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INTERROGATION OF

Sadeo Araki

Date and Time: 18 February 1946, 0930-1210; 1345-1630 Hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Sadeo Araki  
Elton M. Hyder, Interrogator  
Tatsuo Fujii, Interpreter

Questions by : Mr. Hyder

Oath of Interpreter administered by Mr. Hyde .

BY MR. HYDER: Mr. Fujii, do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

BY MR. FUJII: I do.

The October Incident was more or less a continuation of the March Incident. I think that since the March Incident came into an open conflict, HASHIMOTO concluded such actions could be taken to further any aims. I do not know the exact motive and plans of this October Incident since the plot did not materialize. I did not learn of the underlying motive. The Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff did the investigating.

Before, during, and after World War I, the militarists took a beating from the general public. Most of the soldiers were from farms and they were mistreated by the high command. Because of the fact that the farmers were taken into the army, they formed factions to better themselves. These young groups came to realize there was something wrong with the military system and the reason for this was the corrupt political system. Instead of protesting to the higher military officials, they talked to outsiders in the hope of getting aid to better their position. These young men decided they would be the ruling class in the army after the older ones had gone and felt it their duty to take over the military system and save the country from destruction. In that light, I believe these young officers had chosen me because I had no desire for prestige, power, or political influence. This is only my personal opinion. HASHIMOTO did not tell me why he had chosen me. CHO said nothing as to why he had chosen me. I had only sufficient time to tell CHO to discontinue the plans, and it was only afterwards that I heard that the plan was to make me Premier.

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Our ideas (ARAKI's and HASHIMOTO's) differed even before the March Incident, and since I was not here, I knew little of that incident. The differences were that I had been against the government system of the country and the use of the army as the commander pleased and the system of the army organization. By army organization, I mean the army was patterned after the Prussian form of army, and although the present army of Japan was an exact replica of the Prussian, the original organization differed greatly in that the German army was organized for the sole purpose of carrying out war, whereas, the Japanese army was organized solely for maintaining peace, rather than for combat purposes. Because the army had come to a point where they craved wars for the sole purpose of conquest, I had come to have differences with HASHIMOTO and his clique. For this reason, I suppose HASHIMOTO did not approach me before the March Incident and, I think, that HASHIMOTO had thought to carry out his plans and include me in them and set me up after the whole plot had materialized, then I would be in no position to refuse.

In the latter part of November 1931, I first heard from General MINAMI that I might be appointed a new War Minister. I learned officially that I was to be the War Minister when INUKAI told me. There were two of us considered at the time. General ABE may have been the other man.

The WAKATUSUKI Cabinet fell because the parties were not in accord. ADACHI and KUWANA had different views. This is what I heard. I do not know the real reason. My appointment as War Minister was suggested by the War Minister and through the suggestion of the Big Three, KANAYA (Chief of the General Staff) and General MUTO (Inspector General of Military Training) and MINAMI (War Minister) the choice was submitted to the party, then to the new Premier.

I have heard of the Japanese official report of the Mukden Incident, but I have never seen it. The commanding general of the Kwantung Army could only have ordered the advance of the Japanese troops and the occupation of Mukden. There were no orders from Tokyo. Lesser officers on such short notice could have ordered an advance and later reported to the commanding general.

In 1931 we were very uneasy about the movement of forces of Russians in Siberia. They had moved many of their troops to the Eastern Coast of Siberia in that year. Our forces were of Pre-World War days. At that time, we were not afraid of Russia, but we were uneasy. Manchuria was considered as a buffer because if the Russians should take Manchuria, it would be dangerous to Japan.

General MINAMI was supposed to have approved or disapproved of the Mukden Incident, but he was not a man who set down policy in a clear cut fashion. He let things slide. The reason Lieutenant General MAZAKI was sent to Taiwan and General HONJO to the Kwantung Army was because MAZAKI was a senior officer. The staff of the Kwantung Army could have requested whomever they desired, but they had to have the approval of the War Minister, who could, if there was a preference, send the man desired.

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General HAYASHI tried to send one mixed brigade from Korea to Mukden September 19, 1931, without permission. It caused an incident. This was stopped - but later official sanction by MINAMI and KANAYA was given. Before the removal of troops there has to be an Imperial sanction, but these troops were moved by General HAYASHI without sanction. This was called the Etsukio (Crossing the Border) Incident. The sanction of the Emperor was obtained immediately.

I believed that the natural resources of Manchuria and Mongolia were necessary for Japan and her population in 1930 and 1931.

I held army maneuvers in 1932 and 1933 directly opposite Russian ports at Bladivostak. At the time I became ill and resigned as War Minister, Japan was not in an internal condition sufficient to carry on a first class war with Russia. Military preparation for war with Russia was being made. Japan was behind in military standards and desired to build an army comparable with World War I days. Whether for war with Russia or not, is conjecture. Since Russia was the strongest nation, it can not be said preparations were for war with Russia. Outer Mongolia having been taken by the Soviet Union, it had a great influence on Japan in that if Russia could absorb the country without objection from other nations it could do so on countries closer to Japan. Preparation was for any eventuality which might arise.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Tatsuo Fujii, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the statements from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, and that the above statements, consisting of two and one-half pages are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of February, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Elton M. Hyder, Civilian  
Duly Detailed Investigation Officer  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, Elton M. Hyder, certify that on the 18th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me Sadeo ARAKI, and according to Tatsuo Fujii gave the foregoing statements set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

\_\_\_\_ Feb 1946

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Elton M. Hyder, Jr., Civilian

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE

July 5

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2350

TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SIGNATURE

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ROOM NO.

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*Original presented in  
Court*

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2341-2353, inclusive

2 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Transcripts of Interrogations of General ARAKI, Sadao

Date: (See Below) Original (x) Copy ( ) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, Sadao, et al

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression, Manchuria

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Interrogations of ARAKI have been assigned following document numbers: (All are from Document Division Exh.290)

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2341	5 Feb 46
2342	18 Jan 46
2343	19 Jan 46
2344	22 Jan 46 (A.M.)
2345	22 Jan 46 (P.M.)
2346	6 Feb 46
2347	12 Feb 46
2348	14 Feb 46
2349	15 Feb 46
2350	18 Feb 46
2351	20 Feb 46
2352	23 Feb 46
2353	25 Feb 46

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 2341-2353, inclusive.