

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

08 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative
FROM: OIC, CSRT (08 Feb 07)
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – AL HAWSAWI, MUSTAFA AHMED

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. These crashes and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2,972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

b. According to United Arab Emirates General Postal Authority records, the detainee opened a Post Office Box, number 19738, in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates on 24 June 2001. He opened the Post Office Box under the name Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi, date of birth 5 August 1968. He listed his home address as 103 Shaikh Sultan Bin Saqer Street, Al-Butheena, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. He listed his mobile phone as 050-5209905.

c. Recovered Western Union receipts show that on 8 September 2001, “9/11 hijacker” Mohamed Atta sent 2,860 United States dollars from Western Union, Safeway Store, 14100

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Baltimore Ave, Laurel, Maryland. The funds were received by the detainee at the Wall Street Exchange, Dubai, United Arab Emirates on 9 September 2001.

d. Recovered Western Union receipts show that on 8 September 2001, “9/11 hijacker” Mohamed Atta sent 5,000 United States dollars from Western Union, Food Giant Store, 1009 Fairlawn St., Laurel, Maryland. The funds were received by the detainee at the Wall Street Exchange, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, on 10 September 2001.

e. Recovered Western Union receipts show that on 9 September 2001, “9/11 hijacker” Waleed Al-Shehri sent 5,000 United States dollars from Western Union TravelEx #7201, Currency Booth Room 2250, Logan Airport, Boston, Massachusetts. The funds were received by the detainee at the Al-Ansari Exchange, Sharjah United Arab Emirates on 11 September 2001.

f. Recovered Western Union receipts show that on 9 September 2001, “9/11 hijacker” Marwan Al-Shehhi sent 5,000 United States dollars from Western Union Greyhound Bus Terminal #0406, 700 Atlantic Ave, Boston, Massachusetts. The funds were received by the detainee at the Al-Ansari Exchange, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates on 11 September 2001.

g. “9/11 hijacker” Mohammed Atta (Atta) sent the detainee a package with Fayez Banihammad’s Automated Teller Machine card and checkbook. One check was endorsed, but not filled in, and split from the checkbook. The Federal Express receipt for this package was recovered from a trash receptacle located at a hotel utilized by Atta. The receipt indicated that the package was sent to the detainee’s Post Office box in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.

h. On 11 September 2001, the detainee flew from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan via Pakistan International Airlines flight 212, according to United Arab Emirates immigration records.

i. A handwritten 19 page telephone and address book was found in a laptop computer case associated with the detainee. The address book contained contact information of numerous al Qaida operatives. The document was discovered where a senior al Qaida operative was captured.

j. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained al Qaida expense reports from February 2002 to April 2002.

k. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed information for the families of al Qaida operatives.

l. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed family information of 22 Yemeni al Qaida operatives along with the status of the operatives.

m. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained al Qaida expenditure data from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002.

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n. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained a list of al Qaida members who were killed or wounded.

o. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained al Qaida family allowance information from November 2002 to October 2003.

p. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed al Qaida expense reports from January 2002 to December 2002.

q. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed al Qaida United States dollars fund serial account information from 1 January 2002 to 15 May 2002.

r. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed al Qaida expense information through various incoming and outgoing rupee, Euro, riyal and dirham fund transactions for the period of 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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08 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (8 Feb 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – GHAILANI, AHMED KHALFAN

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On 7 August 1998, an explosive device was detonated in the vicinity of the American embassy building located in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, severely damaging the American embassy building and causing the deaths of at least 11 persons and injuries to at least 85 people.

b. On 16 December 1998, the detainee was indicted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, for his role in the bombings of the American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

c. The detainee purchased the vehicle used to bomb the United States embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The detainee supplied trinitrotoluene (TNT) and detonators, and rode in bombing scout vehicle which when recovered tested positive for TNT.

d. Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, who was indicted for his role in the bombings of the American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, identified the detainee as being a member of the group responsible for the bombing of the American embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998.

e. Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, who was indicted for his role in the bombing of the American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, stated the detainee

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brought trinitrotoluene (TNT), detonators, fertilizer and gas cylinders to the Ilala house. The detainee participated in the assembly of the bomb in a concealed truck at the Ilala house.

f. The detainee and a man named Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan purchased a 1987 Nissan Atlas truck during July 1998. That truck was later used as the bomb delivery vehicle for the bombing of the American embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

g. The detainee obtained a mobile phone in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, that was used as a means of communication between terrorist cells in Kenya and Tanzania. The last call from this phone was placed to Kenya approximately one hour before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. It is believed this phone was destroyed inside the bomb delivery vehicle upon detonation outside the American embassy in Tanzania.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – AL-SHIB, RAMZI BIN

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3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m. United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. These crashes and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

b. According to court transcripts and evidence from *United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui*, the detainee was closely associated with three of the hijackers responsible for the “9/11” attacks, Mohammed Atta (Atta), Marwan Al-Shehhi (Al-Shehhi) and Ziad Jarrah while they lived in Hamburg, Germany during the late 1990’s and early 2000. The detainee, Atta and Al-Shehhi are known to have lived at or frequented one particular address during the same time period, 54 Marienstrasse 21073, Hamburg, Germany.

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c. Airline and immigration records indicate that from November 1999 through February 2000, the detainee, Mohammed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah all traveled from Germany to Pakistan.

d. Sayf al-Adl is a senior al Qaida military commander with a long-term relationship with Usama bin Laden. Sayf al-Adl's role in the organization has been as a trainer, military leader, and key member of Usama bin Laden's security detail.

e. The diary of Sayf al-Adl was recovered during a raid in Saudi Arabia in 2004. The diary details the detainee's involvement in the 11 September 2001 terrorist plot and subsequent attack. The detainee is listed as a "highly professional jihadist" along with "9/11 hijackers", Mohammed Atta and Ziad Jarrah. The diary states that the three were briefed on an operation involving aircraft by Abu Hafs, a senior al Qaida planner. The detainee, Mohammed Atta, and Ziad Jarrah subsequently met with Usama bin Laden about the plan. Following the meeting, al Qaida began arrangements for the detainee, Mohammed Atta and Ziad Jarrah to receive pilot training. The detainee handled administrative details for the "9/11 hijackers" while they were in the United States and the detainee served as an al Qaida Europe based liaison.

f. The detainee was identified in a video tape of potential suicide operatives.

g. The detainee attempted to obtain a United States visa on four occasions from May 2000 to November 2000 for the purpose of attending flight school in the United States. Each application was rejected by United States Department of State.

h. The detainee attempted to enroll in the Florida Flight Training School, where "9/11 hijacker" Ziad Jarrah was a student. The detainee put down a 2,350 United States dollars deposit for flight training.

i. Ziad Jarrah repeatedly attempted to assist the detainee's travel to the United States and enrollment in the Florida flight training center.

j. The detainee also attempted to enroll at the Florida-based aviation language school.

k. The detainee, while in Germany, wired "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi (who was in the United States) 2708.33 United States dollars on 13 June 2000 via moneygram.

l. The detainee, while in Germany, wired "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi (who was in the United States) 1803.19 United States dollars on 21 June 2000 via moneygram.

m. The detainee, while in Germany, wired "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi (who was in the United States) 1760.61 United States dollars on 26 July 2000 via Western Union.

n. The detainee, while in Germany, wired "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi (who was in the United States) 4,118.13 United States dollars on 25 September 2000 via Western Union.

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o. In June 2002, the detainee was personally interviewed by Yosri Fouda (Fouda), an investigative journalist for Al-Jazeera television. The interview took place over the course of 48 hours in Karachi, Pakistan. Also present at the meeting was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), a senior al Qaida planner. Fouda conducted the interview in person with both the detainee and KSM. The detainee and KSM detailed how the “9/11 attacks” were planned and executed during the course of the interview. KSM identified the detainee as the coordinator of the “9/11 attacks.” The detainee displayed items he claimed were “souvenirs” of the “9/11 attacks.” The items included: an air navigation map of the American eastern seaboard, flight simulator CD-Roms and Boeing manuals and a flight instruction book the detainee claimed had “9/11 hijacker” Mohamed Atta’s handwritten notes. The detainee stated Mohamed Atta (Atta) left them in the Hamburg, Germany, apartment he shared with the detainee. The detainee stated that he later met with Atta in July, 2001 in Madrid, Spain, to finalize the operational details of the “9/11 plot.” The detainee stated he received a phone call on 29 August 2001 from Atta that gave the date for the “9/11 attacks.” After learning this, the detainee ordered active al Qaida cells in Europe and elsewhere to evacuate and then he fled to Pakistan.

p. An unsigned letter found at the detainee’s point of capture, and addressed to the detainee, asks follow on questions related to the detainee’s Al-Jazeera interview detailing the “9/11 attacks.”

q. An article from the London Sunday Times published on 8 September 2002 listed excerpts from a 112 page document entitled “The Reality of the New Crusaders’ War.” The detainee passed the document to Al-Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda with a request for the document to be translated into English and entered into the Library of Congress. According to the London Sunday Times the document is al Qaida’s written attempt to justify the “9/11 attacks” through Islamic teaching.

r. The London Sunday Times article published on 8 September 2002 listed excerpts from “The Reality of the New Crusaders’ War” which contained statements from Taliban leader Mullah Mohamed Omar and Usama bin Laden which encourages jihad in service of the ousted Taliban regime.

s. The detainee was captured in a safe house. Items also recovered at the safe house at the time of the detainee’s capture were high explosives, sheet explosives, a large quantity of improvised detonation devices, passports for Usama bin Laden’s family members, a handwritten note to a senior al Qaida operative, identification cards for a senior al Qaida operative, identification cards for Ahmad Ibrahim Al-Haznawi, a “9/11 hijacker,” and contact information for several known al Qaida operatives.

t. Documents captured in a raid of a separate al Qaida safe house were identical to documents captured along with the detainee. The documents included training manuals, security information and combat related subjects.

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u. Letters and personal effects of a senior al Qaida operative were discovered in the safe house where the detainee was arrested.

v. Letters found at the detainee's point of capture detailed a plan to egress Pakistan with forged identification. This plan was in conjunction with a senior al Qaida operative.

w. A letter captured on an al Qaida courier detailed a senior al Qaida operative's instructions to the detainee to identify operatives to send to the United States or United Kingdom.

x. The detainee wired approximately 15,000 United States dollars to Zacharias Moussaoui while Moussaoui was enrolled in pilot training.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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8 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (8 Feb 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – BIN ‘ATTASH, WALID MUHAMMAD SALIH

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On 7 August 1998, near simultaneous truck bombs were detonated at the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The explosion at the United States embassy in Nairobi resulted in the death of 213 people, including 12 Americans. More than 4,500 people were wounded.

b. Mohammad Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali (Al-Owhali) stated that in approximately June or July 1998, the detainee told him that his (Al-Owhali’s) mission was a martyrdom mission, where he would be driving a vehicle filled with explosives into a target which would result in his death. The detainee told Al-Owhali the target was a United States embassy in East Africa, but he was not told the exact country.

c. In 1998, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali was indicted in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, for his involvement in the 7 August 1998 bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Charges included conspiracy to kill United States nationals, conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim at places outside the United States, conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against nationals of the United States, conspiracy to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and conspiracy to attack defense utilities.

d. During the latter part of 1999, the detainee facilitated and participated in close-combat training which was held in the Lowgar training camp in Afghanistan. The graduates of the class

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TRIBUNAL – BIN ‘ATTASH, WALID MUHAMMAD SALIH

then met with Usama bin Laden who lectured about the operational details of the East Africa bombings.

e. On 12 October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked during refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden by operatives of the al Qaida network. Al Qaida claimed responsibility for the attack. Seventeen United States sailors were killed and 39 other sailors were wounded.

f. Stamps utilized on a forged Yemeni merchant's registration card, which was utilized by the detainee, were forged by a suspect of the USS Cole bombing.

g. A participant in the USS Cole bombing identified the detainee as someone he knew from an al Qaida training camp. The participant in the USS Cole bombing that identified the detainee stated an individual approached him with a letter from the detainee requesting assistance in facilitation of the USS Cole bombing. The participant in the USS Cole bombing claimed the only reason he agreed to assist the individual was due to the letter from the detainee.

h. The detainee went to an al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan in December 2000.

i. An al Qaida cell associated with a senior al Qaida operative used the code name, *father of the leg*, which was a reference to the detainee and the fact that he was missing a leg.

j. A notebook that was seized during the capture of a senior al Qaida operative contained a phone number that was also found in the stored memory of a phone belonging to the detainee.

k. The detainee's University of Islamic Studies identification card was found at an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan.

l. The detainee was implicated in a notebook containing account ledgers for payments made to various al Qaida operatives which was found during a raid of an al Qaida safe house.

m. A source that met the detainee in Afghanistan stated he also saw the detainee at al Farouq training camp. The source stated the detainee worked for an important person in al Qaida and the detainee was a body guard for Usama bin Laden.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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8 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (8 Feb 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – AL NASHIRI, ABD AL RAHIM HUSSEIN MOHAMMED

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

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3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. The detainee was experienced in military and explosives training, having participated in such activities during his travels to Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.

b. On 7 August 1998, near simultaneous truck bombs were detonated at the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The explosions at the United States embassies resulted in the deaths of 224 people, including 12 Americans. More than 4,585 people were wounded.

c. Mohammad Rashid Daoud Al-Owhali (Al-Owhali), confessed and was later convicted in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, for his role in the al Qaida bombings of the United States embassies in East Africa, which occurred on 7 August 1998. Al-Owhali obtained a Yemeni passport in the name of Khalid Salim Saleh Bin Rashid. Al-Owhali identified the individual who facilitated Al-Owhali's obtaining a Yemeni passport as *Bilal*, *Bilal* is known to Federal Bureau of Investigation investigators as Abdul Rahim al Nashiri, *the detainee*. Al-Owhali used this same Yemeni passport to travel to Nairobi, Kenya, arriving on 2 August 1998.

d. On 12 October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by a small bomb-laden boat. The small boat pulled along side the USS Cole and detonated. The explosion opened a 40 foot hole in the USS Cole, killing 17 sailors and injuring approximately 40 personnel.

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TRIBUNAL – AL NASHIRI, ABD AL RAHIM HUSSEIN MOHAMMED

e. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source identified the detainee as an important person in al Qaida and the source stated he heard the detainee helped arrange the USS Cole bombing.

f. Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi (Al-Badawi) stated he met the detainee in Aden, Yemen in the summer of 1999. Al-Badawi stated he purchased a boat for the detainee upon a request from the detainee.

g. Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi stated the detainee bought explosives in Sadah, Yemen and transported the explosives concealed in fishing coolers.

h. Approximately one and a half months prior to the USS Cole bombing the detainee explained the details of an operation in the port of Aden, Yemen against a United States Naval ship. The detainee discussed this operation with Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi (Al-Badawi). The detainee asked Al-Badawi for assistance videotaping the operation.

i. Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Al-Badawi claimed the detainee personally funded the USS Cole operation from the detainee's own sources.

j. Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Al-Badawi was tried and convicted in Yemen for his involvement in the USS Cole bombing. The detainee was tried in absentia in Yemen, convicted and sentenced to death. The detainee's conviction was later upheld following appeal.

k. An alias used by the detainee was found on a contract for the purchase of a vehicle in Yemen, which was used in support of the USS Cole attack. An individual identified the detainee from a photograph as the person who purchased the vehicle.

l. The detainee was one of the main suspects for masterminding the attacks on the USS Cole and on the French oil tanker Merchant Vessel Limburg in October 2002.

m. The detainee was identified on a leadership list for a scientific laboratory in Karachi, Pakistan, which was sponsored by Harakan Desturia Islamia, a Kuwaiti-based Islamic extremist group that raised funds for al Qaida.

n. The detainee was arrested at the end of October 2002 in the United Arab Emirates. When the detainee was arrested, he was holding several forged passports from several countries. The passports contained several different identities.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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19 March 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (19 Mar 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – HUSAYN, ZAYN AL ABIDIN MUHAMMAD [ABU
ZUBAYDAH]

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3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On 6 April 2001, a federal jury in Los Angeles, California, found Algerian national Ahmed Ressay (Ressay) guilty on nine counts of terrorism and other felony charges for what prosecutors said was his plan to bomb New Year’s 2000 celebrations in the United States. Ressay was arrested in Port Angeles, Washington, on 14 December 1999, after crossing the Canadian-United States border with a car allegedly loaded with bomb-making material.

b. Ahmed Ressay (Ressay) stated he attempted to enter the United States at Port Angeles, Washington, on 14 December 1999, for the purpose of placing an explosive device at the Los Angeles International Airport. Ressay stated he studied for the operation in April 1998, while training at the Khalden training camp near Khwost, Afghanistan. Trainers at Khalden training camp indicated that viable targets included United States warships, hotels holding conferences of VIPs, barracks of United States military personnel, commercial/economic targets, petroleum targets, and information/technology centers. Ressay stated Khalden training camp was one of many camps operated by the detainee.

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TRIBUNAL – HUSAYN, ZAYN AL ABIDIN MUHAMMAD [ABU
ZUBAYDAH]

c. Ahmed Ressam (Ressam) stated the detainee was the emir of the Khalden and Deronta training camps in Afghanistan, and did not have to report to anyone above him. The detainee was an associate of Usama bin Laden (UBL), equal to and not subordinate to UBL. The detainee coordinated and cooperated with UBL in the conduct of training and trainee movements between their camps, and every Islamic extremist group present at Khalden training camp had a direct relationship with UBL. The detainee corresponded with UBL mostly through writing and sending letters.

d. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated the detainee traveled to Saudi Arabia in 1996 and transported 600,000 United States dollars to Usama bin Laden. The source transported 30,000 to 35,000 United States dollars on eight occasions within and between Afghanistan and Pakistan for the detainee.

e. Ahmed Ressam (Ressam) stated the detainee was the facilitator of terrorist attack operations and that the detainee knew about Ressam's operation, although not specifically the date and exact target.

f. The detainee made a diary entry in 2000 in which he described plans against America consisting of explosions and the burning of cities and farms.

g. Ahmed Ressam (Ressam) stated the detainee wrote a letter in 1998 authorizing Ressam to take explosives manufacturing training at the Deronta training camp in Afghanistan.

h. Ahmed Ressam (Ressam) stated that in December 1998 the detainee wanted Ressam to acquire fraudulently-obtained Canadian passports in order for the detainee and a team of five other individuals to enter the United States to possibly bomb several cities.

i. The detainee made a diary entry in 2001 in which he stated within days of the attacks of 11 September 2001 he was preparing for counter attacks. The detainee stated he was working within a military and security plan that Usama bin Laden devised in anticipation of an American military action by buying and storing weapons and arming individuals as well as preparing defensive lines and planning ambushes.

j. The detainee made a diary entry in 2002 in which he stated he would wage war against the United States. The detainee stated he would use several dimensions such as instigating racial wars, timed explosive attacks, attacking gas stations and fuel trucks, and starting timed fires.

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TRIBUNAL – HUSAYN, ZAYN AL ABIDIN MUHAMMAD [ABU
ZUBAYDAH]

k. The detainee was captured on 28 March 2002 during a raid of a safe house. Gunfire was exchanged during the raid and the detainee received gunshot wounds.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (8 Feb 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – AL LIBI, ABU FARAJ

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.
2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”
3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.
 - a. The detainee was a supervisor at the al Qaida training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee assisted in the creation of an urban warfare training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - c. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated he met the detainee in July-August 2001 at the al Qaida guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The same source also stated the detainee managed the guest house, and the guest house also served as the Kabul communications hub for Al-Qaida.
 - d. The detainee was the supervisor of an al Qaida communications site in Afghanistan, in 2002.
 - e. The detainee was a senior al Qaida facilitator. His primary duty was the care of al Qaida families residing in Pakistan. Additionally, the detainee was involved in vetting and transporting al Qaida fighters to Afghanistan.
 - f. Individuals wanting to fight in Afghanistan were required to be sponsored by an al Qaida member and be interviewed by the detainee to verify their bona fides. Once the detainee, a former commander in Afghanistan, was comfortable with the individual’s background, the detainee would arrange travel to Afghanistan for the individual.

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TRIBUNAL – AL LIBI, ABU FARAJ

g. The detainee was the deputy to al Qaida's third in command and was responsible for al Qaida activities and logistics throughout Pakistan.

h. In December 2003, a large group of Islamic extremists; including the detainee, representatives of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and Taliban officials met in Raiwand, Pakistan and discussed operations against the United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan.

i. In September 2004, several members of al Qaida involved in terrorist operations, including the detainee, met in Syria to discuss a variety of terrorist operations, including planned operations in the United States, Europe and Australia.

j. A computer seized during the capture of the detainee contained manuals related to explosives, detonator circuits, chemicals, military tactics, missiles and tanks.

k. A computer seized during the capture of the detainee contained a detailed manual on fabricating and using circuitry for detonators.

l. An al Qaida and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group associate requested assistance from the detainee in acquiring explosives and weapons according to seized letters found on the associate's computer.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

28 March 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (28 Mar 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – AL BALUCHI, AMMAR

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. These crashes and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2,972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

b. On or about 10 October 1998, the detainee opened a bank account at the Emirates Bank International. The detainee provided a Pakistani passport with number *E911562* as identification. The detainee’s passport listed the name of the bearer as “Mr. Ali, son of Mr. Abdul Aziz Ali,” (*Mr. Ali*). The detainee provided, “MEC Ltd. Post Office Box 16958, Jebel Ali, Dubai,” as his address.

c. On or about 8 August 2000, the detainee opened a bank account at the Dubai Islamic Bank. The detainee provided a Pakistani passport with number *E911562* as identification. The

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detainee's passport listed the name of the bearer as "Mr. Ali, son of Mr. Abdul Aziz Ali," (*Mr. Ali*). The account documents listed the detainee's phone number as 0506745651.

d. On or about 18 April 2000, a person named *Ali*, sent 5000 United States dollars from the Wall Street Exchange Centre in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Adel Rafeea. *Ali* listed the Post Office Box and phone number utilized by *the detainee*. The identification card of the sender of the money, photocopied by the Wall Street Exchange Centre, further identified the sender as *Mr. Ali*, a computer technician of Pakistani nationality with the passport number E911562.

e. On or about 4 June 2000, "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta purchased a Voicestream Wireless pre-paid telephone in Manhattan, New York. The phone was activated on 4 June 2000 and de-activated on 11 July 2000.

f. Between 28 and 30 June 2000, "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta's Voicestream cell phone used a calling card to make approximately sixteen calls to the detainee's phone number in the United Arab Emirates.

g. On 29 June 2000, "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi picked up a Western Union wire transfer in the amount of 5,000 United States dollars at the Western Union facility located at 1440 Broadway, New York, New York. The funds were sent by "Isam Mansar" from the U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates on 29 June 2000.

h. On 18 July 2000, "Isam Mansur" sent 10,000 United States dollars via a bank transfer from U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates to "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi's Suntrust Bank, Florida, account (a joint account with "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta). The funds posted to the Suntrust account on 19 July 2000 less a 15 United States dollar fee. Isam Mansur listed the same Post Office box number associated with the detainee.

i. On 5 August 2000, "Isam Mansour" sent 9,500 United States dollars via a bank to bank transfer from the U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates to "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi's Suntrust Bank, Florida, account (a joint account with "9/11 hijacker" Mohamed Atta). The funds posted to the Suntrust account on 7 August 2000 less a 15 United States dollar fee. "Isam Mansour" listed the same Post Office box number associated with the detainee.

j. On 29 August 2000, *Mr. Ali* sent 20,000 United States dollars via bank to bank transfer from U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi's Suntrust Bank, Florida, account (a joint account with "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta). The funds posted to the Suntrust account on 30 August 2000 less a 15 United States dollar fee. *Mr. Ali* listed a phone number one digit off of the phone number listed by "Isam Mansour" on 5 August 2000.

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k. On 17 September 2000, “Hani (Fawaz Trading)” sent 70,000 United States dollars via a bank to bank transfer from the U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Marwan Al-Shehhi’s Suntrust Bank, Florida account (a joint account with “9/11 hijacker” Mohammed Atta). The funds posted to the Suntrust account on 18 September 2000 less a 15 United States dollar fee. “Hani (Fawaz Trading)” listed the same phone number that “*Mr. Ali*” listed on the 29 August 2000 transfer documents.

l. During an August 2002 Federal Bureau of Investigation interview, Abdul Samad Din Mohammed, told the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the detainee was in constant contact with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the detainee’s uncle. Abdul Samad Din Mohammed also stated the detainee would constantly receive Arab visitors from Pakistan at the Airport.

m. During an August 2002 interview, Abdul Samad Din Mohammed (Mohammed), stated the detainee left the United Arab Emirates on 9 September 2001 or 10 September 2001. The detainee did not have all his belongings together, but insisted on leaving. Mohammed asked the detainee why he was in such a rush to leave, but did not receive a satisfactory answer.

n. The detainee discussed the smuggling of explosives into the United States through an import and export textile company in New York, with another individual.

o. The detainee was arrested in possession of a compact disk which contained a letter addressed to Usama bin Laden. The disk also contained two photographic images of the World Trade Center when United Airlines flight 175 crashed into the south tower.

p. The detainee was captured on 29 April 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan, as he waited for the delivery of explosives for an alleged plot against the United States consulate in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was in possession of a perfume spray bottle which contained a low concentration of cyanide when he was arrested.

q. The detainee’s pocket litter included a letter from unidentified Saudi Arabian scholars to Usama bin Ladin. The letter discussed al Qaida’s strategy in the War on Terror.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

28 March 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (28 Mar 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – HAMBALI, RIDUAN BIN ISOMUDDIN

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On 24 December 2000, 18 people were killed in church bombings in Indonesia.

b. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated sometime around mid-2000, the detainee called a meeting to discuss an operation targeting churches in Indonesia and the Singapore operation against the United States embassy. The detainee argued that the church was not being used only for prayer, and was responsible for the unrest in Ambon, Indonesia. The source stated the detainee wanted the churches attacked on Christmas Eve 2000.

c. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated the detainee was hiding in Pakistan and Afghanistan since February of 2001 because he was involved in the December 2000 attacks on the churches in Indonesia.

d. The detainee supervised the plan to bomb the United States, Australian, and British embassies in Singapore.

e. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source discussed the “*Singapore plot*.” According to the source, in 1999 the detainee gave the source a map and videotape of the Yishan mass rapid transit station in Singapore, and asked the source to write a proposal on how they would make an attack. In May 1999, when the source finished the proposal, he showed it to the detainee in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The detainee liked the proposal and told the source to take the tape to

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Afghanistan. The detainee put the source in contact with a high ranking al Qaida operative so the source could contact the al Qaida operative upon his arrival in Pakistan.

f. The detainee orchestrated and funded the Christmas Eve 2000 simultaneous bombings in Indonesia.

g. On 12 October 2002, at least 187 people were killed and over 300 injured when an explosion destroyed a nightclub packed with hundreds of foreign tourists on the Indonesian resort island of Bali.

h. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated the last contact he had with the detainee was in mid January 2002, in Thailand. The source stated the detainee discussed carrying out attacks. The detainee's plan was to conduct small bombings in bars, cafes, or night clubs frequented by westerners in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The source also stated the detainee claimed he had one ton of explosives in Indonesia.

i. The detainee was the leader of the Malaysia Mujahedin group whose agenda was to topple the Malaysian government.

j. The detainee is linked to the recruitment of a foreign student organization in Pakistan called al Ghuraba, which was initiated to help develop the Jemaah Islamiyah organization in Pakistan.

k. The detainee was the operations chief of the Jemaah Islamiyah and its main contact and point man for al Qaida in Southeast Asia.

l. A document seized during the detainee's arrest provided instructions for manufacture of vest bombs used by suicide bombers.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

28 March 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (28 Mar 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – KHAN, MAJID

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. In March 2003, one of the detainee’s brothers stated the detainee was involved with a group that he believed to be al Qaida, and as of December 2002 was involved in transporting people across the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and points elsewhere.

b. On 1 May 2003, Iyman Faris pleaded guilty in the United States District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, to providing material support and resources to al Qaida and conspiracy for providing the terrorist organization with information about possible United States targets for attack.

c. In mid-2001, Iyman Faris (Faris) had dinner and spent the night at the detainee’s family residence in Baltimore, Maryland. Faris stated during this visit the detainee spoke to him about the fighting and struggle in Afghanistan. On a subsequent visit the detainee told Faris he met Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) in Pakistan and referred to KSM as his uncle. The detainee told Faris of his desire to martyr himself against President Musharaff of Pakistan by detonating a vest of explosives inside a building.

d. A computer hard-drive seized from a residence where munitions were discovered contained linkages to media seized from the detainee’s residence.

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TRIBUNAL – KHAN, MAJID

e. In March 2003, the detainee's father stated the detainee recently began to be influenced by anti-American thoughts and became extremely religious in his behavior. The detainee's father believed the detainee had come under the influence of family members in Karachi, Pakistan, who discussed anti-American feelings and could be very destructive.

f. On 23 November 2005, Uzair Paracha (Paracha) was convicted in United States District Court, Southern District of New York, on charges relating to his provision of material support to the al Qaida terrorist organization. The evidence proved Paracha agreed with two al Qaida members, including the detainee, to provide support to al Qaida by trying to help the detainee obtain a travel document that would have allowed the detainee to re-enter the United States to commit a terrorist act.

g. In February and March 2003, Uzair Paracha (Paracha) posed as the detainee during telephone calls with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, called the detainee's bank, and attempted to gather information about the detainee's immigration paperwork via the Internet. Paracha also agreed to use the detainee's credit card to make it appear that the detainee was in the United States, when in fact the detainee was in Pakistan.

h. On 29 March 2003, a search of Uzair Paracha's bedroom in Brooklyn, New York, revealed a Bank of America visa check card in the name of the detainee and five different identification cards for the detainee, including one Maryland drivers license and one social security card.

i. Uzair Paracha (Paracha) stated he knew from his father the detainee and a second individual were al Qaida. The detainee and the individual wanted to give Paracha and his father between 180,000 and 200,000 United States dollars to invest in their company as a loan. Paracha stated he knew the money was al Qaida money and that al Qaida wanted to keep the money liquid so they could have it back at a moments notice. Paracha felt it was implied that he had to perform tasks for the detainee and the individual on behalf of al Qaida because of the money being loaned to their business.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 March 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (8 Mar 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – MOHD FARIK BIN AMIN [ZUBAIR]

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida operative as a member of an al Qaida suicide team that was to participate in a plan to attack a building in the United States.

b. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 5 August 2003, a large vehicle bomb detonated outside of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia. Twelve persons were killed and one hundred forty-four people were injured, including two United States citizens.

c. An Indonesian National Police investigation, supported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies, revealed the J.W. Marriott hotel bombing was planned and executed by members of the Southeast Asia terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya, a group known to have solicited and received the support and guidance of al Qaida for terrorist activities in Southeast Asia.

d. According to the Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a Southeast Asia terrorist network with links to al Qaida. The network plotted in secrecy through the late 1990s, following the stated goal of creating an idealized Islamic state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and

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southern Thailand. In addition to raising its own funds, the JI receives money and logistic assistance from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, non-government organizations, and other groups, including al Qaida. The JI was responsible for the Bali, Indonesia, bombings on 12 October 2002, which killed nearly 200 people and wounded 300 others.

e. According to testimony from the Indonesian indictment of Rusman Gunawan dated January 2004, the detainee played a role in funding the bombing of the J. W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia. The detainee personally couriered 50,000 United States dollars; a portion of this money was used to finance safe houses and procure materials for the bombing of the J. W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia.

f. *Hambali* (Rusman Gunawan is the brother of Jemaah Islamiya operations chief Riduan Bin Isomuddin a.k.a *Hambali*) instructed Rusman Gunawan (Gunawan) to contact Ammar al Baluchi (*al Baluchi*), one of his contacts in Karachi, Pakistan, and request he provide 50,000 United States dollars to *Hambali's* contact in Bangkok, Thailand, a person known as "*Zubair*" (*the detainee*). According to Gunawan, after he requested this funding from *al Baluchi*, he was contacted by Mohammed Nazir Bin Lap (*Lillie*). *Lillie* advised Gunawan he would travel to Bangkok, Thailand, and meet with the detainee to assist in the movement of money. *Lillie* provided Gunawan with a cellular telephone number the detainee would be using. According to Gunawan, *Lillie* told him he intended to contact the detainee by means of this cellular telephone.

g. Ammar al Baluchi was captured on 29 April 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan, as he waited for the delivery of explosives for an alleged plot against the United States consulate in Karachi, Pakistan.

h. Rusman Gunawan (Gunawan) advised Ammar al Baluchi (*al Baluchi*) that Mohammed Nazir Bin Lap (*Lillie*) would contact the detainee in Bangkok, Thailand, and Gunawan provided the telephone number of the detainee to *al Baluchi*. Gunawan later learned that the detainee and *Lillie* were known personally to each other. According to the statement of Gunawan, *Lillie* contacted him approximately a month and a half later and stated he had received the money. Subsequently, Gunawan contacted *Hambali*, who advised him the money had been received, though he did not specify by whom.

i. Majid Khan (*Khan*), an associate of Ammar al Baluchi (*al Baluchi*), traveled to Bangkok, Thailand, to pick up the money after it was sent from Pakistan. During the time he was in Bangkok, Thailand, *Khan* maintained contact with *al Baluchi*. Their communications related largely to the financial scheme initiated by Rusman Gunawan. *Al Baluchi* eventually provided *Khan* with a telephone number for the detainee so he could contact him.

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TRIBUNAL – MOHD FARIK BIN AMIN [ZUBAIR]

j. The money transferred by the detainee was eventually delivered to Indonesia and used to fund a safe house and to purchase materials for the J. W. Marriott attack in Jakarta, Indonesia. During the trial of Rusman Gunawan (Gunawan) for his involvement in the attack on the J.W. Marriott hotel, Gunawan specifically identified the detainee as playing a role in the financing of the attack.

k. The detainee and other Jemaah Islamiya operatives left a suitcase containing 3,100 United States dollars and instructions on how to make and detonate a car bomb with Abdul Aziz Hajicheming (Hajicheming), in Cambodia. Hajicheming was arrested in May 2003 on charges of international terrorism.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

16 March 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (16 Mar 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – BASHIR BIN LAP

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 5 August 2003, a large vehicle bomb detonated outside of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia. Twelve persons were killed and one hundred forty-four people were injured, including two United States citizens.

b. An Indonesian National Police investigation, supported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies, revealed the J.W. Marriott hotel bombing was planned and executed by members of the Southeast Asia terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya, a group known to have solicited and received the support and guidance of al Qaida for its terrorist activities in Southeast Asia.

c. According to the Department of Homeland Security, Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a Southeast Asia terrorist network with links to al Qaida. The network plotted in secrecy through the late 1990s, following the stated goal of creating an idealized Islamic state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and southern Thailand. In addition to raising its own funds, the JI receives money and logistic assistance from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, non-government organizations, and other groups, including al Qaida. The JI was responsible for the Bali, Indonesia, bombings on 12 October 2002, which killed nearly 200 and wounded 300 others.

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TRIBUNAL – BASHIR BIN LAP

d. *Hambali* (Riduan Bin Isomuddin a.k.a *Hambali* is the Jemaah Islamiya operations chief and brother of Rusman Gunawan) instructed Rusman Gunawan (Gunawan) to contact Ammar al Baluchi (*al Baluchi*), one of his contacts in Karachi, Pakistan, and request he provide 50,000 United States dollars to *Hambali's* contact in Bangkok, Thailand, a person known as *Zubair*. According to Gunawan, after he requested this funding from *al Baluchi*, he was contacted by the detainee. The detainee advised Gunawan he would travel to Bangkok, Thailand, and meet with *Zubair* to assist in the movement of the money. The detainee provided Gunawan with a cellular telephone number *Zubair* would be using. According to Gunawan, the detainee told him he intended to contact *Zubair* by means of this cellular telephone.

e. Ammar al Baluchi was captured on 29 April 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan, as he waited for the delivery of explosives for an alleged plot against the United States consulate in Karachi, Pakistan.

f. Rusman Gunawan (Gunawan) advised Ammar al Baluchi (*al Baluchi*) that the detainee would contact *Zubair* in Bangkok, Thailand, and Gunawan provided the telephone number of *Zubair* to *al Baluchi*. Gunawan later learned that *Zubair* and the detainee were known personally to each other. According to the statement of Gunawan, the detainee contacted him approximately a month and a half later and stated he had received the money. Subsequently, Gunawan contacted *Hambali*, who advised him the money had been received, though he did not specify by whom.

g. According to the Indonesian Indictment of Rusman Gunawan in January 2004, the detainee traveled to Bangkok, Thailand, to facilitate the movement of 50,000 United States dollars from al Qaida to the militant Islamic group, Jemaah Islamiya. A portion of this money, 30,000 United States dollars, supported operational expenses to bomb the J. W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 5 August 2003.

h. The Indonesian National Police investigation, supported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies, revealed that the J.W. Marriott hotel attack was financed by persons who were members and associates of al Qaida. Rusman Gunawan (Gunawan) admitted during interviews he played a role in the funding for the attack and identified others who played a role in the movement of money from Pakistan, through Thailand, and eventually to Indonesia. Among those identified as part of this scheme by Gunawan was the detainee, a Malaysian citizen who was in Thailand.

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – BASHIR BIN LAP

i. The detainee shared a house with *Hambali* during basic explosives training. Additionally, the detainee shared a house in Karachi, Pakistan with other individuals in November 2001.

j. One of the individuals the detainee shared the house with in November 2001 is an admitted al Qaida operative and the leader of a suicide squad.

k. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida operative as a member of an al Qaida suicide team that was to participate in a plan to attack a building in the United States.

l. An M-16 rifle with ammunition was found in the detainee's apartment after his capture.

m. Computer media recovered at the detainee's apartment after his capture contained documents that described how to make bombs, grenades, dry ice bombs, and vest bombs. The recovered computer media also contained documents with information on the high explosive, pentaerythrite tetranitrate (PETN) and information on making nitric acid.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

25 April 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (25 Apr 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – GULEED HASSAN AHMED

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. The detainee was recruited by a senior al Qaida operative who participated in the 1998 bombing of the United States embassy in Kenya and the 2002 Mombasa, Kenya, attacks. This senior al Qaida operative considered himself the senior al Qaida officer for the Horn of Africa.

b. The detainee was identified as a prominent Al-Ittihad al-Islami jihadist faction member.

c. The United States Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide placed Al-Ittihad al-Islami on the Terrorist Exclusion List. An organization placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List is known to commit or incite to commit acts which can cause death or serious bodily injury, prepares or plans a terrorist activity, gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity, or provides material support to further terrorist activity.

d. The Al-Ittihad al-Islami jihadist faction suffered significant blows and setbacks with the arrest of the detainee and three other individuals.

e. As of 2004, the Al-Ittihad al-Islami jihadist faction in the Horn of Africa was affiliated with al Qaida and were in direct contact with Pakistan-based al Qaida operatives.

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TRIBUNAL – GULEED HASSAN AHMED

f. The detainee was a well-trained fighter, who trained in guerilla warfare tactics, explosives, and marksmanship in the tribal border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the early 1990s. The detainee later trained at the Al-Ittihad al-Islami training camp in Lugh, Somalia.

g. In 2002, the detainee participated in Al-Ittihad al-Islami operations in Mogadishu, Somalia, which involved killing Ethiopian nationals and individuals believed cooperating with the Ethiopians.

h. The detainee was named an al Qaida Djibouti cell leader and senior facilitator.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

08 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (08 Feb 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – MUHAMMAD, KHALID SHAYKH

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. These crashes and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2,972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

b. The detainee served as the head of the al Qaida military committee and was Usama bin Laden’s principal al Qaida operative who directed the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.

c. In an interview with an al Jazeera reporter in June 2002, the detainee stated he was the head of the al Qaida military committee.

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TRIBUNAL – MUHAMMAD, KHALID SHAYKH

d. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained information about the four airplanes hijacked on 11 September 2001 including code names, airline company, flight number, target, pilot name and background information, and names of the hijackers.

e. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained photographs of 19 individuals identified as the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

f. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained a document that listed the pilot license fees for Mohammad Atta and biographies for some of the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

g. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained images of passports and an image of Mohammad Atta.

h. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained transcripts of chat sessions belonging to at least one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

i. The detainee directed an individual to travel to the United States to case targets for a second wave of attacks.

j. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained three letters from Usama bin Laden.

k. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained spreadsheets that describe money assistance to families of known al Qaida members.

l. The detainee's name was on a list in a computer seized in connection with a threat to United States airlines, United States embassies and the Pope.

m. The detainee wrote the *bojinka plot*, the airline bomb plot which was later found on his nephew Ramzi Yousef's computer.

n. The *bojinka plot* is also known as the Manila air investigation.

o. The Manila air investigation uncovered the detainee conspired with others to plant explosive devices aboard American jetliners while those aircraft were scheduled to be airborne and loaded with passengers on their way to the United States.

p. The detainee was in charge of and funded an attack against United States military vessels heading to the port of Djibouti.

q. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained a letter to the United Arab Emirates threatening attack if their government continued to help the United States.

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TRIBUNAL – MUHAMMAD, KHALID SHAYKH

r. During the capture of the detainee, information used exclusively by al Qaida operational managers to communicate with operatives was found.

s. The detainee received funds from Kuwaiti-based Islamic extremist groups and delivered the funds to al Qaida members.

t. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained a document that summarized operational procedures and training requirements of an al Qaida cell.

u. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained a list of killed and wounded al Qaida martyrs.

v. Passport photographs of al Qaida operatives were seized during the capture of the detainee.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.