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INTERROGATION OF
GENERAL SADAO ARAKI

Date and Time: 6 February, 1946. 1000-1145
Place : Sugano Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Present : Col. Thomas H. Morrow, USA } Interrogators
Elton M. Hyder, Jr. }
Denis Kildoyle - Interpreter
A. Mabel Kramer - Stenographer
General Sadao ARAKI.

Questions by Col. Morrow

Q. General, I would like to ask some more questions about some matters General Masaki referred to and people he referred to.

General Masaki was asked these questions:

"Did you know Kingoro HASHIMOTO?"

And the General replied:

"I met him several times but never associated with him, as I had nothing in common with him. Our ideas were wholly different. I consider him (HASHIMOTO) as my enemy."

And then the question was asked:

"Why do you think he was your enemy?"

And the answer was:

"As long as I was there, well, their plans could not be carried out. Whatever they planned they could not carry out with me in a position to stop them."

Q. I would like to ask you General if you know HASHIMOTO and what your attitude is towards Hashimoto.

(To interpreter - read that to him and tell him that is what prompted my question).

A. I know HASHIMOTO Kingoro. Our views differed considerably and

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I was never able to work with him. I never approved of any of Hashimoto's actions and violent methods. While I did not look upon Hashimoto as an enemy, he is not a friend of mine. During the last twenty years I have met him on very few occasions.

Q. What actions and violent methods of Hashimoto's do you refer to?

A. About twenty years ago, Japan was encountering great internal difficulties and Hashimoto advocated a general reform by force. I insisted that this was not the true Japanese way and we became greatly estranged.

Q. What did Hashimoto do, that is, what method do you refer to that he used that you disapproved of?

A. I think he advocated something in the nature of a coup d'etat.

Q. Then it was the military party that wanted to take charge of state policies, is that what you refer to?

A. I think they were mostly composed of the military but there were others connected with all these incidents, possibly from schools, farmers, workers, as in the case of the May 15th incident. However, I suppose military men predominated as force was required.

Q. How did you know that Hashimoto was concerned in these matters?

A. In April 1931 there was a conference of division commanders in Tokyo at which time rumors of general unrest were heard. I returned to Tokyo in August, 1931, and in October Hashimoto's name was definitely associated with a group of younger officers conspiring towards some end. I brought this to the attention of the War Office and warned them that it would be necessary to investigate this rumor thoroughly.

Q. Is it your understanding then that this was the same group that brought about the assassination of Premier Tsuyoshi INUKAI on May 15th, that you refer to?

A. I think they were entirely a different group. This was almost entirely the Naval Affair. OKAWA who is now here in Sugamo prison is held responsible for this May 15th incident. This matter was thoroughly aired in court and records should be available. No military officers I am sure participated in this incident but I think there were a few cadets from the military college.

Q. What violent methods of Hashimoto do you refer to? What did Hashimoto ever do that was violent?

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- A. While he advocated the use of violence, I can think of no actual example in which he participated.
- Q. When you spoke of Hashimoto's violent methods, you mean violent talk and not violent actions?
- A. He was unable to carry out his violent ideas.
- Q. Can you give me any instance of a violent action of Hashimoto's that you disapproved?
- A. No, no example. He was never able to carry his ideas out. I am sure he had plenty of plans.
- Q. Also - General Masaki was asked this question:

"In your opinion did what is known as the ZAIBATSU have anything to do with the first Manchurian incident."

And the answer in part was this:

"A group known as "NIKI SANSUKE" did all kinds of swindling and bad things in Manchuria. It was called this, because the members names ended in either "ki" or "suke" e.g.,

TOJO, Hideki
HOSHINO, Naoki
AYUKAWA, Gisuke

KISHI, Shinsuke
MATSUOKA, Yosuke

- Q. Will you please state whether you know what General Masaki refers to here and did he ever use that expression and what did this mean if you know about it?
- A. I think the five people mentioned were a group that attempted and did control Manchukuo, economy, but this was after the establishment of Manchukuo as an independent state. I cannot imagine that these people had anything to do with the planning of the Manchurian incident.
- Q. Is it correct that this was a common expression or nickname that was used at that time?
- A. This expression was being constantly used in the newspapers.
- Q. And what in particular did these people do that was criticised if you know?
- A. I think it was their efforts to control Manchukuo economy.
- Q. On what do you base your opinion?

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- A. Their efforts to impose a form of Fascist control on Manchukuo. This was definitely against my ideals so much so that I did not attend the Tenth Anniversary of the founding of Manchukuo and I did not attend the ceremonies and receptions in Japan.
- Q. Did the actions of those men come under your attention when you were War Minister in 1932, 3, or 4?
- A. Yes, because HASHIMOTO was sent to Manchukuo while I was War Minister. However, the actions that I was opposed to became apparent some years later.
- Q. Did any swindling or bad things come to your attention by these men when you were War Minister or when they were in Manchuria?
- A. Nothing special ever came to my notice, but later control over the soy bean producing centers was imposed on Manchukuo which I think brought great hardships to bean growers and I did not approve personally of this step. This control was effected at RYAN-ZAN, the soy bean center of Manchukuo.
- Q. Will you let Mr. Hyder ask a few questions General?
- A. Yes.

Questions by Mr. Hyder:

- Q. General, I asked you yesterday if you did not state that soldiers have always saved Japan, and to them shall fall the responsibility of quieting unrest in agrarian communities.
- Q. Didn't you mean and didn't you state later that these soldiers would establish Japanese prestige in Manchuria and Mongolia firmly and eternally, otherwise they might be forever deprived of the opportunity to extend the national spirit. And of secondary import - that these regions are economically inseparable from Japan and their natural resources are necessary for the existence of the Japanese nation?
- A. In connection with the first part - it would be easier for me to recall if I were to see the Japanese original. I think what I was referring to was that it was the duty of soldiers to help. I have always maintained that increase of armaments by the military should not be effected at the expense of the farmers and farming communities.
- Manchukuo and Mongolia are inseparable from Japan was the general view held by all Japanese at that time and I have no doubt stated that on occasions. I would prefer to see the Japanese original on this before I can give satisfactory explanations. The Vice Finance Minister TAKAHASHI and OKAKA have had similar views. Natural resources are necessary for the existence of Japan and this has been mentioned many times by many people.

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- Q. You believed that did you not General?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You stated that when you were War Minister, or words of similar import?
- A. As this idea prevailed over Japan I had the same idea when I was War Minister. At some time I would like to state my views more fully on this question as many things are involved and I would like to go back to the time of the first World War.
- Q. I shall be delighted to give you the opportunity of making a statement at the end of our interrogation.
- Q. General, you were not thinking of the farmers when you asked for an increase in appropriations to cover the army needs in North Manchuria in the Spring of 1933, shortly after you took office as War Minister.
- A. This was the first appropriation for the Manchurian Incident and was granted under emergency measures. I requested this expenditure with a view to making a quick settlement of the Manchurian affair as I did not wish to see it extended.
- Q. General, you ordered the despatch of the Staff of the 20th Division and another brigade from Korea to reinforce the garrison at Tsitsihar did you not?
- A. This was before my appointment to office.
- Q. This was in December - 27 December, 1931 - four days after you took office as War Minister.
- A. The first reinforcements that I sent were to HIAN-SHI. Japanese troops were already in Tsitsihar when I took office.
- Q. These were reinforcements.
- A. As War Minister I did not concern myself with operations and I have no recollection, but records will show. I think that reinforcements were sent to Tsitsihar long after I took office.
- Q. General, you obtained the Imperial sanction before these reinforcements could be sent and any other movements of troops, did you not?
- A. The General Staff formulates plans and refers plans to the War Minister and he in turn has to operate the government in connection with the funds. It is the function of the Chief of the General Staff to obtain the sanction of the Emperor in connection with operations.

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- Q. You obtained did you not the Imperial sanction for the advance in occupation of CHIN CHOW occupied January 3, 1938?
- A. The Chief of Staff obtained sanction from the Emperor for operations. The War Minister is not concerned with this.

Interrogation concluded 11:45 2/6/46
To be continued.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2341-2353, inclusive

2 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

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General ARAKI, Sadao

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SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Interrogations of ARAKI have been assigned following
document numbers: (All are from Document Division Exh.290)

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2341	5 Feb 46
2342	18 Jan 46
2343	19 Jan 46
2344	22 Jan 46 (A.M.)
2345	22 Jan 46 (P.M.)
2346	6 Feb 46
2347	12 Feb 46
2348	14 Feb 46
2349	15 Feb 46
2350	18 Feb 46
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2352	23 Feb 46
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Analyst: W. H. Wagner

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