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CE QUI EST ET CE QUI ME
EST UN MORTAL ENTOURÉ
DE VOUS QUI ME SOUTENEZ

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**AMERICA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR
CZECHOSLOVAK INDEPENDENCE**

CHARLES PERGLER

America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence

BY
CHARLES PERGLER

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PREFATORY NOTE

English language sources concerning Czechs and Slovaks in the United States are rather meager. As to the Slovaks there is no book of importance. The only book relating to Czechs is Thomas Capek's *The Czechs (Bohemians) in America* (Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1920).

With the exception of a chapter in Capek's volume, the war activities of Czechoslovaks in America have not been described at all in English, and this little work is the first attempt at such treatment. It is mainly based upon the Diary of the Slav Press Bureau and other original documents in the author's possession, and in certain respects is supplemented by his own personal knowledge of Czechoslovak war work in this country. This personal knowledge grows out of the writer's close affiliation with the movement from its inception.

The outbreak of hostilities found the author a practicing lawyer in northeastern Iowa; he is one of the signers of the Czechoslovak demand for independence issued in Paris on November 15, 1915. Thereafter, successively, he was one of the vice-presidents of the Bohemian National Alliance, director of the Slav Press Bureau in New York, director of the American office of the Czechoslovak National Council in Washington, secretary to President Masaryk as a result of the latter's request cabled from Tokio, delegate of the Czechoslovak National Council in the United States following recognition of this Council as a *de facto* government by the Allied Powers, Czechoslovak Commissioner to the United States, and minister of the Czechoslovak Republic to Japan.

As indicated in the text, this work does not pretend

to be of an exhaustive nature, primarily because detailed treatment is probably one for the Czechoslovak historian, but also by reason of the fact that an exhaustive presentation is out of the question until *Foreign Relations*, published by the Department of State, is brought down to date.

This short description is an attempt to present what is available at the present time and to record material which otherwise might be overlooked.

The question of terminology presented certain difficulties. It is not uniform even now. But the reader will appreciate that prior to the war Czechs were known, in the United States, as Bohemians, and that Slovaks are that part of the now united nation, which, before the establishment of the present republic, was subject to the Magyar rule of Budapest.

Beside the work of Thomas Capek, *Czechs (Bohemians) in America*, the following publications are either quoted or referred to in the text: *The State*, by Woodrow Wilson (D. C. Heath & Co., Publishers); *Addresses and Messages of Woodrow Wilson* (Boni & Liveright, Modern Library), edited by Albert Bushnell Hart; *The Life and Times of Cavour*, by William Roscoe Thayer (Houghton-Mifflin Co., Publishers); and *Z boje za svobodu otciny*, by Francis Sindelar (National Alliance of Bohemian Catholics, Publishers). Grateful acknowledgment is made of permission and opportunity to make use of these sources.

Special acknowledgment is due Dr. A. H. Putney, formerly Chief of the Near East Division of the State Department, for authority to make use of his still unpublished memorandum, *Slavs of Austria-Hungary*.

CHARLES PERGLER

Washington, D. C.

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**AMERICA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR
CZECHOSLOVAK INDEPENDENCE**

I

CZECHOSLOVAKS IN AMERICA AND THEIR WAR ACTIVITIES

While the bulk of the Czechs and Slovaks now living in the United States, came to this country during the last seventy-five years, yet immigration of Czechs, to speak of the older branch of the nation, is not a phenomenon restricted wholly to the nineteenth century. The first individuals of Czech (Bohemian) origin came to America during the seventeenth century, undoubtedly seeking religious and political liberty, even as did the Pilgrim Fathers.

Augustine Herrman was probably the first American of Czech origin, and he came to New York in 1633, removing, in 1660, to Maryland, where he founded the Bohemian Manor; there he is buried and a monument has been erected to his memory.

John Jay, diplomat and jurist of historic fame, says this of the old New York family of Philipses: "The first ancestor of this family who settled in this country was Frederick Flypsen, a native of

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Bohemia, where his family, being Protestants, were persecuted.”

The records present clear evidence that in New Amsterdam, under the Dutch rule, lived other natives of Bohemia in addition to Philipse. The latter is referred to as the “Bohemian Merchant Prince.”

One of the signers of the Declaration of Independence is William Paca, concerning whose possible Italian or Portuguese origin historians seem to have no other evidence than the alleged Latin structure of the name. Not being acquainted with the Czech (Bohemian) language, they did not realize that it is much more likely that Paca was of Czech ancestry. If any Czech should be asked of what origin is the bearer of this name, without being told where the name appears, he would answer without hesitation that it is that of a fellow-countryman, so typically Czech is it. Indeed, in certain parts of Moravia the name Paca—and Pacal—is frequent enough.

In the 'fifties of the seventeenth century Czechs came to Virginia, and at this time Czech names also appear in New England records.

The spiritual home of the Moravian Church is the Czechoslovak lands, Moravia being a part of the present republic and Moravians, of course,

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being Czechs. A certain number of Czechs certainly did come to America with the Moravian brethren, as appears from the transactions of the Moravian Historical Society, and as one sees at a glance when examining the tombstones of the Moravian Cemetery in Winston-Salem, N. C., an opportunity which came to the writer in 1919. There is buried Mathew Stach, "the first Moravian Missionary to Greenland," where he spent forty years.

The nineteenth century immigration begins in the 'forties and is prompted not only by economic, but political motives as well. The Czechs, too, had their 'forty-niners. But even before that, in 1836, Reverend John Nepomuk Neuman, with his brother Vaclav, emigrated to Philadelphia, later becoming Bishop of that city and diocese. In the 'fifties the first Czech settlement was founded in St. Louis; they came by way of New Orleans, sailing up the Mississippi. A Czech Catholic Church was founded there in 1854. The largest Czech non-Catholic fraternal society, popularly called the C. S. P. S., was also founded in that city in 1854. The gold fever in 1849 and the 'fifties brought to America about 25,000 Czechs. Between 1850-1868 some 43,645 Czechs came to the United States. In Cleveland they began to

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concentrate in considerable numbers after 1852, and a private census in 1869 shows the presence, in that city, of 3,252 persons of Czech nationality. Chicago sees its first Czechs in 1852-53, and many of them commence occupying farmlands in Texas, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, Nebraska and Missouri, and later in the Dakotas.

According to the census of 1910, persons of Czech parentage in this country numbered 539,392. But it should be remembered, and this applies in an incomparably larger measure to previous statistics, that prior to 1918 there was no independent Czechoslovak nation, and that unavoidably many Czechs and Slovaks appear in the records as Austrians and Hungarians.

The bulk of the Czech stock is in the West. A relatively small number of Czechoslovak immigrants remain in the East. The twelfth census showed 71,389 Czech individuals of the first generation, and 32,707 of the second generation, engaged in gainful occupations, so-called, and of the first generation 32 per cent, and of the second generation 43 per cent, were devoted to agricultural pursuits.

Czech immigration, therefore, was to a large extent of an agricultural character. The farmers of this origin concentrate in Texas, Wisconsin,

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Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas and the Dakotas. Czechoslovak immigrants do not congregate in slums. In fact there are no Czechoslovak slums in the United States. The Slovaks of course came chiefly to Pennsylvania, seeking employment in mines and steel mills.

Czech labor in the urban districts consists almost entirely of skilled workmen. Merchants are plentiful, and professional men of all branches abound. A directory of Bohemian merchants in Chicago, for the year 1900, and one which even for its time was necessarily incomplete, gives 266 grocers, 45 physicians, 43 lawyers, 40 custom tailors, 22 music conservatories. In 1917 there were in Chicago 46 male and 22 female medical practitioners and 78 lawyers. Among the professional classes the most numerous, however, are school teachers. A reliable estimate places the number of teachers of Czech descent in Nebraska at 290. College and university professors we meet in relatively large numbers, three of them on the staff of Yale University. Czech Catholics have a college and seminary in Lisle, Illinois, and many parochial schools and academies. Non-Catholic Czechs in the larger cities maintain schools, usually in session on Saturdays and Sun-

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days, for the purpose of giving their children instruction not otherwise obtainable.

Criminality of the graver sort is quite rare among Czechs. Speaking of the Czechs in Chicago, Capek states that the Czech percentage of burglary is the same as the Canadian and the German, but both of these latter nationalities have higher percentages of the total of gainful offenses and of the specific crimes of forgery and fraud, of larceny and receiving stolen goods.

In a report to the Congressional Committee on Naturalization and Immigration, H. H. Laughlin, of the Carnegie Institution, places the Czechoslovaks in the very forefront of desirable immigrants. The report is a racial analysis of the inmates of institutions for the care of defectives, which in turn was analyzed in *The Survey*, and results of the analysis are found in *The Literary Digest* for February 23, 1924, from which the following is especially pertinent:

If we are required to draw conclusions respecting these main sources of immigrants, it is clear that these data present immigration as least desirable from Ireland, the Balkans and Russia, in that order; most desirable, from Austria-Hungary (including the present Czechoslovakia) and parts of Jugoslavia and Poland, Germany and Great Britain, in that order.

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Socialism and radicalism of the destructive sort, preaching the overthrow of government by force, has no serious footing among the Czechoslovaks. The Czech membership of Communist organizations barely reaches the dignity of hundreds, and among these are very few who believe in violence as a method of political action.

The Czechoslovak Press in this country, as that of other immigrants, affords the first generation the only means of information concerning current events and is frequently the only source of inspiration to cultural, political and other activities. In many respects it is the only medium of contact between distantly separated settlements. Obviously its influence has always been considerable, though it is well to point out, lest its function be misunderstood, that the more or less prevalent belief that the foreign press in the United States is running contrary to American opinion is disproved by a study of 8,504 editorials recently made by the Foreign Language Information Service, of New York. While the immigrant press has certain distinctive interests, it does not differ essentially in subject or emphasis of editorial comment from the vernacular press. This is particularly true of Czech journalism. Only 8.3 per cent of the Czech editorials

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dealt with the native country, and 7.3 per cent were devoted to special group interests. American economic, political and religious problems occupied the foremost place in editorial discussions.

Fraternal organizations and other similar societies are so plentiful that the number of Czech lodges and clubs is generally fixed at not less than 2500. Chicago is credited with 500, while in the same city there are at least 227 Building and Loan Associations. The total membership of fraternal societies is, in round figures, more than 160,000, and the ritual and methods of business of these organizations closely follow American models. In fact, such orders are practically unknown on the European continent, certainly not in the form found in the United States. Their combined reserve fund, according to the *Fraternal Monitor*, is over \$10,000,000, and it is wholly invested in American securities, such as Liberty, governmental, state, soldiers' bonus and other bonds of a similar nature.

Czechoslovakia became an independent nation in October, 1918. Necessarily, statistics relating to Czechoslovakia, even as far as the Czechs are concerned, are incomplete, and as regards the Slovaks such statistics are still more meager, since the latter suffered under Magyar (Hun-

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garian) rule even more than the Czechs did under the Austrian régime. But no one can gainsay that in potential capacity there is no difference between the Czechs and Slovaks.

The great part played by the Czechoslovaks of America in the liberation of their native land can only be properly understood if we bear in mind the character of the Czech and Slovak population in the United States. The winning of independence of any nationality is the result of interplay of various political, social, and economic forces, and the future historian, in appraising the importance of the several constituent parts of the movement for Czechoslovak independence, will not assign to American Czechoslovaks an insignificant role.

The plain people, as Lincoln would have called them, constitute, of course, the vast majority of Americans of Czechoslovak origin. It is a tribute to their sound political instincts, and to their political maturity, that upon the outbreak of the war they at once, and spontaneously, took a position which events have proved to be in the right, and which, in the end, prevailed. The general idea obtains that the Czechoslovak movement for independence was wholly of European origin and

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was directed entirely from Europe, but this impression is erroneous.

Francis Sindelár, in his work (*Z Boje Za Svobodu Otciny: From the Struggle to Liberate the Native Land*), has this to say in the first chapter:

On the sixth of August, Austria declared war on Russia and thus commenced a conflagration which in a short time covered all Europe. The whole maneuver was directed from Berlin by the criminal Emperor William and the German militaristic clique. The American nation in the United States witnessed a terrific spectacle and followed it with breathless interest. We, American Czechs, lived in great excitement. Our sympathies always were on the side of unfortunate Serbia and we suffered in the knowledge that Czech and Slavic regiments were first sent against the Serbs. But we were helpless, our sympathies could not help the Serbs. Nevertheless, we permitted no one to doubt that the conduct of Austria was considered by us a fearful crime. In certain Czech settlements protest meetings were arranged; the largest was in Chicago on the day Austria declared war on Serbia, July 28th. Without any special agitation thousands of our fellow-countrymen met in the Pilsen Pavilion on the west side, on 26th St., known as the "Bohemian California," and many speeches were made and Austria deservedly condemned. There went forth an impressive protest, which, however, in the excitement prevailing in the great metropolis, remained unnoticed.

There were posters in the hall, with eagles, God

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only knows what kind of eagles, but because they could be Austrian eagles, the posters were torn from the walls and torn into shreds. The Austrian consul had his informers at the meeting and these brought to him a list of people most prominent at the meeting and the respective names later appeared in the so-called black book of the Austrian police in Prague.

The meeting had its positive results. It appealed for the founding of an organization of all American Czechoslovaks for the purpose of aiding the poor, suffering from the consequences of the war and on behalf of widows and orphans of Czech soldiers who were forced to fight contrary to their will against brother Slavs.

A rather simple picture, but it speaks volumes as to the attitude of the Czech mind immediately upon the outbreak of the war.

— The meeting described by Mr. Sindelár had its origin in a conference of a group of patriotic Czechs and Slovaks held on Saturday, July 25, 1914. This gathering and the subsequent conferences have been described by a leading participant, J. V. Nigrin, who, according to a contemporaneous newspaper report of July 27, 1914, made this statement during one of the discussions:

In Bohemia our compatriots must remain silent, although they disagree with the action of the Austrian government, and therefore it is incumbent upon

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us, in this land of liberty, to protest against this barbarous and for us fratricidal war. Let us foment the fire of enthusiasm in Czech hearts. The new age must bring freedom to Bohemia.

In a statement issued by a preliminary organization on August 9, 1914, and printed in the Czech press, the following appears:

It is possible that the present storm will uproot the old state system and give rise to larger freedom and independence. We must think even of this possibility and with opportune help show that we are worthy descendants of the nation and worthy of its former glory.

These meetings and discussions were followed by numerous others, and on September 18, 1914, there appeared the first manifesto of the Bohemian National Alliance. This declaration is important, since it was formulated and published before any contact with European leaders could be established, and because it proves that even the founders of the movement in America were quite clear as to their ultimate objectives. The purposes of the Alliance, among other functions, are defined as follows:

By effective propaganda to work for the information of the American and the world public concerning the historical, natural, and human desires and

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rights of the Czechoslovak nation in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Slovakia.

By proper means to work to the end that at the forthcoming solution of European political and national questions, which the present war inevitably leads to, the demands for a free development and government of any independent Czech state be taken into account. (Sokol Americky, November, 1916.)

Considering the outcome of the war, who can deny the farsightedness of these unknown statesmen? For, bearing in mind the results of the movement initiated by them, may we not, with all propriety, call them statesmen?

How spontaneous the movement was, and how it arose in a number of places at the same time, is well illustrated by the fact that in New York, as early as September, 1914, there was formed the American Committee for the liberation of the Czech people. A national scope was given to the organization by a conference held in Chicago, January 2-3, 1915, while the organization itself was perfected at a conference held in Cleveland, March 13-14, 1915. Thereafter the official designation of the national organization was the "Bohemian National Alliance" which ultimately spread all over the country and toward the end of the war numbered 250 branches. The Czech

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press in America from the very beginning was united in opposition to the Central Powers.

So when Professor Thomas G. Masaryk escaped from Austria to become the head of the movement abroad, he found at least the rudiments of an efficient organization at hand, with a definite program; and he was entirely free, in so far as America went, from worries of an organization or administrative nature. The importance of this is best realized if we bear in mind the fact that the Czechs in America are the strongest branch of the nation living outside of the present republic; that they are comparatively wealthy, owing to their thrift and industry; and that they could of course exert, and did exert, considerable influence upon American public opinion.

The first need of successful activity was funds. Money is as much an essential of revolution as it is of war. So the leaders of the movement applied themselves first of all to the raising of financial means, and in this they exhibited remarkable ingenuity. Some of the methods adopted are described by Thomas Capek in his work, *The Czechs in America*, from which the following paragraph may properly be quoted:

Not a dollar was asked for or accepted from a foreign source. Those were Masaryk's orders,

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"This is our revolution, and we must pay for it with our money." The first bazaar of consequence was held in New York in the winter of 1916. It yielded \$22,250. This was thought an extraordinary achievement. The bazaar given in Cleveland in March, 1917, netted \$25,000 and one closely following it in Chicago, \$40,000. The comparatively small Omaha community surprised all by making \$65,109.20 in September, 1918. A few weeks later the Texas Czechs got together at a bazaar fete in Taylor another \$50,000 or \$60,000. The bazaar at Cedar Rapids (Iowa) turned in \$25,000. The Thanksgiving Day offering in 1918, which was nation wide, totaled \$320,000. To this Chicago gave over \$100,000, Cleveland, \$40,000. All the money was not spent for political purposes. Large sums went to relieve distress on the other side. For instance, one million francs were cabled to the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris for the purchase of food.

The total sum so raised, augmented by subscriptions contributed by individuals, has never been published. But in any event it was more than sufficient to finance the whole movement in America and the Allied countries, except Russia, which presented a problem in itself and where ultimately the main part of the Czechoslovak legions was organized. One is well within the truth, and the objective historian no doubt will so hold, that the financial help from America in

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itself was an act of first-rate political importance, since without it no activities abroad would have been possible. It was a standing refutation of Austrian and German charges that the Czech movement was an artificial one financed by the Allies, and it made possible the proud boast that Czechoslovaks financed their revolution themselves. President Masaryk would have been helpless without this aid.

The organization very soon launched numerous political activities in the real sense of the term. American neutrality during the first period of the war imposed certain legal and moral restrictions, since the Czechs are intensely loyal and sincere in their Americanism. But it was realized that even in case of permanent neutrality America inevitably would exercise considerable influence at the Peace Conference, and that her good-will and friendship must be gained. The result was a shower of pamphlets and the utilization of every possible opportunity to address American audiences. Such addresses literally ran into hundreds and their nature and standard may best be judged by the fact that Czech spokesmen succeeded in reaching such organizations as the April, 1917, meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia, and

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the conference on Foreign Relations at Long Beach, May, 1917, held by the New York Academy of Political Science.

During the period of neutrality the tactics adopted and pursued by the Bohemian National Alliance are perhaps best illustrated by the manifesto of this organization in 1916, in which it was declared that neutrality will be observed in letter and spirit, and that within the limits imposed by American neutrality the Czechs of America were simply seeking to lay before the American public the merits of the Czechoslovak cause. It was this manifesto (1916), addressed to President Wilson, which attracted so much attention and even editorial comment, because of the statement that the Czechs are not hyphenated citizens, but American citizens of Czech origin.

When the United States declared war, the bars were down and Czechoslovak propaganda gained proportionately in force and volume. The first step was the establishment of a press office, called the Slav Press Bureau, in New York City, in the Tribune Building, brought about by the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America. And here it may be parenthetically remarked that the names "Czech" and "Czechoslovak" became current only toward the end of

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the war, and that the Slovak League, founded even before the war to aid in the struggle against Magyarization in Hungary, loyally co-operated with the Czechs and furnished conclusive evidence that Czechs and Slovaks sought not only liberty, but unity as well.

The methods adopted by the Slav Press Bureau are an illustration of the simplicity of propaganda when presenting a legitimate and appealing cause, and call for a few words concerning their nature.

Naturally enough, the first thing the director did upon taking charge of the office was the purchase of a newspaper directory (Ayer's). From this directory a selection was made of five hundred of the most important American publications, monthlies, weeklies, and dailies. In the determination of the importance of these publications various factors were considered. Established magazines were included as a matter of course. Other publications were selected because of the strategic location of the place of publication. Still others, because ably edited, they could boast of a national reputation. These were such papers as William Allen White's *Emporia Gazette*, *The Topeka Capital*, *New Orleans Picayune*, *The Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, etc. To these publications were sent

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two or three times a week, as need appeared, what were called bulletins, mimeographed. These were articles of an anti-German and anti-Austrian nature, reports of conditions among Czechs and Slovaks, of their struggle for independence, formation of their legions, historical surveys of the treatment of Czechs by the Germans and the dynasty in Austria, of the Slovaks by Magyars, etc., etc.

Almost the first of these articles attracted some attention. There had been called in New York, in May, 1917, what was called the Emergency Peace Conference, by a pacifist group. The director of the bureau received an invitation to participate in the conference and responded in a letter declining to do so and describing the general Czech position, as well as taking the attitude that the preponderance of right was on the Allied side. It was in this letter that the expression appeared that war for democracy, or at least in advance of democracy, is preferable to the peace of a graveyard. The phrase caught the imagination of some editors. Thus the *New York Globe* published the document verbatim, as did the *Milwaukee Journal*. Because of this, and because it furnishes an illustration of war-time political methods and views of certain organizations, this

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letter appears in the Appendix as it was given to the press.

To the propagandist the publication of the first document of importance was good fortune indeed. But those in charge did not expect, and could not expect, that in the very beginning all their material would be widely reprinted, and were thankful if the clipping bureaus could prove that even some of the smaller country journals made use of this or that bulletin. Also, it was believed that even if a large number of the bulletins did not actually appear in print, the constant hammering of editors would inevitably do some good, and that at least it should bring sound and truthful information to the editorial sanctums of America. This theory was strikingly substantiated when one of the leading editors of New York, then in charge of an important and respected weekly, informed the director that he always carefully read whatever was sent and filed it for future reference. William Hard, in an article in the *Metropolitan Magazine* for January, 1920, said that he found the bulletins very useful. For the sake of further illustration of war-time methods, some of the bulletins of the Slav Press Bureau, in addition to the one containing the letter to the Emer-

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gency Peace Conference, are reprinted in the Appendix.

A confirmation of a different kind as to the usefulness of the work of the Bureau came from one of the liberal journals of New York which for a period was decidedly pro-Austrian, in that it advocated the preservation of Austria-Hungary, though in a federated form. At one time this journal was pressed so hard, particularly with reference to its misunderstanding of the principle of nationality, that on more than one occasion it deprecated the "powerful Czech propaganda," and at least once declared that an expression of dissent from Czech aims immediately subjects one to the risk of being snowed under by numerous Czech pamphlets. When this journal, upon the occasion of Dr. Masaryk's visit to America, came out for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, its change of front was of course quite gratifying to the Czech exponents in America.

As time went on, and almost sooner than could be hoped for, many papers frequently made use of the Bureau's stories, to speak in journalistic parlance, sometimes giving the Bureau credit, at other times refraining from doing so. This matter of credit was immaterial; indeed, publication without such credit was preferred, since it

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avoided the appearance of propaganda, a word which by that time had become rather discredited owing to unsavory German methods. The writer recalls distinctly how a small western daily would occasionally make use of the bulletins in editorial form, as its own material. The truth of the facts registered in these bulletins was never challenged even by those hostile to the work.

Toward the end the offices of the Bureau became much more than a press office and developed into a political center, particularly of the representatives of the smaller nationalities. More than one conference was held there and more than one resulted in concerted important action. Thus, when in 1918 a conference of small nationalities was called in New York, and it became evident that it would be made use of as anti-Ally propaganda, the Slavic representatives met in the offices of the Bureau, joined by the spokesmen of Armenians and others, and there formulated their declaration, declining to participate and resulting in making the conference abortive. In fact, the Czechoslovak movement became the axis around which movements of other nationalities revolved.

The intense political activity of the Czechoslovaks in America is further well illustrated by

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the fact that they could, and did, bring their cause effectively to the attention of the Vatican, realizing its international importance. The National Alliance of Bohemian Catholics was the organization of the Czechs of that denomination, and while, for purposes of political activity, it formed a part of what the American public came to know as the Bohemian National Alliance of America, so that there could be no question as to the solidarity of the Czech movement, it yet lived an active life of its own. On November 18, 1917, this body addressed to the Holy Father a memorandum in Latin, eloquently worded, setting forth before the head of the Roman Catholic Church the plight of the Czechoslovaks, and asking for a sympathetic consideration of the Czechoslovak problem and for prayers for a revival of the ancient liberties of their nation. The receipt of the memorandum, forwarded by the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, was acknowledged through the same office by a letter dated February 21, 1918, in which the Apostolic Delegate, acting upon orders of the papal Secretary of State, assured the petitioners that the welfare of Bohemia was dear to the heart of the Holy Father, who accorded the Catholic Czechs of America his

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Apostolic benediction. (*Sindelár, Z Boje Za Svobodu Octiny*, pp. 76-78.)

All this was done under the leadership and management of Czechs and Slovaks who had long been residents of this country. The Czechoslovak National Council, with offices in Paris, was nominally the head of the movement all over the world and was always so referred to, but as a matter of fact, owing to distance and differing conditions that could not be known and much less grasped by those living in a purely European environment, the Council was rather a symbol than a directing institution; a statement not in disparagement of its importance, which was great, but as a matter of simple historical truth and justice to thousands of Americans of Czech and Slovak origin, who, unlauded and unsung, have yet contributed much to the liberation of their native land.

II

WOODROW WILSON AND THE CAUSE OF CZECHOSLOVAK INDEPENDENCE

The most important facts concerning the United States Government during the war and its relation to the problem of Czechoslovak independence in particular and that of Austria-Hungary in general, may not be known for many years, and certainly not until the various communications between the several legations and embassies and the State Department are given to the public. Yet there are certain facts available at the present time, or which should be made available to the student of history, and which are not generally known, or, at least, not generally appreciated. Some of these may appear insignificant, but apparently insignificant matters, needless to say, frequently do characterize eras and men, and are a help to understanding.

Toward the end of the war the charge was made more than once, particularly in the German press, that the Czechoslovaks were Woodrow Wilson's special protégés, and more than once his

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attitude was attributed to the personal influence of the then Professor, now President Masaryk. The charge, current even today, shows not only a lack of understanding of historical forces, but is also unfair to Woodrow Wilson both as a statesman and scholar, and as an historian. For the fact is that long before the war, and long before he commenced his political career, the War President exhibited a knowledge of Czech history and Czech aspirations which it is safe to say was not possessed by any other leading statesman of the Allied or Associated Powers.

Wilson's work, *The State*, first appeared in 1889, and there he touches upon the Austro-Hungarian problem. In the edition copyrighted in 1898 (D. C. Heath & Co., Publishers) the discussion reappears. If we are correctly to judge the origins of Wilson's attitude toward the Czechoslovaks the matter is of some importance and justifies even an extended quotation. Long before the war, in a scientific work, the future President of the United States, and for a period a dominant world figure, had this to say concerning a realm in the downfall of which he was to play so fateful a part:

Bohemia was a Slavonic wedge thrust into the side of Germany. Compassed about by hostile

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powers, it was a prize to be fought for. Alternately conquered by several neighboring kingdoms, it finally fell into German hands and became an appanage of the empire. It was as such that the Hapsburgs seized it when its throne became vacant in consequence of the extinction of the Luxemburg line of princes. In 1526 their hold upon it became complete, and they were thenceforth able to keep it secure as an hereditary possession within their family. (Par. 732.)

Moravia also was and is Slavonic. Slavs early drove out its Teutonic possessors, and were prevented from joining the Slavs of the southeast in the formation of a vast Slavonic kingdom only by the intervention of the Magyars, the conquerors of Hungary. This dominant race in the tenth century thrust themselves in between the Slavs of the northwest and those of the southeast, and, driving back the Slavs of Moravia, reduced the once "Great Moravia" to the dimensions of the present province. Striven for by Hungary, by Poland, and by Bohemia, Moravia finally met her natural fate in incorporation with Slavonic Bohemia (1029), and passed, along with that kingdom, into Austrian hands, in 1526. (Par. 733.)

The present constitution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy practically recognizes but two parties to the union, Austria and Hungary. Bohemia, for all she has so much individuality and boasts so fine a history of independence, is swallowed up in Austria: only the Magyars of Hungary among all the races of the heterogeneous realm of the Hapsburgers have obtained for the kingdom of their making a standing

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of equality alongside of dominant Austria. (Par. 738.)

The commanding difficulty of government throughout the whole course of Austro-Hungarian politics has been the variety of races embraced within the domain of the monarchy. First and most prominent is the three-sided contrast between German, Slav and Magyar. Within this general classification, again, Slav differs from Slav by reason of many sharp divergencies of history, of speech and of religion; and outside this classification, there is added a miscellany of Italians, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Jews—men of almost every race and people of eastern Europe. This variety is emphasized by the fact that only the Czechs (Bohemians), among all these peoples, have a separate homeland in which they are in majority. In Bohemia and Moravia the Czechs constitute considerably more than half the population; whilst in Hungary the Magyars, though greatly outnumbering any other element of the population, are less than half the whole number of inhabitants; and in Austria, though men of German blood are very greatly in the majority in the central provinces which may be called Austria proper, they constitute in Austria taken as a whole very little more than one-third of the population. (Par. 739.)

At least two among these many races, moreover, are strenuously, restlessly, persistently devoted to independence. No lapse of time, no defeat of hopes, seems sufficient to reconcile the Czechs of Bohemia to incorporation with Austria. Pride of race and the memories of a notable and distinguished history keep

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them always at odds with the Germans within their gates and with the government set over their heads. They desire at least the same degree of autonomy that has been granted to Hungary. (Par. 740.)

These excerpts show clearly enough that in the case of Woodrow Wilson, Czech propagandists were spared the necessity of teaching him the history of their nationality and of convincing him of the heterogeneity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; a task they were confronted with in the case of many another war-time statesman. Equally clearly, a recognition of Czech claims must have been a pleasant task for Woodrow Wilson once the Czechoslovak legions appeared in the field, and once proof was established that nothing short of independence would satisfy the nation.

As a matter of fact, one of the statements of Mr. Wilson, appearing above, furnished the Czechs of America with a slogan which they eagerly seized upon and never tired of using: *"NO LAPSE OF TIME, NO DEFEAT OF HOPES, SEEMS SUFFICIENT TO RECONCILE THE CZECHS OF BOHEMIA TO INCORPORATION WITH AUSTRIA."* This crisp sentence was for the first time quoted by a Czech spokesman at a hearing before the committee on foreign affairs of the

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House of Representatives on February 25, 1916 (see *Bohemia's Claim to Independence*, published by the Bohemian National Alliance in Chicago, 1916), and thereafter it was printed on the title page of *The Bohemian*, later *The Czechoslovak Review*, and served as a veritable battle-cry for the Czech inhabitants of the United States.

The Czech propaganda, while well organized in this country, was spontaneous. At times it seemed that every Czech living in the United States had constituted himself a committee of one for the purpose of convincing his fellow-citizens of other origins, and particularly the White House, of the justice of the Czech cause and the propriety of aiding it. At one time the White House was so deluged with telegrams from Czechs from all parts of the country that the situation so created was the subject of a special Washington dispatch by the Associated Press. That these expressions of hope for the liberation of their native land, and of faith in Woodrow Wilson, inevitably had at least the effect of very early focusing his attention upon the problem, needs no special evidence.

At no time did Mr. Wilson resent this activity, though he did insist upon loyalty to America in the first place. In any event, the Czechs in

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America were fortunate in that the struggle for Czechoslovak independence was perfectly consistent with what they considered to be American ideals and with American aims. The Czech press in this country frequently quoted Mr. Wilson's address, delivered to newly naturalized citizens in Philadelphia on May 10, 1915, and in which the following passage occurs: "I certainly would not be the one even to suggest that a man cease to love the home of his birth and the nation of his origin—these things are very sacred and ought not to be put out of our hearts—but it is one thing to love this place where you were born and it is another thing to dedicate yourself to the place to which you go." (*Addresses and Messages of Woodrow Wilson*, Boni & Liveright, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.)

Direct contact with the President was of course sought, but there were formal difficulties not only during America's period of neutrality, but also after she entered the war, since virtually all the Czech spokesmen in this country were American citizens, and also because no prudent statesman could in any way commit himself to the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary without assurance that such was the desire of at least a majority of the Austrian peoples, and without certain evidence

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of their capacity to govern themselves. The difficulty was solved at least temporarily and partially by presenting to Colonel House a memorandum addressed, however, to the President himself.

The memorandum in question was the work of one of the then vice-presidents of the Bohemian National Alliance; an Iowa attorney, and had the approval of both the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America, and was delivered to Mr. House in his New York apartment by two officials of the Alliance in May, 1917. The document, after a historical survey, dealt mainly with the fact that the plans, occasionally broached, for federalizing Austria-Hungary, were not feasible, and that Austria-Hungary, preserved in any form, would be a constant menace to the peace of the world.

Colonel House asked the Czech representatives many questions and himself showed complete familiarity with the problem. He also stated that the President was well acquainted with, and very much interested in, the Czech cause.

That the matter was present in Mr. Wilson's mind very soon after America's declaration of war is well illustrated by his Flag Day address, delivered in Washington, June 14, 1917, from

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which the following passage is illustrative of the trend of the President's thought:

Their plan¹ (the Germans') was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very centre of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous states of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German states themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians—the *proud states of Bohemia* and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way. (*Addresses and Messages of Woodrow*

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Wilson, Boni & Liveright, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.)

The reference I have italicized is significant, for Mr. Wilson could not speak fortuitously of a proud Bohemian state. Here was evidence that the American President not only was considering the Czech problem, but, also, that he was leaning toward the Czech claim, advanced frequently and included in the memorandums delivered to Colonel House, that legally the Czech (Bohemian) state had never ceased to exist.

This address was important for another reason. For the first time there was indication that Mr. Wilson had commenced to look upon the Austro-Hungarian problem in the light of contentions advanced by the French publicist, Mr. Andre Chéradame. (See especially this author's *Pan-Germany, the Disease and Cure*, and *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked*, The Atlantic Monthly Press.) In the first of these works the author holds that Bohemia dominates all Europe and that none of the subject nationalities can be really freed unless Bohemia is liberated. Evidence of Mr. Wilson's virtual adoption of Chéradame's views is even clearer in his speech to the American Federation of Labor Convention at Buffalo, November 12, 1917. (*Addresses and Messages of Woodrow Wilson*, Boni

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& Liveright, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.)

But there were other indications that while Mr. Wilson was friendly, he was at that time not quite ready, after all, to come out for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. One of these was the address of the President to Congress in joint session, December 4, 1917, recommending that that body extend the state of war to include Austria-Hungary. In this speech the President said:

The peace we make . . . must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.

But Mr. Wilson also declared:

We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. (*Addresses and Messages of Woodrow Wilson*, Boni & Liveright, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.)

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It is clear now, as was clear then to many, that the President intended to show that the peoples of Austria-Hungary must decide their own fate, and that no new form of government would, or could, be imposed from the outside. Also, one must admit the awful and solemn responsibility assumed by the chief of any state once he decides to declare, and does declare, for the dissolution of an Empire which, after all is said, had existed and functioned for centuries. However, to the Czech leaders in this country the speech brought home the fact that much still remained to be done, and that, in the last analysis, when the really critical moment came the fate of the Czechoslovak nation must be decided at home, by those living within its old historical boundaries, and that those active abroad, *standing alone*, could not bring about the realization of their great ideal. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak public in this country demanded that their spokesmen do something, as the public always does demand in similar situations. But what to do and how to do it was a delicate question. Finally two measures were adopted.

The director of the Slav Press Bureau, in this capacity and as Vice-President of the Bohemian National Alliance, addressed a letter to the chief

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of the Near East Division of the State Department, Dr. A. H. Putney, within whose competence Czechoslovak matters came, asserting that no solution continuing Hapsburg sovereignty could be acceptable to the Czechoslovak people, and indicating that the war-ardor and sacrificial spirit among the Czechoslovaks should in no way be weakened by state papers not always clearly understood by the public and tending to create fears of a possible compromise with the Dual Monarchy. It is understood that this letter formed a part of a report to the President, prepared by the official referred to, and that thus it reached him.

On December 12, 1917, an interview by the *Washington Post* with the same spokesman, expounded the same view, and this interview was brought to the attention of the President by the Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane.

President Masaryk, coming from Russia, landed in Vancouver on April 29, 1918, and when he arrived in Chicago, a few days later, a welcome was accorded to him which in American history is probably without a parallel. At least one hundred thousand Czechs and Slovaks greeted him at the Northwestern Station in that city, thus proving the perfect functioning of the Czechoslovak organization and giving Dr. Masaryk prestige which

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otherwise would have been out of the question. Similar welcomes, though on not quite so large a scale, since Chicago's Czech population is the largest in the country, were organized in New York, Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Baltimore.

As for propaganda and political activity, Dr. Masaryk continued along the lines already laid out by American Czechs and addressed numerous organizations of importance. Finally, in the first half of June, 1918, he was received by Mr. Wilson, an occurrence which in itself was politically significant, for until almost the last day there was some doubt as to the possibility of this reception because as yet the Czechoslovak movement had not been recognized officially by America, and Mr. Wilson was unwilling to commit himself definitely to territorial changes or rearrangements. It was understood that shortly before that he had refused to receive a delegation of Alsatians and Lorrainers.

This conference was the only one between Mr. Wilson and Dr. Masaryk held prior to the Armistice. When they next met, for the second and last time, Dr. Masaryk came to bid the American President good-bye, himself the President of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The next contact of a personal nature of Czech

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spokesmen with Mr. Wilson, came on July 4, 1918, when a pilgrimage was organized of citizens of foreign descent to the tomb of Washington on the presidential yacht, *The Mayflower*. Each nationality had a representative in the group which accompanied the President on his trip, and the Czech delegate was in a position to inform the President that the Czech deputies, at a meeting in Prague on May 16, 1918, had declared for a League of Nations, of which Mr. Wilson was even then an advocate. The diplomatic corps participated in this pilgrimage and there was some disappointment in Czech circles that an invitation was not extended to Dr. Masaryk. But at that time the Czechoslovak National Council had not been recognized by the United States, though it had received recognition by the French Government.

While in America, Dr. Masaryk prepared for the State Department and President Wilson certain memoranda. The first of these was a survey of the Czechoslovak problem, largely historical, and requires merely to be referred to, since Dr. Masaryk himself evidently did not attribute to it special diplomatic importance, the same document appearing textually in the *Washington Post*

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as an interview given to Gordon Gordon-Smith.

On July 20, 1918, Dr. Masaryk filed with the State Department a request for aid for the Czechoslovak Army in Siberia. This memorandum is not accessible to the writer, but its nature appears from another document, delivered to the Department of State and undoubtedly read by Mr. Wilson, a mimeographed copy of which is in the writer's possession. (*The Situation in Russia and the Military Help of the Allies and the United States.*) This last paper is undated, but since it refers to an Allied declaration of August 3, 1918, with regard to the aid to be given to the Czechoslovak army, it of course followed that declaration and preceded the formal recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council by America. Its importance lies in the fact that it throws some light on the Russian situation of the period, and its pertinence here is due to the consideration that it was undoubtedly weighed by Mr. Wilson when he deliberated upon the Russian problem and whether or not to send troops to Siberia in aid of the Czechoslovak legions. The following passages have been selected from this document:

The relation to the Bolsheviks I always imagined as a so to say working relation: I am speaking from

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my own experience: I was in contact with them (in Ukraine and Moscow): I know how to work with them, and I had a certain amount of influence over them. I never agreed with the whole of their program, and I utterly condemn their tactics. Mr. Hapgood not long ago quoted a statement of Lenin which said that out of a hundred Bolsheviks one is reasonable, the rest being fools and criminals—if Lenin really believes in this cynical criticism of Russia, then he is himself the greatest criminal of all. Their radical social reforms the few reasonable Bolsheviks can put into effect only through these fools and criminals, and such means and methods ultimately must always destroy the goal. Lenin is a Jesuit . . . an honorable and moral object cannot be achieved by dishonorable methods. Bolshevism is clearly amateurism in all respects, and cannot administer Russia and bring about order there. But the misfortune of Russia lies in the fact that the anti-Bolshevist parties are also amateurish, for that is the curse of Tsarism, that it did not accustom Russians to administrative work. The Bolsheviks keep their power only through the weakness and incompetency of their opponents. I, and with me our army, did everything possible not to provoke the Bolsheviks: we wanted to work in Russia without obstacles. Only when the Bolsheviks showed themselves openly faithless, when they combined with the Germans, we were forced to take the defensive. With those 99 fools and criminals peaceful dealing is impossible; their aggression must be energetically repelled. This they understand, and this only.

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In the beginning of April I advised the Allies to recognize the Bolsheviks de facto (not de jure) so that they could peacefully work in Russia as soon as possible. At that time the Bolsheviks still kept their agreement with us. Five months elapsed since that time. When the Allies did not send to Russia economic and administrative assistance, the Germans and Austrians exploited this fact, told the Bolsheviks the Allies could not and would not help, and so gained the Bolsheviks. But the Bolsheviks, in the meantime, and the Germans are losing in Russia their prestige, because of their defeats in the West. Under these conditions action in Russia is again made easier.

Dr. Masaryk then discusses the degree of Allied help necessary in Russia and expresses the opinion that it will be necessary for the Japanese to send a larger contingent, probably two divisions. As for the military and political function of the Czechoslovak army, he says:

The military quality of our army is generally recognized: they are not only brave, but also intelligent (every individual knows what he is fighting for), and they maintained discipline throughout the terrible events in Russia not only after the revolution, but also under the old regime.

From the military point of view it must be the duty of the Allies to make the most effective use of such a military force. Naturally war against Austria-Hungary and Germany is the chief objective of

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our army not only in France and Italy, but also in Russia; with that object in view the army was organized. Right after the disappearance of the Eastern front after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Allies have decided and agreed to transport our army from Russia to France. That is still our military and political aim. The fact that our army was organized against Austria-Hungary and Germany has a great political and military significance. Austria-Hungary was considerably weakened by it, her population and army demoralized. Of that the voices and official proclamations of the Austro-Hungarian and German governments leave no doubt.

Austrians and Germans have therefore endeavored to prevent our army from coming from Russia to France; to that end they forced the Bolsheviks to break their own agreements and pledges, to that end they are organizing their war prisoners against us and the Allies.

It is therefore in the military and political interest of the Allies and of America that our army gets from Russia to France. The more of our soldiers will get to the western front, the less America will have to send there. Of course, the transportation task is much greater; but the difference is only in transportation to America; American soldiers have to be transported to France also. The political and military value of our army, however, outweighs the expenses and the difficulties of transportation. (Financially our army is much less expensive than the American or British army—the pay of our troops

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is much lower and all equipment much less costly, our men being used to simpler forms of life.)

Our army will have a special and very important part to play on the western front at the moment of decisive victory: it will have to attempt an invasion of Austria-Hungary.

I admit that our army can be used with advantage in Russia. Our men know Russia and Russian: but it would be a distinct loss to use our forces for a more police than military duty, more so, that they would not like it themselves. That of course depends on the further development of the Russian situation and on the plans of the Allies in Russia. Meanwhile, the army will stay in Russia and co-operate with the Allies.

I therefore propose that after Siberia is put into order, and that should be accomplished before winter, half of our army be transported to France; the other half could in the meantime remain in Russia.

It is not without interest to register what Dr. Masaryk said relative to the Russian policy of the Allies:

I abstain from criticizing the action in Siberia; I am not informed about the size of the military help and I do not know what political and administrative plans the Allies are pursuing. Judging from the reports I receive, and from the news I read in the papers, I am obliged to say that it seems to me that the Allies must send a considerably greater force, and that their policy towards the various Russian parties and governments (a rather dreary symptom of

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the Russian disorganization and lack of political maturity) should be clearer and more energetic. A precise political (and administrative) plan is also necessary for the success of the military operations.

Mr. Wilson finally decided to send a contingent of American troops to Siberia, but only for the express purpose of protecting the Czechoslovaks in their march to the Pacific. This contingent numbered seven thousand men and was commanded by General Graves. It never proceeded beyond Vladivostok.

The appearance of the Czechoslovak legions in Siberia, in independent formations, required that this army be given a political head also in the legal sense, and this led to a recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council as a *de facto* government, not only by the Allied powers, but by the American Government as well. The latter's recognition was accorded on September 3, 1918, and Dr. Masaryk, as President-Designate of the new Republic, sailed from New York on November 19th, after having appointed the writer as the first Czechoslovak diplomatic representative in the United States with the title of Commissioner. This appointment in itself was something of a curiosity. The appointee was an American citizen, though of Czech birth, and the

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title of Commissioner was selected to prevent an undesirable diplomatic precedent from arising.

The future commissioner was received by Mr. Wilson at the White House on September 9, 1918, and in discussing the then recent recognition of the Council as a *de facto* government. Mr. Wilson declared: "By your conduct throughout the war, especially by your armies, you have demonstrated that you insist upon complete independence. We have merely recognized an accomplished fact."

Thus was again demonstrated the profound truth of a famous statement of Cavour: "Diplomacy cannot change the status of nations. It can merely legalize accomplished facts." (Thayer's *Life of Cavour*.)

When Austria-Hungary claimed acceptance of the fourteen points as a basis of peace negotiations, she was informed by the Department of State that, in so far as autonomy for the nationalities of Austria-Hungary was concerned, the fourteen points had undergone a modification, and that she must deal with the Czechoslovaks directly. On October 27, 1918, the Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Count Andrassy, in reply to this attitude of President Wilson and his government, admitted the right of the Czecho-

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slovaks to self-determination. On October 28, 1918, the Republic was proclaimed in Prague.

Woodrow Wilson, who so emphasized the importance of the army, without which Czechoslovak independence would have remained but a dream, was afforded an opportunity to review a contingent of these men passing through the United States in July, 1919. The review was to take place from a stand erected before the White House especially for the purpose. Owing to a heavy rain the reviewing party assembled and watched the parade from the White House portico. One of the group was Adolph J. Sabath, Representative from Illinois, himself born in Bohemia. When Mr. Wilson concluded his remarks (see Appendix) he invited Mr. Sabath to address the troops in their native language. Probably this is the only time an address in a foreign tongue was delivered from the White House portico. As to the occasion itself, this was certainly unique, and, it is easy to predict, will never be repeated.

III

THE CZECHOSLOVAK QUESTION IN CONGRESS

While foreign relations even in the United States are entrusted to the Executive, subject to consent to treaties by the Senate, the influence of Congress cannot of course be overlooked by anyone seeking to create a favorable atmosphere, in America, to a foreign cause, or involving any steps within the sphere of foreign policy. Rather early in the war, still during the period of American neutrality, an opportunity was afforded to present the Czechoslovak cause to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

On December 6, 1915, Representative Meyer London, of New York, introduced in the House of Representatives a joint resolution, calling upon the President of the United States to offer mediation to the belligerents in Europe, and declaring it to be the judgment of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States that a durable peace could be established if certain

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principles enumerated in the resolution should be made the basis of discussion in a congress of neutral nations. One of the principles so specified was the liberation of oppressed nationalities.

Hearings were had before the committee on February 24-25, 1916, at Washington, and the Bohemian National Alliance was there represented by a delegation of three of its officials, one of whom obtained the floor and presented the Czech claims in a short address prepared by himself, but which, though it was left in its original form, was the subject of much careful deliberation on the part of the officials of the Alliance before the delegation left for Washington and was, therefore, thoroughly representative of the attitude of Czech leaders in America.

The address, as well as the interesting exchange of views between the speaker and members of the committee, appears in the printed proceedings of the latter, and the exposé itself was published in pamphlet form by the Bohemian National Alliance of America under the title *Bohemia's Claim to Independence*. The speaker found it possible to plant himself on precedents from American history. Paraphrasing the peroration from a famous oration of Daniel Webster welcoming Kossuth, this exposition of the Czech cause ends with the

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question: "Why not Bohemian independence; Bohemian control of her own destinies, and Bohemia as a distinct nationality among the nations of Europe?"

It is worth noting that, with the exception of the legislature of the state of Texas, which invited a Czech spokesman to address a joint session of the Senate and the House in May, 1917, and was so addressed by him, the Foreign Committee of the United States House of Representatives was the only parliamentary body in the world which heard, during the war, an exposition of the cause of oppressed nationalities, Czechoslovaks among them. Of course, this was possible only as a result of the American system which permits, and frequently invites, expressions of opinion by interested parties, or exponents of principles and causes; certainly a method which can do no harm and often probably results in much benefit, and at least gives the public a hearing before legislation is definitely formulated and adopted.

While registering the appearance of Czech spokesmen before parliamentary bodies during the war, it may not be amiss to remark parenthetically that following the Armistice the Czechoslovak commissioner in the United States addressed the legislatures of Nebraska and Massa-

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chusetts and the Senate of the Iowa assembly.

In the United States Senate the Czechoslovak problem makes its first appearance on May 25, 1917, when Senator, now Judge, W. S. Kenyon introduced a resolution reciting the age-long oppression of the Czech nation by the Hapsburgs and declaring it the sense of the Senate that Bohemia should again become an independent state and that at the future Peace Conference the United States insist upon Czechoslovak independence as a part of any really democratic settlement making for permanent peace.

Of course, Senator Kenyon's resolution never came to a vote, yet to the Czechoslovaks it had obvious value, reaching, as it did, every member of the Senate and having been reported by the Associated Press. Also, it was noticed in diplomatic circles, as was ascertained by Dr. M. R. Stefanik, Vice-President of the Czechoslovak National Council and later General in the French Army and first Czechoslovak Minister of War.

A year later, May 31, 1918, Senator W. H. King, of Utah, introduced another resolution, similar to the one presented before him by Senator Kenyon, dealing with the Czechoslovak problem in the same way and also pledging America to the Czechoslovak cause.

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Both Senators—Kenyon as well as King—were actuated by a genuine conviction of the justice of the Czechoslovak demands and were not in the least influenced by ordinary political considerations. Judge Kenyon is a Republican and the Czech vote in this country is almost unanimously Democratic, and as for Utah, Senator King's state, it is to be doubted whether in that commonwealth there is the proverbial baker's dozen voters of Czech or Slovak origin.

The Slav Press Bureau was a political center and a journalistic office, and also the distributing point for virtually all Czechoslovak literature. Naturally, copies of all publications were sent to Senators and Congressmen. Also, there was kept at the Bureau a diary, by all odds the most important source-material for Czechoslovak war activities in this country. Technical reasons—lack of Czech stenographers in America—determined the writing of this diary in the English language, undoubtedly a handicap to the Czech historian, but an advantage to the American writer who may desire to study the movement. The diary indicates that the response in Congress was not perfunctory merely and that in both Houses there was a growing and genuine interest.

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A few of the entries will sufficiently substantiate the statement. The following should suffice:

Individual letters are being written to all senators and representatives relative to Capek's book, *The Slovaks of Hungary*, and this work is being sent to all senators for the purpose of informing them correctly with regard to the Slovak question.—June 15, 1917.

Among the matters disposed of today were letters to Senators Kenyon and Williams calling their attention to the Magyar agitation. To both senators there were sent *The Heart of Europe* with autograph signatures of the author, and Mr. Capek's work, *The Slovaks of Hungary*. This propaganda is being carried out with a view to influencing the senators in regard to the Slovak phase of the Bohemian question.—June 18, 1917.

A particularly important letter came in from Senator W. S. Kenyon. The senator says that he hopes to speak on the Bohemian question in the near future and requests literature and suggestions. Therefore, the following literature was sent to him: 1. A copy of the Declaration of the Bohemian Foreign Committee. 2. A copy of *Austrian Terrorism in Bohemia*. 3. *The Slavs Among the Nations*. 4. *A Program for Peace*. 5. A memorial to the international by the Bohemian branch of the American Socialist Party. 6. An excerpt from this week's *Literary Digest*. 7. Copies of *New Europe* beginning with No. 21 and ending with No. 33, inclusive. His attention was also

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called to Mr. Pergler's April address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science and his address at Long Beach before the Conference on Foreign Relations.—June 23, 1917.

Numerous letters are coming in from various senators acknowledging receipt of literature. Among these today were letters from Senators Sutherland, Dillingham, Stone, Jones, and Watson. A particularly friendly letter was received from Senator John Sharp Williams, addressed to Mr. Pergler.—June 23, 1917.

John Sharp Williams, it should be emphasized at least *en passant*, was one of the members of the United States Senate who from the very beginning understood the nature of the Austro-Hungarian problem, and at the April, 1917, meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science delivered an address in which he advocated Czechoslovak independence.

But to continue our illustrations:

Letters are still continuing to come in acknowledging receipt of *The Heart of Europe* and *Slovaks of Hungary*. Among those today were letters from Senators Martin, New, Jones, Hitchcock, Wadsworth, Thomas, Simmons, Norris, Hale, Penrose, Dillingham, Lodge, Nelson, LaFollette, Pomerene, and Smoot. Also Senators Sheppard, Warren, Vardaman.—June 25, 1917.

Letters from senators are continuing to come in
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acknowledging receipt of literature. Especially important is the letter from Senator New, of Indiana, who says he is in favor of the Kenyon resolution and will vote for it.—June 26, 1917.

Letters from United States Senators, acknowledging the receipt of literature, are still continuing to come in. Today there were letters from Senators Walsh, Chamberlain, H. W. Johnson, Cummins, Culbertson, and E. S. Johnson, who says he will vote for the Kenyon resolution when it comes up in the Senate.—June 27, 1917.

The diary shows other communications of a similar nature, but no useful purpose would be served in setting out others than those given above.

When finally it became evident that the American Government could not avoid declaring war also upon Austria-Hungary, the Czechs and Slovaks resident in this country and still un-naturalized stood in danger of being dealt with as alien enemies, a situation paradoxical enough, but for those concerned very disagreeable. It became necessary to call the attention of competent factors to this abnormal condition, and members of the House and the Senate were also immediately notified. Thus the Czech and Slovak organizations in New York (Bohemian National Alliance, Slovak League and Alliance of Czech

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Catholics) immediately addressed a communication to members of Congress from that state, dated November 28, 1917, and which, perhaps, is not without interest. It reads:

The possibility of a necessity of declaring war against Austria-Hungary and the fact that Congress may consider it wise to declare such war at the present session, and the fact that it is necessary to adopt strict methods against alien enemies, constrains us to call your attention to a situation that would seem to make advisable special measures regarding those residents of America who are technically enemies, but in fact are pro-Ally, such as the Czechoslovaks.

Legally speaking the Czechs and Slovaks are Austro-Hungarians, but as a matter of fact they are antagonistic to Austria-Hungary and Germany, as is evidenced by the fact that there is a Czech army fighting the Austro-Hungarian and German forces in Russia, and another Czechoslovak army is being formed in France. Throughout the world there is a well-defined movement for Bohemian independence and against Austria-Hungary and Germany.

It is worth saying that a strong case could be made out for the legal theory that Bohemians are simply subjects of the Bohemian state; that no Bohemian parliamentary body has ever authorized a declaration of war, and that on this ground no Czech can be classed as an alien enemy. But whatever the situation may be technically, it remains a fact that Czechs and Slovaks are ardent supporters of the

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Allied cause. It is also a fact that they are as loyal an element of the American population as can be pointed out.

Most of the Czechs and Slovaks, whenever they could, have become American citizens. However, there will naturally be some who could not become naturalized here, and perhaps there may be some cases of neglect. But it seems that as a general proposition Czechs and Slovaks should not be classed as alien enemies and subjected to measures adopted against alien enemies, because, in the first place, this might result in a serious injustice to loyal people, and, in the second place, because most of them are skilled workers, and all those who are here should be used, especially in industries needed for a vigorous prosecution of the war, such as munition factories, etc. Unless the situation is handled carefully, a disorganization of industry is not impossible, with serious results.

We hope that at the proper time you will kindly bear these facts in mind. It may be said that in France Czechs and Slovaks are not considered as alien enemies. The French government looks upon the Czechoslovaks as a friendly nation. The Czechoslovak National Council, with headquarters in France, which we recognize as the supreme Czechoslovak body, has issued cards in the nature of passports which, upon being produced anywhere in France, are recognized as evidence of the loyalty and reliability of the bearer, as well as of the fact that he is not an alien enemy in the real sense of the term.

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Perhaps the French experience may aid in solving this important problem.

At least on one occasion the Czechoslovak representatives were confronted by a rather delicate situation. President Wilson's fourteen points appear in his address to Congress, January 8, 1918. Point ten maintains: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." But the Czechoslovaks were not willing to accept mere autonomy—they demanded independence! And Senator Owen, of Oklahoma, following Mr. Wilson's address, introduced in the Senate a resolution endorsing the fourteen points. From the Czechoslovak point of view this would have made matters worse. But what to do and not antagonize the White House?

The representative of the Bohemian National Alliance called on Senator William Stone, then Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and brought the situation to his attention. The Senator at once understood that point ten to Czechoslovaks and other Austrian nationalities was unacceptable, but he also understood that a public and open attack upon this point, taking issue with the President, by any Czech, would be

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poor and undiplomatic tactics indeed. (Mr. Theodore Roosevelt did discuss the matter publicly, in the *Washington Post*, *Kansas City Star*, and other papers.) An executive and therefore confidential session of the committee was fixed for the following day, February 6, 1918, and at Senator Stone's suggestion a letter was written to him, as chairman of the committee, which was laid by him before that body when it met. (See Appendix.) Whether or not knowledge of the letter ever reached Mr. Wilson is, of course, unknown, but the fact remains that the resolution was never acted upon.

The Czechoslovaks of America gave to the country of their birth not only money and time and political support of a highly important nature, but they also gave three thousand volunteers to the Czechoslovak forces in Europe, a very creditable number when it is considered that only those were recruited, for these forces, who were not subject to the draft. The question of the return of these men to the United States, particularly should the cause fail, presented a grave problem. In January, 1918, there was introduced in the House of Representatives a resolution (H. J. Res. 212), permitting the return to this country of men who had fought in the Allied armies. This

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gave an opportunity to present to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, at the invitation of the chairman, Mr. Burnett, of Alabama, now deceased, the plight of the Czechoslovak volunteers. Mr. Burnett, at the hearing in question, expressed a desire that the matter be also presented in writing, and this was done in a communication which, while fairly lengthy, is also descriptive of the Czechoslovak situation at the time, and will therefore bear reproducing here:

With reference to the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 212) concerning which you were so kind as to permit me to appear before your committee the other day, I wish to submit the following thoughts:

1. The resolution provides as follows:

“That notwithstanding the provisions of the immigration act of February 5th, nineteen hundred and seventeen, alien residents of the United States who have enlisted or been conscripted for the military service of the United States or of any one of the nations co-belligerents of the United States in the present war, who may apply for readmission to this country, after being honorably discharged or granted furlough abroad in connection with their enlistment or conscription, shall be readmitted.”

2. There is in existence in France a Czechoslovak (Bohemian) Army which is organized under the pro-

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visions of a decree of the French Government, and the first article of which decree is as follows :

“The Czechoslovaks, organizing an autonomous army and recognizing from the military point of view the superior authority of the French High Command, are waging war under their own standard against the Central Empire.”

The second article of the decree, which recognizes the Czechoslovak National Council officially, says :

“The Czechoslovak National Army from a political point of view is under the direction of the National Council of the Czech and Slovak countries, whose main headquarters are in Paris.”

3. If, by reason of the fact that the Czechoslovak Army recognizes the superior authority of the French High Command from the military point of view, it can be said that the Czechoslovak volunteers from America enlisted for military service with the French Army, then the resolution covers their case. But there is certainly a good deal of doubt that such position could be taken, because politically the highest institution governing the army is the Czechoslovak National Council, and because the decree declares it to be an autonomous army. The mere fact that in the military sense it recognizes the superiority of the French High Command probably does not make it a part of the French Army, any more than the English Army would be a part of the army of France should a united command be accepted. Furthermore, as a general proposition it would seem that in these matters the political status is the determining one.

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4. As to the readmission of these Czechoslovak volunteers, a good deal would, of course, depend on the interpretation the immigration authorities would give to the resolution if it should remain in the present form. But our government as yet has not recognized the Czechoslovak nation as a belligerent, even if the French in effect has done so. Under international law the status of belligerency can hardly be said to exist even though there are Czechoslovak armies fighting against Austria and Germany in Russia, Italy, and France. But if a movement is to be accorded belligerent rights, international law seems to demand that the insurrectionary movement must not only have been participated in by a considerable portion of the population, as is the case with the Czechoslovaks even now, but also that the revolutionists must have proved their ability to maintain themselves in certain well-defined limits of territory, and must be established and must be prepared to maintain diplomatic intercourse with the states whose recognition is sought. (See Davis on International Law.) Owing to the peculiar situation in Austria, this second requirement as yet could not be fulfilled.

5. At any rate, there is so much doubt as to whether the resolution would cover the cases of the Czechoslovak volunteers who might be crippled and would desire to return to this country, that it would seem only fair and just that the resolution be so worded as to cover their case, assuming that this resolution passes. It is to be highly appreciated that you

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yourself remarked the other day that you see the justice of this position. And it is a just position.

6. The justice of this appears sufficiently from the fact that only those men go from America to France to join the Czechoslovak Army who are not subject to our own draft laws, and that they go to fight for our common cause as well. In some cases they leave their families, they sever ties of many years in order to offer up their lives for the cause of America and Bohemia, which is also the cause of humanity. If those can be readmitted who have joined the French, the Canadian and the other Allied armies, certainly the Czechoslovak volunteers can also be admitted on the same grounds, and even for more forceful reasons.

7. The situation is one that might present certain complications which perhaps it will be necessary to submit to the State Department, and indeed I am sending to the State Department a copy of this letter. Unfortunately, as yet our government has not given the Czechoslovak National Council the official recognition which has been accorded by the government of the French republic. I trust the time will come when this will be done. However, if our government as yet is not ready for this step, it still seems that the resolution can be so amended as to cover the cases of the Czechoslovak volunteers without according such official recognition. For instance, if following the word "war" in line nine of the resolution the words should be inserted "or who during the present war left the United States to fight against

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Germany, Austria-Hungary or Turkey," the situation would be adequately met. This is merely a suggestion, and perhaps even a better wording could be found. I am writing this rather hastily so as to get the matter before you, and have not had time to suggest such formulations as, perhaps, may be definite, but probably the suggestion I make conveys sufficiently the idea I have in mind.

8. The Czechoslovak National Council is an organization headed by Professor T. G. Masaryk, a former member of the Austrian parliament, who escaped from Austria immediately after the outbreak of the war, and with the authority of the Bohemian parties, and backed by the whole Czechoslovak nation, is leading a movement for complete Czechoslovak independence from Austria.

The resolution in its original form was met by the argument that the Allied Powers can, and should, take care of their own soldiers, whether conscripted at home or coming from America. But of course this argument could not apply, and was not applied, to those who joined the Czechoslovak forces. So in the end Mr. Slayden, of Texas, introduced a resolution (H. J. Res. 255), on February 28, 1918, authorizing the readmission of "Aliens lawfully resident in the United States, who, prior to April sixth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, declared their intention of becoming citizens of the United States, and who have en-

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listed for service with Czechoslovak, Polish, or other independent forces attached to the United States Army or to the army of any one of the co-belligerents of the United States in the present war," who may apply for readmission within one year after the termination of the war.

The resolution was supported by a report, dated March 2, 1918, which speaks very highly of the Czechoslovak forces, and it also had the support of the Department of Labor in the form of a letter by the then Assistant Secretary, Louis F. Post.

The resolution became law after it obtained the signature of the President. The incident affords an interesting recognition, both legislative and executive, of revolutionary forces which as yet had not been recognized in the usual forms observed in international intercourse and international law. Just what effect under international law this sort of recognition might have had cannot be gone into here, but the international lawyer is afforded an interesting subject for speculation.

When Dr. Masaryk arrived in Washington he was welcomed at the Union Station of the capital by twenty-seven members of the House and Senate. A list of their names has been saved and they may, therefore, be registered here: Sabath,

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Hardy, Buchanan, Slayden, Lobeck, Mansfield, Hitchcock, Sloan, Stephens, Good, Kenyon, Medill, McCormick, McAndrews, Lewis, Igoe, Dyer, Hayes, Baker, Doremus, Pomerene, Wealthy, Smith, Eagan, Cody, Burnett, Barnhart, Van Dyke.

Thereafter the Czechoslovak problem came up often enough. Thus, on October 16, 1918, Representative Sabath delivered an address in which he embodied a whole anti-Austrian article, originally appearing in the *Yale Review* and reprinted in pamphlet form under the title of *Should Austria-Hungary Exist?* In the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge declared openly for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovak independence.

The problem of Austria-Hungary ceased to be regarded as outside the sphere of American interests and Czechoslovaks were no more defending an unknown cause.

IV

THE CZECHOSLOVAK PROBLEM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The work of any foreign office is necessarily confidential, and the general public can very seldom learn much of the method of approach adopted by the Department of Foreign Relations concerning important problems which this branch of the government is confronted with. Instructions of the United States Department of State, and reports of various diplomatic representatives to their superior officer, ultimately, after a lapse of years, appear in the official publication, *Foreign Relations*; but seldom, if ever, has the historian been given a glimpse of the consideration, and its nature, accorded any question by responsible officials on the ground in Washington, in the department itself.

Fortunately, as regards the problem of Austria-Hungary, the author is in possession of first-class evidence that from the very beginning of American belligerency the situation was given investigation and consideration so thorough-going that

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its very extensiveness and detailed nature will come as a surprise to many who are fond of rather ungenerous criticism of everything connected with the conduct of foreign relations. Certainly the material presented in this chapter should go far toward dispelling the charge, often enough made, that recognition of Czechoslovak independence was brought about by clever intrigue, or alleged personal friendship of particular officials.

When the United States entered the war, and throughout the conflict, as well as for a period thereafter, questions relating to Austria-Hungary came within the purview of the Near East Division of the Department of State of which the chief then was Dr. Albert Hutchinson Putney, formerly Dean of the Illinois College of Law in Chicago, and an author of a number of works on legal subjects, particularly on constitutional law. In his official capacity Dr. Putney prepared for the Secretary of State and the President a memorandum entitled *The Slavs of Austria-Hungary*. The document has already become one of first-rate importance in Czechoslovak history, and this work would be but fragmentary indeed did it not devote considerable attention to its nature and very evident influence upon the formulation of

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the policies of the American government. For that reason extensive quotations are not only justified, but in fact necessary. However, the survey would constitute a work of no inconsiderable proportions, and manifestly only its most important parts, relevant to our topic, can be reproduced here. Also, something of its scope and nature can be gathered from the Table of Contents, which is as follows:

- Section 1. Importance of the problem of the Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
- Section 2. Outline of the evolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
- Section 3. Slavs—the earliest known inhabitants of this region.
- Section 4. Classification of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary.
- Section 5. The Czecho-Slovaks.
- Section 6. Hapsburg treatment of the Czecho-Slovaks.
- Section 7. Rights of Bohemia to be considered as an independent and sovereign state merely united to Austria through the accident of having a common sovereign.
- Section 8. The Jugo-Slavs.
- Section 9. Hapsburg treatment of the Jugo-Slavs.
- Section 10. The Magyars and the Non-Magyar races.

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- Section 11. Other Slavs of Austria-Hungary.
- Section 12. Strategic importance of the Jugo-Slav territory from the economic and commercial standpoints.
- Section 13. The controversy between Serbs and Bulgarians.
- Section 14. The Italian Jugo-Slav controversy.
- Section 15. Dualism in Austria-Hungary and its relations to the Slavic problem in the Empire.
- Section 16. The question of the possibility of justice for the Slavs under the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
- Section 17. Arguments in favor of the United States giving support to the aspirations of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary.

The first chapter, discussing the "Importance of the Problem of the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire," among other things maintains:

There are some problems the solution of which is a matter of sentimental rather than practical importance, and there are national and racial ambitions the attainment of which would be of great value to some particular country or race, but which are matters of little importance to the United States or to the world at large. On the other hand, there are questions, the settlement of which will have a far-reaching effect upon the future peace of the world and the security

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of the United States. Among the most important of this latter class of questions, if indeed not the most important of all, is that of the disposition to be made of the Slavic inhabitants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

When the terms of peace, by which the war can be ended, are considered from the standpoint of the security which they will furnish for the future peace of the world, there is no more important question than that of the disposition to be made of the Slavic subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The success of the German plan for "Mitteleuropa" depends upon the continuance of the present alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary; and the continuance of this alliance depends, in turn, upon the continuance of the control of the policies of the latter empire by the Austrian (German) and Magyar minority in the population thereof. The granting of full political rights to the Slavic *majority* in the empire would forever destroy the German control over Austria-Hungary. The various Slavic races of central and southeastern Europe have suffered the most, and have the most to fear from the German ambitions, and are the strongest natural enemies of all Germanic plans of aggrandisement. The Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire should, and would if they were able, constitute the first line of defense against any German aggression towards the east and south; but under the present system of government in the Austro-Hungarian Empire these peoples have been compelled to assist in the carrying out of the designs from which they are the chief sufferers.

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Or, if the various dissatisfied and exploited races in the Austro-Hungarian Empire should be given their independence—if the Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks should be united into an independent Czech state, if the Poles of Austria should be united with their brethren of Prussia and Russia in an independent Poland, if the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes of Austria should be united with Serbia and Montenegro in a strong Jugo-Slav state, if the Roumanians of Transylvania, Bukowina and the Banat should be united with Roumania, if the Ruthenians of Galicia should be united with their brethren in Russia, or if some other just solution should be found for the problem of this people, and if Italia Irredenta should be restored to Italy—the danger of a German-made “Mitteleuropa,” to be used as a stepping-stone to boundless Germanic conquests, would be effectively and forever crushed.

Extremely interesting, from an historical, political, as well as legal, point of view, is Chapter Seven (7) on the “Rights of Bohemia to be considered as an independent and sovereign state merely united to Austria through the accident of having a common sovereign.” After a careful examination of various historical, diplomatic and legal documents, commencing with the Golden Bull of 1356, Dr. Putney summarizes his views in the following words:

The union between Bohemia and Austria being
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merely dynastic it is evident that there was never any legal merger of the two countries, nor can Bohemia be held legally bound by any laws passed by any legislative assembly except a Bohemian assembly meeting in Bohemian territory. The situation was well stated by Charles Pergler, Vice-President of the Czechoslovak National Council, in a speech delivered at the State University of Minnesota, in which he said :

“For that matter, the fact cannot be over-emphasized that the Czechs were deprived of the national state then once had, by force. In demanding independence, Czechs can plant themselves not only upon the proposition that any nation has the right to self-government, but also upon laws and constitutions which have never been repealed or abrogated with the consent of the Bohemian people.

“Almost four centuries ago Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (with the two Lusatias) constituted an independent kingdom, just as Hungary was then an independent kingdom. In 1526 Czechs called the Hapsburg dynasty to the Bohemian throne for practically the same reasons and on the same conditions as the Magyars. Together with the Pragmatic Sanction, the terms under which the Hapsburgs were called to the Hungarian throne formed what we might call the legal foundation of the Hungarian revolution in 1848. The Czech case, legally speaking, is every bit as strong, if not stronger, as was the Magyar case in 1848. The compact of 1526, together with the coronation oaths and a large number of historical documents, too numerous to be here mentioned, form

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the legal basis of the Czech revolution in 1915.

“*De facto* the Bohemians lost their independence, *de jure* they still have it, and are now demanding something of which they were illegally deprived. Just as no one can be legally deprived of his property by force and violence and without due process of law, just so the Czechs retain their legal title to independence.”

The soundness of the Bohemian claim is also proven by the agreement between Austria and Hungary as to the government of the latter country. The Magyars have asserted the right of Hungary to be considered as a country independent of Austria, and this view has been practically acquiesced in by Austria.

But Hungary and Bohemia came under Hapsburg rule at the same time and in the same manner, and there can be no legal difference between the relations between Austria and Bohemia, and those between Austria and Hungary. This has been recognized and admitted by the fair-minded and liberty-loving faction among the Magyars. In a letter to Mr. Helfi, editor of the Magyar paper *Magyar Ujszag*, dated November 8, 1871, Louis Kossuth made the following statement:

“Between the legal titles which form the foundation of the right of the dynasty to the throne in Hungary and Bohemia there is not merely an analogy, but a complete identity. That is true of their origin and time, method, conditions and principles, as well as their literal wording. The Bohemian land is not

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a patrimonium, no so-called hereditary land, no mere appendage of Austria, but a land which may appeal to diplomatic negotiations and mutual agreements. It is a state, just like Hungary."

That a mere dynastic union creates no permanent binding union between two countries is conclusively proved by the examples which history furnishes us. If two countries united by the accident of a common sovereign desire a closer union, this requires an express agreement between the countries to this effect. Thus Poland and Lithuania, though united dynastically under the Jagellons, in 1386, were not merged under one government until the Union of Lublin in 1569; and England and Scotland, while both under the Stewart kings from 1603, were not otherwise united until the act of Union in 1707. There has never been at any time such an act of union between Bohemia and Austria, like those between Poland and Lithuania in 1569, and between England and Scotland in 1707.

Where countries are united by no other bonds than those of a common dynasty it has been constantly held that they might become separated either by the operation of different laws governing the succession in the two countries, or by the wish of either country. For example, within the past century Hanover became separated from Great Britain in the former manner, and Norway from Sweden in the latter.

The relations recently existing between Norway and Sweden were substantially those now existing between Bohemia and Austria. In each case there are

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two formerly independent and distinct countries united together by the historical accident of a common sovereign. Norway, in 1905, desired to do what Bohemia desires to do today—namely, to terminate the dynastic union. After full consideration the powers of Europe decided to approve of the separation of the two countries.

From the historical evidence above stated I believe that Bohemia is legally an independent elective monarchy; that the illegal and tyrannical suppression of Bohemian rights by the Hapsburgs has not destroyed such rights; that Bohemia has the same legal right to terminate its dynastical relations with Austria that Norway had to terminate similar relations with Sweden; and that these rights of Bohemia should be recognized by the United States and the Entente. Above all I believe that it would be contrary to all American traditions for this country to make any treaty which would recognize as legal the destruction of Bohemian liberties by the Hapsburgs.

If, to some, Dr. Putney's attitude may seem too strained and legalistic, let them consider what would have been the situation of the lands of the Bohemian crown if Austria-Hungary had not been dismembered and had there been no demand for Czech independence, but the Hapsburg dynasty had become extinct. It is obvious that in that case the Czech state certainly would have reverted to its original elective rights and that the

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Czechs would have exercised the right of choosing a new sovereign. This consideration demonstrates beyond the peradventure of a doubt that the various parts of Austria-Hungary were held together by a purely dynastic bond, legally speaking.

In his final chapter, Dr. Putney argues for a recognition of the aims of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary and for a declaration of sympathy with them. We can never completely understand the origin of certain declarations of the State Department unless we take into account Dr. Putney's argument. This again calls for extensive quotations. Dr. Putney told those responsible for the country's success in war and its foreign policy:

The Slavic leaders claim that an expression of sympathy with the nationalistic aspirations of the various western and southern Slavic races will assist the United States and the Entente in this war in the following ways:

1. It will encourage the formation of various Slavic Legions to fight on the "West Front" in Europe and elsewhere.
2. It will encourage the large number of Austrian-Slavs who surrendered to Russia and then took up arms against Austria-Hungary to continue in the field against the Central Powers.
3. It will make of such prisoners active propa-

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gandists against the Central Powers. Their work among the Russians might accomplish important results.

4. It will encourage strikes and parliamentary opposition in Austria-Hungary.

5. To a much greater extent it will encourage passive resistance, refusals to participate in war loans, and attempts to disorganize in every possible way the military and economic plans of the Central Empires.

6. It will increase the activities in support of the war and of the administration among the two to three million Slavs in the United States.

While a declaration by the United States cannot fail to increase the activity of the western and southern Slavs against the Central Empires, in the absence of such a declaration the United States and the Entente run the risk in the near future of losing much of the assistance which they have been receiving from this source; although to the credit of these Slavs it must be said that there has as yet been no such result. The recent events in Russia, however, have left the Czechs, Jugoslavs, etc., in a most terrible plight. They can hardly be expected to keep up their efforts against the Central Empires unless they have encouragement, and especially, if possible, express assurance that their liberty will be a certain result of an Entente victory.

At the present time some are beginning to doubt whether an Entente victory will bring them their liberty. The Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians are endeavoring to persuade them that it will not,

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and that the Entente and the United States have abandoned them.

To sum up, every one of Germany's many ambitions in the East depend for their success upon her breaking through and crushing the ring of western and southern Slavs which encircles her on the east and southeast. For this reason (even if we look at the question from a merely selfish standpoint) there is nothing which the United States should not do to aid these Slavic races; and if we look at the question from a humanitarian standpoint there are no races anywhere more deserving of the sympathy and support of the United States than the Czechoslovaks, the Jugoslavs and other Slavic races of Austria-Hungary.

The question which should first be decided by the United States at this time is not what terms can probably be secured, but what terms would secure justice and a peace that can endure. It is at least possible for the United States to set for itself an ideal that will do justice to the races whose fate depends upon the result of this war, and then to secure an actual peace which will conform as closely as possible to the ideal which we have set for ourselves. For a century and a half; after the question might have been settled, the situation in the Turkish Empire has remained a world scandal and a constant menace to the peace of Europe, because the European powers never had the courage to bring about a final solution of the problem. Austria-Hungary will become another constant menace to the peace—not only

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of Europe but also of the whole world, unless the United States and the Entente Powers possess the wisdom, courage and ability to solve the problem which this Empire presents, by giving freedom to its subject Slav and Latin races. A peace which will leave between twenty-five and thirty millions of the most highly advanced branches of the Slavic race to continue to suffer under Hapsburg and Magyar misrule, and which eventually will render a new war in the Near East inevitable, is a peace to which this country should not consent, until and unless it has been proved that it is beyond the power of the United States to secure a more just and lasting peace. As to the possibility of securing a peace which will give liberty to the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, it should be borne in mind that in all probability the Germans will not consent to any *just* peace—to any terms of peace which the United States and the Entente can possibly accept—until Germany has reached the position where she will be obliged to accept any terms of peace which her opponents insist upon. It might furthermore be said that as long as these millions of Slavs remain under Hapsburg rule, the world is not safe for democracy, and such a peace can hardly be called a victorious peace—for the United States or its allies.

Dr. Putney's survey was completed and delivered to the Secretary of State on May 9, 1918. On May 29, 1918, the State Department made public the following declaration:

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The Secretary of State desires to announce that the proceedings of the Congress of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome in April, have been followed with great interest by the Government of the United States, and that the nationalistic aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this government.

Anyone carefully comparing the announcement with Dr. Putney's survey will readily notice not only similarity, but identity of terminology (nationalistic aspirations); but today it is possible to go a step further than a mere surmise of this kind and authentically to declare that A. H. Putney was entrusted with the formulation of the declaration, in fact did write it and that it was given to the public as drafted by him.

Naturally, the full purport of the announcement, and its vital importance, cannot be grasped unless we know something of the Rome congress and of the aspirations there voiced. This congress was one called by a committee formed for the liberation of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary and was held in Rome on April 8, 9 and 10, 1918. The peoples represented were Italians, Czechoslovaks, Roumanians, Poles, Jugoslavs. The following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

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The representatives of the nationalities wholly or partly subject to the domination of Austria-Hungary—Italians, Poles, Roumanians, Czechoslovaks, Jugoslavs—have united in affirming as follows the principles by which their common action shall be guided:

1. Each of these peoples proclaims its right to establish its own nationality and state unity, to complete this unity, and to attain full political and economic independence.

2. Each of these peoples recognizes in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy the instrument of Germanic domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realization of its aspirations and its rights.

3. The assembly recognizes the necessity for a common struggle against the common oppressors, and in order that each people may attain its complete liberation and national unity as a single free state.

In view of the objectives fixed by the congress, the pronouncement of the Secretary of State was certainly clear and far-reaching enough. Nevertheless, certain pro-German and pro-Austrian elements, and even some Italian newspapers, claimed that the aims so expressed were not incompatible with the preservation of the Hapsburg monarchy, and for this reason a supplementary declaration, also from the pen of Dr. Putney, was published, this time on June 28, 1918, and worded as follows:

Since the issuance by this government on May 29th of the statement regarding the nationalistic

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aspirations for freedom of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, German and Austrian officials and sympathizers have sought to misinterpret and distort its manifest interpretation. In order that there may be no misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the statement, the Secretary of State has further announced the position of the United States to be that all the branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule.

The declaration of September 3, 1918, recognizing the Czechoslovak National Council as a *de facto* government, was but a logical culmination of the gradual steps described in this chapter, and it became not only possible, but inevitable, with a definite organization of the Czechoslovak armies in Russia and elsewhere.

APPENDIX

WAR PREFERRED TO PEACE OF THE GRAVEYARD (Slav Press Bureau)

New York, May 28, 1917.—Charles Pergler, of Iowa, now Director General of the Slav Press Bureau and Vice-President of the Bohemian Alliance, declining to participate in the First Conference for Democracy and Terms of Peace, addressed today to the Conference the following letter:

“Your invitation to participate in your conference, sent me to my home in Iowa, reached me only the other day. I am sorry to say that I cannot participate in your gathering because of the nature of the tentative program of discussion, substantial approval of which seems to be required in order to entitle one to participation. Indeed, when you make the demand that those in attendance be in substantial accord with this tentative program, you make your conference merely a ratification meeting, and not at all representative of the various shades of democratic opinions and

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ideas of future permanent peace. Also, that such a restriction is hardly consistent with the spirit of real liberalism and democracy needs hardly to be pointed out.

“What does your opposition to forcible annexation of territory mean? It certainly is not a disputed question that the purely Italian provinces of Austria should be joined to Italy, that there should be a united Jugoslavia and that the Roumanians should be freed from Magyar oppression. Pro-Austrians might call this forcible annexation, yet as a matter of fact it would be merely a simple measure of justice, just as the creation of a Bohemian-Slovak state is a necessity if justice is to be done to the Bohemians and Slovaks. This, of course, postulates the dissolution of Austria-Hungary.

“I doubt very much that you can find in this country a thoughtful Bohemian or Slovak who can and will sign your tentative program without reservations. This very likely means that the Austrian problem will not be discussed at your conference. At least, not from the Bohemian and Slovak point of view. But, without a thoroughgoing discussion of the Austrian problem, which just now is beginning to attract more attention

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than ever, a complete program for terms of permanent peace cannot be formulated.

“I am not a militarist, and yet I believe in universal military training and universal military service. Most of the social democracies of the various nations have this demand in their platforms. Militarism is domination by a military caste; preparation for defense is not necessarily militarism. If a nation defends itself against aggression, it does not become militaristic any more than a man who defends himself against burglary becomes a burglar.

“I am utterly opposed to any separate peace on the part of this country, just as I would view as a calamity to the cause of real democracy a separate peace of Russia with Germany. This world can be made a tolerable place to live in only by a concert of the democratic peoples of the world. Separate peace on the part of any of the allied countries would preclude such a concert, and would be a fatal blow to the hopes for such an organization of the world’s democracies as would insure permanent peace.

“It is to be very much regretted that the several demands that can be approved by those of us who believe themselves democratic, and yet are not for peace at any price, you have so interwoven

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in your program with unacceptable propositions that an acceptance of your invitation is impossible without self-stultification on the part of those who think as I do. The result, of course, unavoidably is that your conference cannot be and will not be representative.

“I know many of those who have signed the call to your conference, and I know that the purity of their motives cannot be questioned for a single minute. Yet it cannot be denied that the result of many of the peace moves recently made has been to assist German imperialism in its struggle to maintain its grip, at least on Central Europe. If the war ends without a decisive victory, and especially without permanently solving the Austrian problem, the peace concluded will be simply a truce. If the Central Powers are permitted to retain any fruit of their aggression, or if they are permitted to oppress in the future any of the nationalities now under their domination, the peace so concluded will be one of the cemetery. If I must make a choice, I prefer war for democracy to the peace of the graveyard. These are some of the things that make many of us pause before we can even think of any co-operation with the pacifist movement. Such co-operation is certainly out of question where

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one of the participants is Victor L. Berger, who is pronouncedly pro-German and who, in his Milwaukee papers sometime ago, did not hesitate to oppose the just Bohemian-Slovak claims to independence."

THE ENEMIES WITHIN

GERMAN LANGUAGE PRESS ASSAILS THE CZECHOSLOVAKS FOR ADHERENCE TO ALLIED CAUSE (Slav Press Bureau)

New York City.—Various indeed are the ways and methods adopted by the German language press of the country in their endeavor to discredit in the present struggle the cause of the Allies and consequently America. In its morning edition for September 8th the *New York Herald* reprints an article from the *California Demokrat*, another German publication, under the glaring headlines, "How the Czechs wrought harm (Wie Czechen schaden); made unusually difficult conduct of war for Austria." These headlines indicate sufficiently how indignant the German-American press is that the Czechs did not make lighter Berlin's and Vienna's quest for world dominion. But the article itself is even more bitter. It recites the conduct of Czech troops during the war, their desertions to the Allies, and speaks of them with contempt as traitors and men without honor because of their refusal to fight under the black and

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yellow banner of the Hapsburgs. Since such a large percentage of the Czechs in this country voluntarily joined the American army, evidently they, too, are objects of contempt to the German-American press.

But can there be even the shadow of an excuse for charging Czechs with treason even to Austria? Waiving for the time being the question that Austria-Hungary declared war without consulting her own parliament, such as it is, and that she entered upon the struggle against the wishes of her own people, except the minority consisting of Germans and Magyars, it still remains a fact that even from a legalistic standpoint the Czechs are not traitors. Legally, the ancient Bohemian state still exists. Its rights were and are suppressed by force, but theoretically they have been repeatedly acknowledged by the emperors of Austria themselves. The Czech diet, the convocation of which has been prevented by the Austrian government for years, did not declare the war, and as a matter of constitutional law the Czechs were not bound by the Austrian Government's declaration of war. In fact, again as a matter of constitutional law, the present Austrian emperor to the Czechs is nothing but a usurper, as was his predecessor, the late Francis Joseph, because

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neither of them constitutionally became King of Bohemia, did not submit to the ceremony of coronation, and because otherwise they did not comply with the ancient Bohemian constitutional usages. Apart from this, the whole world now knows that Austria brought about the war not only to subjugate Serbia, but also to enable her to suppress her own non-German and non-Magyar nationalities. Any Czechs who might have fought for Austria would have been guilty of treason to their own nationality, treason both morally and legally.

In any event, these invectives against the Czechs afford an interesting illustration how our German language press never misses an opportunity to support the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg cause.

HOW KORNILOFF ESCAPED FROM AUSTRIAN CAPTIVITY

ROMANTIC ADVENTURE OF HERO OF GALICIA

(Slav Press Bureau)

New York City: It is not generally known that at one time during the present war Lieutenant-General L. C. Korniloff, whose victories in Galicia have so astonished the world, was an Austrian prisoner of war and that he escaped from Austrian captivity with the aid of a Czech soldier, who himself forfeited his life for the help extended to his distinguished Slav brother.

During the retreat of the Russian army from the Carpathians in the spring of 1915, General Korniloff, then commanding the rear guard, was captured by the Austrians and interned in Bohemia. In the summer of 1916 he managed to escape with the help of a Czech soldier, Frank Mrnak. For several weeks the two fugitives were making their way stealthily toward the Roumanian frontier, hiding by day and traveling by night. But one day in August they were surprised by gendarmes; the General got away and

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HOW KORNILOFF ESCAPED

finally reached Russia, where he commanded the Petrograd garrison during the revolution. Mrnak was hit and captured and later sentenced by the court-martial in Pressburg to be shot.

It had been the Czech soldier's intention to enter as a volunteer into the ranks of the Czecho-Slovak Brigade, which has by this time grown into two divisions and has so distinguished itself in the present Russian offensive around Halicz. That his name and his heroic deed should not be forgotten, the commander of the brigade issued an order to have Mrnak's name inscribed on the roll of Company A of the first regiment of the Czecho-Slovak Brigade of sharpshooters. It was further ordered that at every roll call, when Mrnak's name is called, the sergeant of the first squad should answer: "Shot by Hungarian court-martial in Pressburg for saving General Korniloff."

PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE CZECHO-
SLOVAK LEGIONNARIES

(July 18, 1919, in Washington, D. C.)

“Major Vladimir Jirsa, officers and men of the detachment of the Czechoslovak Army:

“It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity to review this detachment of your valiant army and to extend to you, its officers, and the brave men associated with you, a most cordial welcome. Though we have been far away, we have watched your actions, and have been moved by admiration of the services you have rendered under the most adverse circumstances. Having been subjected to an alien control, you were fired by a love of your former independence and for the institutions of your native land, and gallantly aligned yourselves with those who fought in opposition to all despotism and military autocracy. At the moment when adversity came to the armies with which you were fighting, and when darkness and discouragement cast a shadow upon your cause, you declined to be daunted by circumstance and retained your gallant hope. Your steadfastness in purpose, your unshaking

PRESIDENT WILSON'S MESSAGE

belief in high ideals, your valor of mind, of body and of heart evoked the admiration of the world. In the midst of a disorganized people and subject to influence which worked for ruin, you constantly maintained order within your ranks, and by your example helped those with whom you came in contact to re-establish their lives. I cannot say too much in praise of the demeanor of your brave army in these trying circumstances. Future generations will happily record the influence for good which you were privileged to exercise upon a large part of the population of the world, and will accord you the place which you have so courageously won. There is perhaps nowhere recorded a more brilliant record than the withdrawal of your forces in opposition to the armies of Germany and Austria, through a population at first hostile, or the march of your armies for thousands of miles across the great stretches of Siberia, all the while keeping in mind the necessity for order and organization.

“You are returning to your native land, which is today, we all rejoice to say, again a free and independent country. May you contribute to her life that stamina which you so conspicuously manifested through all your trying experiences in Russia and Siberia, and may you keep in mind

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after your return, as you had kept in mind heretofore, that the laws of God, the laws of man, and the laws of nature require systematic order and cool counsel for their proper application and development, and for the welfare and happiness of the human race.”

A COMMUNICATION TO SENATOR STONE

Hon. William Stone,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Now that the Senate of the United States is about to take up the question of peace terms, I believe it to be not only a privilege, but my duty as well to present to you, and through you to the honorable members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, the position of the Czechoslovaks in the present struggle, and as regards the Austro-Hungarian problem:

1. In 1526 the Czech (Bohemian) nation of its own volition elected the Hapsburgs to the throne of Bohemia, and had nothing in common with the other Hapsburg lands except the dynasty, and the Hapsburgs at that time, by solemn oaths and pledges, bound themselves to maintain and protect the independence of the Czech state.

2. The Czechs never ceased to fight for independence, and never waived, directly or indirectly, their right to such happiness, as is evidenced by the President, who in his work on *The State* declares, "That no lapse of time, no defeat of

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hopes, seems sufficient to reconcile the Czechs of Bohemia to incorporation with Austria."

3. The Czechoslovaks throughout the present war have opposed Austria-Hungary to the utmost of their ability, and immediately upon the outbreak thereof formulated and adopted a program asking for the reconstruction of a sovereign, completely independent, Czechoslovak State, as is evidenced by a solemn manifesto issued in Paris on November 15, 1915, by declarations of Czech deputies in the Austrian Parliament, manifestos of Czech authors and pronouncements of Czech workingmen's organizations, as well as by the bitter persecution and wholesale executions by the Austrian Government perpetrated upon the Czechs throughout the duration of the war.

4. The legal existence of the Bohemian State is further attested by the existence of a Czechoslovak Army in France and Russia, under the leadership of the Czechoslovak National Council, headed by Prof. T. C. Masaryk. This army in Russia recently declared in public proclamation that the Hapsburgs are deprived of the Bohemian Crown and of Slovakia; that it is conducting a defensive war on Austria-Hungary; that the Czechoslovak Army, led by the Czechoslovak Na-

A COMMUNICATION TO SENATOR STONE

tional Council, is a regular army and should be recognized as such under international law.

5. Emperor Charles of Austria-Hungary, as far as the Bohemians are concerned, and even from the legal point of view, is nothing but a usurper, never having been crowned King of Bohemia, and thus not having performed the ceremony which would give him the legal sanction to govern Bohemia, and the throne of Bohemia is therefore vacated.

6. The Czechs demand now an independent republic. As substantiating this, I append hereto as Exhibit "A" a dispatch appearing in the *London Morning Post*, of January 19, 1918.

7. Slovaks and Czechs are members of the same nation, the only difference being that the Slovaks are suffering under Magyar domination in Hungary, while the Czechs are suffering under German domination in Austria.

8. It appears, therefore, that the Czechoslovaks ask the right of development in an independent state. Mere autonomy would mean that they would have to submit, at least temporarily, to a sovereignty to which they are opposed.

9. The Hapsburg dynasty has never kept its pledges: it has made of Austria-Hungary its family estate. It cannot be expected that the

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Czechoslovak and Yugoslav movements will abate with anything short of an independent Bohemia and a united, independent Yugoslavia. Should these revolutionary movements be continued after final conclusion of peace, as I believe they would, the world's peace would still be jeopardized.

10. In a federated Austria, foreign policy would have to remain in the hands of a central authority, just as with us it is not a matter for the various states of the Union. Such control would necessarily remain in the hands of the Magyar and Austrian Germans, the present and future tools of Berlin, who would continue to be at the command of Berlin. This Austro-German-Magyar foreign policy would still menace the peace of the world.

11. Assuming a complete Allied victory, it is easier to meet the desires of the various Austro-Hungarian nationalities than to force upon Austria-Hungary a federal constitution. As soon as the peace conference adjourned, and Allied armies disbanded, what would there be to force Austria-Hungary to carry out a peace treaty demanding federalization? Nothing! The world would not go to war for this purpose again at once, and thus the germ of a future catastrophe would be kept alive.

A COMMUNICATION TO SENATOR STONE

I shall hold myself in readiness to answer such questions as the Committee may see fit to ask, and to supplement the information herein before given personally.

Respectfully,
(Signed) Charles Pergler,
Vice-President,
Bohemian National Alliance.

EXHIBIT "A"
CZECHOSLOVAK AGITATION

REVOLUTIONARY MEETING AT PRAGUE

From a Czech source Reuter's Agency has received further details about the important Congress of Czech deputies from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia which took place in Prague on the 5th inst.

The meeting was opened by the President of the Bohemian Union, Mr. Stanek, who welcomed those Czech deputies who had come out of prison, and pointed out that the Czechs, being unable to speak freely in the Reichsrath, the existence of which still depended on Austrian absolutism, had assembled in order to make the whole world know that the Czechoslovak Nation, who had suffered such great sacrifices during the war, demanded not mere autonomy, but an independent state of their own, according to the right of self-determination.

Deputy Tusar (Czech Socialist), the Secretary of the Czech Executive Committee, then read the resolution, the whole of which has been suppressed by the Censor. The resolution was carried unanimously amid the singing of the Czech

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National Anthem by the whole assembly. In his concluding remarks the President expressed his joy at the complete unanimity of all Czechs in their desire for independence.

THE END

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