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AN INDIAN WHEEL OF LIFE

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# THE INDIAN IDEA OF THE SOUL

BY W. LOFTUS HARE

In the Hymns of the Rig-Veda, the earliest of the Indian religious writings, there is no strict and uniform term for the Soul. The word Atman, coined in the Upanishads, does not appear in the Hymns, and the word Purusha, adopted later by the Sānkhya philosophy for the Soul, occurs but seldom in the Hymns to describe the great being who is both Universal Soul and Individual Soul. Purusha is a mythological figure who has a thousand heads, eyes and feet, pervading every side on earth, who is divided into many portions to make single living beings, both animal and human. The ancient text is worth quoting as being the first formulation of a doctrine of Universal Soul separated into individual Souls. The idea is crude, certainly, but it gives us a clue to the origin of one of the several doctrines of the human Soul.

 A thousand heads hath Purusha, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet.

On every side pervading earth he fills a space ten fingers wide.

This Purusha is all that yet hath been and all that is to be;

II. When they divided Purusha how many portions did they make?

(Griffith X, 90)

Then follows a list of the various portions of the world, animal and human life, into which the first great Purusha was divided. It is clear from this that any given portion was not "the Soul," was not the immortal part of man but merely a differentiation of universal being—the sun, the moon, the sky, horses, kine, goats and sheep. There is here no doctrine of the Soul, strictly speaking, but

merely a creation myth out of which, later, a Soul doctrine was derived. We must therefore dismiss the passage, and all passages like it and look elsewhere in the Rig-Veda for material about the Soul. There is, indeed, a great deal; but it is a general idea, a tradition taken for granted, rather than a formulated teaching. Such teachings generally come later instead of earlier, being preceded by a commonly accepted notion whose origin it is difficult to trace.

### THE FATHERS, OR ANCESTRAL SPIRITS

Like all primitive races, the ancient Indians remembered, revered and worshipped their ancestors whom they called *Pitris*. They were the heroes of famous exploits, richly rewarded by the gods for their pious service, by which they "gained immortality." The hymns of the Rig-Veda contain numerous references to these semi-divine beings to whom is assigned a region of heaven, who visit the place of sacrifice and produce plentious fruit on earth. This all leads up to the belief in continued communion with the Fathers and ultimate return to them at death.

"Men born on earth tread their own paths that lead them whither our ancient Fathers have departed."

(V. XIV, 2)

"I have heard mention of two revoial pathways, ways of the Fathers and of Gods and mortals
On these two paths each moving creature travels. . . . . ."
(X. xxxviii. 15)

It also implies, or necessarily takes for granted, the continued existence of that part of man which is not his body. No discussion of a psychological character is to be found in the Hymns in reference to this; the language used is frankly human, and the argument for the existence of a Soul is presented in the simplest form, and perhaps in the most beautiful in the following prayer:

The kingdom of inexhaustible light, Whence is derived the radiance of the sun, To this kingdom transport me, Eternal, undying.

There, where Yama sits enthroned as king, Among the holiest of the heavenly world, Where ever living water streams, There suffer me to dwell immortal. Where we may wander undisturbed at will, Where the third loftiest heaven spreads its vault, Where are realms filled with light, There suffer me to dwell immortal.

Where is longing and the consummation of longing, Where the other side of the sun is seen, Where is refreshment and satiety, There suffer me to dwell immortal.

Where bliss resides and felicity,
Where joy beyond joy dwells,
Where the craving of desire is stilled,
There suffer me to dwell immortal.

(Deussen IX. CXiii. 7-11)

### THE FIRST PSYCHOLOGY

In the interval between the composition of the Vedic Hymns and that of the Upanishads great changes took place in Indian practice and thought. The Hymns became a mysterious deposit of sacred teaching and required extensive commentaries to explain them not to the people generally, but to the officiating priests, headed by the Brahmins. On the other hand philosophical speculation had begun and led to the writing of the Upanishads and quiet opposition to the ritual and observances taught in the Brahmanas, or commentaries. Here we find for the first time many doctrines of the Soul and here true interest in the subject begins.

Curiously enough although I have bound myself strictly to keep to psychology and avoid theology—owing to the way in which the Indian doctrine of the Soul is first formulated this rule has to be at once broken: for the earliest doctrine of the Upanishads teaches the existence of one unique Soul—"it is thyself which is within all." Here the word is Ātman, used to denote the self of man and the self of the universe, and thus to assert their identity. As already stated the idea of one Soul of the world there named Purusha had appeared in the Rig Veda (X. 90) in a hymn attributed to the Rishi Narāyana. This Purusha, or at least a part of him, was the soul of each animate and each inanimate being. We may assert therefore that after the primitive assumption of the existence of a Soul which at death went to be with the Fathers or the Gods there came into the minds of Indian thinkers a doctrine of the human Soul as identical with the Universal Soul, called alternatively Purusha or

Ātman. In the Hymn this teaching is given by the poet Narāyana and in the Upanishad by Yāgnavālkya the priest.

In the Hymn the great act of creation is represented as a "Sacrifice" of *Purusha* by the gods by dividing him into many parts. Thus he has innumerable heads, eyes and feet; he pervades all the earth and yet in man he is but "ten fingers wide." He is all that has been and will be and grows greater by the pious sacrifice of mankind. His being consists, as to one fourth part, of earthly creatures and as to the remaining three fourths of heavenly spirits or gods who, ascending to heaven, left behind them the earthly portion of Purusha, from whom Virāj was born and then mankind, the creatures of the air and earth. From his mind came the moon, from his eye the sun, from his head the sky, earth from his feet and so on. "Thus they formed the worlds."

In the Upanishads we have a less primitive idea of creation but with the same basis: "In the beginning was this Self alone in the shape of Purusha. He looking round saw nothing but his Self." By his own act rather than by sacrifice by Vedic gods, he produced all creatures from himself and said: "I indeed am this creation for I created all this." After having created the varied forms of human beings, he entered into them "to the tips of the finger nails." (Brihadāranyaka Up: I. iV).

Putting aside all detail and differences, hymn and Upanishad both assert that Purusha, the one self, is the metaphysical basis of all separate selves; each Soul receives its being from him.

## Logical Consequences of the Doctrine

It is unnecessary to draw in full the metaphysical, psychological and ethical consequences from the doctrine of divine and human identity. The earlier Upanishads devote themselves to elaborate discussions of these consequences in passages of great beauty and complexity. From every angle, with proofs both naif and profound, the group of teachers strengthen the doctrine they have initiated. Since the self of Man is the Self of God it is necessarily immortal. "This body indeed withers and dies when the living Self has left it; the living Self dies not." (Chandog: Up: VI. xi. 3). It is the inward ruler of each and every one; it is the Ātman Vaisvānara, the self common to all, and consequently each is not merely inwardly identical to God, but to each other. So when a man looks into the

pupil of his brother's eye "he sees himself." Even more than this: the community of inner being extends to animal and natural forms: "Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf or a boar, or a worm or a mosquito. . . . . that which is that subtile essence, in it all that exists has itself. It is the real. It is the Self and thou art it." (VI. ix. 3-4).

While there were always some who maintained this high doctrine of idealistic monism, the experience of man was continually leading away from it, and contradicting it. Difference, not identity, was the message of the normal senses, and consequently a view of the Soul as a *separate* being using bodily organs, began to develop. The Supreme and Individual Souls, once identical, are now thought of as experience seems to witness to them, as distinct from each other. The former is a Personal God, Ishvara, and the latter a being independent of him. Body and Soul, therefore are the two aspects of human existence with which a man is concerned.

### THE MIND AND THE ORGANS

It is in the Sankhya philosophy that the doctrine of the Soul reaches its farthest development away from the earlier Vedanta of the Upanishads. As a concession to realism the higher, invisible member of the triad: "God, Soul and World" becomes lost. Creation processes are forgotten; the senses are trusted, the world is real and the Soul, the seat of experience, requires no proof. The whole world can be ennumerated into 24 categories with a twentyfifth which is Purusha, the Soul. Here we learn how the Soul uses a central sense-organ called Manas (the Mind) five organs of knowledge, and five of action, called collectively the ten *Indrivas*. These organs, it must be noted, are not parts of the soul, which is one and indivisible; they are apparently bound up with it from eternity, but not essentially. The sufferings or enjoyments which a man experiences are not those of the soul, nor indeed are his actions attributed to it. Actions and experience are those of Nature, Prakriti, to which the manas and the indrivas belong. There is therefore left to the soul in this doctrine those characteristics of immortality and impeccability which it possesses in the Vedanta. It is completely beyond harm; as in the Vedanta "the living self dies not."

### THE STATES OF THE SOUL

It is no part of my task here to explain the Vedantic doctrine of the illusory nature of the Universe except in so far as it concerns the Soul's experience of itself and the world. Deussen puts it in a sentence.

The Ātman is the sole reality; with the knowledge of it all is known; there is no plurality and no change. Nature which presents the appearance of plurality and change is a mere illusion (maya).

(The Philosophy of the Upanishads p. 237)

A moment's reflection shows that the phenomenon of plurality is due, on this hypothesis, to some peculiar power of the Soul which makes illusion possible. The doctrine in reference to these powers was developed gradually in the Upanishads and may be stated in the terms of the *Saropanistsara*, translated by Deussen (p. 299).

"When using the fourteen organs of which manas is the first (manas), buddhi, c'ittam, ahankara, and the faculties of knowledge and action), that are developed outwards, and besides are sustained by deities such as aditya, etc., a man regards as real the external objects of sense, as sounds, etc., this is named the waking (jagaranam) of the ātman."

"When freed from waking impressions, and using only four organs (manas, buddhi, c'ittam, ahankara), apart from the actual presence of the sounds etc., a man regards as real sounds dependent on those impressions, this is named the

dreaming (svapnam) of the ātman."

"When as a result of the quiescence of all fourteen organs and the cessation of the consciousness of particular objects, a man (is without consciousness), this is named the deep sleep

(sushuptam) of the ātman."

"When the three states named have ceased, and the spiritual subsists alone by itself, contrasted like a spectator with all existing things as a substance indifferentiated, set free from all existing things, this spiritual state is called the *turiyam* (the fourth)."

It would have been better, perhaps, if these four states had been presented in their logical or psychological order. The third is the fundamental state out of which the ātman passes from dreamless sleep into a state less real, namely dreaming. From this he enters the waking state which is, according to this theory, still more removed from reality, presenting the phenomena of a complicated

plurality. But from this third state by means of effort (yoga), of which more will be said hereafter) it is possible to pass directly into a conscious possession of the ātman which in the first state, is unconscious. Putting aside the philosophical conception of a greater or less reality attributable to these four states, it is obvious that they are collected from the experience of ordinary life or to the first second and third and from the powers of meditation as to the fourth, in which a blissful consciousness of absorption with the Higher Self or Universal Atman replaces the unconscious absorption said to take place in dreamless sleep. The state is metaphysically similar in the first and fourth but knowledge of the state is added in the fourth which renders it more desirable. Such is the theory of the alternative states of the Soul from the view point of man. It need hardly be said that, considered theologically, the Ātman as "God" can have but one state; but this is not our present concern. It is relevant however to ask the question as to which entity maya or illusion belongs. No simple answer can be given, except to say that man, being the offspring of the Atman as creator, is less than the creator. Maya is a deprivation of Vidya which man suffers; its first state is dream in which the mind creates its own peculiar world, its second state is waking in which minds create a world common to all. But there is still the possibility of escaping illusion in deep sleep or turiva.

## THE LIBERATION OF THE SOUL

The Sānkhya philosophy resembles the Vedānta in another of its elements, namely, that a "knowledge of the truth" is said to be imparted by it. In the older philosophy it is "knowledge only" for its own sake, while in the Sānkhya the knowledge in question is a "remedy for pain." That pain or suffering of three kinds is a matter of experience but it is not known outside philosophical illumination that this pain is not an experience of the Soul. Liberation from the perpetual round of suffering attendant on rebirth in the world is possible, but it is not an experience of the Soul. For the Soul is not in bondage, though it seems to be. Here again there is a kind of maya from which the Sānkhya philosophy is ready to relieve us. I will here confine myself to a few points about the Purusha, or Soul, drawn from The Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila (Trubner's Oriental Series 3rd Edition).

Bondage, from which escape is desired, is not derived from time and place because those who have escaped from it are subject also to time and place. Nor is it derived from circumstance, which is of the body, nor from Ignorance, nor from motion, nor from works. It arises from not discriminating between Nature and Soul. The process of discrimination is not possible to the dull, unlikely to the mediocre and will only be mastered by the best.

As soon as this discrimination begins we learn that to Nature and not to Soul belong the instruments of suffering and bondage: viz Mind (manas) Intellect (buddhi) Selfconsciousness (ahamkara) the senses and their organs. (I. 61).

"It is merely verbal, and not a reality this so called bondage of the Soul; since the bondage resides in the mind and not in the Soul." (I. 58).

Nature supplies to the Soul two bodies, one subtile and one gross; the former consists of seventeen parts and the latter of five elements; the second is the tabernacle of the first. The mundane existence of the subtile body is for the sake of the Soul (III. II) which does not itself transmigrate. This is the function of the subtile body which by transmigration accumulates knowledge which leads to salvation, the Soul's chief end. Discrimination between Soul and Nature is one of the powers of the subtile body which likewise is brought into bondage through non-discrimination. Some remarkable sayings are:

- "From Brahma down to a post for the Soul's sake is creation till there be discrimination between Soul and Nature." (III. 47.)
- "Bondage and Liberation do not actually belong to Soul and would not even appear to do so but for non-discrimination." (III. 71.)
- "That which has to be done has been done, when entire cessation of pain has resulted from discrimination; not otherwise, not otherwise. (III. 84.)

The reader will make his own comparison between the Vedānta and Sānkhya conceptions of the Soul. I take the liberty of suggesting that since Purusha is essentially pure and unharmed our concern is really with the Subtile Body. Might not the first be called "The Spirit" and the second "The Soul"?

### ISOLATING THE SOUL

The common endeavour of the religious philosophies of the ancient Hindus was to isolate the Soul from the bodily and worldly environment which led to illusion and pain. This endeavour was called generally Yoga or effort, and was to obtain knowledge by jnāna yoga, merit by karma yoga and bakti-yoga. All these have their origins in the Upanishads and reappear in the Sānkhya philosophy, whose key word is Viveka, discrimination. One of the results of specialization was the production of the ascetic practice of meditation, and its literary expression was the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. Here at last the term yoga seems to be monopolized by the philosophy which bears its name and which is one of the six orthodox systems derived from the Vedic scriptures.

Theologically the Yoga adopts the standpoint of the Sankhya philosophy and dispenses with a god who is Creator and Sustainer of the Universe. In the combined Sānkhya-Yoga system the universe sustaines itself, being by no means the dead thing western science has made it. True, there is a concession to piety by the admission of an *Ishvara* who seems to have no function other than as a model or standard of ideal purity.

The yoga system exists to enable the devotee to obtain Soulisolation, called *kaivālya*. It is the specific form of the more general *moksha*, liberation. But we must not forget that this isolation is obtainable in this present life. Union with the Ātman or Brahman is taught by the Vedānta by a profoundly intellectual process which leads to, but does not compel the awakening of the Ātman; Discrimination of the Soul from Nature is the result of a scientific analysis of the twenty-four elements of the world; Isolation is an actual psychological experience which results from the practice of yoga.

Patanjali's work is divided into four books on Concentration, Means of Attainment, Supernormal Powers and Isolation respectively and may be studied best, I think in Mr. James Haughton Woods' translation (Harvard Oriental Series). A handy translation is that by M. N. Dvivedi (Rajaram Tukaram, Bombay).

The principles of yoga are stated in the first four aphorisms. Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind-stuff, or the suppression of the transformations of the thinking principle. (I. 2.) When attained the Seer (Atman or Purusha) abides in himself.

(3) At other times the Self takes the same form as the fluctuations of the mindstuff or becomes assimilated with the transformations of the thinking principle (4).

I am not here concerned with the practice of yoga except so far as it throws light on the nature of the Soul. The above brief sentences make it clear that the Soul stands above the mind and its attendant senses. Normally, we live identified with the mind and its rapid transformations; we suffer and enjoy its contacts with the world. The mind and its group of senses constitute the nexus between the soul and the world; this nexus can be cut by stilling the mind. The soul then remains in Isolation. The yogin obtains this state in the present life. What can Isolation be like?

Since all our normal experience comes from association with the world by means of the instrument of sense perception, it must be difficult to conceive of experience when cut off from its customary objects by the cessation of the functioning of the mind. Yet this is what we seek to know. The mind which was formerly directed to objects of sense and its own states of being becomes changed as soon as it has mastered discrimination. It is borne onwards towards Isolation. But even after illumination of the difference between Prakriti and Purusha, after turning away from the world as an object of desire, one must not turn to Isolation as a desired experience. One must be passionless in respect to this also! With Isolation the energy of intellect is grounded in the self, not in the mind which belongs to Nature. Drawn away from some specific things upon which it has been hitherto fixed, the Intellect—the pure knowing function of the Self—becomes omniscient.

But a further consequence of Isolation is that the Self is reborn no more in the world. Upon the cessation of his Karma (which normally draws a man to rebirth) even while yet alive he is released forever. For him the incessant transformations of Nature have fulfilled their purpose, they have reached their end. Involution, or the cyclic withdrawal of the world from manifestation, accompanies Isolation of the Soul.

Such, in brief, is the teaching about the Soul in Patanjali's Fourth Book.

## THE SOUL IN JAINISM

The Jain philosophy is one of those heterodox systems which are not founded on the Vedas. The title Jain is derived from the

old Sanskrit word *jina*, signifying "Conquerer," i. e. one who conquers his lower nature. It was in general non-technical use about the period of the Buddha and Mahavira, his elder contemporary, the reputed founder of the Jain Order. The Jains claim to go back to a period more remote and all that need be said here in relation to their theology and metaphysic is that they seem to bear little resemblance to the dominant Hindu doctrine with which we are more familiar.

Of the four aspects of Jaina religion (1) Theology, (2) Metaphysics, (3) Ethics and (4) Ritual we are concerned here only with a part of the second which deals with the Soul. Jaina metaphysics divides the Universe into two everlasting uncreated coexisting categories Jiva and Ajiva, Soul and Non-Soul. This resemblance to the Sankhya Purusha and Prakriti ceases when we come to examine these categories more closely. Ajiva is divided into Matter, Time, Space, Motions and Rest. Jiva is the higher and only responsible entity. It is always in association with Matter until it reaches its Nirvana, the final state of liberation corresponding to the Moksha and Kaivālya of the other systems. The body is the natural partner of the soul and belongs to ajiva; it has to be subdued or conquered by the soul, which then becomes a Jina in the full sense of the term. The union of body and soul is wrought by Karma whose destruction—or rather whose expulsion—is the fruit of the soul's effort. The remarkable idea in Jainism is that this Karma is a material substance. In common with the other systems it is Karma which keeps a man in bondage to the Samsara or cycle of birth and death.

There are several classes of human Souls, (A) those liberated and in *Nirvana*, and (B) Mundane Souls still enlarged with matter. The former are again subdivided into (1) those who preached Jainism while on earth, and (2) other liberate souls. The latter (3) are separated into Ascetics and Non-ascetics, while the Ascetics again fall into two groups, Arhats, perfected souls awaiting *Nirvana* and other teachers and saints.

There are however souls called *Sthāvara* or "immobile souls" on account of their not possessing power over the bodies they inhabit, being subject to these bodies, namely, souls in minerals, water, fire, air and plants. *Trasa* souls are "mobile" and can control the bodies they inhabit: insects, fishes, animals and men. I quote

the following from an authoritative work: (Footnote. *Outlines of Jainism* by Jaini, Cambridge University Press, 1916).

It is capable of seeing and knowing all, and it desires happiness and avoids pain. Of the mundane form of body and soul the soul is the higher, and the only responsible partner. Or rather the body, except in the drag of its dead inertia, is merely the sleeping partner. The powers of the soul are limitless, . . . . The whole universe is its scope. Its knowledge and perception cover all; its happiness is not measured by time, because time cannot run beyond it; and its power is divine, because it is joined to omniscience. This great principle of Jainism, this little "I," which is the everagitated centre of our brief lives, is eternal. Matter may capture it, keep it back from its light and freedom and bliss; but matter cannot kill it. . . . The string of life is continuous; the migrations are only knots in it. Life is a journey. . . . . The soul is immaterial, of course; it has neither touch, nor taste, nor smell, nor colour. It is the essence of wisdom and power, and eternally happy. Who will gauge its possibilities. It is a king in rags. It has faint memories of the richness and glory and power that were its own. But the rags are tangible. and make it feel incredulous of ever having been a king. "How can I be a king and in rags? No one would allow that." Long accustomed to nothing but pain and limitations, the human soul is sceptical about its power and bliss. . . . . .

Of the "mobile Souls" we are concerned chiefly with those of man, but it should be remarked that in the Jain system every one of the living beings is essentially divine; there is no such thing as an evil soul. Moreover all are equal: the apparent "evil" or "inequality" is due to the presence, more or less, of *Karma*, the only evil.

The mundane soul is in combination with Karmic matter and consequently none are perfect. But improvement is possible. In the human personality there is a combat betwixt the pure soul and gross matter. The soul is ignorant and identifies itself with matter and from this all its troubles begin.

In the pure state the soul has pure enjoyments: perfect perception, perfect knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss. In the impure state nine properties may be discussed:

1. Eternal life, 2. Perception and Knowledge, 3. Immateriality, 4. Responsibility, 5. Spacial occupancy of the body, 6. Enjoys the

fruit of its *Karmas*, 7. Wanders in Samsara (Re-incarnation), 8. Moral progression, 9. Patentral perfection, *Siddha*.

## KARMA IN JAINISM

Perhaps it is in the doctrine of *Karma* that the Jain system differs most from the others. Karmic matter keeps the soul from the realization of its four-fold powers. It is classified therefore as destructive *Karma* under four heads:

- 1. Knowledge-obscuring Karma
- 2. Faith—or Perception—obscuring Karma
- 3. Progress-obstructing Karma
- 4. Infatuating Karma

Another cycle of Four Conditioning non-destructive *Karmas* is as follows:

- 5. Duration of life
- 6. Determination of character of individuality
- 7. Determination of family and nationality
- 8. Determination of pleasure and pain

A moment's consideration shows us that even in respect to the four Destructive and the four Conditioning Karmas the variety of experience of many individuals is infinite. The difference is not accounted for in Jainism by the work of a God, nor the operation of matter which is said to be dead. The works of the soul alone accounts for the changes in the circumstances of each person; each deed absorbs or extrudes corrupt matter. Of what we have done we must bear the consequences; the balance of good and evil in every being registered in the Destructive and Conditioning Karmas. And when death comes, to the still imperfect man, his Karmic body—his body of deeds—claims a new life and starts with its debit afresh.

The recognition among our common experience of the various sub-division of the Form Destructive *Karmas* is most surprising; no where else but in Jainism (as far as I know) are the day to day feelings identified with such precision as Karmic consequences of our deeds.

There are five Knowledge-obscuring *Karmas* which lead to loss of intelligence, revelation, goal, mental order and understanding of the Universe.

The Perception-obscuring Karmas are physical blindness, deaf-

ness, etc., bad memory, sleepiness, heavy sleep, restless sleep, very restless dream sleep, somnambulistic sleep.

Progress-obstructing *Karmas* affect our charity, our profit, our enjoyment, our circumstances and our power.

The largest class is that of Delusive Karma which has forty-two varieties. Anger, pride, infatuation and greed result in "false belief"; the same vices obstruct partial or complete renunciation, they also disturb self-restraint. Self-restraint is rendered impossible by frivolity, eros, aversion, sorrow, fear, dislike effeminacy in men or mannishness in women.

One hundred more conditions of body and circumstance are detailed as due to the acts of our will in former lives. One may take up the Jain catalogue of *Karmas* and learn from one's own defects and vicissitudes precisely these moral faults which are said to lead to the absorption of the appropriate Karmic matter! After all, this is what we want to know; and from it is derived the Jain ethic, which need not be entered upon here.

### SYNTHETIC AUTHORITY IN RELIGION

BY REMBERT G. SMITH

THE idea that authority in religion is to be found in a single source has long prevailed, but it is after all erroneous. While speculatively plausible the attempt to apply it in experience has revealed reasons that require its rejection. There is really no monistic authority in religion which should be respected without any reservations.

Simple explanations have a presumption in their favour only with those who fail to see how vast and varied life is. Unscientific satisfaction with simplicity many times sustains superficiality and stagnation. The doctor who could cure only the measles but claimed that he could change all other maladies into measles is but a legendary quack in the field of medical science and practice, but his twin brother has had a large and baneful influence in theology and philosophy, an influence which happily is now waning rapidly.

True authority in religion is synthetic rather than simple, multiple rather than monistic. The government established and guided by it has a constitution providing checks and balances rather than a rule of centralized and absolute power.

THE FAILURE OF MONISTIC AUTHORITY IN RELIGION

The claim that real authority in religion is to be found in one source must be disallowed because of the testimony of history as to its inadequacy and iniquity. The theory apparently sound has had centuries in which to show its real character and it has been conclusively proven to be erroneous.

The Church is not infallible in matters either of faith or conduct. Down the centuries decrees and deliverances have come from councils and popes. In them there are inconsistencies and contradictions which make incredible the assertion that the Church should have exclusive authority in religion. A foolish consistency may be, as Emerson says, the hobgoblin of little minds but rational and moral

consistency in individuals and institutions is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of influence over an intelligent and moral constituency. The resistance of science by the Church through its stupid mis-interpretations of the Scriptures and its palpable progressive retreat from strongholds of dogma no longer tenable have demonstrated its fallibility so that no one who reads without bias the history can believe any longer in the absoluteness of ecclesiastical authority. This difficulty becomes quite insuperable when the record of the Church as to repression and persecution is considered. The alignment of the Church with the powerful even when they were cruel to the weak and the poor, the persecution and the burning of heretics and of witches by the millions, the subordination of the State made possible by the superstitions of rulers these and other similar facts have stripped the Church of the absolute authority in the practical life of the world which it proudly claimed and exercised for so many centuries. This power it will never again. Bismarck spoke for modern times when he said. "I will not go to Canossa either in the flesh or in the spirit!" As to this, history will not repeat itself.

The Protestant reformers denied that the Church has final authority as to religious truth and declared that such authority was in the Holy Scriptures which they considered to have as the result of inspiration an inerrancy which the evidence had demonstrated not to inhere in the Church as she has spoken either through councils or popes.

The claim that the Holy Scriptures are inerrant has not been maintained by its proponents and protagonists and has really been abandoned and the effort has been made to sustain the substitute theory that the Scriptures as originally written under inspiration were inerrant and that the errors have come about through the mishaps of the ages.

This argument is inconclusive. If man needs an inerrant revelation of religious truth through literature alone, the God who provided such a revelation would be bound to protect it even from infinitesimal impairments threatened by the shocks of change. Why favor one generation with a perfect manuscript which does not remain perfect? Is religious revelation but one flash of lighting in the darkness of human ignorance followed by the reasserted power of that darkness?

The Holy Scriptures do not contain scientific truth. The men who wrote them were in ignorance as to the material world and their inspiration did not emancipate them from these errors. After centuries of protest by mistaken defenders of the scriptures this is now admitted in all areas where the facts have had a patient hearing before minds really open to consideration of the accumulating evidence gathered by modern investigators.

The Holy Scriptures alone do not constitute a source of inerrant truth in morals or religion. The writers of it assembled in one parliament resemble too much the delegates who met in the council of Babel. They hopelessly disagree about matters of central importance, both in morals and religion, and they severally advocate antinomies abhorrent to the minds of man which holds with tenacity to the axiom that truth though many sided really constitutes a harmonious whole.

The Old Testament has a controversy with the New Testament, and Moses' "lex talionis" is repealed by Jesus who called him back to Hermon partly no doubt to tell him of his mistakes. There are irreconcilable moral dissimilarities between Joshua the conqueror of Canaan and John the Evangelist of Ephesus. Abraham with his harem and Paul with his impossible and irreligious ascetic doctrine of marriage are hopelessly disagreed as to the sex problem. If Jesus had invited him to the feast of Cana at Galilee, he would have gone with reluctance, and his spirit of resistance against the gladness of the occasion might have soured the wine. Paul's assertion that propagation is to be avoided if it is possible for the individual to resist the power of appetite is partly responsible for the arid asceticisms and preposterous puritanisms which have plagued human society.

Certain doctrines as to the nature of God which have been drawn from the Scriptures considered as the sole source of religious truth are at variance with each other which is utterly hopeless of reconciliation. That God is a deity partisan in his affections and activities in favor of the Israelites cannot be true if He is the just God of all the nations. Nor can the conception of God set forth by John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards which they ably supported by irrefragable proof texts be true if the conception of Him expounded by James Arminius and John Wesley established by equally convincing proof texts be correct. It is impossible to

believe in arbitrary predestination and in the love of God for all men, and it is equally impossible to show that either of these conceptions has no foundation in the Scriptures. It is said that a great preacher admitted that he preached impartially the doctrines of predestination and of the possibility of salvation for every man. About the same time according to rumour a teacher told the trustees of a remote rural school when they asked him whether he taught that the earth was flat or round that it was entirely agreeable to him to teach it either way. The influence of this type of preacher or teacher becomes more and more impossible in the modern world which requires leaders who will not surrender to the tyrannies of scholastic theories as to the nature of the Scriptures or to the abject ignorance of the blamelessly unenlightened.

The demonstration of the insufficiency of either the Church or the Scriptures as a monistic source of authority in religion has resulted recently in a search for some other source and religious experience has been declared to be all that is to be desired to meet the need. However, the difficulty growing out of the varieties of this experience presents itself, and cannot be removed though there are certain uniformities of real value.

Religious experience as it is found today has been determined by influences flowing from the Holy Scriptures and the Church. John Wesley's heart was strangely warmed but it was in the Aldersgate Street Chapel while the leader was explaining a Pauline Epistle and it was at the end of a search for the blessing which began in the Epworth Rectory, continued in Oxford University, in the conversations with the Moravians, in searchings of the Scriptures and the teachings of the Church. The pearl of great price was found by Wesley in soil semi-scriptural and semi-ecclesiastical and he was ever ready to give the reasons for the rapturous faith which sent him out to his romantic and resistless evangelism.

Experience considered by itself cannot be the source of authority in religion. It is derivative and not original as it is found today. It is true that the religious experience of individuals preceded and produced both the Scriptures and the Church. Moses is at the burning bush before he stands on the burning summit of Sinai to receive the laws on the tables of stone. Peter confesses his faith before he becomes the rock on which Christ can build his Church.

Paul sees the heavenly vision of Christ before he is empowered for his apostolic adventures and achievements.

From the experience of these and other men the Scriptures and the Church came as also similar experiences in other men when they touched and taught the Joshuas and Timothies who were to carry on the work of their spiritual fathers. Those who insist today that because religious experience in individuals antedated the Church and the Scriptures that it is now to be relied on as sole authority in religion, ignore the method of progress in revelation and are really reactionary. Nor is there any real relief in turning away from a Church not infallible and Scriptures not inervant to the religious experience from which the Church and the Scriptures flowed as streams from a spring. Why depend altogether upon experience as authority in religion if its past creatures—the Church and the Scriptures are not either one perfectly authoritative?

What we know as religious experience now coming, as it does, partly from the Church and the Scriptures differs in function from the experience which created the Ecclesia and the Sacred Letters. Religious experience in this dispensation is the fruit on the tree the root of which was the experience of the holy men of old. Religious experience in Paul of Tarsus and in John Wesley are alike in bringing peace to their hearts. They are unlike in that Paul was fitted by it to write the hymn on love and John Wesley to write various valuable religious literature distinctly inferior to the Pauline letters. The religious experience which produced the Scriptures and the Church will never be reproduced. It is no longer needed. It has done its work and this work abides. God buries his workmen who have builded the habitations which He had for them to build—and carries on His work through workmen who build something new and needed.

## Synthetic Authority as a Substitute for Monistic

The demonstrated insufficiency of monistic authority in this age of search and criticism has brought perplexity to many and despair to some. The conviction that peace is possible only if authority in religion can be found in one source has been so long tacitly accepted that the increasing difficulty to sustain the sufficiency of any such one source has caused real distress to many sincere souls. Their petulant protests against progressive prophetism have filled

the air but though really pathetic they have not availed against the resolute leadership which realizes the emergent need for rational reconstruction in religion. Not to meet this need can but result in wide-spread damage and there is no time for laggard lingering on the part of religious leaders.

The Bishop of Ripon recently suggested that science take a ten year holiday so that the new knowledge might be assimilated. No doubt he was really voicing an indirect exhortation to religious thinkers to quicken their pace so that they might walk pari passu with the scientists who certainly will not stop or slow down. One of the most hopeful signs of the present is the fact that many religious thinkers are realizing their responsibility and are consecrating themselves to the manifest duty of the hour.

### THE FOUR SOURCES OF AUTHORITY

Synthetic authority in religion is to be found in the Holy Scriptures, the Church, the Ethico-religious consciousness of Man, and in Science. The area protected by these four fortresses will be found to be ample enough and safe enough.

The Holy Scriptures while not inerrant have authority in religion. There is error in the view that authority is to be found only in that which is perfect and that the vindication of Scriptural authority requires a theory of inspiration postulating an inerrant revelation. That there ever was a perfect Bible is but a fiction which is a product of the arbitrary a-priorism which seeks to impose the tyranny of the theoretical upon the territory of the actual. The perfect is not found in the area of human attainment; it is to be found in the ultimate achievement of man made possible by the help of God. It is not in the perspective of the past but in the horizon of the future. It is true that God has helped hitherto but it has not pleased Him to make the past generations perfect without the present and the future.

The human element in the Scriptures imparts imperfection to it. Nevertheless there come from the Holy Scriptures certain necessary religious elements, and these have rightful and beneficial authority. It is an authority more of the life than of the letter, of pervading principles rather than of particular precepts. The duties which it enjoins and the grace which it reveals are to be understood only when it is read and meditated upon as a whole. Its warnings

are heard as we read the record of lives stormy in sinnings, and its wooings to righteousness are well nigh irresistible as we see the moral beauties of its heroes and heroines. By it we are led to the foot of Sinai that we may fear and tremble because of our sins: by it we are led to the foot of Calvary where we find pardon and peace in the assurance of God's mercy. In the completed revelation in the Holy Scriptures we find knowledge of God's law gradually disclosed until the proclamation of it in its perfection comes from the lips of Christ as he commands the love of God and man.

The Holy Scriptures are the sources of values for man as a moral and religious being just as material nature is the source of supplies for his physical needs. From neither do these values flow as water from a free fountain. Rather must they be gained by study and by toil. Just as man fells the forests and farms the fields so that he may have fuel and food for his material needs, so also must he study with all his powers of mind in order that he may gain from the Holy Scriptures sustenance for his soul. They are not surface mines of precious metals.

"Truth is no idle ore, But iron dug from central gloom, And heated hot in burning fears, And dipped in baths of hissing tears, And battered by the shocks of doom, To shape and use."

It is just as irrelevant to say that the Holy Scriptures are inerrant as it would be to say that nature is inerrant. Both of them are realities so vast as to be inadequately described by the terms which are used in mathematics or logic or law. The attempt should not be made to compress them into such constricted categories. They are too great to be confined by the philosophical and theological conceptions which have been elaborated concerning them. They are sure to come back to life from the tomb to which they have been sent by the persecuting powers of pedantry and loosened from the grave clothes of a presumptuous scholasticism, to walk abroad again in the power of a life which cannot be holden by any grave. The leaves of this book are for the healing of the nations and they shall not wither. Neither their foes nor their mistaken defenders equally as threatening to them shall be successful in discrediting the Holy Scriptures.

For several decades, too much importance has been attached to questions of origin which cannot be dogmatically answered. It is impossible to find out what the process was by which the Scriptures came into being, nor is it necessary to have certain knowledge as to these matters. Many of the imaginative theories as to the inspiration of the Scriptures have done harm because of the error of thinking that the value of the Scriptures was to a large degree dependent upon the stability of these theories. The shaking and fall of the theories are supposed by many to bring down into ruins the Scriptures themselves, so insidiously have some theologians increased the popular estimate of the importance of their speculations. As a matter of fact, theories of origin, scientific or theological are of secondary importance. It is possible to find out what man and nature and religion are now and to appropriate the values that are in reach of living hands instead of expending our energies in researches to find out what happened in a past which must forever be at least partly hidden from those who live in the present and will live in the future. To realize the danger of the backward look does not indicate that the past has been like Sodom. It is just as destructive of peace to be convinced that theories must be constructed as to what occurred yesterday as it is to be consumed with anxiety as to what may happen tomorrow. The fact that there is no adequate conception as to the origin of the Scriptures does not impair their value, which exists in their abiding qualities—qualities which will forever commend them to men as they seek satisfaction for their undving needs.

The Holy Scriptures have authority based not upon any belief as to their origin but upon the power which they directly exert upon men. In spite of the fact that they contain varying and conflicting doctrines, the total result of the study of them has been the disengaging of ideas and ideals which have had and will have incalculable value. Especially is this true as to moral laws. The composite and self-corrected deliverance of the Scriptures as to duty is the loftiest known to human experience and is the source also of the ethical energizing by which man is made able to ascend to these altitudes. Such authority has not been impaired by criticism. Geological theories as to the time and method of the forming of the coal measures do not prevent coal giving out heat nor gasoline from pulling automobiles and airplanes. The inherent moral power of

the Scriptures is not reduced by the theories or the demonstrated conclusions of scholarship, though many alarmed defenders of the faith have been in a panic of fear that there would be such a result.

The Holy Scriptures are authoritative because in them we learn of Jesus Christ-of His birth, life, teachings, deeds, death and resurrection. Such a character as was His could not have been imagined so that the description of it is the demonstration of its historical reality. There are those who would find all authority in the person of Jesus Christ as considered independent of the record concerning Him. They claim that they can worship Him though they are not sure as to what He said or did, and that they can adore Him though agnostic as to His attributes. This is a striking illustration of the surrender of the rights of the intellect in religion, of mysticism raised to the nth power. Such worship is really impossible unless man kills his reason and common sense. We know His character only as we contemplate His characteristics. We know the person of Jesus only as we know His words and deeds. It is not possible by an intuition which ignores particulars to see universals. Those who insist that there is monistic authority in religion in Jesus Christ but who admit fluctuating uncertainty as to what He did and said are seeking to build a home on the shifting sands of a specious scepticism. It may well be asserted that Jesus Christ possesses final authority in religion, but what does this avail unless there is faith as to what He said and did? There is no value in empty symbolic words even if they are the names Jesus Christ. His person was revealed through His words and acts and was portraved in the New Testament record of them. We do not know about Him unless the record is true, for the traditions as they supplement this record are of little consequence. Mystical fellowship with Him is indeed a blessed experience of believers, but it cannot exist if there be no faith in the historic Christ, and that faith rests on the substantial factual reliability of the New Testament record, though not on its absolute inerrency.

The record as to his sayings and doings is not complete, but it is sufficient to be the source of a correct conception of Him, and the clarity and cogency of this conception are fruits that grow on the Holy Scriptures which we search because they treat of Him. Those who believe with Tennyson that "Christ no after age shall e'er outgrow" must also believe that the Scriptures will also abide. The

expectation, the emergence, and the explanation of His incarnation as experiences of the holy men of old produced the Holy Scriptures, and they will be forever the source of a necessary element of authority in religion.

The Church also has real though relative authority, conferred upon her in the command of Christ as He sends her out to proclaim His law and His love and to minister to men. This authority is maintained by the obedience of the Church to Christ's commission and her conformity to His spirit. "The things that I do ye shall do and greater things than these shall ye do"-said Christ to his Church, and when engaged in these dynamic deeds the Church has a manifest and mighty authority to which men gladly yield because of the blessings brought them. The credentials of Christly consecration and the sacrificial signs of the stigmata establish the true authority of the Church. Paul on the way to Macedonia, Francis of Assisi "the minstrel of God," John Wesley preaching to the Cornish miners in spite of their stoning of him, David Livingstone and Mary Slessor of Calabar, William Booth and Florence Nightingale, these are leaders of the Church against whom there is no insurgency. The isles wait for the laws which they announce, the broken hearted and the sick and the sinful are willing subjects of their saving sovereignty.

The Church has a really maternal authority as she gives herself to loving ministries to men. It is said that when Newman went to the Roman Catholic Church that he laid his head on her bosom and gave up his painful effort to solve the problems by his own thinking, agreeing to accept the solutions of the Church. To stop thinking is really an evasion of responsibility on the part of individual or institution. Nevertheless, the prime duty or obligation of the Church is to love men and to minister to them rather than to answer all the questions they may ask. In doing this she will share the magnetism of her Lord who said, "I, if I be lifted, will draw all men unto me!" Important as is the mission of the Church to teach men, it is not as important as her duty to love them. The solution of problems is not as imperative as the salving of wounds. The authority of the Church as it is established in her sacrificial pastoral ministries is unshakable. Its constitutional origin is the commission of Christ, its abiding power is fellowship with Him, its abundant fruitage is the increasing blessings borne to men. The Church may have irenic if not intellectual infallibility.

To bless humanity by the establishing of faith and the enlarging of hope is an important duty of the Church. It is an obligation even higher to bless men by the incessant incarnating of the love which became gloriously visible in the declarations, in the deeds, and in the death of Christ. As the Church does this she has her highest authority. Her most effectual equipment is not a Platonic brow but a Christly heart. The outgoings of her irresistible power are through the work she does as Christ strengthens her.—As to the present perplexity Lanier well writes:

"Vainly might Plato's brain revolve it, Plainly the heart of a child could solve it."

This heart is that of the Holy Child of Bethlehem the tenderness of whose transcendent compassions should be traditions living in the heart and deeds of His Church. Here is the true *Elan vital* of the Ecclesia.

The Church has authority relative to the Scriptures. It was created before they were written, formed the canon by the selection of that which was best fitted to survive and to serve the needs of men, continually interprets and reinterprets the sacred letters. John Robinson said, "Let us continually expect new light to break forth from God's word." As a matter of fact this light increases as the result of the industrious and intensive study of the Scriptures by the Church. Spiritual light does not break forth from the Scriptures any more than useful electric illumination does from thunder clouds. Benjamin Franklin and Edison must dream and invent before electricity lights the cities of men. The Scriptures contain great resources of moral power but the Church through its work and wisdom must make these vast energies available by her spiritual hydro-electric engineering so that human hearts and homes are warmed and lighted.

The Church has authority achieved through the experiences of her long history. She has been disciplined in the school of trial and error. This authority is of course decreased when she insists on an institutional infallibility which history demonstrates not to have existed. But when all allowances are made for the errors of the Church, it will remain clear that she has gained a cumulative authority as, "knowledge comes but wisdom lingers," while she makes her pilgrimage through the chastening centuries. The carnal weapons of intolerance and inquisition are rusting in archaic armories and will never again be drawn from the scabbards of melancholy memories in which they rest. The proverb of pessimism which asserts that history repeats itself is not true.

#### THE AUTHORITY OF MAN'S MORAL NATURE

The moral nature of man also has a degree of authority in religion. Aristotle said man is the measure of all things and Jesus declared the law was made for man and not man for the law. Before there were institutions or literatures there was man. The Church and the Holy Scriptures are, it is true, partly divine in origin and in maintenance, but any elements in them which do violence to the Ethico-religious consciousness of man are additions made by ignorance or selfishness. How many crimes have been committed by those who have claimed to speak for God; how many superstitions have been spread by spurious religious leaders who have terrorized their weaker fellow man; how many erroneous and evil doctrines have been expounded and enforced because men have been taught to distrust the light that was in them. That light, it is true, is insufficient, but it is nevertheless real and it has rightful and rational authority to reject and to disbelieve such doctrines as are repugnant to its principles. The doctrine of humility that teaches that man must be reduced to zero before he can be saved is erroneous. The view that sin has marred the nature of man so that there is no authority left in it is an exaggeration. It is true that there are mysteries which may well be accepted in faith, but when these so called mysteries have in them elements against which the moral-religious consciousness of man protests they are malign and are to be rejected though they may be taught in so called sacred literature and proclaimed by pseudo priests and false prophets. No towering institutionalism—ecclesiastical or political—must be given the tyrannical power to enforce such conceptions.

lan Maclaren tells in one of his stories how the old Scotch preacher walked the floor in agony all night because the arbitrary predestination taught in some parts of the Scriptures was repugnant to his sense of justice. Nevertheless because of his conviction that he should crush the best elements in his moral nature in order to be a humble recipient of the teaching of an objective revelation he grimly climbed the pulpit stairs the next Lord's Day and preached the damnation of infants. When John Calvin put Servetus to death in Geneva, he was not really as cruel as he was in requiring believers in his theological system to murder what was best in their own souls. What he required them to do he had first ruthlessly done in his own heart.

Man's moral nature, his Ethico-religious consciousness, has authority in religion. Man has the right and the duty to subject to its testings the teachings of literatures or institutions and peremptorily to reject conceptions which are contrary to the congenital criteria which are clear in the heavens of his moral nature. When he does this, he is true to the divine that is within him against the gainsayings of science or religion falsely so called.

### THE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE IN RELIGION

The duty to learn everything possible about the world is religious. The scientist who undertakes it may be expected therefore to make a real contribution to religion. The physicist who works conscientiously in the laboratory is as religious as the priest who prays importunately in the oratory. Kepler the astronomer, who as he studies the stars, cries out, "O God, I am thinking Thy thoughts after Thee!" has fellowship with the psalmist as he sings, "The heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth His handiwork." The truth that the scientist discerns is authoritative in religion, for truth is authoritative everywhere.

Much of scientific truth has pertinence in religion. When we find out how God works we are adding to our religious values and learning how we may more efficiently cooperate with Him. Francis Asbury crossed the Alleghenies sixty times on horse back. It would be irreligious for a bishop to travel that way now. He had better use the railroad, the automobiles, or the air-plane—all creations of modern science and "servants of the servants of God." The use of all the forces of nature for the welfare of man is religious, and it must therefore be religious to find out how best to use them. Science sends its sons out on this quest and it becomes in their cumulative knowledge a conquest of disease, of burdensome labor, of ignorance.

Science has served religion in ridding it of many of the parasites that have weakened it. Faith has many times degenerated into fanaticism and devotion has been shadowed by superstition. The resistance of these tendencies which will be exerted by true religion may very well be augmented in power by the aid which science brings. The alliance of religion and science rather their antagonism is the need of the times. In such an alliance science will become religious and religion scientific.

The scientific method has manifest authority in religion. To find out as clearly as possible what the facts are and to make the rational conclusion from them is religious as well as scientific. Reverence for God's methods of activity is an integral part of reverence for God Himself. The botanist may stand with as sincere reverence before a growing bush as did Moses before a burning bush.

"Let knowledge grow from more to more But more of reverence in us dwell, That mind and Soul according well May make one music as before, But vaster."

### THE APPLICATION OF SYNTHETIC AUTHORITY

It is not only possible to apply the tests of synthetic authority in religion today, but there is a pressing need to do so. Unless it is applied, there will be increasing confusion that will culminate in chaos. Multitudes have rebeled openly or secretly against the inadequacy or the tyranny of the types of monistic authority which have been tried. They will not yield to the sole guidance of the Bible, of the Church, of the Moral Nature, or of Science, because they are convinced that neither one of these four sources is alone equal in wisdom or in strength to their needs. It is possible to convince them that the cooperative guidance of all four will mean safety. The traveler fears to climb the Alpine peak roped to one guide only, but if he is securely tied to four stout and skillful guides he attempts without fear the ascent to the summit. There is real and manifest need today for synthetic authority in religion.

# DR. WHITEHEAD AND PROF. MATHER ON RELIGION BY VICTOR S. YARROS

THE views of a distinguished scientist and philosopher on religion—its essence, foundation and rôle—when expressed deliberately, and after much anxious study and reflection, are of course worthy of the most serious attention. The present writer has deplored and criticised offhand, superficial utterances on religion by prominent and influential men of science, and it is plain that such utterances help neither science nor religion. But the exact thinker, the sincere and thoughtful student who gives us his mature convictions on the subject of religion renders a real service to the cause of truth and reason, and should be warmly commended for his contribution.

Prof. A. N. Whitehead—to whose religious essays the writer has repeatedly but briefly referred in previous papers—is a physicist, a mathematician, a philosopher and an original, independent thinker. In dealing with religion he apparently makes no assumptions, begs no questions, evades no difficulties. He tries to be as rigorous, as precise, in short, as scientific, as he is when dealing with matter, with conceptions of space and time, with the development of the theories of evolution.

It is for this reason that his Lowell lectures on religion, delivered in 1926 and published in book form under the title *Religion in the Making* possess deep interest and significance. Both his negative and his positive conclusions are calculated to challenge attention and provoke discussion. While the germs of these essays may be easily found in his *Science and the Modern World*—discussed by the present writer in these pages—they are valuable and instructive because they expand, elucidate and amplify the propositions adumbrated in the more general volume.

The conventional and orthodox theologians will not care for the essays. The advanced and radical schools of religious thought and the frank agnostics may be puzzled here and there by some of the author's arguments, or terminology, or methods, but they will be grateful for the essays. There is much in them that makes for clear, honest thinking and for the right treatment of religion.

To begin with, how does Dr. Whitehead define religion? It is worthy of note that he attempts no strict, technical definition. He prefers to indicate the nature and essence of religion in several pregnant phrases. Here are some of them:

"Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things."

"Religion is the force of belief cleansing the inward parts."

"Religion is solitariness" or "What the individual does with his solitariness."

"Religion is world loyalty."

"The final principle of religion is that there is a wisdom in the nature of things, from which flow our direction of practice and our possibility of the theoretical analysis of fact."

"Religion insists that the world is a mutually adjusted disposition of things, issuing in value for its own sake."

The foregoing quotations are obviously superior to narrow definitions. But we have only generalities so far. What is *essential in doctrine* to religion? What are its basic propositions?

Fundamental to religion, answers Dr. Whitehead, is the doctrine of the nature of God. In this respect, as we know, great cleavages of religious thought arise. Dr. Whitehead impartially states the two opposite extremes, the doctrine of God as the *impersonal* ruler of the universe, and the doctrine of God as the *one person* creating and sustaining and governing the universe, and rejects both—naturally enough. His own conception of God may be summarized as follows:

"God is the kingdom of Heaven; that is to say, the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms. He is complete in the sense that his vision determines every possibility of value. He is not infinite; he is limited, and his limitation is goodness. God is the mirror which discloses to every creature its own greatness. The world lives by the incarnation of God into itself; apart from God, there would be no actual world, and apart from the actual

world, there would be no rational explanation of the ideal vision which constitutes God."

In other words, God is the term we have evolved to denote and sum up our highest ideals—ideals that cannot be alien to the nature of the world and that are in fact implicit and inherent in it. If there were no ideals of goodness and justice, there would be no worthy conception of God. There is evil in the world, but we can and must eradicate it. Good must overcome evil, and our belief in this potency of good is a belief in God. God confronts the actual with the potential and possible; he thus solves all contradictions and indeterminations. God, therefore, is the valuation of the world, not the world itself. He is not a person or super-person; he does not answer prayers; he does not promise or vouchsafe immortality to human beings; he does not send any one to save any one else—all such notions are childish.

But it is natural for human beings to entertain crude beliefs and to modify them gradually in the light of science, method, critical thinking and history. Religions that fail to adjust their creeds and dogmas, their metaphysics and philosophy, to new conceptions decline and die. Christianity is one of the decaying religions because of its impurities, its survivals, its slavery to dogma and irrelevant tradition. But *religion* is not dead or dying; it is only "in the making." We need and are fashioning a true and sound religion that will solve the riddles of obsolete theologies, that science will accept and that will once more offer light and guidance to humanity. If religion does not shape conduct, it is not a real, significant thing. To believe in order and in righteousness in the universe is to believe in living up to and working for that order, that ideal of righteousness.

We have, I venture to think, in the foregoing, a faithful and sympathetic though brief restatement of the position taken in Dr. Whitehead's essays on religion. It is plain that with all the negative conclusions of the lectures, or the historical exposition they contain, or the charitable attitude of the author toward human frailty, inconsistency and tendency to formalism, rigidity, wrong emphasis, veneration of nonessentials and unwitting sacrifice of essentials in religion, it is impossible not to agree. But, unfortunately, there are weak points in the case for religion built up from Dr. Whitehead's interesting point of view. At any rate, the Agnostic is not likely to be easily converted to that point of view.

In the first place, the legitimacy of Dr. Whitehead's definitions and characterizations of God may well be-and have been-questioned. His right to use words in any sense he pleases is admitted, but that is irrelevant. How many other thinkers will be persuaded to use the word God in Dr. Whitehead's sense? A god without a name, a habitat, personality, attributes, will not do. Spencer used the term Unknowable instead of the term God, but he assumed the existence of a Power whence all things proceed. Dr. Whitehead rejects such phrases. He does not like the words Power, Force, Unknowable, Spirit, and studiously avoids them. He believes in the moral order of the Universe, in moral progress, in the conquest of evil by good, in the gradual development of harmony in human society. There is, he says, order in the universe, else it could not exist. Yes, there is a sort of order, but is it moral? We cannot speak of moral order among the suns and constellations, the solar systems and their planets. Moral conceptions are purely human, and have no reference to any other phenomena. The birth or death of a planet or a star is a fact without our moral significance. The death of this earth of ours would be an event of small moment to the universe, and would be neither moral nor immoral. But the relations between individual human beings, or between nations, or between states and individuals give rise to moral conceptions. Dr. Whitehead attaches far too much importance to the human race, and his religion, after all, is strangely anthropomorphic.

Further, he assumes that good is overcoming evil and that the ideal is transforming the actual in this world of ours. But he must know that there are thinkers who do not believe in moral progress and see no real evidence of it. They insist that only forms and modes are changing, while the essence of human nature remains unaltered. We still have war, crime, revenge, cruelty, punishment, selfishness, misery, injustice, oppression. Evil is everywhere, and the triumphs of goodness are few and shadowy. Where, then, they ask, is God, and what is his function and authority? And suppose evil conquers in the end, not good. Suppose strife and brute force destroy civilization—a not inconceivable possibility in view of the world war, the preparations for another war, the revival of militarism and navalism, the recrudescence of overheated nationalism and narrow, formal patriotism.

The present writer believes in moral progress, and thinks that history sufficiently supports the doctrine of progress. But he does

not believe in the *elimination* of evil. New forms of evil always appear and will continue to appear; the ideal will never overtake and completely transform the actual. In that case, the idea of God, even of a limited God, will become more nebulous and misty than ever.

There is still another difficulty for Dr. Whitehead to face. Where does he find his data for the ideal of goodness and harmony, of beauty and nobility? How does he evolve his idea of goodness and morality? He does not, of course, accept the childish belief in Revelation. He does not believe that this or that man was God's special messenger and savior, or that any particular message or book is "inspired," in the conventional sense of the term. He quotes Jesus' "the kingdom of God is within you" and assumes that the phrase implied that the kingdom of God was not and could not be anywhere else. In passing we may remark that this interpretation is quite arbitrary, for Jesus believed in a personal God, in a place called heaven, in the resurrection of the dead, in human immortality, in other orthodox Hebrew notions of his time and milieu. He stressed the fatherhood of God, it is true, and the love and mercy of God. But in this he is not always consistent—at least, as portraved and represented by his disciples and worshippers. His inconsistencies and contradictions, indeed, are part of his fascination and mystery.

If, then, our ideas and conceptions are *our own*, based on our experience, racial and individual; if conditions, traditions, circumstances, the logic of necessity and utility combine to fashion our beliefs and ideas, the God hypothesis is entirely superfluous. The law of parsimony or economy, so-called, forbids the use of gratuitous and unnecessary suppositions. Men have believed monstrous nonsense, and there is no quality of their mind that saves them from superstition and absurdity. Facts mar and do force them to modify their beliefs; facts, not any inner grace or light. Is experience God? Is God a name for all phenomena, past, present and to come? That is not Dr. Whitehead's view, though logically he cannot escape it. He deliberately limits God to goodness, but goodness is not an absolute, a fixed quantity of a determinate quality. It is relative, and God must be relative if he is another name for goodness. A relative, limited God—one can hardly conceive such an image!

It is difficult to see then, what good the God hypothesis does if we follow out Dr. Whitehead's analysis. And, to use his own words, a religion that does not serve the ideal, the good and the true, is not religion worthy of the name.

Dr. Whitehead points out that religion may be destructive and injurious, and that the worst crimes against the essence of religion have been committed in its name and in the name of God. We may add that millions of men think they are religious when they merely profess certain empty and hollow doctrines, or exalted doctrines which they have no intention of translating into practice. If a Christian be one who loves Jesus and accepts his teachings as divine, or as true and healing, then there are very few Christians in the world, since few, if any, apply or practice Christian precepts and teachings. He who believes in a doctrine and violates it in his daily life believes only in a Pickwickian sense.

Man, says Dr. Whitehead, is or is not religious. Thinking has nothing to do with religion. To believe in values and ideals is to co-operate with the forces that make for righteousness in realizing those values and ideals; to co-operate with God, Dr. Whitehead would say. To be true to one's own best and noblest self, the writer prefers to say. And it does not seem quite philosophical to call the best in us "God."

Similar reflections and criticisms are invited by the opinions and expressions of Prof. K. F. Mather, of the Harvard chair of geology, in a new book entitled *Science in Search of God*. This volume has received high praise from serious thinkers, and demands consideration. Prof. Mather believes that science and religion are, or should be, friends and co-workers, not enemies, and of course he asks theologians to adopt the scientific method. So far so good. But he has certain admonitions and explanations for the men of science who are indifferent to religion or frankly antagonistic to its claims. He says:

"Science has as its goal the complete description of the universe in which we live; religion seeks to find the most abundant life which men may possess in such a universe."

But do not the several sciences seek to find the most abundant life? What is the mission of economics, ethics, politics, sociology and philosophy if not the enrichment and improvement of life? It is arguable that religion begins where the social and moral sciences stop, but that must be proved, and cannot be assumed. Prof. Mather makes an attempt to point out specifically the part played by

religion, and religious ritual and ceremonial, in making life most abundant. To quote again:

"Love and beauty are not yet resolvable into units of a scale or ticks of a clock; either they have no time-space relations or those relations are not yet susceptible to measurements... Those qualities of the spiritual which are revealed by measurable transformations of matter and of energy in time and space should be studied scientifically. But other qualities of the spiritual are revealed only in the discovery of values. These are distinctly in the field of religion; it is religions insight rather than scientific observation which permits their recognition."

Here, again, the words are ambiguous and question-begging, and the conceptions behind them vague, too vague for scientific discussion. Love and beauty are real and important values, the most important in human life, but there is nothing religious about much of what appears to us lovely and beautiful. Love between the sexes is not a religious value, and other examples may be cited on the same point without swallowing Freud and his exaggerations. some values cannot be measured or explained physically and physiologically, it does not follow that we are driven to postulate supernatural origins and significance for them. What is called "religious insight" takes us nowhere; it leaves us facing an impenetrable mystery. We "recognize" nothing beyond our ignorance and mystery the moment we leave science. We are free to make assumptions, but no instinct is responsible for the assumptions of religion. We do not know, for instance, of what stuff the universe is made, and we gain nothing by saying that the unknown stuff was created by God. We are finding out, in the words of Bertrand Russell, that the physical is not as physical nor the mental as mental as men have thought in the past. We are satisfied that there is mind in all living things, and perhaps in non-living things, but we have no idea what mind is and can only know what it does where we can watch and test its operations. To say that some instinct refers mind to the field of religious values is to say nothing that has any meaning.

Too many men of science protest too much when they disclaim antagonism to religion and assure the average man that science and religion are not incompatible. Such condescension and patronage may satisfy nervous theologians, but they offend common sense. The man of science, as man of science, is an Agnostic beyond his own sphere. He cannot pass upon the claims of religion and theology except in so far as they are scientific. When he is asked to express opinions about God, the purpose of being, the future of the universe, the meaning of life, the fate of the so called human soul, he must plead ignorance. He has no data to justify even bold speculation. He must suspend judgment.

To allege that we are religious when we love somebody, or find joy in work and in research, or serve our fellows, or admit that we know very little, or have faith in human progress despite evil, injustice and cruelty in nature and in human life, is not to use scientific terms at all. A little more rigor, Messrs. Savants.

# THE AUTHOR OF JOHN XIX 32b-42. BY WILLIAM WEBER

WE are fortunately in a position to prove not only the Gentile origin of John xix, 32b-42, but to determine also the time when it first was published. The later additions to the Fourth Gospel proclaim Jesus the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world and relates how the sin is washed off by the blood and the water which flowed from the pierced side of Jesus. The Christians among whom this conception of Jesus originated, regarded accordingly the day on which Jesus died as the most holy day in his human career and felt in duty bound to call the attention of the entire Roman world to that new discovery.

The Jewish Christians, at least in Palestine, observed always the Passover as well as the other religious feasts of the Old Testament including the Sabbath. They gathered at the temple three times every year until it was destroyed by Titus. For Jesus, as he had warned them expressly, had not come to destroy, but to fulfil the law and the prophets. The Gentile Christians of the apostolic age however did not observe the 14th of Nisan nor any other holy day of the Old Testament. They rather held their religious meetings on Sunday very likely because their heathen neighbors did so.

Polycarp, a bishop of Smyrna and a Gentile Christian, introduced the celebration of the 14th of Nisan in his city. His teachings were apparently by and by accepted by a small group of churches near the western coast of Asia Minor. But he made, even before he approached his neighbors, a serious attempt of winning the Christians of Rome for the teachings of the Fourth Gospel he brought to them. That book was unknown to the Christians at large who up to that time had become familiar only with the three Synoptic Gospels. Otherwise the discrepancy between the Synoptic

and Johannine tradition as to the day on which Jesus was crucified would have caused an earlier discussion. On the other hand, if the last two chapters of the Fourth Gospel with the story of the resurrection had been a part of the book of Polycarp, he would hardly have called upon the Roman pontiff with the request to proclaim the 14th of Nisan as the most holy day of the Christians. As it was, Anicetus, the bishop of Rome, was just ready to announce Easter Sunday as the most holy day. Easter is the old spring holiday of the Aryan nations of Europe and appealed as such to the Gentile Christians. The outcome of the meeting of the two bishops was according to Eusebius E. H. V 24:

Neither could Anicetus persuade Polycarp not to observe it, Neither did Polycarp persuade Anicetus to observe it.

Eusebius E. H. IV 19 enables us to fix within a year the time when these two rival sponsors of a new Gentile religion met at Rome, the proper place for such an innovation. He writes: "It was in the eighth year of Verus that Anicetus, who had held the episcopate at Rome for eleven years, was succeeded by Soter." Verus as adopted brother of Marcus Aurelius shared with the latter the imperial throne from 161-169. Anicetus therefore died either in 168 or 169. But in the latter case, our authority would probably have said in the last year of Verus. Therefore Anicetus became bishop of Rome in the year 157 and Polycarp called on him very likely at once. It was of vital importance for him to reach Anicetus before he had proclaimed ex cathedra the paramount holiness of Easter Sunday. For the Gentile churches recognized even then the bishop of Rome as the superior and head of all provincial bishops. For Rome was not only the capital of the Empire and seat of the Emperor, but the very mother of the Roman world. The people of Rome were looked upon for that reason by all provincials as superior beings in every line of human activity. That becomes very clear in the controversy with the Quartodecimans, the followers of Polycarp.

Anicetus accepted gladly the new doctrine that Jesus had died as the lamb of God because it removed in the eyes of the Gentiles the stumbling block of the crucifixion of Jesus. But he rejected the 14th of Nisan. He may have disliked the observance of a Jewish holiday. But he probably had made up his mind to proclaim Easter Sunday as the most holy day before Polycarp called upon him.

It seems to be clear however that the observance of the day of

resurrection did not begin before the year 158. For if it had reached back into the apostolic age, Polycarp would never have thought of proposing the 14th of Nisan. The Christians of all the provinces would have protested. As it was, even Anicetus treated Polycarp with respect.

But as fast as the celebration of the resurrection spread, opposition against the Quartodecimans grew more and more bitter and determined under the leadership of Rome. About 170, Rome, Alexandria, and even churches of Asia Minor raised a protest against the observance of the 14th of Nisan by the Christians of Laodicea. In the year 196, bishop Victor of Rome wanted to excommunicate the followers of Polycarp in Asia Minor, especially at Ephesus; but the churches outside of Italy proved unwilling to go that far. In the third century, the Quartodecimans were listed as heretics at Rome. At last, the General Council of Nicaea closed in 325 that chapter by condemning the Quartodecimans.

These heretics claimed John, the disciple whom Jesus loved, as their authority. They even insisted that Polycarp was a personal disciple of John. That is, however, excluded by the peculiar character of his additions to the genuine parts of the Fourth Gospel.

This fact brings us face to face with the question: When and why can John have visited the western districts of Asia Minor? He was not an apostle, although one of the three disciples who had joined Jesus as intimate companions. Jesus appointed only one of them as apostle, namely Simon Peter.

Later tradition has indeed surrounded Jesus with twelve apostles, one for each of the twelve tribes of the children of Israel. But ever since 722 B. C., when Sargon, king of Assyria, destroyed the kingdom of Israel, and 586 B. C., when Nebuchadnezzar did the same to the southern kingdom, the ten tribes of Israel and a large number of the people of Judah and Benjamin lost their identity and religion in Mesopotamia where they were absorbed by a kindred, Semitic population. Ever since the return of 42,300 Jews from the Babylonian captivity, the worshippers at the temple of Jerusalem have called themselves Jews. For the remnants of the Israelites in Galilee were adopted by the tribe of Judah because they were too few to organize a tribe of their own.

The second chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians states very clearly that Peter and Paul were the only apostles at that time, the

first, the apostle of the Jews, the second, the apostle of the Gentiles. These two traveled over the whole empire, proclaiming the message of Jesus.

Chapter ii, 1-10 admits of no doubt as to that fact. As late as seventeen years after Paul's conversion, there were only two apostles. Verse 9 mentions by name James, the brother of Jesus, Cephas, and John as present at Jerusalem and calls them pillars and verse 6 those who were reputed to be somewhat as well as they who were of repute. But the decisive statements are found in verse 9 f. where Paul declares: When they saw that I had been intrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision, even as Peter with the gospel of the circumcision and when they perceived the grace that was given unto me, they gave to me and Barnabas the right hands of fellowship, that we should go to the Gentiles and they unto the circumcision. To render it even more emphatic, verse 8 repeats verse 7, saying: He that wrought for Peter unto the apostleship of the circumcision wrought for me also unto the Gentiles.

Accordingly, more than seventeen years after the death of Jesus—how many years later, we do not know—there were only two apostles, one for the Jews and another for the Gentiles. They were accompanied on their journeys by companions, as for instance Paul by Barnabas. But that did not make those companions apostles. The reason why may be learned from Acts xiv, 12, where the people of Lystra salute Barnabas as Jupiter and Paul as Mercury because he was the chief speaker. The same difference as far as the gift of convincing speech is concerned must have existed between Peter and his fellow pillars.

Chapter i, 18-19 seems to contradict ii, 6-9. We read there: I went up to Jerusalem to visit Cephas, and tarried with him fifteen days. But other of the apostles saw I none, save James the Lord's brother.

If it were not for what we have learned in chapter II, we should come to the conclusion that James, the brother of Jesus, was one of the twelve apostles to the Jews. That would be in harmony with the generally accepted legend. But chapter ii forbids us to regard James as an apostle. Therefore, i, 19 must have been altered by a transcriber who lived about 100 years after the apostolic age when the legend of the twelve apostles had been accepted as history. He was clearly unaware of what he did when he changed the genitive

singular into the plural. Otherwise, he would have replaced also  $\tilde{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\varrho o \upsilon$  by  $\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda o \upsilon$ . For  $\tilde{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\varrho o \varsigma$  means one of two whereas  $\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda o \varsigma$  is one of more than two. Paul himself wrote: Another than the apostle I saw not except James, the Lord's brother.

Under these circumstances, John was not an apostle. His task was not to carry the gospel of Jesus to his countrymen in Palestine and the Diaspora, but to stay in his native land and take care as a good shepherd of the lambs of his master. If he ever went to Asia Minor—and we possess in the Fourth Gospel the strongest evidence of such a visit—he can have gone there only as a good shepherd, not as a hireling, who had to save the flocks entrusted to his care. Such an emergency arose as a result of the Jewish revolt against the Roman government which lasted from 66-70 and ended with the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple.

McGiffert in his *Apostolic Age*, p. 608 has come very near to that conclusion. Only he sends John to Ephesus as a fugitive, who was unmindful of his master's warning: "He that is a hireling, and not a shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, beholdeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep, and fleeth, and the wolf snatcheth them and scattereth them."

During those terrible years from 66-70, the Christians in Palestine must have suffered incredibly from both warring parties. The Roman soldiers would maltreat them because they were Jews, and the Jewish rebels would handle them with even less mercy because they refused to fight for their country and religion. As long as the war lasted, outside help could not reach them. For the Romans would of course not permit anybody to send food, clothing, and other things to Jews in Palestine. That is not even done in modern, Christian wars. As long as the war lasted, there was no help for those Christians. But as soon as peace was restored, those, still living could appeal to their brethren in Asia Minor and elsewhere. That some Gallilean Christians had survived the war is proved by the two grandsons of Judas, the brother of Jesus. They were summoned before the emperor Domitian to show that they were poor, harmless farmers.

Under such conditions, John not only may, but must have called for help upon the rich cities of the western shore of Asia Minor, especially Ephesus and Smyrna, but besides all other cities of that region where Paul had gathered believers, and Peter had possibly preached among the Jews. These and other Gentile Christians had helped their brethren in Palestine before as we learn from Galatians ii, 10. But in the year 70, conditions in Palestine must have been simply terrible. The homes of the survivers were ruined, their cattle had been taken away, their fields lay fallow, their vineyards and orchards had been cut down. They could not even cover their nakedness. They were bound to perish together with their neighbors who did not believe in Jesus if quick and abundant help was not brought to both.

To secure such help can have been the only reason that prompted John to visit Asia Minor. He cannot have deserted his friends and neighbors in Palestine to fatten himself at the flesh-pots of the rich cities on the Aegaean Sea. His task must have been to obtain immediate and sufficient assistance for the perishing victims of the terrible war.

Such a mission required of course time. No single city contained Christians and Jews enough to supply alone the urgent wants of the Palestinians. He had to visit quite a number of cities before he could return to his native land. In each city, he had to linger for some time in order to meet all friends, Jews as well as Gentiles, and arrange with them what they would do and how they were to deliver their gifts.

He must have celebrated at least one Passover feast in Asia Minor and that in the city of Ephesus as we learn from Eusebius E. H. V 24. But that fact cannot mean that he was a Quartodeciman. As a faithful Jew, he was undoubtedly invited by either Jews or Jewish Christians to eat the Passover lamb with them, and he was bound to accept such an invitation gladly. Even Gentile Christians may have eaten the Passover at that occasion as guests of Jewish Christians. But that had as a matter of fact nothing to do with the Quartodeciman conception of the death of Jesus.

During his stay in Asia Minor he wrote a short account of the death of Jesus and its cause, beginning with the cleansing of the temple and ending with his interment. To that he added some reminiscences as for instance what Jesus had said of the Good Shepherd and of the other sheep not of the fold of Israel. These writings were given possibly to a Gentile Christian and came afterwards into the possession of Polycarp. He incorporated them with

quite a number of legendary additions into the present Fourth Gospel with the exception of chapter xx and xxi. He is thus the author or rather the editor of this Gospel. It is our task, if possible, to separate the chaff of Polycarp from the wheat of John and restore his genuine memoirs in their pristine truth and beauty.

### BUT IT RAINED ON THE UNIUST ONLY

BY GEORGE BALLARD BOWERS

M ORE than a score of the religious editors in the Ohio valley had commended the appointment of that promising young divine John Maxwell as a missionary to the Philippines, America's insular possessions of the Orient. The appointment had come to him at his graduation as a reward for his religious zeal and vigorous defence of certain beliefs frequently questioned by modern college youth. Maxwell fervently believed, as yet do millions more, in a literal interpretation of the Bible, in the power of prayer to heal the sick, to control the sunshine and the rain notwithstanding contrary contentions of modern science.

In due time Maxwell reached Manila where after three months of instruction in one of the seventy dialects of the archipelago, he was assigned to the land of the Mayaoyaos, a tribe of primitive, picturesque Filipinos living in the mountains of Northern Luzon. The Mayaoyaos are those little, stocky brown farmers whose fields are terraced mountains. Many of the terrace walls reach a height of fifty feet to form a field no wider. Terrace is laid upon terrace until the topmost is lost in the clouds and cold a mile above the perpetual torrent at the foot of the mountain. These marvels of primitive engineering are irrigated, many with water carried by canals a mile or more around a mountain peak, or through tubes of bamboo supported on bamboo trestles a hundred feet high across gorges five hundred, or more, feet wide. Because of their inhospitable surroundings, men, women and children, hiding their nakedness with no more than a mud-plastered wreath of sweetpotato vines, toil in the mortar-like earth from dawn to dark to wrest from their narrow fields the rice and taro that are their scanty fare. Should there by chance be left a slight surplus it is traded to peddlers from the coast for salt, cheap cotton cloth and thin blankets to protect their scurvied limbs from the cold, damp mountain air.

East of the mountains of the Mayaoyaos there lies a great plain drained by the mighty Cagayan, where dwell the tall, gaunt Gaddaans, a tribe of mighty hunters, who, like the Mayaoyaos, were headhunters, each tribe being ever ready to take a head from the other whenever the pagan rites required one. From time immemorial, to prevent surprise head-taking raids, each tribe had maintained outposts against the other.

Soon after the American occupation of the Philippines, the military authorities decreed head-hunting a crime to be punished as murder, thus the revolting custom came to be practiced only in the greatest secrecy. Although head-taking had been forbidden, that prohibition had not healed the mutual tribal hatreds then existing between the Gaddaans and the Mayaoyaos; for the hunter Gaddaans still owed the farmer Mayaoyaos three heads. Peace was deemed impossible without a settlement of some sort. Years later the Mayaoyaos brought their claim to me.—Here I may explain that both tribes were at the time within my military jurisdiction.

It was on an October morning that the two chiefs, Damag of the Mayaoyaos and Gaoad of the Gaddaans appeared at my headquarters. Each was accompanied by a group of his followers. The Mayaoyaos wore loin-clothes of somber blue and variocolored blankets draped sash-like over the shoulder. The Gaddaan warriors were draped with yards of red cotton cloth and wore loin-cloths of bark. Because of my previous instructions the attending warriors had left behind their lances and machets, only Damag and Gaoad were permitted to bring their lances and shields into my presence. At first sight I was glad that I had thus limited arm-bearing; for, notwithstanding the early hour, both parties showed signs of having freely imbibed of nipa wine sold in the local shops.

At nine I opened the conference. The warriors squatted on their haunches, each tribe apart, silent and scowling at each other.

I asked Damag to speak first. His speech surprised me, he said in part:

"I desire to know why the Gaddaans killed one and wounded two of my warriors last July. We were peacefully returning from trading in Ilagan when Gaoad ambushed us without warning. Besides the loss of a life the Gaddaans stole thirty pigs, twenty blankets, ten pieces of black cloth and thirty chickens.

"My people have acknowledged American sovereignty but the Gaddaans do not. They are false. I once made a treaty with them

but they broke it. Their word is without value. I must have a written agreement. But before I can talk of peace I must be indemnified for the losses we have sustained."

"Yes, I attacked the Mayaoyaos as related by Damag," Gaoad began, "but it was only to repay him for his attacks upon my hunters. Only last Lent he took two heads. In the July attack I took one head."

At this point I questioned him and brought out the admission that the attack cited had occurred three years before instead of the last Lent.

So Gaoad continued, "Yes, it was three Lents ago that we lost two heads together with six pig nets, five blankets, three lances, four dogs and a horse.

"I deny taking the articles lost by the Mayaoyaos. A Gaddaan never loots.

"I can make no peace until my people are paid for what they lost to the Mayaoyaos."

Damag denied having attacked the Gaddaans, but, however, he was willing to make some concessions, he would cut his claim to fifteen pigs and twenty blankets. Gaoad announced that he was willing to pay fifteen pigs and ten blankets provided he were first reimbursed for all his people had previously lost.

The conference ended at four o'clock when the Gaddaans had agreed to pay the Mayaoyaos one blue loin-cloth and four blankets.

But the treaty of peace thumb-printed and sworn to in my presence was to be of short duration although both parties appeared satisfied. I neglected to instruct them to return home by different trails, so Gaoad's party ambushed the Mayaoyaos thereby increasing the Gaddaan score by two heads.

Soon after this incident Maxwell reached Banaue, the principal Mayaoyao settlement. He was accompanied by Ciriaco a Bontoc Igorot who had accompanied a former master to Manila where he had been left stranded when his employer returned to the United States. Ciriaco came with Maxwell in the capacity of cook but later became a valuable assistant.

Maxwell was a tall, ascetic-looking individual dressed in close-fitting khaki, helmet and leather puttees. With the addition of silver bars on his shoulders, and bronze buttons instead of shell, he would have passed for a disappointed, dyspeptic army chaplain who had found the service ungodly.

Notwithstanding its picturesque setting Banaue is neither romanatic nor inspiring unless one leaves it almost immediately after arrival. It occupies an entire valley miles long with clusters of houses perched periliously on terrace walls and on rocky points.

A Banaue home is never a pretentious structure. It is built with no other end in view than to protect its occupants from the cold and rain. Under its low thatched roof there is a box-like sleeping-place entered through a small opening only large enough to admit the sleeper. The space between the sleeping-box and the roof serves as a storeroom and quarters for the numerous dogs kept for hunting and fattening.

Taro and rice, their principal food, are cooked in earthen pots under that part of the roof not used for sleeping. Meat is a delicacy served only on special occasions when dogs, pigs and caraboas are slaughtered, the number depending upon the occasion and the importance of the person honored by a feast, or canyao.

After Maxwell had temporarily settled in the guest-house built for passing travelers, he began a study of Mayaoyao life and customs, thus he thought to better fit himself for the mission he had come to carry out. This he pursued with consummate tact. For a time the people thought Maxwell an officer of the government. When he gave out that he was a missionary who intended to live in their midst they were surprised. Until then they had known only Spanish friars garbed in long black cassocks.

Damag was somewhat abashed once he had discovered Maxwell's plans and kindly intentions. He felt that he had not given the missionary the consideration and honor deserved. Therefore, Maxwell was informed through Ciriaco that on the Sunday following after the morning-service, there would be a canyao, an honor not to be lightly considered in view of its cost to the people.

The Sunday service was early, while the air was cool, after which Maxwell returned to his hut to await the feast in his honor. Damag escorted him to the scene of the festivities, a bare terrace with a small shelter of banana leaves erected for his comfort. On his right within the shade there was a row of clay jars filled with a brownish, pungent liquid which the thirsty drank from large bowls carved of wood.

As a majority of the men and women present already showed signs of intoxication, Maxwell guessed that the jars contained tapuy, an alcoholic beverage made of rice. Some distance in the rear of

the shelter there were several caldrons of rice steaming under their banana-leaf covers ready to serve. To the left and partially covered with palm frounds there were two roast carcasses which, upon inquiry, the missionary was informed were dogs, stuffed with the rice of their own eating, rare delicacies dear to the heart of the Igorot of whatever clan.

Directly in front of the guest of honor, about a hundred feet distant, was tethered a decrepit carabao. Maxwell inquired of Ciriaco the reason for the animal's presence but he pretended not to know. Later, at a signal from Damag fifty or more warriors set upon the bellowing, tortured animal. They literally hacked it to pieces much to the delight of the onlookers. Each secured for himself a portion. The horror of the spectacle was heartrending. Maxwell closed his eyes. He prayed that the inhumanity he had witnessed might never again be repeated.

Damag was too much occupied with the enjoyment to notice his visitor's disgust. Even had he seen his look of horror he might have interpreted it as the American manner of appreciating a signal honor, for, according to the Mayaoyao idea of hospitality, Damag had gone the limit.

As soon as the caraboa meat had been roasted in the fires freshly kindled for that purpose, the feast began. Banana leaves served as platters. Damag ordered generous portions for his guest. Anxious not to offend Maxwell managed to swallow a few mouthfuls of rice with a new wooden spoon carved for the occasion. The Mayaoyaos use a wooden spoon for eating, other peasant Filipinos carry the food to the mouth with the hand.

Maxwell remained but a short time after the feast started, for Damag was soon too drunk to notice his departure. A Mayaoyao canyao lasts as long as there remains a bite to eat or a drop of tapuy. Dancing continues after eating until the dancers are overcome by the stupor of food and drink.

That night Maxwell prayed with greater fervor than ever before. In the States he had been told that the Filipinos do not drink to excess. His short stay in Manila had proven that false. Now, he had found that the primitive Mayaoyaos were even more intemperate than the Manila Tagalogs. And the canyao, he could not think of the spectacles he had witnessed without a shudder of disgust. Disillusion had met him more than half way.

The missionary put the memories of the canyao behind him as

if it had been a bad dream. He resolved to redouble his efforts to forward the mission he had been assigned. Within four months he had gathered a congregation eager to learn something of the Americans and their beliefs, for the Americans were the conquerors of the Spaniards known to them only as leaders of slave-hunting parties gathering laborers to toil in the steaming muck of the tobacco fields in the Cagayan valley flood-lands. It has been asserted that such raids always had the sanction of the Spanish missionaries on the ground that those Mayaoyaos finally escaping and returning to their mountain homes might bear some message of the meek and lowly Nazarine.

Maxwell's conduct toward the Mayaoyaos was most satisfactory from their point of view. He neither demanded nor accepted contributions of any kind, instead he presented them many gifts of beads, red cloth and other articles dear to the heart of the simple folk.

The tribal leaders secretly hoped that the new religion might serve them as an additional weapon for use against their traditional enemies the Gaddaans dwelling beyond the protecting mountains. After a time Damag the chief accepted baptism that the gods of the white man might be called upon to reinforce those of his ancestors, thereby giving his people an advantage over the Gaddaans who have to this day resisted every missionary effort of whatever creed.

Damag's acceptance of Christianity without discarding his ancient creed is a common Oriental practice. A Chinaman may be a Buddhist, Confucian and a Christian, all at the same time. Most Japs are both Buddhist and Shintoist, and a few add Christianity.

Maxwell had opened an intensive campaign for converts in April after his arrival in Banaue, at the end of the rainy season when the terraced fields promised a bountiful harvest. But, before the rice had ripened, there came a plague of locusts that left but half a crop. That meant hunger should the dry season linger longer than usual. In the Philippines there are but two seasons, the wet and the dry. A few days delay of either one may spell ruin to the farmer. The rainless days continue to the end of October long after the first shower should have fallen. Secretly, the shamans of the tribe, the pagan priests, had already many times invoked the ancient tribal gods and with propitiating offerings of white roosters, wine and tobacco performed the customary rites, but there came no rain to drench the parched fields.

It was not until the middle of November that Damag confessed to Maxwell the seriousness of their plight, that hunger had begun to exact its toll. Damag requested that he aid them through intercession with the god and savior to whom he had taught them to pray with an assurance that their prayers would be heeded. That a white man might thus have lived in the midst of an alien people without having known their precarious condition seems improbable to him who has never studied the Orient. Nevertheless, nearly twenty years there has proven to me that such is often the case, primitive peoples are slow to carry their problems to an alien who would change their customs or might criticize their beliefs.

At first Maxwell doubted the truth of what he had heard from the trembling lips of the grizzled, white-haired chief. Little investigation was required to convince him of the truth of what he had heard. At first thought, Maxwell decided to appeal to the government at Manila. But to obtain that aid weeks were necessary. Food would have to be brought in over trails too steep and narrow for other than light-burdened foot-travelers. While Maxwell was mentally debating the difficulties, Damag reminded him that he had not asked for food from the outside, only for the help of the gods of the white man. He explained that up to that time their own god Lumauig had not heeded their pleas. This made the situation even more perplexing in that not until that moment had it dawned upon the missionary that the primitive Filipinos had no concept to fit such terms as alms and charity as understood in modern society of the Occident.

The Mayaoyaos had prayed to their principal god and failed. Maxwell, too, believed in the power of prayer as did those responsible for his appointment to the post he occupied, hence to pray for rain in that hour of helplessness and distress seemed to be a most fitting course. This at least was his public attitude but, whatevermight have been his secret convictions of the power of prayer as a producer of rain, the circumstances put them out of his mind, he had to follow the course of his preaching; he could claim no less power than the shamans of the local cult who never confess defeat.

A tropical shower closing the dry season has an effect scarcely believeable to one who has never actually observed it. Such a shower, in a single night, turns brown fields green with inch-long grass. Plants grow with such rapidity that we who know the tropics sometimes hesitate to relate our experiences; for example, that a

banana plant may add a foot to its height in a single night, that within a period of three or four days leaves and roots grow to an edible size.

Prayer would bring rain the missionary assured the simple mountaineers. A call went out for a meeting that very afternoon. The entire community assembled. The men wore their best blankets, every color represented, and blue loin-cloths freshly cleansed. The women were resplendent in bright-colored skirts and necklaces of black, white and red seeds. Many of the girls wore flowers in their long, dark tresses. The babies naked romped in the yellow dust covering the clay floor of the little grass-thatched chapel the tribe had built with love and hope. The chapel furnishings were meager. There was a raised platform with a small table and a chair made of packing-boxes in which Maxwell had brought a supply of tinned foods and a small library. Into the earth floor stakes had been driven to which bamboo poles were lashed to provide seats for the worshipers.

The prayer service was opened with every member of the tribe present except those on guard against the Gaddaans. The opening was a song by the missionary himself assisted by Ciriaco his cook, the words of the song being Ilocano, a dialect understood by only a few Mayaoyaos. As yet no songs had been adapted to the Mayaoyao, this dialect having no written characters or alphabet. After a series of songs and prayer, Maxwell read a translated selection from the Bible, the Fifth Chapter of Mathew, calling particular attention to and explaining verses 43 to 45, inclusive.

"Ye have heard that it has been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy.

"But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them which despitefully use you, and persecute you;

"That you may be the children of your father which is in heaven; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust."

Maxwell had not yet concluded his explanatory remarks when Damag, followed by his lieutenants, stalked angrily out with the entire congregation in their wake. The missionary was so astonished he could utter no word of protest. He was left alone with his faithful Ciriaco. Although the chief and his people had vacated the chapel they lingered near to hear Damag's explanation of his action.

After Maxwell had recovered from his surprise, he went outside to where Damag with his lieutenants squatted in a circle, chewing betelnut. The center of their circle was marked by a blood-like pool, the combined efforts of their agitated chewing.

"Chief Damag, why didst thou leave the meeting?" Maxwell inquired with concealed chagrin and anger.

With what he considered a lordly mein, Damay discarded his chew, wiped his red-stained lips on the hem of his blanket, after which he began in a loud voice.

"Brother, thou shouldst know that it was thy reading that offended. Thou knowest that the Gaddaans are the only enemies we know. How can we love them? And thou knowest, too, that they are the unjust. My people ask for rain for themselves alone, they desire none for their enemies. We have no desire to love our enemies, neither do we desire their love. If the god of thy creed were to send us rain and famine to the Gaddaans, we would willingly pray to him," gulping emotion silenced him for a time. "We are now convinced that we must depend solely upon the god of our fathers Lumauig who has never yet failed us although sometimes somewhat tardy."

Maxwell raised his hand, a sign that he wished to reply. "Chief Damag, why should not the god of whom I have told thee send rain to all his children?" Damag was silent, Maxwell went on. "Surely thou wilt not deny that the Gaddaans are God's children as well as the Mayaoyaos."

"The Gaddaans are the evil spirits and their children," Damag sneered. "I can not believe that any Gaddaan could be a child of the Good Spirit of the white man thou hast recommended to us. Even now our enemies beat their tomtoms and drums nightly while dancing around a freshly taken head of a black pigmy an offering to the evil god to whom they pray for rain. But they pray in vain, their god desires a Mayaoyao head. They could not take one this year."

This last speech brought shouts of approval and peals of laughter from the listening crowd. The pigmies are the little blacks living in the Philippine jungles not yet invaded by the Malay stock. The Mayaoyaos being Malays did not consider a pigmy head a suitable offering during a crisis such as then threatened both tribes.

After hours of entreaty and argument, it was Ciriaco who was to find a way out of the dilemma. His was a Malay mind that under-

stood the viewpoint of Damag and his people who insisted that if the god of the white man were able to send rain to friend and foe alike, he would be equally as powerful to send rain to the just alone, the just, of course, being the Mayaoyaos.

Although Ciriaco was only a fair bean cook, he was a devout student of the Bible insofar as his limited schooling permitted. He like many others study most those chapters and verses best justifying their prejudices and suiting conditions confronted. He was fond of the Psalms, and it was in that part of the Bible he sought and found a solution of the problem at that moment confronting his employer whose failure might mean the loss of his own position as cook and prominent social figure of the community because of his ability to read and sing with the missionary. Shouting in a loud voice that all might hear, he read:

"Psalms XI, verse 6, Upon the wicked he shall rain snares, fire and brimstone and an horrible tempest, this shall be the portion of their cup." He explained briefly that "the wicked" meant the Gaddaans and the "he" referred to the god of the white man.

"That's what we want for the Gaddaans!" Damag shouted. He thought such destruction as that described equally desirable as rain for the Mayaoyaos themselves.

The church refilled with a wild rush, only Maxwell and Ciriaco were left outside.

Maxwell bowed his head as if in silent prayer. After a full minute he boldly entered followed by his faithful Ciriaco. The service was resumed where interrupted hours before and continued long after the tropic sun had purpled and fallen under the horizon and had been relieved by a great, yellow moon flooding the chapel with her pale light.

The service ended the worshippers filed out. Through the clear, crisp mountain air, up from the plain beyond, there came to their ears weird sounds, drumbeats and echoes of shrill cries, high notes of the fierce Gaddaans dancing around their pigmy head, an offering to their god that he might send rain to quench the fires raging over their hunting-grounds. While they danced they put aside all thought of their enemies the Mayaoyaos; they had no desire to call the attention of their god to the substitution of a pigmy head for that of a Mayaoyao which they themselves considered a more acceptable offering.

The Mayaoyaos held a second meeting during the following

afternoon as no rain had fallen as a result of the first. Damag reported to the missionary that the Gaddaans had danced all night, their weird chants had been heard by his outposts at the lowest pass. They had been audible in the settlement only during the early hours of the night. On such occassions pagan enthusiasm wanes with the passing of the night.

At the third meeting of the third day, it was reported that a party of Gaddaans lead by their chief had been seen skulking near the low pass, but upon being discovered, disappeared in the jungle.

In the early part of that evening the Mayaoyao outposts reported that an omnious silence reigned in the Gaddaan camp. The strength of the outposts was doubled, an attack seemed imminent.

At midnight the excited outposts reported to Damag who passed the news on to Maxwell that great banks of clouds were gathering over the Cagayan valley beyond the Gaddaan plain. The end of the dry season seemed assured. Hope ran high, the settlement wakened, the rain-bearing clouds in the east, the Mayaoyaos believed, were an answer to their prayers. But the morning brought only disappointment, more bitter, when the coppery sun showed the Gaddaan hunting-grounds resplendent in ribbons of glistening silver. The silence on the plain was now explained. Rain had kept the Gaddaans under cover, and had filled their streams to overflowing.

At sunup not a single Mayaoyao guard remained at his post, each wanted to be first to report to his people that the rain had fallen on the unjust only.

### THE MELIORABILITY OF MAN'S WORLD

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND

THE biological naturalism of man's place in Nature has served its purpose well enough to lead now to considerations of a more philosophical question, viz: What capacity and method has man for bettering his place in Nature, building up his cultural estate, deepening and expanding his more or less altruistic world-conception so as to include all those aspects and functions of his civilizing process which seem at present to be so incompatible and discrete? Man has found that his world is not by any means the best possible of worlds, so it therefore concerns him greatly to know whether it is meliorable and what the most efficient method for realizing such betterment is.

We do not have to assume that he *nceds* a subtle and persistent capacity as well as a just and adequate method, because this necessity is one of the most easily demonstrable conditions of his historical career as an intelligent social being. But we will be required to assume that his capacity and method for bettering his world are not altogether futile, illusory or incompetent to the purpose in hand. Man undoubtedly has in his cultural possession some few very real and positive elements of genius and affection, will and aspiration, knowledge and skill, which are no longer in embryo but are rather very much adolescent and ambitious to become mature in function and expression. He is even a little too precocious now and then for his own durable good, but the general program and practice is admirably progressive and aspirant, sufficiently devout and wise to offer tokens of an early arrival at a stable and worthwhile Civilization compared with which the present one is infantile and feeble.

Let us look into the situation a little closer and try to see just what is meant by the *ideal* that man's world is meliorable, to see whether it is a statement of fact or fancy, whether man really can work transfiguration on himself and his fellows, whether he is more

social and spiritual than selfish and biologically brutal in his primary instincts and ambitions, and whether his destiny is permanent and his efforts truly commendable or merely the vain gestures and anxieties which his finite nature experiences in a cruelly chaotic and transitory world.

In a brief workout of this theme I will try to review only a few of the main features marking the situation, and while presenting them as they are, to also make a few suggestions as to how I believe they can be expanded and refined in such a way as to offer further hope and action-patterns in the general melioristic of every really vital process which concerns man's civilizing power and function. Among other things having very determinable and indispensable value to future modes of cultural achievement I will show that whatever ideals, aims, practices or criteria we cherish and respect are thereby given prominent place and effectual influence on the trend of our own contemporary civilization. The present subject accordingly will be treated in the light of two different periods of action as well as under two different aspects of the melioristic ideal. Not only present and future conditions concern us, but the programs and purposes (objective-external and subjective-internal) which now exist or may yet be developed to meet the conditions of life. These also are further divided into three different avenues of approach which for the one side may be listed as Culture-Epochs and Historical Sources, Empiricism and Social Science, Modern Civilization and the Incompetence of Legislation; while on the other may be listed considerations of heuristic contribution from the Creative Functions of Art and Philosophy, and from the Teleology and Eschatology in the Mystic's Overworld, leading on to Man's True Apocalypse and Ultimate Transfiguration. Let us see whether we are able possibly to draw some few synthetic conclusions not altogether devoid of scientific validity and suggestive sociological significance to that promissory millennium when man shall have become both philosopher and saint, when his life shall have become both wise and good, when his world shall have become both civilized and redeemed.

The primary analysis of what constitutes Civilization approaches it historically and selects out of the general evolutionary chronicle of human life those factors, dreams, discoveries, accidents and aspirations which served and still serve to make the world a spiritual cosmos instead of a bestial chaos. It is an effort fully

conscious that only a small part of the real civilizing process ever finds narrative attention or descriptive record in historical documents, whose sources may be as manifold and innumerable as the hopes and ideals of all humanity, but whose feeble power of catching these living factors on the wing renders the record called history all too significantly finite and inconclusive. However, it does fortunately exercise a reliable function in selecting representative types of knowledge, skill, action-patterns and genius-ideals which act as and often are direct elements in the very emergent process we are trying to study and understand. It is the redeeming credential of history that it records and reveals to later research just these factors of man's spiritual progress and renders just that much service in helping to prove that man's world has a future of no mean promise, that it is meliorable and aspirant as well as evolutionary and emergent.

The full career and development of civil society is prehistorical in sources and impulsion. Its real beginnings were much in vogue and studied concern even before anyone thought of recording the actual achievements of men on the pictorial panels of hewn logs, carved ivory and stone, or in the laborious mural sculptures of the cave-dwellers. History is a documentary product of a far later era when states had become organized, when the political affairs of men had been sufficiently coordinated and harmonized to warrant a few of the more conservative minds to mark down certain events as commendable and worthy of record to posterity. But, while the first beginnings of social development were essentially prehistorical, the functions, duties, ideals and heroic decisions which were really intelligent and effectual as conscious political purposes did not arise until civil states had become established as authoritative governmental and protective institutions. Ever the priestly function of ritual assembly and its later eventuation into ecclesiastical communion and authority had first to gain the favor of the political and military leaders so as to share with them the hegemony already earned or seized. Likewise with many other civil and cultural interests, tho perhaps in a less insistent and dominating way, the field had first to be cleared politically and economically before any of the arts and sciences, literature, history, religion or philosophy could find either the leisure or the security, much less the inclination and will, which were the primary factors in their flourishing. But they did somehow manage to grow up and flourish, healthily and fruitfully as modern history and archeology so plentifully prove, just as soon as the troubled times settled down and men found security and a demand for their labors.

Organized society today of course reveals many developments of more recent ages than the primitive and prehistorical, many moresubtle refinements of barbarism than cavemen ever dreamed were possible perhaps, but still listed generally as new economic situations, newer and more complex industrial, vocational, moral, social and political combinations which demand equally newer and more complex mental equipment, more skillful and more accurate, deeper, wider, subtler preparations, adaptations and arrangements. exteriors have changed remarkably, but not the innner frame of steady vital purpose; the continuous and irresistible substratum of cultural and philosophical principles involved has hardly altered in one single item. These are characteristics of eternal verity, they are not so ephemeral or dependent upon finite situation or personal needs but are durable and regulative of all human labor and experience, interest and ambition. It has only been during the last quarter century that men have begun to develop a philosophical sociology which would cover the whole field of social evolution and control, giving accurate and adequate attention not only to the customs, rites and notions of primitive society, barbaric and pagan tho it most generally was, but also to lead on thru the whole cycle of human life and give equally accurate and valid attention to the later and more recent developments, the modern especially for it concerns us most in being most immediate to our own cultural makeup and welfare.

One of the first principles of sociology is that the growth of social groups could not have taken place at all were there no common bonds of union and communion among the members making up the group; they had first to be in the mood to dispense with their primitive and barbaric ideas and dispositions in order to get together and work out programs of social contact and control. So then we must first begin our analysis of the sources (whether historical or prehistorical makes no difference here) of social development and ambition by examining the bonds which first brought together and held the men concerned in a common field of interest and activity. Among these we find custom, religion, law and personal influence as the chief external bonds of communion, and private need of support, security and general morale as the chief internal bonds

holding together groups of any size from the tribal family to the whole modern world. Roughly speaking, practically every phase of organized society, whether primitive, classical or modern, can be analyzed, classified and interpreted under one or another of these several fields of interest, only the terminology used might vary according to the particular culture-epoch or locale under inquiry.

The primitive family, clan and tribal groups had their respective order and security according to very definite and established social customs, ritual exercises and beliefs, governmental procedure and military protection as objective obligations and guaranties while they also had very definite and insistent personal fears, notions, desires and dreams which made up the private subjective forces which helped to keep them bonded in social communion with their fellows. The same situation essentially prevailed in the classical eras of civilization in Egypt, Babylon, China, India, Greece and Rome except that the tribal groups had become enlarged into principalities, states and empires with their consequent involution and complexity of life and its requirement of more adaptable objective apparatus and personal submission. The same elements even may be seen following clear thru to our own more cosmopolitan and vet more differentiated modern age with all its worldwide ambitions and collaborations, its precocious but fairly promising gestures toward religion and culture, philosophy and art, science, government and romance. But the more subtly complex and involved social situations of today are just as amenable to precise analysis, understanding, direction and control, just as meliorable and progressive under proper treatment and decision, as either the primitive or classical examples can be found to have been. One difference perhaps being that then was the heyday of superstition and magic, small world-conceptions and ephemeral ambitions, while today men are (supposedly, alas!) blessed with good sense, broadmindedness and all those pristine virtues which balk and shy at everything expedient.

We should be cautious enough to ask whether the modern age really deserves all the dignity and discretion which contemporary thinkers have expended in their contemplation and espousal of its supremacy.

Modern empiricism finds its subtlest sanction and staunchest support in the pragmatic values established as current criteria in social science and the ethical theory of Civilization. It takes patterns of action and purpose from man's historically emergent experience, but on practical requisition that these ideal examples should have some independent valuistic connection and moral significance, empiricism takes refuge in the more finite and ephemeral categories of sociology, in such opportunist types of ethical theory as batten heavily on man's innate rhyomistic nature as it has found exercise throughout his political, economic and industrial development, and is therefore gunshy under the more general philosophical attack of rational analysis and impersonal research into the whole civilizing process as it has been variously pursued since preadamite days. The pragmatic phases of Civilization are too materialistic and ephemeral compared with its eventuations into cultural development, progressive education and spiritual refinement, and are thence not to be so easily incorporated into our true philosophy, not even so readily adopted as the best sanction and support open to what will later on be introduced as a more valid empirical method and viewpoint. We must remember that human life supplied these elements of spirituality and cultural discipline along with the less important elements of material welfare and economic opportunity, and it is only fair that we consider both fields of value and see that it is only by virtue of our own deliberate choice of one or the other field of interest and action that life is noble or mediocre, heroic or pusillanimous, as also that our sociology will interpret all Civilization as either aspirant or utilitarian, cultural or pragmatic. We know of course that a full and true philosophy of the subject would include all manners of approach, all modes of analysis and interpretation, but we know also that it would have validity only so long as it held them all in their proper valuistic order replical to the series of their importance as items or functions in the general cultural development, the melioristic purpose and spiritual advancement of human life.

There may be somewhere in the dusty tomes of political apology some theoretical justification for taking refuge in empirical theories of Civilization and human progress, but none whatsoever so far as I have been able to discover in the annals of symmetrical unbiassed philosophy for making man's cultural career on this planet appear so artificial and forced as to be no more than empirical, merely worldly and rhyomistic, that is. If these were its only features, its only ambitions and credentials, I am much afraid we would have little hope of actually departing the bestial and barbaric codes of our primitive ancestors. On the other hand we may be pretty sure that

empiricism's truer value as a representative type of ethical theory could not have arisen in the first place if it had not taken advantage of the outstanding historical fact that man is an intelligent social being and that the persistent struggles, gains, losses and heartaches of his whole evolutionary career make up that richly abundant background of his modern nature which demands that all his affairs, hopes, beliefs and decisions shall be eductive, progressive, melioristic else they stagnate and become recrudescent, sterile and decadent. Whence if it would flourish and find theoretical favor as either a metaphysic or an ethic of Human Civilization it must keep faith with the subtle spiritual sources which give origin, vitality and even some share of dignity and destiny to all that man has thus far been able to accomplish in his two worlds of physical and mental labor.

Sociology has long been imbecile with the wrong assumptions and categories, looking more to economic, industrial and political control for its reward than to educational, cultural and moral rehabilitation for its rubric and recommendation. It is about time that we ceased this all-too-fashionable paternalism and officious snuppery, this everlasting debauch of crime-news and scandal, this interminable harangue about how our captains of industry and economic war-lords have inherited the divine right formerly exercised so fatally by kings and aristocratic chameleons. There is absolutely nothing about these factors or actors sufficiently real and sincere that an intelligent courageous man should for a minute consider them necessarily critical or socially omnipotent. At best they are merely transient items of obstruction to progress, ephemeral figures on the dial of an inexorable and melioristic Civilization. The nobler and more adequate social science of the future will not harp on the highly lucrative pragmatic values now so universally in the ascendent; it will exercise better judgment and wider sympathies for the real life and ambition of men heroic enough to repudiate selfishness and trifling rewards, that reliably genuine sort of human life which is at once devout and wise, generous and just, social and intelligent.

In one of its most interesting and at the same time most problematic phases man's world has to be somehow made better day by day, but the rub comes when we find that a good world has to be fool-proof as well as virtuous and heroic. It is far more difficult to enlighten a fool than to reform a rogue because if a man is stupid enough to be a fool he will not be clever enough to be a scoundrel. The knave is very often the more congenial and amenable because his mischiefs require a certain amount of suavity and intelligence to start with, while the fool is just as likely to cause disaster as he is some trifling disaffection.

It is to cover and combat situations like this that we saw that Civilization and social welfare are practically synonymous terms, at least insofar as they signify conditions which are meant to guarantee vital security and general morale to the whole population regardless of personal faculty or fortune. Both are results of social organization, efficient social control of industrial production and distribution, moral and vocational guidance, educational and economic equality of opportunity, full stability and encouragement for all interests and activities which are good and exemplary to the general cultural upreach and spiritual refinement of the whole human commonwealth. It means in short that both the material and spiritual welfare of mankind is looked after in the really just and melioristically operative civilizing process; the effort and ambition of which are not considered sufficient or sincere when only conveying a few words of commendation or patronizing genuflexions in favor of some superficial sophists selfish exploit or spoliation of his fellows, but when direct thought and rigorous labor is expended to make social welfare true and Civilization actual. It means that a really just and genuine social security, concord and efficiency will be the chief features of a truly civilized world which will in turn maintain itself by the organization and administration of a just and stable system of social control, good and impartial laws, direct and strict vocational guidance, educational encouragement and proper economic placement of all genius and special types of skill or learning, sure rewards for the righteous and deserving as well as certain retribution (or rehabilitation if possible) for all wrongdoers.

But so far our efforts have been all but totally futile in trying to establish such a social utopia by means of legislation only. External law will never make men virtuous or intelligent, these being qualities of private character. The mood and makeup of a man, on the other hand, are what often decide whether the external authority of law shall be respected or its statutes considered adequate restraints upon his conduct. Law in the first place is only a plan of action, as Gladstone said, and cannot therefore strike into a man's character with sufficient force to be imperative. His own mind and conscience are supposed to be given him for that highly

responsible function. Authority and government by law (whether civil or ecclesiastical, neither is actually successful or imperial) can at best seek only preventive measures rather than clumsily punitive and weakly restitutive regulations in dealing with the criminal and defective. We can trust and hope however that this in time will help to sterilize the debauchee and imbecile at the same time that it elevates and increases the ranks of the wise and good. The incompetence of legislation alone to meet the cultural situation is a serious defect in man's present status as an intelligent social being, but it is not inclusive of nor even representative of that really pejoristic incompetence ascribed to man's whole cultural career by Bertrand Russell and Oswald Spengler in their anxiety that modern Western Civilization is moribund. Their antidote was prescribed more than thirty years ago by Mazzini who held that any real Civilization cannot die because it has genuine faith and its faith prefigures what it shall become in the future. If modern civilization, at least so far as its Western Phase is concerned, is in any degree actually moribund it must be because it is not a real civilization in the first place.

In order to forestall any such cultural disaster, whether or not caused by an over-industrialized economic hegemony, we must take immediate and devout action to rechristianize our faith, ennoble and catharize our characters, purify and spiritualize our social conceptions so as to prefigure the future which we would like to realize. We know, or should know unless all our historical examples and the discipline of Nature have served in vain, that jerry-built civilizations cannot endure the ravages of Time, that smeer-cultures are precarious, puerile and too precocious for rewards to ever be long ascendent or capable of survival. We know also, however, that the main difficulty is not so much in establishing but in getting people to support and respect some sort of genuine and durable social communion having its first and perennial maxim devoted to those better values of human life, those ideals of self-respect, lawobedience and general amiability which are ever ascendent credentials to man's spiritual estate. The establishment and concerted pursuit of this ideal program is what we will have to fight for first, because all other features of our purpose to enlighten and democratize the world depend upon thus first winning over the general assembly of mature responsible minds to the only really effectual measure that is in favor of cultural rehabilitation and reform.

Very probably we shall have to start with individuals first, trying to get them aroused out of vulgarian inertia to make themselves lifelong examples of heroic effort at deliberate self-improvement and ennoblement, while latterly we might be able to look forward to that last great age when all men would be rechristianized and inspired anew with social responsibility, moral accountability, intellectual honesty and spiritual rebirth. We know clearly enough already that it is comparatively no problem to gauge and remedy our own individual faults, but a herculean task to even get the public conscience aroused to its obligations, much less to get any really accurate and effectual program introduced and adopted as a part of their honest daily practice. The ideal pursuit of culture and civilized ambition is readily sanctioned and taken in as favorable and desirable as a general proposition for others to liev for, but the actual discipline and pursuit of this ideal by individuals themselves in a genuine life of refinement and spiritual character is still persistently evaded and left largely to vicarious effort and performance.

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