The Development of Auction Bridge

Under

The New Count

Florence Irwin

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By Florence Irwin

The Fine Points of Auction Bridge

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By

Florence Irwin

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PREFACE

To an analytical mind, the changes wrought in Auction by the *New Count* are very marked and very fundamental. The entire basic principle of sane bidding and sane doubling has been altered; methods which were formerly sound are now both unsound and futile.

I find that there is great demand for a book that will simply dissect these changes without forcing its readers to wade again through pages of description of the game itself. This, with its laws, I have already fully discussed in my previous book, *The Fine Points of Auction Bridge*, a thorough knowledge of which is presupposed in these pages.

Portions of this volume have already appeared in the New York *Times*, and I have been strongly urged to issue them in a more permanent form. The test-hands, especially, have all awakened lively interest on their original appearance.

I must remind my readers, once more, that *poor* Auction is a bore to one's associates; *fair*

Auction is but little better; *good* Auction makes for wide popularity; and *expert* Auction is a rare delight. To be an expert player, is to be in constant and unceasing demand.

F. I.

HASTINGS-ON-HUDSON,
October, 1912.

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The Development of Auction Bridge under the New Count

CHAPTER I

CHANGES NECESSITATED BY THE NEW COUNT; THE OPENING-BID.

A YEAR of the *New Count* has revolutionized Auction. As is always the case, the necessary changes grew more and more apparent as time went on. At first, we realized merely that the closer proximity of the suit-values made for better bidding and more perfect balance. But the differences are more radical than that.

Chief amongst these is the change in the opening-bid. Under the new count, *every bid should be a make* (except, of course, "one spade"). In other words, when you bid a suit, you must be able to play it.

Under the old count, no-trump was the only

valuable suit, save hearts. It was impossible to establish a heart-make, between partners, unless good hearts were dealt them. But it was entirely possible to establish a no-trump by information gleaned on the various rounds of bidding. For instance, if you held the ace-king of clubs with one small card, or the ace and three or four small, you would bid "a club"; this did not mean that you wanted to play clubs; it meant that you commanded clubs and that your partner might use that information as a help to a possible no-trumper. You were practically sure that your partner would not raise your club-bid very high,—the suit was too low in value to tempt him to do that; instead he would use the information to establish a no-trumper if possible. In other words, *you could bid "a club" when you were unable to play a club*, because you were practically sure that your bid would neither stand nor be raised; it would be changed. You had simply "shown suit" as an invitation to no-trump.

Under the new count, conditions are quite different. No-trump is worth less, and the other suits are worth more, than formerly. In addition to this, we have a brand-new suit that is a very tempting and valuable one. Consequently, no-trump is neither desired nor bid,

as frequently as formerly. It is astonishing to note the decrease in the proportion of no-trump hands. And, to me, it is most refreshing. "Variety is the spice of life," and no-trump was growing a bit monotonous.

For the reason that no suit is now beneath notice, your partner will allow your suit-bid to stand, or will raise it when it becomes necessary, in place of changing it to no-trump. It follows, therefore, that you must be able to play it when you bid it. Ace and three or four small would be a sorry club bid or diamond bid, under the new count. Formerly it was good as an "invitation to no-trump." Now it is misleading and worthless.

A bid should be a make. Don't misunderstand this, and think it will allow you to go back to your old Bridge makes on jack-suits and ten-suits, provided they are sufficiently long. You positively cannot bid a suit on the first round, unless you hold the ace, the king, or (possibly) the queen of that suit. No jack-suits or ten-suits may be bid on the first round, unless in some very unusual and critical situation. Even queen-suits are barred by the most conservative authorities. I consider bids on queen-suits perfectly permissible *provided the suit runs to great length, and the hand holds something*

beside trumps,—such as side-aces, or ruffs. I will devote more space to the subject of queen-suits a little later on.

There are players so conservative that they claim that you should never make an opening-bid in a suit unless you hold the ace, or the king-queen. With this, I do not concur; I think that by such over-carefulness, you lose many chances to make excellent bids and to give your partner information that will enable him to go game in the hand.

Your suit should certainly be headed by one of its three highest cards, and it is infinitely to be preferred that that card should be the ace or the king; yet I do not see why you need hold both the king *and* the queen. King-jack-ten and two or three small, or even king-jack (or king-ten) with three or four small, is a perfectly good opening-bid.

You must hold, then, the ace, the king, or the queen of your suit,—*but you must hold something else beside.* A bid, to be safe, should come to *seven points;* that is, when you count two points for each honor and one point for each plain card, the sum of the points should be seven or more.

This "point" system of counting a hand is invaluable; before I go further, I will explain it more fully.

In every suit there are eighteen points; two points each for the five honors,—ace, king, queen, jack, and ten, and one point each for every other card in the suit. You must not bid on a suit, on the first round, unless you hold its ace, king, or queen; and you must not bid on it, even then, unless the suit will add up to seven points. An occasional six-point bid may be tolerated, if the occasion demands it; but a *safe* bid must come to seven, and a queen-high suit should be even more. A six-point make is always light, *and should never be made unless the suit holds the ace and another honor, or the king-queen.* Even then, the hand should have outside strength. A ruff cannot be considered outside strength in a four-trump suit,—the hand is too short to take a ruff; and all six-point suits are four-card suits, for two of the cards must be honors. These two honors will count four points, and that leaves but two more points for plain cards. To bid on a six-point suit, therefore, you must hold outside aces, or guarded kings.

No bids are permitted on three-card suits even though all three cards are honors. You might have to play the hand with ten trumps against you. Seven points or more, then, for a safe make, and six points if the occasion makes it absolutely necessary!

Now, remember, the moment any one makes a bid in a suit (whether that suit stands as final or not), *allow for seven points of that suit to be in that hand.* Count your own points, and you can get an approximate idea of the holdings of the other two players. When Dummy goes down, you will have but one hand at which you will have to guess.

Always remember that the person who first bids on the suit may have more than seven points, but he probably has not less. Suppose the dealer opens with "a heart," and you yourself hold:

Hearts—Jack, 10, 6, 4, 3.

Allow seven heart-points to the dealer; your own hand holds seven more. That makes fourteen points out of eighteen. There are, therefore, but four heart-points divided between the other two hands—not four cards, but four points. If either of those hands holds a king or a queen of hearts, it counts for two points, and reduces the possible cards to three. When Dummy goes down, notice his heart-points and make your own deductions as to the fourth hand.

Of course the dealer may have held more than seven points for his original bid. Also he may possibly have held less; this latter contingency

is unlikely (if he is a good player) unless the score demands something unusual, or unless his side hand is fortified by aces, kings, or ruffs.

Whether the hand I have been describing goes to the original bidder at hearts, or whether an entirely different player gets it at an entirely different suit, always remember the probable approximate position of those heart-points. Follow this process with every suit in turn, as it is named, always remembering, however, that later bids are apt to be modified by earlier ones. Still, by allowing not less than six or seven points for the player who first names a suit, counting your own hand, observing Dummy, remembering that each suit holds eighteen points, and never forgetting which player bid which suit, you will soon come to be known as an "Auction wizard."

It is impossible to tell you how this is going to help your game, and it is a system that very few players know, unless they have had professional instruction.

At first you won't realize its value, or you will become a little confused. But before long you will wonder how you ever attempted to play without using this process of "point-counting." It will become involuntary and unconscious;

but you will "know," where formerly you merely "wondered" or "hoped."

I have taught this method to many persons, and I have never heard more than one complaint about it, and that is that when you have mastered the method, it becomes discouraging to play with those who have not.

It is always discouraging to play out of one's class—in tennis, in golf, in Auction, in anything. But that does not deter one from wishing to be in the first class, with the few who have become experts, rather than playing *at* a game with the mass of non-experts.

No matter how good one's game may be, it is a pleasant and a courteous thing to play with those who are less skillful. But there is no reason why this should be done constantly; in fact, it greatly injures one's game of Auction to play incessantly with players in a lower class of skill. If no one notices signals, one stops making them; if no one makes them, one stops watching for them. In other games, such things are not demanded of the good players. Tennis experts do not play constantly with beginners, either from friendship or from a philanthropic desire to help the beginners in their game. You play in the class to which your degree of skill admits you.

Play, whenever your courtesy allows it, with inferior players, and look upon such games as an act of charity; do not turn them into a lecture, unless asked to do so, and do not be irritated by the mistakes that you are bound to notice. Also try, in spite of discouraging conditions, to keep your own game up to the mark. Then play (eagerly seize the chance to play) with players more expert than yourself; but always remember that such games are an act of charity on *their* part. And, in conclusion, remember that your general run of games must be in that class to which your skill admits you.

Always remember to use "the process of elimination," in your bid. The lower the suit you bid on, the more expensive your bid. "A spade" is the most expensive declaration there is; you make less, if you win, than at any other suit, and you lose just as much, if you lose,—unless, of course, you lose more than two-odd. In that case, a one-spade declaration is protected by Law 48.

When you look at your hand, begin at the highest suit, and see if your hand warrants a bid in it; if it does not, go to the next highest, and so on down the line. But always bid the very best suit that your hand allows. Say to

yourself: "A no-trump? No. A royal? No. A heart? Yes." And there you are. If you have not the material for a heart-bid, look next at diamonds, then at clubs, *and never open with a spade unless you are forced to it—never, unless you are sure you must lose more than two-odd!*

Let no one misunderstand me and think that I am urging unsound opening-bids to avoid an opening spade declaration. If you have a spade hand, you must bid a spade. But please never bid it unless you have to.

There is nothing more discouraging than to have one's partner open the bidding with "one spade"; it means that the next adversary will almost surely pass, and that the third player must come to the rescue, or that the hand will be left at "a spade." Then, if you play it and win, you make 2, or 4, or 6; and if you play it and lose, you lose 50 or 100.

Just look at the odds against you. It hardly pays you to win, it certainly does not pay you to lose, and your best efforts can hardly bring you more than 2 or 4 points.

Again, if you can win at "a spade," you could win at "a royal," and it would be a much more profitable winning; each trick would be worth four and a half times as much. And it would be

worth no more to the adversary if you lost, unless you lost more than two-odd.

Then give a thought to your partner. It is enough for him to bear the responsibility of his own forced bid when he deals; don't put it up to him to come to the rescue every time you deal. Moreover, "a spade" from you is discouraging to him. He feels that to essay "a no-trump," he must have a phenomenally strong hand, because you have just declared a phenomenally weak one; in other words, he will have to do all the work alone, and keep leading away from his own hand, because you may not have a trick in yours (for re-entry). No-trump is a terrifying proposition after a spade bid from one's partner, it therefore follows that, unless he has a good suit-bid, he will be wise to take shelter under Law 48: to pass and to limit his losses to 100.

Now, suppose he has a fair average hand with the strength scattered evenly, and suppose you have just the same thing. Then you have a good no-trumper between you, and, thanks to your foolish opening bid, it is played as "a spade."

Here is a fair sample of a hand on which I find many players glad to shirk their responsi-

bilities and to open with a spade "just to see what the others will do":



It does n't look possible on paper, but time and again I have seen hands similar to this opened with "a spade." The second player goes by, on principle (I will explain to you later why one should never declare against "one spade," unless one can go game in the hand). Then, what is Y to do? If his partner's hand is a genuine spade, how can Y pull off a no-trumper, alone? On the other hand, he has no good suit-bid; he can do nothing but pass. And B will pass joyfully. An amateur, in B's place, would

declare "a royal"; a good player would realize that royals are worth 9 a trick, and defeating the adversary is worth 50 a trick. How could B make 50 or 100 on that hand by playing royals? And why should he not make 50 or 100 by defeating spades?

If Z opens that hand with "a spade" he cannot fail to lose 50 points, unless he leads his clubs instead of finessing his diamonds—a thing that he would hardly do with a closed hand. By leading the club, he makes the odd—2 points! If he opens the bidding with "a no-trump," he cannot fail to take game, or to set the adversary in his bid!

A might cover the "no-trump" with "two diamonds," upon which Y would immediately answer with "two no-trumps." If B tries "three royals," relying on his side suit and his singleton in his partner's suit, Z can bid three no-trumps, or he can do better still by doubling the royals and defeating them. As soon as he knows that his partner stops diamonds, and that the good spades lie with B rather than with A, Z is in a position to double a three-bid in anything. Just look at the difference! Instead of losing 100, Z takes 100, or he takes more, or he goes game in the hand. And all through sound bidding! I think any one will

grant that this is not an unusual hand, or a remarkably strong hand, and it could certainly be entirely wasted with an unsound opening-bid.

If Z plays the hand at no-trumps, A will lead his fourth-best diamond; the rule of eleven will show Z that B cannot take it, and that his own nine-spot is good; wishing to get into Dummy to finesse the hearts, he will start to make Dummy's clubs re-entry cards; to that end he will lead his king and then his jack—which B will have to take. If B then leads a spade (up to weakness), he shows that he has no diamonds, and allows Z to read the entire diamond suit. Playing the hand open, Z would know that his ten of spades would take B's eight; but with closed hands, and on a forced interior lead, he would certainly play his queen. Even then, the game is his, with no trouble whatever.

Of course, there is a school of bidding which always opens with "a spade" on every good hand—the partner being obliged to keep the bidding open. But that is n't our school; and I notice, moreover, that its adherents are wandering more and more away from it. They now open a no-trump hand by bidding "a no-trump" just as any one else does.

Let this hand be a warning to you not to bid "a spade" unless you have to—especially if

your adversaries are good enough players to refrain from declaring against you.

If you held that same hand and opened it with a no-trump, and your partner had not a trick in his hand, he would either bid two in a very long, weak suit, to warn you, or you would play it at no-trumps and lose no more than at spades. So you can be no worse off, and may be far better off, with the no-trump opening than with the spade.

CHAPTER II

ON OPENING-BIDS OF MORE THAN ONE

UNDER the old count, certain players adopted a system of what were known as "shut-out" bids. In order to keep the adversaries from bidding, the dealer would open with a bid of two or three in his suit—provided the suit was good enough to warrant it.

This was done to keep the adversaries from naming their suits to each other and thus establishing a possible no-trumper, which neither one, alone, could essay. Even under the old count, I never cared for this method, never practiced it, and never taught it. And under the new count it is certainly unsound.

No-trump, now, is not the wonderful thing it once was. It is worth less, and the other suits are worth more, than formerly. There are four suits that may be easily and successfully bid against no-trump. Therefore, no-trump has

lost its dazzle when bid by one's own side, and its terrors when bid by the adversary.

Moreover, we *want* the other side to name their suits. We want to hear where the suits lie; we have learned to count the "points" in a suit and to read the closed hands accordingly. It is of infinite value to know what our adversaries hold and to be able to lead through strength, instead of up to it. Then why make "shut-out" bids and voluntarily block these sources of information?

Take this hand, for instance:



Z should open this with "one heart," in which case A would bid "two clubs," which he

can just make. So, if Y undertakes to double on his major ten-ace in clubs and spades, and on his partner's hearts, he will meet with defeat. But suppose Y does what is much wiser; suppose he uses his spades and clubs as raisers, and bids "two hearts" (hoping to force A to "three clubs" and to defeat him)! Then the hand will be played at two hearts by Z, and, thanks to the club information, he can make a grand slam. Knowing the clubs to be in A's hand, Z can take the finesse with his ace-queen—which he would never do otherwise, with a singleton club in his own hand. This finesse will give him a chance to discard his losing diamond on his partner's master club.

If Z had opened that hand with a bid of "two hearts," A would certainly have passed. He could not say "three clubs" lacking the ace-queen of his own suit, and holding a very uncertain combination of diamonds, three losing hearts, and one losing spade. Nobody would have bid against Z, and he would have played the hand at two hearts, in absolute ignorance of the position of the clubs. He would never have attempted the club finesse—holding a singleton himself—and without that finesse he could not get rid of his losing diamond. He would make one less trick (eight points) and a small slam

instead of a grand slam; a total difference of twenty-eight points, which would be the cost of his shut-out bid.

Twenty-eight points is not much, but it is something! And in many hands the information as to suit-position is even more valuable. Remember this: you want to know where the suits lie; it will make nearly as much difference as playing open hands or playing closed ones. And if you want to know this, don't block your information by making shut-out bids.

As to the practice of bidding two to show a long weak suit—it is a miserable one. That system has been thoroughly tested and proved unsound. To open with "two hearts" on six to a queen is to announce your poverty to the entire table and to undertake a contract that you cannot keep, unless fate is remarkably kind and gives your partner an unusually good hand. If the good cards lie against you, and the adversaries are skillful enough to pass, you will not be long in repenting your bid of two.

To sum up, then, don't open with a bid of two to show strength, and don't open with a bid of two to show weakness. In other words, never open with a bid of two.

There is a bid that is finding warm support amongst certain excellent players. While I

do not care for it, personally, it may appeal to you, and, at any rate, it is necessary to understand it.

It is the old opening call of "two spades," but with a different meaning. If you hold the ace-king of spades and one small card, and one other trick in the hand, you bid "two spades" to show you can take the first two rounds of that suit if your partner wants to try no-trumps or royals. To bid "one spade" might discourage him, and the hand is just a shade too light to warrant "a royal."

While I see the advantages of this bid, I do not advocate it. To begin with, the occasions when the situation arises are so rare as scarcely to need a special provision. One more little spade would give you a possible royal bid; one less would cut your "two spades" down to "one spade." It is such a slight chance, that I think I should risk the hand on the higher bid (royals), or consign it to the lower one, with very few regrets.

Then, I dislike the necessity that the bid imposes on your partner. I do *not* see why any one's bid, save the dealer's, should be a "forced" one. Now, if you open with "two spades," Law 48 will not shelter you. And you are marked with spades that are not good

enough to warrant a royal-bid. Therefore, the second player will certainly pass and leave you in the hole, and your partner will have to rescue you, or leave you with a bid that you probably cannot pull off, and which will be nearly worthless if you do. Suppose your partner has no bid! It is true that "one" in any suit will overcall your "two spades," but you may force him to a thoroughly unsound bid.

That seems to me the drawback to the bid; the chance of needing it is very slight; and its inconvenience, when used, may be very great.

I have never heard this bid in actual use, even by its advocates. This does not mean that they do not practice what they preach; it means, rather, that there is scarcely one hand out of a thousand where it is necessary, or where the situation may not be covered by some other perfectly sound bid.

CHAPTER III

SUBSEQUENT BIDS

REMEMBER always that the dealer, alone, is *forced* to bid. He must bid, but no one else need; and no one else should, unless he has a real reason for so doing.

The bid of the second player is largely determined by the dealer's bid. If the dealer has bid one in no-trump, royals, hearts, diamonds, or clubs, the second player should look first to see how that bid suits his own hand. "*If the bid suits you, say nothing*" is a very excellent rule. At the same time, it is necessary to remember that a bid of one is very hard to defeat. No matter how good your hand, rarely count much on defeating a bid of one; realize, however, that your good hand will probably keep the dealer from making more than his one.

Another excellent rule is this: "*unless the bid would put you game, be content to yield it to the adversary, unless his bid would put him game!*"

This rule, too, must be taken with modifications. Very often the adversary's *bid* will not put him game, but if you let him play the hand he will take enough *over* his bid to go game. For instance, he may *bid* "one heart," which will not put him game; but he may *take* four hearts, and there is his game in the hand.

If you have sufficient material to overbid the dealer, it is well to do it; for the mere indication of your suit will often enable your partner to raise it (if necessary), and you will score on the hand, instead of permitting the other side to score on it. Also, it is well not to let the other side get the bid at one-odd; force them to two, if possible, and give them a harder contract. But remember that *a forcing bid does n't always force!* You may be left with it. Your partner may even raise it, when it comes round to him if the third player has bid. For instance, suppose the dealer opens with "one heart"; you want to force him and you say "two diamonds"; the third player says "two hearts"; now, if your partner has two tricks in his hand (a trick and a "raiser"), he may easily say "three diamonds," which will give you more than you can carry, if your bid has been a light one. So you must always remember, when you make a forcing-bid, that there is a chance of your bid being raised.

Now, if the dealer has bid "a spade," your duty (as second player) is changed. *You must positively pass, unless you can take game in the hand!* Never bid against a one-spade opening-bid, under any other circumstances. If the dealer's partner bids, you can bid your hand against his, on a second round. If the dealer's partner passes, you have two poor hands against you and *the chance of making 100 points without any effort whatever!* What matter if they are above the line? I wish that cross-line could be erased from the minds of players if not from the score-card. *One hundred points are one hundred points, no matter where they are!* Don't scorn them, and don't throw away the chance to score them. One such penalty will increase your rubber-value to 350; two of them will nearly double it! Take my word for it, expert players will give you very few chances to score 500 and 600 in penalties; so don't waste your time waiting for those chances that never come, but seize the spade-penalty with proper gratitude. If you make five-odd on a no-trump hand, with thirty aces, you are triumphant; yet that totals 80 points—20 less than the spade-penalty. Ninety royal-honors fill you with joy, yet you turn away from 100 spade-honors, and bid a weak hand

on which you cannot score more than six or eight points!

If you can go game on your hand, bid it against a spade. If the rubber (two games) is worth 250 honor-points, one game is worth 125 honor-points; that means it is worth more than the spade-penalty.

But a partial game is worth little or nothing. You may toil on at your sixes, and tens, and eighteens, and see the other side go game in the hand before you ever reach your Mecca of thirty points. Partial games are very disappointing things; take them if you can get nothing better; but never fail to remember that 100 honor-points are infinitely better.

Occasionally the other side will surprise you by taking the odd, or even two-odd, on a spade bid. But what if they do? Two points, or four points, need cause you no alarm; while, if you set them, you make a very pretty sum.

Write this rule on your memory tablet: "Rarely bid against the adversary's one spade, unless you have a chance to go game on the hand."

When tempted to bid your hand against "a spade," count what it will probably bring you, and if it does not mean game, weigh it against 100 honor-points, and choose the latter.

The bid of the *Third Player* has been tremendously affected by the new count, in the way it makes it *more valuable to dovetail his hand with his partner's than to show independent suits.* Let me explain.

Suppose the dealer is your partner, and he has opened the bidding by a bid of one in any suit—save spades. Two things may happen: the second hand may pass, or he may bid. We will consider the two cases separately.

If the second hand passes, you (being third hand) should pass also, *unless you have a much more valuable suit than your partner's, or unless you want to warn him of your inability to help him in his suit!* This, you see, is a distinct departure from the old régime when we showed as many suits as possible, in order to establish the ever-desired no-trump.

If your partner bids "a club," or "a diamond," you are at liberty to overcall with "a heart," "a royal," or "a no-trump," if your hand warrants it—because you can go game in fewer tricks. If, however, the score stands at such a point that his bid would put you game, it is not desirable to overcall him (even in a better suit), unless you have high honors.

If your partner has bid "a heart," "a royal,"

or "a no-trump," your suit cannot be very much better than his; therefore, you never overcall him unless to show weakness in his suit.

Personally, I always prefer to overcall, if I have a good suit and entirely lack my partner's suit; but many excellent players do not overcall even in those circumstances, if they can give their partner two tricks. Suppose your partner opens the bidding with "a royal" and the next hand passes, and suppose you have the following hand:

♡ A J 10 8 4 2
♣ A 9 8 5
◇ Q 10 6
♠ ——

My advice would be to overbid your partner with "two hearts," to show that you cannot help him. Then, if he still wants royals, or holds a combination from which he can afford to lead away and to play his hand without your assistance, he can go back to his "two royals"; if he does, be sure to let him alone.

But on this same hand many authorities would advise you to let his "one royal" stand; you have two aces in your hand, and two tricks are a fair allowance from you; therefore, they

would not overcall even being blank in his suit. I prefer to warn and to be warned, and I think most players do.

A "backward" bid, however, has come to have quite a different meaning from what it once had; by "backward" bid, I mean a bid in a suit that is worth less than your partner's, when the intervening adversary has not bid. *Formerly, such a bid meant wonderful strength in that lower suit; now it means wonderful weakness in your partner's suit.* Nothing else. The lower suit on which you bid may, or may not, have unusual strength; it *must* be good enough to warrant your bid of two—otherwise, you should let stand your partner's bid of one. But it may hold nothing but the most ordinary strength, and a warning to your partner that he must manage his own suit alone.

To sum up then, if your partner bids "a heart" and you hold none of his suit, you are wise to change the bid if you can; if he says "a royal" and you have none, change the bid if possible. *If he says a no-trump* (now attend), *his suit is aces and kings, and, holding none of them, you should tell him so, if possible.* And now we have come to one of the most-discussed questions in Auction, and one on which the authorities have been more misquoted than on any other.

Every one knows that it is easier to win a shaky hand at a declared trump than at no-trump; in the former you can often establish a ruff in the weak hand, or a cross-ruff between the two hands, whereas in no-trump you are helpless if the other side gets in with an established suit. All authorities agree that when your partner bids no-trump and you hold a hopeless hand, you should warn him of it by making a "backward" bid of two, in some suit—*if you can. But the lightest material on which you should do this, is five cards to a ten-spot.*

On no other point have the authorities been so misquoted. I have seen players calmly change their partner's no-trump to "two diamonds," holding only four to a jack—and vow that they had been taught to do so. This is positively mistaken! Change to *any* six-card suit (even if it runs only to an eight or nine-spot), for then you have half of the trumps in the pack, while your partner has a no-trump hand. Change, too, to any five-card suit that runs to a ten-spot, or to anything higher, *but not to anything lower.* And do *not* change to any four-card suit that runs to a single honor, or to two honors. You will regret it, if you do.

By changing to a two-bid, you assume a contract of one more trick; you are going to

jump out of the frying-pan into the fire, if you try that with a four-card suit. Moreover, your partner's "one no-trump" will not be doubled—for no one doubles bids of one; he can therefore lose but 50 a trick. *And your two suit-bid may easily be doubled, and you will lose 100 a trick.*

Here are some hands to illustrate; assume, in every instance, that your partner has opened with "one no-trump," that the next hand has passed, and that you hold the hand given:

♡ J 4 3 2
♣ 10 8 6
◇ 9 5
♠ 7 6 5 3

That is a desperate position; but it is not a "two-heart" bid. How under heaven could you make "two hearts" unless your partner held a marvelous hand? And if he does, let him have his no-trump. Here is another hand:

♡ J 4 3
♣ 10 9 8 5
◇ 5 3 2
♠ 6 5 3

Don't say "two clubs" on that hand; it is simply senseless. Here is another:

♡ Q 3
♣ 10 8 4
◇ 9 8 5 3 2
♠ J 10 7

That is decidedly *not* a "two-diamond" bid; if the nine of diamonds were a ten, the hand would just come inside the lightest possible limit. Now I will give you a few examples of hands in which you *should* change the bid:

♡ 10 9 3
♣ ———
◇ J 9 6 5 4 2
♠ 8 6 4 3

Change to "two diamonds"; you have a six-card suit headed by a face-card, and a club-ruff, which would be wasted in no-trump.

♡ K
♣ 9 6 4
◇ 3 2
♠ 10 9 8 6 4 3 2

Change to "two royals." The reasons are obvious.

♡———
♣ 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
◇ 10 9 7 4
♠ A

Change to "two clubs."

I hope that these examples will serve to make clear a situation that I am sure is the most-discussed and the least-understood of any that the game offers.

Now suppose that instead of opening with a legitimate bid, your partner has been forced to say "a spade"; this, of course, means nothing; it is the dealer's equivalent for "by"; the next hand passes—what are you to do?

In the first place, rid your mind of the idea that you *must* "rescue" your partner from "a spade." If he is a good player and does not bid a spade unless he must, you would far better take refuge under Law 48 (which limits the loss at a one-spade bid to 100 points) than essay a light make yourself. If you have a good suit-bid, well and good. *But remember that it takes a better hand than usual to bid "a no-trump" after your partner's spade.* He has practically

declared his hand to be valueless; you would have to do all the work yourself.

This all pre-supposes that the second hand has passed; suppose, instead, that he has overbid your partner. Then the case is quite different.

If your partner has opened with "*a no-trump*" and the second hand has bid two in some suit, you, of course, cannot say "two no-trumps" unless you hold a stopper in that suit. But even holding such a stopper, you are not *forced* to say "two no-trumps" unless your hand warrants it. If it does, bid it; if not, bid another suit when you are able; otherwise, pass.

When your partner has made a *suit-bid*, and has been overbid, examine your hand and see if you have a "raiser" for him. Before you can raise him—deduct one trick from your hand (not necessarily a trump trick); after deducting this trick, "raisers" are guarded trump-honors, side-aces, side-kings, singletons, and missing suits—nothing else. No guarded queens may be counted as raisers. A singleton is a raiser, and a singleton ace is two raisers; a missing suit is also two raisers—provided, of course, that you have the trumps to ruff it.

In no-trump, any well-guarded honor is a raiser; but in a declared trump, the third round

of a suit is too apt to be ruffed by one or the other of the adversaries.

If you hold a suit that is very much better than your partner's, bid it against his; but if yours counts nearly the same, or less, use it as a side-suit and raise his bid. This "dovetailing" of hands, instead of showing independent suits, is one of the marked effects of the new count.

Under a system where the suits are but one point apart, the necessity for changing them is not so great. For instance, it is hardly worth changing "a club" to "a diamond" (on a clean score), because it takes five-odd of either to put you game. On the other hand, if you were 16 on the game, you *would* be apt to change "a club" to "a diamond," because two diamonds would put you game and two clubs would not. With a clean score, you would change "a diamond" to "a heart" (possibly), because it takes one trick less to go game; but you would not change "a heart" to "a royal," unless you held wonderful honors. You would be wiser to use your ace and king of spades (if you had them) as side-help for your partner in his heart-bid—even granting that your own hearts are nothing wonderful. Formerly, if your partner opened with "a diamond," and the next player said "a heart," you would be apt to say "two

clubs" (if you had them), so that your partner might shift to "a no-trump," if he had a heart stopper. To-day, "one no-trump" won't beat "two clubs," and "two clubs" themselves are worth more than they used to be. But my point is this, you would better use those clubs as a side-suit, and cover the adversary's heart-bid with "two diamonds." There are but three points' difference between diamonds and no-trump. Take this hand:



A–B were game in and 24–0 on the second game. Consequently, Z–Y were extremely anxious to make a declaration that would put

them game in the hand. Z bid "a diamond" which A capped with "a royal." It was not a wonderful royal-bid, but it had two side-tricks, a singleton, and a seven-point trump-make. And a "forcing-bid" may often be made when a player falls below the standard that is set for an opening bid. As a matter of fact, the royal-bid would fail by just one trick, and that only because the adversaries had a cross-ruff in diamonds and hearts.

Y bid "a no-trump," because his partner had diamonds and he had every other suit—and that was where he made his mistake. It was true that he held the ace-queen over A's probable king of spades, but he had a singleton in his partner's suit, his long suit would need three rounds to establish it, and his strong suit was short and might not clear.

Do beware of no-trumps when you hold singletons—even when your singleton is in the suit which your partner has declared!

Y had a much better raise to "two diamonds" than a no-trump bid, because he knew his hand would fit in with his partner's. His trump singleton would either take a trick or clear the suit for his partner, and he had two spade-tricks and two heart-tricks that were almost sure. It was a beautiful raising hand.

B passed, and (most unfortunately) Z passed. Beyond all question, Z should have overcalled with "two diamonds." His hand was worthless except for diamonds; he held two singletons (those dread things at no-trump) and a trio of miserable spades. His reasons for passing were these: his suit was not established, and he feared his partner would read him with four or five honors (if he insisted on diamonds), and would be deterred from a perfectly possible no-trumper; and it needed but three-odd to go game in no-trump, and five-odd in diamonds, and they needed game. The first reason was poor, the second was rather better. But Z *should* have argued thus: with his wonderful diamonds, *and his partner's no-trump hand*, five-odd was a very possible thing. The first wrong step, however, was when Y said "a no-trump" instead of "two diamonds."

Until you try out the hand you will be surprised to know that Y cannot take the odd in no-trumps; in spite of his partner's diamonds and his own beautiful suit, and in spite of his fourchette over A's king of spades, the odd is an impossibility for him; his three singletons kill it.

If Y had tried to dovetail his hand with his partner's, in place of bidding independently, or if

Z had gone back to his own wonderful suit, they would have gone swimming to victory.

If your partner (as dealer) uses the "two-spade" call, then, and then only, your bid is "forced" and not "free." The second player will surely pass, and Law 48 will not protect you in a "two-spade" bid, as it would in a one. Your partner has probably but three spades to the ace or king-queen; he cannot take two-odd, and they would be worth almost nothing if he did.

With a fair general hand, bid "no-trump." Lacking this, or a good suit-bid, bid "a royal" on four to the jack or the ten. And if this is an impossibility, bid one in the best suit your hand holds.

The bid of the *Fourth Player* depends largely upon the information gleaned from the previous bids. It offers very few difficulties. The principal points to remember are these: *not* to bid if the declaration rests at "one spade," unless he can go game in the hand; not to bid at all, if the declaration rests at "two spades" (for then the adversaries are in a decided hole and he would be more than foolish to help them out); and to use the same rules for raising, and dove-tailing his hand with his partner's, as hold between the bid of the third player and the dealer.

As fourth player, I should risk very little to save *game*, but I should risk a good deal to save *rubber*. A consciously losing bid that will give the other side 200 or 300 points, is often a profitable loss when the rubber is at stake.

CHAPTER IV

THE DOUBLE

NOWHERE in Auction are the effects of the new count as apparent as in the double. *Doubling has decreased fifty per cent. since the advent of the new count!*

The double is also one of the weakest points in the average game. Let me see if I cannot make its use clear to you.

There are two all-important rules that govern the double: (1) *never double any bid of one;* and (2) *never double anything unless you can double everything.* We will consider these in turn.

First, "*never double a bid of one.*" This rule must positively be adhered to. One-odd is surprisingly hard to defeat and surprisingly easy to make. Just notice, the next time you play, how seldom a bid of one is defeated; there are times, of course, when it can be done, and on those times rest content with your 50 a trick. Fifty is five times as much as you could possibly

make on one odd trick, if you played the hand yourself—and it is just as valuable when the adversary gives it to you.

Here is a hand that arose in actual play; it illustrates admirably the foolishness of doubling a one-bid:



The score was 14–10 on the rubber game in favor of Z–Y. Z dealt and bid "a royal." His bid would, therefore, not put him game, even if he made it—*but if it were doubled, it would put him game* (if he made it). "A royal" suited A better than anything else; and he could be almost sure, from his own hand, that

Z could not take more than the odd, if he took that.

The rule says, "unless your bid would put you game, be content to yield it to the adversary, unless his bid would put him game." "A royal" would not put Z game—and A's only possible forcing-bid would be "two clubs," which would not put him game, even if he made them. Moreover, A could be sure (with so many spades in his own hand) that his partner would hold few, or none, and that Z would not be apt to hold enough to make him take the force and bid "two royals." "Two clubs" on a four-card suit would be a poor bid; even the singleton is not of much use, because no one cares to take many ruffs with only four trumps.

If A had doubled that bid, he would have made a sad mistake. Z could take the odd with ease; instead of being worth 9 (with simple honors against him), it would have been worth 18, plus 50 for contract, plus 250 for rubber. A nice little windfall for Z, and all because A had made a mistaken double on a bid of one-odd.

If you double a bid of one, the adversary may easily surprise you by making it; if he does, it is worth twice its normal value, and he gets a nice little bonus besides. He gets the 50, in place of your getting it. But that is n't the

only reason you don't double bids of one; *you don't do it, because you are afraid that the maker or his partner may jump to something else.* Suppose you double "one diamond," and the adversary's partner changes to "one heart" or "two clubs"; you may not be able to do a thing in hearts or clubs. And by your foolish double you have frightened them away from the very suit you most wanted to play. You have been good enough to warn them from their dangerous suit and to guide them toward one where they are perfectly safe. It is so obvious that I cannot understand the difficulty many players seem to have in grasping it.

Under the old count it was permissible to double a bid of one, in a black suit, to show that you could stop the suit at no-trump. If the adversary opened with "a spade," or "a club," and you held the ace of his suit, or the guarded king or queen you would double to indicate a stopper, so that your partner might go to no-trump. I never liked this custom, never played it, and never taught it, even under the old count. And under the new count (when such wild dashes for no-trump are unnecessary), such bids would seem positively archaic. No one makes them any more. The other day I ran across some players from another city who

still clung to doubling bids of one in the black suits, and I cannot tell you how old-fashioned and futile it seemed. You know how queer a ten-year-old photograph looks to you to-day. That was precisely the impression those doubles made on me. We have left that sort of thing far, far behind.

We come now to the second of the two great doubling rules: "*never* double anything unless you can double everything." This is, without exception, the best doubling rule that has ever been made. And it is the direct outcome of the new count.

Under the old count, the wide disparity in the suit-values cut off your adversary's means of escape from an unwelcome double. Suppose he had bid "three no-trumps" (36 points) and that you had doubled him. His only possible escape would be "five hearts" (a very high bid and one which would make your book two tricks), or "six diamonds,"—a small slam! No black suit would have offered him refuge, and the red ones were almost prohibitive.

Suppose he bids "three no-trumps" to-day. They are worth 30 points instead of 36; and just think for a moment of how many paths lie open before him, if you attempt to double him. He, or his partner, may jump to "four royals"

(that brand-new suit), "four hearts" (instead of five), "five diamonds," or "five clubs"; four alternatives instead of two, and not one of them a six-bid!

If the adversary has made a bid that suits you so well that you are virtually sure of defeating it, *and if no other bid would suit you at all*, why should you run the risk of frightening him away from the desirable bid? If you wanted to startle a person in the dark, would you say to him, "Look out, now, I am going to frighten you! Boo!" or would you jump at him without a word of warning?

To double a person is to warn him. It tells him at once that you are strong enough to think you can defeat him; if he thinks you cannot, and refuses to change his bid, then no harm has been done. But in that case you are the one who would better look out.

But if the bid has been a shaky one, your double will warn him of his danger and will give him a chance to get into a safer place where you cannot touch him, for "doubling keeps the bidding open." Your opponent will change his bid, or, if he cannot, his partner will rush to the breach, and they will make a new bid in a suit where you cannot harm them in the least.

But there are many occasions where you can

double the adversary in anything which he attempts as a means of escape; those are the times, and the only times, when you should double him at all. And, of course, the higher you get him, the harder it will be for him to get out. Suppose he has bid "three royals" on this hand:

♡ J
♣ A 6
◇ K 10 4
♠ A Q 10 7 6 5 4

That, I think, is a perfectly sound "three royal" bid; he has four cards that rank as "losing" cards—the jack of hearts, the six of clubs, and the ten and four of diamonds. That gives him a three bid, even without the legitimate allowance of one trick from his partner's hand.

Now, suppose you sit "over" him (on his left hand, not his right), and have been bidding no-trumps against his royals, on the following hand:

♡ A K Q
♣ K Q 5
◇ A Q 6
♠ K J 9 8

When you get him to "three royals," you should certainly double him, for he cannot possibly make it. Your book is four; your king and jack of spades will both take, being guarded and being on the proper side of the bid. That makes half your book; three tricks more will enable you to defeat him. You can be almost sure that he is short, or lacking, in at least one suit; for with the high side cards in your hand, he must have a long line of royals to go to three, and with so many of them he is short somewhere else. But even so, you can certainly squeeze three tricks out of your three master hearts, your major ten-ace in diamonds, and your guarded king and queen of clubs. And that is without counting on a single trick from your partner.

But the real reason you double him is because you have him, no matter where he jumps. It is like trying to defeat an enemy in battle; you first cut off every possible means of escape, and then you pounce on him and demolish him. If in this case your adversary tries to get out by changing his bid to "three no-trumps," "four hearts," "four diamonds," or "five clubs," you are perfectly sure he cannot make it, and you can double him again.

Even sitting on the wrong side of the royal-bid, a hand like that would defeat "three royals";

but you could not feel as sure of making both your high trumps when there was danger of being led through.

Amateurs will always tell you that this rule of "never doubling anything unless you can double everything" is "a perfectly absurd" one. They will be sure to think that it cuts down their chances of doubling. And so it does; for it eliminates all foolish doubles and leaves only the sane and safe ones. Rather a good way of pruning, is n't it? What satisfaction is there in doubling and seeing the adversary jump to safer ground?

Here is a hand where you should not double, even though you can easily defeat the bid:



Z opens this hand with "a royal." It is not a wonderfully strong bid, but it is a perfectly legitimate one. In the present instance he cannot make it, but that is only because the other side has a cross-ruff. And he loses but two-odd (100 points), which is no more than he would lose at spades. At royals, he will lose 100 points less 18 honors (82 points), and at spades he would lose 100 points less 4 honors (96 points). The royal is therefore preferable.

A says "two clubs," and Y says "two hearts," —to B's secret delight.

But B must not double for fear of frightening Z back to royals; Z could not make two royals, but B does not know that. Neither does he know that between them the adversaries could not establish a two no-trump bid. His partner's club-bid makes this seem improbable, but B must not risk it. "When the bid suits you, say nothing," and "two hearts" suits B to perfection. By passing, he scores 150 points—more than he could possibly make on his own declaration.

Here is another hand that admirably illustrates the rule in question:



I hope and pray that none of my readers would open this hand with "a heart"; it is absolutely unwarranted to bid on jack-suits on the first round, except in extreme cases, where things are desperate and the score demands that you break the rule. Z's proper bid is "a spade."

A must not bid "a royal" for the same reason that Z must not bid "a heart." Moreover, if A could take the odd in royals, he can keep the adversary from taking the odd in spades. To score a trick in royals is worth 9 points; to defeat a spade is worth 50 or 100 points. A passes.

Y bids "a diamond."

B boosts with "two clubs."

Z has a trick and a raiser—his two aces. He can say "two diamonds" if he likes—but I do not particularly care for it. However, if he does, or if Y does, B must not double the diamonds for fear of frightening the adversary to hearts, to royals, or to no-trumps. Of course, he can defeat the diamond bid; but let him be satisfied with his 50 a trick. By reaching for 100 he might lose it all.

If B doubles two diamonds, Z will bid "two hearts," and he can just make it. But let no one think that this fact warrants an opening bid of "a heart" from Z. Suppose the rest of the cards were differently divided; suppose B held the ace-queen of hearts over Y's king, and A held all the little hearts and a diamond-ruff; or suppose B held Y's hearts and a spade-ruff, and Y was chicane in hearts! Then where would Z's heart bid land him? Because a thing works out sometimes is no proof that it is right. And you simply must not deceive your partner by bidding on jack-suits on the first round.

It is not always necessary to hold good trumps in order to double; it is only necessary *to hold one more trick than your book, and to be able to double any other possible make.* Here is a hand that shows on what light trumps you can some-

times double; the doubler, here, holds *only the singleton deuce of trumps:*



Z bids "a diamond," A "a royal," and Y "two diamonds" or "two clubs"—preferably the former. He is debarred from no-trump by his singleton spade. A goes up in royals on account of his honors; he is naturally loath to lose them. Y continues to force him with diamonds until he gets him to "three royals" (he will have to make this bid or yield the play to Y on his bid of "three diamonds," and lose his 90 honors). If A says "three royals," Y is wiser to double than to bid "four diamonds."

Of course, if he could see his partner's hand, he would realize that he was safe at four diamonds; but with four losing cards in his hand, he is wiser to double the "three royals." And he is safe in doubling, because:

If A or B should say "four hearts" (to get out of the double), Y can double that.

If they should say "three no-trumps," he can double that.

And they certainly cannot escape by the way of diamonds or clubs, so he has them in a hole.

Y makes 200 by doubling "three royals. A's honors cut his profit down to 110; but even that is 47 points more than he could make with four diamonds, unless the latter would put him rubber.

Now I am going to tell you why I have been so anxious to impress upon you this rule of "never doubling anything unless you can double everything." It is because it eliminates from the game one of its weakest points. Every one knows how tiresome it is to have a partner who insists upon taking you out of a double when you want to stay in. All good players agree in declaring that it is one of the most annoying things that can happen in Auction, and, unfortunately, it happens constantly. *But with*

the adoption of this rule, it will be entirely done away with.

Your partner cannot "rescue" you with an inexcusably weak bid in another suit, because it is impossible for you to be rescued. If you have been doubled in diamonds, he will be doubled in anything that he attempts—clubs, hearts, royals, or no-trumps. This will keep him from feeling that he must do something "to pull his partner out," and will wipe out the weak bids which are often the mistaken results of a double. This is the secondary advantage of the rule, but, to my mind, it is almost as great as the primary one.

It is, of course, impossible to know whether your partner is pleased or displeased at being doubled. If I could make a rule, or establish a convention, that would clear away this difficulty, I should be the most popular person in the Auction world to-day. But such a rule, or such a convention, is an utter impossibility. Nevertheless, one thing is certain: whether, or not, he likes his position, *you can not help him out.* And that fact should keep you from essaying such a thing on a hand which is probably far weaker than the one on which he bid and was doubled.

I have seen players bid "three hearts" on a hand approximating this:

♡ A Q J 8 6 2
♣ K 10 3
◇ K 9 4
♠ A

and I have seen the bid doubled.

Then I have seen the partner of the first bidder go to "three royals" on the queen-jack-ten, six, and four, *and not another trick in the hand!*

Now, I ask you, would any sane person bid "three royals" on five to the queen-jack-ten, and not an outside trick, if there had been no double? Most certainly not; therefore it is not a bid with which to rescue a partner who has been doubled, for the simple reason that it is certainly far worse than the hand on which he voluntarily went to "three hearts"; you throw away the good hand and play the poor one, simply because you permit yourself to be terrorized by a double. If you realize that you are bound to be doubled on the hand no matter what you do, you will soon see how much better it is to be doubled on his hand, which he bid with his eyes open and in cool judgment, than on your hand, to which you fly as a desperate hope.

There is just one situation where it *is* wise to take your partner out of a double. Let me explain it to you: suppose your partner deals

and declares a diamond, and the second hand passes; you hold very good royals, but do not declare them against your partner's bid, because the score makes his diamonds as good as your royals. The fourth hand bids hearts, and your partner allows himself to be forced up in his diamonds till he is *doubled by the second player* (*i. e.*, the one on his left). Now declare your royals if they are good enough; you will have no heavier contract than your partner's, and though you know you will be doubled if he was doubled, you have this advantage—*the doubling hand sits "under" you and can be led through; whereas he sits "over" your partner, and has him at a disadvantage.* This position, and one where you hold excellent honors in a high suit (and can thus deduct their value from your losses), are the only ones where I should advise you to try to pull your partner out of a double.

The redouble is a very interesting subject, and a point of the game that holds many pitfalls for the unwary. *If you have been doubled, and are sure you can make your bid, be very careful about redoubling!* By so doing, you give your adversary a loophole through which to escape from his unfortunate double, and an opportunity to change it to a bid of his own.

The only hand on which you should redouble, is

one on which you are not only practically sure of making your contract, but one where you are prepared to defeat the adversary if he attempts to get out with any bid whatever. The following hand will illustrate:



The score on this hand was 18, all on the second game; but A–B had lost rather heavily in penalties and were anxious to get them back. Z bid "one heart."

A said "two clubs."

Y and B passed, and Z bid "two hearts."

A bid "three clubs" on his honors, his two singletons, and to push Z up. And when Z

went to "three hearts" A doubled. I think most players would; he held five trumps to the ten (thus making his ten good if trumps were drawn), and a wonderful club-suit. With this he expected first to force Z—and later, to take a few rounds when trumps were exhausted. There was also a possibility of taking a trick with his king of spades.

Z was delighted at the double, for he knew he could make his bid; but he proved his right to the title of expert by refraining from redoubling. Why should he risk frightening A back to clubs? And A, or B, would certainly have gone to four clubs had Z redoubled,—and they could have made them. Z, of course, could have said "four hearts," but no one could have doubled him, his tricks would have been worth 8 apiece, instead of 16, and he would have lost his bonus.

Every one passed and the play of the hand was intensely interesting. A led his king of clubs; Z trumped and led a high trump; he realized that A had probably five or six small trumps, and he wanted to see which. As soon as B followed once, Z read A's hand as well as though it were open. He dropped trumps, and began to establish Dummy's spade-queen as a re-entry card, so as to finesse Dummy's diamonds towards his own; the chance of finding the queen

of diamonds with B was his great hope. Z led the ace of spades, and seeing A's king fall, he led spades again. Now, whether A ruffed or discarded his losing diamond, Z had him badly beaten. If A ruffed and led a club, Z would take it, exhaust A's trumps, get into Dummy with the queen of spades, and make all his diamonds—a small slam! If A discarded the diamond on the spade, Z would take with Dummy's queen and lead the jack of diamonds. This was what he did, in actual play; A then ruffed the diamond, and the result was the same—a small slam for Z.

A could have saved one trick by refusing to ruff either the spade or the diamond (discarding clubs on them), until Z had not another diamond to lead to Dummy. On that last round A should have trumped, but not till then. B would then have taken a spade trick, making two tricks instead of one; but, not seeing the other hands, it would have been a most unusual play.

Z scored on that hand:

6 tricks at 16 each	96 points
4 honors in one hand	64 "
Small slam	20 "
Bonus	50 "
Three extra tricks (50 each)	150 "
Total	380 points

Now suppose he had redoubled, and frightened A back to clubs; Z would then have said "four hearts" and no one would have doubled him. The hand would then have been worth:

6 tricks at 8 each	48 points
4 honors in one hand	64 "
Small slam	20 "
Total	132 points

A foolish redouble would have cost Z just 248 points!

Here, on the contrary, is a hand on which A would have every reason to redouble:



It is the rubber-game and the score is 18–10, in favor of Z–Y. Z deals and bids "one no-trump."

A can pass and make 100; or he can bid "two royals," or "two no-trumps."

If he chooses the latter, Z might possibly double. He has what is known as a "free" double. If A makes his bid, he will go rubber anyhow, doubled or undoubled. Therefore, Z might as well get 100 a trick (instead of 50), if he defeats him. He holds five possible tricks.

If Z doubles, A must redouble because:

He is practically sure of making his bid.

He could defeat "three royals" (should Z attempt them). He can also defeat "three hearts," "four diamonds," or "four clubs." He has, therefore, a sound redouble.

Always think twice, then, before redoubling. And remember that you must not do it unless you can make your own bid, and can also defeat any bid that the adversary may make.

The double will lose its terrors for you if you adhere strictly to this rule and to these following:

Always double in preference to bidding, unless the bid will put you game.

Remember that a poor double is worse than a poor bid; the adversary cannot go game or

rubber on your bid, no matter how poor; he may easily go game or rubber on your double.

Never double a bid of one; it is too easy to make and too easy to change.

Never double unless you are prepared to double again, no matter where the adversary jumps.

When your partner has been doubled and has refrained from redoubling, remember "it may be from fright or delight."

Never attempt to "pull your partner out" of a double by making a bid that you would not have made had there been no double.

CHAPTER V

THE CLUB CONVENTION

THE club convention is the child of the new count. Let me explain it to you.

In old Bridge, if you were in the lead and your partner doubled no-trump, it was your place to lead your highest heart. This was known as the "heart convention," and it made it imperative that third-hand should hold the ace of hearts in order to double no-trump. Some players objected to this convention, because it curtailed their chances of doubling; so they substituted the "weak suit convention," by which the proper lead in doubled no-trump was the highest card of your weakest suit. This increased the opportunities for doubling, but it was a rather risky thing, as the two partners were frequently weak in the same suit. However, it was played universally in England, and had some admirers here.

Then Auction came and all these conventions were done away with. If your partner had a good suit, he usually showed it by bidding; then

if he doubled the adversary's no-trump, you knew his suit and could lead it to him. *If he doubled no-trump without ever naming a suit, it was a safe gamble that he was doubling on a long black suit whose value was too low to make it possible to bid it against no-trump*—that is, clubs or spades. No one could bid either of these suits against "two no-trumps"; and yet, if a player held seven spades or clubs headed by the three highest cards—he could certainly defeat "two no-trumps," provided he could get the lead. Certain authorities advised you always to lead your highest spade in a doubled no-trump; but I contended that if you held a spade-honor yourself, your partner could n't be doubling on spades; his suit must be clubs. From that arose the rule: "If your partner doubles no-trump without ever naming a suit, lead him the highest card of your own weakest black suit." Of course, there was always the chance that he might be doubling on general strength, and in that case, no lead could hurt him; he could certainly come in soon, no matter what was led.

But now we are confronted by a new situation. Under the new count, if your partner has wonderful spades, he will certainly bid them as "royals" once, at least. And even clubs have sufficient weight to hold their own against no-

trump. Therefore, if a player (not in the lead) doubles no-trump without ever naming a suit, what does he want led to him?

There are two situations where such a double would be possible: one is where a player holds a long established suit which is too low in value to be bid against no-trumps (and clubs is the only such suit); and the other is where he is doubling on general strength—and then, no lead can hurt him. I will give you a hand to illustrate each situation. Each time, pray imagine yourself to be A:



Z bids "a no-trump."

A, "two hearts," on a ten-point suit and two singletons.

Y would *possibly* say "two no-trumps," though I do not care for it. However, he stops the hearts and might wish to tell his partner so. So we will imagine him to bid "two no-trumps."

Now, two no-trumps are worth 20. It would take "four clubs" to beat them, and B's hand (with three losing diamonds and three losing spades) would never warrant a bid of four. Yet, if he could be sure of having clubs led him he could easily double the no-trump bid. His book is five; he has that many *sure* tricks in his hand, two more that are nearly sure, and his partner has shown heart-strength; moreover, he could double "three royals," his partner could double "three hearts," the other side could not get out by a club-bid, and their only possible means of escape would be "three diamonds." Allowing a heart trick to A, a heart-ruff to B, together with his spade-trick and two club tricks (if they are not ruffed), he has even a hand to defeat three diamonds.

The point is this: if B held those same cards in any other suit, he could beat two no-trumps with a three-bid—three diamonds, three hearts, or three royals. Clubs, being the lowest suit, will necessitate a four-bid; *but B can positively defeat the adversary's bid, if he is sure his double will be met with a club-lead from his partner.*

The next hand is one where B doubles on general strength:



Z, "a no-trump."
A, "two hearts."
Y and B "by."
Z, "two no-trumps."
A and Y, "by."
B, "double."

No lead can hurt B in this hand; and a club would suit him as well as anything else. If a player doubles no-trump on general strength he does n't greatly care what is led him; it is only when he is doubling on a long established suit that it is essential that you lead him that suit.

Remember then, if you ever find yourself in A's position, with a partner who doubles no-trumps without ever naming a suit, he does n't want a heart led him—hearts and no-trumps are so close in value, under the new count, that he could bid his hearts; he does n't want a spade—if he had long spades he would bid them as royals. *What he wants is a club, and it is your business to give it to him!* This constitutes the "club convention."

Had B held those same cards in any other suit, not only would he have been able to beat two no-trumps with *three* in his suit (instead of four), *but his honors would have been so valuable as to make it profitable to risk losing the odd.* Such a hand would be the following:



If Z should open this hand with "a no-trump," and A should cover with "two hearts," Y would make a mistake to say "two no-trumps" on such a weak hand. Many players, however, would do it to show that they stopped the hearts. In the event of such a bid, B is well able to bid his "three royals," and his honors are extremely valuable, besides.

Players in A's position (*i. e.*, those who find themselves in the lead, with a partner who has doubled no-trumps without ever showing suit) are not the only ones who must remember the "club convention." To those who sit in B's position its observance is just as necessary; *such players must never make such a double, unless it is convenient to them to have a club led.*

CHAPTER VI

CHANGING A DOUBLE TO A BID

I AM constantly surprised to see players changing their partners' doubles to bids, with no intervening bid from the adversary. Under the old count, this was correct, because we sometimes doubled simply to show that we could stop a suit if our partners wanted to try no-trumps. The double did not mean that we wanted to play the suit, or that we could score if we did play it; it meant only that we held a stopper in it. And we fully expected our partner to bid, after our double.

Under the new count, we are not so anxious for no-trump, nor do we invite it by showing stoppers. A double, therefore, means that we want to play the suit, *and that we expect to make 100 a trick for every trick over two, three, four, or five, as the case may be* (for no one ever doubles a one-bid). It means, moreover, that we can double any suit to which the adversary jumps.

Under these circumstances, what possible right can a partner have to interfere with our plans, and to drag us back to a suit that is worth but 6, or 7, or 8, or 9, a trick,—for every trick over six? How can that compare with the profits on a double?

Suppose your partner has been bidding royals on a hand that holds 90 honors; and suppose the adversary has been bidding hearts. When he gets to three or four hearts, you double him on your own hand and your partner's royals. You feel rather happy to think of the two, or three, or four hundred that you expect to make. And suppose your partner is so dazzled by his 90 honors that he goes back to his royals! Would n't you have a right to feel discouraged?

One of your doubled tricks would be worth more than all his honors; two of your tricks would beat a grand slam in royals with 90 honors, and three of your tricks would cast the rubber, itself, into the shade.

I can never understand why players are so indifferent to these hundreds that they can make on doubled tricks, and so eager over their 60, or 72, or 81, or 90 honors that they score by playing the hand. It must be because the honors are tangible, sure, and unusual: they are tangible, because there is no vagueness as to

what they will net you; they are sure, because the adversary cannot possibly steal them from you; and they are unusual because you do not often hold five honors in one hand. The chances for doubling and defeating the bid are much more frequent and are therefore less prized; and there is often the chance of an unpleasant surprise in seeing your double defeated. Nevertheless, in most instances a good double is infinitely preferable to playing the hand. It is only the over-fearful type of mind that will fail to appreciate this fact after a little practice.

If your partner has doubled, *let him alone*, and don't interfere with his plans by making a bid of your own, unless—

Your bid will give you a certain winning rubber, or—

You are weak enough to know you will be a drag to him, or—

You have made a previous bid which you fear has misled him and tempted him to an unwise double.

In other words, you rarely change your partner's double to a bid because you feel strong, or because you have high honors: very few hands score a hundred, or two hundred by taking the play. *But you do change his double to a bid if you*

are weaker than you have led him to believe. Here is a case in point:



A–B were one game in, and the score was 14–12 in favor of Z–Y.

Z bid "a heart"; if he could take two-odd in hearts it would make the score game-all.

A bid "a royal."

Y had the ace of this suit, which made one sure trick, and his singleton club was a legitimate raiser; his was a wretched hand, but his bid of "two hearts" was strictly in accordance with the rule for raisers, and therefore cannot be criticized.

B did not believe that the adversaries could

make "two hearts." He himself held five hearts to two honors, with the three top cards in sequence; he held a diamond singleton, rather nice clubs, and his partner had shown royals. It was a weak double and one of which I do not approve. But B could not raise his partner's royals at all; his singleton diamond would be a raiser if he had another trick in his hand, which he has n't. Guarded queens do not count as tricks in a declared trump unless they are trump queens. The principal objection to B's doubling "two hearts," is that he might frighten some one to "three diamonds," which would n't suit him at all. "Never double anything unless you can double everything!"

The original B felt, however, that he had a "free" double. Two-odd in hearts, even undoubled, would put the adversaries game. So B doubled two hearts.

It was a most unfortunate move, for Z–Y could make four-odd in hearts, with the greatest ease.

Z was delighted at the double. His three master hearts, his splendid clubs, his spade ruff, and his partner's raise all made him sure that his bid would go through. A poor player in Z's place would have become panic-stricken and jumped to "three clubs," which would have

suited B to perfection. Or he would have redoubled the "two hearts," and frightened A back to royals. Z did neither; he passed.

Z passed, and A did the very thing we are discussing—he changed his partner's double to a bid, with no bid from the intervening hand.

A's hand was valueless except in royals, and he feared his partner was playing him for the ace of spades, which he did not hold. Moreover, he was chicane in hearts. And (as a third reason) if he made two-odd in royals he would go rubber. Therefore he bid "two royals."

He did not do this because of his 72 honors or his strength in royals. He did it partly from weakness (lacking hearts and the ace of spades), and partly to the score (he could go rubber on his bid).

If that had been the beginning of a rubber, and if A had held the ace of spades, he should have passed, even though he could make his royals, and his partner (in this case) could not make his double. But A does not know that; he has every reason to suppose that B's double is sound; if it is, they make a hundred a trick for every trick over five, or 300 for eight tricks. And by playing royals A could make but five tricks at 9 each, plus 72 honors, a total of 117.

Here is another hand totally different, but illustrating the same principle:



It is the first hand of a new rubber; penalties are therefore more desirable than playing the hand—unless one could go game in the hand.

Z bids "a diamond," and A passes.

Y is in an unpleasant position. He is chicane in his partner's suit, but I certainly should not advocate his bidding "a royal" on a four-card, six-point suit, with nine wretched side cards in his hands. He would like to warn his partner of his weakness in diamonds, but I do not see how it is possible. Suppose he should say "a

royal"; B would immediately cover with "two hearts," Z would not want to lose his hand to a heart-bid; he might say "three diamonds" (and be defeated), or he might raise his partner's royals,—which would lead to trouble. That is the worst of bidding on a hand like Y's; Z would consider it a sound bid, his diamonds, clubs, and singleton heart would give him a number of raises—and they would come to certain grief.

But suppose Y passes, as I think he certainly should, then B will bid "one heart," and Z will say "two diamonds." A cannot double for fear some one will say "three clubs," which he cannot hope to defeat; he must pass, Y will pass, and B (unconscious of his partner's desire for diamonds) will say "two hearts."

Z has *not* a three-diamond hand,—especially when the score demands nothing from him; ace-king-ten is a very poor combination, and his partner has given him no raise. Still it is an every-day occurrence to see players bid three on hands no stronger than Z's.

If Z says "three diamonds," A will simply have to double to keep his partner from going up in hearts. It would take four clubs from Y to pull him out of the double, and that is a pretty big hand to have kept quiet all this time. A–B's

book would be three; A holds the ace of clubs, his partner has shown hearts, and it does n't look as if any one could make four-odd against them. Certainly no one can get out with a "three no-trump" bid; A holds the master club, good diamonds and spades, and his partner has shown hearts.

A doubles three diamonds, trusting no one will bid clubs. Should the adversary try it, B has his hearts and may be able to bid them, or to defeat the club bid.

After A's double, Y passes. And B would be more than foolish to go back to his hearts, in spite of his 64 honors. What is 64 compared with 100?

Z can take but the book in diamonds, and he cannot take that unless he plays very well. A will lead to his partner's bid the eight of hearts. B will know that to be A's highest heart, and the moment Dummy goes down he will realize that Z has a singleton king and that A has no more hearts. B will therefore take the first round with the ace and lead the queen. Now, if Z tries trumping with a low trump, or even with his ten, he will lose heavily. He must trump with the king and lead his ace in order to pull two trumps for one. This will spoil B's spade ruff on the second round. Z must also put up his

spade ace on the first round, and must continue to force A with clubs—making A ruff and lead up to him. In this way he can manage to take the book—no more.

This gives A–B 300 points—provided they have doubled. That is more than the rubber; and to win such heavy penalties on the first game is a marvelous help. It puts the other side at an immediate disadvantage and hampers them continually.

If B plays the hand at hearts he can just take the game; 32 points and 64 honors are the best he can do. A total of 96 points against 300!

If A–B were 8 or 10 points on the rubber game, B might be excused for changing A's double to a bid; otherwise he would be extremely foolish to do such a thing. Yet players fall constantly into this error. It is the prevailing mad desire to capture the bid and play the hand that is the cause of so much trouble.

An odd thing about this hand is that Y would be able to make the book in royals, in spite of what looks like a wretched hand. By very clever playing he could make the book, but not the odd. Give him a higher heart or club, and he could pull out the odd against the best defense.

One more hand will be sufficient proof of the futility of changing doubles to bids:



Z opens with a "no-trump" on his hundred aces and a very miserable hand.

A says "two hearts" on an eight-point make, a singleton, a doubleton, and a guarded honor in the remaining side-suit.

An amateur in Y's place would say "two no-trumps," because he stopped the hearts. If Y is a good player he will realize that with such cards as he holds, and a partner who bids no-trumps, they can defeat anything. He will therefore double two hearts and make the tricks worth a hundred apiece. Do you know any suit that is worth that?

B will pass, and Z will make the mistake of

his life if he changes that double to a bid; notwithstanding his hundred aces. One doubled trick will equalize these—and no-trumps are worth but 10 a trick.

In "two hearts," doubled, Z–Y will make 500, —the value of two rubbers. By playing the hand at no-trump, they will make 60 points plus 20 for a slam plus 100 aces—a total of 180 and a loss of 320. Of course, they have all the cards; but there is absolutely no way in which it is possible to score 500 on your own declaration.

Let these hands convince you of the value of a double, as opposed to a bid. And if your partner doubles and the next hand passes, *never bid against that double*, unless from weakness, from the certainty of taking a winning rubber, or from fear that a previous bid of yours has misled your partner in regard to your hand.

CHAPTER VII

THROWING AWAY A HUNDRED ACES

In Bridge, of course, such a thing as throwing away a hundred aces was unheard of. Their value was as great as the rubber value; they were things to be longed for, but seldom acquired. In Auction there are so many opportunities for gathering in the hundreds that four aces do not seem anything stupendous. Your Auction stake should be one-fifth of your Bridge stake. If you used to play Bridge at 5 cents a point, you should play Auction at 1 cent a point. They are nearly equal stakes; therefore, one hundred aces in Auction are about equal to twenty honor points in Bridge—just the value of a small slam. Nothing very wonderful, you see!

Here is a sample of a hand on which I should choose a suit-bid in preference to no-trump—even with four aces in the hand.

♡ A
♣ A 2
♢ A 5 4
♠ A K J 10 7 6 4

I should certainly bid that hand "a royal," rather than "a no-trump." Royals are worth but one point less than no-trump; there is not a face-card in the hand, outside the spade-suit, and there is a singleton, a doubleton, and a three-card suit. Played at royals, the opportunities for ruffing are wonderful; and the 72 honors are valuable in themselves. But even with simple honors, I should bid "a royal" on that hand.

Here is another combination on which the dealer, holding a hundred aces, opened with "a no-trump," and later abandoned the suit:



Z opened this hand with "a no-trump," A said "two diamonds," and Y passed; B lacked his partner's suit, so he said "three clubs," on seven to four honors, his ruff, his partner's diamonds, and his good hearts.

Z was practically sure of his ability to defeat "three clubs"; his book was four, he had two club rounds and three other aces—making the odd in his own hand alone. His ace of diamonds would be ruffed, but he did not know that. However, his partner's king of spades would be a trick.

B could never make any use of A's diamonds, because he had none to lead, and because A held no side re-entry.

Z hesitated about doubling "three clubs," because he feared frightening A to "three diamonds," which he was not entirely sure he could defeat. If all his aces took, that made the book, and he would have to trust his partner for the odd. Moreover, with a "three-club" bid from B, and five clubs to the ace in Z's own hand, there was a strong probability that A held no clubs and could ruff Z's ace, if diamonds were trumps.

If Z allowed B to play "three clubs" and defeated him by one trick, undoubled, he would make fifty and lose his hundred aces. If he

bid "two no-trumps" himself, he got his hundred aces, but would probably lose heavily in penalties—with a "two-diamond" hand on one side of him and a "three-club" hand on the other. And, finally, if Z doubled the "three-club" bid, he would make a hundred in penalties (as much as his aces were worth), but he would risk frightening A to "three diamonds," which he was not sure of defeating.

Z decided to double "three clubs," and to double again if A tried "three diamonds." With four aces in one's hand it is fairly safe to double a three-bid in anything.

A refused to raise. He held six losing cards and lacked the ace of his own suit, which he was practically sure of finding in Z's hand. That made seven losing tricks, as far as he could tell, and he knew, moreover, that Z was too good a player to double anything unless he could double everything.

A passed, Y passed, and B did the most remarkable thing I ever knew—he jumped to three hearts.

He did this because he hoped to find more help with his partner than he could get in clubs, and because he had been doubled in clubs and hoped (by some fluke) he would not be doubled in hearts. But he was doomed to disappointment;

Z promptly doubled "three hearts," and every one passed.

B was very unwise in his last bid; he could not lose much in clubs, and he had a splendid long line of them with which to ruff his missing suit and his short suit. In hearts he had but four trumps, and no one cares to do much ruffing with a four-card suit. However, he argued that diamonds, hearts, and clubs were all on his side, leaving but one suit against him, and that his partner might easily lack clubs (with two big club hands against him), and they could establish a cross-ruff in clubs and diamonds. This last idea was a clever one.

In "three hearts" doubled, Z–Y make 300—three times the value of those aces. Z leads; he will not lead his ace of diamonds, for fear of establishing a long suit for Dummy; he will not lead the club, for fear Dummy has none and will get a ruff; and he will not lead trumps. He leads the ace of spades, and Y plays the nine (an encouragement card) to show the king. Then, no matter how B plays, he can not fail to lose 300 against the best defense.

In "doubled three clubs," B's loss would have been 100. His shift to hearts was a bad move, even though it required no heavier contract. A three-bid on a four-

card suit presupposes too much help from one's partner.

Here is one more hand that has recently come under my observation where a heart-bid (even without simple honors) proved more profitable than a no-trump with a hundred aces. Z, the dealer, held these cards:

♡ A K 7 5 3 2
♣ A 6
◇ A 8
♠ A 4 2

He opened with "a heart," meaning to go to no-trump later, if the bidding warranted it. And there was no bidding. Every one passed, and the hand was played at one heart, scoring three-odd, with simple honors to the adversaries. Had it been played at no-trump the dealer could have taken but five-odd, as his partner had an absolutely blank hand; the penalties, therefore, would have exactly balanced Z's aces.

Remember, then, that, though a hundred aces were never a negligible quantity in Bridge, and were rarely so even in Auction, under the old count, under the new count they are not so wonderful. The new suit of royals holds very valuable possibilities in honors and, in addition,

makes it fairly easy to go game in the hand. *When you hold good spades or good hearts, running to the ace, and when all your other suits are very short and hold no other honors but the ace, choose the suit-bid in preference to no-trump!*

CHAPTER VIII

QUEEN-SUITS

A BID on a suit that is headed by the queen is known as an "irregular" bid; irregular, but not necessarily prohibited. First-round bid on jack-suits and ten-suits are prohibited bids. Ace-suits and king-suits are standard bids, and the most conservative authorities permit no others. I see no reason to bar queen-suit bids, *under certain conditions*.

If a queen-suit contains one or two other honors (the jack, the ten, or the jack-ten), if it is unusually long, and if the hand holds outside strength (such as aces, kings, and ruffs), *but does not admit of any other bid*, I should bid on the queen-suit to avoid a one-spade bid. With such a hand as that, you can scarcely lose more than two-odd, which would be what the adversaries would probably take on the spade-penalty. It is not as discouraging to your partner as the spade-bid, it sometimes strikes a lucky combination in his hand; and, if it does

not, he can generally warn you of his weakness, either by a backward bid or a forward bid.

Now the fact that I consider a queen-bid allowable under these circumstances does *not* mean that I approve of bids of two or three on queen-suits; or of one, even, on a queen and four or five little spots; or of queen-bids from players who are not the dealer and are therefore not *forced* to bid; or of queen-bids on any hand that does not hold outside strength.

Queen-suits, if they be long enough, are all right as trumps, *but they are not always left as trumps*, and they are wretched things as side-suits, or at no-trumps. It takes three rounds to establish a queen-suit; sometimes the partner lacks that third card, and the queen-high hand has no other re-entry; that spells trouble!

If you are going to bid on a queen-suit, choose one of the two high suits (hearts or royals), for the simple reason that your partner will not change them to no-trump as he would a lower suit. There is so little difference in the value of a no-trump and a royal, or a no-trump and a heart, that there is little object in changing them; in fact,

it is specially forbidden. *A good heart or a good royal is good enough for any one.* It takes but one more trick to go game in them than in no-trump; and if your partner has a no-trump hand he will give you that extra trick. The only time when he should change your heart (or royal) bid to no-trump, is when he wants to warn you of his weakness—when he holds little or nothing in your suit, but protects every other. After this one warning, if you go back to your own suit, he should let you alone.

For this reason, it is less risky to bid on queen-suits in hearts or royals than in clubs or diamonds. Those, your partner might easily change to no-trumps,—and he would be apt to feel very disappointed when he saw what your bid meant.

Again, a queen-suit bid may prove very misleading if your partner essays a double. Say you have bid hearts and the other side bids diamonds; your partner may hold two or three little hearts and may count one of them, at least, as a sure trick in your hand, and all three rounds may easily go to the adversaries—twice to the ace and king, and the third time to a ruff. Let me illustrate with a hand:



If Z opens this hand with "a heart," A may say "two diamonds," both because he can make it, and because he wants to push Z to "two hearts," or he may sit still.

Now if A bids two, Y will know that his book is five; he has four tricks in his hand, and the chance of a ruff in his partner's suit. If Z can take one or two rounds in hearts, Y is safe in doubling; and if Y were behind in penalties, he would be very apt to seize this opportunity to catch up.

If Z belongs to the school that bids two to show a long weak suit, if he is allowed to play it as "two hearts" his plight is pitiful, and certainly

the adversaries would never take him out. If his partner comes to the rescue with "two no trumps" (the only possible thing he could venture), they are no better off. So much for opening bids of two, to show long weak suits!

Z is safer on that hand with "a spade" than with anything else, because his losses are limited to 100. He would lose no more at royals, and his honors would be 18 instead of 4. Y might try a "rescue" with a royal, and lose just the same as at a spade (with the exception of honors), 100 — 18, instead of 100 — 4, but it would be rather a risky bid from Y.

All this does not mean that you should never bid on a queen-suit, but it does mean that queen-suits are worthless except as trumps; that the bid may mislead your partner as to doubles and no-trump bids; and that queen-suits must be unusually long, or that the hand must hold other strength, such as aces and ruffs. In the present hand there is absolutely nothing to excuse the bid, with the possible exception of the short diamonds. And even with the diamond ace in his partner's hand, Z cannot make it.

As a matter of fact, it presupposes a no-trump hand from Y, in order that Z's heart-bid shall go through. And if Y has so good a hand, he may as well be the one to bid it. If he has n't, Law

48 should be their refuge. Z himself holds ten losing cards, no ace, and no ruff, and his best suit is queen-high. Therefore his bid is "one spade."

CHAPTER IX

THE PASSING OF NO-TRUMP

THE passing of no-trump is like the "Twilight of the Gods." The old idol, so mistakenly adored, is being rapidly overthrown, to give place to the new order of things.

All beginners love a no-trump hand; nothing else so appeals to them. But as they progress in the game they realize the sameness in no-trumps, and the small field they allow for skill and judgment. All no-trumpers are played in pretty much the same way. You establish your long suit and then proceed to slide down it, the only skill necessary is to avoid blocking your suit (which means only that you must first play the high cards in your short hand), and an occasional elemental finesse to catch a missing honor. And there you are! And no amount of skill will enable the adversaries to break in upon you; they have nothing to do but to toss their aces and kings on to the deuces and treys of your long established suits. It is simply a matter of cards.

All hands depend on the cards that you hold, but no-trumpers more than any other. In a manner of speaking, no-trumpers must come ready-made, and suit-bids can be created by a certain amount of skill. See how many things you can do in a suit-hand: you can exhaust trumps and make your side-suits, you can use the weak-hand trumps for ruffing losing cards, you can establish a cross-ruff, and when you find that the other side is longer in trumps than you are yourself, you can use infinite skill in forcing them with side-suits until you yourself hold the "long" trump. And they, on their side, can use infinite skill in deciding whether or not to allow themselves to be forced.

No-trump is like blind luck, and suit-makes are like open-eyed skill. And just as no-trump is overwhelmingly easy when the cards fall right, so it is overwhelmingly impossible when they fall wrong. You cannot make schemes and lay pitfalls with side-suits; every one knows just exactly what you want and what you are planning. Every one realizes that a well-guarded jack, held on the safe side, will take the fourth round of a suit, and no one is going to throw away that jack, or unguard him. You can always count ahead, and there is no way of discounting that calculation. Whereas in a

suit-bid, the fact that the fourth round of a suit will be sure to be ruffed somewhere (if played before trumps are exhausted), will alter all calculations.

Take the lead of a thirteener. In no-trump it is a perfectly obvious play; if you hold the thirteenth card of a suit, no one can possibly take it. Now suppose you mistakenly lead a thirteener in a declared trump; immediately the skill of the player is put to the test to decide in which hand to ruff it, and in which to discard a losing card.

Then the opportunities of the adversaries to lead trumps in a suit-bid, when the player himself is hesitating to do so! To lead them against a cross-ruff—even at the expense of a cherished honor! To hold up the ace of trumps against the player in order to make him pull two trumps for one as long as possible!

Long ago one of the greatest of authorities said that he thought Auction would be a better game if no-trump could be eliminated and every hand played as a declared trump. And among good players it is considered almost a test of a person's expertness to find how much or how little he cares for no-trump.

No-trump will never be dropped from the game; so its devotees need not take alarm. But

the new count has certainly put it in its proper place. It is the highest suit, but it is by no means the only suit. Under the old count it was so overwhelmingly important that almost every hand was a no-trump race—to see who could get there first. Special conventions of bid and double were established in order to arrive at the much-desired destination. *The abolishment of those conventions testifies to the decrease in the popularity of no-trump bids.* When two hands out of every three were played as no-trump by *some one* of the four players, the variety of the game was gone and it lost in interest.

Now no-trump remains the highest suit, and the only one in which it is possible to go game with three-odd. But it is worth much less, and the other suits are worth much more, than formerly. Then there is a new suit (royals), the opportunities for which were entirely wasted under the old count. Formerly, if you held good spades, they were perfectly worthless unless you could play them in a no-trump hand; now, you can declare them in a suit of their own, and that suit is but one point less valuable than no-trump itself. No-trump used to be worth three times as much as clubs; now it is worth but one and two-thirds as much. It is simply

one of five fairly equal suits, instead of being the great and only one.

I have taken from recent actual play some hands that testify to all that I have just been saying. Here is one:



This hand occurred at "compass" auction; eight persons were playing, duplicate boards were used, the hands passed from one table to the other, and a record of all bids was kept. The advantages of good bidding over bad bidding were marked. At the first table the bidding was correct. It ran as follows:

Z—"One club."

A—"One royal."

Y—"Two clubs." Y *might* have said "two diamonds," but under the new count, when your suit and your partner's suit are but one point apart, it is better to dovetail your hand with his and to use your suit as a side-suit and a raiser. And it made no difference in this hand whether Y bid clubs or diamonds,—A–B could outbid him with royals.

B—"Two royals."

Z—"Three clubs."

A and Y—"Pass."

B—"Three royals."

A–B took five tricks (45), plus simple honors (18)—a total of 63. They had the winning combination; all that Z–Y could hope to do was to keep them down as low as possble.

At the other table, the opening bid itself was a mistake. Z opened with "two clubs," and by so doing cut out the royal information, which would have warned him away from the no-trump bid, through which he finally came to grief.

A and Y passed, and B bid "two hearts" (I should have preferred "two royals" by the process of elimination, and to keep the ace-suit for a side-suit).

Z and A passed, and Y said "two no-trumps" on his partner's clubs, his own diamonds, his

heart-stopper, and the hope that his partner could stop spades. If people would only come to realize what pitfalls singletons and missing suits are in no-trumps much trouble would be saved.

B made an unwarranted bid of "three hearts" on his missing club-suit; if the other side had been clever enough to let him alone they could have defeated him, but Z said "three-no-trumps."

B was in the lead. He did n't want to lead hearts up to a declared stopper, he had no clubs, and he hoped that by some stroke of luck his jack of diamonds might be good. He led his fourth-best spade, and A–B made seven tricks before Y could get in. One hundred and fifty points instead of the 63 they made at the other table. Z–Y had more than doubled their losses by their no-trump bid.

Remember that you cannot possibly lose as much on the adversary's bid as on your own. If A–B won that rubber, it was worth 400 instead of 250. If they lost the next two games, they would lose rubber anyhow, and 150 would make a much better offset than would 63.

On another hand Z opened with "one diamond," holding these cards:

♡ K 6
♣ ———
◇ K Q J 10 8 6 2
♠ J 9 8 7

A and Y passed, and B held this hand:

♡ A 9 2
♣ A 7 4 3
◇ A
♠ A K Q 10 2

At table one, B bid that hand correctly as "a royal" (in spite of his hundred aces), because:

He had 72 royal-honors, and the chance of a small slam, which would raise his honors to 92—as against 100.

He realized that, with eight spades against him, the jack might well be guarded. If it were, he had but six tricks in his hand.

He knew that the singleton ace of the adversary's suit was a wonderful asset in declared trumps, and a wonderful drawback in no-trumps. The other side would naturally lead diamonds, and his ace would fall on the first round.

At the second table, on the contrary, B was so dazzled with those aces that he bid up to "three no-trumps"; he scored 100 for aces and lost five tricks doubled—a total loss of 400 on the

hand. Even if that jack of spades had not been guarded his reasoning was poor.

The other B failed of his small slam, but he made five-odd in royals plus 72 honors—a total of 117. His profit over his adversary at the other table was 517 points.

A split-hand is a no-trumper. By a "split" hand I mean one where the strength is evenly divided and the suits lie in groups of three or four. Bid no-trump on a hand of that sort, *provided* it contains no sound bid in royals or hearts.

A hand with one long established suit and two side re-entries used to be a no-trumper. Now it calls emphatically for a bid on the long established suit.

Hands holding singletons are dangerous no-trumpers. Think of the opportunities of ruffing that suit in a declared trump. Even if your singleton be an ace, it is a far more valuable possession in a declared trump than in no-trump.

I should never dream of bidding no-trump on a hand with a blank suit. The adversaries may hold thirteen cards of one suit against you! One of our earliest maxims was: "Length is strength in no-trump." It follows, conversely, that shortness is weakness. And what, I ask

you, is so deplorably "short" as a suit in which you hold not a single card?

One more hand which has recently come under my observation will be proof enough of the safety of a declared trump, as opposed to no-trump:



Z opens this hand with "a no-trump." It is a split-hand of divided strength, and holds but one weak suit. No-trump should never be bid with *two* unprotected suits; that demands too much of one's partner. On the other hand, to wait for all four suits to be protected, is to spend one's time waiting.

Z has but one unprotected suit. If his partner also lacks that suit, it will almost surely be bid against them.

A does this very thing: he bids "two hearts."

The original Y wanted to say "two no-trumps," because he held the ace of the adversary's suit, and an excellent suit of his own.

Y's proper bid is, unquestionably, "three diamonds," because:

The singleton ace of the adversary's suit is an asset in a declared trump, and a drawback in no-trump. Also:

Y's partner, Z, has a no-trump hand and can hold but one weak suit. If that suit is diamonds, he can go back to his no-trump bid (if he likes), trusting Y to take care of diamonds. He can do this without increase of contract. If, on the other hand, Z's weak suit is *not* diamonds, he and Y, together, hold a perfect "three-diamond" bid. Also:

Y has another singleton in his hand. With two singletons, a hand should certainly be played as a declared trump.

Just lay out this hand and play it both ways, if you need convincing. In diamonds, Y loses but two tricks,—the two black aces. In no-trumps, he and Z cannot make two-odd in spite of their excellent cards. The bid is killed by the two singletons.

CHAPTER X

SUBTLETY VERSUS OBVIOUSNESS

WHILE I never fail to warn my pupils against erratic "brilliancy," and beg them always to be solid and reliable partners, yet I am a firm believer in subtlety of play as opposed to obviousness. It is never well to run the risk of mystifying your partner, but there are many occasions when your choice of suit can make no difference to him, and can do a great deal toward benefiting you and inconveniencing the adversary. These are the occasions when you should be subtle rather than obvious; the obvious game is like a slow, heavy plodding cart-horse; the subtle game is like a spirited thoroughbred hunter.

Here is a hand that admirably illustrates:



The score is 18 to 10 in favor of A–B; it will be a winning rubber for whichever side makes it, and both sides are eager to capture the play.

Z deals and opens with a no-trump.

A has a choice of two bids—"two clubs" or "two royals"; in the original game he chose "two clubs," for the following reasons (notice the subtle reasoning): He keeps his ace-suit for a side-suit, so that if his partner should chance to hold a singleton they would not lose a round in the suit; twelve points are sufficient to put him rubber; and his partner can overcall, if necessary, without increase of contract.

Y stops the clubs and bids "two no-trumps"

to save rubber. He has very little hope of defeating "two clubs," and with a two-club bid from A and the ace-jack small in Y's own hand, Y feels sure that his partner must be weak in clubs and does not want them for trumps.

B and Z pass, and the bid comes round to A.

A now realizes that the ace of clubs lies over him, and will kill either his king or his queen (with the ace in Z's hand he might make both his king and queen); he realizes, too, that Y may easily hold the guarded jack of clubs. With clubs as trumps, Y would take the first round, lose the second, and still hold the master-trump. Therefore, A abandons his clubs and bids "three royals." He counts his king of diamonds as a sure trick, provided diamonds are led from any hand but his; for, with the good spades (including the ace) in A's hand, and the good clubs divided between A and Y (Y holding the ace), it is more than probable that Z holds ace or king in each red suit in order to bid no-trump. He does not hold the diamond king; therefore he must hold the diamond ace. A's king is then safe.

You see what a perfect example of "inference" this reasoning is.

Y and B pass. If Z has any hopes of defeating "three royals," he is doomed to disappointment, for A can make them without the slightest trouble.

The original Z, however, was too good a player not to realize that four trumps (not in sequence) lying on the wrong side of the bid make a very weak defeating hand, even if they are headed by the king, and if the bid is three. Z had no idea of allowing A to take the rubber so easily, so he bid "three no-trumps"; he expected to lose, but he hoped not to lose too heavily. He had diamonds and a stopper in hearts and spades, and his partner could stop clubs and sat on the proper side to do it.

Z realized that his stopper in spades was not a good one, but he hoped that B had very few taking cards and could not lead through him very often (a perfectly well-warranted hope, with the other three players all bidding on the hand).

After the "three-no-trump" bid, every one passes, and it is A's original lead and B's play to that lead that I wish especially to point out to you.

Every player at that table realizes that A holds a club-make and Y holds a club-stopper; in other words, the club-stopper lies over the bid and cannot be led through. And every player also realizes that A holds a royal-make and Z holds a royal stopper, which, however, is under the bid and can easily be led through. Therefore:

He must not lead spades; they must come to him.

He must not lead clubs; if by any chance they should come to him from Y's hand he can make both his king and his queen.

He certainly must not lead a diamond, for he knows that Z holds the ace; his own king will thus be safe if the diamond lead comes from any hand but his own.

He can lead nothing but a heart.

He leads his jack of hearts, and Dummy goes down with four to the queen. Most players, holding Z's cards, would put up the queen on that much overrated principle of "covering an honor with an honor." Z realizes that B must hold the ace of hearts; by playing Dummy's queen, he can force the ace and establish his own king and ten.

This Z is too clever for that. With three honors (jack, queen, ace) on one trick, the nine may easily become established for the adversary. He plays low from Dummy meaning to take with his king, if B withholds the ace; and if B puts up the ace, the queen, king, and ten are all good in Z's two hands.

(Let this example be a warning to you against invariably "covering an honor with an honor." I wish that rule had never been made!)

B sees his partner's jack uncovered by Dummy and knows that Z must hold the king of hearts. If he "ducks" the trick, Z's king will take; and if he puts up his ace, he makes both the king and the queen good. B knows, however, that his partner did not lead that jack of hearts in order to take the trick or to establish the suit; he led it with the express purpose of throwing his partner in! It is therefore B's business to come in and to lead A his suit. Not clubs, although that was the suit that A named first; if B leads clubs, he leads up to declared strength. But by leading a spade he goes through a declared stopper and into his partner's hand.

When B leads the jack of spades, Z *does* cover with his king because, by so doing, he makes his ten good. Nevertheless, he is set for 150 points—more than half the rubber value; and that at a very critical point of the game. Z saved 100 points by losing 150, for either two clubs or three royals would have put his adversaries rubber. Still, it is an awkward point at which to sustain such a loss.

I know that to many of my readers these various points will be perfectly obvious; but I know, too (from the games I watch and the ones I play), that many others stand in decided need of just such instruction. The bidding on

that hand, the choice of lead from A, Z's decision not to put up the queen of hearts, and B's taking his partner's jack with the ace and giving him his second suit (not his first) through the shown stopper, are all excellent examples of subtlety of play and reasoning.

Here is another hand in which B threw away a perfectly good trick in the most unnecessary manner—simply because he did not give his partner credit for an ordinary amount of acumen and subtlety.



Z could have opened his hand with an exceedingly weak "no-trump," or with "a spade,"

or (at a pinch) with "a diamond." If he were using the "two-spade" call, his hand is a perfect example of such a bid. In that case, A would pass (reserving his heart-bid for a second round, provided Y bid). In any other event (save the spade-bid), A would bid his hearts immediately. The ultimate result would be the same, so we will imagine Z to say "a diamond"; A, "a heart"; and Y, "two clubs." B passes; he has not a raiser in his hand; his only two taking cards are in the same suit and he has no singleton or missing suit. Had his partner bid "a no-trump," B's guarded jack of spades would have been a raiser, while his two diamonds would be two good tricks. But guarded jacks and guarded queens do not count as raisers in suit-bids—they are too apt to get ruffed.

Z passes and A bids "two hearts," upon which both Y and B pass. Y does not like to bid "three clubs" and make the adversaries' book four tricks, when he holds six losing cards and lacks the ace of his own suit—(his two hearts, two diamonds, and two small spades are all losing cards, and one of his small trumps must go on the ace if it be held against him; he has, therefore, seven losing cards in his hand, and cannot bid for nine tricks).

The bid comes round to Z, who should most

certainly bid "three clubs." He has the ace of the enemy's suit and holds but four losing cards—a perfectly sound three-bid.

His losing cards are the small heart, the small spade, and two of his diamonds; his queen of that suit will be high after two rounds.

Instead of a sound three-club bid, the original Z chose to bid "two no-trumps." He said he did it because it was less of a contract and was worth more if they made it. He thought his partner held the high clubs; he himself could stop the adversary's hearts on the first round, the diamonds after two rounds, and he held two good spade tricks.

This is average reasoning, combined with the average desire for no-trumps. Z has not a no-trump hand; all his suits but diamonds are short and his hearts are lamentably so.

A refuses to bid "three hearts" with six losing cards, lacking the ace of his own suit (which he knows lies with Z), and with a no-trump hand against him. His 64 honors make him willing to lose the odd, provided it be not doubled, for, with 64 plus and 50 minus, he would still be 14 to the good. But if he should be doubled and should lose those two diamonds and three spades, as well as the trump ace, he would be badly set.

Z gets the bid at "two no-trumps," and A

leads his king of hearts. Z takes the second round of hearts and leads his ten of clubs, to establish his long suit. A comes in immediately with the ace, and makes all his good hearts, on which the others are forced to discard. And what do you suppose the original B chose for his first discard? *The king of diamonds*, so that A might be sure to lead a diamond to his ace, after hearts were gone. He had heard that to discard so high a diamond was to "scream for diamonds!" And so it is. But what, I ask you, could A lead, other than a diamond? Not a club, with Dummy's established suit lying there on the board; and not a spade to Dummy's ace—thus allowing him to get in and make his clubs. He had absolutely no choice but diamonds, and B threw away 50 good points by his discard of that king. It was a most unnecessary sacrifice of a perfectly good trick! Be subtle, but not as "subtle" as that; for you must always remember that your partner, too, may have some gifts in that line.

CHAPTER XI

RISKY BIDS

A RISKY bid is permissible in but two situations—one where you are trying to go rubber, and the other where you are trying to save it. A risky bid is *allowable* in the first case, and *imperative* in the second.

But, unfortunately, such occasions are not the only ones which call forth unsound bids. To sit still, is the one lesson that it seems impossible to teach the average player.

When you sit down to an Auction table, say to yourself, "I will not permit myself to overbid." Say it over and over, and let nothing tempt you to break your resolution. But if you do break it, break it at once, and be done with it. The longer you wait the worse it will be. And I will show you why.

Overbidding is the curse of the game, but it is impossible to cure most players of it. You may reason with them, plead with them, argue with them, and apparently convince them, and the

very next hand will find them at their old tricks. If overbidding could be wiped off the face of the earth to-day, the Auction of to-morrow would be a different game. It would approach perfection.

I think I never play with strangers without having them say, "Why, how little you bid!" or "How little you double!" Why bid, or why double, unless you have a reason for it or are forced to it? All professionals, all experts, will tell you this and will live up to their convictions, and the results will prove the wisdom of those convictions. Yet the mass of players will go merrily on, bidding and doubling on hope or on foolishness. "Let us take a gamble," they will say (when the score does not demand it), and their gamble will cost them 400. Or they will tell you that they "like the fun of playing the hand," and they will play it at a heavy loss. They may be able to afford it, and their partners may not object—being players of the same sort, —but that is not good Auction. It is the most discouraging thing in the world to be unable to weed out this error. Now, if you have the habit and can not, or will not, give it up, let me at least persuade you to commit your blunders early in the game. It is a positive tragedy to be heavily penalized when the rubber is nearing

its end and you have no time to recoup yourself.

Suppose you lose 500 in the beginning of a rubber. It is a terrible handicap; but it is not nearly so serious as it would be later, for the simple reason that you have time to recover it. And that should be your one object—to get back that 500—or, at the very least, to get back 250 of it. Then you can afford to take the rubber, for the rubber value plus the 250 penalties will equalize your own losses. But with that 500 still against you the rubber itself would be a loss.

But suppose the rubber game stands at 20–24 and you lose 500, then where are you? If you take rubber, you are in a hole; if the other side takes rubber, you are in a worse one; and if you make wild bids to keep the adversaries from going rubber, your plight is still worse. And some one must soon go rubber with the score at such a point.

Such nightmares are unnecessary and are always of your own creating. If you never overbid, they cannot happen to you.

In a game the other evening my partner and I scored a cool 400 in penalties, and felt rather happy. The very next hand he made a risky bid and lost it all; and on the following hand the adversaries took rubber. If they had taken it

while we were 400 in, we should still have been the winners.

And the moral of all this is: Sit tight in your bidding and profit by the other man's mistakes.

The futility of winning "losing" rubbers is another point which, apparently, passes the comprehension of the average player. *To win a rubber at a cost of 350, is exactly the same as to lose it at a cost of 350*—except that one is voluntary and the other is unavoidable. Those who play for money have no trouble in grasping this point; and the heavier their habitual stake, the quicker they are to see it. That, I think, speaks for itself.

But the general run of players feel that they have won *something*, when they take a rubber with 600 penalties piled up against them. Suppose any one owed you six dollars, would you jump at the chance to take two dollars and a half in full payment, and call it square? Would you feel that you had lost nothing—that, on the other hand, you were "ahead of the game"? You certainly would not, and I am sure of it.

As long as the rubber stays open you may have a chance to win back what you have lost. But the moment that you voluntarily close it, you cut your throat with your own hand; you

definitely end your chances to catch up, and you make yourself a loser.

If you suffer a heavy-penalty loss *early* in the rubber, you are not in such a terrible plight (even with 600 penalties against you), unless you purposely take rubber, or the other side forces it on you. You have time to penalize the adversaries; if you can manage to squeeze out even 200 in penalties, and then go rubber, you will be all right. Two hundred is n't so hard to make; the other side may get a bad hand and be forced to bid "a spade"; you, holding all the cards, can leave them in and get 100. Do that twice, and you can afford to go rubber. Two hundred plus the rubber value (250) plus the trick and honor-values of the hands on which you go rubber, should equalize that 600 loss.

On the other hand, if I were on the side that had *won* the 600 penalties, I should try to force the adversaries to take a losing rubber, and I should never make a risky bid. If the rubber stays open, you may lose some of your "velvet" on poor spade hands.

I have had players say to me: "There is no use worrying over penalties that are past and over." Past and over! If you had lost six hundred dollars an hour ago, would you cease thinking of it because it was "past and over," or would

you still try to recover it on the principle that while there 's life there 's hope?

Of course, if you and your partner are to play together all evening, you can afford to take the losing rubber, pocket the 250, and trust to the next rubber to make up your losses. But if you "cut in" at the end of each rubber, *one of you has to lose again, while the other wins.* One will double his losses while the other will recoup his. *And as it is impossible for any one to know which is to be the next winner, and which the next loser, it is to the interest of both players not to end the present rubber at a considerable loss.*

Dalton says: "You can win the rubber but *once;* but as long as it stays open, the chances for penalizing the adversaries are infinite!"

It is a choice between a *sure* loss and a *possible* gain. I should choose the gain, even at the risk of a further loss!

CHAPTER XII

PENALTIES

From time to time the question of penalties or non-penalties raises itself and stares us in the face. Players are very much divided on this head; even excellent players are not always entirely sportsmanlike on the subject.

Whatever game a person goes in for, his first aim should be to take it up in the true sporting spirit. The object of a game is to reward skill and punish or penalize want of skill and carelessness; add to this the element of chance in a greater or less degree, the rules and implements of the particular game in question, and your game stands made.

No one questions most of these facts; no one tries to play a game without the proper implements, and without a certain knowledge of its rules. No one plays a game without failing to take advantage of any skill he may possess. Why, then, should any one wish to evade the only remaining condition? Why should he

object to taking his punishment for ignorance or carelessness?

What would you think of a golf player who wanted to be allowed to lift his ball out of every difficult "lie," or a tennis player who wanted to "take it over again" every time he missed a ball, or any player of any game who turned sulky over consequences that he had brought on his own head?

Auction should be approached in precisely the same sporting spirit which one shows at other games. Penalize yourself promptly and cheerfully—don't wait to be dragged to it by the adversary; if you expose a card from your hand, or drop one on the table, lay that card immediately—face up—on the table, subject to call. Never dream of grabbing it up and returning it to your hand, and of wrangling over the adversary's right to call it. And when you have placed it on the table and the adversary has called it to his own advantage, play it cheerfully and graciously. Don't be ill-tempered over it, and *please* don't say, "I was just going to play that, anyhow—so it does n't hurt me any!" Oh, if you *knew* the difference that all these things make in a game, you would never have to be twice urged to be sportsmanlike!

You were clumsy when you dropped that card;

take the penalty for your clumsiness as naturally as you would if you were running a race or skating on ice; there, if you are clumsy, you fall. Here, too, you fall—by having your card made subject to your adversary's pleasure.

When I play for the first time with new acquaintances it does n't take me three minutes to rate their game. There are good players, indifferent players, and poor players—but there are infinitely more classes than that. There are good players whom I never want to see again; they are grumpy, over-eager to exact penalties from others, and exceedingly loth to pay up their own. And there are indifferent, and even poor players with whom I am willing and glad to have other games. They are eager to improve, intelligent and quick at taking hints, gracious in giving penalties, and very slow in exacting them.

And there is another odd point: The player who is quickest about penalizing himself is usually slowest about exacting penalties from unwilling adversaries. And the player who watches, lynx-eyed, for chances to penalize his adversary is nearly always excessively ill-tempered when the tables are turned on him.

I am going to run over the principal penalties of the game, in order that you may be, not only

willing to "pay up" when your time comes, but intelligently posted as to whether it has come.

The first and greatest is, of course, the penalty for the revoke. No one, I think, questions this or seeks to evade it. One hundred and fifty honor-points for the adversaries if the player revokes; and the choice between 150 honor-points or the value of three tricks below the line for the player if either adversary revokes. The revoking side can score nothing on the hand, except any honors they may chance to hold. A slam can not be scored on a revoke penalty.

The next great question concerns the lead from the wrong hand—and here players are divided. The old penalty of taking a trick for this lead was found excessive and was abandoned. Nevertheless, the best players agree that some sort of penalty is desirable; it prevents carelessness as well as willful cheating. Twenty honor-points is the new penalty, and it is being adopted very generally. Any player, including Dummy, may call attention to a lead from the wrong hand. Two penalties cannot be exacted for the same fault; therefore, if the twenty honor-points be taken, the card which is led in error is not an exposed card. It is returned to the hand where it belongs.

Any card exposed on, or above, the table

(so that its face can be seen and named) is an "exposed" card. It should be placed face up on the table, subject to the call of the adversary. But no one can be forced to revoke with an exposed card; its owner can be made to play it only when its suit is led, or when another suit is led to which he is unable to follow. Suppose your partner drops an ace of hearts; it is laid on the table and can be "called" if a heart be led. Now, be very careful, if it is your lead, never to lead a high heart, such as the king; the adversary would immediately "call" your partner's ace on your king; you should lead a low heart, or lead another suit, where you are sure he can follow.

A card dropped below the level of the table (on the player's lap, or on the floor) is not an "exposed" card, even though it lie face up and every one can see it.

The owner of an "exposed" card may play it at his own convenience, without waiting to have it called.

There is another penalty that is expressly provided for by the rules that I have seen horribly neglected, yet it is one of the best of the lot. If the wrong adversary lead, the player may call any suit he pleases from the proper leader. If more players would learn this rule,

and practice it, the game would be greatly improved. No good players would be caught many times in this trap, and the result would be very gratifying. Nothing is so amateurish as a game in which, at the close of the bidding of every hand, some one asks, or some one tells, whose lead it is. *If any one at a table knows whose lead it is, every one should know!* No one should ask where the lead is, and no one should tell. "It is your lead," should be a proscribed phrase in Auction. At the close of the bidding, all the players should sit silent until some one leads; if it is the proper leader, well and good. If not, the player should call any suit he wants, from the real leader. It will not take many such experiences to cure players of this tiresome fault.

If any player bid or double out of turn, either adversary may call for a new deal.

If a player make a bid, insufficient to cover the previous bid, he is forced to bid enough to cover it, by bidding in the suit he has named. And if the following adversary pass, the partner of the faulty bidder is debarred from bidding. If, however, the adversary bid or double, the partner of the faulty bidder is free to do as he likes.

If, near the close of a hand, one player shall be

found to be short one or more cards, it shall be counted a revoke for the short hand.

There are two more faults that are expressly forbidden by the rules, though there is no penalty for committing them. One is looking at back tricks that have been quitted, and the other is asking back bids that have been covered. Both these mistakes are constantly made, and the latter is allowed by the ruling of certain card clubs. It is, nevertheless, an error, and a localism (in that it is not universally permitted), and, moreover, it greatly hampers the smoothness of the game. It is just as easy to play without committing either of these blunders, and I beg you all to expurge them from your game, even though the rules provide no penalty for them.

I append a condensed list of penalties, which may be easily consulted if a question arise.

Auction Penalties

Revoke. One hundred and fifty honor-points for the adversaries if the player revoke; and the choice between 150 honor-points, or the value of three tricks below the line, for the player, if either adversary revoke. The revoking side can score nothing on the hand, except for any honors they may chance to hold. A slam can not be scored on a revoke. Should

there be more than one revoke in a hand, each one after the first is worth 100 honor-points to the adversaries. A revoke should not be claimed till the close of the hand.

Lead from Wrong Hand.

Twenty honor-points. Any player, including Dummy, may call attention to a lead from the wrong hand.

Two penalties cannot be exacted for the same fault; therefore, if the 20 honor-points be taken, the card led in error is not an exposed card. It is returned to the hand where it belongs.

An Exposed Card.

Any card exposed on, or above, the level of the table, so that its face can be named, is an exposed card. It should be placed face up, on the table, subject to the call of the adversary. No one can be forced to revoke with an exposed card. The owner of an exposed card may play it, without waiting to have it called.

Not an Exposed Card.

No card dropped below the level of the table is an exposed card, even though its face can be seen.

Lead from Wrong Adversary.

If the wrong adversary lead, the player may call a suit from the proper leader. If the player holds no card of the suit that is called, the penalty is not paid. The card led in error is returned

to its owner's hand. No one may ask, or tell, whose lead it is.

Bids. If a player bid, or double, out of turn, either adversary may call for a new deal. If a player make a bid insufficient to cover the previous bid (and the error be discovered before the adversary has bid, doubled, or passed), the faulty player is forced to make a sufficient bid *in the suit he has named.* And if the following adversary should pass, the partner of the faulty bidder is debarred from bidding. If, however, the adversary should bid or double, the partner of the faulty bidder is free to do as he pleases. If a faulty bid be not discovered until after the adversary has bid, passed, or doubled, it stands as good.

Forced Revoke. If, near the close of a hand, a player shall be found to be short one or more cards, it shall be counted a revoke for the short hand.

Faced Card. If the dealer face any card to any player, he must deal anew.

There are two more faults that are expressly forbidden by the rules, through there is no penalty for committing them. One is facing tricks that have been quitted, and the other is asking back bids that have been covered.

A trick is "quitted" when it is turned and the

fingers are off it. A bid is "covered" when the following adversary has passed, bid, or doubled. A revoke may be corrected before the trick is quitted, or the next lead is on the table.

CHAPTER XIII

SOME FAULTS OF THE AVERAGE GAME

THE three most conspicuous faults of the average game are unquestionably over-bidding, bidding against a one-spade declaration, and doubling one suit when you can double no other. All these I have already fully discussed, but there remain some minor faults which are constantly seen and which are a decided bar to a good game. Chief amongst these is *establishing a ruff for the weak hand.*

There is nothing that so helps a player as being able to make his trumps separately in the two hands. If he can use Dummy's weak trumps for ruffing and then, when they are gone, pull two trumps for one by leading them from his own strong hand, he is immensely advantaged. Those little trumps in Dummy would be wasted if they fell on his

own big ones; they could not take tricks by themselves.

The moment that you (as adversary) see that the player is trying to establish a ruff for the weak hand, or a cross-ruff for both hands, you should come in at any cost and lead trumps. Of course, the ideal way would be for that adversary to lead, who could lead trumps through the strong hand and up to the weak one. But if that cannot be managed, the other adversary should seize the first chance to come in and to lead trumps, even up to strength. He should do this even at the cost of sacrificing a cherished trump-honor. There is nothing so deadly to the adversaries as having the player cross-ruff, or ruff in the weak hand.

If the player can be forced to follow in Dummy and to ruff in his strong hand, he is greatly weakened by the process. But never permit him to ruff in the weak hand.

Now, I notice dozens of players who not only permit the weak hand to ruff, but are kind enough to establish that ruff themselves. By so doing, they generally make the player a gift of two- or three-odd tricks. Let me illustrate with a hand:



Here is a most commonplace-looking hand for the adversaries; I am sure you have all held its counterpart many times and have despaired of scoring on it. Z is playing the hand at hearts; as far as he is concerned, it is a beauty; he has five trumps to 64 honors, and two doubleton suits, headed by Aces.

Now, it rests entirely with the defense how much Z shall score on that hand. Against the ordinary defense he will take three-odd. Against intelligent defense he can take but the odd—and that only by the most subtle of play. Consequently, if Z happens to be 8 on the game, ordinary adversaries would permit him to take

the game under their noses, while clever adversaries would hold him down to the odd, and if he had been beguiled into a bid of two, or had been one of those unfortunate players who open with a two-bid because they "want to play the hand," Z would be set in his bid.

A will, of course, lead his king of spades. Dummy goes down with but two spades; if A is sufficiently obliging to lead spades again, Dummy's ruff is established, and Z will not have the least trouble in taking three-odd.

If, on the contrary, A determines to kill Dummy's ruff, and makes his second lead a heart, B will come in with the ace and lead trumps again, to exhaust Dummy. In this way Z can make but the odd, and he cannot make that unless he is clever enough to play his ten of trumps on the first trump round and retain his six-spot. This will make Dummy's nine a re-entry card on the second round, and Z can lead diamonds up to his ace-queen, instead of being constantly thrown back into his own hand and forced to lead away from the ten-ace.

This hand is a splendid example of what can be done with mediocre cards. When I hear players constantly grumbling that they "hold no hands" and that "the other side has all the cards," and then see them miss dozens of tricks

by poor plays, I am both amused and disgusted. It is tiresome to hold poor cards the greater part of the time; I should know, for I have tried it. But nothing is better for one's game than to make the best of poor hands, and nothing is better for one's character than to cease complaining about them. Such complaints are also intensely poor form.

When Z bids "a heart" on this hand, if every one goes by, he gets the play and makes his odd with 64 honors—a total of 72 points. If A leads a second round of spades before exhausting trumps, Z makes three-odd plus 64 honors—a total of 88 points. If B covers Z's bid by bidding "one no-trump" (which he can just make), on the principle that "it is always a pity to let the other side get the bid at one-odd," Z will be almost sure to go to "two hearts"; he can then be set for 50 points, and his honors will make him just 14 points plus on the hand, nothing below the line and 14 above, instead of 24 below and 64 above! *And the cards are the same in both cases!*

Leading up to a king and one, is another common fault. A king and one small card is a sorry object when led through; *led up to, it is always good for one round.*

The failure to lead trumps up to the weak

hand, and against the player, is a noticeably common error. When you are leading up to a Dummy whose weakest suit is trumps, *lead trumps!*

And finally, unless you want to become known as a very tiresome player, *don't* feel it necessary to explain at the end of every hand just why you did so and so—why you bid, or doubled—or failed to bid, or double,—and the reasons for every move you have made. Auction that is too conversational is not a joy. It should be played as quietly as Bridge used to be played. If, when every hand closes, every one of four players tries to explain his reasons for all his moves and to convince the other three how right he was, Auction becomes a weariness and a bore. You generally know why a man did a thing as well as he knows himself. Sometimes you may agree with his theories and his choice of bid, sometimes not. In the latter case, pray don't force your opinions on him unless asked to do so. He may be right and you may be wrong when it comes to a matter of judgment, and if it is a matter of his want of knowledge, then he bids as he does because of that want, and a game is not a lecture. As for your own reasons for your decisions, pay others the compliment of taking it for granted that they know enough to

reason out the situation for themselves. The peace and harmony of the game are worth more than the most brilliant exposition of theories.

CHAPTER XIV

DON'TS

Don't overbid.

Don't double bids of one.

Don't double anything unless you can double everything.

Don't talk while the bidding is in progress.

Don't be too explanatory at the close of a hand.

Don't open with bids of two.

Don't bid no-trump unless you stop the adversary's suit.

Don't establish ruffs for the weak hand.

Don't lead thirteeners, except at no-trump. You will give the player a chance to trump in his weak hand and to discard a losing card from his strong one.

Don't forget that there are eighteen "points" in every suit.

Don't make any bid that is in excess of what is absolutely necessary.

Don't be over-eager to penalize unwilling adversaries.

Don't be slow to penalize yourself.

Don't claim a revoke till the end of the hand.

Don't bid "a spade" when your hand warrants anything better.

Don't bid anything better when your hand demands "a spade."

Don't bid against the adversary's "one spade," unless you can go game in the hand.

Don't try to "rescue" your partner when he has been doubled.

Don't bid on jack-suits on the first round.

Don't forget that no suit is worth 50 a trick, and that penalizing the adversary is always worth 50 a trick.

Don't exaggerate the importance of the cross-line that separates trick-points from honor-points. A hundred points are 100 points.

Don't forget that if the rubber (two games) is worth 250 honors, one game is worth half as much, or 125 honors. But partial games are worth little or nothing. Take them if you can get nothing better, but remember that the spade-penalty is always better.

If you have played badly don't lay it to the light, the heat, the conversation, etc. Every one has been at the same disadvantage, and every one has "off" days.

Don't ask back bids, or face quitted tricks.

Don't take losing rubbers, if you can avoid them.

Don't fail to force losing rubbers on the adversary, whenever occasion offers.

Don't change your partner's double to a bid except from weakness, from fear of having misled him by some bid of your own, or on the certainty of taking a *winning* rubber.

Don't forget that "game in the hand" is very valuable. Try to get it for yourself and to keep it from the adversary.

Don't do any "flag-flying" to save game; do a reasonable amount of it to save rubber.

Don't break any of these rules, unless the issue is more important than the rule.

CHAPTER XV

REMEMBER THAT:

WHEN you want to *bid* high, you count what you *have n't*; when you want to *double*, you count what you *have*.

To double a high bid, it is not necessary to hold many trumps. It is necessary only that you and your partner, together, shall hold one more trick than your book.

To raise your partner's bid, you must hold "a trick and a raiser." In any declared trump, raisers are: guarded trump-honors, side-aces, side-kings, singletons, and missing suits. A missing suit or a singleton ace in a side-suit may be counted two raisers.

Singletons and missing-suits are dread things in no-trump, but tremendous assets in a declared trump.

If you hold but four trumps in the strong hand, singletons and missing-suits lose their value. You are too short to take ruffs.

If the adversaries show any signs of trying

to establish a ruff, or a cross-ruff, get in at any cost and lead trumps, even up to strength.

The lower the suit on which you bid, the more expensive your declaration.

If the bid suits you, it is wise to say nothing.

If your partner makes a "backward" bid (with no bid from the intervening adversary), it is more apt to mean weakness in your suit than strength in his own.

Courtesy and calmness are necessary adjuncts of a really great game. Unasked criticism is intensely poor form.

Test Hand No. 1

(Flag-flying.)



Score: 18–12 on rubber-game, in favor of A–B.

As this hand was originally played, Z opened with "a club," A passed, Y bid "a heart," and B bid "a royal."

Z now said "two diamonds." It was an odd bid, but Y read it aright as a long weak suit,

headed by cards that were too low to make a first-round bid advisable. He immediately counted his two diamonds as losing cards; but he hoped that Z's first bid of "a club" meant the ace, but that his suit was too short to admit of a two-bid.

A passed and Y bid "two hearts."

B answered with "two royals." Y said "three hearts," and B said "three royals"; Y said "four hearts," and B "four royals."

Then Y was confronted with the decision between "four no-trumps" and "five hearts." Seeing the hand open, we know that the no-trump bid would be the better. But on a closed hand Y reasoned thus (and rightly):

In hearts he had 80 honors—nearly a third of the rubber-value. In no-trumps he had no honors. Why throw away 80 because you are running for 250?

Again, if the ace of clubs were in his partner's hand, he could make five hearts, *and* rubber, *and* 80 honors. If it were not, *there was no possible combination of cards by which he could lose more than 20 points (even if doubled); or fail to come out plus on the hand if he were not doubled.*

In hearts, he had ten sure tricks and 80 sure honors. In no-trumps, if the ace-king of diamonds and the ace-queen of clubs happened to

lie in A's hand, Y would surely lose 100, if doubled, and have no honors to offset it.

Suppose Y said "four no-trumps," and the cards lay thus (leaving his hand and his partner's intact):



B may have been bidding his royals on 72 honors and two side-singletons. Now he passes, Z passes, and A doubles.

B, realizing that Y must hold the ace of spades (in order to bid no-trump), will not lead a spade and put him in with his long hearts. For the same reason, he will not lead a heart. *Whatever else he leads, Y cannot fail to lose 100,*

whereas in a heart-bid his heaviest possible loss is 20. There are numerous other possible positions by which the no-trump bid would cost him 100; *and Y does not see the hand.*

As soon as he was doubled, he realized that the ace of clubs was against him. But then it was too late to say no-trumps; it would have taken five-odd to cover the heart-bid; he would have lost one trick and all his honors.

If Y *had* said "four no-trumps," B could have done a little flag-flying of his own. He would have bid "five royals" to save rubber. He would have lost one trick; doubled, this would have cost him 100 minus his 72 honors, or 28 points.

The total difference on the outcome of the hand would thus be 48 points; Z–Y lose 20 or make 28, thanks to clever flag-flying by both sides.

Test Hand No. 2

(More flag-flying.)



Score: 18 all on rubber-game.

Z, "a heart."

A, "two clubs."

Y, "two hearts," and it is about B's bid that I want to speak.

Most players would bid no-trump; and, of course, in the present instance, it would be a most successful bid. Nevertheless, I do not like it. Let me tell you why.

Unless A holds some re-entry beside his clubs, B can never use those clubs, can never get into the hand, and cannot make his bid. *Now what re-entry can B expect from his partner?* Not hearts, certainly, and it is a long chance to look for a spade or diamond re-entry with those good cards in B's own hand.

As it happens, A has re-entry in his diamond queen; but just suppose Z held his own diamond king plus A's queen and ten. Suppose the diamonds were well guarded against him in either hand, or that A had n't the queen at all —where would the two no-trumps be?

A singleton is a heavy weight in no-trump, and when it is a singleton ace of your partner's suit it is very apt to block. On the other hand, a singleton ace is a wonderful asset in a suit-make. I should rather hear B say three clubs— or pass (in the hope of defeating two hearts).

If B and Z pass, A must positively bid "three clubs"; now if Y says "three hearts," why should not B think he could double? He cannot make it, as we know from seeing the open hand. But he would be apt to think he could. One trump round, one club round, one diamond round, and one spade round will make his book; now, if his partner gets a trick or if B gets a club-ruff, it will make the odd, and 100 points.

If A–B bid "four clubs," Z–Y should bid hearts, to a certain loss, to save rubber; if they bid "four hearts" and are doubled, they lose 100 points minus their 16 honors—84 points. If they allow A–B to play clubs, the score on the hand will be seven club tricks (42), four honors (24), grand slam (40), and rubber (250)—a total of 336 points' loss for Z–Y, as against 84 points.

If Z–Y bid "four hearts" and A–B prefer rubber to doubling, they must bid a small slam in clubs to cover four hearts. The question is, would either one dare it, not knowing his partner's hand?

Because the no-trump bid would prove successful, in this instance, do not think that it is proper. It presupposes absolutely that A shall have diamond or spade re-entry; and B (with his cards) has no right to expect either. Nine times out of ten, he would not get it.

Test Hand No. 3

(Changing no-trump to suit.)



Z bids "a no-trump."

What bid could suit A better than that? He has no side-suit with which to force, so he is obliged to choose between letting Z play it at "one no-trump" or bidding "two no-trumps" himself.

A's hand does not warrant "two no-trumps." I do not say this because the bid would not go through in this particular instance, I say it on general principles. You remember how I have always warned you against overbidding, and you know that "length is strength" in no-

trump. A's hand has not a single long suit in it, and not one that is established. He would have to lose one or two rounds in every suit, thus giving the adversaries a chance to establish any long suits they might happen to hold. As a defeating hand he can count seven reasonably sure tricks; as a declaring hand it is not worth two-odd.

Y must positively change his partner's no-trump to "two royals." He has no ace, king, or queen in his hand; and he *has* a five-card suit that runs to the jack-ten—one point more than the lowest combination on which a no-trump should be changed to a suit-bid.

If your partner bids no-trump, the next hand passes, and you hold a hand without an ace or a king, you must change your partner's no-trump to two in a suit, on:

Any six-card suit, no matter if it runs to nothing higher than a seven-spot.

Any five-card suit that runs to the ten or to any higher card, but not to a five-card suit whose highest card is lower than the ten.

No four-card suit. A two-bid in a four-card suit, with a weak side-hand, is too much of a contract.

These rules are so specific that it is hard to understand the haziness of the average player on this subject.

Test Hand No. 4

(Bidding to a small loss in preference to allowing adversary to score a big hand.)



If Z bids "five clubs" on this hand he cannot make it against the best defense. He loses one trick, 50 undoubled or 100 doubled; to offset this somewhat, he scores 36 for honors.

A has 72 honors in his hand, and almost the certainty of taking game, provided he bids "four royals." It is the proper thing for him to do, beyond question. And he would positively make it, as the hand would be played. With

all four hands exposed, Y can defeat the bid by leading a small trump, and by continuing to lead one each time he comes in. In this way Dummy's club-ruff is killed and the bid is set for one trick. But no one but an insane person would make such a lead. Y's proper lead is the ace of clubs; he might fear a club-ruff from the adversary, because his partner, Z, had been bidding so high in clubs. In that case Y's only other choice would be the ten of hearts from his three-honor suit ("the lead of the ten means the two gentlemen"). This would lose him a trick, as A would take with Dummy's queen, take the second round of hearts with his own ace, and ruff all subsequent rounds. In this way Y would never make his king of hearts, as he would certainly do if he allowed the hearts to come to him from his partner.

The whole hand hinges on the position of the king of diamonds. If Y held that king, instead of Z, it would be over the ace, and would be safe. This would give Z–Y the winning combination of cards, either to play the hand at "five clubs," or to defeat the bid of "four royals."

Test Hand No. 5

(A case where I should advise a "backward" bid.)



Z–Y are one game in, and the second game stands 18-10 in their favor.

Z says "a royal" and A passes. Y, in my opinion, should say "two diamonds," to warn Z of his spade weakness. Moreover, "two diamonds" would put them rubber and "one royal" would not; and in diamonds Y's singleton spade is an advantage.

B must not let the rubber go so easily. He

and his partner must bid hearts, to a loss, rather than let the adversaries go rubber.

On the first round, when Z says "a royal" and A passes, many authorities would have Y pass too (in spite of weakness), because he has two tricks in his hand. I prefer the warning bid.

Test Hand No. 6

(The one situation where it is better to bid than to double; *i. e.*, when you can go rubber on your bid, and have no reason to suppose that a double would be worth more than 250.)



The score is: Z–Y 20, A–B 24, on the rubber-game. Z bids "a no-trump" and A says "two diamonds."

Y can defeat "two diamonds," but he has no reason to suppose that he can take much more than 250, by doubling. Moreover, some one might jump to royals. On the other hand, if he says "two no-trumps," he has a hand which should put them rubber.

If A bids his diamonds high (to save rubber, and on his two singletons), *then* Y should double. He can get a big score and run no risk himself. And when the bid is high, the other side cannot get out safely, with a no-trump hand against them.

Test Hand No. 7

(Bidding to the score.)



It is the rubber-game, and the score is 18–10 in favor of Z–Y. But they have lost heavily in penalties, so that their grand total (above and below) is 550 less than A–B's. Remember all that I have been teaching you about losing rubbers, and don't forget that the side that is far ahead should never be beguiled into a risky bid, and that they should try and force a losing rubber on the adversaries; and remember that those adversaries cut their own throats when they let themselves take a losing rubber.

If Z–Y take rubber, they lose money; if they let A–B take rubber, they lose more, and if they permit themselves to be further penalized, they lose still more. Their one hope is to penalize A–B, and it is the place of A–B to frustrate this.

Z opens with "a club." It won't put him rubber and it won't let the adversaries go rubber.

A passes.

Y would go to no-trump under ordinary circumstances; but just now the lower declaration is safer. He passes.

B bids "a royal."

Z cannot risk B's taking rubber in royals. He bids "two clubs," and A passes.

Y says "two no-trumps." "Two clubs" will put them rubber, anyhow, and they might as well have as big a score as possible.

B should pass and force Y to take the rubber at a heavy loss. But not one player out of a hundred would be clever enough to do this. Moreover, if B can take three-odd he takes the rubber, and with seven trumps to three honors, a blank suit, and two well-guarded side-kings, it looks very promising for three-odd in royals.

If B makes this bid, Z should pass (there are too many penalties against him already, for him to bid "five clubs," with six or seven losing cards in his hand). And then comes Y's chance.

He must double, and get back 200 of his lost penalties.

Z leads short, the seven of diamonds, hoping to ruff with his little trumps. Dummy goes down with five diamonds to the queen, and Y holds ace-jack. He plays the jack for two reasons: his partner may be leading from the king, in which case the jack is good; and if B holds king it will force him to lead up to Y and establish his two trump-honors.

B takes the diamond with the king and is defeated. If he leads diamonds again, Y takes with the ace and gives B his ruff. If B leads a club (hoping to ruff in Dummy on the third round), Z just beats the table and leads a diamond. If B makes his proper lead of a trump (the ace, and then another), he kills Z's diamond ruff, but establishes Y's king and queen; and Z–Y can always force B with the heart-suit, and make him lead to them. They must never give Dummy a club-ruff nor allow the queen of diamonds to take. If Dummy should play it on the first trick, Y must play his ace and lead the nine of clubs; Z must take the round, but not lead it again, to establish Dummy's ruff. He must lead a heart, which will throw B back in his own hand.

B is thus defeated, and Z–Y can go rubber, *at a profit*, on any subsequent hand.

Test Hand No. 8

(The dangers of withholding legitimate information.)

Here is a hand where A–B were far ahead, and they lacked but ten points on the rubber-game. The cards fell as follows:



It was, of course, important that Z–Y should keep the adversary from getting the play of the hand, or, failing that, that they should push A–B to a contract that they could n't keep. Z said "a club" and A "a heart." Now Y should certainly have said "two clubs" to show that he

could help. He held a guarded trump honor, a side-ace, and a side-singleton—and very little prospect of defeating a "one-heart" bid.

He should have bid to force A up, even if he did n't bid to help his partner. As a matter of fact, he passed and so did B. Z did n't want to yield that bid to A (in a suit that would probably put him rubber), and he considered that Y had virtually said that he had no help in clubs. So, instead of two clubs, Z tried "a royal," because it was one trick instead of two, and because it would give Y another chance to show assistance.

A said "two hearts," and again Y went by—this time because he hoped to beat the hearts. But, considering the state of the score, he should have tried to capture the play; he should have said "three clubs" to warn Z from "royals."

That singleton jack of spades that Y holds is an excellent thing in a side-suit, but a terrible thing in trumps. Y, however, passed, as did A, and Z found himself in a desperate position. If he passed, A would go rubber on his bid. Z feared a three-bid with no indication of help from his partner, so he chose a two-bid—"two royals." And every one passed.

Z could easily have made three clubs, but he could not make two royals. In the first in-

stance, his adversary had a trump-singleton, while his partner held a trump-honor and a side-singleton; and in the second instance it was his partner who held the trump-singleton and his adversary the side-singleton. Y should certainly have bid on his hand. In this special instance it was much more important that he and his partner should score below the line than that they should penalize their adversaries.

Test Hand No. 9

(A case where the partner of the declarant should do all the raising.)



Z opens with "a club," A passes, Y (holding a singleton in his partner's suit) says "a royal," and B says "two hearts."

Now Z may go on in his own suit, if he likes, but I should greatly prefer to have him raise Y, in the higher suit, which is worth more and is less of a contract. Z has a perfect raising hand for royals; a singleton in the adversary's suit, three little trumps with which to take ruffs, and two ace-king side-suits. Whatever B bids in hearts, Z can cover with the same number of royals.

If B should go very high in hearts, Z should double on the principle that, as he and his partner hold all the other three suits, B can neither make a great many in hearts, nor jump to any other bid.

In this case, Z will lead ace and then king of diamonds, to show no more. On this second round of diamonds, B should throw his queen of diamonds to unblock for Dummy's jack; then, unless Z throws his partner in on a spade lead, so as to get his diamond-ruff, B has a re-entry in Dummy. For the moment Z leads short (mark well what I am about to say), B knows positively that the queen of trumps lies with Y. No player sitting in Z's position (on the safe side of the heart-bid) would invite a ruff if

he held a guarded trump-honor. He would keep it to take a trump-round. B knows, then, that the queen is either *unguarded* in Z's hand, or guarded in Y's. He must take no chances of leading up to it, if Y has it.

B knows, too, that, if Y's queen is guarded, Z has but a singleton trump (seven trumps in his own hand, two in Dummy, and three in Y's make twelve—that leaves but one for Z). Thus if Z should happen to lead his own suit (clubs) on the third round, hoping to find his partner short and to establish a cross-ruff (a very natural lead), B would trump the first round of clubs, lead one round of trumps to pull Z's singleton and kill his diamond-ruff, then lead his ten of diamonds and take with Dummy's jack, and put the trump through Y's queen.

It is a beautiful plan—but it can be frustrated by Z's lead of a spade, in place of a club, on the third round. That will put Y in, and he will give Z his diamond-ruff and pull B's only remaining diamond. However, if B gets the lead, he can throw it with a spade-lead up to Y, and Y will probably lead his fourth diamond, hoping to give his partner another ruff—as he cannot tell that Z (having doubled) had but a singleton in trumps. If Y makes this lead, Dummy's jack takes as B wants it to. It is a wonderfully

interesting hand, and that is an invaluable point to remember, in the event of a short lead; the moment a player leads short, place any problematical trump-honor that you may lack, in his partner's hand rather than in his. His trumps are apt to be nothing but useless spots. No one leads short with good trumps that he wants to protect.

Test Hand No. 10

(A very peculiar hand.)

The bidding on this hand might vary exceedingly and yet be correct. And the fact that the score is love-all on the first game of a new rubber leaves one quite independent in that respect; when the score makes no demands upon you, you can do much that you would not otherwise do.

I can give no set rule for the bidding of this hand other than to repeat my oft-reiterated caution against any possible doubling of bids of one; and to remind you that forcing bids do not always force—you may get left with them. Were I any—or all—of the four players holding the cards in this hand, I should bid it in this way:



Z can open this with "a no-trump" or "a royal." Most players would choose the former, because it is higher in value, much more popular with the average player, and because hearts will probably be bid if the adversaries hold them. I should choose the suit-bid, because of the heart-singleton; I have a horror of singletons and missing suits in no-trump.

"A royal" would please A and "a no-trump" would not—with two blank-suits. Whichever Z bids, I think A should say "two hearts"; in the event of Z's no-trump, A will say this in order to play the hand; in the event of Z's "royal," A will say it to force him.

Two hearts is too good to spoil, as far as Y is concerned. He passes.

The bid does not suit B at all. But he can do nothing but pass. He has two tricks in his hand, and that must be his comfort.

Z is no better pleased, and does not know of his partner's pleasure. No-trump is now out of the question, but I think his side-suit and his heart-singleton would warrant "two royals."

Then A is the one to smile and to pass. B can do nothing but pass, and Z plays a most remarkable and disappointing hand.

Test Hand No. 11

(A hand whose interest hinges solely on the new count.)



Score: Game each and nothing on the rubber-game. Z–Y have 450 in penalties to A–B's 200.

A glance will show you that it is a battle between red suits and black—a battle that would have been an impossibility before the era of the new count.

Z, being 250 ahead in penalties, does not care to risk losing them on a shaky bid. He says "a spade."

A passes, leaving Y to get his partner out of the hole. If Y bids, A can bid later; if Y passes, A–B have two poor hands against them, and the chance to win back 100 of their lost penalties.

Y says "a royal" and B says "two hearts."

Most players, in Z's place, would say "two royals." *Z has not a raiser in his hand.* His two tricks are in the same suit; he has no outside aces or kings, no singletons, and no missing suit. The other side will lead, *and they will not lead trumps!* Z has eight losing suit-cards. He must pass.

Y bids the "two royals." His bid will not put him game, and B has six or seven losing cards—too many for a three-bid. He must pass and see whether his partner has a raiser.

A has, and says "three hearts."

From then on, it is a battle between the red suits and the black. Nothing but the tempera-

ment of the players, the soundness of their game, and their adherence, or non-adherence, to the rules will determine the remainder of the bidding.

Test Hand No. 12

(A mistaken double, and some other mistakes.)

I will give you this hand as it was originally played, in order to sound some warning notes.



It was only the third hand dealt and A–B had had phenomenal luck; the first hand, A had held a no-trumper with a hundred aces.

He held all the cards, no one could make a bid against him, and he made 40 below the line and 100 above. The next hand, B had held 72 honors in royals and had scored 27 below the line. Thus, when the deal came to Z, his opponents were game in and 27–0 on the rubber game, with 172 points above the line, while Z and his partner had an absolutely blank score. Z was anxious to do something handsome, and to lose no time about it. At first his hand did not look wonderfully promising. He opened with "a heart."

This was good news to B. Imagine sitting in his place, holding that rather discouraging hand, and hearing your adversary bid on the very suit in which you held five cards to two honors, including the ace.

A followed with "two clubs."

Y could have said "two hearts" on his club-singleton and his two wonderful side-suits. Instead, he said "two diamonds," because of his 56 honors; they would reduce those hundred aces held by A two hands back to less than half their original value.

B passed.

Z realized that his hand was not of much use, except in hearts; he realized, too, that his hearts were excellent, lying, as they did, in such close

sequence. That is my first point—the strength that lies in a sequence. It is the holes in a suit that weaken it. Z remembered also the difficulty in going game in diamonds; it meant that the other side must take but two tricks, whereas in hearts he could give them three tricks and still go game. And it was his great object to go game in the hand and wipe off that discouraging 27–0. With the score at game-all, things would look much brighter. He determined to use his partner's diamonds as a strong side-suit, and to go back to his own higher suit. Accordingly he bid "two hearts."

A saw no danger of Z going game on that bid; he lacked the ace of his own suit, and held six wretched side-cards. He passed. Y passed, and B made the terrible mistake of doubling "two hearts." Many players would do this in B's place.

It was fundamentally wrong, because you should "never double anything unless you can double everything." If B wanted to play that hand at hearts, why should he risk frightening Y back to diamonds? B could not double diamonds, and he could not double no-trumps; the only thing he wanted was hearts, therefore he should *not warn* the adversaries of what he took to be their danger.

Again, he sat "under" the heart-bid and could be led through, and, as his cards were far from being in sequence, such a process would hurt him greatly.

And, lastly, "two hearts" would not put Z game, if he made it, and two hearts doubled would do just that.

Z was delighted with the double. He was absolutely sure of making it, with his trumps in sequence, and his partner holding good diamonds. Had he been playing with experts, he would never have dreamed of redoubling, because he liked his position too well to want it changed. Moreover, no expert would have doubled his hearts unless he could have doubled Y's diamonds as well. And with a better player sitting on the other side of him, Z would have been afraid of a return to "three clubs." This bid Z was almost sure of defeating; he held the ace of clubs and two small; his partner held the diamonds, and he himself might get a ruff on the third round, and the good hearts were his after the ace was gone. He might defeat "three clubs," but it would be far less profitable than making two hearts doubled.

Z was conscious that he played very poor Auction when he redoubled that bid. These were his reasons:

1. He had taken the gauge of his adversaries.

2. The score made him anxious to pull off something tremendous.

3. He feared Y would go back to the diamonds if he saw his partner doubled and afraid to redouble.

4. He had no suit to fear but royals, and he reasoned thus: If A had good royals, he would have bid them instead of clubs. And if B had good royals, he would have covered Y's first diamond bid instead of passing. Also B's hand must be rather full of hearts.

Z redoubled "two hearts," and prayed that A would not go back to clubs; his prayers were answered. A should certainly have said "three clubs" on his missing heart-suit and Z's redouble. He feared to do so because he lacked the ace and held six losing suit-cards.

Every one passed, and Z made a small slam on a bid of "two hearts" doubled and redoubled. B took nothing but his ace of trumps; he should have made his ace of spades, but by a faulty play he lost it and allowed Z to make a slam. Z scored 192 points, 16 honors, 20 for slam, 100 for bonus, and 400 for extra tricks,—a total of 728 points on the hand.

A led the king of clubs, which Z took with the ace. He saved Dummy's club-ruff for later, and got into Dummy with a diamond in order to lead trumps through B. B put up his ten on the first round of trumps, and Z took with the jack. As soon as he found A was chicane, he gave up pulling two trumps for one and began to lead Dummy's diamonds. B hated to trump, knowing that Z would over-trump; he therefore continued to discard on all the diamonds, and allowed Z to do likewise. In this way Z got rid of all his spades, and trumped B's ace. By trumping the diamonds and forcing Z to over-trump, B would have saved his ace of spades and 152 points, 20 for slam, 32 for the trick, and 100 for its extra value above the line.

The mistakes in this hand were:

1. B's double, sitting where he did, and with his hearts not in sequence; also with the score as it was.

2. Z's redouble. He risked frightening the adversary away to another suit.

3. A's failure to bid "three clubs."

4. B's failure to trump the diamonds when they were led through him. He made Z a present of all those spade discards.

Test Hand No. 13

(Changing "one no-trump" to two in a suit.)



Z opens with a "no-trump." And would n't any one say that he had a perfect beauty? Yet he simply cannot make the odd.

It is Y's undoubted business to change that bid to two diamonds. His lack of aces and kings (his partner's suit is "high-cards," and he has none), and his spade singleton together with his six diamonds to an honor (a seven-point make), all demand a "two-diamond" bid from Y. He would be an awful weight at no-trump; but his

partner's no-trump hand should make his hand a good one for two diamonds.

This is another instance of the weakness of a singleton in no-trump, even though the singleton be an ace.

Test Hand No. 14

(Double rather than bid.)



On the original appearance of this hand, Z bid "a no-trump," A passed, Y passed, and B said "two diamonds."

Of course Z could have said "two no-trumps"; but equally, of course, he could beat "two dia-

monds," and at a much greater profit. Also, he could beat two of anything else, so he doubled.

B did a remarkable thing—he redoubled. Whether he thought he could make it, or whether he hoped to frighten Z back to a bid, I do not know. At any rate, the hand was played at "two diamonds" redoubled, and Z scored 814 points.

Test Hand No. 15

("Process of elimination," in bid.)



This hand was played in duplicate boards, by two rival clubs.

In the first club, Z opened the bidding correctly with "one no-trump" (following the process of elimination).

The Z of the second club opened with "one diamond."

In both cases every one else passed. Each Z scored 4-odd on the hand; but in the first case they were worth 40 (more than game), plus 40 honors; and in the second case they were worth 28 (not game), plus 56 honors.

Test Hand No. 16

(A difficult hand to bid.)



The score is game-all. Z deals; he has to choose between "a spade" and a thoroughly unsound "heart." If he says the former, he has almost the certainty that the adversaries will not bid against him, and that the responsibility will fall on his partner. If he bids the heart, the adversaries will be more apt to bid, but Z's unsound bid may deceive his partner. Z should bid the spade.

A passes and Y bids "a diamond." B says "a heart" on his diamond singleton and the certainty that the hand that lies "over" him is a weak one.

Z could say "two diamonds" if he chose; he has a trick (his heart king), and a raiser (his singleton). But I should think he would prefer to play against the heart bid. He could not double, for two reasons: first, because he is not sufficiently sure of defeating the bid, and "a poor double is worse than a poor make"; and second, because he might frighten A to royals, which he could not defeat.

If Y goes to "two diamonds" he will be disappointed. He can take but the book.

On the other hand, A can make two royals (if he should choose to bid in that suit), in spite of the fact that Y sits over him with four, to the king-queen-jack. A's two singleton aces

give him a very strong hand in anything but no-trump.

Test Hand No. 17

(Do not change your partner's double to a bid.)



The score is 18-all on the rubber-game, but A–B are 250 behind in penalties. Twice, they have held spade hands which they were forced to play because the adversaries were too clever to take them out of a one-spade bid, and each time they lost a hundred. The other fifty was lost on a perfectly sound bid that failed to go through because of the position of the cards;

every finesse failed, and B (who was playing the hand), was set for one trick—making 250 penalties against him and his partner.

Now 250 does not seem a serious loss, yet see how these two players were hampered by it when the rubber-game came to 18–all. They must positively get the rubber in order to come out even; if they lost the rubber, they lost 500; and even by winning it they won nothing at all —they simply avoided loss. That rubber was bound to be a loss at the worst, or a blank at the best.

Z opened this hand with "a royal," and A rushed to the breach with "two hearts." And he had a perfectly sound two-heart bid; seven hearts are the bigger half of thirteen, and two of them being honors raised the bid to a nine-point make (counting two for each honor and one for each plain card). Seven points is an average bid, and in addition A held a singleton side-ace, and a diamond stopper that was a sequence stopper. But he had a partner whose hand was a dead weight.

Y doubled "two hearts." He had a perfect double, because he could double the adversaries in any suit to which they jumped ("Never double anything unless you can double everything"). Y had everything but spades, and

his partner had shown them; if A–B tried to get out with "two no-trumps," Y could certainly double them; if they tried "two royals," Z could double them, and they could not make either "three diamonds" or "three clubs."

The results of the doubled two hearts were disastrous to A–B. The adversaries made 200—raising the total in penalties to 450. This made the rubber itself a 200-point loss to A–B and anything else a worse loss. With the score at 18–18 on the rubber-game, there is very little chance to catch up in penalties, especially with adversaries who play well enough to allow you to take a losing rubber rather than make a risky bid themselves.

After Y doubled the two hearts and B passed, many players holding Z's cards would have bid "two royals," arguing that it meant rubber and "sure money." Z preferred to let Y make 100 a trick for every trick over five, rather than take him back to a suit that was worth 9 a trick for every trick over six. For aught Z knew, his partner might take three-odd tricks, and if he did, they would be worth more than the rubber itself.

Z took but two-odd, and the following hand gave them all a problem. It was A's deal, but he will now have to be designated by "Z,"

in order to place him in the dealer's position in the diagram. Remember, though, that the dealer and his partner are 450 behind in penalties.

Test Hand No. 18

(The predicament in which the dealer and his partner may find themselves, if the rubber-game stands at 18–all and they are 450 behind in penalties.)



Z bid "a no-trump." A could have passed and given Z a losing rubber, but he had something better to do. He saw a chance to go

rubber himself, with 64 heart-honors; so he said "two-hearts."

Y could not stop the hearts, so he could not raise the no-trump bid. However, he said "two royals," on six to two honors, a singleton, and his partner's no-trump hand.

B passed. The bid suited him and he had no desire to send Z back to no-trumps.. Z considered that he had an excellent hand to help two royals, and passed.

A was too wise to bid three hearts when he did n't have to. His partner had given him no raise, he held seven losing cards, and would win even if the other side took rubber. He passed.

B led his singleton diamond, reserving the hearts to throw his partner the lead later and thus get the diamond ruff.

Y was set for two tricks, making his penalty-losses total 550.

In spite of my love of penalties, I think B should have given his partner a legitimate raise to "three hearts"; he had a trick and two raisers (his two aces and his singleton). They would then have scored 24 points plus 64 honors plus 250 for rubber—a total of 338, and a big rubber.

Under those circumstances, the dealer's plight would have been worse than ever.

Test Hand No. 19

(A position where it is right to break the rule against bidding on jack-suits.)



Z bids "a spade," and A passes (with hopes of gathering some penalties). Then Y bids "a heart" on a jack-suit. He does this to take his partner out of the spade, by which they seem doomed to lose 100. And it is hardly likely (with Y's hearts) that they can lose more than 100 in that suit. Then, too, Y's bid is not the opening-bid; he knows that his partner (with a spade hand) will not go to no-trumps,—which is the principal danger with jack-bids; and he

knows that no one can hold more than simple honors against him.

Y can just make the odd if B leads a club; he makes two-odd if B leads the ace of spades; and he makes three-odd if B leads the queen of diamonds,—and any of these leads would be perfectly correct.

If B bids a "no-trump," he can make just the odd. I should consider it a very light bid on three mere stoppers and a three-card suit. Only the state of the score could warrant it.

Test Hand No. 20

(On taking the adversary out of a one-spade bid.)



Z bids "a spade," and A should certainly pass. If Y passes, B must pass too.

Played at a spade, A–B score 100. Should A declare "a no-trump" (against Z's opening spade), he can score 10. Partial games are worth very little. One hundred is ten times better than ten!

It would take a good deal of courage, on the part of Y, to bid no-trump on one ace, two kings, and a queen, after a discouraging spade-bid from his partner. However, if he does try it, he saves one trick, losing 50 instead of 100. This 50, even, is more profitable to A than his no-trump bid.

On a club-bid from B, he and his partner could make two-odd. This proves that A–B have the winning combination, but that *they must take less on their own declaration than on the adversary's.* Their profits are 100 (on the adversary's spade), or 50 (on the adversary's no-trump), or 12 (on their own club), or 10 (on their own no-trump). There should not be much hesitation, on their part, whether to declare or to defeat.

Two-Handed Auction

A VERY fascinating game for two players is the new one of two-handed Auction.

It is played with a full pack of cards. The dealer deals his adversary and himself each thirteen cards, alternately. Two cards are dealt, face-down, to form a "widow," and the remaining twenty-four cards lie in a pack, face down, with the exception of the top one, which is turned face-up. Each player looks at his hand and decides what suit (or suits) he had better keep and draw to; also whether he wants the card that is faced on the top of the pack. Suppose your original thirteen cards are these:

♡ 6 3
♣ 10 8 4
◇ J 5
♠ A J 9 8 7 2

You see at a glance that you have the foundation of an excellent royal-hand. Suppose the card faced on top of the pack is the queen of

spades, and it is your lead (*i. e.*, that the other player dealt). The only way for you to get that queen is to take the first trick, and the only taking card in your hand is the ace of spades, for at this point of the game there are no trumps, the players have either to follow suit or to discard. You, therefore, lead your ace of spades. Your adversary must follow suit if he can. If not, he discards, and in either case you take the trick. But you do not lay it in front of you. The two played cards are thrown to one side, face-down, in the discard pile. You take the queen of spades from the pack and your adversary takes the next card. He knows your card, but you do not know his—it may be good or bad. *But you both know that the ace of spades is in the discard pile, and can never appear later in the hand*—in other words, the king of spades is now the highest spade. Another card is turned up on the pack—say the four of hearts. It is your lead, as you took the last trick. You don't want the four of hearts, so you lead to lose it, the three of hearts. Your adversary may be forced to take this, or he may hold the two and play under your three, thus forcing the four on you, or he may be filling his hand to hearts and may want even a small one. In any case the two cards just played are thrown into the dis-

card pile, another card is turned, and the player who took the last trick leads. *It is always a mistake to force, or allow, your adversary to take too many cards of the same suit*, even if they are small ones, particularly if they are in a high suit. And it is very essential to remember what cards have been played and thrown aside.

When the last two cards have been taken from the pack, there are twenty-four cards in the discard pile, two in the widow, and thirteen in the hand of each player. Then you start in to play Auction. The player who took the last trick is forced to open the bidding; his adversary covers, passes, or doubles, and the bidding goes from player to player till one of them passes. This closes the bidding.

The successful declarant may take the widow, or leave it. If he takes it, *he is forced to keep both cards that he has picked up*, and to discard two other cards from his hand. And he may not discard any ace or any trump. It would give him too much of an advantage to know that a certain ace, or a certain trump, was out of the way, while his adversary was still awaiting its appearance. If his hand should not hold two cards that are eligible to discard, and if he is *forced* to discard an ace or a trump, he must do it face-up.

If the successful declarant refuses the widow, his adversary may take it, or leave it, with the same conditions.

The adversary of the successful declarant makes the opening lead, and the remainder of the game is played under the same laws as four-handed Auction.

It is an excellent memory-test, to keep track of all the cards in the discard pile, and the widow lends the element of chance to the game.

"Royals" or "Lilies"

In my former book, *The Fine Points of Auction Bridge*, I used the term "Lilies" where, in the present volume, I have substituted "Royals." I must explain the discrepancy.

For a long time, I resisted the use of "Royal," for several reasons. In the first place, I accepted the new count just as it was made, by its creators. They gave the suits their new values and called the new suit "Lilies." Why should I not accept their term as well as their values?

"Royal" was brought into use by a number of players who not only did not make the new count, but who held it back and refused it countenance as long as possible. When forced to fall into line, they substituted the word "Royal" for the "Lily" they had so ridiculed.

Then, I greatly dislike the use of an adjective for a noun. All the other suits have nouns for names,—why not the new one?

However, "Royal" has become the more popular term, and is therefore the one to be adopted.

In matters of *principle*, it is necessary to stand out against opposition, because there, often, to be alone is to be right. But in all matters of *taste* and of *convention*, to be alone is to be wrong. Personal taste must yield to the taste of the majority, or be eccentric. And non-essentials are not worthy of so much resistance. Therefore, I have adopted the word which has found favor with the majority of players.

"Card-sense"

We hear a great deal about "card-sense"; it is an expression in constant use. Such and such a person has "no card-sense" and can never learn to play; another has wonderful "card-sense." I contend that there is no separate gift that should bear that name. It is true that certain persons acquire quickly any card game that is presented to them, and achieve a high grade of skill in it; and it is equally true that certain other persons seem incapable of grasping such things. Yet no one could lay this to stupidity; the non-card player may be as brilliantly clever a person as any that you will ever meet. So, for want of a truer definition, we have coined the term of card-sense.

Card-sense is the possession (natural or acquired) of a number of gifts—all of which are of the greatest use, not only at cards, but in the entire course of one's life. The first and greatest of these gifts is concentration. Brilliancy and concentration do not always go hand in hand; but concentration and skill at cards are insepa-

rable. When you are playing a hand, that hand should be the only thing in the world, as far as you are concerned. No fascinating thoughts of new toilets, no engaging bits of gossip at the next table, no dream of love, even, should share your consciousness. The woman who looks up with vague eyes in the middle of an enthralling hand and wonders whether she will rent her house this summer, is the woman who should either give up Auction, or buckle down to it. You simply cannot get the most out of a difficult hand unless you are thinking of that hand *exclusively* at the moment you are playing it. To some persons this gift of concentration is natural; others acquire it with difficulty. But *it can be acquired*. And who will gainsay me when I maintain that it is one of the most useful of mental attributes?

After concentration, I should place memory. It does not take a phenomenal memory to keep track of thirteen cards in each of four different suits. Almost any trained intelligence can remember fifty-two objects. But Auction memory does not end there. You must remember the rules, the leads, the bids, and, above all, *the similar situations under which you have seen existing conditions approximated*, and what were the results of those situations. And this will

help you toward the acquiring of the third requisite—judgment.

Your judgment of an existing condition and of the best way of handling it may be naturally quick and sound. If it is not, it can positively be made so by seeing that situation arise again and again, in a more or less modified form, and by having forced upon your consciousness the results of various forms of handling it. Memory will help you with past experiences, and practice with present ones.

Practice or habit is the fourth great ingredient in this recipe. Play, play, play—provided always that you play intelligently. There is nothing else that will so help your game.

There are two more elements that make toward success at cards, and those two I will grant are more apt to be inborn than acquired; but they are not so absolutely essential as those I have already mentioned. The first of these two is quickness, and the second is harder to define. It is the gift of foreseeing hypothetical situations and their results, should they arise; it is the gift of the chess player. He does not pick up the pieces and move them around to see what will be the result of a certain play; he looks at the board, and (without touching a piece) he says to himself: "If I move thus, or thus, my adversary

will be able to do this or that; then I can go on to such and such a move," etc. He is able to look ahead and foresee the outcomes of different modes of procedure without losing himself in a labyrinth. Personally I find this the hardest gift to acquire, and that is probably the reason that I am willing to consider it inborn.

Take, then, this prescription for the acquiring of card-sense: Three parts of concentration, two parts each of memory, judgment, and practice; one part of foresight, and one-half part of quickness. Dose: from three to six times a week for six months. The result is guaranteed.

THE NECESSITY FOR A UNIVERSAL STANDARD OF BID AND DOUBLE.

FOR three or four years, Auction has been in the making; now, it stands made and perfected. All suggested theories of bid and double, all proposed conventions of information, have been thoroughly tested by the master-players, and embraced or discarded. *The ones that live are the ones that have been proved both sound and useful.* The discarded ones are those that, though sound, are unnecessary and therefore useless; or those that would be useful if sound, but which contain an unfortunate flaw.

The result of this testing by recognized authorities is a game that is as nearly perfect as any game can be. But, unhappily, it is still far from being generally understood and practiced. The mass of players think they are playing Auction when they are merely playing Bid-Bridge; they have not the faintest conception of the game in its perfected form. They think they understand the new count, simply because they know its suit values. It would be as sensible

to think that they knew all about a book simply because they had seen its cover!

The want of a universal knowledge and acceptance of the established code of bidding and doubling, and the substitution of personal and eccentric theories, are the present bars to perfect Auction.

All professionals, all experts, and all first-grade players everywhere play exactly the same game. Except in a few minor details, their theories are the same, and their practice always upholds those theories. The result is a game of rare delight, where every one speaks the same language. But to play with a person who has his own personal theories as to bid and double, is to try and converse with a stranger who speaks nothing but an unintelligible jargon. Multiply this into the thousands, and you get an idea of the average Auction of the day.

It is the effort and desire of all experts to do away with this confusion. Such an end can be accomplished in but one way: *every person who aspires to play Auction must be willing to waive his personal theories in favor of a universal standard.* Let him rest assured that he can think of nothing that has not already been thought of, played, and tested. *If it has not a place in the game of to-day, it is because it does not deserve one.*

In old Bridge, no one attempted to set up individual standards; no one advocated freak leads, freak conventions, or freak play. *Why, then, should they insist now on freak bids and doubles?*

With the exception of the discard from strength or from weakness—every one played the same Bridge—except for a greater or less degree of skill. Their *aim* was the same, namely, to acquire skill in the game by mastering its accepted rules as quickly as possible,—but never to make a new game of their own! Solitaire is the only game that offers a field for personal excursions into the Un-accepted.

Until this universality becomes established in Auction, the pleasure of the game must be marred and its progress impeded. It is a constant surprise to see the wretched Auction that is played by perfect Bridge-players. Their bids and their doubles mean nothing under the sun to any one but themselves. They bid on jack-suits and ten-suits; they double bids of one (and, incidentally, let the adversary out); they open with a two-bid—sometimes to show strength, sometimes weakness; they double the only suit they can possibly hope to defeat; they make bids that they could n't possibly play, "just to give information"; they raise without

raisers; they change doubles to bids; they feel it necessary to "rescue" their partner from a double which has delighted him; they bid "one when they want to be taken out and two when they want to stay in" (which is about the most remarkable theory I ever heard); they bid no-trump without a stopper in the adversary's suit; it is impossible, in fact, to enumerate their elementary errors. The bidding closes in a haze of uncertainty, where it is impossible to count winning cards or losing cards, or to place any reliance in any information that has been given; and then these same persons sit up and proceed to play absolutely flawless Bridge. And you groan in spirit, and wonder how it is possible to be so skillful in the one game, and so hopelessly short-sighted in the other. *Their Bridge is good, because they accept the game as it was made; their Auction is wretched, because each one is insisting on having a finger in the making of the pie!*

Every player who accepts, digests, practices, and spreads the established standard of bid and double is helping to hasten the Auction millennium, which can never otherwise arrive.

The Laws of Auction Bridge[1]

Also the Etiquette of the Game as Approved and Adopted by The Whist Club of New York, September, 1912

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THE RUBBER

1. The partners first winning two games win the rubber. If the first two games decide the rubber, a third is not played.

SCORING

2. A game consists of thirty points obtained by tricks alone, exclusive of any points counted for honors, chicane, slam, little slam, bonus, or undertricks.

3. Every deal is played out, and any points in excess of the thirty necessary for the game are counted.

4. When the declarer wins the number of tricks bid, each one above six counts towards the game: two points when spades are trumps,

[1] Copyright, 1912, by The Whist Club, New York.

six when clubs are trumps, seven when diamonds are trumps, eight when hearts are trumps, nine when royal spades are trumps, and ten when there are no trumps.

5. Honors are ace, king, queen, knave, and ten of the trump suit; or the aces when no trump is declared.

6. Honors are credited in the honor column to the original holders, being valued as follows:

When a Trump is Declared.

3	honors	held	between	partners	equal	value	of 2	tricks.
4	"	"	"	"	"	"	4	"
5	"	"	"	"	"	"	5	"
4	"	"	in 1 hand			"	8	"
4	"	"	" 1	" { 5th in partner's hand }		"	9	"
5	"	"	" 1	"		"	10	"

When No Trump is Declared.

3	aces	held	between	partners	count 30
4	"	"	"	"	" 40
4	"	"	in one hand		" 100

7. Slam is made when seven by cards is scored by either side, independently of tricks taken as penalty for the revoke; it adds forty points to the honor count.[1]

8. Little slam is made when six by cards is similarly scored; it adds twenty points to the honor count.[1]

[1] Law 84 prohibits the revoking side from scoring slam or little slam.

9. Chicane (one hand void of trumps) is equal in value to simple honors, *i. e.*, if the partners, one of whom has chicane, score honors, it adds the value of three honors to their honor score; if the adversaries score honors it deducts that value from theirs. Double chicane (both hands void of trumps) is equal in value to four honors, and that value must be deducted from the honor score of the adversaries.

10. The value of honors, slam, little slam, or chicane is not affected by doubling or redoubling.

11. At the conclusion of a rubber the trick and honor scores of each side are added, and two hundred and fifty points added to the score of the winners. The difference between the completed scores is the number of points of the rubber.

12. A proven error in the honor score may be corrected at any time before the score of the rubber has been made up and agreed upon.

13. A proven error in the trick score may be corrected prior to the conclusion of the game in which it occurred. Such game shall not be considered concluded until a declaration has been made in the following game, or if it be the final game of the rubber, until the score has been made up and agreed upon.

CUTTING

14. In cutting, the ace is the lowest card; as between cards of otherwise equal value, the lowest is the heart, next the diamond, next the club, and highest the spade.

15. Every player must cut from the same pack.

16. Should a player expose more than one card, the highest in his cut.

FORMING TABLES

17. The prior right of playing is with those first in the room. If there are more than four candidates of equal standing, the privilege of playing is decided by cutting. The four who cut the lowest cards play first.

18. After the table is formed the players cut to decide upon partners, the two lower playing against the two higher. The lowest is the dealer who has choice of cards and seats, and who, having made his selection, must abide by it.

19. Six players constitute a complete table.

20. The right to succeed any player who may retire is acquired by announcing the desire to do so, and such announcement shall constitute a prior right to the first vacancy.

CUTTING OUT

21. If, at the end of a rubber, admission is claimed by one or two candidates, the player or players having played the greatest number of consecutive rubbers shall withdraw; but when all have played the same number, they must cut to decide upon the outgoers; the highest are out.[1]

RIGHT OF ENTRY

22. A candidate desiring to enter a table must declare his intention before any player at the table cuts a card, whether for the purpose of beginning a new rubber or of cutting out.

23. In the formation of new tables candidates who have not played at any existing table have the prior right of entry. Others decide their right to admission by cutting.

24. When one or more players belonging to an existing table aid in making up a new one, he or they shall be the last to cut out.

25. A player who cuts into one table, while belonging to another, forfeits his prior right of re-entry into the latter, unless he has helped to form a new table. In this event he may

[1] See Law 14 as to value of cards in cutting.

signify his intention of returning to his original table when his place at the new one can be filled.

26. Should any player leave a table during the progress of a rubber, he may, with the consent of the three others, appoint a substitute to play during his absence; but such appointment shall become void upon the conclusion of the rubber, and shall not in any way affect the substitute's rights.

27. If any player break up a table the others have a prior right elsewhere.

SHUFFLING

28. The pack must not be shuffled below the table nor so that the face of any card may be seen.

29. The dealer's partner must collect the cards from the preceding deal and has the right to shuffle first. Each player has the right to shuffle subsequently. The dealer has the right to shuffle last; but, should a card or cards be seen during his shuffling, or while giving the pack to be cut, he must reshuffle.

30. After shuffling, the cards properly collected must be placed face downward to the left of the next dealer, where they must remain untouched until the play with the other pack is finished.

THE DEAL

31. Each player deals in his turn; the order of dealing is to the left.

32. The player on the dealer's right cuts the pack, and in dividing it he must leave not fewer than four cards in each packet; if in cutting or in replacing one of the two packets a card is exposed, or if there is any confusion or doubt as to the exact place in which the pack was divided, there must be a fresh cut.

33. When the player whose duty it is to cut has once separated the pack, he can neither reshuffle nor recut, except as provided in Law 32.

34. Should the dealer shuffle the cards after the cut, the pack must be cut again.

35. The fifty-two cards shall be dealt face downward. The deal is not completed until the last card has been dealt.

36. In the event of a misdeal the cards must be dealt again by the same player.

A NEW DEAL

37. There *must* be a new deal:

a If the cards are not dealt into four packets, one at a time and in regular rotation, beginning at the dealer's left;

b If, during a deal, or during the play, the pack is proven incorrect or imperfect;

c If any card is faced in the pack or is exposed during the deal on, above, or below the table;

d If any player has dealt to him a greater number of cards than thirteen, whether discovered before or during the play;

e If the dealer deal two cards at once and then deal a third before correcting the error;

f If the dealer omit to have the pack cut and either adversary calls attention to the fact prior to the completion of the deal and before either adversary has looked at any of his cards;

g If the last card does not come in its regular order to the dealer.

38. Should three players have their right number of cards, the fourth, less, and not discover such deficiency until he has played, the deal stands; he, not being Dummy, is answerable for any established revoke he may have made as if the missing card or cards had been in his hand. Any player may search the other pack for it or them.

39. If, during the play, a pack be proven incorrect, such proof renders the current deal void but does not affect any prior score. (See Law 37 *b*.) If during or at the conclusion of the play one player be found to hold more than the proper number of cards and another have an equal number less, the deal is void.

40. A player dealing out of turn or with the adversaries' cards may be corrected before the last card is dealt, otherwise the deal must stand, and the game proceed as if the deal had been correct, the player to his left dealing the next hand. A player who has looked at any of his cards may not correct such deal, nor may his partner.

41. A player can neither cut, shuffle, nor deal for his partner without the permission of his adversaries.

DECLARING TRUMPS

42. The dealer, having examined his hand, must declare to win at least one odd trick, either with a declared suit, or at "no trumps."

43. After the dealer has made his declaration, each player in turn, commencing with the player on the dealer's left, has the right to pass, to make a higher declaration, to double the last declaration made, or to redouble a declaration which has been doubled, subject to the provisions of Law 54.

44. A declaration of a greater number of tricks in a suit of lower value, which equals the last declaration in value of points, shall be considered a higher declaration—*e. g.*, a declaration

of "three spades" is a higher declaration than "one club."

45. A player in his turn may overbid the previous adverse declaration any number of times, and may also overbid his partner, but he cannot overbid his own declaration which has been passed by the three others.

46. The player who makes the final declaration shall play the combined hands of himself and his partner (the latter becoming Dummy), unless the winning suit was first bid by the partner, in which case he, no matter what bids have intervened, shall play the hand.

47. When the player of the two hands (hereinafter termed "the declarer") wins at least as many tricks as he declared, he scores the full value of the tricks won (see Laws 4 and 6). When he fails, neither the declarer nor his adversaries score anything towards the game, but his adversaries score in the honor column fifty points for each under-trick—*i. e.*, each trick short of the number declared; or, if the declaration has been doubled, or redoubled, one hundred or two hundred respectively for each such trick.

48. The loss on the original declaration by the dealer of "one spade" is limited to one hundred points whether doubled or not, unless redoubled. Honors are scored as held.

49. If a player make a declaration (other than passing) out of turn, either adversary may demand a new deal, or may allow the declaration so made to stand, in which case the bidding shall continue as if the declaration had been in order.

50. If a player make an insufficient or impossible declaration, either adversary may demand that it be penalized, provided such demand be made before an adversary has passed, doubled, or declared. In case of an insufficient declaration, the penalty is that the declarer must make his bid sufficient, and his partner is debarred from making any further declaration unless an adversary subsequently bids or doubles. In case of an impossible declaration, the penalty is that the declarer is considered to have bid to take all the tricks, and his partner cannot further declare unless an adversary subsequently bids or doubles. Either adversary, instead of accepting the impossible declaration, may demand a new deal or may treat his own or his partner's last previous declaration as final.

51. If, after the final declaration has been made, an adversary of the declarer give his partner any information as to any previous declaration, whether made by himself or an adversary, the declarer may call a lead from the

adversary whose next turn it is to lead; but a player is entitled to inquire, at any time during the play of the hand, what was the final declaration.

52. A declaration legitimately made cannot be altered after the next player has passed, declared, or doubled. Prior to such action by the next player, a declaration inadvertently made may be corrected.

DOUBLING AND REDOUBLING

53. The effect of doubling and redoubling is that the value of each trick over six is doubled or quadrupled, as provided in Law 4; but it does not alter the value of a declaration—*e. g.*, a declaration of "three clubs" is higher than "two royal spades," even if the "royal spade" declaration has been doubled.

54. Any declaration can be doubled and redoubled once, but not more; a player cannot double his partner's declaration, nor redouble his partner's double, but he may redouble a declaration of his partner which has been doubled by an adversary.

55. The act of doubling, or redoubling, reopens the bidding. When a declaration has been doubled or redoubled, any player, including the

declarer or his partner, can in his proper turn make a further declaration of higher value.

56. When a player whose declaration has been doubled wins the declared number of tricks, he scores a bonus of fifty points in the honor column, and a further fifty points for each additional trick. If he or his partner has redoubled, the bonus is doubled.

57. If a player double out of turn, either adversary may demand a new deal.

58. When the final declaration has been made the play shall begin, and the player on the left of the declarer shall lead.

DUMMY

59. As soon as the player to the left of the declarer has led, the declarer's partner shall place his cards face upward on the table, and the duty of playing the cards from that hand shall devolve upon the declarer.

60. Before placing his cards upon the table the declarer's partner has all the rights of a player, but after so doing takes no part whatever in the play, except that he has the right:

a To ask the declarer whether he has any of a suit in which he has renounced;

b To call the declarer's attention to the fact that too many or too few cards have been played to a trick;
c To correct the claim of either adversary to a penalty to which the latter is not entitled;
d To call attention to the fact that a trick has been erroneously taken by either side;
e To participate in the discussion of any disputed question of fact after it has arisen between the declarer and either adversary;
f To correct an erroneous score.

61. Should the declarer's partner call attention to any other incident of the play in consequence of which any penalty might have been exacted, the declarer is precluded from exacting such penalty.

62. If the declarer's partner, by touching a card or otherwise, suggest the play of a card from Dummy, either adversary may call upon the declarer to play or not play the card suggested.

63. Dummy is not liable to the penalty for a revoke; if he revoke and the error be not discovered until the trick is turned and quitted, whether by the rightful winners or not, the trick must stand.

64. A card from the declarer's own hand is not played until actually quitted; but should he name or touch a card in the Dummy, such card is considered as played unless he, in touching the card, say, "I arrange," or words to that effect.

If he simultaneously touch two or more such cards, he may elect which one to play.

CARDS EXPOSED BEFORE PLAY

65. If after the cards have been dealt and before the trump declaration has been finally determined, any player lead or expose a card, the partner of the offending player may not make any further bid or double during that hand, and the card is subject to call. When the partner of the offending player is the original leader, the declarer may prohibit the suit of the exposed card being the initial lead.

66. If, after the final declaration has been made and before a card is led, the partner of the leader to the first trick expose a card, the declarer may, in addition to calling the card, prohibit the lead of the suit of the exposed card; should the rightful leader expose a card, it is subject to call.

CARDS EXPOSED DURING PLAY

67. All cards exposed after the original lead by the declarer's adversaries are liable to be called, and such cards must be left face upward on the table.

68. The following are exposed cards:

1st. Two or more cards played at once;
2d. Any card dropped with its face upward on the table, even though snatched up so quickly that it cannot be named;
3d. Any card so held by a player that his partner sees any portion of its face;
4th. Any card mentioned by either adversary as being held by him or his partner.

69. A card dropped on the floor or elsewhere below the table or so held that an adversary but not the partner sees it, is not an exposed card.

70. If two or more cards are played at once by either of the declarer's adversaries, the declarer shall have the right to call any one of such cards to the current trick, and the other card or cards are exposed.

71. If, without waiting for his partner to play, either of the declarer's adversaries play or lead a winning card, as against the declarer and Dummy, and continue (without waiting for his partner to play) to lead several such cards, the declarer may demand that the partner of the player in fault win, if he can, the first or any other of these tricks, and the other cards thus improperly played are exposed cards.

72. If either or both of the declarer's adver-

saries throw his or their cards on the table face upward, such cards are exposed and are liable to be called; but if either adversary retain his hand he cannot be forced to abandon it. Cards exposed by the declarer are not liable to be called. If the declarer say, "I have the rest," or any other words indicating that the remaining tricks or any number thereof are his, he may be required to place his cards face upward on the table. His adversaries are not liable to have any of their cards called should they thereupon expose them.

73. If a player who has rendered himself liable to have the highest or lowest of a suit called (Laws 80, 86, and 92) fail to play as directed, or if when called on to lead one suit he lead another, having in his hand one or more cards of the suit demanded (Laws 76 and 93), or if, called upon to win or lose a trick, fail to do so when he can (Laws 71, 80, and 92), or if, when called upon not to play a suit, fail to play as directed (Laws 65 and 66), he is liable to the penalty for revoke, unless such play be corrected before the trick is turned and quitted.

74. A player cannot be compelled to play a card which would oblige him to revoke.

75. The call of an exposed card may be repeated until such card has been played.

LEADS OUT OF TURN

76. If either of the declarer's adversaries lead out of turn, the declarer may either treat the card so led as an exposed card, or may call a suit as soon as it is the turn of either adversary to lead.

77. If the declarer lead out of turn, either from his own hand or from Dummy, he incurs no penalty; but he may nor rectify the error after the second hand has played.

78. If any player lead out of turn and the three others follow, the trick is complete and the error cannot be rectified; but if only the second, or second and third play to the false lead, their cards may be taken back; there is no penalty against any except the original offender, who, if he be one of the declarer's adversaries, may be penalized as provided in Law 76.

79. If a player called on to lead a suit has none of it, the penalty is paid.

CARDS PLAYED IN ERROR

80. Should the fourth hand, not being Dummy or declarer, play before the second, the latter may be called upon to play his highest or lowest card of the suit played, or to win or lose the trick.

81. If any one, not being Dummy, omit playing to a trick and such error is not corrected until he has played to the next, the adversaries or either of them may claim a new deal; should either decide that the deal is to stand, the surplus card at the end of the hand is considered to have been played to the imperfect trick, but does not constitute a revoke therein.

82. When any one, except Dummy, plays two or more cards to the same trick and the mistake is not corrected, he is answerable for any consequent revokes he may have made. When during the play the error is detected, the tricks may be counted face downward, to see if any contain more than four cards; should this be the case, the trick which contains a surplus card or cards may be examined and the card or cards restored to the original holder, who (not being Dummy) shall be liable for any revoke he may meanwhile have made.

THE REVOKE[1]

83. A revoke occurs when a player, other than Dummy, holding one or more cards of the suit led, plays a card of a different suit. It becomes an established revoke if the trick in

[1] See Law 73.

which it occurs is turned and quitted by the rightful winners (*i. e.*, the hand removed from the trick after it has been turned face downward on the table); or if either the revoking player or his partner, whether in turn or otherwise, lead or play to the following trick.

84. The penalty for each established revoke is:

a When the declarer revokes, his adversaries add 150 points to their score in the honor column, in addition to any penalty which he may have incurred for not making good his declaration;

b If either of the adversaries revoke, the declarer may either add 150 points to his score in the honor column, or may take three tricks from his opponents and add them to his own. Such tricks may assist the declarer to make good his declaration, but shall not entitle him to score any bonus in the honor column, in the case of the declaration having been doubled or redoubled;

c When more than one revoke is made by the same side during the play of the hand, the penalty for each revoke after the first shall be 100 points in the honor column.

A revoking side cannot score, except for honors or chicane.

85. A player may ask his partner if he has a card of the suit which he has renounced; should the question be asked before the trick is turned

and quitted, subsequent turning and quitting does not establish a revoke, and the error may be corrected unless the question is answered in the negative, or unless the revoking player or his partner has led or played to the following trick.

86. If a player correct his mistake in time to save a revoke, any player or players who have followed him may withdraw their cards and substitute others, and the cards so withdrawn are not exposed. If the player in fault is one of the declarer's adversaries, the card played in error is exposed and the declarer may call it whenever he pleases; or he may require the offender to play his highest or lowest card of the suit to the trick, but this penalty cannot be exacted from the declarer.

87. At the end of a hand the claimants of a revoke may search all the tricks. If the cards have been mixed, the claim may be urged and proved if possible; but no proof is necessary and the claim is established if, after it has been made, the accused player or his partner mix the cards before they have been sufficiently examined by the adversaries.

88. A revoke must be claimed before the cards have been cut for the following deal.

89. Should both sides revoke, the only score permitted shall be for honors in trumps or

chicane. If one side revoke more than once, the penalty of 100 points for each extra revoke shall then be scored by the other side.

GENERAL RULES

90. Once a trick is complete, turned and quitted, it must not be looked at (except under Law 82) until the end of the hand.

91. Any player during the play of a trick or after the four cards are played, and before they are touched for the purpose of gathering them together, may demand that the cards be placed before their respective players.

92. If either of the declarer's adversaries, prior to his partner playing, call attention to the trick, either by saying it is his, or, without being requested so to do, by naming his card or drawing it towards him, the declarer may require such partner to play his highest or lowest card of the suit led, or to win or lose the trick.

93. Either of the declarer's adversaries may call his partner's attention to the fact that he is about to play or lead out of turn; but if, during the play of a hand, he make any unauthorized reference to any incident of the play, or of any bid previously made, the declarer may call a suit from the adversary whose turn it is next to lead.

94. In all cases where a penalty has been incurred the offender is bound to give reasonable time for the decision of his adversaries.

NEW CARDS

95. Unless a pack is imperfect, no player shall have the right to call for one new pack. If fresh cards are demanded, two packs must be furnished. If they are produced during a rubber, the adversaries shall have the choice of the new cards. If it is the beginning of a new rubber, the dealer, whether he or one of his adversaries is the party calling for the new cards, shall have the choice. New cards must be called for before the pack is cut for a new deal.

96. A card or cards torn or marked must be replaced by agreement or new cards furnished.

BYSTANDERS

97. While a bystander, by agreement among the players, may decide any question, he should not say anything unless appealed to; and if he make any remark which calls attention to an oversight affecting the score, or to the exaction of a penalty, he is liable to be called upon by the players to pay the stakes (not extras) lost.

ETIQUETTE OF AUCTION BRIDGE

In Auction Bridge slight intimations convey much information. A code is compiled for the purpose of succinctly stating laws and for fixing penalties for an offense. To offend against etiquette is far more serious than to offend against a law; for, while in the latter case the offender is subject to the prescribed penalties, in the former his adversaries have no redress.

1. Declarations should be made in a simple manner thus: "one heart," "one no-trump," or "I pass," or "I double"; they should be made orally and not by gesture.

2. Aside from his legitimate declaration, a player should not give any indication by word or gesture as to the nature of his hand, or as to his pleasure or displeasure at a play, a bid, or a double.

3. If a player demand that the cards be placed, he should do so for his own information and not to call his partner's attention to any card or play.

4. No player, other than the declarer, should

lead until the preceding trick is turned and quitted; nor, after having led a winning card, should he draw another from his hand before his partner has played to the current trick.

5. A player should not play a card with such emphasis as to draw attention to it; nor should he detach one card from his hand and subsequently play another.

6. A player should not purposely incur a penalty because he is willing to pay it, nor should he make a second revoke to conceal a first.

7. Players should avoid discussion and refrain from talking during the play, as it may be annoying to players at the table or to those at other tables in the room.

8. The Dummy should not leave his seat for the purpose of watching his partner's play, neither should he call attention to the score nor to any card or cards that he or the other players hold, nor to any bid previously made.

9. If a player say "I have the rest," or any words indicating the remaining tricks are his, and one or both of the other players should expose his or their cards, or request him to play out the hand, he should not allow any information so obtained to influence his play nor take any finesse not announced by him at the time of

making such claim, unless it had been previously proven to be a winner.

10. If a player concede in error one or more tricks, the concession should stand.

11. A player having been cut out of one table should not seek admission into another unless willing to cut for the privilege of entry.

12. No player should look at any of his cards until the deal is completed.

The Fine Points
of
Auction Bridge
Together with an Exposition of
The New Count
By Florence Irwin

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