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Armed Forces

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
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Philippines

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Armed Forces

A. Defense establishment (S)

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are smaller than the military forces of most Asian nations. They have been developed primarily for internal security and to provide initial defense in case of foreign attack, pending the arrival of U.S. armed assistance. They are capable of maintaining internal security, exercising moderately effective antismuggling control and providing limited air defense. The armed forces consist of four service components and an integrated general headquarters and have a total personnel strength of about 79,000. The Philippine Army (PA) has about 29,000 men; the Philippine Constabulary (PC), 26,900 men; the Philippine Navy (PN), 11,500 men and 122 ships and craft; the Philippine Air Force (PAF), 8,200 men and about 235 aircraft (54 jets); and the General Headquarters, AFP, 3,400 personnel.

The armed forces are patterned after those of the United States. They generally employ U.S. equipment, tactical doctrine, and techniques, and the English language is widely used, particularly in the navy and air force. Military assistance from the United States amounting to more than US\$673 million since World War II has been of paramount significance to the armed forces; it has included material, training, and advice. Despite this assistance, however, the effectiveness and development of the armed forces have continued to be limited by personnel and equipment shortages, inefficient top-level organization and administration, a poorly organized supply and maintenance system, and a chronically inadequate military budget. The size of the armed forces is not expected to increase

significantly, and shortcomings in the training program and logistical weaknesses are likely to remain.

The more than 1,000-mile-long Philippine archipelago, lying off the southeast rim of Asia, forms the southern link in a natural line of defense running northward through the Republic of China, the Ryukyu Islands, and Japan. The Philippine Islands are of great strategic value to the United States, particularly as an operations and logistic base for U.S. military forces in the Pacific. The Republic of the Philippines, in turn, relies heavily upon the United States for defense, and its military doctrine is based on the understanding that the United States will assist in Philippine defense in the event of war. Under the terms of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, ratified in 1952, each nation agreed to regard an attack upon the other as "dangerous to its own peace and safety" and pledged to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. To meet its obligations, the United States maintains four major bases (Clark Air Base and naval bases at Cavite, Sangley Point, and Subic Bay) and a number of lesser installations in the Philippines under the terms of a military bases agreement which was renegotiated in September 1966 to provide for a lease of 25 years. The Philippines is a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and has collective security arrangements within the framework of that organization.

1. Military history

The Philippine people did not maintain a national armed force until 1935, the year in which the Commonwealth was established. Nonetheless, they have a lengthy history of armed resistance to authority

beyond the family or tribal levels. Filipinos were among the first Asians to attempt open rebellion against their colonial rulers; the three centuries of Spanish rule were punctuated with revolts. In 1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War the islands were ceded to the United States. In 1935 they achieved Commonwealth status. At that time a constitution was adopted that made all male citizens liable for military service and made the President of the Commonwealth the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The National Defense Act of 1935 supplemented the national defense provisions of the constitution. The act instituted a conscription system, established the National Defense Council to advise the President on defense policy, created the Office of Chief of Staff and a General Staff Corps, and established the Philippine Army. The Philippine Army used as its nucleus the officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary, a semimilitary police force that was organized in 1901 under the tutelage of the United States. The National Defense Act also established, as part of the army, an offshore patrol and an army air corps based on the existing Philippine Constabulary Air Corps.

The Department of National Defense, directly subordinate to the President, was established in 1939 and charged with supervising development of the country's armed force. As planned, the Philippine Army was to be essentially a citizens army, composed largely of a trained reserve built up by the conscription of 20-year-old Filipino males in such numbers as to develop by 1945, the scheduled date for Philippine independence, a trained reserve of 80,000 men. However, orderly development of the military forces was interrupted in July 1941 when, because of the critical world situation, the President of the United States ordered all organized military forces of the Philippines to be merged with the U.S. Armed Forces of the Far East, which were put under the command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

The Philippines fell to the Japanese in 1942. Through the following 2 years, resistance organizations kept up a stubborn guerrilla warfare against the occupation forces. In October 1944, U.S. forces invaded the island of Leyte, and in that same month the Headquarters of the Philippine Army was officially reconstituted. In April 1945, army headquarters became autonomous, ceasing to be a part of the combined headquarters. By the end of the war, the army had become an unwieldy force of 200,000 men. Following the war most of it was soon demobilized and only a 10,000-man regular force and

a 20,000-man Military Police Command, which had come into being during the war, were retained.

The Philippines became an independent republic on 4 July 1946. On 4 October 1949, by executive order the Department of National Defense was reorganized. The Philippine Army became the Armed Forces of the Philippines with an Armed Forces Headquarters and three subordinate services—the Philippine Ground Force, the Philippine Naval Patrol, and the Philippine Air Force. The same executive order concurrently reestablished the Philippine Constabulary, which had been superseded by the wartime Military Police Command, and placed it under jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. In 1950, further changes were made: two of the services were renamed and the constabulary was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to become, together with the army, the navy, and the air force, one of the four major elements of the armed forces. This nomenclature and organization are still in effect. The marine battalion, which is part of the navy, was conceived in 1949 as a seaborne striking force similar in purpose to the U.S. Marine Corps. It was commissioned in 1950 by the then Philippine Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, who used it in a wide variety of roles in the following years until his death in 1957. Set up by executive action only, it has no legislative identity.

In the postwar period, the armed forces, particularly the Philippine Army, distinguished themselves in the campaign (1950-57) to suppress the rebellious Hukbalahap (Huks), the military arm of the Philippine Communist movement. This long campaign, which was conducted without the assistance of outside forces, resulted in the decimation of the Huk movement.

In late 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean war, the Philippines sent an expeditionary force to serve with United Nations forces in Korea, where five battalion combat teams served successively from September 1950 to May 1955. In early 1963, 18 officers and five airmen of the 5th Fighter Wing, Philippine Air Force, organized the 9th Tactical Fighter Squadron (Provisional), which participated in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Congo. In October 1966, a Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) arrived in Tay Ninh, South Vietnam, and in September 1968 the group totaled about 1,500, about one-third construction engineers, one-third security and logistic support troops, and one-third civic action and field hospital personnel. PHILCAG returned to the Philippines in December 1969.

Additions to the military establishment have included the Women's Auxiliary Corps (WAC) in June 1963. The authorizing act permits the eventual activation of five companies of 120 women each. The National Defense College, patterned after the U.S. National War College, was inaugurated on 15 February 1966. On 9 September 1967, the Philippine Congress established the coast guard and placed it under the operational control of the navy.

In January 1971 the Armed Forces of the Philippines initiated a Home Defense Program aimed at combating internal instability. The program was designed to include such matters as community relations, reserve affairs, public works projects, disaster relief, and psychological operations. While civic action has been underway in the country for many years, the scope and expanded objectives of this program are new.

2. Command structure

The President of the Philippines is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Figure 1). He exercises control over all defense




FIGURE 1. Organization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (C)

matters through the Department of National Defense, which is headed by the Secretary of National Defense. On matters affecting national security, the President may call on the National Security Council, a large advisory group that includes the Vice President, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Secretary of National Defense. This council meets only when called by the President.

The Secretary of National Defense exercises administrative supervision over all the services and is charged with defense planning and the maintenance of internal security. There is also a General Military Council composed of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the commanders of each of the four services. This council serves in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of National Defense on broad military policy. The Office of the Secretary of National Defense is staffed by the Under Secretary of National Defense; the Chief, Public Information Office; the Chief, Civic Affairs Office; the Chief, Budget and Fiscal Office; and the Chairman, Special Board.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, executes the President's directives in relation to military strategy, tactics, and operations through AFP General Headquarters, at Camp Aguinaldo near Manila. He has the assistance of a vice chief of staff, a deputy chief of staff, a general staff, an administrative staff, a technical staff, and other support elements. Each of the three staffs is an integrated body composed of officers from all the services.

In addition, the Chief of Staff is assisted by a Deputy Chief of Staff for Home Defense Affairs who administers an Office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs; an Office of Community Relations; an Office of Military History; Special Services (disaster relief and civil assistance); and the Armed Forces of the Philippines Home Defense Training Center.

The commander of each service is assisted by a vice commander, a planning office, a general staff, and a special staff. Army, navy, air force, and constabulary staffs perform staff functions, including operations and training, for their own services; personnel and logistic functions, however, are handled by AFP staff elements.

B. Joint activities

1. Military manpower (S)

Philippine manpower resources are ample for meeting the personnel requirements of the country's modest armed forces. As of 1 January 1974 there were approximately 9,209,000 males between the ages of 15

and 49, about 65% of whom are considered physically fit. During the period 1974-78, the average number annually reaching the military age of 20 years will be about 392,000. Available manpower by 5-year groups as of 1 January 1974 is estimated as follows:

| AGE | TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES | MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE |
|--------------|-----------------------------|---|
| 15-19 | 2,205,000 | 1,565,000 |
| 20-24 | 1,833,000 | 1,245,000 |
| 25-29 | 1,499,000 | 1,005,000 |
| 30-34 | 1,214,000 | 795,000 |
| 35-39 | 988,000 | 590,000 |
| 40-44 | 807,000 | 470,000 |
| 45-49 | 663,000 | 350,000 |
| Total, 15-49 | 9,209,000 | 6,020,000 |

By law, all able-bodied male Philippine citizens between the ages of 20 and 51 inclusive except those specifically exempted can be called to active duty for the duration of an emergency plus 6 months. All youths who reach the age of 20 during each calendar year must register for military training. The Chief of Staff, AFP, determines the number to be called up; selection is by lottery from those registered in each province. Since 1963, a total of 4,000 to 5,000 have been called up annually. All conscripts receive 22 weeks basic training in the army, after which they become a part of the army first-line reserve unless they elect to enlist in the regular force. At the option of the government, under a law passed in 1964, 20-year-old conscripts can be retained to serve an additional 6 to 12 months of active duty before being released to the reserve. This was a measure taken to fill the gap left by the retirement of many World War II veterans, and the law was first applied to conscripts inducted in September 1965. Of the 3,000 brought into training at that time, 1,500 were retained for an additional 12 months beyond the usual term.

Service in the regular army, navy, air force, and constabulary is by enlistment for a 3-year term. Service pay and fringe benefits compare favorably with civilian salaries, and a military career is regarded as one providing reasonable security. Nevertheless, the current enlistment and reenlistment rates reportedly are quite low, and the turnover of personnel is relatively high. Morale, however, is considered generally good despite the unfavorable effects of reports of corruption within the military establishment, especially in the army and the constabulary, and political intrigue in its higher echelons.

In addition to establishing a regular armed force, the Philippine National Defense Act of 1935

authorized a reserve force the size of which is to be determined by the President. The reserves of the navy, air force, and constabulary comprise ROTC graduates and men who have completed their terms of enlistment in the services; reserve personnel of these services serve on a volunteer basis. Estimated strengths for the reserves are army, 500,000, navy, 12,400, air force, 16,600, and constabulary, 3,500. The AFP budget is not sufficient to support an effective reserve training program, and the lack of logistic support for the reserve forces precludes the development of a well-organized, responsive reserve capable of mobilizing and taking effective action on short notice.

However, efforts have been made recently to improve the reserve system. An Office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs was established to coordinate the reserve activities of the major services and update and computerize the records of reservists. Reserve assembly tests were conducted by the AFP during 1971 to evaluate the system.

The army reserve is divided into three age groups: first-line reserve—ages 21 through 31; second-line reserve—ages 32 through 41; and third-line reserve—ages 42 through 51. The first-line reserve is organized into six reserve infantry divisions; 10 additional divisions, five each from the second-line and third-line reserves, exist on paper only. Officers and enlisted men are carried on a mobilization roster and assigned to a reserve division within the military area of residence. Mobilization plans provide that on declaration of emergency, General Headquarters, AFP, will direct each military area to open mobilization roster for use in calling up personnel. First to be called up will be the six organized reserve divisions of the first-line reserve; second, the five "paper" divisions of the second-line reserve; and third, the five "paper" divisions of the third-line reserve. The third-line reserve would be called up only in case of extreme emergency.

2. Strength trends (S)

The strength of the armed forces fluctuated during the 1960's. Personnel strengths of the General Headquarters, constabulary, navy, and air force increased slightly, while army strength declined during the decade. The constabulary and the navy registered the greatest increase. However, as a result of growing dissidence in the Philippines, army strength has about doubled since 1972. Personnel strength of the armed forces since 1961 are shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2. Personnel strengths (S)

| YEAR | GENERAL HEAD- QUARTERS | ARMY | CONSTAB- ULARY | NAVY | AIR FORCE | TOTAL |
|-----------|------------------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|--------------|--------|
| 1961..... | 2,900 | 17,600 | 14,000 | 4,400 | 7,000 | 45,900 |
| 1962..... | 3,100 | 17,000 | 15,000 | 4,300 | 7,900 | 47,300 |
| 1963..... | 3,600 | 14,700 | 15,400 | 5,000 | 8,300 | 47,000 |
| 1964..... | 3,500 | 14,700 | 15,400 | 5,400 | 8,300 | 47,300 |
| 1965..... | 3,500 | 14,200 | 15,200 | 5,400 | 8,300 | 46,600 |
| 1966..... | 3,600 | 12,600 | 15,800 | 5,400 | 8,000 | 45,400 |
| 1967..... | 3,500 | 15,400 | 15,900 | 5,500 | 8,200 | 48,500 |
| 1968..... | 3,400 | 15,250 | 18,150 | 6,400 | 8,700 | 51,900 |
| 1969..... | 3,400 | 15,900 | 20,200 | 6,900 | 8,800 | 55,200 |
| 1970..... | 3,400 | 16,800 | 22,800 | 8,000 | 8,800 | 59,800 |
| 1971..... | 3,600 | 14,600 | 22,600 | 9,500 | 9,200 | 54,500 |
| 1972..... | 3,700 | 14,200 | 24,000 | 10,400 | 8,200 | 60,500 |
| 1973..... | 3,400 | 29,000 | 26,900 | 11,500 | 8,200 | 79,000 |

3. Training (C)

Training in the armed forces is closely patterned after that of the U.S. military services. Key instructors are mostly graduates of U.S. service schools. U.S. manuals and training aids are used with only minor revisions. Training is inferior in both degree and quality to that of the United States but compares favorably with that of the armed forces of other small countries in Asia. Training areas are good to excellent, and instructors are competent. Training is hampered, however, by shortage of equipment, constant demands on training units to participate in civic action and internal security operations, and insufficient funds.

Military schools that provide training for personnel of all four services are the Philippine Military Academy (at Baguio); the Command and Staff College (at Fort Bonifacio, which was formerly Fort William McKinley, near Manila), patterned after the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Philippine Army School Center, also situated at Fort Bonifacio. The last, which also provides training for noncommissioned officers, includes the School for Combined Arms, the School for Technical Services, the School for Administration, and the School for Reserve Commissions (an officer Candidate school). The National Defense College, at Fort Bonifacio, is similar in mission and curriculum to the U.S. National War College. The tour of duty is 3 years for both staff and faculty. The 42-week course is held annually. The student body is composed of colonels and lieutenant colonels and naval officers of equivalent rank as well as high-ranking government officials. Reportedly, completion of the National Defense College course

will be required before field grade officers can become eligible for consideration for promotion to general/flag rank.

Five categories of training are available to army reserve forces: 1) ROTC training in colleges and universities; 2) officer candidate training at the School for Reserve Commissions (at Fort Bonifacio); 3) the 6-month cycle of recruit training given annually to 20-year-old conscripts; 4) annual active duty training (noncompulsory refresher training) for officers and NCO's in the inactive reserve; and 5) Army Extension School correspondence courses for officers. There are plans for providing a week of active duty training annually for about 4,000 army reservists. Periodically the navy offers refresher training to inactive reservists, when the budget permits. The air force has no reserve training program; however, most of its qualified pilot reservists are actively engaged in flying with domestic airlines.

4. Military budget (U/OU)

The annual Philippine military budget is prepared by the Budget Commission, an agency within the Office of the President, based on estimates of expenditures submitted by the Secretary of National Defense. This budget is incorporated in the central government budget, which is forwarded to the Congress for legislative action. Congress has the authority to accept or reject all budget proposals, but may not increase any of the proposed appropriations. In practice, the Congress generally has appropriated a lesser amount for the armed forces than requested. However, the President through the Budget Commissioner, has the power to withhold appro-

priations and transfer funds from one agency to another without congressiona¹ restraint.

During recent years the military budget has ranked second among major categories of expenditures in the national budget. Increases in the military budget have resulted mainly from the termination of direct budgetary support provided by the United States until FY1970.¹ Philippine self-financed military budgets, in millions of U.S. dollars for FY1970 through FY1973 are as follows:²

| | FY70 | FY71 | FY72 | FY73 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Department of National Defense budget | \$100.6 | \$114.1 | \$135.1 | \$164.2 |
| Military budget as percent of government budget | 12.3 | 14.3 | 21.7 | 21.6 |
| Military budget as percent of GNP | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.1 |

5. Economic support and logistics (C)

The Philippines has little capability to provide materiel for its armed forces, and although largely agricultural, the country is not self-sufficient in food. Manufacturing is the most rapidly growing sector of the economy and provides basic consumer goods, some petroleum products, and industrial chemicals. Motor vehicles, electrical machinery, and metal products are also assembled using imported components. The economy is heavily dependent on imports of crude oil and some refined products.

Domestic output in direct support of the armed forces is limited to small arms ammunition and some quartermaster-type items such as uniforms and footwear. All other military materiel is imported, primarily through the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). From FY1950 through FY1972, equipment valued at over US\$520 million was delivered under MAP. The bulk of this materiel (\$440 million) was provided as grant aid. Since 1954, military equipment valued at \$6 million has been purchased from Japan, Australia, Singapore, and Italy.

The armed forces have been plagued continuously by serious deficiencies in their supply and maintenance system, including an ineffective accounting system, haphazard distribution, inadequate storage facilities, and poor maintenance. In 1963, after repeated prodding by JUSMAG to remedy this situation, the Secretary of National Defense

¹Fiscal year ends 30 June of stated year.

²Converted at exchange rates as follows: FY1970 at 3.90 pesos equal US\$1.00, FY1971 at 6.40 pesos equal US\$1.00, FY1972 and 1973 at 6.70 pesos equal US\$1.00.

ordered the activation of a central supply center at AFP headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo, that was to be responsive to the needs of all services. The AFP Supply Center (AFPSC) consists of five components—AFP Base Shop, AFP General Depot, 1st Ordnance Direct Auto Support Company, the Signal Repair Company, and the Quartermaster Repair and Reclamation Platoon. Items of supply are concentrated at the General Depot; repair and reclamation are conducted by the other units. The functions of the AFP Supply Center include determining replenishment requirements for items of supply, procuring needed items of supply, distributing and controlling stocks of supplies, providing storage facilities and services for materiel, and providing facilities for the return of unseviceable items and repairing the salvageable for reissue.

Under the reorganization, a simplified requisition system has been adopted, a new inventory of all stocks is being made, and a concerted attempt has been made to improve maintenance service. Modernization of the accounting and distribution systems has resulted in a more economical and efficient use of equipment on hand, but there is still need for improvement. The supply system is not yet adequately responsive to users—there is too much lag between submission of requisitions and receipt of suppliers—and accountability is still unsatisfactory.

C. Army (S)

The missions of the Philippine Army are to organize, train, and equip regular army units for combat operations; to develop tactics, techniques, and equipment for army field operations; to train, organize, and equip all army reserve units; to perform civic action tasks; to maintain with the constabulary internal security; to support SEATO; and to accomplish such other functions as the President may direct. The army is essentially an internal security force and would be incapable of resisting a major external attack without considerable logistical support and augmentation by allied countries. The army is able to make little more than token contributions in support of SEATO commitments. In conjunction with the constabulary, the army is capable of coping with the current level of insurgent activity and of performing a variety of civic action tasks. However, the army is unable to effectively control large areas of Mindanao and the Sulu Islands, where Muslim rebels have established themselves. The noninvolvement in politics, which had generally characterized the army since independence, came to an end in September

1972 when the President issued a declaration of martial law. Since then the influence of the army in society and politics has greatly increased.

Weaknesses of the army include the lack of operational readiness because of considerable dissipation of strength by detached service in socioeconomic activities and antidissident operations; fragmented, understrength, and dispersed units; deficient maintenance and property accountability standards; marginal command supervision; training activities restricted by lack of funds; and the added responsibilities resulting from martial law.

1. Organization

The army is commanded by a brigadier general. He is assisted by a vice commander and supported by General and Special Staffs. The General Staff consists of a Chief of Staff, a Secretary of the General Staff, and seven assistant chiefs of staff: G-1 (Personnel and Administration), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Organization, Operations, and Training), G-4 (Logistics), G-5 (Plans), G-6 (Comptroller), and G-7 (Civic Action and Home Defense). The Special Staff consists of administrative and technical sections.

The country is divided into four geographic areas called Philippine Constabulary Zones (PCZ), the boundaries of which delineate jurisdictional responsibility for major units of both the army and the constabulary. The Greater Manila Area, consisting of four cities and seven municipalities, is not included in the four zones but is under the control of the Metropolitan Command (METROCOM), with certain army and constabulary units designated to augment METROCOM when required. Within the four zones, the senior army and constabulary commanders are responsible for coordinating all activities. The four PCZ's and their headquarters consist of: I PCZ, the northern section of Luzon with headquarters at Camp Olivas, Pampanga; II PCZ, the southern section of Luzon and island of Mindoro with headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna; III PCZ, the Visayan Islands with headquarters at Camp Osmena, Cebu City; and IV PCZ, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago with headquarters at Camp Parang, Mindanao. At times, units of the army and constabulary are joined in special task forces which cross geographic areas. The Unified South West Command, a joint command headed by a navy captain, was formed in 1968 to strengthen antismuggling operations in the southern Philippines in conjunction with IV PCZ forces.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition³

The Philippine Army has about 29,000 men, about 3,000 of which are officers. Personnel strength began to increase when martial law was declared in September 1972. The largest concentration of troops is on Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, where army units have recently been engaged in operations against Muslim rebels. The second largest concentration of army personnel is found on Luzon, where dissident activity has been chronic.

The army has two light infantry divisions. The 1st Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Magsaysay in Luzon, consists of five infantry battalions, one combat engineer battalion, and one fire support battalion. The 4th Infantry Division, stationed at Camp Evangelista on Mindanao, consists of five infantry battalions and a fire support battalion. In addition, there are three separate infantry brigades. The 2nd Infantry Brigade (Sep) at Camp Capinpin, Rizal, and the 5th Infantry Brigade (Sep) at Camp Aquino, Tarlac, consist of five infantry battalions each; and the 3rd Infantry Brigade (Sep), located at Camp Lapu Lapu, Cebu City, consists of five infantry battalions. There is also a separate engineer brigade.

The army is equipped primarily with standard individual weapons, mortars, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, artillery, and armored vehicles, almost all of U.S. origin.

3. Training

The army training system is patterned after that of the U.S. Army. A large percentage of Filipino officers holding command or staff positions have attended one or more U.S. service schools, and most key instructors are graduates of U.S. service schools of the branch in which they instruct. Individual training is given to volunteers within the regular combat units to which they are assigned. Individual training for officers is given at the Philippine Military Academy, the Command and Staff College, and the Philippine Army School Center. In addition, between 1962 and 1966 a total of about 880 officers and enlisted men attended U.S. service schools under the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP).

Because of insufficient appropriations, the goal of training 10,000 inductees annually has not been met. The 22-week basic training of conscripts has been directed at training most of the men for assignment to

³For regularly updated information, refer to the *Military Intelligence Summary*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.



FIGURE 3. Army troops in training near Tarlac (U/OU)

engineer construction units and civic action projects. Basic training for the ROTC requires 68 hours per semester, and the advanced ROTC course requires 120 hours per semester for instruction and practical training.

Unit training has not extended beyond battalion level. Units within the division usually hold an annual joint exercise and some army units participate in SEATO military exercises and combined U.S.-Philippine exercises. Scheduled exercises and maneuvers sometimes have been canceled for lack of funds. Also, at times the number of exercises has been curtailed because of demands made on the combat divisions for task forces to operate against dissidents, use of military personnel for civic action projects, and the requirement to train conscripts. Figure 3 shows infantry troops in training.

4. Logistics

Inasmuch as most equipment and supplies are provided under the U.S. Military Assistance Program, Philippine Army logistics involves primarily the storage, maintenance, and distribution of these items. Much of the army equipment on hand is of the World War II period; some is inoperable because of poor maintenance or lack of replacement parts. Distribution and movement of materiel is slow and inefficient. Although a major reorganization of supply procedures, which included revamping of the antiquated accounting system, correcting maintenance operations, and instituting a more efficient distribution system, was initiated in 1963 throughout the AFP, the logistics system is still not satisfactory.

The major deficiencies in army logistics are shortages of qualified maintenance and supply personnel; shortages of repair parts; absence of an efficient maintenance and supply accounting system; and too wide dispersion of installations and units, which tends to complicate the flow along lines of communication and reduce supervision by higher echelon commanders.

D. Navy (S)

The Philippine Navy (PN) is basically a small, though expanding patrol force. Tasks of the PN include defense of the country's territorial waters, protection of its sea lines of communication, enforcement of maritime laws and regulations, and support of civic action projects. An additional role includes seaborne transportation in support of the ground forces and civilian components of the government. Customs, immigrations, and lighthouse services are the direct responsibility of the coast guard, an integral part of the navy since 1967 (Figure 4).

In peacetime, the primary missions of the navy are directed at controlling smuggling and piracy, and, more recently, combating the restless Muslim dissidents within the southern island's area. In wartime, the missions are to assist allied naval forces, to conduct reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare (ASW), to protect the country from a seaborne attack, and to protect interisland shipping. However, the physical dimensions of the Philippine Islands, in addition to the limited number of personnel and ships, preclude the possibility of the navy effectively meeting either normal or wartime objectives.




FIGURE 4. RPS *Abra*, flag ship of the coast guard, was built by Vosper Thornycroft Uniteers Ltd, of Singapore and is capable of 25 knots. Powered by two Mercedes Benz marine diesels, each producing 1,230 hp. at 1,500 r.p.m., it is manned by a crew of 3 officers and 11 enlisted men. This craft gives the coast guard a fast patrol boat capability needed in antismuggling operations. (C)




FIGURE 5. RPS *Capiz* is the only Philippine ex-U.S. 173-foot patrol gunboat armed with fixed single torpedo tubes. With a length of 170 feet, a beam of 23 feet, and a crew of 5 officers and 51 enlisted men, its twin diesel engines give it speed up to 20 knots. (C)




FIGURE 6. RPS *Datu Kalantiaw* is an ex-U.S. *Bostwick* class DE which was transferred to the Philippine Navy in late 1967. Because of its capabilities and functions, it is classed as a patrol escort. With a length of 300 feet, a beam of 36 feet, it has three 3-inch/50 single-fire dual-purpose guns and a crew of 200. This ship, built in 1943, and other patrol escorts provide the backbone of the navy. (C)

The lack of a modern naval combat or operational capability in ASW, tactics, mine warfare, or air defense further limits the effectiveness of the navy. The majority of its ships are ex-U.S. World War II types; the largest are equipped with 3-inch dual purpose guns (Figures 5 and 6). While efforts to improve maintenance are in progress, about 30% of the fleet is usually undergoing repairs of a rapid, patchwork nature. The United States remains the principal supplier of spare parts and technical assistance. Cavite Navy Yard is the only facility capable of undertaking overhaul work. Budget restrictions are a limiting factor for those ships, which are not eligible for U.S. Military Assistance Program support.

What the PN lacks in material, it makes up for in the quality and high morale of its personnel. High entrance standards ensure a navy of high-caliber personnel. Efforts to improve conditions of service life have also encouraged a high reenlistment rate. Training facilities are adequate to meet the navy needs; more advanced instruction of the USN "B" and "C" school type is provided by U.S. facilities.

1. Organization

Control of the PN lies in the Flag Officer in Command (FOIC), whose headquarters are in Manila. Functional assistance is provided by the Chief of Staff and seven Assistant Chiefs of Staff who manage the following sections: N-1 (Personnel), N-2 (Intelligence), N-3 (Operations), N-4 (Logistics), N-5 (Plans and Programs), N-6 (Maintenance), and N-7 (Communications). Individual units are under the direct administrative control of this Naval Staff. Four major subcommands, the Naval Operating Force (NOF), the Naval Shore Establishment, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and the Philippine Marine Brigade, exercise operational control.

Most of the ships and craft in the fleet inventory, as well as the Underwater Operations Unit (similar to USN Underwater Demolition Teams), are managed by the NOF. These afloat units fit into one of four groups for "forces"—Offshore Patrol, ASW, Mine, or Services.

Cavite Navy Yard, site of the Naval Shore Establishment Headquarters, is responsible for repair, supply, training, and medical services. This site contains the majority of maintenance and repair facilities. Support vessels operating in the Sulu Archipelago can also use the forward operating base at Zamboanga on the southwest coast of Mindanao Island, which has a repair capability for patrol craft.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition⁴

A continuing program of expansion has increased the size of the navy from 6,400 (including 700 marines) in 1968, to 11,500 (including 3,200 marines), as of 30 June 1973. The emphasis on patrol type vessels is shown in the following inventory total of 122 ships and craft assigned to the naval operating forces:

| | |
|--|----|
| Patrol Gunboat (PG) | 4 |
| Patrol Escort (PF) | 6 |
| Motor Gunboat (PGM) | 9 |
| Patrol Boat (PB) | 20 |
| Hydrofoil Patrol Boat (PBH) | 4 |
| Port Security Boat (PSB) | 10 |
| Ocean Minesweeper (MSO) | 2 |
| Coastal Minesweeper (MSC) | 2 |
| Fleet Minesweeper (MSF) | 2 |
| Tank Landing Ship (LST) | 11 |
| Landing Ship Medium (LSM) | 2 |
| Utility Landing Craft (LCU) | 2 |
| Mechanized Landing Craft (LCM) | 4 |
| Large Personnel Landing Craft (LCPL) | 3 |
| Vehicle/Personnel Landing Craft (LCVP) | 17 |

⁴For regularly updated information, refer to the *Military Intelligence Summary*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

3. Training

The training center at Cavite provides recruit and enlisted training. The Philippine Army Training Center at Manila is utilized for technical and command courses. The Philippine Military Academy, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Philippine NROTC College, and the enlisted ranks provide regular officers. In addition, one Filipino is graduated each year from the U.S. Naval Academy.

Training afloat is extensive on the unit and force levels. Combined U.S. and Philippine Navy training programs in USN ships have improved operational competence. The combined training programs and exercises are realistic, allowing evaluation of individuals, teamwork, and multiship operations. Although training assistance has been extensive, the United States has encouraged the PN to develop independence and self-reliance.

Efforts to upgrade ASW capabilities have resulted in some progress, although the lack of sufficient submarine training availability has restricted overall ASW capability. ASW equipment remains inadequate against modern submarines. The minesweeping force (Figure 7) recently received two additional vessels from the U.S. However, antimine capabilities are still very limited, and the navy would be hard pressed to keep Manila harbor open in the face of a determined enemy mining effort.

4. Logistics

The logistics system has only a marginal capacity to effect repairs and provide satisfactory maintenance. Virtually all significant facilities are located at Cavite. Material support is provided by the United States. Almost all food, petroleum and other consumables are purchased on a day-to-day basis. Ships normally are stocked with sufficient supplies for less than a 2-week period. Zamboanga is capable of performing small-craft repair and maintenance work.

No combatant naval ships have been built in the Philippines; however, a few small craft up to 87 feet in length have been constructed in recent years. Most of the navy units have been obtained from the United States; however, Japan has supplied a command ship and Italy has supplied two hydrofoil patrol boats. General overhaul and repair can be effected at the Cavite Naval Base Shipyard.

5. Philippine Marine Brigade

The former Marine Battalion has been expanded to a brigade-size force. Total personnel strength has



FIGURE 7. RPS *Zamboanga del Norte*, sister ship to the RPS *Zambales*, is an ex-U.S. MSC 60 class coastal minesweeper. Until the mid-1972 delivery of two ocean minesweepers, also a part of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, these two 1956-built, wooden hull units provided the only minesweeping capability of the navy. (C)

increased from 700 in 1968 to 3,200 as of 30 June 1973. The Marine Brigade is composed of eight rifle companies, one heavy weapons company, and a headquarters and service company. One rifle company is assigned to palace guard duty, one is located at navy headquarters in Manila, another is at Sangley Point, and a fourth is assigned to South West Command in the Sulu Archipelago. A reinforced company is located on islands near the disputed Spratly Island group, and two others are deployed within the area of the South West Command. The remaining company is in a training status.

The Marine Brigade is considered free from political ties. While it is combat effective, its capability is limited to small-scale amphibious operations. The marines suffer from a shortage of motorized transport and the lack of organic artillery. Until its forces are concentrated within one area, or the size of its units increases dramatically, the individual company-level units will be unable to conduct major operations.

E. Air force (S)

The Philippine Air Force (PAF) is a small force of about 8,200 men and 235 aircraft. Its small size and lack of combat experience limit its capabilities in a major combat operation, but it has played an important role in support of ground forces in countering dissident activity throughout the islands.

The missions of the PAF are to defend the Philippines against air attack, support operations of the ground and naval forces, and fulfill SEATO commitments.

In general, the air force is capable of supporting nonsustained, small-scale, internal antirebel operations and providing a modest air defense capability for the Manila area. Major deficiencies consist of an inadequate number of aircraft, maintenance facilities, and jet-capable airfields for deployed operations covering northern and southern air approaches.

The air defense system is jointly operated by the USAF and the PAF. A jointly manned Air Defense Control Center (ADCC), located at Nichols Air Base, performs the system's identification function and issues scramble orders to PAF aircraft at Basa and Mactan International Air Bases or USAF aircraft at Clark. An alternate ADCC is located at Wallace Air Station (Poro Point). The PAF has two fighter squadrons (one F-5 and one F-86F) which operate with one USAF F-4 jet fighter squadron. There are no anti-aircraft artillery weapons or surface-to-air missiles. The ground section of the air defense system includes four radar sites, one of which is USAF-operated. The system is concentrated on the island of Luzon and provides good early warning and early warning/ground-controlled intercept (EW/GCI)/contiguous radar coverage of the island against a high altitude target. Contiguous radar coverage against a low altitude target is afforded only in the Manila area.

Tactical air capability is provided by the same aircraft used for air defense. In 1973 the PAF had become increasingly involved in the Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines. Deployed F-86 and F-5 aircraft, operating from Mactan and Zamboanga air bases, have flown ground attack missions against concentrations of insurgent troops and insurgent-held villages. Pilots are skilled in the ground attack role, and air strikes have been of assistance in relieving ground troops under attack from insurgent elements. Air operations have been hampered, however, by the scarcity of jet-capable airfields in the forward area (reducing time-over-target), slow reaction times from strike request to strike on target, uncertain pre-strike targeting information,

and lack of adequate post-strike bomb damage assessment. Tactical photo reconnaissance is provided by one RT-33 and a few C-47's. Close air support of operations against the Muslim insurgents has been the function of the UH-1H, U-17, U-6A, and Siai-Marchetti SF-260 aircraft and armed T-33 trainers. Operational sorties have included armed and visual reconnaissance, strafing and rocket attacks, and forward air control missions.

Transport support is provided by C-47 and F-27 aircraft. Missions have included troop and logistic supply, visual reconnaissance, and limited bomb damage assessment. Despite the limited numbers of aircraft available, the air force has been able to deploy and supply 5,000 troops throughout the southern Philippines since 1972. The transport capability has been enhanced by the recent receipt of a L-100-20 (civil version of the C-130). Three others are scheduled for future delivery. Sixteen recently acquired C-123K transports in flyable storage could also be pressed into service. These recent acquisitions have given the air force the capability to resupply advanced forward positions with heavy equipment such as trucks, refuelers, howitzers, etc.

Because of the limited numbers and obsolescence of many of the PAF aircraft for air rescue, the USAF and USN are relied upon for most rescue services. The PAF's air rescue squadron is equipped with utility helicopters and light aircraft.

Personnel lack experience in antisubmarine warfare, convoy patrol, antishipping strikes or aerial minelaying, but with additional training could perform these functions within the limitations of existing aircraft.

The personnel system, as a whole, is only fair. Prime deficiencies are inadequate classification and accounting methods. The quality of personnel is good; all selected airmen are high school graduates and 95% of the officers have completed college. Morale is high and discipline generally is considered good.

No appreciable change in the size or effectiveness of the air force is foreseen in the immediate future. It has purchased 12 Italian Siai-Marchetti SF-260 prop utility aircraft to replace the T-28's. Additional U.S. Bell UH-1 Iroquois helicopters may also be acquired under the USMAP.

1. Organization

The head of the Philippine Air Force is a brigadier general who exercises normal administrative and operational command. He is appointed by the President and is functionally responsible to the Chief of Staff of the AFP. Directly subordinate to him is the

Vice Commander, who in turn is assisted by the Chief of Air Staff. Air force headquarters is at Nichols Air Base, near the Manila International Airport. Staff support is provided by a coordinating staff of seven assistant chiefs of air staff, a personal staff, and a special staff.

Tactical unit control is exercised through two air divisions—the Airlift Division and the 1st Air Division. The former, located at Nichols Air Base, controls the 205th Airlift Wing, the Reserve Airlift and Tactical Support Service, and a weather squadron. The 1st Air Division, also located at Nichols Air Base, has operational control of the air defense fighter aircraft and EW/GCI sites. Administrative and logistic control of air defense operating units is, however, the responsibility of the 5th Fighter Wing and the 580th Air Control and Warning Wing at Nichols Air Base. Service and support establishments include an air base wing, an air material wing, a special missions squadron, an engineering squadron, a communications squadron, all at Nichols Air Base, and a training wing at Fernando Air Base. All aircraft are assigned either to the 205th Airlift Wing or the 5th Fighter Wing.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition⁵

Personnel strength of the air force is about 8,200. The aircraft inventory as of August 1973 totals 235 (including 54 jets) of the following types:

- 23 day fighters (jet)—U.S. North American F-86F Sabre
- 17 attack (jet):
 - 15 U.S. Northrop F-5A Freedom Fighter
 - 2 U.S. Northrop F-5B Freedom Fighter
- 1 reconnaissance (jet)—U.S. Lockheed RT-33A Shooting Star
- 48 transports:
 - 36 Prop:
 - 19 U.S. Douglas C-47 Skytrain
 - 1 U.S. Douglas EC-47 Skytrain
 - 16 U.S. Fairchild C-123K Provider
 - 12 turboprop:
 - 10 Netherlands Fokker F-27 Friendship
 - 1 Japanese NAMC YS-11
 - 1 U.S. Lockheed L-100-20 (C-130)
- 1 transport helicopter (turbine)—U.S. Sikorsky S-62B
- 25 utility helicopters (turbine)
- 57 trainers: 13 jet, 44 prop
- 63 utility (prop)

With the exception of the one day fighter squadron and one transport squadron based at Mactan

⁵For regularly updated information, refer to the *Free World Air Order of Battle*, and the *Military Intelligence Summary*, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

International on Mactan Island, all units are based on Luzon in the Manila area. Unit disposition as of 15 August 1973 is as follows:

| UNITS | AIRCRAFT | PRINCIPAL BASES |
|--|---|---|
| 1 attack squadron | F-5A | Basa Air Base |
| 1 day fighter squadron | F-86F | Mactan International |
| 5 transport squadrons (1 VIP) | C-47, EC-47, F-27, NAMC YS-11, L-100- 20 (C-130) | Manila International and Mactan Inter- national |
| 1 VIP transport detachment (independent) | F-27, Sikorsky S-62B | Manila International |
| 1 air commando squadron | UH-1H | Do. |
| 1 air rescue squadron | HU-16A, UH-1H | Sangley Point Air Base |
| 1 liaison squadron | Cessna 180, U-17A and B, U-6A | Do. |
| 1 combat replacement training unit | RT-33A, T-33A, F-5B | Basa Air Base |

The PAF has an estimated 16,600 reserve personnel, including about 150 pilots. Personnel who have had military service and have been discharged are considered reservists. No training program to update their skills is in effect, and their effectiveness is questionable. The air force is, however, alleviating this situation somewhat with the Reserve Airlift and Tactical Support Service, similar to the U.S. Civil Air Patrol. This unit is charged with developing a reservoir of qualified personnel capable of assisting the PAF in search and rescue, reconnaissance, airdrop, antismuggling, air evacuation, mercy flights, and other tasks as may be directed. This organization is under the operational control of the Commanding General of the PAF through the Airlift Division. Personnel are organized, trained, and equipped from voluntary membership of private pilots and aircrew. Members receive refresher or orientation training in organization, mission, and functions of the air force and in the basic duties and responsibilities of an airman. Membership is about 650, of whom 430 are pilots. Seventy aircraft, ranging from Piper J-3's to DC-3's, are committed to serve when needed.

The Philippine airfield system, as a whole, is generally suited for light transport operations. Inadequate service and support facilities and poor maintenance would preclude large-scale sustained combat operations. (For information on airfields, see the Transportation and Telecommunications chapter.)

3. Training

Officers and airmen receive adequate basic training in the Philippines at air force and army schools but depend on U.S. assistance, locally and in the United States, for advanced and specialized training. Inadequacy of equipment, facilities, and qualified instructors reduce training results of the in-country training program. Failure to utilize newly trained personnel properly, inadequate flying hours for the majority of pilots, and insufficient numbers of instructors continue as problems. Overall quality of training is good; techniques are similar to those employed by the USAF.

The major air force training establishment is the 100th Training Wing, Fernando Air Base, which offers basic recruit, pilot, and technical training. Flight training is conducted in T-41 and T-28 aircraft. Aviation cadets graduating from basic pilot training receive jet transition training in the T-33 at Basa Air Base and upgrading to aircraft such as the HU-16A, C-47, F-27 and the UH-1 helicopters at Sangley Point and Nichols Air Base. A total of 120 hours are flown in the T-41 and 90 hours in the T-28. Average annual pilot output is about 45; pilot proficiency generally is good.

Technical training courses at Fernando Air Base consist of basic air force indoctrination, air intelligence, communications and electronics maintenance, aircraft and engine maintenance, on-the-job training in administration supervision, inventory management, aircraft electrical navigation equipment, aircraft radio maintenance, and ground radar maintenance. Courses vary in duration from 6 weeks for on-the-job training administrative supervisors to 29 weeks for communications and electronics maintenance.

The Air Command and Staff College was merged, along with other separate service command and staff schools, into a consolidated Command and Staff College. This organization conducts professional officer training up to squadron officer level. Officer training is also provided at the officers school at Nichols Air Base. An annual 6-week indoctrination course is given for Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates entering active duty. There are usually 40 graduates annually. The 26-week Squadron Officer Course is also conducted once each year for captains and majors, with about 40 students per class. The Academic Instructor Course provides instructors for the other air force schools.

Air force personnel attend army schools for training in subjects such as ordnance, medical services, supply, finance, combat intelligence, engineering, etc.

The air force participates in SEATO exercises which provide some training in joint operations. Participation in joint training exercises with other Philippine services has been on a small scale.

The PAF's indigenous training is being expanded gradually but will remain highly dependent on U.S. assistance for some time. In the 1960's there were as many as 300 air force trainees at one time in the U.S. under the U.S. MAP. This number has declined steadily, however, and only 55 trainees were scheduled for training in FY1972 and 35 for FY1973.

4. Logistics

The air force is dependent on foreign sources, principally the U.S., for all of its logistic requirements. With only minor exceptions, aircraft are provided by the U.S. MAP. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-4 (Materiel), is responsible for proper functioning of the air force logistic system which is patterned after that of the USAF. The Supply Depot, Nichols Air Base, is charged with procurement, storage, control, and distribution of supplies and materiel. The system, as a whole, is adequate but has some factors which lessen its effectiveness: outdated and inaccurate accounting procedures, inadequate warehouse facilities, overcrowded warehouses due to reluctance to dispose of excess items, limited commercial transportation support, and lack of domestic budgetary support. The current supply level is estimated at 30 days at peacetime consumption and 15 days at wartime consumption rates. Ample weapons and ammunition are on hand, but there is a shortage of aircraft spare parts. The PAF is able to satisfy about 63% of unit supply requests from stock on hand. CONUS support on supply requests averages 17 days on urgent requisitions; 18 days on work stoppage requisitions; and 66 days on stock replenishment requisitions. On-base petroleum storage capacity throughout the PAF is about 11.6 million gallons for jet fuel and 7.1 million gallons for avgas. Tanks average about 55% full.

The air force is capable of performing field and organizational maintenance on all types of aircraft within its inventory. Major airframe repair is accomplished through the PAF or commercial contractors within the area. Component repair is obtained on a repairable-exchange basis through the USAF. The Maintenance Depot is located at Nichols Air Base. USMAG specialists and technical

representative of U.S. aircraft manufacturers assist in various activities at the depot. Quality of maintenance performed is generally good but has recently deteriorated to some extent. Management needs improvement, and facilities are inadequate. Aircraft serviceability rates average 60% to 70%, but for the C-47s is as low as 30%.

F. Paramilitary (S)

The Philippine Constabulary (PC) is one of four coequal services of the Armed Forces of the Philippine (AFP). Its mission is primarily one of internal security and law enforcement. The PC is capable of performing this mission with support from the other services, with the exception of large areas of Mindanao and the Sulu Islands where Muslim rebels have established themselves.

The Chief of Constabulary, a brigadier general, is subordinate to the Chief of Staff, AFP. Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, includes a general staff and special staff organization similar to the U.S. Army staff system. The PC is organized into 4 PC zones, 69 Provincial Commands, 7 PC Battalions, 128 separate PC companies, the Metropolitan Command, the Presidential Guard Battalion, the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group, the Off-Shore Anti-Crime Battalion, the Criminal Investigation Service, and the Anti-Narcotics Unit.

The personnel strength of the PC is approximately 26,900, of which about 2,400 are officers. Ranks, pay and allowances of the constabulary are the same as those of the army, and officers of the two services are on the same promotion list. Transfer of officers between the PC and the army occurs fairly frequently.

The majority of PC munitions and equipment is presently provided and supported through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Japanese reparations are becoming an increasingly important source of vehicles and communications equipment, primarily for the Metropolitan Command, the Highway Patrol Group, and the provincial commands. A total of 9,244 M16A1 rifles have been procured through foreign military sales or provided by grant aid. Large quantities of WW II type weapons and equipment remain in the inventory, but steps are being taken to phase out uneconomically repairable items as rapidly as possible. Typical PC separate companies are armed with a variety of weapons which include M79 grenade launchers, M16 rifles, .30-caliber Browning automatic rifles, .30-caliber

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machineguns, and various small arms. Field units are approximately 32% mobile. Crowd control and antiriot equipment is procured from Japan. Maintenance and logistical problems characteristic of the army are also found in the PC.

The wide dispersal of the PC and its full-time mission of maintaining law and order make organized

training of units and personnel difficult. The army provides the PC with technical and specialist training, and the Philippine Constabulary School at Camp Crame conducts various courses in police operations, criminal investigation, and traffic control. U.S. civilian police agencies also provide training to PC personnel under auspices of the MAP.

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