊ヲ駐屯
 セシムルコトヲ差控ヘ、支那事變解決後ハ佛
 領印度支那ヨリ撤兵シ、フィリピンノ中立性ヲ
 保障シ、又東亞細亞ニ於テ合衆國ニ必須ノ資
 源ノ生産及ビ獲得ニ協力スルコトヲ約スベキモノトス。
 又

二、合衆國ハ、西南太平洋地域ニ於テ其ノ軍ヲ
 上ノ手段ヲ中止シテ、同様ノ行為ヲ和蘭及ビ
 英國兩政府ニ勸告シ、西南太平洋ニ於テ日
 本ニ必須ノ資源ノ生産及ビ獲得ニ協力シ、日米
 間ノ正常ノ通商回復ノ爲善處ニ、日米及ビ
 重慶政府間ノ直接交渉招致ニ斡旋ノ勞ヲトリ、
 且日本軍撤退後ト雖モ印度支那ニ於ケル日本
 ノ特殊地位ヲ承認スベキコトヲ約スモノトス。

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九月六日、近衛総理大臣ハ、東京駐劄米國大使
トノ會談ニ於テ、本政府ガ日本トノ關係更新ノ
基礎トシテ先ニ述ベタル四原則ニ全幅決定的
斂見意ヲ示スモノナル事ヲ表明シタ。然シ、一ヶ月後ニ、
日本外務大臣ハ、米國大使ニ、是等四原則ハ、主義
トシテハ之ヲ受入レルモ、實狀ニ同原則ヲ適用スルニ
當ツテハ、或ル修正ガ必要デアラウト表明シタノデアル。

(一七七卷才一三三頁)

十一月三日及び十一月七日ノ電報ニ於テ、日本駐在
米國大使ハ、米國トノ戰爭ヲ不可避ナラシムル如ク
日本側ノ不意打攻撃ノ可能性ニ就テ警告告ノ
電報ヲ發シタ。

(第七卷第二三六頁乃至第二三五頁)

十一月二十日、日本、最後通牒及び我が回答
十一月二十日、日本大使及び末柄代、明カニ最終的
ナル提案ヲ私ニ渡シタ。私ハ政府、他、高官達同
様陸海軍省ヨリ提供サレタ傍受、日本通信
ヨリシテ、提案ハ日本、最後の提案即チ最後
通牒ナルコトヲ知ツタ、デアツタ。

同提案ハ以下、如ク書カレテ平ル。

一、日本及び合衆國政府ハ共ニ日本軍が現在駐
屯セル佛領印度支那ノ一部ヲ除ク東南亞細
亞及び南太平洋地区、如何ナル地域ニモ何等
武裝進駐ヲ行ハサル旨、約定スルコト。

二、日本政府ハ日華間ノ平和回復、若シクハ太
平洋地区ニ於ケル公正ナル平和確立ト同時ニ、
佛領印度支那駐屯中ノ自己ノ軍隊ヲ撤退
セシムル事ヲ約スルモノトス。

三、一方日本政府ハ後日最終協定ニ於テ具体
ナルベキ目下ノ協定締結ト同時ニ、現在佛領
印度支那ノ南部ニ駐屯中自己ノ軍隊ヲ同地
南部ニ移動セシムル用意アルコトヲ宣言スル。
四、日本及び合衆國政府ハ兩國ガ南領東印
度ニ於テ必要トスル物資ノ入手ヲ確實ナラシ
ムルヲ協力スルモノトス。

五、日本及び合衆國政府ハ、兩國ノ通商關係

ヲ資産凍結前ノ關係ニ復舊スルコトヲ相互ニ
約スルコト。

「合衆國政府ハ日本ニ要求量ノ油ヲ供給スルモトス。
「五合衆國政府ハ日華間ノ全面的平和恢復ヲ
計ル努力ニ害アルカ如キ手段及ビ行動ヲ差控ヘル旨
約スルコト。」

斯リ提案サレタル該計畫ハ合衆國ガ日本ノ要求
スル又ノ油ヲ日本ニ供給スル事凍結手段ノ中止合衆
國ノ中華民國ニ對スル援助ノ停止及ビ承認セラレタル
民國政府ニ對スル道義的乃至物質的支援ノ打切
リヲ要求シタモテアル。夫ハ日本ガ其ノ軍隊ヲ南部印
度支那ヨリ北部印度支那ニ移駐セシムル一項ハ設ケ
アルモ日本ガ印度支那ニ派遣スベキ軍隊ノ數量ニ就テハ
如何ナル制限モ置カズ又日華間ノ平和恢復若シクハ太
平洋地区ニ於ケル公正ニ平和確立後ニ至ル迄ノ其等ノ軍
隊撤退ニ對スル何等ノ規定モシテキナカツタノデアル。

東南亞細亞並ニ南部太平洋(印度支那ヲ除ク)ヘノ日本ノ
武装兵力ノ以上ノ増大ニ對スル約定ハアツタガ印度支那ノ
北方ニ在ル亞細亞ノ如何ナル地方トイヘドモ例ヘバ中國ノソヴエ
ト聯邦ノ如キニ於テモ前カラノ又ハ新タテ日本ノ侵略行動ヲ防
止スル何等ノ規定モ存在シテカツタノデアル。該提案ハ日本ヲテ
侵略ヲ放棄シ平和的方策ニ復帰スルヲ誓ハシムル何等ノ規定
ヲモ合マツカツタノデアル。

十月五日、末栖氏ハ單身私ヲ訪レ三國條約下ノ日本義務ニ関スル法式、
草案ヲ私ニ送リ、ソノ形式何等新タルモノ又ハ役ニ立ツモノヲ提供レ
タカシ、私ハ、末栖氏ニ全体トシテ平和的解決ノ主題ニ就テ更ニ何カ

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提案スニトカアルカト云々。末福氏ハナト答ヘク。

十一月二十日、我々ハ、日本軍ガ日本委任統治諸島、
 内、蘭領印度心臓部ニ取モ近イ地點、ハ、ハラオレ附
 近ニ到着シタト言フ情報ヲ得タト言フ報告ヲ知
 蘭カラ受ケタ。我々ハ、河内、及ビ、西貢、駐在領
 事ハ、日本軍及ビ軍需ノ大規模ナル印度支那
 新上陸ヲ報ジテキタ。吾々ハ、日本ノ傍受通信ヲ通
 ジテ、日本政府ハ、交渉ハ十一月十五日ヲ以テ、之ハ後十一月
 二十九日ニ延長サレタガ、打切ルベキコトニ決セリト言フ情報ヲ
 得タ。我々ハ、他ノ日本ノ傍受通信カラシテ、日本ハ如何ナル讓歩
 モテス意志ナキコトヲ知ツタ。此ノ事實ト十一月二十日ノ日本政府ハ
 コレ以上何等提案スベキコトナシト言フ事ヲ明カニシタ。私ニ
 對スル來函ノ陳述トテ考ヘ合セテ見ルニ、既ニ述ベタ通り
 十一月二十日ノ日本ノ提案ハ、事實上彼等ノ「絕對的最
 後提案」デアッタ事ハ明カデアッタ。提案セラレタ全係
 爭點ハ、日本ガ其ノ公言セル征服行動ヲ讓ルカ、或ハ我々
 ガ太平洋及ビ全世界ヲ於テ主張スル基本原則ヲ讓ル
 カデアッタ。一九四一年(昭和十六年)盛夏迄ハ、我々ハ日本ガ其
 ノ武力ニヨル擴張方針ヲ繼續スルニ決シタ事ニ十分満足
 シテキタ。我々ハ、彼等ノ我々ガ我々ノ原則ヲ固守シテキタ事
 ヲ明ニシテ置イタデアッタ。併シ、彼等ハ其ノ武力脅迫
 ニヨリ我々ガ威壓セラレ讓歩スルカモ知レヌトイフ機會
 ヲ購ケテ行動シテ居タコトハ明カデアッタ。彼等ハ充分武
 裝シテ居タソシテ我々ハ、彼等ガ時ト所ヲ擇ハスノ望ムトコロ
 ニ從ツテ攻撃スルデアラウト言フコトヲ知ツテキタ。若シ圖ラズ

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Doc 2007 (Forth Defense)

モ我々が其基本原則ヲ讓歩シタラハ日本ハ多分暫時ノ間少ク
トモ戦ハズシテ得ラレル利益ヲ我輩國スルノ時迄ハ攻撃シテカ
トデアラウ。我が國ガ日本ニ戦ヲ強制シタトイフ問題ハ全然ナ
クタル。問題ハ我が國ガ其ノ原則ヲ犧牲ニスル用意ガ
アルカドウカデアツタ。十月二十日ノ日本ノ提案ヲ受諾スル
トイフ事ハドウシテモ考ヘラレナイ事デアツタ。夫ハ合衆國ヲシテ日
本ノ征服及ビ侵略計畫ニ於ケル其ノ與國ヲラシメ、且
「ヒットラー」ト、合作ノ與國トシテシマツタデアラウ。夫ハ合衆
國ニ其ノ主義政策ヲ放棄セヨト言フ日本ノ要求ニ屈服シタ事
ト云フコトデアラウ。夫ハ威嚇下ニ我々ノ地位ヲ棄テテ淺クモ降服シ
タ事トモ云フデアラウ。情勢ハ危期ニ瀕シ事實上絶望的ナモノ
デアツタ。然シ一面ニ於テ我が政府ハ平和的解決方法ヲ發見シ余ヲ傾
注シテモ當國軍部長官ガ對抗準備爲時日ヲ要スルヲ強調シ
續ケテ存テ除テモアリ武カ衝突ハ之ヲ避ケ或ハ延引シ度ト意シテ本
ヲナシタ。處ガ他方日本ハ半ヲ見セヨト要求シテ存テテアツタ。事能
ハ此様デアツト即チ日本ハ其ノ要求ヲ讓ラズ威嚇シテ居リ我々國共
ニ主張ヲ固守シテ居ラカハ。外交ニ依リテ此ノ危期ヲ處スル機會ハ事實
上ナクテ存テ居リ。我々ハ果シテモ摺ミカカルト言フ所ヲ達シテ存テテ
ル道ハニシテ居リ。我が政府ハ解答ヲセスト言フ事ヲ出來タデアラウ。期
日本軍部ノ巨頭等ハ米國政府ハ解答ヲセズニテ他ノ採ルハキニ策
ヲ提出シヨウトシテイト國民ニ告グル事ヲ出來タデアラウ。我が政府ハ日本
ノ要求ヲモテテ拒絶スルト言フ事ヲ出來タデアラウ。ソウナル
ト日本軍部ノ巨頭等ハ全然虚構ナハアルニシテモ兵ヲ用
ヒテ攻撃スル口實ヲ與ヘラレル事ニナル。

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我が政府ハ尤モ十及對提案ノ提出ニ努力スルト言フ事モ
出来ヨウ。最後ノ道ガ我々ノ選ンカモノデアワタ。
及對提案ノ内容勘考ニ際シテハ、其ノ中ニ成立可能ナル暫
定協定ノ件ヲ含ムヲ極考慮サレタノデアワタ。斯カル提案
ハ、我が國カ何處カヲモ平和ニ關心ヲ有シテ斗ルト言フ事
ヲ示ス利益トモナラウシ、又日本人カ此ノ提案ヲ受理シテ
イ場合ニハ、幾分カ彼等ヲ象目ニサラス利益トモナラウ。
若シ之カ交渉延引ノ役ニ立ワタナラハ陸軍ニモ海軍ニ
モ準備ヲスル時ヲ與ヘタ事ト思フ。此ノ暫定協定案ハ、
大統領及ヒ陸海軍ノ首腦者達ニヨリ國務省内ニ於テ
十一月二十五日ヨリ十一月二十六日迄論議サレ又熟慮サレタノ
デアワタ。最初ノ草案ハ十一月二十二日ニ出来、修正案ハ十一
月二十四—二十五日ニ完成シタ。此ハ又英國、濠洲、和蘭、中華
民國等ノ政府トモ論議サレタモノデアアル。案出サレタ暫定
協定ハ合衆國及ヒ日本、其ノ國策ヲ恆久平和ノ方向ニ向ケルト云
フ相互公約、太平洋地區ニ於ケル武力進駐或ハ脅威ニ對ス
ル相互保障、南部印度支那ヨリノ日本兵力ノ撤退、日米間ノ
一定額自ノ貿易ヲ或特定ノ限度内ニテ再始ヲ認ムルヤウ兼
結令並ニ輸出制限ヲ米國側ニテ修正スル事、右ニ對應ス
ル凍結令並ニ輸出制限ノ日本側ニ於ケル修正及ヒ右方
策ト同様ノ方策ヲ濠洲、英國、和蘭ニ於テモ取ラセル
目的ヲ以テ各政府ニ交渉ヲ支事ヲ規定シテ中ナク、尚又日華兩
政府間、如何ナル取極メテ平和法律秩序、正義、原則ニ基クベ
キモノト事ハ合衆國ノ主要關心事ナラズ事ヲモ斷言シタ。

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同暫定協定ハ三月月間效力ヲ有シ更ニ延長セシ得
ベキモノナリト言フ規定カアワタ。

同時ニ此ノ暫定協定ノ非常ニ重要ト一部トシテ日本
人ニ公明正大ナル線ニ沿ヒ太平洋地區ノ了解ニ得ル
解決ヲ窺出スル基礎トモナリ得ル平和解決ノ大
綱ヲ考慮ノ爲與ヘル事ヲ提案シタ。十一月十一日極
東事務局ニ於テハ公明ナル線ニ沿ワタ提案ノ草稿カ
或ハ參考考トナルベキ事ガアルト考ル準備サレタノテ
アワタ。此ノ草案ハ他ノモノト同様交渉ヲ續行シ
(カクテ時ヲ得)モシ受諾サレバ米國ノ主義ニ適合
スル性質ノ了解サシ得ル解決ニ最後ノ導ク様ニ
トノ目的ヲ以テ作成セラレタノテアワタ。

此ノ草稿提案ハ私が四月十六日日本政府ニ提出シタ
原則ヲ始メ一般原則ノ聲明ト經濟政策ニ関スル原則
ノ聲明トヲ含シテアタ。此ノ草稿ニヨリハ合衆國ハ中
國及ヒ日本國政府ニ對シ平和交渉開始ヲ提案シ
交渉期間中ハ日本政府ハ中國政府ニ休戦ヲ提
議スベキモノトシタ。此ノ休戦案ハ日本ニ不公平ナリ
益ヲ齎ラヌモノト考ルラレタノテ削除サレタ。

余カ注意ヲ拂ワタ他ノ提案ハ、前日財務省ヨリ
受テ取ワタ全面的解決提案ノ草稿ニ基キ十一月
十九日當者ニ於テ暫定的ノ形ニ作成シタ修正案ヲ
アワタ。此ノ暫定的提案ハ陸海軍兩者ト審議サ
レタ。ソノ結果出来タ修正案ニ於テハ彼等カ異議ヲ説

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Due 2007 (For the Defense)

へ夕點ハ削除サレタ。

私カ考慮ニテ平々第三ノ提案ハ暫定協定アリ
ツタ。

十一月二十二日カテ同二十六日頃マテノ間ニ私カ日本
側ニ提出シヨウト思ツテ平々モハ我々ノ暫定
協定ト公明正大ナル線ニ沿ツテ太平洋地區
ニ於ケル全面的解決ヲ案出スル基礎トモナ
リ得ベキ平和解決案大綱トアリツタ。

其ニ番目ノソコテ一層廣汎ナ部分ハ十一月十一日案
及ビ十一月十九日案ニ示サレタ所ニ從ツタトコロモア
ツタ。

暫定協定カ尚考慮中アリツタ時私ハ十一月二十
五日ノ戦争會議ノ席上テ我カ國ト日本ノ國交
關係ノ危機ヲ強調シタ。

大統領、國務、陸軍、海軍各長官、參
謀總長、海軍作戰部長、ヨリ成ル戰
争會議ハ我々カ夫々ノ交際ニ於テ、夫
々ノ社會ニ於テ一般ニ論ジ合ワレ平々全
クノ情報ヤ意見ノ交換所ノ様トモノ
アリツタ。

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此等會議ヲハ特別ナ場合ノ事件
ノ進展ノ特ニ興味アル事ハ必ス論評
サレタ。

Dec 2007 (For the defense)

ソノ會議ノ席上私ハ日本軍部ハ既ニ攻勢ヲ能ク取
ツテナルト言フ自カノ豫想ヲ表明シタ。日本ノ指導者達
ハ決シテ必死テアツタリテアル。彼等ハイツ何時何処ニシテモ
突出スルカモ知レヌ、ソシテ私ハ彼等ノ計畫ノ不意ヲ突キ
ソウナ點ヲ強調シタ。余ハ實際ニ取後ノ段階ニ至ツタ事
ヲ感ジタ。ソシテ我が國ノ安全ヲ防衛スル任務ハ陸海軍
ノ掌中ニアルヲ思フタ。

十一月二十四日當省ヨリ通シテ「チャーチル氏ニ打電サレタ事通告
ニ於テ「ロースベルト大統領ハ我々ノ提案ニシテ暫定協定ノ
説明ニ附シテ「余ハ余リ希望ヲモツテ居ナイ、我々ハ此旨心ラ
クハ遠カラズ到ル本當ノ困難ニ備ヘバナラナイ」ト云フ
言葉ヲ加ヘタ。

十一月二十五日ト二十六日ノ夜私ハモウ一度我々ノ提案案特ニ暫
定協定ノ件ニ就テ考慮シタ。

余が既ニ指摘セル如ク十一月二十二日、二十四日、二十五日、連續セ
ル草稿ハ皆「(一) 事ヲ含ミテ(二) 能ナル暫定
協定及ビ(三) 原則ノ聲明ト此ノ適用法ヲ示ス例ヲ提案
シタ」モリテアリ、之ハ其ノ後「般ニテ條ノ提案ト呼ビレテモ
モリテアル。

余並ビニ我が政府ノ他ノ高官達ハ日本軍部が攻勢ヲ
能ク執カヲトツテ此ノ事ヲ知ツテ居タ。我々ハ日本政府ハ
期限付キテ始メ十一月二十五日後ハ十一月二十九日ニ延長シ
タガ、我が政府が彼等ノ十一月二十日ノ極端ナル最後の
提案ヲ受諾スル事ヲ要求シテ中々トヲ知ツテ居タ。

No. 14

No. 2007 (Fortification)

ソレ故に天統領並ニ他ノ高官達上同シク私モ又日本側が我々ノ提案ヲ受諾スル見込ハ非常中ニ薄イト判断シタ。

日本側ノ見タ目デハ暫定協定ノ容貌ハ日本ノ要求スル無限ノ量ニ比レバ非常中ニ制限サレタ量ノ棉花、油、ソノ他數種ノ物品ト云フ謂ハハ鷄ノ餌ノ様ナモノシカ合言ニテナク見ラレタデアラウ。

此ノ提案ノ暫定協定件ニ関シテハ殊ニ日本ニ對シテ假令制限サレタ量ヲモ油ヲ供給スルコトニ對シテハ亞米利加ノ輿論カラ廣ク反對ガヤルダロウト云フコトハ明白デアリタ。中國政府ハ強烈ニ反對シタ。他ノ關係國政府モ中國ノ見解ニ同情的デアリ。根本的ニ不賛成カ又ハ不熱心デアリタ。是等諸政府ガ協力シテ受レルコトガ此ノ計畫ノ前途ニ對シテアル。日本ト斯カル取極メテ締結スルコトハ中國ノ士氣ニトツテ大打撃ヲニルダロウト云フコトガ明カトナツタ。是等ノコトヲ考ヘテ見ルト、日本ガ此ノ暫定協定ニ同意シメウナ様子がケレテモ見エルト暫定協定ヲ進メテ行ク上ノ危険、就中、中國ノ士氣ガ抵抗ノ崩壞殊ニ中國ノ分裂スラ起ス様ナ重大ナ危険ヲ冒スコトニナリカネナク云フコトガ明瞭ニナツタ。ガカラ此ノ暫定協定ハ実行出来ナイダロウト云フコトハ完全ニ明カトナリカ。日本側ハ、彼等ガ包圍サレシムアルト云フ意味ノ宣傳ヲシテ居ツタ。我々ハ一方ニ於テハ此ノ攻撃ニ當面シ他方ニ於テハ我々が日本ヲ宥和スル政策ヲトル準備ヲシテ居ルト云フ攻撃ヲシタ。其ノ結果生レル混乱ニ鑑ミテ、根本的事項ヲモウ一方ニ述ベルコトガ大切ト思ハレタ。

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2016

我々ハ日本ニモウ一度、我々が總テ、國家ニ提言シタモ
、即チ平和的、互惠的且進歩的ナ線ニ沿ッテ、協
カスルト云コトヲ提議シテ筋書ヲ提言スルコトガ本末
タデアル。日本ハ何時デモ、此ノ種ノ筋書ヲ受入レテ
其ノ方向ニ動クコトガ出来タテアッタ。ソウスルコトハ、
日本ニトッテ未ダニ可能ナテアッタ。ソレハ日本ガ決ムルベキ
事柄テアッタ。日本ガソウ決ムルベキ願フタ我々ノ希望
ハ、事實上破ラレタケレドモ、平和的解決ノ凡ル手
段ヲ試ミ且盡ス爲ス。如何ナル努力モ惜ニテハナラ
ナイ、ト云フ原則ノ上ニ、我々ノ將來ノ会谈ニ於テ、大
キナ然ラシ単純ナ解決ノ一ツノ標本ヲ作り出スト云
フ形ニ於テ、此ノ非常ニ基礎的ナ努力ヲ進メテ行
フコトカ望マシイト考ヘラレタ。

上述ノ様ナ考エテ十一月二十六日ニ、私ハ大統領
ニ、私ッ日本ノ代表者達ヲ招致シテ、暫定的
計畫ハ見合セ置キ、此ノ大綱的基礎的ノ提
議ヲ手交スルコトヲ進言シ、大統領ハ之ニ同意
シタ。此ノコトハ其ノ日、午後晚ク行ハレタ。

十一月二十六日ニ、日本ノ代表者達ニ手交サレ
タ文書ハ、ニツノ部分ニ分レテキタ。

Oct 2007 (Forth Defense)

日本側ニ手交サレタ文書ノ最初ノ部分ニハ、口頭ト云フ記号ガ附サテアツタ。其ノ中ニハ、豫備合談デ探求サレタ目標、即チ若シ出来レバ太平洋全域ニ関係アル問題ヲ、國家間ノ平和、法律、秩序及ビ公正ナ處理ノ原則ニ立脚シテ解決ニ潜キ付ケルト云フ目標ガ簡單ニ再述サレタ中、原則ニ関シテハ、若干ノ進捗ヲ示シタト信セラレル旨ガ述ベラレテアツタ。日本政府ハ全般ノ平和解決ヲ目的トシ、會談ノ繼續ヲ希望スル旨ハ、日本大使ノ最近ノ言明ニモ言及サレテ中タ。

十月二十日ノ暫定協定ニ関スル日本ノ提案ニ就イテ、米國政府ハ全太平洋領域ニ亘ル廣範ノ平和案作成ニ對シテ、日本政府ト、會談ノ繼續ニハ凡ル機會ヲ享スルコトヲ希望セル旨ガ述ベラレテアツタ。十月二十日ノ日本側提案ノ若干ノ特長ハ、我カ國政府ノ見解ニ依リ、目下考慮中ノ一般ノ取極メ一部ヲ形成スル根本原則ニ抵触スルト我カ政府ハ述ベラレテアリ。各國政府ハ其ノ原則ニ關係ガスト宣言シテ平ルベシ。我カ政府ハ既ニ述ベラレタ基本原則ノ實際的適用ニ関スル意見ノ相違ヲ解決スル爲、尚努力スベキト提言シタ。此ノ目的ヲ念頭ニ於テ、

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我々ノ将来ノ会談中ニ解決セラルベキモノト我々ノ政府ノ觀察スル事案ノラ、事實上ノ例トシテ、全太平洋ニ跨ル大綱的テハアルカ、簡單ナ解決案ヲ日本政府ノ考慮ニ供シタト我々政府ハ述ベク。

文書ノオノ部ハ、二首ニ分テ居ル計畫案其物ヲ具体化シラモテアル。

才一章ニ於テハ、内國家ノ國家ハ、全太平洋地域ニ亘ル平和ニ向テラレタルコト、内國ハ其ノ地域ニ於テ何等ノ領土ノ意圖モ亦侵略的野望モ有セザルコト、及ビ内國ハ相互ノ關係及ヒ他ノ諸國家トノ關係ガ基礎ヲ置ク平和、或ル根本原則ヲ支持スルト云フコトヲ肯定スル政策ハ相互宣言ガ概述サレテアル。是等ノ原則ハ、次ノ様ニ述ベレテキタ。

(一) 總テ、國家ノ領土保安及ビ主權ノ不可侵原則。

(二) 他國家ノ内政問題ニ不干渉ノ原則。

(三) 通商上ノ機會均等及ビ待遇ノ平等ヲ念ム平等ノ原則。

(四) 紛争ノ防止並ニ平和的解決及ヒ國際狀態ヲ平和的手段トシテ法ニ依リ改善スルメニ國際間ノ協力及ヒ宥和ニ依ルル原則。

此ノ政策及ヒ原則ノ声明ハ、既ニ四月以來數回ニ亘リテ日本政府ニ提出サレタ、聲明ノ線ニ即シテキタ。

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第一章ニ又彼等相互同乃至他國及ビ他民族ト、經濟關係ニ於テ、自由經濟原則ヲ支持シ、適用スルト云フ相互誓約ノ規定モアツク。是等諸原則ハ列擧セラレテキク。而シテ之等ハ、通商、機會及ビ待遇ノ平等ノ一般的原則ニ基クモノデアツク。此ノ經濟關係ニ関スル相互誓約ノ提案サレタル規定ハ以前ニ日本側ニ提出セラレタソレノ線ニ即シテキク。第二章ニハ兩國政府ノ採ルベキ提案方策ガ概述サレテアツク。日本ガ全陸海空軍乃至警察カヲ中國及ビ印度支那ヨリ撤退スルト云フ日本側ノ保障タルソノ片務公約ガ暗示セラレテ居リ相互公約トシテハ次ノ諸線ニ即シテイタモノガ暗示セラレテキク。

(イ)主トシテ太平洋地域ニ關係アル諸政府間ニ於テ相互的不可侵條約ノ締結ニ努ムベキコト

(ロ)主要關係諸政府間ニ於テ印度支那ノ領土保全ヲ尊重シ而カモ該地ニ於ケル特惠經濟待遇ヲ求メ或ハ受ケル協約ヲ締結スニ努ムルコト。

(ハ)重慶ニ臨時首都ヲ有スル中華民國國民政府以外ノ在華政權ヲ支持セザルコト。

(ニ)中國ニ在ル治外法權乃至ソレニ類スル權利ヲ撤廢シ斯カル權利ヲ現有スル他ノ諸政府ノ之等權利ノ放棄ニ対スル同意ヲ得ルニ努ムルコト

(ホ)相互的最惠國待遇ニ基ク通商條約ヲ商議スルコト。

No. 19

へ各々ノ國ニ依リ相互ノ資産ニ課セラレタル凍結制限ヲ撤却スルコト

(7) 日本及び合衆國が各々資金ノ半分ヲ供給スル弗円相場ノ安定計畫ニ同意スルコト

(8) 当事國ノ何レカが第三國ノ一國又ハ數國ト既ニ締結セル條約ハ何レモ此ノ條約ノ基本目的ト抵触スルモノト当事國ハ解釋セザルニト同意スルコト

而シテ

此提案サレタ本協定中規定セル基本的政府經濟原則ヲ他ノ政府ヲシテ固守セシム様 当事國ノ勢力ヲ利用スルコト

十月ニテ今日 日本側ニ千渡サレタル文書ハ本復的ニハ長イ間我が國ノ對外政策ノ根本ヲ成シテ平ル諸原則ノ再述デアッタ。

本文書ノ含ム十ヶ條ニ依リ具体化サレテ平ル如ク極東ノ情勢カニ對スル是等ノ原則ノ實際的適用ハ上述ノ文書ガキ交サレル以前ノ數ヶ月間ニ行ツタ略式豫備會談中ニ日本側代表者ト爲シテ論議ノ線ニ沿ツタモデアッタ。

我が政府ノ提案ハ如何ナル友邦國家ニモ提出セントスル様ニ相互ニ有利ナ政策ヲ具体化スルモノデアリ同提案ガ爾後ノ會談ノ基礎トトルベシトスラ提議ト結び付ケラレタモノデアッタ

我が方ノ諸原則ヲ断乎トシテ擁護スルト云フ我

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Doc. 2007 (For the Defense)

々ノ計畫ノ最モ肝要ト事ハ他ノ諸國家ニ對シテモ
我々自身ニ對スルト同様ニ非常ニ有利ナ立派ト
計畫ヲ提言スル事デアアル我々ハ日本側ガ是等ノ諸
原則ヲ放棄スル様主張シタモ拘ラス 断ヤトシテ
是ヲ擁護シタノデアアル此ノ成行ニ對シ何等陳辯
スル所ヘイ。我ガ政府ノ提案ハ作成セラレルベキ計
畫ノ一ツノ事實上ノ例トシテ日本政府ガ考慮スル
爲候ガレタモノデアアル 夫レハ何レノ政府ニ依ッテモ
自由ニ提出サレル他ノ事實上ノ例ヲ排除スルモノデ
ハ丁カツタノデアアル
会谈ヲ通ジテ日本側ガ征服支配政策ヲ棄棄スル
事ヲ拒否セルニ鑑ミ我々ハ日本ガ本計畫ヲ受諾
スル見込ハ極ムテ薄イト云フ事ハ良ク承知シテエタ
ノデアアル併シ平和ノ可能性ハソレガ如何ナル微小ナ
ルモノニモセヨ探索シ盡サズニ措カナイト云フノガ政
治家ノ任務デアアル 此ノ精神ヲ以テ十月二十三日ノ文
書ガ日本政府ニ手渡サレタノデアアル

Doc. 2007 (For the Defense)

十一月二十六日、文書日、日本代表ニ于テ文書際、私ハ提案セル
協定ハソノ要綱中ニ誤解ヲ惹起スルカアルベシト云ヒ及ビテ
ナシケレバ、財政的協力ニ関スル實際的方策ヲ提供スルカモ知
ナシト述ベタルニ。私ハ更ニ加ヘテ、同ニ私ハ移民問題解決ニ
関スル私ノ希望ヲ大便ニ通告シタカ、今日迄情勢ハ私ヲシテソ
ノ希望實現ノ運ビニ至ラズテナシト白述ヘタ。

日本側宣傳ハ特ニ日本カ惨敗ヲ喫シ始メテ、我カ方ノ十一
月二十六日、覚書ヲ最後通牒ト稱シテ、夫ヲ曲解シ之ニ
虚偽ノ意味ヲ与ヘシト努メテ驚カセテハタイ。此ノ事ハ日本
國民ヲ欺キ軍國主義的掠奪ト膨脹ト對シ、彼等
支持ヲ得ルヲ虚偽淺薄ニ口實ヲ完全ニ利用スト
云フ周知ノ日本人ノ特性ト一致スルモノアリタカ。

七 最後ノ局面

十一月二十六日以後、日本側代表ハ彼等申出ニ依リ、大統領
及ヒ私ト教回會見ニテ平和的協約ニ関シテ、何等新展
開ヲ見セザリ。

十一月二十六日、日本大使ニ對シ、我が政府提案ノ傳達ニ次ギテ
記者團ニ、日本代表、是處ノ文書ヲ検討、為テ文書日、國
務省ノ一言更ニ依リ報知セリ。此文書ハ、彼等カ報知セリト
シ、依リ、最近數週間ニ亘ル會談ノ極點ニ至リテ再三反復ニ
照シ、記者團カ今ヲ熟知スルカ如キ、感振本原則ニ其方ニテ
アリタ。十一月二十七日、私ハ長時間、新聞記者團ト特別會見ヲ
行ヒ、ソノ席上、私ハ記者團ニ、彼等ニ与ヘレタ情報ヲ彼等自
身ニテトシ、或ハ權威筋ヨリ得タ事トシ、彼等カ利用スルニテ、自
由アリト告ケタ。

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Doc. 2007 (For the Defense)

私軍指導者道亨君日本同志者達が世界人ト事分テ有
 ス地球ノ約束カテ武カニ依テ征服スル計畫ヲ持テ中ニコトク最初
 ヲ念頭ニ置テナルト語ル又記者團カ之ヲ念頭ニ置テコトク
 私ハ提言シタ。彼等ハ此地球一帯ニコトクローガ歐洲カ行ッテ
 中ニト酷似シ各民族ノ政治、經濟、社會及道德事情ノ
 軍事支配ヲ強利スル計畫ヲ持テ中ニコトク。私ハ極東ニ於テ
 此ノ勳カ一九三二年(昭和十二年)三本式ニ開始サタト語ッ。天國
 際關係ニ於テ行爲凡ニ規準或ハ法律或ハ正義法則或ハ
 公正ノ不遵守政策ヲ伴フ。最初カラ我々ノ主要自由國家
 一トテ國際關係ニ於テ對スル見解ヲ支配ス基礎原理乃至
 原則ヲ存續スルニコトク希求ス。即ケ法ニ依リ統治、右國ノ自由ヲ完
 全ニ保障スル正義、道德及ヒ主義ニ其ノ一定規準ニ準據シ
 以テ法ニ依リ統治地國內事ニ對シテ不干涉主義他國ノ主權及ヒ
 領土保全不侵犯ノ保持、紛争ノ平和的解決、通商機會
 及ヒ關係ノ平等ヲ示ス。此等及ヒ之ト方向ヲ共ニス。其他ノ主義ハ、
 我々ノ外交政策行爲ニ於テ凡ニ激動ノ標準テアット私指摘ス。
 我々ニ世界カ益ニ國際的無政府狀態ニ向ヒコトクテ、タテ、シ等ノ主
 義ヲ存続サシムルニ他、諸國ニシテ等ヲ銘記カモ標カカシテ来タ
 我々ノ保全ヲ保障スル計畫カニ未タテアル。而シテ此ノ決ニテ
 容易ニコトクナカク。

No. 23

私一九四一年(昭和十二年)春平和問題ニ日本側トノ会谈問題カ
 起テテ事ト述ベリ、其ノ目的ハ全太平洋地域ニ関スル平和的解
 決カ可能カ否ヲ確カスコトデアリタリ。
 永イ間日本ニシテ相立スル團體カアツタト私ハ述ベリ。

Doc. 2007 (For the Defense)

ソノハ軍閥デ之ハ時ニ軍人極端論者ニ指導サレタ。彼等ハ一九三七年昭和十二年ノ支那事變ガ決定セタ時ニ權力ヲ握ツテ居ル様デアツタ。支那事變ノ進約ニシテ、日本ハ平和、法律、及び秩序ヲ衷心カラ愛好スル者ヲ代表トスルツノ反対團體ガアツタ。此ノ團體一部ハ個人的ニ武力及び征服ノ政策ヲ支持シタカラソレニ着目スルツトハ色々ナ理由デ時ヲ得テ居ナイト考ヘタ人々ヲ包含シテ居タ。此ノ團體ニ屬スル人々ハ支那ニ於ケル日本ノ不満足ナル經驗及び彼等ノ見ル所ニ三国協定下ニ於ケル日獨間ノ不満足ナル外交關係ニ鑑ミ日本ノ政策ニ反対スル傾向ガアツタ。私ハソレ以前ノ數ヶ月間ニ於ケル我々ト日本トノ會議ハ全ク瀟灑的ニシテアツタと言フ。其ノ期間中余ハ其地域ニ於テ利害關係ヲ有スル他ノ諸國ニ絶テ一般的情報ヲ傳ヘテ置イタ。

NO. 24
余ハソレ以前ノ約十日間ニ我々ニ提出セタ根拠問題及び日本ト美國ヲ含メテノ太平洋、他ノ諸國ト間ノ何等カノ平和的親善的關係ノ端緒トモナルデアラウト見解ト下ニ果ヲ出セル外ニ親密ニスルヲ提言意見或ハ方法ニ就イテ凡ソ局面ヲ探求シタニテ指摘シタ。私ハ會議中我々ハ幾多ノ角カカラ考察シテハナラナイト言フ。我々ハ政治的關係ノミナラス陸海軍關係ニ関スル局面モ考慮ニ入レナケレバナラナカウタ。其ノ例トシテ引継キ明日トウテ事ヲ事實ヤ事情カラシテ、日本軍ハ人員、資材、船舶及び凡ソ種々ノ施設ヲ印支支那ニ注イテ居タ事ヲ我々ハ數日モカラ知ツテ居タ事ヲ引照シタ事情通一ノ觀察者ハ南佛印ニ於ケル日本軍ノ數ヲ、十三万八千ト報告シタソレハ多過ヤタカ知キ。然レ軍隊ノ大移動ハ行ハレテ居タ。更ニ數日中ニシヤハ局辺ノ或地ニ對シ日本海軍ガ

Dec 2007
(For the Defense)

攻撃ヲ加ヘルカ知キイトノ報告ガアツタ。余ハ情勢ガ實際ニ多分ニ
日本軍人ノ極端論者ニ委ネラレテ居テリテ手ニ負ヘテラヌ内ニ事
態ヲ緩和スル機ヲ諒解ヲ得ガ爲メ我々ハ懸念命ノ努力ヲシテ
居ルニテハト記着箇ニ述ビツタ。

私ハ、印支支那ニ言及シテ、若シ日本軍ガ現ニ爲シワワルト
由トレル如ク十命十兵カヲ以テ同地ニ駐屯スルハ、彼等ハ對華作戦基
地ヲ持ツハカテナク南洋全地域ニ對スル明確ナク脅威トシテ述
ス。是ハ特別ノ危険ヲ意味スルモノテアルト知ルト我々ハ勿論
此ノ種ノ脅威ヲ避ケル爲メ凡ソル方法ヲ研究シタ。

我々ノ宥和主義ヲ責メ又或ル人々ハ他ノ諸國ヲ見捨テト云フ責メ也
此ノ両者テ我々ハ絶對ニ正反對ノ努力ヲシテ居タリケル。是等種々ノ
見解ハ總ヘテ善意ニテサレモモシキウテ、リ提言者達ハ何等
提言者側ノ罪ヲモウツタ。之ハ余ノ利益ニ無キトテハナク、狀態
ヲアツタ。

我々ハ日本側ト此ノ問題ノ諸局面ヲ解ク爲メ、全努力ヲ傾倒シタ。
我々ノ努力ハ、一般的協定ノ作成ヲ容易クナラシメル爲メ致サレタ。
我々ハ、會議ヲ中止シ、會議ヲ中断セシメザレトテ欲シタ。
然レ、從來多年ノ百々ノ聲明シ、実行シテ來タ基本
原則ヲ、常ニ完全ニ生カシテ來タ。

Doc. 2007 (For the Defense)

私ハ更ニ續キテ言フ。十一月二十六日東京ニ於ケル日本政
府高官達、古イ武力主義、宣言ト共ニ多大ノ混乱ト多ク、
附隨事項ヲ導入サシテ来タノテ私ハ情勢ニハツキリシタ見
透ラ附ケルコトガ重要デアルト考ヘタ。ソコテ私ハ基本的原則
ヲ再檢討再述シ、且是等ノ原則ヲ太平洋地域ニ於ケル廣
汎ニ基礎的平和的解決ニ論理的ニ含マレルベキ多數
ノ特殊條件ニ適用シヨウト企テタ。

我々ガ右會談ヲ繼續スル間ニ、凡ユル種類ノ提言ガアツタ
私ハ勿論我々ノ主張スル總ベテノ主義ノ完全ナル保持ヲ期
シツ、一般的協定ヲ期待スル會談ヲ容易ニ存續セシム且
若シ出来ルナラバ、促進スルモノデアルカドウカノ觀點カラ總テ提
言ヲ考慮シタト述ベタ。私ハ總ベテノ可能ナルモノヲ檢討シヤウ
ト努メタ、デアルガ、然レ會談及ビ平和ニ関スル一般的協定
ヲ求メントスル努力ノ停止ヲ企圖スルカ如キ提案ノ考慮ヲ
常ニ省クヤウニ努メタ。

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私ノ十一月二十六日日本側ニ與ヘタ基礎ニ彼等ガ再ビ歸
ツテ更ニ會談スルコトヲ私ガ期待スルカドウカト一記者
ノ質問ニ對シ私ハ知ラナイガ私ガ既ニ述ベタ様ニ日本側
ハソウシナイカモシレナイト述ベタ。私ハ彼等ガ行ツテ居
軍事行動ニ言及シテ記者達ハ日本側カ右會談ヲ
再開スル考ヘカアルカドウカヲ知り度イカラウト考ヘルト
述ベタ。

我が政府ノ政策ノ根本的原則ニ一致セシメル為ニ日本
ハ南方ニ派遣シツ、アル軍隊ヲ撤退セシメル必要カアル

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カドウカトノ次、質問ニ答ヘテ、私ハ「然リ」ト云ツタ。更ニソ
レハ日本軍隊ノ中国及ビ印度支那カラノ撤兵ヲ意
味スルモノデアリカト、質問ニ答ヘテ、私ハ一九三七年昭
和十二年ノ聲明シタ我々ノ綱領ハ勿論ソレヲ全部網
羅スルモノデアルト述べタ。中国カラ軍隊ヲ撤退サセ
ル問題ハ論争ノ骨子デアッタ。

日本が我々ノ原則ヲ受諾シ且又會談ヲ續行
スル為ノ基礎ヲ與ヘル迄ニ行ク望ミハナイト云フ臆斷
ハ正シイカトノ質問ニ答ヘテ、私ハソノ可能性ハ常ニアルカ
トノ程度ノ公算ガアルカハ云ヘナイト述べタ。

日本が樞軸カラノ離脱ニ顧トシテ應ジナイコトが立
證サレタカトノ質問ニ對シテ、私ハ日本ハ今尚樞軸ニ
加盟シテ居ルト答ヘタ。

事態ハ日本側カラ言葉ヨリモ、寧ロ行動ヲ必要
トスルカトノ質問ニ答ヘテ、私ハ之ハ疑モナクサウデア
ルカ、実行ニ移スノニ必要ナル或ル種ノ了解ニ達
スルニハ第一ニ言葉カ必要デアルト述べタ。

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是等南方之軍事行動ヲ日本側ハ如何ニ説明スルカト
ノ質問ニ對シテ、私ハ彼等ハ説明シテイト答ヘタ。

十一月廿八日ノ戦争會議テ私ハ我々が日本側ニ提テシタ十月
廿六日ノ提案ヲ吟味シ、且又日本トノ了解ヲ達成セラレル可
能性ガ殆ンド無イコトヲ指摘シタ。私ハ私見テハ日本ハ何時征
服ノ新行動ヲ起スカモ知レナイコト、且又我が國ノ安全、自
衛ハ陸海軍ノ手ニ存スルコトヲ強調シタ。私ハ我國ノ軍事
的防禦計畫ハ日本側ガ奇襲ヲ其ノ戰略ノ中樞矣トシ、
且又防禦更ビ調整ヲ攪乱スル目的ヲ以テ各要所ヲ同時ニ
攻撃スルカモ知レナイト云フ假定ヲ含ムベキテアルトイフ私ノ判
断ヲ相尋ノ敬意ヲ表シテ南陳シタ。

十一月廿九日、私ハ英大使ニモ大体同様ノ意見ヲ述ベタ。
私ハ當時ハ終始私ヲ接シタ多ク教ノ人々ニ同様ノコトヲ述ベタ。

十一月二十五日、印及支那ノ河内駐在ノ米國領事ハ日本
ハ十二月一日頃「グラ」半島ニ攻撃ヲ開始スル豫定アルト、
報告ヲ本省ニ通知シテ來タ。彼ハ又更ニ之マデ時々報告シ
タ上陸ニ加ヘテ新タル部隊並ビニ軍需品ノ印及支那上
陸ヲ報告シテ來タ。

十一月二十六日ハ「サイゴン」駐在ノ米國領事ハ同月概報ノ到
着部隊ノ補充トシテ更ニ南印及支那ニ日本ノ大増援部
隊ガ到着シタ事ヲ報告シテ來タ。十一月二十九日、國務省ハ
東南亞細亞ニ於ケル諸先機関ニ對シ、今後陸海軍ノ行
動ニ關スル情報ハ直接「マニラ」ノ合衆國亞細亞艦隊司令長

官宛打電スル様訓令シテ。

十一月三十日英國大使ハ、英國ハ日本ガ「シヤム」ヲ攻撃チセント
シテ居リ、此ノ攻撃ハ「アラ」地峽ノ戰略的重要地莫ク奪取セ
ムトスル海上遠征ヲモ含ムモ「アム」ト云フ重要ナル徵候ヲ得
テキルト私ニサレタリ。

十一月三十日ノ兵條首相ハ大政翼賛會及ビ大日本輿論同
盟主催ノ國民大会ニ連ツテ祝辭ノ中テ次ノ如ク述べタリ。

「蔣政権ハ或ハ英米ノ煽動ニ左右セラレ、或ハ共産黨ノ宣傳
ニ踊リ、シナリニ抗戦ヲ叫ビ前途有沙キ、昔々年ヲ宣エシテ
大北セシメツツアルトハ大亞細亞民族ヲシテ相食マシメソノ間隙
ニ乘レ英米兩國ガ「アジア」制覇ノ野ハヲ逞シウセントスルモ
「アム」ツテカクノ如キハ由來英米兩國ノ常套手段トスルトコロ
デアル。

我々人類ノ名譽ノ為ニ人類矜持ノ為ニ斷ジテコレヲ徹底
的ニ排撃シテケレバナラズ。

ソノ日即チ十一月三十日ノ日曜日ニ、日本ノ總理大臣ノ好戰的声
明ト極東状況ノ重大化ニ関シ我が軍部ト協議ノ後、私ハ
「アム」ニ「スプリングス」ニ居テ大統領ニ電話ヲ掛ケ「フレントン」
帰還ノ日ヲ繰リ上げル様ニ勸メタリ。依ツテ大統領ハ十二月
一日「フレントン」ニ帰還シタリ。

十二月二日大統領ハ印支那ニ於ケル日本軍隊ノ繼續的移動理
由ニ對シ日本大使並ニ來栖氏ニ直ニ面會シ訊ス様指令シタリ。

十二月三日ノ記者團トノ會見ニ於テ私ハ十一月二十七日ニ私ガ言及シテ
諸君ノ或部分ニ突シモウ一層吟味シタリ。私ハ十一月カラ豫備
的ニ他ノ方法ニテモ問題ヲ決定スル占大ニ付何等ノ進捗
ヲモ見テ居ナイト云ツタリ。

十二月五日、日本大使が訪レ十二月二日、大統領、
質問ニ對スル回答ヲ提出シテ、ソレハ日本増援部
隊、中國ト境ヲ接スル地域ニ在ル中國軍ニ對ス
ル警戒的措置トシテ、印度支那ニ派遣セラレタト
言フ尤モラシイ聲明ヲ含ンデ居ル。

十二月六日、我が政府ハ輸送船三十五隻巡洋
艦八隻及ビ駆逐艦二十隻ヨリ成ル日本艦隊
、印度支那カラコラレ海峡へ、移動、報告
ヲ数テ、筋ヲ受ケテ、コレハ長、間脅威シテ
日本、南方へ、武力ニ依ル膨張運動ガ進行
中デアルトト、確證デアツテ、合衆國及ビ其、友邦
ヲ共通、差迫ツテ危険ニ置ク、此、進展、危
急的性質ハ我々全部、念頭ニ深ク置カレ又當
日及ビ其、翌日、陸海軍代表ト私ト、會談、主
題デアツテ、

十二月六日、トルズヴェルト大統領ハ日本天皇ニ宛
テ、事態、悲劇的可能性ヲ避クルべク直接懇
請ヲ打電シタ。

十二月七日、日本軍ハ真珠湾ヲ攻撃シタ。
真珠湾ニ於テ極点ニ達シテ危急、數年間待ニ
最後、數ヶ月間ニ於テ、大統領、國務長官、陸海兩
長官並ニ軍部首腦者、相互ニ絶エズ接觸ヲ保
ツテ、末々、情報及ビ意見、交換ハ最も自由ニ行ハレタ。
電話ヲ取上テ呼出人ガ相手方ニ狀勢ニ何カ新シ

重要ナルハナキト奪ネズ、又呼出人が持ッテ居ル新ニイ
 情報ヲ傳ヘル等我々ハ之ヲ通例セワテ来リテ
 アツタ。是等、情報及ビ意見、交換ハ閣議及
 ビ一九四一年（昭和十六年）秋中ニ開カレテ戰
 争會議、會合並ニ他、数多、會談ニ於テ論
 議セラレヌモ、外ニ行ハレヌイデアル。

一九四一年／昭和十六年／十一月二十日カラ十二月
 七日ニ至ル特ニ危急デアツテ期間中、我が陸海
 軍兩省、將校ト保ツテ接觸、例證トシテ私ハ
 私事務室ニ於テ記入シテ月日、用務簿カラ
 作成シテ是等、代表者達ト語ツテ時、記録
 ヲ添附スル（附屬書類A）。ソ、記録ハ勿論
 完全デハナイカモシレナイ。

更ニ私ハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十月カラ一九
 四一年／昭和十六年／十二月七日迄ニ私ガ陸海
 軍兩省、代表者ト談合セル時、記録、報告
 書ヲ添附スル（附屬書類B）

私ハ更ニ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）乃至一九四
 一年／昭和十六年／間ニ國務省ト陸海軍
 兩省ト、間、接觸ニ関スル取極、報告書ヲ
 添附スル

（附屬書類C）。（以下次頁へ）

以上ニ依ッテ私ハ我ガ國ト日本トノ間ニ起ツタ
事項、特ニ此、共同委員會、質問ニ關係ス
ル事項ヲ簡單ニ述ベ且今折シヨウト努ムノ若
シ我ガ國ノ關係中此、陳述ニ洩レテナル部分
ニ関シ私ガ明ラカニスル事、出来ルモイガアルヲ私
ハ喜ンデ、レヲシタイ。

(第七卷 第二八九乃至二九〇頁)

「ゲゼル」氏一抜テ丁度其ノ頃「スチムソン」長官
ハ十一月二十五日ニ白亞館ガ會議ガアツクト
報告シテナル、ソノ會議ニハ、貴殿「ワフラス」長
官「スチムソン」氏「モーシヤル陸軍大將」「スターク」
海軍大將ガ出席シタ。彼ハ其處テ次ノ如ク云
ツテ居ル。

「大統領」ハ日本側トノ關係ヲ持テガシタ。彼ハ
オソラク、若シカシクラ来週ノ月曜日ニテモ我
ルハ攻撃ヲサレルカモ知レヌ場合ヲ持出シタ。何故
ナラバ日本人ハ豫告ヲシニ攻撃スルコトニ有名ニ
ナルカラ、ソシテ問題ハ我々ハ何ヲ爲スベキヤ、アツ
我々ハ一般問題ニ関シ協議シタ。

貴殿ハ其ノ時或ハ其頃一般問題ニ關シ如何ニスベキカ
 ト云フ事ニツイテ戦争會議トノ協議ヲ記憶シテ居ラレシカ
 「ハル」氏 一其頃又其ノ後私ノ考ニテ居タリ主要点ハ
 日本カ如何ナル會日談ニ真劍ニ参加ヲ續ケル見込ハ殆ク
 無イト云フ事ヲテアツク我々ハ彼等カ最後通牒ニ決
 シタバカリナク二十五日ニ會談ヲ打テ切ル事ヲ命ジテ事
 ヲ俟受通信ニ依リテ知ワテキタルナルソレテ遂ニ彼等
 ハ二十日以後ハ速ニ答ヲ求ムルヲ殆ト病氣ニスル程ニ怯
 マレタ

（第九卷第一四七二頁）

副議長一ツルハ貴殿ハ十一月二十日ノ日本ノ提案ヲ
 最後通牒ノモノト考ヘラレタカ

「ハル」氏 一然リ。文書ヲモロ頭アモサウ言フツソレ
 テ我々ハンノ性質ソノモカラレサウトシカ考ヘラレタカ
 副議長一ツルコト十一月二十六日ノ貴殿ノ回答ハ何等
 カノ意味ニ於テ最後通牒ニアツタカ

「ハル」氏 一サア。本當ノ事ヲ云ヘバ我々カ此ノ席上テ
 辱々述ベタ通り我々ハ會議ヲ續行スル事ヲ非高クニ
 望ミテオケレ又我々ハンノ進ムル事ヲ望ム全ク動機ヲ
 持ツテ居タソレテ我々ハ之等ノ線ニシテ之ヲ國際
 關係ノ普通通商中ノ次第トシテ提案シタソレテ
 國務者ノ凡テノ人々大統領其他ノ人々ハ比白意見ガ
 一致シ居タト思フ又私カ云フ通り日本側モスガ二道ヲ

見出スコトカ云来タルハカナル彼等ハ唯 征服ト侵略
ヲモウ止マルトサヘ云ハヨカラクナルサウスレバ彼等ハ自勤
的ニ此等提案ノ受益者トナルコトカ云来タルカ
副議長一貴殿ノ十一月二十六日通告ヲ日本側テハ最
後通牒ト見ナシテ平ルト云フ情報ヲ受ケラレタカ
「ハル氏」暫クテ細工ヲテ受ケトラカワク 彼等ハ其ノ時
彼等ノ艦隊ヲ「ハワイ」水域ニ向ハヒテ居ク 彼等自身
會談ノ打ち切りヲ命ジタノカワク 我々ハ彼等カ所
時我々ヲ攻撃スルヤモワカラヌ事ヲ確信シテキタ 我々ハ何時
来ルカ人知ラナカク ソレハ完全ニ彼等ノ手中ニアラク
カ然レソレハ彼等カ彼等自身ノ最後通牒ノ影
響ヨリ避ケル為ニ陳腐ナ「此等待テト云フ詐欺
的叫ビナル」虚偽ノ捏造ニ着目シテテ始メテ判ツタノ
カらん 彼等ノ考テハ若シ自國民ニ偽ル事カ云来レバ
一彼等ハ我ノ國ニハカシ偏見ヲ抱キテナルカ又ハカシ
極端ナルヲ持テナル人々以外ニハ効力ガテイ事ヲ知
ワテキタカ然レシ彼等ハ一度「ヒトラー」カ彼自身
ノ計畫ト進路ヲ守リ、偽装セラル為ニ、彼ノ侵略軍
ヲシテ次カラ次ヘト偽リテ信セシメタト同様ニ此ノ本ヘテ
自國民ニハ認メカセルコトカ云来ルモノト思フタ
日本ノ言ヒ此レハ世界ノ他ノ部分デハ少數ノ人々ニ取
リアケラレ且信シラセテトモソレハ大ニテ範圍ヲナ
カク