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FINAL REPORT

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NJ 87-211
By ~~sp~~, NARA, Date 1-5-88

Sigma II-65

PREPARED BY
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-795-65
20 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN SIGMA II-65

SUBJECT: Game Documentation (U)

Enclosed is a final report on the politico-military game, SIGMA II-65. It includes a brief summary of the game highlights and analysis, the somewhat longer script of a video-summary, a transcript of senior discussions following review of the video-summary and documentation of the actual game.

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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Sigma II-65(U)

26 JULY - 5 AUGUST 1965


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THE JOINT STAFF

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WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY

SIGMA II-65

F O R E W O R D

The Joint War Games Agency conducted SIGMA II-65 as the first politico-military simulation of the FY 66 program. Unlike interagency senior or cabinet level exercises, usually conducted three or four times each year, SIGMA II was carried out with participants in the grades of Lt Colonel/Commander through Major General and their civilian counterparts. It consisted of three moves and lasted one week, from 26 to 30 July 1965.

Using qualified "experts" on opposing teams and Control, its purpose was to obtain new perspectives on the developing politico-military situation in Southeast Asia, to illuminate means for coping with potential problems or possible windfall opportunities, and to stimulate useful ideas for enhancing current plans and programs. It was also expected to provide an array of plausible scenario concepts against which current and future contingency plans could be evaluated.

Although these games are developed along plausible lines, they definitely should not be thought of as predictive. Some of the situations are developed purposefully to challenge planners and decision-makers.


The Blue planners in SIGMA II-65 felt additional constraints in that the first move started from the actual current situation. Their initial game strategy and actions were necessarily influenced by the current decisions and policies, and Blue was partially committed by certain forces already in motion.

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In addition to a review and discussion of the video-summary of the game by the participants, a senior level review and discussion was conducted on Thursday, 5 August 1965.

This meeting provided an opportunity for very senior policy planners to discuss the game, to exchange ideas, and examine potential problems surfaced during play.

I am forwarding this final report of SIGMA II-65 for your information along with an invitation to use the video-tape records of this exercise in either the summary (thirty-five minutes) or complete (one-hour and fifty minutes) format. Arrangements may be made with the Politico-Military Branch, Cold War Division, Joint War Games Agency (Extension 11-79892 or 79860). It will also be available on 16 mm motion picture film.



C. J. VAN ARSDALL, Jr.
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief, Joint War Games Agency

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SIGMA II-65

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SIGMA II-65

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

THE GAME DIRECTOR FOR SIGMA II-65 WAS
COLONEL GEORGE A. LINCOLN

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

PRESENT POSITION: Professor and Head of Department of
Social Sciences, United States Military
Academy, West Point, New York.

SCHOOLS: University of Wichita, Kansas, 1924 - 1925
United States Military Academy, 1925 - 1929, B.S.
Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar, Magdalen
College), 1929 - 1932, B.A. and 1938, M.A.
National War College (Equivalent).

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:

1932-1937 Various staff and troop assignments in
Corps of Engineers.

1937-1941 Instructor, Department of Economics, Government
and History, United States Military Academy.

1941-1942 Headed the first major troop information and
education program, the Army Orientation Program.

1942-1943 Chief of Control and Planning Branch, G4,
Services of Supply, ETC.

1943-1947 War Department General Staff (Chief, Strategy
and Policy Group, OPD; Chief, Plans Division,
G3). Member of Joint Staff Planners, and
Combined Staff Planners.

1946-1952 Military Advisor to Secretary of State, Paris
Peace Conference, 1946; Defense Advisor to US
Representative of Temporary Council Committee
of NATO ("3 Wise Men"), 1951-1952; US NATO
Delegation, Rome and Lisbon, 1951-1952.

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- 1947- Professor, Department of Social Sciences, US Military Academy; Head of Department (1954).
- 1948-1949 Deputy to Under Secretary of the Army.
- 1951-1953 Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
- 1953- Present Consultant on various executive office activities.
- 1957-1958 Member of panels of Gaither Report and Rockefeller Report.
- 1958-1959 Study Coordinator for the President's Committee to study the Military Assistance Program.
- 1961- Present Consultant, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
- 1962- Member, President's Advisory Panel on a National Academy of Foreign Affairs.
- 1964- Special Consultant to Administrator of Agency for International Development.
- OTHER: Commissioned 2nd Lt., Corps of Engineers, USA, 1929-advanced through grades to Brigadier General in 1945, reverted to permanent rank of Colonel in 1947 to become Professor of Social Sciences, USMA. Member: Various learned societies having to do with Social Sciences; National Security Research Committee of Social Sciences Research Council; Council on Foreign Relations; Association of American Rhodes Scholars; Society of American Military Engineers, Denver Country Club. Lecturer, various civilian and military colleges.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster); Honorary Commander of the Order of the British Empire.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PUBLISHED WORKS:

Books (in collaboration): Background for Our War, 1942; Economics of National Security, 1954; International Politics, 1954; Dynamics of International Politics, 1962; (contribution of chapters); American Foreign Policy and American Democracy, 1954; Global Geography, 1957; Contributor to American Economic History (Ed. Harris, 1961). Also numerous articles.

GAME STAFF ORGANIZATION

The politico-military game SIGMA II-65 was developed and conducted under supervision of Colonel William T. Minor, USAF, Chief, Cold War Division, Joint War Games Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in cooperation with personnel of the participating agencies.

The Game Project Officer was Lt Col Thomas J. McDonald, USA, Head, Politico-Military Branch, Cold War Division.

- Colonel George A. Lincoln, USA
- Lt Col Thomas J. McDonald, USA, JWGA
Mr. Henry H. Gaffney, OSD/ISA
Captain Lee D. Olvey, USA, USMA
- Lt Col Rolland V. Heiser, USA
- Lt Col Charles D. Ford, Jr, USA
- Major Richard W. Hobbs, USA
- Col Samuel N. Karrick, Jr., USA
- Commander Harold A. Willyard, USN

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GAME PARTICIPANTS

The following personnel, nominated by their respective agencies for special knowledge and experience in the area under study participated as members of the five playing teams or control group:

- Col George A. Ambrey, USA -----DIA
- Mr. Edgar J. Beigel -----State
- Mr. Stanley Bergman -----CIA
- Lt Col Richard C. Bowman, USAF -----White House
- Mr. George Carver -----CIA
- Mr. Lawrence M. Connell -----CIA
- Mr. Chester Cooper -----White House
- Col John C. Crego, USAF -----USAF
- Col Marion C. Dalby, USMC -----SACSA
- Col Frank W. Elliott, Jr., USAF -----USAF
- Mr. Robert K. German -----State
- Col James J. Gibbons, USA -----J-3
- Col Walter J. Haberer, Jr., USA -----DIA
- Captain David T. Hafner, USN -----USN
- Mr. William C. Hamilton -----OSD/ISA
- Mr. Robert C. Haney -----USIA
- Mr. William Hebert, Jr -----CIA
- Captain V. G. Holzapfel, USN -----OSD/ISA
- Dr. Steve Hosmer -----USAF (Rand)
- Mr. Fred W. Janney -----CIA

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GAME PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D)

Mr. Ralph Johnson -----CIA
CDR Watt W. Jordan, USN -----USN
Mr. Thomas M. Judd -----State
Col Hale H. Knight, USA -----SACSA
Col Richard B. Kreutzer, USA -----USA
Mr. Pardee Lowe -----USIA
Mr. Philip W. Manhard -----State
Mr. Robert Miller -----State
Mr. Richard D. Nethercutt -----State
Col Willard A. Nichols, USAF -----Special-State
Defense Study
Group
CDR Alexander K. Rentschler, USN -----USN
Mr. Kenneth E. Roberts, Jr -----OSD/ISA
Col Jack A. Rogers, USA -----OSD/ISA
Mr. Donald W. Ropa -----White House
Mr. Joseph Z. Taylor -----AID
Mr. James C. Thompson, Jr -----White House
Mr. William C. Trueheart -----State
Major Albert N. Weidhas, Jr., USA -----USA
Mr. Charles Whitehurst -----CIA
Col Coleman Williams, USAF -----SACSA
Col Jasper J. Wilson, USA -----USA

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GAME PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D)

Dr. Thomas Wolfe -----USAF (Rand)
Mr. Joseph A. Yager -----State
Col Kenneth L. Yarnall, USA -----Special-State
Defense Study
Group

GAME MANAGER

Major LeRoy A. Wenstrom, USAF - JWGA

GAME ADMINISTRATION

TSGT Haywood Vaughn, Jr., USAF -----JWGA
SP6 Gary D. Williams, USA -----JWGA
A1C Curtis Clark, USAF -----JWGA
A1C Richard G. Hall -----JWGA
Mrs. Marion E. Boland -----JWGA
Miss Rose Marie Cernin -----JWGA
Mrs. Joan I. Conley -----JWGA
Mrs. Wilma Matasic -----JWGA
Miss Minnie P. Murphy -----JWGA
Mrs. Donna L. Reno -----JWGA

TELEVISION SUPPORT

Mr. Fredric D. Butcher, Jr., Producer -----NMCCSSC
Mr. Steve A. Olsavsky, Special Effects -----NMCCSSC
SFC Nathan J. Atwood, USA, Special Effects -NMCCSSC
Major Thomas C. Capraro, TV Coordinator ----Hq USAF
TV Center
Norman Morgan, TV Director -----Hq USAF
TV Center

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Admiral H. Rivero, USN -----USN
Mr. Walt Rostow -----State
LGen B. E. Spivy, USA -----J-5
Mr. Llewlllyn Thompson -----State
BGen W. A. Tope, USAF -----J-1
RAdm C. J. Van Arsdall, Jr., USN -----JWGA
Gen E. G. Wheeler, USA -----JCS
Col L. K. White, USA -----CIA

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SIGMA II-65

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

The following are brief biographical sketches to provide a sample of the background experience of SIGMA II-65 game participants:

Colonel, US Army, presently assigned as Special Project Officer to the Chief of Staff, US Army on matters relating to Vietnam. Served as Corps Advisor to I, II and III Corps in RVN Army for eighteen months and for three months as Liaison Officer between South Vietnam Prime Minister and US Ambassador. Closely affiliated with key politico-military figures in SVN such as General Nguyen Khanh. Has been member of several planning and study groups on subject since return. Has lectured on subject to National War College, Military Assistance Institute, several DA agencies and civic organizations.

Commander, US Navy, has been assigned for one year as Assistant to the Pacific and Far East Branch of the Politico-Military Division in OPNAV. Last assignment was as Commanding Officer of a US Destroyer, home ported in Japan and operating in the Far East Area. Graduate of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy with a Masters Degree in International Affairs.

Colonel, US Army, Chief, Plans and Operations Branch, USSR-East European Division, Intelligence Support and Indications Center, Defense Intelligence Agency. Served as US Army Attache in Moscow 1963-1964, and as Assistant US Army Attache in Warsaw 1954-1956. Currently engaged in production of National and Defense intelligence estimates and studies pertaining to area of responsibility. Speaks, reads and writes Russian. Graduate of US Military Academy and National War College.

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Colonel, US Army, last two years assigned as Chief, International Policy Division, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Headquarters, Department of Army. As such, monitors current politico-military matters on a world-wide basis coordinating the activities of 21 action officers covering various aspects of international affairs. Served a total of three years in the Far East. Graduate of National War College and attended graduate schools of Utah University and George Washington University, specializing in International Affairs.

Chief of the Sino-Soviet Bloc Area, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA. 17 years of experience in intelligence, the last 7 of which have been devoted to the Sino-Soviet Bloc area.

Chief of the North Vietnam Desk, CIA. 13 years of experience in intelligence, the last five on North Vietnam.

Deputy Chief of the Thailand/Burma/Laos Desk, CIA. 14 years of experience in intelligence, the last 8 on Southeast Asia.

Production Assistant in the Sino-Soviet Bloc Area, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA. 17 years of experience in intelligence, the last 9 on the Soviet Union.

Chief of China Operations, CIA. 21 years of experience in intelligence, the last 18 devoted to China.

Estimates Officer on the North Vietnam Affairs Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA. 12 years of experience in intelligence, the last 8 on Vietnam.

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Lt Colonel, US Air Force, assigned for the last year as Military Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Previous assignment was on Long Range Planning Division, USAF. Assisted in preparation on study on Concepts for Tactical Nuclear Warfare; also "The CHICOM Bomb", and Air Force Basic Doctrine Manual. Served as Associate Professor of Political Science, USAF Academy. PhD, Political Science.

An Intelligence Research Specialist, Office of Research and Analysis for Sino-Soviet Bloc, Department of State. Served twice in US Embassy in Moscow, 1948-1950, 1962-1964; proficient in Russian language. Served for five years in duties directly related to Soviet affairs. Member of US delegation in negotiations for US-Soviet cultural exchange agreement. LL.B Degree - University of Texas.

Member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State for the last two years. Previous duties included: Director, Office of East Asian Affairs, 1961-1963; Deputy Chief of Mission in Taipei, 1959-1961. Served a total of seven years in the Far East. MA Degree, University of Michigan; graduate of National War College.

Chief, Asian Communist Division, Office of Research Far East, Bureau of Intelligence Research, Department of State. Previous assignments as Second Secretary, Rangoon, 1962-1963; Third Secretary, 1951-1954; Tokyo; and Consul, Hong Kong, 1958-1961. Served a total of nine years in Far East. MA Degree, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Fluent in Chinese (Mandarin). Prepared several research memorandum on Communist China.

Colonel, US Air Force, presently Chief, Plans and Policy Branch, Special Warfare Division, Directorate of Plans, Headquarters, USAF. Lectured on USAF Special Warfare activities in Southeast Asia at several Defense Department

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Schools. Served approximately six years in the Far East including an assignment with the US Air Advisory Group in South Korea; also a temporary duty tour in South Vietnam in 1964. BS Degree in Military Science.

Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, for last 18 months. Previous duties included: Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Saigon, 1961-1964. MA Degree.

Deputy Director, Office of Vietnam Affairs, AID. Previous duties with MAAG, Vietnam, 1961 (USMC); Staff of Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations; Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency to Administrator of AID. Graduate of US Naval Academy.

Captain, US Navy, presently assigned on Ship's Characteristics Board, CP-36. Previous assignments include: Naval Attache Vietnam-Cambodia, 1962-1964; and in the Office of Naval Attache Taiwan, 1956-1958. Total of nine years duty in Far East. Fluent in French. Acted as reviewer and advisor on several articles on Vietnam.

Policy Planning Staff, OASD/ISA for the last 2½ years. Completed several studies of the contingency and planning process. Graduate study at Columbia University.

Captain, US Navy, presently Chief, Policy Division, Plans and Policy Staff, OASD/ISA. Coordinated on Department of Defense inputs to National Policy Papers on Thailand, Korea and Philippines. Previous assignments have included duties in air transportation covering Far East; Operation Section Head, CINCPACFLT Staff; Executive Officer, Attack Carrier in 7th Fleet. Graduate Naval War College.

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Member, Special State-Defense Study Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Participated in special study of current Far East problems. Graduate Army War College.

Director, Vietnam Working Group, Department of State. Formerly Chief of Political Section, US Embassy Saigon. Total of three years in Southeast Asia. MA Degree from Harvard. Speaks French.

Lieutenant Commander, US Navy, presently assigned as Assistant Contingency Officer, Pacific and Southeast Asia Branch, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Served as Flag Lieutenant to Commander Seventh Fleet and for two years was closely affiliated with key politico-military officers throughout the Far East. Member of SEA planning and study groups for one year. Graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

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SIGMA II-65

One official in a position of high responsibility comments that the gaming technique seems to be useful in defining problems but does not so often produce answers. Having observed the development of SIGMA II, as a participant in a privileged position, I offer the thought that the answers, if found at all, will be more often developed in the after study and analysis of the game developments rather than in the actions and counteractions of the game teams.

SIGMA II started from the real world situation on 26 July 1965, as the participating individuals and teams saw that real world. Participating agencies had been requested to nominate informed professional individuals for positions in the SIGMA II operation. The director therefore presumed that the participating personnel constituted a cross section of the best informed and most expert professionals in government. Hence the director decided to, and did, strive to proceed in step with what appeared to be the consensus of judgment of the Control Team and of each operating team.

The Control Team did introduce into the happenings of the thirteen future months at least six major items: a shake-up in the Saigon government; a qualified acceptance of the VC/RVN strategy of avoiding major military confrontation of US forces while emphasizing political, psychological, social, and economic measures; a somewhat gloomy (perhaps overly gloomy) appraisal of the US and world opinion situation -- but also a relative quiescence of formal pressures from friends and allies; a spot situation at the close of the game requiring each involved government to become somewhat specific on discussions (negotiations) toward cessation of fighting and movement toward a political settlement; a facing by the US/GVN Team of a negotiating situation in which the US and GVN (citing an improving military situation) were not in complete accord; and a facing by the US Team of the

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
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possibility that the GVN might initiate some form of "inviting the US out" in a situation where such a development is contrary to US interests. The Control Team did implicitly postpone, but not overrule, at least two Red proposed actions which, if implemented on the proposed timing, would have added to the problems of the US/GVN.

Ideally, SIGMA II should have been the subject of considerable discussion by individuals charged with policy responsibilities for Southeast Asia. Because of an overriding requirement to attend another meeting, the critique of SIGMA II was limited to less than a half hour following the television presentation of a compressed summary of the game play. The experience supports a conclusion that an attempt at a critique and discussion of such a complicated situation as SIGMA is unlikely to be very fruitful unless adequate time (an hour or more after the summary presentation) is allocated to the effort.

The utilization of video tape and other presentation aids is of great assistance to the conduct of study and analysis through the gaming technique. A caution needs to be noted however. The compression of materials necessary in using the technique results in a need for extraordinary care and precision in drafting. Also, this visual briefing method does sometimes, for some people, give a different impression from close study of the same words in written form.

The following pages contain the seven points presented for consideration at the Senior Discussion with brief expositions. One method of continuing the analysis could be by extension of SIGMA II by one or more moves at later dates.



G. A. LINCOLN
Colonel, USA, Professor

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DISCUSSION POINTS DEVELOPED IN SIGMA II-65

1. THE VARIOUS REACTIONS TO THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION.
(See Comparison of Negotiating Positions, Page B-6)
2. FRICTION ON DIFFERENCES ON POLICY AND OPERATIONS BETWEEN US AND GVN -- POSSIBLY EXTENDING TO SUGGESTION THAT US PRESENCE BE REDUCED.

The game indicated that friction between the US and GVN on policy and command and control of the joint military effort, a matter of continuing concern, is a problem which may be reasonably expected to increase sharply in the future as the scale of the US involvement increases. The game situation at Move III of prospective negotiations produced the sharpest conflict of interests, with the GVN strongly opposed to discussions. In addition, the DRV and Viet Cong teams devised a number of stratagems designed to exploit such differences. The overall VC strategy of continuing to undermine political authority and disrupt the economy -- if it were to be successful -- raises the question in a more general way: How much of the governing authority are we, or should we be, prepared to assume?

3. DOES THE SITUATION AS DEPICTED ON LABOR DAY 1966 CONSTITUTE A LIKELY AND ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS (DISCUSSIONS)?

Both the Viet Cong and the DRV felt they were winning and not under strong pressure to compromise their ultimate objectives at the conference table. They saw discussions as a means of establishing the legitimacy of the NLF and pressuring for US withdrawal. They were receptive to "free elections" as a basis for settlement, since they were confident of their ability to win such elections. Blue felt they were constrained by the Presidential commitment to attend discussions, and felt they could use the respite which prolonged discussions (two years) would provide to shore up the internal political and economic situation. The game situation

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poses two questions: (1) Is the opposing teams' position (that the US build-up would not constitute effective pressure on them to negotiate a compromise settlement) a realistic one? If so, what additional US action would constitute effective pressure? (2) What strategy should the US adopt in the event the opposition agrees to negotiations before the situation is ripe for a meaningful settlement?

4. ALL PARTIES IN THE GAME DISPLAYED A HIGH LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFIDENCE THROUGHOUT.

There was a marked asymmetry in the objectives of the opposing teams. The Blue team assumed a significant commitment by the Viet Cong to major military victories in the short term and attached principal importance to the short term objective of preventing such victories. The Red and Black teams in fact, however, discounted the importance of an early military victory and were unperturbed at the prospect of decreasing military activity in the short-run in the face of the US build-up. Their attention was focused on the longer term results of their efforts to disrupt the economy, terrorize the opposition, and destroy political order and they read the results in these areas as pointing to eventual victory for their side.

5. THE ACTUAL DIFFERENCE ON IMPACT BETWEEN A LARGE, AND A LARGER, NUMBER OF US TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM REMAINED UNCLEAR.

The Viet Cong, DRV, and Chinese teams seemed to be relatively unconcerned as to the problems which the US build-up on the ground would create for the Viet Cong. Although they recognized the ability of US troops to stalemate the Viet Cong military offensive, they did not believe the US build-up would be able to impose any significant additional costs on the VC through offensive actions, or to prevent a continuing erosion of the economic and political situation. Control rendered a qualified acceptance of this view by allowing the VC/DRV strategy of avoiding major military confrontation with US forces. However, the game did not incorporate a detailed tactical analysis of the offensive capability of varying US force levels in this type of situation.

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6. THE VC, DRV AND CHINESE SEEMED TO PLACE MORE EMPHASIS AND CREDENCE ON THEIR READING OF US AND WORLD OPINION THAN ON US OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS.

The Blue team made no appreciable progress toward its objective of convincing the opposition that the US is willing to take appropriate action to prevent a VC victory in Viet Nam, even with the massive build-up on the ground -- a move which cannot be immediately or easily reversed. The opposing teams continually reasserted that "time is on our (the VC's) side", reflecting the view that although the US may bring about a military stalemate in the short run, in the long run it will be unable to sustain this position. The principal reasoning underlying this position seemed to be the expectation by the VC, DRV and Chinese teams of increasingly adverse US and world opinion. This raises questions as to whether there is a serious misreading of US sustained intent and resolution and, if so, what can be done to change the situation.

7. THE OPPOSITION TEAMS PLACED HEAVY EMPHASIS ON SPECIFIC PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC MEASURES.

The US/GVN team gave serious attention to these areas in principle but did not develop specific initiatives as did the opposition, which almost exclusively concentrated in these areas. This difference of emphasis reflects the asymmetry of objectives noted in Point 4, and raises a question as to whether the overall US effort in real life is devoting sufficient attention to blunting the Communist offensive in these areas, assuming the military situation turns, but not decisively, and only slowly, to the US/GVN advantage. The same question remains if the game assumptions had been more optimistic as to the timing of the turn of the military situation.

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SIGMA II-65

GAME SUMMARY

Introduction

SIGMA II-65 began on Monday, 26 July 1965, with a video tape summary of the Southeast Asian situation. Five playing teams represented the United States/The Republic of Vietnam (US/RVN); the Soviet Union (USSR); Red China (PRC); North Vietnam (DRV) and the Viet Cong (NLF or VC).

Team Objectives

US objectives were designed to achieve a favorable political solution as soon as possible. They were limited in that they did not require overthrow of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) regime, or its military defeat in a classical sense. Blue, assisting the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), sought discontinuance of DRV and Chinese Communist support of the insurgency in South Vietnam. Blue wanted, if possible, to avoid direct US-Chicom hostilities and to minimize the impact of the conflict on US/USSR relations.

The Soviet objective was a neutralized South Vietnam under Soviet aegis minimizing Red Chinese influence. The Soviet Union also sought to avoid a major US/Soviet confrontation.

The Communist Chinese objective was to bring about a US defeat or withdrawal from Vietnam without incurring a United States attack on China. Underlying this strategy was China's belief that such a victory would have significant impact on the developing nations and would enhance China's position as world leader of the Communist movement.

The North Vietnamese objective was the "liberation" of South Vietnam in spite of US bombings. Its goal was a Communist government of a reunified Vietnam. The North Vietnamese walked a middle line between Moscow and Peking.

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The objectives of the Viet Cong paralleled those of the DRV. The immediate political goal was international recognition of the National Liberation Front.

First Move Strategies

In their first period of deliberation the United States/RVN team decided to declare a US State of Emergency, partially mobilize, and deploy US forces in South Vietnam to a strength of 250,000. Concurrently, Blue intended controlled escalation of air attacks against North Vietnam. Blue rejected a quantum increase in bombing on the basis that the DRV would withstand any amount of conventional bombing until convinced the Viet Cong could not win in the South. However, at the point in the future when military operations in South Vietnam took a turn for the better, bombing would be greatly escalated.

Opposition teams, without coordination, adopted a strategy calling for more North Vietnamese reinforcements into South Vietnam and avoidance of "stand-and-fight" actions with United States forces. They concentrated Viet Cong military efforts on vulnerable RVN or small US elements and on domination of the countryside. They accelerated sabotage, terror and disruption of economic and social activities in urban areas, emphasizing subversion of key military and civil leaders within the Ky government and exile group.

It appeared to the Communists that the Viet Cong could use weather, terrain and superior intelligence capabilities to elude US military forces or at least to minimize the number of major engagements with Americans. The Viet Cong expected to win eventually by weakening the economic and psychological fabric of Vietnamese society. They were thinking in terms of the 1958 US elections, ten and even twenty years beyond, and they did not think they needed early victory.

Blue, on the other hand, was intent on achieving an early settlement and estimated that the Communists were operating on a timetable calling for victory during the current monsoon. Blue assumed that China wanted an early and sensational victory to advance her struggle with the Soviets.

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Blue believed that US deployments in South Vietnam and a graduated program of air attacks would create a climate for meaningful negotiations. The "Communist" teams were not convinced although they did give some thought to possibilities that Blue's escalation against the DRV might force a reduction in Communist activities in South Vietnam. (Along this line the DRV considered unilaterally and covertly reducing the level of military action if Blue pressures against North Vietnam became too intense. Since Blue's air attacks did not escalate to what was considered an intolerable level, this idea was never implemented.)

US, Viet Cong, North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese teams independently considered the possibility that, in the face of a major US build-up in Vietnam, the Viet Cong might avoid combat and actually disperse their units into remote areas until the US reduced its military presence. The Viet Cong, while considering a major reduction in activity during such a period, would not altogether have abandoned their terrorist campaigns, nor did they feel that this situation would preclude covert infiltration of even larger areas. Blue addressed this as a contingency during the first move seeing it as a net gain. Morale problems were anticipated but much of the troop effort could be directed into civic action programs. With such a respite in major guerrilla actions, the GVN political structure could be rebuilt, social/economic programs could be launched, and there would be a chance to rehabilitate RVN regular and para-military forces.

The Communist Chinese team was impressed with how little direct involvement or risk was necessary to keep the pot boiling in Southeast Asia. They were willing to accept a massive US military presence in SEA and if this were to occur they visualized a long-drawn out military stalemate.

With the possible exception of the Soviets, "enemy" teams did not read "signals" coming from Blue as increasing US threat levels toward Red China.

Although reluctant to impair US/Soviet relations, the Soviets felt certain harassing actions were essential to preserve the Kremlin's image vis-a-vis Peking.

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First Control Projection
to 31 Dec 1965

Control considered the various team strategies as well as probable third country inputs and developed a scenario projection which showed US/RVN forces hitting more frequently into Viet Cong sanctuaries but having difficulty finding, fixing and destroying an elusive enemy. The Viet Cong were interdicting fixed communications routes in South Vietnam, disrupting supplies, fomenting discord among different interest groups in South Vietnam and generally shaking the internal structure of the RVN. (Because of time limitations, it was infeasible to make anything but the most aggregated kind of military analysis.)

As of 31 December 1965, there were about 170,000 US Army, Navy and Air Force personnel in South Vietnam. These forces were employed to secure base areas and to conduct active counterinsurgency operations. Bombing in North Vietnam continued at a controlled but escalating pace. Transportation facilities, military airfields and other targets were included. Hanoi and Haiphong, not initially included as targets, were still held hostage for future attacks.

Control's assessment of the situation on December 31st, 1965 showed military initiative beginning to shift from the Viet Cong to the US/RVN without major Blue victories, while economic and social problems in South Vietnam mounted for the US/RVN. Control portrayed command and control problems and mounting adverse opinion in the US and abroad.

Control did not allow enemy attempts to seduce certain key RVN generals to succeed nor did Control allow the many disquieting actions the Communists put in track around the world to seriously impede Blue policies. Control did portray the emergence as Premier of South Vietnam of a fractious strongman -- General Thi, Commander of I Corps. Control also introduced the resignation of a prominent US Administration official in protest against continuation of the conflict.

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Second Move Strategies

During the second move, the US team, after receiving firm commitments from General Thi, decided that his government was responsible and determined to back him. (Control confirmed this by having the new Premier swing from previous questionable affiliations with the Buddhists to a harder nationalistic line of action.)

In response to problems of military command and control, Blue established a high level joint and combined command of military forces in SVN under an RVN general assisted by a US Deputy.

Blue took a somewhat more optimistic view of the internal situation in SVN than Control had intended to portray. While Blue acknowledged the importance of a stable economy in South Vietnam, players felt that more effective measures could not be taken until there was security in the countryside. No constructive innovations were formulated.

The US team's reaction to world opinion was primarily passive. Although the US shaped some of its actions to minimize adverse impact on opinion, the over-all extent to which US actions were actually constrained by world opinion did not appear great. Certainly it was a less significant factor in US considerations than the "Communist" teams judged it to be. The US made little if any effort to mold opinion through the use of propaganda or information. By contrast, the Communist teams devoted much more of their time to positive measures aimed at actually shaping world opinion toward support for their actions.

The United States team tended to downplay such problems as recalcitrance on the part of de Gaulle, difficulties within NATO, or pressures on Berlin.

US reactions to situations threatening the security of Thailand, the Philippines, Formosa, Japan and South Korea were more specific. The US Vice President traveled to all of these countries proposing definite programs designed to secure the flanks.

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The Second Move saw the NLF attempting to establish itself as a widely recognized political entity. The VC and DRV attempted to wean General Thi away from the Americans and to set up a "Popular Front" government in Central Vietnam to include prominent Buddhist and other RVN leaders. The enemy teams actually shifted their military pressures away from Central Vietnam and into the Delta Region. (But Control had Thi take a strong nationalistic stand toward continuing the war just at the moment when discussions leading toward international negotiations appeared imminent.) DRV reinforcements continued arriving from North Vietnam through Cambodia, Laos and by sea infiltration, and Control allowed the Communist forces the same relative strength as had existed at the beginning of the game.

At this point, the Viet Cong changed their theme from one of "Get the US out" to a general call for "peace". They demanded formation of a neutral "Peace Government" and introduced a proposal to convene a "World Peace Conference" under sponsorship of the 17 Nations with a view to obtaining wider recognition of the National Liberation Front's status. This move was made early in 1966, but Control did not allow it directly. Instead, a series of abortive peace efforts involving any number of world figures were allowed to occur culminating in September 1966 (shortly before the US congressional elections) with a plea by Shastri of India for a conference in Rangoon.

Meanwhile, China and Russia continued to minimize their own overt involvement in the conflict, playing down incidents involving their forces and the United States. The Soviets began pressing both the United States and Hanoi toward discussions, fearing United States frustration over the deteriorating political position in South Vietnam might escalate the conflict.

China was concerned about how it might respond to US air strikes on Hanoi-Haiphong or the possible blocking of Haiphong Harbor. Concern was expressed over fear that Mainland China might become the object of US air attacks as the result of an incident or ultimate frustration on the part of the Americans. They were particularly sensitive to vulnerability of their nuclear capability, a prestige feature essential to Red China's power image among developing nations of the world.

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The Red Chinese sought to remind the US of its vulnerabilities elsewhere in Southeast Asia by creating pressures (in some cases merely psychological pressures) on Thailand, Laos, Formosa and the Republic of Korea. They had no thought of serious intervention with ground or air power unless Hanoi showed signs of weakening. That seemed a remote contingency.

Second Control Projection to 4 Sep 1966

In line with Blue's policy of gradual air escalation, shortly after New Year 1966 US bombers took out power plants and petroleum in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Blue was credited with at least one successful foray into War Zone D in April 1955, although in general the Viet Cong were still avoiding large scale actions. The influx of refugees into coastal areas, inflation, urban food shortages and political unrest were increasing sentiment in Saigon Buddhist quarters for a US withdrawal. The second Control scenario showed pressures toward the conference table building up in the US as well as abroad.

All teams were requested by Control in their last move to cite conditions prerequisite to their participation in such a conference and their objectives if a negotiating situation were to develop.

Third Move Strategies

Most of the third period of team deliberations was devoted to Shastri's proposal. Negotiations were not actually conducted.

The US team felt obligated to attend discussions based on the US President's oft stated willingness to talk. Although the US team felt compelled by world opinion to attend the conference, they had some hopes of negotiating an acceptable settlement. The Thi government in South Vietnam would not participate. (Thi said there was nothing to be gained now that a military victory was beginning to look possible.) Nor would Thi agree to sit in a conference if the

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National Liberation Front (NLF) were recognized as a government. He ignored US assurances that the NLF would not be so recognized.

All teams except the GVN and the Communist Chinese (who avoided public opposition to the talks), were agreeable to attending the Rangoon discussions.

The US and USSR teams agreed to attend without pre-conditions and both wanted to exclude the Communist Chinese. The US team arrived at a legalistic formula that would have precluded both Communist China and France from attending. The DRV took a position that the NLF must be seated at the conference and any agenda must include the Four Pham Vam Dong Points. The Viet Cong wanted to be recognized as a principal before accepting.

All the Communist countries backed the Four Points of Pham Vam Dong on the agenda, the first of which involves withdrawal of foreign troops and a cessation of bombing in the North. The US visualized eventual withdrawal or reduction in foreign troops following a meaningful settlement. The DRV were prepared to phase withdrawal of PAVN troops with a US withdrawal, and the Viet Cong wanted immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops. The day prior to the talks, the United States planned to reap the psychological benefits of unilaterally announcing a temporary halt in bombings in the North.

The Second Pham Vam Dong Point prohibits foreign bases in Vietnam.

The Third Point required acceptance of the NLF Program for South Vietnam. All playing teams, including the US team, appeared to feel that some kind of popular front government would eventually come to power in Saigon. The US visualized a coalition composed predominantly of current Saigon factions with limited NLF participation. The USSR saw the government as a neutral coalition with at least one-third NLF representation. The VC, DRV and CPR wanted a coalition government dominated by the NLF.

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The Fourth Point is that reunification of Vietnam is essentially a Vietnamese problem. All teams agreed that reunification of Vietnam was a long range consideration.

All teams appeared to accept the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The United States, USSR and DRV favored an International Commission as agent for the Rangoon Conference to supervise a cease-fire.

All teams felt they could win in free elections in South Vietnam. The DRV agreed that international supervision was acceptable. The Viet Cong not only wanted free elections, but they wanted them by the first of July 1967. The US team estimated discussions would be long--lasting, perhaps two years, during which time the US would win popular support.

The United States team considered the possibility of some form of international trusteeship in South Vietnam as a possible outcome of the negotiations and/or a means of solving the problem of GVN intransigence.

The United States would have agreed to continue foreign aid to South Vietnam as long as desired by a post settlement government. The USSR had no objections to outside countries furnishing foreign aid. The CPR, however, wanted an immediate end to foreign aid and removal of all foreign aircraft. (Apparently based on conditions in Laos after the 1962 Geneva Accords.)

None of the teams considered that the negotiations or discussions would be conducted in a military vacuum. Before the talks the US planned to continue bombing North Vietnam while increasing military activity in South Vietnam. The DRV and Viet Cong also intended to increase activity in South Vietnam and to grab some key real estate.

During the talks, the United States planned to maintain sufficient military pressure to stabilize

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the countryside and to promote its in-country psychological/economic programs. The Viet Cong and DRV planned to continue low level harassment while disavowing it.

After a cease-fire the US would reduce its military actions if possible. The DRV stated they would appear to comply.

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SIGMA II-65

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY

COMMENTARY

SIGMA II-65 differed in several respects from previous Southeast Asian games in organization, format, and in the strategic directions taken by the playing teams. It was an "intermediate level" rather than a cabinet level exercise so the teams had no requirement to "sell" their proposed strategies to a "senior" team. The teams were staffed however, with more than ordinary regard to personal credentials. Every member of the small Communist teams was selected for special knowledge and direct experience. It is believed also that a more favorable balance between political, military and socio-psychological experience was attained than in previous games. Team meetings were considerably shortened compared to previous games but more attention was applied to the preparation of video as well as written messages. (Video presentations were used to communicate between the teams and Control since these groups met on alternate days.)

The game was extremely economic of the time of participants amounting to an average of under nine hours per player between 26 and 30 July 1965. Through the medium of video tape it was possible for groups of senior level officials to review and to discuss the game. (Both a long and a short version are available for further review and analysis on video tape and 16mm film.)

In terms of content, this game started with real life intelligence and considerable knowledge among the Blue team of current high level thinking. All previous games in this area have begun from scenario projections several months out into the future. The opinion has been expressed by several players that Blue was a captive to real life policy and plans. Certainly, the Blue team was influenced by their understanding of policy and plans.

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The following points led to major discussions during and after the game:

a. There may be as many pitfalls as there are opportunities facing the United States in approaching discussions aimed at resolution of the Southeast Asian conflict. In the situation depicted there was a painful choice to be made by the US between: beginning discussions at Rangoon despite opposition by the Government of South Vietnam or of rejecting Communist offers to sit down at a conference table in the face of powerful opinion pressures. Either decision would have been difficult.

b. In the former case, expected problems of negotiation would be compounded by non-cooperation, possibly active interference by the United States' principal ally, the GVN.

c. This might be handled if sufficient political support could be garnered among peace-seeking elements within South Vietnam and an eventual settlement might even be reached involving some acceptable form of coalition government -- possibly under international trusteeship.

d. In a sense, the US bargaining position at Rangoon might have been strengthened by refusal of the Government of Vietnam to participate in the conference. US negotiations could point to the demands of their recalcitrant ally in extracting concessions from the enemy.

e. In this situation the United States and the two principal enemy teams were not too far apart on: the cessation of the air attacks against the DRV; some kind of cease-fire; the concept of free elections; the idea of an international control commission; and even upon the ultimate withdrawal of United States forces.

f. Since these aspects of the situation appeared negotiable, the major obstacle to settlement would probably have stemmed from United States' insistence on an international peace-keeping force. This might not have been an unacceptable condition to the

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Communists since they actually believed they could win free elections in SVN and even a truly neutral force wouldn't impair their chances. Discussions might have foundered on other reefs such as continued DRV infiltration of SVN, or too high a level of Viet Cong terrorism.

g. Obviously the whole outcome of any negotiations which might have eventuated would have hinged upon the length of time involved and the degree of success attained by the United States in building popular support in South Vietnam. Too rapid a settlement might have seen the Communists in firm control in Saigon and the United States withdrawing.

If the United States had adroitly avoided the Rangoon discussions on the basis of GVN intransigence and successfully ridden out the storm of outraged opinion, it might have continued military pressures within South Vietnam. Blue could have continued at current strength levels or have raised these levels substantially -- imposing a naval blockade of the DRV, mining DRV waters, and attacking the only targets of consequence that remained in North Vietnam -- the industrial complex of Hanoi-Haiphong, the ports and airfields.

Whether success stemming from these actions would have made the GVN in the game any more tractable in going to a conference is questionable. It might have fanned the fires of nationalism and stimulated further South Vietnamese offensive action. There are indications from discussions among the Communist teams, however, that they might have covertly and unilaterally lowered the level of Viet Cong activity if bombing attacks in the North became "intolerable". There were a few indications that Red China might risk ground intervention -- perhaps by major movements into Laos and Burma (which avoided direct confrontation with the United States), but this was recognized as risky business, probably beyond the range of actions which the Soviets would support. Except for a 1st Move Chinese contingency plan for large scale intervention, there was little in any of the Communist team deliberations suggesting that major US escalation would result in more than threatening moves, ominous noises and a massive propaganda effort.

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The foregoing discussion suggests the need for further study of:

a. Problems which might be encountered during a period of cease-fire and protracted negotiations in which the US/RVN sought to strengthen and expand popular support for its positions.

b. Possible alternative plans for an international authority to supervise implementation of a settlement and of an international trusteeship to supervise establishment and at least initial functioning of legitimately constituted South Vietnamese Government.

c. Means of detecting an increase or decrease in levels of DRV infiltration and support entering South Vietnam, during a period of discussion or cease-fire with or without effective international supervision.

Two major points of discussion at the 5 August Review and Discussion of SIGMA II-65 centered on the game hypothesis that by September 1966 gradually escalated air attacks against the DRV had not led to concessions from the enemy, and that on the ground in South Vietnam expanded US/RVN forces had not enjoyed greater success in destroying large numbers of the Viet Cong.

One of the limitations of games of this type is the lack of time for Control to make detailed operational evaluations. It is also normal in these games to pose difficult and challenging problems for the Blue team in order to provoke thought and to focus on possible contingency situations. Probably there was a little bit of both elements in the austere situation confronting the Blue team at the end of SIGMA II-65. Nevertheless, there was considerable feeling among game participants that Viet Cong adoption of the strategy of avoiding major engagements with US forces would make it extremely difficult to find and fix enemy units. It was also felt that it would take several months for each US unit to become acclimatized and fully battle ready and that the principal period favorable to US ground-air strike operations in South Vietnam would be between the Southwest monsoons -- November 1965 through June 1966. Viet Cong experience in the jungles, guerrilla warfare, intelligence capabilities would pose serious problems, even for well equipped and highly mobile US regulars.

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With regard to the air strikes into North Vietnam, there was considerable feeling among all of the Communist teams that punishment being imposed could and would be absorbed by the Hanoi leadership. This thought was based on the fact that the country is basically a subsistence economy centering on the self-sustaining village. Isolation and disruption of the Hanoi-Haiphong-complex transport systems would pose serious urban and military problems but the DRV still had its ports and although electric power and petroleum were becoming critical, major industry had not been hit. Industrial activities constitute such a limited portion of the total economy that even this disruption seemed an acceptable price. Hanoi's hopes for victory were bolstered by the deteriorating political and social situation portrayed in South Vietnam.

The disparity of opinions among participants on these subjects in the game and in the senior review suggests the desirability of a follow-on or supplementary effort using study and/or gaming techniques to explore these subjects in greater detail than was possible during SIGMA II-65.

Control's portrayal of serious internal problems in South Vietnam leading to instability in the government and mounting pressure toward negotiations stemmed, at least in part, from the fact that the US team's deliberations were oriented toward military and political action and few specific innovations were aimed at resolving internal problems. This may have resulted from the format of control messages or from ambiguities in the information which Control provided to Blue, but there was considerable feeling among the participants that this reflects a high level planning emphasis in real life.

This Blue team's willingness to engage in negotiations and their intention of eventually accepting the idea of free elections hinged on making substantial social progress in South Vietnam during preliminary talks. Blue's ability to win popular support (which all teams agreed was leaning toward the enemy), hinged on making psychological, social and economic breakthroughs among people in the countryside as well as urban areas.

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It is worth noting that while every member of the Blue team including the AID and USIA representatives were generally knowledgeable regarding current and proposed military plans, there was a general dearth of knowledge regarding current and proposed informational, social and economic measures and resources (although the innovation dealing with a crash housing project for refugees modeled after the recent Hong Kong Program was suggested by a military member of Control).

Certainly the problem of gaining popular support while military operations are being conducted and more particularly during any future period of negotiations is vitally important and as worthy of high level inter-agency attention as political and military problems. This suggests the desirability of follow-on studies and discussions aimed at wider dissemination of information outside of the specialized agencies, of current and future psychological and economic programs in connection with the struggle in Southeast Asia.

It has been noted that if the United States had refused to attend the Rangoon discussions there was pressure building in South Vietnam which might have resulted in replacement of the Thi Government by one which desired an early peace. Such a government might have implemented the threat implicit in Tri Quang's "enigmatic" speech and demanded the United States to withdraw its forces forthwith.

While the idea of any government emerging in Saigon which would demand American withdrawal appears unlikely since it runs counter to the interests of the South Vietnamese military leadership, it appears equally unrealistic to discount such a contingency. There have been accusations by key military leaders in the past that one or another military individual or group leaned toward a negotiated settlement.

If a neutralist or left-leaning government were to emerge and arrive at a settlement with the National Liberation Front or even were to begin negotiations toward a settlement the US position could become untenable.

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While such a request would provide a powerful and somewhat face-saving basis for a US withdrawal, it does not appear likely to constitute a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict in the light of broader strategic considerations. Such a demand would be difficult to reject however, and to continue United States presence in South Vietnam might require a new rationale.

As was brought out during the game one response might be to deny the legitimacy of any government making such a request while seeking support from another faction.

Another would be simple rejection of the request and immediate action to show US determination to continue the effort in a different context than one of cooperation with the GOV.

A detailed analysis of the individuals, interest groups and related conditions in advance of such a contingency would appear to be highly useful particularly in the face of SIGMA II-65, Communist efforts to subvert and seduce several high level members of the present establishment and the exile group abroad.

It would appear profitable to develop plausible scenario situations depicting one or more of the possible settings for "inviting the United States out", and further analyzing the problem.

A number of follow-on actions and studies have already begun as the result of SIGMA II-65. A number of participants in the game and in the Review and Discussion have suggested that at least a fourth move and perhaps more be played in the not too distant future with the same teams. This would involve a minimum of administrative effort and only a few hours effort for each participant. A query regarding the desirability of another move will be included in a game questionnaire which is being prepared. Your cooperation is solicited in completing these questionnaires when they are received as fully and candidly as possible.

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Listed below are some of the questions which developed during SIGMA II-65 in the course of play.

1. To what degree can the United States meet current or expanded military commitments in other areas of the world if deployments to Southeast Asia reach the level indicated in SIGMA II?

2. How much latitude will the United States have in avoiding strong pressures toward international discussions if it appears that conditions are not conducive to an acceptable settlement?

3. What are US/RVN prospects for "winning" free elections in South Vietnam?

4. How can the United States build greater free world support for its policies in SEA?

5. What "signals" of US determination and long-range resolve would be convincing to the Viet Cong, DRV and PRC?

6. What "signals" emanating from the United States are interpreted by the enemy as signs of irresolution and lack of determination in SEA?

7. If the United States were to unilaterally discontinue the bombing of North Vietnam as the preface for negotiations, would it be politically feasible to reinstitute the bombing without a major and public enemy provokation?

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SIGMA II-65

VIDEO TAPE SUMMARY

The following presentation, **CLASSIFIED SECRET - NOT FOR FOREIGN DISSEMINATION**, is a summary and review of SIGMA II-65. Like other similar exercises, this one was conducted to obtain problem solving insights and for educational purposes. It was a chance to explore the inter action of opposing strategies and decisions using highly qualified US officials to think from the viewpoints of several contesting governments.

SIGMA II-65 was a five day simulation conducted at the Pentagon during the last week of July 1965. It was a manual or discussion type game conducted with five teams representing the governments of:

The United States and Republic of Vietnam

The field leadership of the Viet Cong or
National Liberation Front

The Governments of North Vietnam, Red China
and the Soviet Union

Participants for the game were provided from the White House Staff, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency, Agency for International Development, and the following elements of the Department of Defense:

International Security Affairs

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff

The Services

The Defense Intelligence Agency

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Each of the agencies designated an individual to serve on the Blue Team which had the dual task of representing the executive leadership of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. Players were instructed to think and decide in as objective a manner as possible.

In selecting members of opposition teams, emphasis was put upon individual knowledge and experience regarding the country concerned. All of the agencies were invited to nominate players on these teams but final selections were based upon individual credentials.

The Control Group included representation from most of the agencies but was also selected on the basis of individual qualifications. A few members were selected to determine the reactions of certain key countries -- so called "third countries" with major stakes in the Southeast Asian conflict. The Control Group also represented all other nations and influences in the world, nature, fate, the operating forces and resources of the competing powers. Teams had complete freedom in the choice of objectives, strategies and specific moves.

The game was played in three moves beginning with an intelligence report of the 26 July 1965 situation. The Video Support Group consisting of personnel from the National Military Command Systems Support Center and the Headquarters, US Air Force Television Center, completed this video tape summary of the game during the period 2-4 August for showing at the final review and critique of the game.

I would now like to introduce
Colonel George A. Lincoln,
Professor of Social Sciences, US Military Academy at
West Point, a gentleman who is well known, respected and
admired by the wide circle of American leaders who have
worked with him inside and outside of the military.

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Gentlemen:

Speaking without any vested interest in any gaming job or techniques, I take the opportunity to suggest you note the possible application of these gaming techniques to some of your problems. The techniques are comparatively economical of the precious time of busy staff people and of people like yourself. The techniques provide concise information and analysis. They provide realism. They preserve the product for ready future study.

I now have five points as a preface to the summary of what happened in Southeast Asia between the beginning of last week and a year from next Labor Day: First: We, in this game, started from the situation as we saw it, with appropriate briefings, in the real world a week ago last Monday. Second: The Director and his Control Team had no item of guidance or suasion from any authority. Third: The analysis and the actions of the teams meshed and conflicted in a reasonably plausible way. Hence, the Control Team chose to make its guidance and the situations presented before each move consistent with the teams actions in the previous move. We over-ruled nothing explicitly and have heard no serious complaint that our published situations ignored or over-ruled anything important. There have been a few gripes, showing that the morale is high. Fourth: Because of the problem, the material produced is heavily economic, psychological and political, all set in the background of a changing military situation. We had not the resources or the time to make a detailed test of production, budgetary, logistical, personnel, communications, and other military matters. Perhaps to test some of these would be worthwhile. But our control military guidance is based on professional experience and judgment. Next: The errors and the unwisdom in the development by control of the situation are already committed, they cannot be erased. For these errors and unwisdom, the Director takes responsibility. The fruitful areas for discussion today are, I believe, what we did accomplish. The Game Staff will now present those accomplishments.

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CONTROL PROJECTIONS

Good evening. Events in Southeast Asia picked up momentum today as a major shake-up in the government of South Vietnam and the resignation in Washington of a top ranking US official dramatized the deteriorating political situation in South Vietnam. It also underlined the fact that the expanded US ground forces in Southeast Asia have not as yet been able to find, fix or to destroy major Viet Cong Forces. Meanwhile, enemy interdiction of the RVN economy, strikes against vulnerable RVN units, sabotage, terrorism and subversion continue. They hit hardest among refugee, student and labor groups. They reinforce centrifugal forces between American and Vietnamese leaders, farmers and merchants, Catholics and Buddhists and the varied ethnic and religious groups comprising this war-weary nation.

The sudden accession of General Thi to power, his retention of command of his first corps in Northern Vietnam and a pointed refusal to come to Saigon underline dangerous differences between the "Saigon Generals" and Thi. The new premier is rumored to have strong backing from Tri Quang, the powerful Buddhist leader.

In South Vietnam major increases in US force levels have contributed to inflationary pressures. The needs of refugee hordes streaming in from Communist threatened areas have taxed capacity in the ports at a time when Saigon's main channel is blocked by a sunken freighter and food supplies are being interdicted.

170,000 US troops are deployed in South Vietnam guarding the mushrooming base complexes against major Viet Cong attacks which have not as yet come and probing forcefully into stronghold areas after the elusive enemy. Four US divisions including the 1st Cavalry (Air Mobile), have been in action since the end of the Southwest monsoon without achieving anything that can be construed as a "victory" in the accepted sense, however, it does appear that US RVN ground and supporting air actions have taken initiative away from the Viet Cong in certain areas.

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Air strikes against North Vietnam have been escalated very gradually without engaging targets in the Hanoi area other than the outer missile sites last summer. Since obtaining a Joint Congressional Resolution and initiating partial mobilization in August the President has faced mounting internal and overseas pressures to proceed slowly. These pressures have included extended Warsaw Pact exercises hampering access to West Berlin. Chinese artillery demonstrations against Quemoy and Matsu as well as ground forces concentration in South China, French threats to pull out of NATO and communist fomented demonstrations and riots in Japan and the Philippines.

The resignation today of Mr. X, a high official who has previously supported Administration policy has impacted squarely on US and world opinion. In a TV interview indicating impatience with steps taken to date, he called for immediate US negotiations with the Viet Cong and early US force withdrawal.

This has been the substance of the first scenario projection developed by the Control Team based on the messages submitted by five playing teams.

The Game Staff representatives will now report briefly on the thinking of their respective teams for the second move of the game at game time 31 December 1965.

VIET CONG TEAM

Our goals are complete political control in South Vietnam, reunification with North Vietnam through elections and removal of all foreign troops. To achieve these our immediate objective is to obtain recognition as the legitimate South Vietnamese government. Toward this end, we are inviting foreign journalists to tour areas where we have de facto control. We are avoiding major military confrontations except in cases where victory is virtually certain. We intend to exploit recent changes in Saigon and growing defeatism in Washington to subvert General Thi, offer portfolios in a

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popular front government to selected GVN figures, including General "Big" Minh, and promote a peace conference through the 17 nations as a show case for the National Liberation Movement. Militarily we will concentrate on disrupting the economy in Saigon controlled areas.

DRV TEAM

In Hanoi we continue to walk a political tight rope between Moscow and Peking while absorbing the inconvenience of limited US air attacks. Time is on our side. We will see a more favorable environment for victory approaching with the US Presidential elections of 1968. As US troop strength in South Vietnam increases, we infiltrate additional PAVN units through Laos, Cambodia and by sea, maintaining the same relative strength to the enemy. The accession of General Thi to power is an opportunity we shall exploit, encouraging him to remain in Hue, splitting the RVN leadership and hopefully establishing a new political state in Central Vietnam which might be detached from the war. We will shift our military, economic and psychological emphasis to the Delta and Saigon. In effect, we will allow Thi's position to strengthen while weaning him away from the Americans.

CPR TEAM

In Peking, we are satisfied with developments and wish to avoid provoking the US into attacks against China. We want to see as little Soviet support for Hanoi as possible while minimizing our own overt involvement. Toward that end we are playing down inadvertent air clashes with the US and our contributions of technicians and air defense personnel to the DRV. We have no intention of intervening in a large way except in the event that Hanoi's resistance collapses.

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Our military efforts will remain at the demonstration level against the off-shore islands while we maneuver near the Yalu. We will privately caution the DRV not to get too involved in overtures on negotiations and to continue to insist on withdrawal of all foreign troops prior to negotiations. We do not want UN involvement in SEA! We will make attractive trade offers to the Japanese and worry the Thais into pressing the US for increased military support. We feel that subversion of General Thi and central Vietnamese military and Buddhist leaders by offers of important positions in a coalition government has attractive possibilities.

USSR TEAM

The long-term goal of the Soviet Union is a "neutralized" South Vietnam within the Soviet sphere of influence. This calls for withdrawal of the US presence in a manner which does not precipitously introduce Chinese power. Although we wish to strengthen Soviet prestige within the Communist world, we are moving in a manner calculated to prevent a major Soviet-US confrontation.

The relative value of Vietnam is not very great in light of major domestic and foreign policy goals. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union would prefer not to see the US achieve a victory in the Vietnamese test case of "national liberation" by force.

The SAMS provided to deter US bombing indicate Soviet willingness to honor defense pledges but we are now using recent downings of US aircraft to persuade Hanoi that the time is becoming ripe to reconsider negotiation conditions.

If the US begins to interdict shipping to the DRV we will be prepared to withdraw Soviet shipping from those waters.

We have previously taken the following low risk initiatives:

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A Warsaw Pact meeting to consider US threats to peace, East German helicopter over-flights, access restrictions and inter-zonal travel curbs around Berlin, Warsaw Pact manuevers and a cooling of US-SU relations.

We are aware of significant signs of deterioration in the US situation politically--the US may now feel pushed toward dangerous escalation. Our primary efforts will be toward developing a situation under which the US may be forced to consider a negotiated settlement and troop withdrawal.

While boosting our defense budget we will encourage Hanoi to feel that the US is now likely to negotiate. We are stressing to Hanoi that political and economic disintegration in South Vietnam makes it increasingly difficult for the US to justify its struggle as the invited defender of Vietnamese sovereignty.

We point out that mutual reluctance of the US and USSR to escalate discussions or actions over SAM missile incidents has been a deterrent to strikes against Hanoi, but as the training of North Vietnamese crews is completed, the withdrawal of Soviet missile technicians may signal increased US air action.

We will inform Hanoi that eventual negotiating conditions may be less favorable than now.

We intend to woo de Gaulle with invitations to Moscow, thoughts of a European security conference and the role he might play as mediator in SVN.

US/RVN TEAM

The US Ambassador in SVN has conferred with General Thi and is confident Thi has been misrepresented. It has been decided to support him while planning for contingencies.

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Vice President Humphrey will visit Thailand, the Philippines, Formosa, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea and strong steps will be taken to reinforce support of each government. At this time, President de Gaulle is not considered to be as an important issue.

It is our feeling that world and domestic opinion is, or soon will go our way and that the financial and economic situation in South Vietnam is not too critical. Blockage of Saigon harbor is temporary and offset by recently completed port facilities.

Press reports on the degraded readiness of US Army units in Europe are considered to be unreal and as additional troops arrive in SVN we believe we will see an increase in effective US offensive actions.

Meanwhile, we are moving to set up a Joint and Combined Staff under an RVN general with a US Deputy.

CONTROL PROJECTION

Good evening. During the last eight months, the build-up of US and allied forces in South Vietnam have continually expanded although it has leveled somewhat short of the target established last summer. Operating under over-all Vietnamese field command but with wide latitude in engagements, which have most often been fought at platoon and company level, US forces have to date produced few dramatic military successes. One giant foray, however, into War Zone D in April did cause heavy VC losses, but for the most part the enemy has avoided stand and fight actions against the Americans.

Although energetically pursued and harassed, difficult weather and terrain conditions have left the Viet Cong some capability for conducting carefully rehearsed assaults against vulnerable RVN elements at times and places of his own choosing. Massive and continuous sabotage, terrorism

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and murder continue to disrupt urban as well as rural life. The Government of South Vietnam has been unable to protect its officials from murder, kidnapping and worse in the III and IV Corps areas, however, conditions have recently seemed somewhat improved in central Vietnam. For many months in fact, these improved conditions, in the central area, gave rise to speculation that General Thi, who has long operated from headquarters in Hue, was engaged in behind-the-scenes dealings with the enemy. A large number of stories about a Buddhist backed arrangement to create a Popular Front Government in Central Vietnam had received wide credence.

However, most of the thinking was scotched after Thi's triumphal entry into Saigon.

Looking at world and domestic opinion, it is apparent the honeymoon is over for the United States Administration's policies in Vietnam. Disorders mount daily due to economic and other internal pressures.

Enemy infiltration continues across Laos, Cambodia and by sea from the north and there is mounting Buddhist sentiment for an end to the war.

It now appears that the high official who bolted administration ranks last year has become a potential Presidential candidate and the focal point for vociferous efforts to end the war at this time. Student demonstrations and teach-ins are being conducted on both sides of the question and seven state governors have recently registered their desire to have National Guard units demobilized.

One thing does appear certain. That is the amount of momentum that is developed in Southeast Asia, Europe, the United States and certain other parts of the world for a peace conference. This resulted in a series of abortive efforts initiated along this line during the last year.

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Two days ago Premier Shastri of India proposed a meeting in Rangoon of representatives of the governments involved including the NLF. Ne Win quickly indicated no objections to the meeting and Secretary General U-Thant strongly supported it. The Shastri proposal was tied to the US President's recent offer for unconditional negotiations and to the Pham Vam Dong proposals of Spring 1965.

Yesterday, in Saigon the Buddhist Tri Quang made one of his vague speeches endorsing the Shastri proposal while going on to state that "Vietnam has been a battleground long enough, the Vietnamese should settle their own affairs and that President Johnson should now tell the Vietnamese people his plan for departure of US troops on the assumption the conference would be successful."

However, Premier Thi in Saigon immediately announced that Shastri's conference proposal was unacceptable in its present form.

VIET CONG TEAM

The NLF will participate in the Rangoon conference provided we are recognized as a principal and voting member. We have three minimum conditions to be met however if negotiations are to be concluded. These are:

Return to conditions specified in the Geneva Accords of 1954.

Withdrawal of all foreign Military Forces.

Free elections by 1 July 1967.

If the United States withdraws we can win any elements based on the growth of anti-Americanism among the population and other factors which we will reinforce by announcing autonomous Montagnard, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao states. We will stress the Popular Front rather than communist nature of our

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movement, soliciting support from Vietnamese patriots in exile. Our General Don will invite his brother "Big" Minh to reunify the divided families, while similar overtures are made to the Dalat generals and others with inclinations toward neutralism. We will work covertly to depose General Thi and other anti-communists.

We have been preparing since July for attacks against soft spots held by over-extended US and RVN forces. If a cease fire appears imminent we will quickly seize critical targets, or if our position at the conference table appears to require strengthening, we will also take such action. Meanwhile, we will continue lower key measures to disrupt the floundering RVN economy.

DRV TEAM

In Hanoi, we will not be pressured into a meeting, however, we are prepared to join in exploratory talks at Rangoon on the basis of Pham Vam Dong's four points provided that the NLF is seated "as representative of the people of South Vietnam."

We will initially demand that the four points constitute the agenda of the meeting and we will restate this condition daily. If American air attacks continue against the DRV we will demand their cessation on the basis that talks are otherwise meaningless.

If talks show signs of progress we will move toward the following positions:

Acceptance of a short-term cease-fire recognizing that if the situation deteriorates, violations can be staged with blame placed on the Imperialists.

Withdrawal of forces would not involve public withdrawal of PAVN units although we would be willing to undertake "not to employ DRV units in SVN."

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We would accept some form of international supervision.

Our position remains the adoption of a coalition government including the NLF, not a neutralist government formed by the Saigon clique without the NLF.

We will also accept international supervision of elections, but we will discourage talk of UN controlled elections. We will not discuss elections in North Vietnam.

We will continue to encourage Tri Quang's supporters in Central Vietnam, but we will encourage heavy Viet Cong attacks in III and IV Corps areas.

If US air attacks cease we will curtail VC activity while continuing harassment. If a cease-fire is reached we will urge the appearance of VC compliance and if the talks move toward settlement we will halt terror against civilians. (Without a cease fire, however, we would continue small scale harassment of the RVN.)

Prior to the Rangoon meeting, we will demand that American air attacks halt but we will not make it a pre-condition.

Privately we are urging the DRV and NLF to resist negotiations in the belief that our present course of action is successful, time on our side and victory assured.

CPR TEAM

Publicly we'll approve the idea of negotiations in principle, provided all foreign troops are withdrawn and that negotiations (not to take place until withdrawals are completed) should be limited to the participants, the NLF and GVN.

Prior to any talks we will insist the Phan Van Dong points be accepted as a basis for negotiations.

Our private position in Peking on a negotiated settlement in addition to an NLF dominated government in SVN includes the following points:

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Removal of all foreign military, commercial and private aircraft from South Vietnam.

Withdrawal of all foreign forces prior to settlement.

An end to all foreign aid.

Reunification of Vietnam as called for in the Geneva Accords of 1954.

We do not feel that the alleged military stalemate in South Vietnam is in fact a stalemate. If the VC are not being defeated they are actually winning!

Even though there seems to be a good chance now of taking over SVN through negotiations and free elections, we are becoming stronger and the US more isolated, therefore, we are not in a hurry.

We will continue to sponsor insurgent movement adjacent to Vietnam and hope to gain the cooperation of former Thai Prime Minister Pridi in a Thailand liberation struggle.

We are still concerned that the US might feel forced to take some action to threaten the viability and stability of the DRV, such as a blockade, mining or strikes against industry. We would have difficulty determining a satisfactory response to such actions.

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USSR TEAM

In public announcements the USSR will favorably consider an invitation to participate in discussions at Rangoon. Privately, we would like to see the talks limited to principals thereby minimizing Chinese influence. However to insure consideration of Soviet interests where they are contrary to Chinese interests, we will participate.

Publicly we will press for the DRV's four Pham Vam Dong points but if the talks are threatened by US intransigence we will indicate willingness to compromise. We want a neutralized coalition government in SVN and privately we would settle for one third of the key posts under control of the NLF.

Publicly we'll call for a cease fire and foreign troop withdrawal prior to formation of the neutralized government. Privately we'll accept a cease fire later timed, to coincide with formation of the neutralized coalition government. We will demand withdrawal of all foreign combat forces at that time and expeditious withdrawal of other forces immediately thereafter.

Publicly we will say nothing regarding non-military aid but privately we will take no position against future non-military aid missions from outside powers.

Publicly we will not voluntarily discuss the issue of Vietnamese reunification. If pressed we will refer to Pham Vam Dong's fourth point stressing the necessity of Vietnamese solving this problem without outside interference.

US/RVN TEAM

In Washington, a decision has been made to participate in the Rangoon conference with or without the Thi government of SVN although everything practicable will be done to have Saigon represented. If necessary, preliminary meetings to discuss invitations and detailed arrangements will be used to delay proceedings while Thi or his successors are brought around.

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Thi's position can be simply stated. He feels that for the first time the RVN/US forces are winning and this is not the time to negotiate. Furthermore he is unwilling to sit down with the Viet Cong even though assured that the NLF would not be treated as a government.

He claims strong Buddhist as well as Catholic support but Tri Quang's recent statements would tend to discount the former. Thi claims backing by the RVN generals, but it is not believed that there is a solid front there.

The United States is committed to negotiations. Therefore it will oppose a cease-fire prior to the conference and require no pre-conditions for attending. Meanwhile the US will apply pressures upon General Thi. This will be done in a manner however, which does not alienate the bloc of US opinion which wants the US to approach the conference table from a position of greater strength. Care will be taken not to solidify Thi's base of support.

The day preceding the conference the US will announce, as a symbol of good faith, initiation of a pause in the bombings in the North. We will reserve the right to resume the bombings in the event infiltration from the North continues or VC operations in the South are escalated.

The US contemplates that negotiations would probably be long and drawn out--perhaps two years.

A cessation of hostilities would permit the US/GVN to work toward improvements in the political-economic and psychological fields.

The US will recommend the following interested parties attend the Rangoon meeting:

Governments interested on the International Control Commission (ICC) are: India, Poland and Canada; the current belligerents: The US, GVN, DRV and VC the UK and USSR as co-chairman under the Geneva agreements, also the United Nations.

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At the opening session, the UK and India would welcome suspension of US air attacks against the DRV and call on Hanoi to cease infiltration and support to the VC.

They will propose that international peace-keeping units be placed appropriately to monitor traffic and provide a buffer.

The US will accept the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

It favors an international commission with a measure of authority and sufficient military force to carry out decisions of the Rangoon conference and to supervise a cease-fire. The force may initially include US troops.

The US favors reunification of Viet Nam as a long-range objective and it favors elections in South Viet Nam provided they are supervised by an international control commission and are in fact free. The US will insist on nationwide free elections at some point after the GVN has a popularly elected government.

As a last resort, the US has no objection to establishing an international trusteeship as a result of the conference.

USOM would remain along with similar activities as long as desired by the popularly elected government of Vietnam.

Military operations prior to the conference will include bombing in the North at current levels until the day before the conference and stepped up operations in South Vietnam. During the conference, ground military pressures in South Vietnam will be continued but if real progress is made, activity will be dropped to minimum security levels which permit strengthening the GVN and ensuring stability in the countryside.

If a cease-fire is accepted, US withdrawal will be keyed to VC disarmament and DRV repatriation to North Vietnam. Any withdrawal will be contingent on the control commission's ability to supervise a cease-fire.

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In addition to planning for Rangoon, US contingency planners have studied possible demands from an RVN government that the US withdraw from South Vietnam. This eventuality might conceivably arise following a successful coup or shift which brought left-leaning elements to power. It is a remote but possible contingency if a highly nationalistic leader like Thi were to diverge entirely from US policies and it could arise under various conditions developing in the course of actual discussions or negotiations.

The planners feel that the US must not leave South Vietnam if asked to leave prematurely, they should remain until there is a permanent solution in sight.

Such a situation could also lead toward the idea of inter-national trusteeship which was mentioned previously.

SUMMARY

Looking at the pre-discussion positions, from a control viewpoint, only one team, the Red Chinese, seemed seriously opposed to negotiations and Peking kept to this position only in private. They felt the idea was premature and that if negotiations were conducted, attendance should be limited to the principals -- the VC and RVN.

The Soviets had no desire to actually participate in the negotiations unless the Chinese did and then only to protect their own Soviet interests, but they were anxious to see talks begin. They applied similar suasion to the DRV and the US to encourage decisions making omnibus noises and pointing out dangers to all concerned.

The DRV did not address the question of allowing the NLF to handle negotiations by itself. Certainly the NLF wanted to be the principal negotiator. It did not seem that the US would be willing to talk without Hanoi however, particularly since it was in difficult straits with its own recalcitrant ally - the GVN!

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Everyone except the Red Chinese appeared willing to reduce formal military pressures and to allow an international authority to supervise "free elections." The Communist side seemed confident of its ability to win free elections in September 1966 but the US team believed that it could make sufficient political and social progress during a period of reduced hostilities to head off a communist election victory. The US had every intention of keeping pressure on with ground action in SVN and to quickly reinstitute RVN air attacks if conditions warranted.

The Americans hoped that the DRV would cut down infiltration into SVN as a quid pro quo for elimination of air attacks.

The VC, DRV, USSR and the US accepted the idea of foreign troop withdrawals and of eventual reunification.

The Americans expected to see an international peace keeping force established however to assure South Vietnamese stability, but the Communist countries really did not address this possibility in their deliberations. It raises a question of what countries they might want to see in such a force - the Russians perhaps!

The US position hinged on meaningful guarantees before it pulled out its forces. It intended to continue its non-military presence after a withdrawal through USOM and simialr activities.

The US Team believed that they were winning and they tended to downplay difficulties that Control and the enemy teams put in their path. It is hard to say whether this reflects real life attitudes, inherent Blue Team optimism or simply that the scenario projections were ambiguous. All the teams thought they were winning, except perhaps the Russians, they appeared very concerned during the second move.

As the game ended, the Communists thought they were observing a weakening political situation in both South Vietnam and in the United States.

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To the US it appeared as though the military initiative was just beginning to shift over to the US and to the RVN.

There were hazy indications apparent to Blue that the US might soon be asked to leave South Vietnam by its SVN Allies.

Control had created a situation, at the end of the game, where there was powerful pressure from many sides gaining momentum toward a conference situation.

Perhaps this was as good a point to stop as any. Several participants have expressed a desire, however, to continue this same game at least one more move within the next few weeks.

This summary has been held to minimum time by deleting much detailed material. A complete video summary of the team and control messages runs something under two hours. A final game report, in writing, which includes a transcript of this meeting, a summary and an analysis of the game will be published in the near future.

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SIGMA II-65

SENIOR DISCUSSION (U)

(SNF) A group of senior governmental officials met with all participants involved in play of the game at 1600 hours, 5 August 1965 to review the Politico-Military Game, SIGMA II-65. Since senior officials did not participate in the actual play, a video tape brief (the text of which is contained at TAB E), was shown to acquaint those present with a brief of the highlights of the game. The Game Director provided a series of "Areas for Examination Indicated by Game Results". These are outlined below. A verbatim record of the discussion follows the listed areas for examination. No attribution is made to specific discussion participants.

Senior officials are identified by the governmental department or agency they are from, while game participants are identified by the team to which they were assigned.

AREAS FOR EXAMINATION - 5 AUGUST 1965

1. The various reactions to the negotiating situation.
2. Friction on differences of policy and operations between US and GVN -- possibly extending to suggestion that US presence be reduced:
 - a. In a prospective negotiating situation.
 - b. In planning and command of operations.
3. Does the situation as depicted on Labor Day 1966 constitute a likely and acceptable basis for initiation of negotiations (discussions)? If not, what US actions would have constituted effective preparation and pressure.

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4. All parties represented in the game displayed a high level of military confidence throughout. The US/RVN group considered the time schedule of the opposition was for victory in the short-run whereas the opposition considered time on their side and were willing to decrease military activity in the short-run in the face of US build-up.

5. The actual difference on impact between a large, and a larger, number of US troops in South Vietnam remained unclear.

6. The VC, DRV and Chinese seemed to place more emphasis and credence on their reading of US and world opinion than on US official statements and actions. Is there a serious misreading of US sustained intent and resolution? If so, what can be done to change the situation.

7. The opposition teams placed heavy emphasis on specific psychological, social and economic measures. The US/RVN gave serious attention to these areas in principle but not in detailed programs to the extent which the opposition did.

**** VIDEO PRESENTATION ****

Gentlemen, we are aware that there are people here who have to be at a meeting at another place at 5:45, so we propose to recess this meeting at 5:20, if that provides appropriate running time. If those who don't have to be at the other meeting will stay out of the aisles so the people who have to go can get to the door, we would appreciate it. The game staff will remain here and will be at the disposal of those who wish to remain. Before giving the meeting to those of you here, I want to expand the video summary by one point. We did one thing that didn't come through on the video summary, and I've already been questioned on it. The game control did take out North Vietnam's oil and power after New Years, perhaps because the planning team was working through New Years.

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The game staff has prepared a paper which I think all of you have. It lists seven areas for examination which we thought were particularly interesting, and there are other areas too. Here we turn the meeting over to you gentlemen and ask where you want to start.

Can I ask a question? As I see it, the game consistently was assuming a military stalemate, that is the Viet Cong were permitted a decisive victory. Our military moves in South Vietnam were indecisive. Whatever bombing you assumed in the North did not produce a decision, and it really consists in saying that Control so defined the political situation inside South Vietnam as to give both sides the hope of a political victory. This particular game really hinged on that ambiguity.

I don't think it is correct to say the game assumed a political stalemate. Starting from reality, it was the judgement of the people concerned that by New Years the initiative was turning to the US and RVN forces and continued to turn that way, but not at a rapid rate of speed.

What I'm trying to clear up is simply this -- you get a military improvement, you assumed objectively some political deterioration at the same time you get a military improvement.

Certainly, political instability.

Right -- and you assumed that political instability is judged from both sides to be compatible with an outcome which was satisfactory to them. I'm just trying to clarify the gut nature of the game. Is that right?

I think what you're hitting at -- is what we put down here as part of the sixth question. The opposition seemed to place more emphasis and credence on their reading of US and world opinion than on US official statements and questions. As to the sustained intent and resolution of the United States -- that's happening -- and I think what you're also hitting at is that the opposition teams placed a

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heavy emphasis on their hope of psychological, social and economic measures in South Vietnam, with secondary emphasis on importance of the military.

Putting it more bluntly, just to get the point loose -- as I got the final statement, each side thought it could win a free election in South Vietnam.

Yes.

And that's the basic ambiguity which each team.....

Each side thought they could win a free election in Vietnam and also throughout this period, each group thought that they were winning. The situation was improving for them. Now this is, I understand, quite common in games of this sort, but I don't think we want to talk about games, rather about the reality.

As I read the game then, leaving aside this normal game feature which is that people on each side think they are winning, it was the kind of demonstration that -- how you would make out in a free election may turn out to be one way of either winning or losing the war.

That is correct.

And since you've framed the situation to demonstrate it emerged as one which demonstrates that as one

Was the US/RVN team really satisfied? To put the question another way, would they have played it differently?

~~SECRET NOFORN~~ You mean by that, was the US/RVN team satisfied as to the military success?

~~SECRET NOFORN~~ As to whether they made good decisions over that year and a half time.

Let me turn and ask a member of the US/RVN team for a comment. The US/RVN team spent some time on this.

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US/RVN TEAM: Well, personally I think we played it all right. One comment on the questions and your answers -- I myself was not confident that we could win an early election, but felt that there would be time during the negotiations or before the cease-fire was really put into effect for us to do the things that were necessary to be able to win. This is, I think, an important qualification. You recall that the Communist side contemplated rather early elections.

US/RVN TEAM: The difference between the 2nd and 3rd moves struck me, in terms of terrorism and the effect on the stability of the GVN, as a little troublesome and, I felt, somewhat more dangerous for us than I would have expected in terms of where we were going after the 2nd move. On the other hand, if you projected the situation that existed in real life after we began to increase our forces and the fairly realistic appraisal we have of the immediate effect of introducing our forces -- where we certainly didn't expect anything really dramatic to happen right away -- and we're ready in a sense to discount a lot of the stuff that Control had ground in to it. I think we felt that as bad as the situation was on December 31st, we had survived not only one monsoon season, but two, and that the VC and DRV must have then been pretty much reconciled to the fact that they had lost any chance of winning.

But they didn't think so.

But they didn't think so. This also is our question, does the situation as depicted constitute a likely and acceptable basis for initiation of negotiations or discussions, what ever word you wish to use. And we ask if not, what US actions would have constituted effective preparation and pressure? Now certainly one of the occurrences would have been a more favorable development from the 1st of January to the 1st of September than was ground into the scenario, but as to the question, how much more favorable, and what additional actions are possible? We do not have an answer.

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██████████ If you accept for a moment that the situation is as you described it, as it was described in September 1966, could we be a little clearer on what the development of the military situation is at that moment and as these negotiations begin? I gather there is a stand-down in the bombing of the North. The duration of that stand-down was not clear. I gather there is supposed to be something like a cessation of infiltration and support into South Vietnam. It wasn't clear how that is to be verified and I may have missed the coupling between these two. In case it is not verified or is not carried out, what then happens on the bombing in the North? I would just like to get the military picture a little clearer.

Well, first may I say that I heard one of the "Presidential Advisors" say that he agreed with General Thi, but he was apparently disciplined by his colleagues before the paper came in.

He didn't resign. (Laughter)

And another wrote a long analysis on the basis that there should be no cessation of bombing except in connection with an effective cease-fire throughout.

That's really my question!

This was well argued, but it was not to the policy position -- except he didn't resign either. He argued his case well. I have in front of me an extended brief on the military situation at that time and I'll just read a few points: The military build-up had fallen short of the 250,000 projected last Summer. The operations conducted were generally small unit operations. Coordinated Viet Cong attacks have very definitely decreased. The RVN units are doing well. VC initiatives shifting to Delta. Infiltration from Cambodia has increased with enemy strength in South Vietnam now estimated at over 100,000 (regulars). Terrorism increased. Air escalation continues at controlled pace. Power plants and petroleum facilities gone. South Korean division arrived in early Spring. Then details on some of these proposals prior to the Rangoon Conference, bombing of North Vietnam ceased the day prior

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to the conference; although military activity in South Vietnam increases, however. And during the conference, sufficient pressure, what ever we mean by that, in South Vietnam to make the conference meaningful.

Do I understand you to say that you have taken out the POL and industrial installations?

The POL and power.

What about the railroads to China?

The railroad to China went out before New Years.

There was little mention of the effect this had on North Vietnam. And then you have the Chinese thing that North Vietnam should not be a party to the negotiations; this seems to be a little unrealistic, if they had taken that kind of punishment.

Correction. I didn't say it but the North Vietnamese or the Chinese said it.

What was the scale of the war at this point? What were the rates of loss on various participants?

Nothing specific enough really to be indicative -- a recognition of rising casualty rates in US forces. But the impression that I personally got was that the casualty rates were not severe, in that the VC had deliberately adopted the military policy of avoiding contact with US forces.

So Mr. X was campaigning now not on the basis of losses but on the basis of frustration.

Primarily on the basis of frustration.

I think that this was one of the most fascinating aspects of this war game. That is the rationale offered by Mr. X. I mean is he merely a reformed drunkard (Laughter) or is he struck with religion or what -- what is the motivation of this gentleman?

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I'm equally puzzled with this. If I had been having anybody resign in this war game, he would have taken the opposite course, if he was going to run.

Well, we who were looking at history forward were a little surprised at the interest that the resignation of Mr. X caused.

Well, he could have been very far down the line and been dandy for propaganda purposes. That's clear. But if he was actually trying to run in the United States, all fooling aside, I doubt if this is the side he would have taken.

US/RVN TEAM: I would like to point out that this team paid no attention to Mr. X. That is, they didn't think it was important. They decided to ride it out and really discount it as a detail.

The US Government in this case had a spokesman say in a few more words that he was just nuts. We had brushed it off that way.

Of course, we would say that no matter what he said. (Laughter)

One clarification, the Communist -- their first goal was to fragment politics and to get a good chunk of a popular front government in Saigon. Was their fall-back at the conference to run the National Liberation Front in free elections to see if they can win? What exactly was their political position? Was it two different ones?

This is a Viet Cong position you're asking about and I must turn to a Viet Cong man to find out, since this didn't come out.

VC TEAM: As a VC we probably didn't count on gaining a great number of concessions at the conference. Our desires were simply to have the conference and build ourselves a very dignified position as a government or try to enhance our position. We planned to ask for the moon, and if we got anything, so much the

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better but we really didn't entertain any serious hopes of gaining great concessions through the conference. It was more to play it for the bleachers.

Then how did they expect to get anywhere if they had a cease-fire going on at the same time with the government in effective exercise of governmental functions throughout the country? The American team is saying that they are taking advantage of the stand-down in order, in effect, to have some pacification free. While he's getting himself something from the bleachers.

Well now, these people were not anxious for a cease-fire and they also had a whole Pandora's box of things they were going to do which didn't get on this screen. At the time of the talk of negotiations -- would you comment on that.

VC TEAM: Well briefly -- if there were a cease-fire, we felt that we could militarily only let this ride for a certain period of time. During this time, terrorism, subversion and other splinter-group actions over which we have "absolutely no control over" would continue. Any pressing into the countryside by RVN and US units, we felt, would cause a response to occur and we weren't really bound by a cease-fire. We didn't ask for it. We wouldn't tolerate it for too lengthy a period. A psychological campaign would be conducted during this time against the RVN forces. If we have an off-again-on-again type of cease-fire where there's suddenly a relaxing of activity in the countryside, perhaps this would tend to demoralize the RVN forces just a little bit. So we weren't too serious about a cease-fire, from the Viet Cong standpoint.

From the standpoint of operations, I was struck by one of the plans which was to be prepared so that in the days around the cease-fire, or around the developing of a negotiation, would grab certain chunks of landscape and at long last run up their flag and say, "This is our capital!"

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Getting back to something that State said at the beginning, isn't it true then that but for this strange combination that every one seemed to think that they were winning -- all you had a year from September is a stalemate. You had a war going on pretty much as you have right now and not much changed.

I will again give you a personal judgment which was the initiative turning increasingly to the US/RVN side.

I didn't get that from the review. I got it from your statement afterwards, but the report doesn't indicate it.

Was the US/RVN team under any inhibitions or restraints as to what it could do in terms of military actions, or could they have done anything they wanted to?

Not as far as the Director was concerned.

Then why didn't they mount a sharply escalated ground and air operation in RVN at the same time have a big jump in air and naval operations against the DRV? Apparently if that had been done, then one side would have known that it wasn't fixing to win. That wasn't done!

Well, first there was extended discussion on the part of the people in the business of Control -- who I point out to you were the people who took out the power and electricity -- as to whether we were also going to take out the industry and engage in a blockade. We left that open to our playing teams. They did not choose to do it.

Well, they're not very sharp militarists, I would say. I'd like to read an item from a message that was sent 19 March 1964 by _____. He says, "Now we face the problem of how to apply our power to North Vietnam and we seem also to be up against a blank wall. Yet we seem to be quite sure of two things: a. One single saturation raid on North Vietnam could destroy the fruits of eight years fighting against the French and of ten years back-breaking labor since 1954, and b. While there would be a sort

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of Chicom reaction, the above raid would not repeat not bring on nuclear war or a real world war. If North Vietnam thought that the US had the will to use just what we have out here in Southeast Asia, the 7th Fleet, US Air Force units and so forth," and that was before the Marines and the Army were in there in any strength, "they would see that they could not afford a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam. The price would be too high". Apparently that particular part of it was not played by the US/RVN team, even though they had the ability to play it.

US/RVN TEAM: We started, I think the very first hour of this game, we pointed out that one of the problems we were confronted with both in fighting the war and in our own public support, was the problem of a war that would result in a political rather than a military solution. We discussed the difficulties of moves we would have to make and the public reaction both in this country and abroad, which in effect would result in a situation, would there still be a Hanoi, still be a Viet Cong after this whole thing was over? This, in a sense, inhibited us from undertaking the kind of saturation attack which would be designed and which the Hanoi regime and perhaps the Soviet Union and Peking as well, would think was designed to destroy Peking and Hanoi, rather than reach the kind of solution we thought the US policy was in fact focused on.

What happened however, was that as we projected the world forward, we came to Labor Day 1966, and we do not, according to this game, establish a satisfactory atmosphere for initiation of negotiations. In effect, only the US wanted to negotiate! The Communists had not been subjected to enough pressure, if our people who were in the business of being Communists were correctly representing their line of thought.

Turning the General's questions around, how about your Communists and how did they feel about the prospect of saturation raids? Did they think there was any risk and if they thought there was any greater risk what would they have done? Can they tell us something about that?

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[REDACTED] First, our Chinese Communists throughout were sensitive about the US getting frustrated and going berserk. As to the North Vietnamese Communists, I had better call on a North Vietnamese Communist to talk.

DRV TEAM: We felt that the situation was such that it didn't impose too great a restriction on us at this time, from the content of the scenario and that we could live with what took place at that time. Thus, we felt that there was no serious impact in the general situation.

Without lights and without oil!

How long, indefinitely?

DRV TEAM: Oh no! If it had gotten more severe it would have changed the entire situation, but at that time we felt that time was on our side and we didn't feel that the US would project escalation to a point; we felt that they were still limited by political considerations.

Let me get this straight. Were the lights out and all the oil storage taken out?

The lights were out and the oil storage was taken out. We did that. May I ask for a comment on the Chinese approach?

PRC TEAM: Throughout, we felt that we were winning. We had the ability to take a long term view of it. We didn't think the US was good on a long haul, with the tremendous expenditure of US effort into the country which was not producing decisive results, that sooner or later the US would get in a position where it was forced to try to hunt for a way out and the scenario seemed to follow that.

[REDACTED] You didn't know what to do about taking out Hanoi?

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PRC TEAM: We didn't know what to do amongst ourselves, to come up with a really good answer if Hanoi was threatened or industrial targets were hit. We worried about this early and then as it went along it developed that it didn't look as though the United States was going to take such action.

Returning to my question, I'm not sure I got a very good answer to it. Maybe it wasn't a very good question. I'd like to try it again. It is not clear to me why the US/DRV team would discontinue its bombing unless, a. They thought they were winning and could afford to do that, or b. There was something compensatory on the other side. I can't find either a or b in any of this discussion and I wonder if perhaps the US/DRV team could comment. Perhaps they could answer this question. What did they have on their mind to do in case it developed a? We were not winning, and b. There was nothing compensatory that the other side did, not even the business of cutting off the infiltration and the support.

US/DRV TEAM: I think there's one point of fact that has not come through too clearly. The conference is not open yet. It may not open for weeks, maybe even months. During this period we are actually escalating in the South and continuing bombing against the North. We have not made the announcement of the pause in bombing, we have just made a decision to do so the day before the conference opens.

Have you addressed the question what you are going to do if you get this far and if it turns out we were not winning and they do not stop their infiltration -- in other words, have you addressed the next step?

US/RVN TEAM: Yes, the announcement would be that we paused and will resume if they continue to infiltrate or if they escalate their operations themselves. We reserve to ourselves the decision of whether or not to resume.

And you thought that simply stopping the infiltration, you didn't demand that they stop the insurgency in the South -- or stop their attacks in the South?

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US/RVN TEAM: Not stop -- not step it up!
We felt we were selling a dead horse, that if we went into the conference we would be forced to stop the bombing anyway.

Who would force you?

US/RVN TEAM: That world opinion -- US opinion. We wouldn't be able to break off the conference because of the refusal to stop bombing.

_____ This immediately raises the questions, a. What are you striking in the North after 18 months and, b. What are the soldiers doing in the South?

US/RVN TEAM: They're getting frustrated. They have been there almost a year and they are not having any results.

Are you committing them to actions at all?

US/RVN TEAM: Yes, very heavily, platoon and companies. The fact is they are winning the war, and we begin to see signs of that.

_____ I think you have put your finger on the nub of the negotiating problem, if the situation develops from 1 January to 1 September better than the scenario, why there would certainly be a better negotiating situation than we are now discussing which doesn't seem to be a very happy negotiating situation.

I don't see why North Vietnam has agreed to this conference if they don't know that you're going to stop bombing and they have all their lights and oil taken out. Why are they willing to come, without that pre-condition?

_____ Well, as I recall, North Vietnam didn't really make that pre-condition.

CONTROL: North Vietnam actually did not intend to consider this as a negotiating session, they were simply going there to visit and talk and they were going to make it very plain that this was not a negotiating situation.

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 They used the word discussion.

Wasn't the question of escalation discussed in one of the moves where if Hanoi got taken out and the actions that were going against them that Ho Chi Minh says, "Well, we're just going to unilaterally quit and go underground again! No conference, no nothing! There's the void, now you fellows, what are you going to do about it?"

Ho Chi Minh and his people said that if the pressure got too tough, not defining what they meant by "too tough", that they would be willing to back off for awhile.

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US/RVN TEAM: Now for the question that a General asked previously. I don't think he got an answer and I would again like to see a run-down of the actual players on the Chinese side, on the DRV side and Viet Cong side if we actually put the kind of pressure that the General indicated that he was going to place on. The reason I ask is that I have been overhearing your conversations from the Red side and it is quite revealing to me and I sure would like to get a quick run-down with a specific question that if we put heavy air pressure, mine Haiphong and attack Hanoi and Haiphong, what would be the reaction of the Chicoms, the DRV and the Viet Cong?

PRC TEAM: We would intervene. We would intervene in Laos. We wouldn't go all the way to the tide-water but we would move into Phong Saly and we would look at the Viet Cong and see whether they were still standing or not. Then we would have to decide what we wanted to do. As for the Viet Cong, if the Viet Cong continues to fight, and didn't just throw in the towel, then we would be greatly encouraged to move on into Burma and Laos, staying away from the Thai border, maybe by 20 or 30 kilometers, but we would definitely try to draw more US forces into Laos. The philosophy being to get a massive US commitment into a stalemated position in the hills and jungles of Laos and Vietnam, all the way across there.

This is the Communist China view. What about North Vietnam?

DRV TEAM: We wouldn't be in much of a position to do anything under this situation.

DRV TEAM: There was no consensus that you would go to the table because of extreme bombing to the point of taking out industry, and the question even came up that if all the industry that went in was taken out, why would we quit now when we've lost all this stuff? Let's fight this thing to the end.

DRV TEAM: I'll make the comment on what the DRV would do. I think if their power and lights were gone, not a damn thing because there's an agricultural economy there. There's a group of nucleated agricultural villages and the industry and the power in North Vietnam just means not a whit to this country's ability to carry on a war like they're doing right now.

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SOVIET TEAM: The way we looked at the world of this game, that was certainly very true. I suspect it's probably the way the Soviets look at the real world too.

US/RVN TEAM: I'd like to add a little more on the US/RVN Team's reasoning. You may recall in our first move, we set forth as our strategy an effort to convince the communist side that they could not win in the South. That after we achieved this, we felt that escalation in the air attacks against the North would pay off. So we contemplated escalation and in fact when you took out the power and the oil facilities, we felt that you were acting under the strategy that we had laid down. We would, I believe, though you can't say what might have been, I believe that we would have escalated more steeply in the third move if we hadn't been thrown into the context of dealing with the Shastri proposal. This being so, we felt that steep escalation just didn't fit that situation. I wish I could have brought this out while General ----- was still here, he might feel a little better about the US/RVN Team. (Laughter)

We might as well recognize the fact--- I want to put myself on record for a half minute, as appreciating the thought of all the teams, being sympathetic to the US/RVN Team because we certainly were pointing at the US/RVN Team --- testing out certain ideas or situations which might arise and we didn't give you too much time to think about any one situation since we threw you four or five tough ones. The negotiating one was a particularly a tough one.

It appears to me that this trend in the play may have done a really greater service than appears perhaps or was even discussed, because it looked to me that if this road was followed, as it was followed by the US/RVN Team, that we have a scrry future to look forward to. It may take something else of what we are either doing or propose to do or indicate it was done in the US/RVN effort. I haven't heard it spoken to but I hope it came through as clear to others as it seemed to me.

The comment made to me by one of the gentlemen who has now departed to a much higher level

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meeting, was that the one thing that came through to him from this game was that every negotiating situation was not necessarily a good one.

I think it's axiomatic that one wants to approach a conference table under the most favorable circumstances possible. As I interpret this scenario, we are going to this conference table under the most disadvantageous circumstances that we could. This leads up to a question on my part. As the scenario developed and I gather as factual within the framework of the scenario, the initiative in South Vietnam was just beginning to come over to the US/RVN side. My question is, why do we cease and desist and agree to go to a conference table when we for the first time apparently, are just about to bear the fruit of all our efforts there? So that we then well may have been able to convince the DRV, particularly---and the Chicoms perhaps---that the situation in South Vietnam was rapidly deteriorating insofar as their stakes were concerned. And I think this is also generally agreed that the way the situation is going in South Vietnam is going to be more influential than the reaction attitudes insofar as conferences are concerned on the DRV and the Chicoms.

US/RVN TEAM: We were boxed a bit by Control, if I may say so. We were confronted with the alleged fact that the President had declared he was for "unconditional negotiations." It seemed to us to be a further softening of our position. We also were confronted with this Shastri proposal. These were not our ideas of course, but we just had to play them. One qualification on what you said about the situation, the initiative had started to shift in January of 1966, as Control laid it out. So we felt that things were going our way, militarily in the South.

Who proposed the free elections in South Vietnam? Or did I misunderstand that?

US/RVN TEAM: This was in our negotiating position which was still private.

Negotiating position with whom? South Vietnam or North Vietnam?

US/RVN TEAM: The Viet Cong.

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██████████ Were you going to bring them into the elections?

DRV TEAM: Well, this was one of our conditions for going to the discussions, that free elections would be held within a certain time limit, which I think was June of 1967 or July 1967.

You didn't make it a condition for going to the discussions. It was one of your objectives? It was a condition for completion of negotiations and I should here take responsibility for this semantic slip which one individual said might have been a mistake in translation, because when writing rather fast, late in the afternoon, I wrote the word "negotiations," which probably should have been "discussions." This however did develop some interesting results in considerations of the teams and I came to the conclusion that "unconditional negotiations," an agreement by the US to undertake "unconditional negotiations," whatever that means, put us no further forward than sticking on "unconditional discussions!" Again whatever "unconditional discussions" mean.

To carry a previous question just a step further, did I understand that the US/RVN Team thought it was a good idea to have the elections early?

US/RVN TEAM: We wanted them late, and anticipated this.

I guess I missed the late part of it, I wasn't sure I could see how they wanted it early.

I guess I missed a point too. To whom are we announcing that we are dissatisfied with the government of Vietnam -- to the world.....?

US/RVN TEAM: Oh no, this is a private position.

US/RVN TEAM: We are in trouble because of having finally gotten to this negotiating objective that we've been talking about or this discussions objective that we've been talking about with unconditional discussions. The head of the Vietnam government says "We won't go."

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██████████ We are just trying to tidy up the house, is that the idea?

██████████ Yes, so this problem which we threw to our President's advisors -- they decided that we had to go even though the Vietnamese Government would not go and secondly, they decided to use various kinds of suasion to get the Vietnamese Government to change their mind. Now, the head of the Vietnamese Government said that going to the conference was unacceptable under the conditions proposed. But no one, I believe, went beyond that to define what conditions would be acceptable to the then head of the South Vietnamese Government, a point worthy of exploration perhaps in the studies you people have to make.

However, without the support of the US Government, how could it be conceived that any concessions have been made to the GVN to get them to participate. Which raised the question in my mind because I think that this is a very intriguing aspect of the scenario, how can we have any meaningful conference on the problems in South Vietnam without the full participation of the GVN?

US/RVN TEAM: We are faced with the counter problem that the President had openly said we would negotiate any place, any time, and playing both these, the only thing we could think of doing was to come up with something that might help us delay and we came up with such things as exploratory meetings and these types of things.

The US/RVN Team were bound by the President's policy which perhaps implicitly assumed that any place any time the South Vietnamese Government would go too -- they didn't!

US/RVN TEAM: In a sense there was a constraint, it can't be helped in any game, the Control puts things in the scenario and you are constrained to pay attention to them.

CONTROL: Even without the semantics of the negotiations versus the discussions, for a year and a half now the American administration has been talking about unconditional something or other kind of talks, and now there's a sudden world move, a tremendous amount of pressure galvanized on all sides toward this conference in Rangoon. It's fairly realistic that it would be tough,

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the US would have to get awfully elusive at this point to avoid going into some kind of a meeting there, and this is where they were coming up with very fast foot work in terms of preconference discussions to work out invitational arrangements and agenda and all that while they try to get their house in order with the GVN. And that was their problem. What to do with General Thi? He was being hard to deal with at this point.

PRC TEAM: But the world pressure is on the US, it is not on the Chinese, the DRV or the USSR.

US/RVN TEAM: I have a point that's related to the question of constraints on the US/RVN Team affecting military escalation. In our opening meeting the US/RVN Team laid out a series of objectives pertaining to South-east Asia and Vietnam in particular. Our actions throughout the play of the game went within the confines of these objectives. One of the problems that we felt we were facing at the beginning was that the nature of our objectives (which were very real life, present day objectives) had certain built-in constraints. I think we tended to react to these constraints, while we didn't have explicit constraints, we felt they were built-in constraints.

This point came out very clearly at a meeting ~~earlier~~ this afternoon of the people who worked on the game, that the US/RVN Team felt that it worked within the constraints of explicit and implicit US policy and if those constraints had not existed, perhaps they would have done something else, or some additional things.

DRV TEAM: I think it should be made clear that the thing that bothered the DRV Team more than anything else was what you were going to do with your air power and naval power against North Vietnam and against Red China. We were more frustrated about that than anything else. And the fact that you did nothing just made us happier than hell!

US/RVN TEAM: Well, nothing? That's not right.

DRV TEAM: Well, nothing is not right, but you didn't do anywhere near what General --- had in mind, and that made our problem much simpler.

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US/RVN TEAM: Our military tactics as we spelled them out in the beginning were first secure the bases, then strike out against the Viet Cong while the bombing would continue at a controlled, gradually increasing pace in North Vietnam. We would hit industrial capacity, transportation facilities, POL storage and other systems, and we felt as the time of the game came up, and following these general tactics that at the end of a year from this Labor Day there weren't a heck of a lot of targets left in North Vietnam.

US/RVN TEAM: Plus one other point, at the beginning of Move Two, or at the point where we thought the initiative was turning to our advantage, we were then going to step up the bombing campaign.

Against what?

US/RVN TEAM: I think that's a very good question, whatever was left.

Hanoi and HaiPhong industry was still possible, you would hit the power plants and you would hit the POL, but you had not hit what passes for industry up there, the steel works, the capital investments.

US/RVN TEAM: As to capital investments, that was effectively stopped when you hit the power.

US/RVN TEAM: That's correct. At the first meeting it was also said as far as our bombings went, we'd hold Hanoi hostage in case we really had to go and clobber them with something at the last minute. And when we got up to a year from Labor Day and didn't have any targets left, we couldn't see how we could escalate a heck of a lot further than we had!

Well, at the risk of being called a horrible war monger and a few other things, there is somewhat of a parallel that may have some flaws that you ought to take out, but if this initiative is turning in the summer of 1966, the bombing has gotten out of this thing, except this hostage area that we are holding up here, the groups of North Vietnamese that are down South are beginning to be let's say, surrounded and picked off, our army and marines are hitting out in the countryside and what have you; I see a parallel between the situation in North

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Vietnam at that time and Japan as of the end of the Okinawa campaign. Where we had the initiative to hit any damn thing we wanted to and they needed a persuader to say "quit." I would suggest maybe a small size A-bomb on Dien Bien Phu as the place where they won their victory the first time, rather than Hanoi might be the persuader, but I don't think that national policy would probably approve. (Laughter)

Well one could take your principle and put some of these younger people on the business of thinking up something other than an A-bomb that would do the same thing.

And this move that was talked about by the Reds, "If things get rough enough, we'll just quietly fade away underground," has been worrying the hell out of me. Because I don't know just where we go against a thing like that. So I think we've got to give them something that is a damn good persuader to quit officially.

PRC TEAM: This was the crux of Red Chinese philosophy in this whole thing and I think it's in their published writings. The word "win," we're looking to win a war. The Chinese were not looking to "win a war" this year or next year, and were perfectly willing to see this thing drag on and go back into the bush and let things quiet down again, and start all up again, just so long as China wasn't knocked out as an entity during this period. I think it felt that the initiative certainly was turning on a local short term basis but that the political pressure over the long haul -- let's say five years of US commitments of troops in the jungles of South Vietnam and Laos -- would sooner or later bring this pressure to bear -- whether it came in '66 or '68 -- for a conference, because this wasn't the US kind of war. Logistics were very difficult. It was unfavorable terrain in which to fight guerillas and it was a long drawn out process of attrition. When Red China looks at North Vietnam and whether it might go under in the process, I think for purely personal reasons, they're probably willing to extend it.....in its present form.

May I ask a question? Did you feel that you were running any high risk of losing China as a progressive

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entity at the time that you moved substantial numbers of Chinese troops into Laos and Burma and in the vicinity of Thailand with a view toward bogging down massive numbers of US troops there?

PRC TEAM: No sir, because we will not attack anyone.

US/RVN TEAM: Of course you had not done it, this was just something you were thinking about.

PRC TEAM: No, we weren't going to make an attack. We were going to move in to try and get a counter move, to try to bring about a stalemate in to the wide jungle area across there. But we weren't going to rush into the sea, which might tempt the US to use those bombers on our atomic installations. I think that what has been said here is coming out very clear and that is that China, if it is really threatened, if it really feels that it is liable to be attacked, can get very conservative, but under the present circumstances it doesn't feel that way. We also did some talking about Moscow in this context, along the lines that if the US was to think of destroying us then the hard-liners in Moscow, the ones that are still not happy with "co-existence," would have their hand raised this time. And that we would expect this to have some effect on the Soviet position in terms of it taking a harder attitude towards a direct confrontation with the US before the Soviet Union would sit there and risk the US destroying China. These are some of the things we bounced off the wall.

CONTROL: Wasn't this the sort of thing war-gamed twice already? In the earlier SIGMA's, I wasn't a party to those.

US/RVN TEAM: SIGMA II-64 had that in it and it didn't work well.

██████████ It didn't work. They went right on back into the boon-docks again.

██████████ It crossed my mind that I should have talked more which rarely happens, and have explained to some of those senior people that left here that in case they're worried about what the teams did that we rotated the generalship of the teams each move, so that you

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can't say that any team's view is dominated by some "damn militarist" or one of these "political guys" from State Department or one of these "individuals" from CIA. We shifted leadership. I'm also following up on the view of the Chinese. I feel that it is worth stressing that as I understand it the Viet Cong were not really interested or critically interested in negotiation. Their objective was to meet and gain popular international support. They didn't necessarily feel that they had to have negotiation. Am I right in this?

VC TEAM: Yes, I might add one other thing too, that it was the consensus among the VC, that we weren't going to give up anything in the conference, if we could get something for nothing, fine-- but we had a number of retrenchment positions that we could fall back to, clear back to the positions say of 1959. In other words, we had a long time that we could hang on, if our strategy was to avoid contact with any of the regulars or the high power forces, so we thought we could hang on for a long time retrenching and re-trenching back to the earlier position.

VC TEAM: We have a very extensive organization and as long as we could keep that intact we could raise this thing again at almost anytime in the future we desire.

Can we go back to the Chinese a second with the notion and the idea that the Chinese could make certain of these moves with relative impunity to try to get a feel for the estimate of just how much it would take to provoke the US into starting to beat on China itself?

PRC TEAM: In our attempt to think about this like we thought the Chinese would, I think I could say for the team that we thought that wasn't going to happen. World opinion was building up so fast throughout the play of the scenario. We did worry about it being a move of frustration. It would come very quick without any warning, but we read the fact that it had not already taken place in a considerable period of time as meaning that the US was having a tougher problem with that one and it probably would not happen.

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CONTROL: One more element of time and space here. Even if you say went down the track of going over or beyond the veil in terms of US frustration, and say we did something, some sort of major nuclear excursion in China, as a result of further extension in this sort of speculation of play --- that in view of the Chinese Communist's relative confidence that world opinion was working against us, they could survive one thrust by us and turn around and shift their position perhaps for the moment in terms of negotiations, appearing to be more forthcoming toward the conference table for the time being. Then where would we be? You don't have an answer I don't think, even if you go to the extreme in terms of a thrust and that sort of thing, which they could take and play the negotiating track for awhile with world opinion and so forth on their side, I just want to point out that I think in a further move, this is not the ultimate answer either.

PRC TEAM: Our Chinese sensitivity over the nuclear installation was the fact that we considered it a real political back-stop in our world-wide propaganda, political action campaign in Africa against the Soviets, in other words to give the image that China was rapidly attaining major big power status in dealing with under-developed nations in Africa and Southeast Asia. Our real objective being to supplant the Soviet Union in the world Communist movement. If we lose this thing and suffer the embarrassment of having the "Paper Tiger" come over and wipe it out, this is what we were working on. A political thing more than losing the military capability in the bomb itself.

 Gentlemen, I believe we should call this meeting to a close. Otherwise those of you who don't have Pentagon after 6 o'clock passes will be picked up and recruited into our expanding armed forces (Laughter).

 I want to thank you for coming down and taking on this job and for every one from the outside agencies coming in and helping us again. As usual, we are frustrated. We haven't solved anybody's problems. We have just kicked them around again. So we'll have at it a little later on in another theatre, maybe we can do better.

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SIGMA II-65

GAME DOCUMENTATION (U)

All messages which were generated in the game are contained in this Tab. The messages appear in chronological sequence by move and by color team within each move. Game play started from the world situation in Southeast Asia as it existed in real life on 26 July 1965. Each color team was shown a video presentation which was designed to set the stage for the particular move of game play. The video presentations are transcribed herein as "Scenario for Move I, II or III." After viewing the video presentation, the color teams then developed move messages which the Control Team analyzed and melded into the next scenario projection. Each message in this Tab is classified SECRET-NOFORN. Color teams represented various governments or organizations as follows:

Black-----Viet Cong

Red-----DRV

Yellow----PRC

Green-----USSR

Blue-----US/RVN

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~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. I

SIGMA II-65

SCENARIO FOR MOVE I

On Monday the 26th of July 1965, the war in South Vietnam appears to be going badly. In spite of American ground reinforcements, it appears that Viet Cong forces are having it pretty much their own way, particularly in the Northern area. Several district capitals have been occupied by the Cong. Other key centers can only be supplied by air or by heavily reinforced government relief columns. Mobile government reserve forces have been severely taxed coping with one hit-and-run attack after another but new hope is being generated by the mounting build-up of United States Army and Marine ground elements including the "Big Red One" of World War II fame and the 3rd Marine Division.

The US military build-up is changing the Vietnamese coastal landscape as logistical facilities, air fields and headquarters for a variety of forces move in under conditions reminiscent of World War II and of Korea.

Meanwhile in North Vietnam, US and RVN air strikes continue against bridges, rail lines, ammunition and petroleum storage facilities, and barracks destroying trucks and other targets of opportunity in wide ranging armed-reconnaissance over the enemy countryside. It does not appear however, that these air strikes, naval patrol activities along the coast, or ground efforts to interdict Communist land lines of communication into South Vietnam are having an appreciable effect on the influx of Chinese weapons and supplies from Communist countries. Nevertheless, the great bulk of Viet Cong logistical support is being derived from the countryside, along with mounting taxes, recruits to replace youths killed or wounded in action, and the Viet Cong have even been recently reported to have floated a bond issue. There is evidence that a full division of North Vietnamese regulars has infiltrated into the Northern area of South Vietnam. Military sources have been quoted as saying that overall Viet Cong strength is 50% greater now than it was at this time a year ago.

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Among the US military on the ground, there is a confidence which dissipates somehow along the attenuated lines of communication back to Washington, D.C. The government in Saigon continues to control the major urban centers containing three million people and appears to be in control of another five million in the sprawling rural areas. Less than twenty-five percent of the thirteen million rural inhabitants are under Communist control. Another five million of the sparsely distributed population continue as the target of both sides, trying to conduct their daily activities inspite of the war.

In North Vietnam, US/RVN air forces have not yet attacked Communist aircraft on the ground or the five surface-to-air missile sites in the Hanoi area, but the latter are not believed as yet to include actual missiles or launching equipment. Presumably this is on the way from the USSR.

In their propaganda, the Chinese have been expressing arrogant confidence in eventual victory over the US in event of a larger war involving an attack on China. They have stressed however, that China will not attack unless attacked first. The Chinese warnings have been accompanied by increased civil defense preparations, including intensified militia training and political indoctrination. China is building new airfields along the southern border to handle increased numbers of aircraft.

The Soviet Union has associated itself with Hanoi's position with respect to negotiations. They have particularly emphasized that a cessation of the air strikes against the North is necessary if there is to be any chance for Vietnam talks or any significant improvement in US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, the USSR has repeatedly proclaimed that it will provide North Vietnam with all assistance necessary for strengthening its defenses.

The political scene in South Vietnam is relatively calm at the moment, with most Vietnamese groups willing to give the new military government a chance. The government is trying to carry out a drastic program of reform. Controls and austerity

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are being imposed in an effort to mobilize the country's resources. There is some danger that the government's programs along this line will overstrain its limited administrative capabilities, leading to internal frictions and arousing the ire of entrenched political and economic interests.

For the past several months, there has been a trend of increased intervention by the Viet Cong into the economic life of government-controlled areas. An intensified Viet Cong effort has included the destruction of key bridges, roads, rail lines, and the harassment of repair crews, as well as the blocking of shipments which previously were permitted to move after the payment of taxes. The result has been lower deliveries of rice into the urban areas, with hoarding and speculation tending to push prices up. Moreover, road interdiction has affected the shipments from the rubber plantations, despite protection payments by the French planters to the Viet Cong. Repeated sabotage of power lines is creating a critical power shortage.

At the same time, there is evidence of serious economic instability in the Viet Cong-controlled areas. During the last 12 months, the Viet Cong appear to have doubled their rate of taxation on incomes, production and transportation. These harsher policies, in addition to deceptive land promises, and increased requisitioning of supplies, have caused a growing antipathy toward the Cong. Recently taken prisoners assert that serious food shortages also exist.

The Viet Cong military organization comprises about 50,000 well-armed regulars, 18,000 combat support elements, and some 80,000-100,000 irregulars. Despite losses about double those of the government, the Viet Cong is showing an increasing capability to mount and to sustain large-scale engagements.

Opposing this Communist force is a US-equipped, South Vietnamese military establishment which includes a 226,000-man regular army, a 106,000-man regional force, and a 151,000-man popular force. The South Vietnamese are assisted by a US military force

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of over 70,000, of which some 20,000 are in a ground combat role, as well as by small units from South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The South Korean government is reported planning to dispatch a full combat division to South Vietnam in the near future.

It is worth noting the comparison between these figures and the strength of French Union Ground Forces in 1954, in Indo China. At that time, throughout what is now both North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the French had some 540,000 troops, these included almost 300,000 static defense forces, 180,000 semi-military forces and about 90,000 mobile combat troops. French nationals constituted approximately 90,000 out of this total force of 540,000.

At that time, Marshall Giap said, "Our position was time and again to pin down the enemy's main force in fortified camps while choosing more favorable directions for our attack." When Giap said that, Viet Minh strength was estimated at around 300,000, about one-third of whom were regulars.

As the southwest monsoon makes military action increasingly difficult in much of the interior of South Vietnam, the United States troop build-up continues along the coast. To what extent this build-up will ultimately expand in additional ground divisions, air wings and naval units cannot be predicted, but it is apparent that the Viet Cong and Hanoi have no intention of sitting down at a peace table or of slowing the tempo of their attack on the basis of US commitments or actions to date. Meanwhile, the latest word from Saigon indicates that the influx of American soldiers loaded with pocket money, is causing a spiraling inflation in Saigon and in other Vietnamese cities.

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FROM BLACK TO CONTROL

MESSAGE No. 1

MOVE NO. I

DTG 26 July 1965

LONG RANGE GOALS:

1. Total political-military control of South Viet Nam.
2. Reunification with North Viet Nam through elections.
3. Removal of all foreign troops.
4. Attain international recognition of National Liberation Force as the legitimate government of South Viet Nam.

STRATEGIES:

1. Continued expansion of political-military effort in South Viet Nam, gain popular support.
2. Increased expansion of international relations and active support.
3. Intensify actions specifically aimed at demoralization of ARVN.
4. Intensify actions specifically aimed at demoralization of GVN.
5. Intensify actions specifically aimed at demoralizations of U.S. in SVN and ZI.
6. Alienate GVN from U.S. at all levels.
7. Disrupt national economy.
8. Continue struggle until victory is achieved, even though it takes 10-20 years.
9. If expanded American intervention achieves a military victory then we will go underground without withdrawal, but maintain economic and political pressure for U.S. withdrawal, then follow-up with elections.
10. Avoid:
 - a. Major stand and fight actions.
 - b. Any appearance of agreeing to negotiate from weakness
 - c. Major Chinese intervention except as last resort.

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SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION (Numbered items are keyed to related STRATEGIES):

1. Intensify Combat Hamlets.

Hamlet and Village controlled elections.

Expansion of Women's Solidarity Fronts, youth, farmers and other front organizations.

Intensify recruiting for irregular forces to add 50% to overall forces in 6 months.

Secure additional depots and training areas in populated areas or near populated areas.

Dig up highways and feeder roads to harass GVN troops and government controlled economies.

Intensify nationalist anti US/GVN puppet progaganda.

2. Attempt establish unofficial contact with commonwealth nation - i.e. GHANA.

PRC, DRV, USSR and other Block pressure on Cambodia and Indonesia to give official recognition to NLF/SVN as legitimate government based on "de facto" control. Thus, providing legal basis for logistical and financial support.

Offer tours to selected pro west journalists to establish idea of "de facto" control.

Send additional delegates to all International conferences contesting GVN legitimacy.

Establish credit facilities in international banks - sterling via Ghana, dollar via other "neutralist" countries.

3. Attack and destroy selected ARVN battalions in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, Phu Yen, Tay Ninh.

Isolate ARVN military units by establishing permanent ambush facilities along key supply routes.

Attack ARVN troops in preference to US with propaganda theme that ARVN bearing the burden of fighting.

Defect Generals (Dinh, Kim and Duc and approach Gen Kahn to act as intermediary for notional neutralization of SVN) to lead "Freedom Army" for NLF/SVN.

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Propaganda against ARVN from families, wives etc, to stop fighting and return to family, that VC will win for nation.

US soldiers stealing wives of soldiers.

Life of soldier's families is hard due to fact soldiers far from home and farms not tended.

VC have promised freedom and safety to ARVN soldiers who return to families.

GVN generals and leaders profiteering and sending money abroad.

ARVN fighting for US, not Viet Nam.

Introduce PAVN Division (Notional) into Delta near Cambodia,

4. Assassinate provincial chiefs.

Assassinate district chiefs.

Grenade GVN offices in Saigon.

Finance student, Buddhist peace demonstrations - kill student as martyr.

Cut off food supplies to urban areas.

Cut off charcoal supplies to urban areas.

Insert VC propaganda in GVN mails and distribution systems.

5. Employ block press facilities and diplomatic representation to build up image of US casualties in SVN.

Push themes that GVN troops are not to be trusted and are thoroughly penetrated by VC.

US troops under incompetent GVN/ARVN command.

Not a US war.

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Request US leftist groups press for stopping of killing of innocents.

6. Enlarge on GVN/US military command frictions.

Propagate US troop colonization of SVN.

Propagate US overriding GVN decisions.

Exploit and create incidents between US and GVN service men and population, i.e. bar girls etc.

Exploit racial difference and traditional Xenophobia.

Intensify theme "let's get rid of Foreigners and settle issues by negotiations among ourselves."

Stop US killing Vietnamese.

7. Cut roads (dig them up).

Stop rice shipments, exploit prices.

Stop charcoal for cities.

Destroy bridges.

8. Exploit through all diplomatic, block, radio, and front groups, both externally and internally, propaganda that NLF/SVN will continue to victory despite any foreign intervention by US colonialism.

9. Increase discipline and expand strength and numbers of our cadre for further employment should US intervention prolong the war.

Prepare underground organization of SVN population for exploitation of election opportunities under a neutral government.

Expand penetration of GVN and various sects for future manipulation.

10. Avoid:

a. Major "set peace" battles unless positive political victory can result.

b. Any appearance of agreeing to negotiate from weakness.

c. Chicom (PRC) intervention except as last resort.

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FROM RED TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 1

MOVE NO. 1

DTG 26 July 1969

ASSUMPTION

The Red Team considered the NLF to be under their control even though they accepted the idea that the NLF might think they were independent. The consensus was that there is a close working relationship between DRV and the VC. The long range view was that though they might have to accept VC control of a Communist SVN for a period of time, they intended to absorb them and reunite Viet Nam.

GOALS

The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam continues to pursue the liberation of our brothers in South Viet Nam. The indiscriminate bombings by the Yankee imperialists will not deter us from our objectives.

Our primary goal continues to be the establishment of a Communist Government of a reunified Viet Nam. To accomplish this objective, it is mandatory that all the US imperialists and their Allies get out of South Viet Nam permitting the establishment of a friendly regional atmosphere with sympathetic governments bordering our nation.

We shall continue to be the masters of our own destiny and while we look for the support of friendly Communist Governments, we must and will demand the responsibility of nationhood without being subject to taking sides or being influenced by ideological differences. We will walk the middle line between Moscow and Peking.

In assessing the situation, we find our plans and programs continue to reflect favorable progress inspite of the harassing and indiscriminate enemy air actions and contemplated escalation through troop build-up by the US.

STRATEGIES

To progress toward ultimate victory our strategy will continue to give maximum support to our brothers of the National Liberation Front until the forces of imperialism are

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expelled. Our policy continues to be one of avoiding major confrontation at all levels. Time is on our side. We will continue to press the effort in South Viet Nam recognizing that as the 1968 U.S. Presidential Campaign nears, a favorable environment will develop in terms of U.S. concessions. This will force the U.S. to the conference table on our terms. We must keep in mind that while maintaining pressure we do not want the hostilities to reach a level which will have a deleterious effect on our economy.

Simultaneously, we will try to utilize our classic non-military techniques such as securing control of the police, front groups, trade unions, and other administrative areas throughout the population centers.

Our present actions include compressing enemy areas of control, the interruption of routes of communication between the major cities, the undermining of morale, and the confiscation and control of the rice crops. Our success with rice has been reflected in the importing of U.S. rice to replace the shortages in Saigon and the resulting hoarding and inflation. Without reducing our rural activities, we now intend to increase urban terror activity including the U.S. A full coordination must prevail between urban and rural activities to yield maximum advantage.

We intend to maintain our relative strength in South Viet Nam vis a vis the U.S. We must commit additional People's Army Units to SVN in view of recent U.S. activities.

To show our determination to deny freedom of air space over our territory, we will make every effort to improve our air defense capability with emphasis on mobility. We will look to friendly Communist nations to provide the necessary technological support.

Concurrently with all other actions, we will maximize our psychological effort in the world arena and simultaneously tarnish the United States.

There is division in Hanoi on what to do if the pressure becomes intolerable. No prior decision has been provided as to the specific level of destruction which can be absorbed before changing the apparent North Vietnamese strategy.

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At some point however, it appears that the DRV leaders will initiate an unannounced unilateral cease fire, in effect going underground, while continuing all efforts in the political, economic and psychological struggle.

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FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 1

MOVE NO. I

DTG 26 July 1965

STRATEGY

The long range Chicom strategy is to bring about U.S. defeat in or withdrawal from Viet Nam without pushing the United States to direct attacks on China. This is expected to strengthen China's political appeal to under-developed areas as the leader of the Communist revolutionary movement at the expense of the USSR.

COURSES OF ACTION

MILITARY

Our analysis of the military situation is that eventually the North Vietnamese will win. Time is on their side; but the U.S. is under the pressure of domestic and Free World opinion to win quickly. We wish to win with as little Russian support as possible, and with as little Chicom involvement as possible. We feel that in general we can control the degree to which the U.S. escalates the conflict. Therefore, the following military actions will be taken:

1. Chicom forces in MENG LA in South China will be increased.

2. Chicom Army Units posing as labor forces will move into Northern Laos, ostensibly to repair roads.

These two actions will remind the U.S. of Southeast Asia's vulnerability to Chicom threats, outside South Vietnam. Further, they should weaken Thailand's resolve to assist the U.S. and raise the possibility of Thai demands for greater evidences of U.S. protection.

3. Materiel and advisors will be provided the North Vietnamese as required to keep lines of communication to Chinese open.

4. Inadvertent U.S. violations of China airspace or clashes with Chicom aircraft will be played down.

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5. Chicom forces will not intervene at this time. If the U.S. strikes Hanoi, Haiphong or industrial targets, we have a problem in responding properly. We might urge the North Vietnamese to make a one-time air raid on Danang or do it ourselves. We would urge USSR actions to increase tensions in Berlin and NATO (These actions to be coordinated now on a contingency basis). We would however, not escalate to direct confrontation with the U.S. unless it appeared that the U.S. strikes would cause Hanoi to give up. In this latter case, we would intervene on a large scale, not confining our attacks to Viet Nam alone.

6. We will avoid conventional war --urging Hanoi to continue guerilla actions. If U.S. forces become a significant factor after the monsoons, and we feel we will know this before the U.S. does, we will bring pressures on Hanoi to revert to small unit guerilla actions until the end of the dry season.

7. We will shell Quemoy and Matsu at our option.

POLITICAL

In the political field, we will resist moves to negotiate. We expect increased U.S. ground forces but do not believe they will make a material difference. As U.S. casualties increase, the U.S. will be under pressure to negotiate. At some future time therefore, we may agree to negotiate. To do so now may be interpreted as fear on our part of U.S. strength.

We will widen our rift with the USSR to put the Russians on the defensive about the degree which they support Hanoi.

We expect that this will increase our prestige in the under-developed areas as leaders of the Communist movement; and in any case will make the USSR appear to follow us.

We will coordinate with Russia concerning pressures they can cause in NATO and Berlin. These actions will probably be to the USSR advantage.

We do not want UN involvement in Southeast Asia. Therefore we will not raise the issue of our membership in the UN at this time.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL

In the psychological field we shall take measures to worry the ROKs and Chinats. For example, we may conduct maneuvers near North Korea. We may urge NK statements to supply volunteers to Hanoi if the ROKs send a division. Shelling of Quemoy and Matsu at our option should curb Chinat initiatives to supply forces.

We will continue our propaganda attacks against U.S. aggression. Simultaneously we will appeal to factions not supporting U.S. involvement by pointing out, for example, how France withdrew from Viet Nam and Algeria with no loss in status as a world power.

We feel that these actions will contribute to our eventual victory without provoking a U.S. attack on China. Our biggest problem is to determine a satisfactory response militarily and politically, if the U.S. should strike industrial targets in North Vietnam.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM GREEN TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE _____

DTG 26 July 1965

Members of the Soviet Leadership met in the Kremlin today to reconsider the Vietnamese and world situation. This became particularly necessary after our Surface to Air Missile destroyed a US aircraft during the past weekend.

OBJECTIVES

We reassessed our objectives in Southeast Asia in light of the apparent US intent to partially mobilize and the probability they may escalate the war there.

Our long term objective is to obtain a neutralized SVN under our sphere of influence. We eventually want US presence withdrawn; however, we do not want to precipitate such rapid US withdrawal that the Communist Chinese move into a vacuum.

We will continue our major economic development programs in the USSR as much as possible while still maintaining a suitable defense posture.

We will take steps to prevent a major US-Soviet Confrontation where possible while continuing to build our prestige in the Communist world.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN FORMULATING THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A major long term Soviet goal is to prevent emergence of Chicom dominance over the SEA area and to retain Soviet influence on future developments there. The reasons are both to block practical Chinese control and to prevent important Chicom gains in the leadership struggle within the world Communist movement.

It is also of Soviet long term interest to weaken US power and influence in the Asian world. However, the Soviet Union does not want US withdrawal from SEA to be so precipitate that Chinese influence will flow in to fill the vacuum.

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The relative weight of Viet Nam in light of major domestic and foreign policy goals such as internal economic reform and avoidance of the risk of nuclear war, is such that the Soviet Union does not wish to see the Viet Nam situation develop in a way which would drastically prejudice these goals.

It is important for the Soviet Union not to allow the US to win the Viet Nam "testcase" by stopping a national liberation struggle with force. However, the Soviet Union can afford to accept some slow down in the progress of national liberation struggle, in order to avoid greater risk of a large war and because Soviet leaders are still confident that the long term political trend in SEA favors the Communist side.

In the short-term, dominating Soviet interests are to avoid a major military confrontation with the United States and to bring about a cessation of hostilities without leaving the Soviet Union vulnerable to charges from Peking and Hanoi that it has defaulted on its obligations to the international communist movement. The Soviet reading of the short-term situation in Viet Nam has aroused increasing concern among the Soviet leaders about the direction and scale of US activities, but to date this concern has not reached the point where the Soviet leadership is willing to put direct pressure on Hanoi and the Viet Cong to stop. Rather, the Soviet leaders are still focusing pressure on the US to accept negotiations on terms satisfactory to Hanoi and the Viet Cong. A new major crisis in the area with high risk of escalation might serve as the rationale for the Soviets to take a more forward role in persuading Hanoi, the VC and possibly Peking that prudence dictates more receptiveness to negotiations.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING OUR STRATEGY IN SEA

The SAM was used in light of US bombing closer to Hanoi in an effort to serve notice that the Soviet Union is honoring its defense pledges. Also, we felt it necessary to point out to the world that the situation is approaching a new and more dangerous state of confrontation.

We intend to meet expected military response with further air defense of NVN. We will also use this situation to persuade Hanoi in particular that a slow down of the military escalation trend is a desirable move and requires reconsideration of negotiation conditions.

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We expect the mobilization effort will be taken rapidly; however, we do not think this will arrest the political, morale or economic deterioration in SVN. Also, these efforts probably will not serve to crush the VC in the next 6 month period. Therefore, if other developments like a SAM crisis do not threaten rapid and dangerous escalation, we feel that we can safely await developments during the next 6 months.

We realize the US is capable of interdicting shipping to NVN. In that event, we will be prepared to withdraw Soviet shipping from those waters in order to avoid a major confrontation.

Introduction of such forces as Nationalist Chinese or South Korean will raise the question of volunteers for NVN from our camp and will heighten the chance of greater involvement by Peking in NVN. Although we hope this does not happen, our response to this eventuality will be to stress the threat of expansion to other areas of the world as well as NVN.

In the event more positive Chinese intervention is provoked by US air attacks near the Chinese border, we confidentially would not mind seeing the Chinese get their fingers burned. However, our main interest would be to emphasize to the Chinese the dangers of escalation and convey that they should not count on our unconditional support.

Instability in Saigon will enhance chances of a settlement favorable to us. We will encourage instability but in the next six months we cannot count on formation of a Saigon Government which would demand US withdrawal.

SOVIET INITIATED MOVES

We feel the Vietnamese situation has progressed to the point where some bold actions are necessary to shock the US into changing its policies. Therefore, we propose to take the following initiations, none of which incidentally is of a high risk nature.

First, we are instructing our representatives to use the Geneva talks as a forum to focus world protest against new US provocations and threats to peace.

Secondly, we are publicly calling the Warsaw Pact into emergency session in order to consider US threats to world peace.

We are instructing the East Germans to launch a program of controlled harassment including helicopter over-flights, temporary access restrictions and inter-zonal travel curbs around Berlin.

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In connection with the Warsaw Pact and Berlin harassment measures, we will announce major Warsaw Pact maneuvers are being held requiring restrictions on movement in the affected areas.

Finally, using both the private channels and public statements, we are undertaking a more intensive campaign to stress that bilateral US-Soviet relations have come to a standstill and will not be resumed until the US gives tangible signs of amending its ways in Vietnam.

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FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 1

MOVE NO. I

DTG 26 July 1965

NATIONAL GOAL

Restore peace to SEASIA so that all countries in the area may progress in such a manner as each may freely choose.

US OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

1. Cause DRV and Chinese Communists to cease support and direction of the insurgency in SVN.
2. To assist the government of SVN to defeat insurgency.
3. Avoid if possible direct US Communist China hostilities concerning SEASIA.
4. Minimize the adverse impact of developments in SEASIA on US - USSR relations.
5. Help build in South Vietnam an independent, politically stable and economically viable nation.

These objectives are political in nature and are designed to achieve a favorable political solution as soon as possible. They are limited in that they do not demand the destruction of the DRV regime nor its military defeat in the classical sense. The objectives address the situation in Vietnam with an understanding that SEA must be treated as a whole. However, the United States policy-makers considered solution of the Vietnamese problem essential to SEA peace and security.

We are convinced that the DRV and the Viet Cong are embarked on a campaign to destroy the RVN during the present monsoon season. They assess their chances of success as very good.

The actions we propose are aimed at thwarting this enemy objective. The key, then, is to convince the DRV and the Viet Cong that they cannot win in South Vietnam.

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We propose the following:

1. Introduce large numbers of additional US forces into South Vietnam. About 250,000 men are considered necessary. Their mission would be to secure US bases, and to engage in active counterinsurgency combat operations against the VC. The deployments should be made as rapidly as possible. We envisage their presence as a stabilizing factor, giving renewed impetus to offensive operations by the RVNAF and favorable weight to all GVN programs. They would not engage in pacification or area control functions; these would remain a responsibility of Vietnamese forces. Rather, they would seek out and render ineffective the VC units now allowed to operate unimpeded. Operating in conjunction with the RVNAF they would also allow reopening of the communication routes now disrupted.

Partial mobilization and call-up of reserves are considered essential parts of this program.

2. Continue for the present the controlled, gradually increasing program of bombing in North Vietnam.

Until the DRV becomes convinced that the VC cannot win in the South we consider they will bear practically any amount of conventional bombing. Thus to increase the severity of the program drastically at this point might risk loss of the support and understanding of our allies we now have. However, when our actions in South Vietnam have achieved a measure of success and it has become increasingly clear to the DRV that the VC cannot win, we propose a sharp increase in the tempo and severity of air attacks in North Vietnam. Industrial capacity, transportation facilities, POL, storage and other systems should be attacked. At least initially Hanoi should remain hostage, in the expectation that the DRV regime would agree to call off the insurgency in SVN before it became necessary to attack the capital.

3. Continue and expand if necessary the program of controlling infiltration from the sea. Allocate forces to the disruption of major centers on land infiltration routes into SVN.

4. Increase economic aid to the GVN in order to offset the effects of VC actions against transportation and marketing systems.

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5. Concurrently with the actions so far enumerated, conduct a vigorous worldwide diplomatic and psychological program leading to the negotiation of a settlement advantageous to our interests. Aspects would be:

a. Making our firm intent to deny victory to the VC unmistakable. (US mobilization would assist in this program.) All possible diplomatic channels should be used to reinforce the message. Methods should be devised to have "uncommitted" countries help get the word across to the communists. Attack of targets in NVN close to the Chicom border should be executed to convince the Chicom leadership we are not reluctant to engage them.

b. There should be devised a follow-up to the President's Baltimore speech which would hold out to the DRV a more attractive or convincing promise that cessation of hostilities would benefit them as well as SVN. A better carrot is needed to accompany the "stick" of military actions.

6. Continue by all means possible to strengthen GVN programs by provision of advisors wherever they can help. Some examples of programs needing special attention are:

a. Effective mobilization and force buildup.

b. The local militia, (paramilitary) program. (The Vietnamese should be prepared to extend control to areas now VC-held when the security situation improves.)

c. Anti-guerilla, guerilla forces. An offensive force should be built up to operate continuously in VC base areas.

d. The Chieu Hoi Program of encouraging defections from the VC. Recent successes in this field suggest the possibility that we might exploit disaffection within VC units.

7. Our total program in Asia must be made consistent with US actions in Vietnam. Nothing should be done, for example, which reduces the security potential of any of our Asian allies.

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CONTINGENCIES

1. There is a possibility that the Viet Cong in the face of a major US buildup would refuse to fight and would withdraw their units to lie low in relatively inaccessible base areas.

This would not by any means be a disaster for the US/GVN cause. The time thus gained could well be spent by the GVN - with US support - to regain control over most of the population and in general to regroup. Regular forces could be brought to strength and retrained; militia forces could be formed wherever needed and trained and equipped. Resurgence of the VC thereafter would be much more difficult.

Other subjects:

Coup in Saigon

Increased DRV intervention.

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FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 1

MOVE NO. II

SCENARIO FOR MOVE II

On this Friday, the 31st of December of 1965, the build-up of U.S. forces in South Viet Nam continues as it has over the last several months, but the U.S. administration has suffered two crushing blows during the past week. On the heels of the latest Saigon coup, a very high U.S. administration official today resigned in protest over U.S. policy and action in Viet Nam.

The U.S. has now made an enormous investment in SVN but there is yet only slow progress toward resolution of the situation.

The coup in Saigon, which removed at least for the time being, the flamboyant General Ky, has brought the controversial General Thi into power. He has threatened to stay away from Saigon and make Hue his capital, thus reinforcing suspicion that Thi is "the Buddhists' Man".

This accession follows division of the GVN generals into several factions. It is doubtful whether the new regime can function as a government unless it attains more breadth and structure and certainly unlikely that they can cope with the deteriorating economic situation, the riots and demonstrations sweeping the streets of Saigon and Hue, and the failure of GVN administration in the countryside. The failure of previous regimes to formulate an adequate program of tax, social and economic reform is coming home to roost. Meanwhile, VC actions are restricting the flow of food and fuel supplies to the city.

The build-up of U.S. forces and the shortage of consumer goods has contributed to galloping inflation while the massive influx in food shipments has taxed port facilities. Labor leaders are no longer sure they can control union members. Unrest has required the stationing of more ARVN units in Saigon. While the GVN controls the populated areas, the burden of security has become so great as to impede progress in rural pacification, although this effort has been progressing in

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areas where the U.S. forces are stationed. Large numbers of refugees have been streaming into these U.S. occupied areas, placing heavy burden on facilities and imposing the risk of infiltration. The dramatic U.S. housing program for refugees has, however, been highly effective.

In Laos, all has been quiet, although there are fears that a rightist coup may upset the balance.

Since July 1965 the estimated U.S. force level has increased to 170,000 Army and Marine troops in South Viet Nam. Among the four divisions represented is the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) and the build-up continues. An additional 80,000 troops are expected to arrive during the next several months. Since partial mobilization last summer the flow of forces overseas has imposed heavy demands on transportation capabilities of the Navy, the Air Force and commercial carriers engaged in these operations.

Facilitated by the call-up of selected reserve and national guard units, the US military presence in South Viet Nam has dramatically expanded.

In addition to providing security for the mushrooming U.S. base complexes along the coast, U.S. units have engaged in a series of probing operations against the VC, hitting War Zones C and D with little demonstratable loss to the enemy. The VC appear to be avoiding confrontation with American units wherever possible. However, they continue to inflict severe punishment on isolated RVN battalions and relief units. These units are, nevertheless, making some limited progress in roll back of Viet Cong control. Arrival of American forces is giving some badly needed respite to RVN units to reorganize, and re-equip although Communist propaganda is making much of the fact among the Americans that the South Vietnamese are taking a "Let George do it" attitude. In Asia and Africa, Communist propaganda is stressing ruthless killing of Asians by Americans.

Some American officers have been complaining that the long promised division from the Republic of Korea has not materialized due to political problems in Seoul.

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The rapid American build-up has as might be expected led to letters from troops, newspaper articles and congressional questions about "critical supply shortages" ranging from certain types of aircraft to electronic parts, but the Defense Department asserts such instances are insignificant in practical terms. The outlook for support of the next phase of the build-up is not so certain.

More significant problems perhaps stem from command and control snafus in which critical decisions have been withheld in certain recent operations conducted jointly between the U.S. and RVN. One such problem was widely reputed last week to have led to the serious losses in the ambush of one company of newly arrived American infantry north of Bien Hoa. The command situation has been highlighted by correspondents and there are strong demands for corrective action.

In effect the military situation at this moment in Viet Nam might be described as one with initiative slowly passing to US/RVN but with Viet Cong still maintaining wide latitude through over half the area of South Viet Nam. The US/RVN is really only beginning an effective program of strikes into enemy redoubts.

Since the beginning of the ground build-up, U.S. air strikes against NVN have continued to escalate slowly. Except for intermittent attacks against missile sites in the exterior ring around Hanoi, that city has not been hit nor have major strikes been made against industrial targets.

The introduction in the Fall of B-52's flying from Guam however, has virtually severed the rail links connecting North Viet Nam and Red China with consequent reductions in vital traffic.

The recent sinking of a U.S. freighter in the main channel of Saigon harbor has severely delayed and hampered berthing and discharge operations in that port.

During the last month the possibility of a new conflagration involving the off shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu appears to be in the offing.

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Aerial intelligence is reported to indicate a mounting build-up of Red Chinese coastal shipping, and shelling by mainland batteries has steadily mounted against the close-in islands.

There are rumors of combined Chinese and North Korean maneuvers along the Yalu River and growing tension in South Korea.

Last August the President asked for and after considerable debate, received a joint resolution of Congress, supporting mobilization and build-up. A number of Congressmen clearly kept their position open to criticize and recommend shifts in policy. The build-up places strains on supply, necessitates major increases in production, and pointed up a need for another 5-10 billion dollars for the '66 Defense Budget. It has generated grave future personnel problems in the junior officer area and in probable need for extension of tours and terms of service.

On the domestic scene there are growing indications of public disaffection with the Administration's policy in Viet Nam. The failure of the U.S. troop build-up to produce any decisive results therefore, and increasing demands in some quarters for an even greater escalation of the war have fanned the flames of criticism and warnings of the dangers of massive Chinese intervention.

Only recently (as casualties began to mount), the Administration began to stress that the Department of Defense is operating on wartime principles. Also, only recently, the U.S. administration has been effectively stressing the critical importance of turning the military tide in Viet Nam. Despite this shift of public statements of the Administration from the pessimism of last Summer to a considerably more optimistic note, the ferment in the U.S. public continues to grow. Various liberal groups have argued effectively that the war in Viet Nam is one in which there is little prospect for any long term solution.

The Organization of Mothers of Sons in Viet Nam have publicized the argument that U.S. soldiers are doing all of the fighting and suffering all of the casualties. One particular concern has been indications in letters

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from Viet Nam that large numbers of U.S. soldiers are hospitalized as a result of public health problems. Over the Christmas vacation over 100,000 U.S. students organized a protest march on Washington.

World opinion has become increasingly critical of the U.S. role in the war. Wide spread rioting and work stoppages in Japan have disrupted the operation of U.S. facilities there and Premier Sato has let it be known that unless the U.S. assist him to make some important concessions to leftist demands, his government's continued support may become politically impossible.

Principal targets of leftist criticism have been the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and visits of U.S. warships to Japanese ports. There has also been concern over the possibility that the Philippine Government impose restrictions on the use of Subic Bay and Clark Field.

The Government of Thailand, concerned over the increased Chinese forces in Meng La has demanded an increase in the U.S. ground capabilities in that country.

In the NATO countries, Prime Minister Wilson of Britain has refrained from overt criticism, but has repeatedly expressed his private concern for the necessity of finding an acceptable basis for negotiations. French sources indicate that General De Gaulle may be close to making a decision to request the withdrawal of foreign forces from French soil -- a possibility he has hinted at several times in the past months.

Last night the Administration was stunned by the resignation of a high placed government official who had in the past been a close supporter of administration policy. This official, in his dramatic reversal of opinion, called for immediate negotiations with the Viet Cong and an early U.S. withdrawal. The committee of 17 nations issued an immediate statement in support of this demand. The NLF representative in Algeria expressed his appreciation for the U.S. officials' statements and some interest in the proposal. So far, Peking and Hanoi have been silent.

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Among Third World countries there seems to be increasing dissatisfaction with the U.S. position on negotiation. The image of the U.S. as the side willing to negotiate is fading and the problem of U.S. intransigence is a topic frequently heard.

Warsaw Pact Exercises which began in November are still in progress. These combined exercises are the largest in recent years. Access routes to Berlin have been harassed under the guise of exercise restrictions. Tension over the Berlin situation is mounting. In the face of this apprehension, the NATO nations are questioning the United States specifically on its ability and determination to provide its commitments to the defense of Europe.

Today, a news correspondent released a sensational story depicting the degradation of U.S. 7th Army troops due to priorities levied in support of Viet Nam. This story indicates that our forces in Europe are not as combat ready as the government would lead us to believe.

Yesterday, there was a front page article by Hanson Baldwin stressing that the U.S. operational command system in Viet Nam violates principles of good sense and of war.

Meanwhile, a military spokesman in Washington, in a prepared statement, asserted that the situation in Viet Nam is taking a turn for the better and that significant improvements will be clearly apparent in the next three months.

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FROM CONTROL TO RED & YELLOW

MESSAGE NO. 2

MOVE NO. II

REAL DATE 28 Jul 1965

SCENARIO SUPPLEMENT

Some advisors of Ho, who has recently shown some signs of his advancing years, are seriously discussing ways to achieve a respite in American attacks. They point out that the southwest monsoon is over, that the Americans have built up forces and a quick communist victory seems unlikely. There is no point to taking unnecessary destruction.

They suggest that the Imperialists can be confused and embarrassed by a proposal taking advantage of the criticisms of their actions by both our friends, their allies and their own people. The suggestions being discussed in Hanoi include one that there be some proposal around the concept that DRV military support is not going to South Viet Nam, that France, the UN or any other honest third party, should be willing to certify to this, and that U.S. forces should now get out of Southern Viet Nam.

(This information is reported by Chicom agents in Hanoi to Peking.)

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MESSAGE No. 1

FROM BLACK TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

SPECIFIC AIMS AND COURSES OF ACTION

1. POLITICAL

a. World "Peace" Conference scheduled in Djakarta of all nations interested in Peace and Settlement of Conflict in SVN - following increased support of conference by "The Committee of 17 Nations".

Conference to be chaired by one of the leaders of these Nations.

Encourage international demonstrations in support of scheduled conference in such places as London, Mexico City, Cairo, Paris, Djakarta and U.S. "by group who demonstrated 31 DEC 65", Syria and African nations.

All demonstrations to be peaceful and coordinated within each country.

b. Publish aim of conference is to emphasize "Peace" and establish "Peace Party" as true representative Government of SVN.

"Presence of large number of U.S. forces tends to discourage any hopes of peaceful settlement.

Prepare for national elections and relief for refugees who have fled their home areas.

Vietnamese can settle their own problems without foreign intervention".

Observers from all nations invited to attend conference. Publicize and emphasize invitation to U.S. to participate.

c. Offer portfolios in new "Peace Party" to present selected GVN officials requesting they take part in conference in interest of their fellow man and peaceful solution to war.

d. Soviet "Peace Petitions" for presentation at conference by Neutralist Nations and other country action groups to include U.S. groups.

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e. Hold controlled elections at the hamlet, district and province level to add to credence of "Peace Party", as recognized party (political) representing the people of SVN.

f. Tours to selected pro-West journalists to observe these elections.

g. PRC and DRV have been informed of scheduled conference and asked to only act as observers to conference in effort to negate possibility of face-to-face discussions between U.S. and PRC - Increased propoganda that (NLF) "Peace Party" is a true representative government of SVN and not controlled or tied to DRV as VC supposedly are.

h. Conference will also guarantee interest (economic) of Third Countries present in SVN (such as French Plantations).

i. Obtain support from Province, District and Hamlet level personnel to "Drag their Feet" and do little or nothing to support pacification efforts - hoard food stuffs for their villages and areas - "do nothing" attitude in view conference scheduled to settle war.

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. Increase efforts to establish and redefine concept of "neutral" throughout rural areas as well as urban areas.

b. Demonstrations prior to and during conference stressing such themes as "Human Rights - Democracy - Free Elections" to be staged by young girls and youths at large U.S. installations such as Da Nang, MACV Headquarters, Chu Lai, Bien Hoa - aimed to create incident where by U.S. Armed Forces may have to shoot youths to protect equipment and real estate.

c. Emphasize "All ARVN forces go home during Tet".

d. Increase efforts to fragment GVN senior military leaders to come at odds with each other.

e. Invite support of "Peace Party" from Gen. Minh (Big Minh) Gen. Kim and possibly Gen. Khiem with presence at conference.

f. Follow-up with terrorist actions in those areas reported to be recently pacified by GVN to bring discredit to pacification efforts.

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g. Increase penetration of all labor groups such as longshoreman, cyclo drivers and taxi drivers to gain labor control by NLF party.

h. Through presence of VC amongst refugees fleeing to Saigon and other urban areas create unrest - increase their demands on the government - discontent with other people that they aren't receiving enough food and inadequate housing - U.S. forces are, and have bombed out their homes and destroyed their crops.

i. Continue exploiting difference between Catholic and Buddhist-riots and demonstrations in urban areas.

j. Employ new theme in recruiting forces "Stay at home and defend your family and villages or join ARVN and be moved away to defend other homes and protect real estate not yours - Lose your home and family to U.S. bombing and U.S. colonist forces".

k. Exploit indiscriminate bombing of people and homes by U.S. Air Force utilizing Napalm.

l. Gen. Thi replaces in symbolic manner Boa Dai in moving headquarters to Hue.

3. MILITARY

a. Continue present concentration of military effort against ARVN. Over-run ARVN headquarters were success assured.

b. Continue to avoid large set piece actions with US forces but increase effort to ambush small U.S. forces on operation.

c. Increase terrorist actions against U.S. personnel by murders, etc., in retaliation for bombing with Napalm.

d. Cut road between Hue and Da Nang in mountain regions and between Nha Trang and Chu Lai.

e. Permit capture of several hard core VC who will report presence in SVN of another PAVN division in 6th Military Region who infiltrated from Sihanoukville, Phnom Penh then Tay Ninh Province.

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f. Complicate U.S. intelligence efforts in SVN with fictitious new units - rumors of regrouping of VC forces for increased efforts - VC forces better armed with heavier armament.

g. Destroy one span of Bien Hoa-Saigon bridge.

h. Harassment of U.S. forces building base at Cam Ranh Bay and bombs in Rex BOQ and Hong Kong BOQ.

i. Increased efforts to disrupt communications net works (PT&T), troposcatter nets in Saigon and Nha Trang and electrical power stations at Bien Hoa.

j. Frequent mortar shellings of Nha Be POL farms and POL installations supporting US/VNAF air bases.

k. Mortar attacks on Phu Bai.

l. Continue military efforts presented in Message 1.

4. ECONOMICS

a. Intensify measures to disrupt economy

Food
Supply line interdiction
Charcoal
Improve taxation procedures
Bogus currency

b. Encourage Third Country direct support of those persons and areas attacked by US forces and ARVN.

c. Increase control of indigenously owned POL tanker trucks that supply rural areas.

d. Disrupt all trucking delivering goods to U.S. bases and large urban areas.

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FROM RED TO CONTROL

MESSAGE No. 1

MOVE No. II

ASSUMPTION

American bombing of the DRV, while troublesome, has not succeeded in breaking our morale nor reduced our ability to continue the liberation of the south. Economic and logistic dislocations within the DRV notwithstanding, we believe that the American administration is under increasing pressures from popular opinion, both domestic and foreign, as evidenced by the recent defection of a high U.S. official and his plea for negotiation, and increased disillusionment of the NATO powers as to the wisdom of American policy and likelihood of its success. In these circumstances, we still believe we can outlast the American Imperialists.

POLITICAL

In our view, the most important and potentially useful internal SVN political development of recent months is the accession of General Thi to power and the considerable disarray of the Saigon Generals. We wish to encourage General Thi to remain in Hue and to develop Central Viet Nam as his power base with the primary objective of weaning him away from the U.S. We direct the NLF to reorient their efforts so as to enhance the prestige of General Thi and, in effect, make him receptive to NLF cooperation. We shall thus create a new mechanism in Central Viet Nam which will split SVN in two and simultaneously develop as an entity independent of the Saigon authorities.

The objectives of this new group will be to detach central Viet Nam from the war and to call for U.S. and all foreign troop withdrawal from Viet Nam.

MILITARY

The foregoing political objectives call for certain specific military actions taking into account also the large American troop presence which is about to be increased by a further 80,000. We direct a reduced NLF/VC/DRV effort in Central Viet Nam in order to create a climate in which General Thi can strengthen his position toward one of control. Reduction in

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pressure in Central Viet Nam will be accompanied by maximum increase in pressure against the Saigon Generals and the Americans in III and IV Corps.

Although overland infiltration will continue in spite of transport dislocations within the DRV itself, and the American air effort in Laos, we will increasingly emphasize maritime infiltration into III and IV Corps. In addition to the expected shipping of VC/PAVN troops from Central Viet Nam to III and IV Corps, there will be an introduction of additional PAVN units from the DRV.

ECONOMIC

In close conjunction with the southward shift of military emphasis, we direct the NLF to reduce its economic pressures against central VN and to permit operation of the normal transport arteries used for the distribution of food stuffs and other commodities. Economic pressures of this character will, however, be continued and intensified throughout III and IV Corps.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

The psychological under-pinnings of the political and military course outlined above will include, but need not necessarily be limited to the following:

1. Requests to our Communist Allies for continued pressure against Berlin, South Korea, Taiwan and Laos.
2. Through third country propaganda, to continue to portray the US as unwilling to negotiate a settlement in Viet Nam.
3. To conduct a propaganda campaign in Saigon and elsewhere in III and IV Corps against the Saigon Generals.
4. In Central Viet Nam, however, there will be a reduction of propaganda against General Thi.
5. To develop and exploit labor and student unrest in favor of General Thi and in opposition to the Saigon Generals.

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6. To increase anti-US propaganda throughout Central Viet Nam.

7. To utilize fully the cadres introduced into the refugee centers to exploit the natural unrest within the refugee community and to play upon their desire to return to their native locales.

We hope our Communist friends as well as other nations opposing the Imperialists will continue pressure in Europe, particularly near Berlin to intensify NATO dissensions. In the Far East, we hope for a Chinese/North Korean feint against South Korea, heightened tension on the Formosa Straits, and the continuous threat to Thailand of the Chicoms operations in Laos. Continued Japanese political unrest can only help our cause. Likewise, continued ferment by Sukarno in the Indonesian-Malaysia area will further confuse the U.S. intervention in the Far East.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MOVE No. II

STRATEGY

The long-range Chicom strategy remains unchanged.

It is to bring about U.S. defeat in or withdrawal from Viet Nam without pushing the United States to direct attacks on China.

Furthermore, the developments of the past six months convince us this is the correct strategy and will eventually prove successful.

We do have some concern, however, that mounting U.S. frustration over relative stagnation in spite of its large scale commitment of force to Viet Nam may lead the U.S. to escalate the conflict by direct attacks against Communist China.

Although some minor military actions will be taken - to be discussed in more detail later - we see no requirement for major military action on our part.

Our emphasis will be twofold; both in the political field. This emphasis will be to isolate the U.S. politically, and to undermine the South Vietnamese will to fight.

POLITICAL

Specific political actions would include the following:

1. Greatly stress our world-wide propaganda/political action effort to coalesce world public opinion against U.S. actions in South Viet Nam.

2. Instruct our ambassadors and New China News Agency representatives world-wide to redouble their efforts to build up public and official opinion against the U.S. in Viet Nam - stressing the following points:

a. Victory by the NLF is inevitable.

b. The U.S. is finding itself politically isolated from its Free World support.

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Instruct them to pressure indigenous Communist parties in Free World Nations in an attempt to induce them to organize demonstrations and riots against U.S. Embassies and other official installations, especially in Paris, Tokyo and London (if possible).

3. Public statements in medium low key expressing understanding, sympathy and compassion with the U.S. high government official who resigned, as well as the position of the Mothers of the Sons in Viet Nam, using these statements to reiterate the fact that military strength cannot, over the long haul, defeat the masses of the Vietnamese people.

4. Privately caution the North Vietnamese not to get over their heads in overtures on negotiations, and to continue to insist on the withdrawal of all foreign forces prior to negotiation.

5. Our ambassador in Paris to make a maximum effort to convince De Gaulle that U.S. defeat in Viet Nam is inevitable, and request his assistance by pressures within NATO to bring about U.S. withdrawal from SE Asia. In turn we would indicate our belief that French proposals for ending the war are generally constructive. We would take the slant that we are interested in a U.S. withdrawal, not in communizing SE Asia, and that we would welcome continued French influence there after a settlement. Of course, we would not honor this arrangement after the settlement if eventually it were to our advantage not to do so.

6. As to Japan -

a. We would intensify our invitations to cultural and trade delegations to visit China.

b. We would invite fairly sizable numbers of members of the Japanese PIET (friendly members of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese Socialist Party) to come to China on a fact-finding mission.

c. Attempt, through covert means to stimulate demonstrations and riots within Japan against the US - making an issue of US use of Japanese bases in support of the war in Viet Nam.

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7. As to Africa - we would increase our propaganda on the racial issue - White vs Asian.

MILITARY

In the military area - we would:

1. Continue shipping supplies to North Viet Nam, making use of our sea and river routes as well as roads and trails.

2. Increase our military readiness in South China, continuing to reiterate that we will send volunteers if asked. Meanwhile, we will covertly continue to establish a logistical base in South China and North Viet Nam to support combat operations by our forces.

3. Move air defense units into North Viet Nam to protect the vital rail LOC to China.

4. We will not flaunt - by testing or by atomic maneuvers - our growing nuclear capability.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

In the psychological field, we will:

1. Send volunteer "civilians" to North and South Viet Nam - posing as medical assistants and ambulance drivers, technicians and the like.

2. Attempt to use former Thai Prime Minister Pridi, now in Peking, for propaganda purposes.

3. We would attempt to exploit tensions and incidents resulting from the increased American presence in Saigon. Our only action with respect to negotiations at this time would be to discuss with Hanoi the establishment of covert contact immediately with General Thi offering him a deal which would promise the majority of the present high level military commanders and Buddhist of Central Viet Nam, important positions in a coalition government of South Viet Nam.

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ECONOMIC

Our private position on a negotiated settlement includes these principal points:

1. A coalition government of South Viet Nam dominated by the NLF.
2. Removal of all foreign military, commercial and private aircraft from South Viet Nam.
3. Withdrawal of all foreign forces prior to settlement.
4. Ending of all foreign aid.
5. Implement the Geneva Accords of 1954.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM GREEN TO CONTROL

MOVE No. II

The Soviet leadership met early today to review the world situation prior to commencing New Year festivities.

GOALS

Our long range goals as stated in July remain valid. The developments in the last six months have generally been favorable to our course.

ESTIMATE OF SITUATION

The main lines of the situation as we now see it are:

1. The political situation is improving from our viewpoint while showing signs of significant deterioration for the United States.

2. The military situation is not quite so favorable for us - mainly because the United States may not feel pushed to dangerous escalation in an effort to extricate itself from a multitude of political commitments.

Therefore our primary effort will be to bring political pressures to bear to force the United States to reconsider its dangerous posture in Viet Nam to cease military actions "before it is too late" and to take the initiative in developing a situation in which the United States may be forced to consider a negotiated settlement in Viet Nam involving an eventual U.S. withdrawal. Also, we can undoubtedly begin to increase our political influence with Hanoi at the expense of Peking. The political situation in Saigon is such that the creation of a neutralized South Viet Nam within our sphere of influence may soon be obtainable.

SPECIAL NOTES

To contribute to these objectives, we have decided to take the following steps:

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1. Send one of our members, with both Party and Government functions; to Hanoi on January second to deliver a message on the desirability of negotiations. The instructions which we have agreed upon for this emissary are attached.

2. Proceed next week to publish the 1966 budget, which we have taken the unusual step of holding up beyond the usual mid-December time of announcement, indicating our intention to increase defense expenditures by three billion rubles, simultaneously we will announce that other appropriate measures to build up our armed forces are being taken.

3. In the event of a favorable response from Hanoi, we will send Mr. Gromyko to Washington to privately inform the U.S. of the desirability of a negotiated settlement and of the Moscow-Hanoi initiative in this regard.

Our instructions for our emissary to Hanoi are:

I. Enumerate the many compelling reasons which establish the fact that the U.S. would be likely to agree to negotiate on terms favorable to Hanoi:

A. In the U.S., domestic pressures in opposition to the continuation of present U.S. policy are mounting. These pressures have seen a culmination in the resignation yesterday of a high official protest over Viet Nam policies.

B. Internationally, pressure on the U.S. from its major allies are likewise contributing to the necessity for a change of policy -- NATO is in disarray, the governments of Japan and the Philippines may be forced to demand a modification of U.S. policies. Thailand and the Republic of Korea are becoming increasingly concerned that continuation of hostilities in Viet Nam may bring overt Chinese involvement.

C. Political and economic disintegration in South Viet Nam is threatening, making it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to carry on the war and at the same time depriving the U.S. of its public justification as a defender of South Vietnamese sovereignty at the request of South Viet Nam.

D. The U.S. is undoubtedly concerned at the danger of an imminent massive intervention by the Chinese.

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II. Point out the extent to which the USSR has loyally supported Hanoi and the contribution we have made in various ways to bring about the favorable climate for negotiations on our terms:

A. We have contributed substantially to the defense of the DRV with both technical personnel and with hardware.

B. We have contributed to the international isolation of the U.S. through pressure on neutrals and in particular through the Warsaw Pact measures and pressures on Berlin which have led to increasing concern among NATO allies and increased questioning of viability of U.S. military capability to aid in defense of Europe.

III. Make certain that Hanoi understands the dangers involved, both for the DRV and for the world, in failure to seek a negotiated settlement:

A. The USSR, like the DRV and other socialist states, has an over-riding concern for world peace and continues to make every effort to avoid a major war which would be destructive to all concerned.

B. In this connection, both the USSR and the U.S. in their treatment of the SAM incident in late July refrained from openly acknowledging a US-Soviet confrontation. Both we and the US know, however, that the missiles were supplied by the USSR and that we are involved in manning the SAM defenses. At the same time, training of North Vietnamese SAM crews is nearing completion, as the US knows. The Americans may be less reluctant to attack Hanoi and its defenses when they are not faced with a possible US-Soviet confrontation at the missile sites.

C. The frustrations now facing the US indicate that, barring a face-saving solution for the US, the Americans may be on the verge of a fresh escalation. Any extension of bombardments would bring greatly increased suffering to NVN and possibly lead to a situation where negotiations, when reached, would be under less favorable circumstances from our point of view.

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D. The USSR will of course continue to honor its commitments to aid Hanoi. Successful interdiction of rail lines however, and continued Chinese intransigence on the matter of over flights makes it increasingly difficult for our deliveries to get through. For that reason, Hanoi must consider the probability that the aid which will be needed in the event of further US attacks can come only from the CPR, with all the attendant risks of greater Chinese involvement in Hanoi's internal affairs.

IV. Explain to Hanoi that we are prepared to undertake certain specific steps in the world arena aimed at 1) ensuring that the US will come to the table and 2) weakening Washington's position during the course of talks:

A. We would quietly convey to the Americans that if they acquiesce in a Moscow-Hanoi initiative for a settlement in Viet Nam, we feel that the heat which has grown up in Europe and which threatens US-Soviet relations will be reduced somewhat. At the same time we would, of course, pose veiled threats of our capacity to cause difficulties in Europe.

B. We would call the attention of the US to the rapid Chinese build up of forces in sensitive areas, point out that we are in no position to influence Peking, and remind them of our treaty commitments to the CPR and of the fact that that which unites the socialist comity is much stronger than that which divides.

C. We would continue to exploit divisive opportunities with America's allies, thereby encouraging them to urge the US to call off its aggression in Viet Nam.

1. Specifically, in the disarmament contest, that unless the US immediately renounces its MLF/ANF plans, we would announce, we would proceed to implement the plan announced a year ago for establishing a system for nuclear sharing among Warsaw Pact states.

2. We would encourage de Gaulle to go through with his threat to demand the withdrawal of NATO forces from French territory. In addition to the usual blandishments, we might encourage de Gaulle to visit Moscow, coupling with the usual invitation, the suggestion that we wished to discuss in concrete terms

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the convening of a conference on European security or, possibly, the role which he might play as a mediator in the Viet Nam situation.

3. In order to compound American difficulties in Japan, we would be prepared to renew our invitation of a year ago to Prime Minister Sato to visit Moscow, this time suggesting that we might be interested in hearing his views on former Japanese territories now occupied by the USSR, but in a broader context which would make mention of the US-occupied territories, Okinawa and the Bonins.

D. We would continue to encourage the non-aligned nations to oppose US policies and would particularly urge the Committee of 17 to maintain pressures on the US.

E. The US undoubtedly would refuse to negotiate unless the Saigon Government were included. At the same time, to ensure as favorable an outcome as possible we would make it clear that representatives of the NLFSV would have to be admitted to the table with an equal voice.

CONTINGENCY

Should either Hanoi or Washington refuse to respond positively to our initiatives looking toward an immediate commencement of negotiations we would be forced once more to review the world situation from a long-range viewpoint, to determine which is our predominant interest prevention of a major confrontation with the US, or preservation of our prestige and leadership in the Communist World.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL MOVE NO. II

GENERAL

On this New Years Eve, United States policy planners met to assess the rapidly changing world situation. Their conclusions were that the world scene appears to favor our actions to date. The war in Viet Nam is going as planned militarily. Specific world problems in most areas are not too great. A detailed summary of political, psychological, economic and military assessments along with proposed actions was made known late this afternoon.

POLITICAL

The political shakeup in Saigon provided a major area of discussion. Upon learning of the "Shakeup" two weeks ago, the President asked Ambassador Lodge to meet with General Thi and seek answers to the following questions:

- a. What are Thi's intentions?
- b. What is the composition of the new government?
- c. Why hasn't Thi moved to Saigon?
- d. How is the situation really developing?

A report received from Ambassador Lodge this morning points out that Thi's government has been misrepresented in the press. The new government is really only a reshuffling of key personnel. Thi explained that the military counsel felt that General Ky was really needed to run the air force. Thi retains his position as Chief of State. Thi reaffirmed his government's commitments to continue the war, stabilize the government, strengthen the armed forces and to cope with the economic/psychological situation. Thi explained his presence in Hue in terms of wanting to retain command of his corps and to disassociate himself with the rotten politics in Saigon. Our Ambassador points out that General Thi is the first premier with troops under his direct command, and the fact they are located adjacent to the DRV border. Thi questions the resolve of the American people as demonstrated by the resignation of the high ranking officer. Mr. Lodge assured Thi of our good intentions. Based on this news, our government decided to support Thi while continuing to plan for further political contingencies.

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Security conditions permitting, Vice President Humphrey will visit Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea.

He will inform the Thai's that we are prepared to provide the MAP add-on they requested. While there, we will propose that Thailand investigate the feasibility of a SEATO exercise to include a US Army brigade.

In the Philippines, the Vice President will discuss current problems and generate good will. The Taiwan visit will be accompanied by a show of force by elements of the Seventh Fleet.

Major areas will be explored to strengthen our ties with Japan. In pursuit of President Kennedy's March 1963 policy statements some minor concessions will be offered to Japan pertaining to Okinawa. It will be stressed that these arrangements will not jeopardize our operational base in Okinawa. Further, discussions will include concessions on textile imports, as well as civil air arrangements. The future of IWO JIMA will be discussed and we will renew our assurances to provide security to Japan.

The Republic of Korea will be reminded of our years of military and economic aid. We will promise more purchases from South Korea to bolster South Viet Nam. Mr. Humphrey will push to obtain the promised ROK Division in South Viet Nam.

In the event the Chicom activity continues opposite Taiwan, we will establish 7th Fleet patrols in the straits consonant with our capabilities.

The situation in NATO will continue to be handled using personal diplomacy. De Gaulle will be ignored for the present. Efforts to support Mr. Wilson will continue-particularly in the economic field.

The White House released an announcement that the two eldest children of the British royal family will spend the remainder of the long Christmas Holiday at the ranch as guests of President and Mrs. Johnson.

A responsible source commenting on the resignation of the government official minimized the importance of the incident by stating that all responsible people know that the administration is striving for a meaningful peace in Viet Nam.

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In this respect, our new Ambassador in Algiers is striving to establish a dialogue with DRV diplomats in that country. It is hoped that these efforts may lead to the conference table.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

A feeling was evidenced that world opinion will soon fall our way as a result of continuing efforts to obtain peace in South East Asia. In the meantime, government efforts are being accelerated to educate our people at home as to our purpose for being in Viet Nam. In fact, there are signs that a crystalization of views is starting to develop among our educators and students.

ECONOMIC

Meanwhile, the economic situation in Viet Nam is not considered critical. Government economists consider a modest inflation desirable. Local efforts such as the introduction of military payment certificates to US forces and control of grain prices in Viet Nam are being used to control the inflation. The US freighter sunk in Saigon harbor was not considered important in view of our recently completed port facilities elsewhere.

MILITARY

Stories of degradation of US forces in Europe due to the drain imposed by Viet Nam were termed unreal.

Militarily we are in good shape in Viet Nam. Our troops have secured their bases. As additional troops arrive we should see an increase in the US offensive action in seeking out and destroying the Viet Cong.

Growing demands that more Vietnamese troops be released from combat for security missions and to act as local government officials are being studied in Washington.

Bombings of North Viet Nam will continue to increase at the present controlled pace.

High level efforts to streamline command and control procedures are progressing. The United States has proposed the formation of a Joint and Combined Command with

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a ARVN general as Commander-in-Chief and the Senior US general as his deputy. Australia, New Zealand and other nations contributing forces would be represented on the staff.

If the GVN agrees to this arrangement, combat operations should improve significantly. This point has the highest US government backing.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

SIGMA II-65

SCENARIO FOR MOVE III

As of this date, September 4th, 1966, events in Southeast Asia have attained a striking new level of complexity. However, prospects for some form of negotiation appear better than at any previous time. Nevertheless, there are some disquieting factors.

Before discussing the new major initiative toward negotiations which has attracted interest and support from governments and peoples on both sides of the "Iron" and "Bamboo" curtains, it would be well to review some developments of the last several months.

Militarily, the level of US and allied forces in South Viet Nam has been progressively expanded, but has fallen well short of the target set last summer.

Operating under Joint and Combined Command Structure in which a Vietnamese General, assisted by a US Deputy exercises broad authority over the field forces, most of the ground engagements to date have been fought at the company and platoon level. Few of the brigade and larger size operations which have been aggressively launched into Viet Cong strongholds have yielded significant enemy casualties, although the third such foray into War Zone D last April did cause major enemy losses. Persistent and energetic pursuit actions and around the clock efforts to force VC units to fight have succeeded in reducing the enemy's capability to prepare the painstaking and well-rehearsed attacks and ambushes that in times past played havoc with RVN forces. Recently reconstituted RVN units, backed by increased air-lift and American fire support have likewise been doing well, particularly in the two northern corps areas.

During the last dry season most of the Viet Cong initiative seemed to center on the Delta area, involving the III and IVth Corps of the RVN. It is widely believed, in fact, that regular North Vietnamese units have joined the VC in southern Viet Nam, having infiltrated by sea and in steadily mounting numbers from Cambodia. There is little doubt that important VC forces

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in Cambodia's sanctuaries are receiving important logistical support under the noses of the Cambodian government. Recent ground probes into Cambodia by RVN/US forces have been alleged by the fiery Prince Sihanouk and there is increasing evidence of Red Chinese military advisors and technicians being in that country.

The VC appear determined to offset American increases and it is estimated that regular enemy strength in SVN is now in excess of 100,000 men.

Terrorism, especially urban terrorism has been boosted with a steady toll of assassinated Americans including civilians, that can now almost be predicted in Saigon. This coupled with massive difficulties involved in feeding, ministering to, and housing the inhabitants of Saigon and other cities have created obstacles to a build-up in popular support. Inflation, in spite of imaginative and constructive efforts to control it, is rampant. Interdiction of food and charcoal deliveries to the cities, the destruction of POL storage facilities and physical limitations on the government's ability to receive and distribute rice have created chaotic conditions. VC infiltrators among the refugees and student groups are exploiting these conditions to the fullest.

The small number of competent administrators, even augmenting with RVN junior officers in these duties, plus the general lack of experience in solving complex problems of rationing, price control, combating black marketing and graft have all taken a toll.

There have been rumors afloat that General Thi, the Premier who reluctantly moved to Saigon from his former I Corps Area, has fallen out with the so-called "Saigon Generals."

The often obstreperous and definitely Nationalist Thi, who in August demanded withdrawal of the American Field Force Commander and made it stick, now appears to be out of step not only with the other military commanders and the

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American high command but also with Buddhist leaders who up to now appeared to support him.

For months there were strong indications that the Buddhist Monk Tri Quang had strong influence over General Thi and that both the Buddhists and Thi were engaged in clandestine discussions with the Viet Cong aimed at establishing some sort of coalition -- a kind of popular front with the National Liberation Front.

Before his assassination, General Khiem, former member of the 1964 triumvirate, accused Thi of planning an autonomous Central Vietnamese republic in the five northern provinces of South Viet Nam. This allegation has been vigorously denied by General Thi. Thi, contrary to expectations, has since that time struggled to formulate and gain acceptance of tax and economic reforms. In step with his program to do more for the peasants, some USOM operations have been released from some bureaucratic requirements for auditing and programming.

As civil unrest continues in the urban areas and differences continue between Catholic and Buddhist officers and troops, the so-called National Liberation Front has been making efforts to achieve wider recognition of its status as a legitimate government. Invitations to foreign journalists to visit Viet Cong controlled areas have led to the belief in some quarters that the NLF is genuinely approaching the point where it would accept a proposal for UN controlled elections.

Certain US/RVN military operations aimed at flushing and destroying VC units have resulted in situations involving civilian casualties all of which has been played up with potent effect in the world propaganda program underwritten by the USSR, DRV and Red China.

While American air-mobile and other units have succeeded in keeping the VC off balance and in many cases on the run and in disrupting their logistical and administrative support, the psychological effects of US casualties in the Vietnamese countryside have been exploited cleverly in the Communist and neutral press.

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These actions, coupled with US air escalation against North Vietnamese power plants and petroleum facilities, even tho done after sabotage of similar installations in SVN, have posed serious problems for John Chancellor's Voice of America, and political problems in the United States as elections approach.

Prominent Republican leaders are calling for complete destruction of North Viet Nam's industrial base, and for aerial mining and blockade of the entire country.

Former Secretary X on the other hand, followed by a growing number of Administration supporters is beginning to sound like Presidential timber in 1968. He, yesterday strongly urged that the President accept Premier Shastri's proposal for discussions in Rangoon.

As students return to campuses around the country for the second year of major American involvement in the South-east Asian war, there are many teach-ins scheduled by partisans on both sides of the central issue. Seven state governors have issued statements critical of current policies, calling for demobilization of National Guard units now approaching the ends of their terms of service. This demand comes at a time when service in SVN and terms of service of regulars will thereby need to be extended if our forces are to be kept at present levels.

Lacking military successes which seem to bring a decision, pressure to "Bring the Boys" home and negotiate a solution is finding more editorial support in the US press than at any previous time and several seats in the forthcoming Congressional election are being contested on this issue.

Abroad, pressure from left leaning, negotiation-seeking elements of the Labor Party is reputed to be the real reason for cancellation of a visit by the Royal Children to the President's Texas Ranch although this was vehemently denied today by the Foreign Office.

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In Viet Nam the dull routine of war includes such tasks as defense of the several US base complexes, each by sizeable US ground elements, the patrol of coastal and inland waters by a variety of US/RVN naval forces and the steady tempo of air attacks against military targets and selected economic targets in North Viet Nam. An unexplained explosion recently damaged a carrier on patrol off the Delta causing the vessel to limp back to base for repairs.

In Asia, South Korea finally provided a division of Infantry in early Spring for service in SVN, and the influx of US military procurement orders have impacted on the economics of both Korea and Japan.

Premier Sato of Japan recently refused his third invitation from Moscow and his second invitation for major trade delegations to visit Peking, although leftist pressure along the latter line continues.

US agreement to recent Japanese demands regarding the islands of Okinawa, Iwo Jima, trade agreements involving textiles and air line agreements extending Japanese air links beyond New York have been significant factors.

With respect to negotiations, there have been several proposals over the past eight months for diplomatic meetings to deal with the mounting war. The NLF proposal of last January found few takers. De Gaulle in March proposed that the contestants meet on neutral ground, implying that Paris was available. U Thant has been continually conducting private discussions with the principals as well as figures such as Premier Shastri of India. Two days ago Shastri proposed that there be a meeting in Rangoon of representatives of the governments involved, including the NLF. NeWin quickly indicated no objection to the meeting, and U Thant supported it strongly. The Shastri's proposal was tied to the US President's recent offer for unconditional negotiations and the Pham Vam Dang proposals from Hanoi made a year ago last spring.

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Yesterday, in Saigon, the Buddhist Tri Quang, made one of his enigmatic speeches. While endorsing the Shastri proposal he went on to state that Viet Nam has long enough been made a battleground, that Vietnamese should now be able to settle their own affairs, and that President Johnson should now tell the Vietnamese people his plan for departure of US troops on the assumption the conference is successful.

General Thi, true to his recent form, immediately announced that Shastri's conference proposal is unacceptable in its present form.

In Laos. Souvanna Phouma is reported to have commented privately to our Ambassador yesterday that he believes he will give up his heavy load and return to Paris if some immediate progress is not made on negotiations. He is tired of threatened rightist coups.

In the atmosphere of these events, the President yesterday announced that he was working with his advisors over the Labor Day weekend.

Usually reliable sources indicate he is giving consideration to a plan recently presented by an interdepartmental study group called the "Blue Team" for reduction or withdrawal of US efforts in Viet Nam in the face of popular SVN pressures as well as the pressing questions of whether and under what terms the US will meet in Rangoon.

Similar meetings are today going forward in Hanoi, Peking, Saigon, Moscow, the UN and other capitals.

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FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 2

MOVE NO. III

SCENARIO SUPPLEMENT FOR MOVE III

Two weeks ago the President directed that an inter-departmental working group informally named the Blue Team, prepare a study to include U.S. courses of action and recommendations on the assumption that a situation arose in SVN in which the US presence was becoming unwelcome with a likelihood of being invited out.

Yesterday morning the President asked to have the study placed on his desk today.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM BLACK TO ALL TRAMS

MOVE NO. III

The NLF announced today through their representatives in Cairo, Algiers and New Delhi that they would welcome a conference such as that advocated by Premier Shastri. The NLF wants only peace and a free democratic government in South Vietnam. In its search for peace the NLF is willing to join in a conference without precondition. The NLF welcomes the opportunity to sit down and develop a peaceful settlement directly with the foreigners.

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FROM BLACK TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 2

MOVE NO. III

The NLF representative will not establish any restrictions or minimum conditions for sitting down at a conference table other than that of being recognized as a principal and a voting member.

We have passed the word thru a number of the 17 Nations, particularly Egypt and Algeria, that we will go to the conference proposed by Premier Shastri without any pre-conditions except that we be recognized as a principal.

In order for any negotiations to reach a successful conclusion, however, the NLF will insist on three minimum conditions. These are an actual return to conditions specified in the 1954 Geneva Accords, withdrawal of all foreign military forces, and finally, the holding of free elections by 1 July 1967.

We are convinced that if we can get the U.S. out of the country, we can win any elections that might be conducted. We have observed the accelerated growth of anti-Americanism among the population. We are convinced that this is a result largely of recalling the French Colonial image and stirring again the feeling of Vietnamese nationalism. The Vietnamese see, as they did prior to 1954, tens of thousands of white soldiers; there is de-facto command of the Vietnamese military by white foreigners, and there is over-all U.S. military primacy with a subordinate role being delegated to the Vietnamese soldiers.

To take maximum advantage of these conditions, we have announced the establishment of autonomous Montagnards, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao states, and have guaranteed NLF support to Y-Bham in his efforts towards Montagnard autonomy. We are confident that these steps will serve not only to unify these groups behind the NLF cause, but will also seriously disrupt GVN pacification and military efforts in the critical border regions.

Since its inception in December 1965, we have continued to enhance the position of the National Vietnamese Peace Party. The aim throughout has been to create a front whose

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image is one, not of primarily communism, but rather one which encompasses the views of all Vietnamese who desire peace, freedom, and social progress.

We have applied special effort to solicit the support of Vietnamese patriots, particularly those who are in political exile or political limbo, and who have large public following.

We are particularly encouraged by the possibility of a successful effort with General "BIG" Minh. We have instructed his brother, our General Don, publicly to invite "Big" Minh to join with him in efforts toward peace which will reunify the divided families who are needlessly fighting for foreign political objectives.

Covertly we have contacted, not only "Big" Minh, but also the Dalat Generals and other public figures who have demonstrated an inclination toward a truly neutralist solution.

Covertly through our agents in the GVN, we have vigorously encouraged a coup to depose such anti-communists as Thi and Ky and install a neutralist government which would invite the foreigners to leave Viet Nam.

Throughout 1966 our military strategy has been one of constant pressure against the ARVN and US and other foreign Imperialist forces, but at the same time we have avoided large set piece confrontation with the US forces.

Since July, we have been massing forces in positions to attack and overrun soft spots which we have selected in areas which would tend to overextend the US and ARVN lines of communication. In this way we will enhance our interdiction and ambush capability. Although preparations have been underway for several months, initiation of the offensive is being withheld pending progress in the Rangoon Conference. For example, in case a cease fire agreement appears imminent, we will move swiftly to seize these critical targets so as to stabilize the military situation in a condition more favorable to NLF. Or, if our position at the conference table requires strengthening, we may also initiate this action.

The same general measures which have been used so successfully over the past 18 months will continue to form the basis of our tactics to disrupt the floundering national economy.

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MESSAGE No. 1

FROM RED TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

Agree to meet at Rangoon.

Conditions:

1. NLF must have a seat.
2. Discussions of Viet Nam situation shall be on the basis of the 4 pts of Pham Vam Dong.

NOTE: By ridicule, seek to stifle talk of UN-controlled elections.

(PRIVATE: DRV agrees to explore possibilities for a settlement - does not acknowledge that Rangoon talks constitute "negotiations".

Flexible re other participants provided USSR included.)

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM RED TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

ASSUMPTION

Hardships for the people of North Viet Nam have increased but not to the point of open dissidence or a threat to our regime's control. In the absence of punishing attacks on the urban centers, we remain determined and able to continue resistance if required. We count on our Chinese ally to fill our acute shortages of items necessary to continue the war, including sufficient POL through Haiphong to meet essential military needs. We would like to see a halt in military operations under conditions that would not frustrate our long term goals, but we believe the internal and external pressures on the U.S. for a settlement are greater than on us.

RANGOON TALKS

Our reaction to Shastri's call for a meeting in Rangoon will be essentially the same in public and private. The DRV is ready to join in exploratory talks on the situation in Viet Nam:

- (1) On the basis of the 4 points of Premier Phan Vam Dong, and
- (2) Provided the NLF is seated as "representative of the people of South Viet Nam".

In discussing arrangements with our allies and prospective neutral participants, we will work toward the following objectives and positions:

- (1) We will not be pressured into the meeting and would prefer to have Shastri's project collapse rather than have the meeting under unfavorable circumstances.
- (2) Assuming that there will be numerous participants, we are flexible as to who attends (including U-Thant's presence) but would strongly argue for Soviet participation. We would tacitly accept presence of the Saigon "clique".

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(3) We would see some advantage in stalling the meeting until after the American elections and will work to that end but will not allow ourselves to be exposed for foot dragging.

(4) In advance of the meeting we will not acknowledge that the talks constitute "negotiations" for settlement of the Viet Nam problem.

If the meeting takes place we will initially demand that the 4 points constitute the agenda. If this is not accepted we will daily restate the position that these points constitute the basis for our participation. If the Yankee air attacks on our homeland have not ceased, we will demand such a cessation arguing that talks are meaningless while such aggression continues. If the talks show signs of progress we are willing to move toward the following positions:

(1) Accept short term cease fire recognizing that if situation in SVN deteriorates, violations could be staged to place blame on Imperialist side.

(2) On withdrawal of forces, we would make no public withdrawal of PAVN units although willing to undertake "not to employ DRV forces in SVN."

Should withdrawal of foreign forces be agreed, we would phase actual withdrawal of PAVN units in proportion to American reduction of strength recognizing that the US would know this is happening but publicly identifying individuals as North Vietnamese who went south to help their brothers and who have asked "to return home". We would be prepared to accept some form of international supervision.

(3) On political arrangements for SVN, our position remains the adoption of the NLF program with formation of a coalition government including the NLF as the minimum requirement. We will not accept a so called "neutralist" government formed by the Saigon "clique" without the NLF.

(4) On elections, we would not seek to obstruct NLF agreement to elections in SVN and would accept international supervision thereof. Under Phan Van Dong's fourth point, we would refuse to discuss elections in North Viet Nam. We would quietly discourage NLF interests in talk of UN controlled elections and publicly seek, by ridicule, to stifle talk of such elections.

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POLITICAL

Although it has not been completely successful, our effort to subvert General Thi and detach central Viet Nam has had helpful results. To further embarrass American relations with Thi and to promote instability in Saigon, we will continue our mild treatment of Thi, and our hard political line against the Saigon Generals. To encourage Tri Quang's supporters in Central Viet Nam, we will continue the pattern of contrast between vigorous pressure in III and IV Corps and moderation toward the people and authorities in Central Viet Nam.

MILITARY

Before any talks commence in Rangoon, we will encourage heavy Viet Cong attacks, concentrated in III and IV Corps, except for widespread but small scale harassment of ARVN positions. During the talks, if the Imperialists are still bombing us we will continue these attacks. If the bombings cease we will significantly curtail major attacks but continue harassment. If a cease fire is agreed we would urge the NLF to give the appearance of compliance. If the talks seemed to be moving toward a settlement, we would halt terror against Vietnamese civilians; but, in the absence of a cease fire, we would continue small scale harassment of ARVN.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Prior to any meeting in Rangoon and the cessation of bombings we would demand loudly that the Americans create the proper atmosphere for these talks by halting the bombings and their atrocities in the south. We will make maximum psychological effort in this regard but not state it as a condition for Rangoon. We would exploit to the maximum all statements by SVN individuals or groups favoring peace, neutrality and settlement. A world wide effort will be mounted to identify American withdrawal as the key to settlement and to obtain general acceptance of the NLF as the legitimate representative of the SVN people.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM YELLOW TO ALL TEAMS MOVE NO. III

Privately we would urge the DRV and the NLF to resist entering negotiations in the belief that our present course of action is successful, that time is on our side, and that eventually victory is assured.

Publicly we would approve in principle the idea of negotiations provided all foreign troops were withdrawn and that negotiations (not to take place until withdrawal completed) for settlement of the RVN problem be confined to the participants, i.e., NLF and GVN.

Prior to any talks we would insist that the PHAM VAM DONG points be accepted as the basis for negotiations.

Our private position on a negotiated settlement includes these principal points:

1. A coalition government of SVN dominated by the NLF.
2. Removal of all foreign military, commercial, and private aircraft from South Viet Nam.
3. Withdrawal of all foreign forces prior to settlement.
4. Ending of all foreign aid.
5. Unification of Viet Nam as called for in the Geneva Accords of 1954.

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FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 2

MOVE NO. III

STRATEGY

Our long range strategy of bringing about US defeat in or withdrawal from Viet Nam without provoking the US to direct attacks on China remains unchanged.

We feel we are winning. Our political and psychological activities to isolate the US world-wide are bearing fruit; US domestic support of US presence in Viet Nam is divided, and Saigon confidence in the US is uncertain.

On the surface the military situation may appear to be a stalemate. In fact, however, - so long as the Viet Cong are not being defeated, they are winning, - for the NLF psychological/political apparatus continues to function in areas under VC control.

We acknowledge that there is a good chance now of taking over South Viet Nam through a negotiated settlement and free elections. However, time is on our side; we are getting stronger and the US is finding itself more and more isolated and unproductive. Therefore, we do not favor negotiations now.

Privately we would urge the DRV and the NLF to resist entering into negotiations at this time. We would also urge them to avoid any political solution involving UN or ICC supervision of elections, seeing in such supervision a device for prolonging the US presence in Viet Nam.

Publicly we would approve in principle the idea of negotiations, provided all foreign troops were withdrawn, and that negotiations (not to begin until the withdrawal completed) be limited to the participants, that is to the NLF and CVN. Prior to any talks we would insist that the Pham Van Dong points be accepted as a basis for negotiations.

Our private position on a negotiated settlement includes these principle points:

- (1) A coalition government of South Viet Nam dominated by the NLF.
- (2) Removal of all foreign military, commercial, and private aircraft from South Viet Nam.
- (3) Withdrawal of all foreign forces prior to settlement.

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(4) Ending of all foreign aid.

(5) Unification of Viet Nam as called for in the Geneva Accords of 1954.

Our tactics for the next few months would be in general as follows:

POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

In the political/psychological field -

1. To recognize the NLF as the government - the only legitimate government - of South Viet Nam, and establish diplomatic relations with it.

2. To endorse and publicize all charges by Sihanouk of aggression against Cambodia. To increase our commitment to assist Cambodia with pledges to treat aggression against it as aggression against China and to send volunteers if called.

3. To continue our world-wide propaganda political action effort to coalesce world opinion - public and governmental - against US actions in South Viet Nam. Our efforts to obtain diplomatic support would be directed especially at the Afro-Asian Bloc, and individual leaders such as Ayub, Nasser and Nkrumah.

4. To continue to sponsor insurgent movements, adjacent to Viet Nam, to further disrupt political stability - hoping to gain the cooperation of former Thai Prime Minister Pridi in the Thailand liberation struggle.

MILITARY

Our analysis of the military situation is that our actions to date have not led to direct confrontation with the US and that the danger of US attack on China has not substantially increased.

The US has not challenged the presence of our "advisors" and "civilian volunteers" in Cambodia and South Viet Nam and we have not acknowledged losses of our military and civilian personnel killed in US attacks in North Viet Nam.

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Privately, we would not want to see reunification until such time as our influence in Vietnam is sufficient to prevail over Chinese influence.

Since the danger of a Soviet-US confrontation has diminished at this time, we feel that we have a particularly strong negotiating position. Therefore, we do not feel the need to be understanding of the US position.

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MESSAGE No. 1

FROM GREEN TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

Soviet Union will be happy to participate in the Rangoon Meeting if any one thinks we could play a useful role. However, we are not directly involved in the situation which exists in Southeast Asia today.

We of course reiterate our support of our socialist allies.

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FORM GREEN TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

GENERAL

The leadership of the Soviet Union met today to discuss its position with regard to Prime Minister Shastri's proposal that talks concerning the Southeast Asian situation be conducted in Rangoon.

The Soviet Union wishes to make the following announcement in this connection: In the interest of world peace and because of our desire to see a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Southeast Asia, we would favorably entertain an invitation to assist in discussions concerning this problem. We have repeatedly stated we are deeply concerned with the continued Imperialist aggression against the peoples of Viet Nam.

Privately, our position on the issue of representation at the Rangoon talks has been to confine participation to the principals involved in the conflict, in the hope of minimizing Chinese influence. However, the present circumstances foresee much broader interest than originally anticipated. Therefore, to insure consideration of Soviet interests, where contrary to Chinese interests, we will participate.

SOVIET POSITION CONCERNING TALKS

During the course of the talks our position on some key issues will be as follows:

1. Publically we intend to press for a solution of the Viet Nam question on the basis of the four points of Pham Van Dong. However, in the event the talks are threatened by US intransigence, we would privately indicate a willingness for some compromise in our position. This would show a willingness to consider US proposals for discussion.
2. We support a settlement based on a neutralized coalition government for South Vietnam. This government should be formed in accordance with terms expressed by the National Liberation Front. Privately we will hold out for a government with at least one third National Liberation Front representation in key posts within the Central government of SVN.

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In the Provincial governments we will hold out for continued National Liberation Front defacto control which has been gained to date.

3. Publicly, we will call for an immediate cease-fire in all of Viet Nam and withdrawal of foreign troops prior to formation of a neutralized coalition government. This supports Pham Van Dong's first point.

Privately we will accept a cease fire throughout North and South Viet Nam at a later date, timed to coincide with the formation of a neutralized coalition government. This government to be composed of representatives of the National Liberation Front and the Republic of Viet Nam faction. We demand immediate withdrawal of all foreign combat forces concurrently with the formation of the coalition government. This will be followed by the expeditious withdrawal of all remaining foreign military forces and advisory personnel.

4. Publicly we will call for appropriate supervision of the formation of a neutral coalition government, cease fire and withdrawal of foreign forces to insure the imperialists carry out the terms of the agreement.

Privately, our position will be that the old ICC be abolished, and a new International Control Commission be formed to oversee the cease fire and withdrawal of foreign forces. This commission should be comprised of representatives from the Socialist countries who are amenable to our interest and who will exclude Chinese interests.

5. Publicly, we prefer to say nothing on the subject of outside non-military aid but if the subject arises, we would say that it is a matter for a new coalition government to decide.

Privately, we will take no position against future non-military aid missions from outside powers.

6. Publicly we will not voluntarily discuss the issue of Vietnamese reunification. If pressed, we will refer to Pham Van Dong's fourth point which stresses the necessity of the Vietnamese solving this problem without outside interference.

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We are still concerned that the US might feel forced to take some action to threaten the viability and stability of the DRV - such as a blockade, mining, or strikes against industry - although we tend to believe the US would not do so in the present world environment having refrained up until now. Nonetheless, we would have difficulty determining a satisfactory response to such action, for we do not want a direct US/China confrontation, nor do we want to be upstaged by the US.

Specific military actions would include the following:

1. Step up the flow of necessary military supplies to Hanoi, especially POL, making use of our sea and river routes as well as roads and trails. We would favor shipping in foreign vessels.
2. Maintain our air defense capability in North Viet Nam protecting the existing LOC with China, and provide additional personnel in both South China and the DRV to construct or repair additional transportation routes and facilities.
3. Exhort the DRV/NLF to intensify small scale guerilla acts against the US, using terrorism, and causing attrition in manpower and equipment, thus discrediting US force as a "Paper Tiger".
4. Within China, further increase our military defense preparation, mobilize a stand-by "volunteer" military force, and continue our training and equipping of North Vietnamese as required.

Thus we are in effect continuing to execute our present strategy, confident that we can achieve our objectives in Viet Nam with little risk of direct confrontation with the US.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE No. III

1. General. In response to Mr. Shastri's proposal for negotiations in Rangoon, immediate discussions were held with Premier Thi as well as with military, Buddhist and Catholic leaders in Viet Nam. The purpose was to determine Thi's real position as well as to estimate his strength.

2. Vietnamese Situation.

a. GVN. General Thi explained that the idea of negotiating at this point in time was totally unacceptable. He would not sit in on negotiations with the NLF since the NLF is not a government--and he will not recognize it as such. In answer to U.S. assurances that the NLF would not be treated as a government by the U.S., Thi stated his opposition to quitting when his forces are winning. He stated that the offer of the NLF to negotiate is a sign of their weakness. In addition, he objected to all the foreign nations wanting to negotiate essentially a Vietnamese problem. When reminded that we have carried his government a long time, he replied, "You are purely interested in your coming elections. Our problem is to insure that the Communists don't come into power." He further pointed out that President Johnson has agreed to discussions, not negotiations.

A leading U.S. diplomat reminded Thi that he does not have a veto over U.S. policy. He asked Thi what he would do if the U.S. went to Rangoon without him. Thi muttered, "that sounds like a veiled threat." General Thi reminded the U.S. diplomat that the GVN is winning and questioned why the U.S. was not doing more in the North.

b. Catholic. The Catholics stated they were originally reluctant to see Thi take over. However, his determination to prosecute and win the war impressed them. A Catholic leader reminded the US that the Catholics are in South Viet Nam to escape Communism in the North.

c. Buddhist. The Buddhists are lined up solidly behind General Thi's administration and contended the GVN can settle its own affairs.

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d. Other elements. General Thi appears to have the backing of all elements including the Saigon Generals. They all feel that they win the war and see no advantage to negotiating now. All elements indicate they'd like to sit back and see what the President of the US does.

3. Political

a. In Washington, Government officials admitted that this is a tough problem. The US is committed to negotiations. While it would be desirable to have GVN participation at conference, the US must attend -- with or without GVN representation. Based on these developments, the United States decided to:

- (1) Oppose a cease fire prior to the conference.
- (2) Announce to the world that the US government will attend the Rangoon Conference and meet with other governments and other parties interested in the Viet Nam situation (this includes UN and NLF).
- (3) Announce that the US has no preconditions to attending the conference.
- (4) Insist that a preliminary meeting be convened to discuss invitations, detailed arrangements and agenda items. (This is designed to give the US time to solve the problem in Saigon).
- (5) Work behind the scenes to obtain Thi's support or replace him. This action requires finesse to insure that the segment of the US population that wants us to go to the conference table from a position of strength is not alienated. Basic to this approach is a determination of exactly how much strength Thi really has. Care must be exercised not to solidify Thi's support. We will have Catholics and Buddhists from outside Viet Nam exert pressure on Thi. In the event Thi does not go along with us, we will seek to establish a more cooperative government in Saigon. (This is discussed further under contingencies below).
- (6) On the day preceeding the Rangoon Conference, the United States will announce, "As a symbol of our good faith we are initiating a pause in the bombings in the North. However, we reserve the right to resume the bombings in the event infiltration from the north continues or operations in the South are escalated." The rationale here is that we are showing our good intentions while retaining a big stick. We also hope to engender favorable reaction as the conference opens.

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b. Prior to attending the conference the Washington Planners agree that:

(1) The US will conduct preliminary informal discussions with the UK, USSR and India.

(2) A cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam would see both sides jockeying for position. During this period the US should guarantee security while the GVN and US together improve the political and economic situation.

(3) Concurrently with the expanded GVN social and political initiatives during the cease fire/negotiations, the GVN should announce and implement a psychological "Chien hoi" program designed to return the VC to the GVN - a GVN in which the NLF would of necessity have a voice. Some type of coalition government will in any event evolve. The USG-GVN strategy should be one which creates a "coalition" within the GVN apparatus - rather than a coalition of the Laos type in which the GVN must compete with the NLF as a separate, equal body.

(4) The US contemplates that the negotiations would probably be long and drawn out -- lasting perhaps two years.

c. US policies and actions concerning the Rangoon Conference will be:

(1) In an effort to control the participation at the Rangoon Conference, the US will recommend that the following interested parties are included. (France and Communist China are conveniently excluded).

(a) The governments represented on the International Control Commission (ICC) (India, Poland and Canada).

(b) The current belligerents (US, GVN, DRV and VC).

(c) The UK and USSR as co-chairman under the Geneva agreements.

(d) Representation from the UN.

(2) At the opening session, the UK and India will be primed to welcome the US decision to suspend bombings and call on Hanoi to suspend infiltration and support of the VC. They will propose that international units be placed at appropriate locations (Danang, Route 9, Laos and NVN ports) to monitor traffic and provide a buffer.

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(3) The US accepts the principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements.

(4) The US favors an international commission with a measure of authority to carry out the decisions of the Rangoon Conference. It will sit in Saigon and have a military force capable of policing a cease fire. The military force could initially include US troops. US troop participation in the international force is desirable but not mandatory. Phased withdrawal of excess US troops would take place as the international force is able to take over. USOM and other similar agencies would remain as long as desired by the popularly elected government.

(5) The US favors reunification of Viet Nam as a long range objective.

(6) The US favors popular elections in South Viet Nam provided they are supervised by an international commission and are truly free elections. The US will insist on nationwide free elections at any point after the GVN has a popularly elected government.

(7) As a last resort, the US has no objection to establishing an International Trusteeship as a result of the conference.

4. Military. The US military establishment announces revised military plans to compliment these political developments.

a. Prior to the Rangoon Conference there will be a gradual escalation of US military activity in South Viet Nam. Bombings in North Viet Nam will continue at their present level until the US announces cessation of the bombings the day prior to the conference.

b. During the conference the United States will impose sufficient military pressure in South Viet Nam to keep the negotiations meaningful. If genuine progress is made, military activity will be reduced to the minimum level commensurate with overall security to permit strengthening the GVN and providing stability to the countryside. There will be no bombings in North Viet Nam unless warranted.

c. If a cease fire is agreed to, we contemplate withdrawal tied to VC disarmament and DRV repatriation to the North. Our withdrawal will be phased based on the international commission's ability to supervise the cease fire and any requirement to provide troops to the international force.

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5. Contingency. US Planners briefed the President on their recommended courses of action in the event we are invited out of South Viet Nam prematurely. General Thi's reaction to the Rangoon Conference highlighted the importance of this contingency.

a. The US will not leave Viet Nam if asked to go prematurely. We will stay until the situation has improved to the point where a permanent solution to the problem is in sight.

b. We will try to have popular South Vietnamese figures make loud noises in our behalf.

c. If General Thi asks us to go publicly, our position will be made harder. In any event, we will stay. If necessary, we will engineer a "palace uprising" and install a more satisfactory government. We would try to use some leading civilians in Saigon who are now unemployed to form the new government.


d. This could also lead to an international trusteeship which would be acceptable to us.

e. During a period of long negotiations it would be to our advantage to have a loyal government in Saigon. This would insure an atmosphere in South Viet Nam conducive to the progress of the talks. It would preclude an embarrassing crisis.

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

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NORTH VIETNAM

- Catholic concentration
- ▣ Minority groups
- ▭ Autonomous region
- Province boundary
- ⊙ National capital
- Province capital


Province names are same as province capital except where province name is identified by bold type.



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SIGMA II-65

GAME PROCEDURES
(Published Prior to Play)

1. (S) PURPOSE - The purpose of SIGMA II-65 is to explore current problems in Southeast Asia using an inter-agency United States/Republic of Vietnam team as well as selected teams of area experts representing other national and influences concerned. It is hoped that examination of familiar problems and constraints from several national viewpoints under conditions of simulated crisis will lead to:

a. New perspectives on the overall politico-military situation.

b. Better insight into potential problems or windfall opportunities.

c. Ideas to enhance current plans and problems.

d. An array of realistic scenario material against which current and future contingency plans can be evaluated.

2. (C) AGENCIES REPRESENTED - The following organizations are invited to participate in planning, conduct and review of SIGMA II-65:

a. The White House Staff

b. The Department of State

c. The Agency for International Development

d. The United States Information Agency

e. The Central Intelligence Agency

f. The Department of Defense

International Security Affairs (OSD)

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Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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J-5
SACSA

The State-Defense Study Group, China

Army

Navy

Air Force

Marine Corps

3. (S) FORMAT - SIGMA II-65 will depart from the format of recent inter-agency games in that team meetings will be limited to two hours a day, every other day for three moves; the Control group will meet on alternate days for three hours each; and the game review (which will be open to non-participants) will be conducted several days after the final move of the game. The medium of video tape will be employed to prepare an edited account of principal team decisions and control projections for use at the review. This game is expected to begin with an intelligence briefing on the current conflict situation rather than a simulated crisis scenario, although certain game assumptions will be introduced by Control.

4. (U) LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION - SIGMA II-65 is an intermediate, as opposed to a cabinet level game. Participants in playing teams and Control will be selected for individual knowledge and experience in South-east Asia and specific countries involved in the conflict. Grade levels of participants will range from Lt Col/Comdr to Major General/Rear Admiral and civilian equivalents. Senior agency officials will be invited to attend the review and discussion tentatively scheduled for 1600 hours, Thursday 5 August 1965.

5. (U) CLASSIFICATION - SIGMA II-65 will be played for the most part at the SECRET level and final reports will in all probability carry that classification. Some of the material discussed in game rooms may be TOP SECRET

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and all participants should be cleared for that level of information. Individual clearances will be confirmed in writing prior to the game by Administrative Section, CWD.

6. (U) LOCATION - SIGMA II-65 will be conducted in Cold War Game Rooms of the Joint War Games Agency, Room BC 942A next to the US Air Force Command Post in the basement of the Pentagon. The final review and critique will be conducted in the Pentagon.

7. (U) GAME MECHANICS - The organization and method of operation to be employed in SIGMA II-65 is simple. While teams are deliberating, game time is stopped. The game clock is frozen. Time only moves after teams have submitted their decisions to Control and it only moves to the extent determined by the Control Group. Control may advance the situation a few days, weeks or months for subsequent moves and will prepare a scenario projection outlining the results of team moves and other developments. Each team will be required to prepare a brief written message on forms provided outlining its initial broad objectives, its estimate of broad enemy capabilities and intentions and its strategies. It will outline specific political, military, psychological or other actions so that Control may assess possible results. Stochastics (random number techniques) will be used to make certain decisions within the Control Group based on confidence levels established through discussion. Opposition teams may also elect to use these techniques in determining strategies. Teams may only communicate with one another through Control with one major message for each move. Questions regarding substance, assumptions or administration will be addressed to Control through JWGA members with each team.

8. (U) TIME REQUIREMENTS - It is planned that actual participation by color team players can be limited to two hours on Monday, 26 July, Wednesday, 28 July and Friday, 30 July. Control members will meet for approximately three hours on Tuesday, 27 July, and Thursday, 29 July. Team captains who will be selected before the game will be required to spend

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one or two additional hours after discussion periods to prepare concise video tape briefings of team decisions for Control and record purposes.

Daily Schedule for Playing Teams

	<u>Deliberate</u>	<u>Prepare Video</u>	<u>Record</u>
Viet Cong (Black)	0830-1030	1030-1230	1230
DRV (Red)	0930-1130	1130-1330	1330
PRC (Yellow)	1030-1230	1230-1430	1430
USSR (Green)	1130-1330	1330-1530	1530
US/RVN (Blue)	1130-1430	1430-1630	1630
Control Group	0900-1200	1300-1600	1600

9. (U) VIDEO SUPPORT - Concurrent with preparation of video tape briefings of playing team and control output for game communications and analytic purposes, a Video Support Group will assemble a 25-30 minute summary of the game using documentary techniques for presentation to senior participants in the game review and discussion on 5 August. A subsequent kinescope presentation will be prepared including selected material from the review and discussion for inter-agency and other dissemination as appropriate.

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SIGMA II-65

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Director, Joint Staff -----	1
Vice Director, Joint Staff -----	1
Deputy Director, Joint Staff -----	1
CIA -----	15
AID -----	4
USIA -----	3
DIA -----	10
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National War College -----	1
Industrial War College -----	1
Armed Forces Staff College -----	1
Game Director -----	1
Game Participants -----	63
JWGA -----	27
CINCPAC -----	1
NMCSSC -----	1

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Final report of politico-military game SIGMA II-65. Department Of Defense, 20 Aug. 1965. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/5MVQ93>. Accessed 6 Feb. 2018.