

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND#

760050

894.20/1-145 -- 12-3145 - 47-48-49

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


INCOMING TELEGRAM

21210

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

DMH-420

PLAIN



Bern

Dated April 5, 1945

Rec'd 3:52 p.m.

JA
ES
~~HR~~

Secretary of State

Washington

1979, Fifth



German press April 3rd announces Commander in Chief Japanese Army Airforce Iwojo appointed Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Yasuda of General Staff appointed Commander Army Airforce.

HARRISON

MRM

894.20/4-545

DCR - EUR Unit	
Anal.	<i>ll</i>
Rev.	<i>ai</i>
Cat.	
Dist.	

MAY 4 - 1945

FILED

A i

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

28511

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

MES-855



PLAIN

Bern

Dated April 12, 1945

Rec'd. 1:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2142, Twelfth

German press publishes Tokyo despatch April 9 stating connection Cabinet change Japanese Army reorganized including establishment supreme commands for home defense forces Field Marshals Sugiyama and Hata appointed supreme commanders home defense army General Shono Kawabe supreme commander home defense Air Force Field Marshall Terauchi appointed supreme commander southern territories General Okamura supreme commander China and General Yamada supreme commander Kwantung Army Lieutenant General Mamoru Hara appointed Commander in Chief armored forces Lieutenant General Teitaro Uchiyama Commander in Chief military district central Japan and Lieutenant General Yoshio Kamizuki Commander in Chief military district Korea.

note
740-0011P W / 4-12-45

File
m. H.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 13 1945
DCL
HARRISON OFFICE

894.20/4-1245

WFS

DCR - EUR Unit HARRISON	
Anal.	<i>VR</i>
Rev.	<i>ai</i>
Cat.	
Dist.	

APR 18 1945

FILED

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS
DIVISION
JUL 25 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

23 July 1945

FE/RDE
[Signature]
JR
DORI
file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LIAISON OFFICER, STATE DEPARTMENT:

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Report

The attached Report No. A-220, from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, dated 20 July 1945, is forwarded for transmittal to the Department of State.

1 Incl
As stated

Edward H. Miller
EDWARD H. MILLER
Lt Colonel, GSC
Liaison Officer
with the State Department

894.20/7-2345

DIV. OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION
JUL 24 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB - 9 1951
FILED CS/H

894.20/7-2345
SECRET FILE



SECRET

627

SECRET

23 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LIAISON OFFICER, STATE DEPARTMENT:**SUBJECT: Transmittal of Report**

The Attached Report No. A-220, from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, dated 20 July 1945, is forwarded for transmittal to the Department of State.

1 Incl
As stated

EDWARD H. MILLER
Lt Colonel, OSC
Liaison Officer
with the State Department

SECRET

S/js

State

CONFIDENTIAL

(Copy # *92*, of 95)
20 July 1945

A-220

REPORT FROM CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL BRANCH
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT

1. This report presents a number of statements made by several Japanese Ps/W in June 1945 regarding (a) socio-economic conditions in Japan, (b) political controls and (c) morale in the Japanese Armed Forces.
2. The statements also reveal a Japanese point of view (probably not generally representative of the nation today, but nevertheless one that seems to be becoming more articulate) (a) on the causes of the present war, (b) on the best post-war international arrangements for the maintenance of peace in the Orient, (c) on the proposal that the present Emperor abdicate, and (d) on the differences between the American and Japanese ways of life.
3. Some of these Ps/W also comment upon the significance of anti-Japanese Propaganda and make specific suggestions for the furtherance of Psychological Warfare against the Japanese.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 1)

SIDE-LIGHTS ON MORALE IN THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES:

"The Army has broken every rule of the Emperor Meiji's five great sayings (Go Kajo and Go Seiman), especially that paragraph which says, 'soldiers must not take part in government affairs.'"

"When the enemy aircraft raided our area, the civilian construction unit all went into the air raid shelter because they were scared."

"The Buddhist priests are the hardest sect of people to get into this war - they're really opposed to the killing of people."

"Japan is going to fight on the Continent. This Continental war will involve more individual fighting; but it will be impossible to resist the Allies because of their mechanized power. I have seen them fight 'even by moving mountains'." (Note: P/W probably refers to the levelling of hills for new airfields by bull-dozers and other equipment.)"

"They used to rank the civilian personnel attached to the Armed Forces next to the carrier pigeons. I guess the rank order was like this: war-dogs, horses, carrier pigeons and then civilian personnel. Animals doing outstanding work in battle received great honors but non-combatants were not even recognized as having made any contribution. The least they should have done for these was to give them a place at the Yasukuni Shrine; but how could they, as there's no room even in the cellar for them."

"Up to now we've been having things too much our way in China. Just because we were born in God's country doesn't give us any superiority over the Chinese. And the same thing holds with the Germans - they are not better than those Jewish people whom they executed by the thousands."

"I hope Japan doesn't resort to mass suicide. I wouldn't know what I'd be living for, if my parents and brothers all died."

COMMENTS ON CONDITIONS IN JAPAN.

"Win or lose, that military clique must be broken; and if once broken, should never be allowed to be formed again."

"There are many men in Japan who have a lot of common sense but they do not have any power."

"The best thing for Japan is to ask for peace. It will at least save Japan from utter destruction."

"The rations that we brought with us from Japan weren't very good and we didn't have much canned meat."

"Towels and soap are two of the commodities that are rationed and are very scarce. Towels sold for three or four yen apiece. The government should have released more of these, for without them factory workers cannot keep clean. I had a very hard time trying to get one. I wonder whether the government thinks we are savages. Even toilet paper is scarce and hard to get."

"We have a death ray in Japan but it probably hasn't been perfected as yet."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 2)

"Those Boeings are really effective. Their accurate bombing can be traced to their superior bombsight."

"We received inexperienced pilots at our station - for example, out of the four patrols sent out, two failed to return because they lost their way."

The following statement was prepared in Japanese by a P/W who offered his assistance to the American officer particularly in China. He has frequently expressed strong anti-Japanese government sentiments and stated that while a student, he was jailed for expressing liberal thoughts:-

"My Opinion on the Present World Situation

I am not in favor of the present Japanese Imperialistic Government. My present attitude is seemingly not one of loyalty towards Japan, primarily because I am interested in the restoration of Japan.

My actions to date have been motivated by the thought of bringing this war to a speedy conclusion.

The longer the war continues, the more people will die, and the greater will be the destruction of Japan. Realization of this causes me much grief.

Americans as individuals, I think, are very kind. One cannot express the same opinion of Americans when they become a group. Nevertheless my feeling is based on the attitude of several individuals among my guards who are under strict discipline.

Let us look at Europe which has come under Allied control.

America, through the medium of democratic doctrines, has saved the nations in Europe from dictators. This is proof that Americans are kind. France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary are freed by democracy and kindness.

I am one of the peace lovers, so hope this war will end as soon as possible; and I will do my best to bring about this peace. If America will allow me, I will give her everything I have, and will cooperate with America who is fighting for democracy. I will repeat again, my ideal is not Imperialism and I am a lover of freedom. I will promise to live my entire life under the ideals of democracy. I am planning to write a book on my ideas for finishing the war with Japan as soon as possible.

For this reason, and for my work hereafter, I want to change my name to 'KIYOKAWA, Tomoyuki', please understand me."

A Navy Captain writes:-

A. Post-war Arrangement for Maintaining Peace.

The most important and essential element in maintaining peace between both countries is mutual understanding. The nationality, system of government, national traits, nationalistic feeling, policy, etc., of each must be well known by the other, and then mutual sympathy is naturally produced with complete understanding. In addition, we must not forget 'faithfulness.' We can avoid a collision, or rather we can cooperate in the policy with mutual compromise, even though our policies cross each other. Founded on this idea, of a 'Japan-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 3)

America harmony assembly or society with members of officials and private persons of various interests. Besides, promoting international cooperation among the people it would support the promotion of national resources, modify the educational system, encourage mixed marriages, and strengthen law enforcement and punishment of extremists who menace life, etc.

I have been thinking deeply still of these measures and am endeavoring to find a possible and practical plan. I believe this to be my assignment given by God, and I have determined to concentrate my energy on this work; otherwise it is unworthy for me to live any longer since I am a captive. When I later evolve a plan I will report it to the Authorities in the U.S.A. and ask their assistance. Whatever the arrangements are, we must not, I believe, forget they can be expected to succeed only through the faithfulness of the persons involved and with mutual confidence as the key.

I will try herewith to describe only my present ideas:

1. An absolute superiority of armed forces, and the permanent occupation of necessary strategic bases will be necessary.
2. It will be wise for the troops not to have long and direct contact with peoples of the defeated nation in order to avoid bad feeling among the people through troubles which may happen accidentally because of misunderstandings. To maintain peace, we have to be very careful from the first stage after the war.
3. It is of greatest importance for America to let the Japanese people know by her deeds and words - declarations and practical treatment - that she believes that Japan has the right and ability to develop and keep a normal living activity, and society as a nation in the world, ~~(and that a normal living activity, and society as a nation in the world)~~ and that therefore if the people of Japan will be faithful to humanity, and be trustworthy and moderate internationally, America will willingly support them and assist in the establishment of an economic system and foreign trade.
4. The government of the Japanese empire should be left in the hands of the Japanese. If some foreign body tries to govern Japan, many and great dangers must be expected, because foreigners do not know much of the peculiarities of Japan, while the people of Japan know themselves best. Even China, which is now apparently thought to be best fitted to control Japan, cannot do so. This will be easily understood even by reading only one report of the "Newsweek" war correspondent Harold Isaacs, whose stories have become familiar to everyone who knows China. We know that there are many cleverer Japanese who can be expected to establish a better Japan without outside assistance, pushing aside or destroying the so-called Military Extremists or black clique with their own hands, because they have known the faults and failures of their plan, even though the Militarists' realism is right. I prefer the way which will make the people of Japan understand the American ideals and system.
5. I believe it has not occurred to the Japanese people, to think of the leaders among the war advocates as legal criminals, but I have some presentment that those leaders will find their way to apologize for their failures to the Emperor and to the whole nation. Even if Japan loses the war, Japanese cannot believe or even imagine the Emperor as responsible. Therefore it will be most effective for America to show the people of Japan her full understanding by permitting the Emperor to keep his throne. Conversely it behooves the Japanese to believe and trust Americans. With this foundation we can surely expect continued peace between the countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 4)

B. Responsibilities When War is Over.

1.) Officially as a senior officer, I have the responsibility of reporting on our prisoners' life, with accuracy, and without any exaggeration. I would like to publish the report to the world and hope even to record it in war history.

2.) I would like to appeal to the Japanese authorities to reinstate prisoners of war and let them share in establishing peace according to their abilities.

3.) I would like to erect a monument to let our nation know true America and Americans which I have come to understand during my prisoner life. I believe that knowledge of each other is an essential element of mutual understanding. I must confess that we Japanese did not know enough of America and the Americans. One of my plans to establish understanding is the publication of the record of what I have seen and heard directly with my eyes and ears during my prisoner life; the other is to become a member of the movement which I described earlier in this statement.

4.) I would like to comfort the families which lost their sons or husbands who died under my command in the Pacific area, and to help to find jobs for them if necessary.

5.) In addition to these I will dare to do anything that will contribute to peace.

C. Causes of the War.

My views on the causes of the war have not changed since I became a P/W. But I must confess that I found the difference in order of the standard is far apart from my knowledge about under-estimating the powers of America for example I could not have imagined the American mechanical superiority in practical application of science, and in its quantity. I found the strong power to keep the fighting spirit of people up. I found how cleverly and effectively the Pearl Harbor invasion has been used to advantage in arousing hostility and the fighting spirit. All these facts are what I have witnessed and have observed in papers, magazines, and in the many Marines, and Navy Officers whom I have met. I will herewith try to describe my views for reference about the cause of the war.

Could this war have been avoided? No! Because both Japan and America lacked mutual understanding, faith, and sympathy, and they underestimated the military power and the national spirit of each other. Which was right? Each can be said to be right, or each can be said to be wrong. A quarrel is never one-sided. Is this a war of race? No! Is this a war of thought? No! Then it can be called a war of economy. "If there had not been a Pearl Harbor attack, the war would not have happened", is an explanation merely for child.

Now I will try to review the policies of both nations. In Japan they say that they expect to establish eternal peace, making a world of mutual friendship of race and country, developing the good relations between neighbors with the principle of equality and reciprocity. They insist on respect of sovereignty and independency of each country, and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. They say economically the principle must be one of cooperation and the open-door; and with this principle of reciprocity, these should follow freedom

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 5)

and development of trade and communication, and mutual open-doors. By enforcing the smooth current of cultural movement, both countries would contribute to world peace. Thus they declare to establish a world of non-aggression. America, too, announces almost all of the same principles, emphasizing mutual confidence. With these declarations, how can we expect war? But there was a cause for the collision: namely, the policies of Japan and America concerning the Far East were not the same.

We must look back a century. America appeared in the Far East theater to gain a market with many nations one after the other. From the first, America was aware of Russia's ambition in Asia. Since Peter the Great, Russia has been firmly holding to the traditional policy of marching out to the Pacific; and has had a geographical advantage in this. It might be a serious matter for America and England to check Russia's eastward movement. They decided to use Japan. Japan, directly facing the Russian wall, being backed by America and England, made an offensive - defensive alliance with England. The rapid and unexpected development of Japan, and her inevitable expansion, which was unfortunately misinterpreted as her intention to push all rights and interests of America and Europe from Asia, made America and England change their Far-East policies. Since then China has been put in the place of Japan in their policy to prevent the expansion of Japanese power. England abandoned the Japan-England alliance and with America backed China against Japan.

Japan's ideal is, that Far Eastern regional peace must be gained first in order to secure and maintain world peace. Naturally after that Japan should be the leader of the Asia region with the policy described above, which is similar to what America has been adopting and applying to the North and South American continents.

On the other hand, Japanese immigration in the U.S.A. was restricted. The current of Japanese expansion had to change its course to the north or to the west of Japan. At about that time Japan felt the menace of Communism coming down through Siberia to Japan. Manchukuo was established and Japan helped her as she is called the protecting line of Japan. This advance of Japan into Manchukuo was bitterly criticized by America and England as the behavior of the Japanese Army in Manchukuo was aggressive and also was against the international spirit of reciprocity and the open-door principle. At last Lord Lytton's report tried to check Japan's development toward the continent of Asia.

During the World War I, Japan proposed the so-called notorious twenty-one demands on China. Though these were not successful, they caused a strong anti-Japan movement in China, and gave a good excuse for China to back America and England.

The ratio of 5: 5: 3 is well known to every Japanese as having been forced upon her. Japanese people were not only afraid of her comparative weakness thus created, but also feared that Japan might lose an adequate supporting power for her diplomacy, which was thought poor enough; that America and England might be tricky in their dealings, since fair and right diplomacy must be backed with adequate power.

China has never tried to throw away her traditional policy founded on the principle of being cooperative at a distance, and offensive towards neighbors. She misunderstood Japan's hand as being aggressive. She disturbed the stabilizing influence in Asia she held with Japan, refusing now to join with Japan, and siding with America and England. Anti-Japanese movements in China became more and more serious.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 6)

By this time the military extremists had gained the leadership in Japan and pushed their policy forcibly. They were criticized by many Japanese as intending to adopt some kind of the totalitarian administration contrary to Japan's proper governmental system. The people of Japan believed the Japanese policy to be right. They had suffered extremely during many years of anti-Japanese movement in China. Therefore thinking that it would be better to persuade China first, they followed the militarists demands, taking advantage of the Marco Polo Bridge incident. Meanwhile active assistance by America and Britain to China from the back became stronger and more obvious; and Singapore, Hongkong etc. were strongly fortified. Japan was face to face with a direct menace both in arms and in economy. We could well understand at that time the seriousness of the economic situation because Japanese economy had mainly relied upon America and England.

By this time the Japanese were experiencing many diplomatic troubles in the North, where they could not be satisfied because of poor material and food at the time. Therefore naturally they turned to the South for national expansion and to gain the oil to feed industry. This is the reason that the South is called the "life line" of Japan.

But here, too, Japan faced the obstruction of America and England. I think there has never been a more serious time of anti-American and English feeling among the people of Japan, than the time when they realized that Special Commissioner Kobayashi (Minister of Economy at the time) failed in his negotiations with the Dutch government in Java to buy oil, because of the influence of London and Washington; and the time when the people were told by returning veterans from China that they found American and British soldiers sometimes including officers in the first lines helping Chinese troops against them.

In spite of the continuous diplomatic negotiations both in Tokio and Washington there could not be found any way to solve the difficult and tangled problem, unless either Japan or America changed its policy.

However Japan believed and insisted that her policy was never wrong, and that she must keep it because of promises to Germany and Italy. America, too, could not change her policy, without breaking her promises to the Allies, and also cheating China and her own nation. Thus Japan and America faced a stalemate.

In addition to these facts described above, there were likely such under-estimations as follows, to fan the flames of dispute between the two countries. The fire may have been lighted at Pearl Harbor, and the tinder may have been prepared in Washington. Anyhow Japan thought if the ratio 5:3 were equalized by this strategy she could then control the western Pacific; consequently after occupying the East Indies, if the war lasted long, she could supply enough materials from the South. She under-estimated the power of weapons and the fighting spirit of America. On the other hand, America, too under-estimated Japan's power: Japan had not sufficient power to challenge America, and she had already spent much energy in China, and Japanese economists could not risk such a foolish war as to bring about their own automatic destruction; American military superiority could easily win the war.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 7)

Whenever I think of the cause of the war, I have specially to point out the lack of faith on each side. They must reflect upon the fact that in being too loyal to the interests of their own country they forget the most beautiful faith of morality in human living. If they both have this faith they can trust each other, and consequently they are sure to find a way to avoid war.

D. Observations on the Difference Between the Japanese and American Governmental Systems.

Now I must shamefully confess that my knowledge of governmental systems is very poor. My views on this question have not changed since I've been a prisoner but after long thinking about this in a P/W camp and from a somewhat perspective position, I can state some of the merits and defects of the Japanese system.

There is a distinctive and great but natural difference between the governmental ideas of Japan and America. The difference of ideas is not strange because it is the natural product of the origin of each country. In Japan an ancestor came out to govern and his descendants spread over the land. Therefore the origin naturally came from above. Japanese people are all branches of twigs from one seed, with the same privilege and duty to the ancestor-monarch. This is the spiritual and virtual tradition lasting over two thousand years. This ideal theory means that the monarch has the right to govern the people, and all the people have equally the right and duty to help the monarch to govern. On this view-point the Japanese governmental system was firmly established, and in its form and even in its spirit European and American styles are adopted, being modified along the Japanese lines.

The fundamental idea of the Japanese constitution is that it is representation of the will of God - ancestor: with it the monarch governs, and with it the people help the monarch. And this constitution - drafted by Prince Ito - is founded on the declaration of the Emperor Meiji, that "Many deliberative Assemblies shall be summoned and all measures shall be decided by public opinion; everyone shall be of one mind in the active conduct of the administration; the vicious and uncivilized customs of antiquity shall be broken through, searching knowledge widely in the world; the great principles of impartially and justice - shall be the basis for action;.....".

Being ruled by the constitution, the governmental system of Japan is composed of Cabinet, Diet (high and low) and Privy Council. Sumitsuin (privy council) is an organ which checks governmental measures as planned by the Diet or sometimes by the Cabinet to see if they come within the constitution before the Emperor signs. This system is similar to that of the U.S.A. which is composed of an Executive branch (Cabinet), Congressional branch (Senate and House of Representatives), and legislative branch (Judiciary). But there is a distinct difference in that the Japanese Premier is appointed by the Emperor, while the president of the U.S.A. is elected by the people. Therefore the Japanese premier has logically a responsibility to the Emperor, but not to the Diet. However the original idea, held by the drafter Prince Ito, is that the premier should be the leader of whichever political party controls the Diet. Members of the Diet, of course, are all representatives of the nation. Thus the premier of Japan ordinarily has the further qualification of being a representative of the nation. He is therefore responsible to the Diet. This embodies a democratic idea. But recently there is the fear that a premier, who is not a member of and who has no actual support from a political party in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 8)

Diet, may become somewhat totalitarian and want to force his policy. We cannot say there is no risk that he may not cleverly use the name of the Emperor to override a law. It is very natural that one should hear of movements to recreate or renew a powerful and healthy political party with enthusiasm.

Now as to revising the Japanese governmental system, I believe that there is no chance of success in abolishing the monarchy, because it is against the great ideal spirit of its creation of the Empire of Japan, described above. In other words, it is as much against nature, as it would be for America to change from democracy.

Americans united themselves from everywhere in the world into a nation in comparatively recent times, therefore they naturally agreed to govern themselves. Hence the idea can be said to have come from below, and the governmental system was produced by this idea.

In Japan, there has been the ancient doctrine that the best and necessary ways to govern is first to hear the people's voice. In recent years the idea is popular that officials should be, at the same time, servants of the people. They will welcome such adequate steps as will avoid the tendency to totalitarianism of a particular group.

E. Difference Between Japanese and American Ways of Life.

My views about the difference between the Japanese and American ways of life have not changed at all, but I must confess that I found that the differences are greater than I had thought before. I think it is because I was put in a new and unaccustomed atmosphere. I will herewith try to describe various views which I deeply feel:-

1.) It was most curious for me to find that the American people keep the war spirit at such a high pitch as at present, during comparatively long years, in spite of the fact that they are the assembled people from ever where in the world. Every soldier of the Army and every Marine or the Navy officers with whom I met, used to say unanimously that they are engaging in the war because they want to come back home as early as possible, hence they must win the war; but they would not hopefully go to the fighting front, and, when at the front, they advance after sweeping the dangers by shells and bombs away. Some said that the term of "righteous war" is only one which leaders of government made to encourage the people toward the war, and that there is no war in which justice is only on one side in this civilized world. Judging from these conversations, I can say that materials and machines are the main factors of fighting power. Still I could find that such a spirit as "America is the first in the world", - though it looks something like an adult infantilism, - has strongly supported them in the war. Nevertheless the actual facts tell us that materials and armaments are winning the war against the spirit. I want to note a few results of the differences of ways of life of both nations.

2.) The difference in the surplus of goods was remarkable to me. Even at one glance at any American installation shows a higher order surplus in the American life both spiritually and materially. And every day the newspaper teaches us that the American people have such a surplus of goods as to arrange postwar plans - officially and privately.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 9)

3.) I have heard that the living standard of the American people is much higher than that of the Japanese, because of the American's higher education. But I found the reason is not true. On the point of education, the conditions are rather on the contrary. I could know this fact after having many chances to contact military service men who came from various classes or jobs. Among Japanese soldiers there are very few who cannot write their own names or who cannot read a paper.

4.) As for the development of the scientific civilization - specially the greatness and a spread of mechanical power and ideas - everyone can easily understand it with a glance at Construction Battalion (See-Bee) activities and equipment. I saw in a vast field only two or three persons working, or it is better to say, maneuvering some large machines. This way of life partly shows the difference between the conditions of both countries. If every farmer in Japan changed his ways of life to this style, they would be unmanageable with so many people out of jobs. It can be said that the Japanese have been trained during many centuries to enjoy the spiritual ways of life, and they have actually enjoyed and admired them, while in America rather materialistic ways of life are much adopted and admired. The majority of the Japanese, except the people in large cities, seldom enjoy a movie or theater once a week. Instead of these amusements they enjoy writing characters or composing poems, or their best comfort and recreation will be to make a happy family group of smiling and humming at home after the days work. They enjoy going out to the fields early in the morning with stars overhead and to coming back home to bathe in the moonlight. For them the fruits of work are the more respectful if gained by the sweat of their brow. Thus they live with a great self-satisfaction. In America it will be natural to find too many artificial amusements, because the people of America have a great tendency to raise the highest working efficiency with the least labour, and to make a time to enjoy materialistic amusements.

5.) We had learned that the people of America have an individual character but also they are very fair and frank, because of their ways of life. But sorry to say, I doubt this. Probably because, I must know the American way of life as observed by a P/W.

6.) The large-scaled ways of life of the Americans must be admirable as a whole. I think these ways of life came from large-scale ideas. They use an aeroplane to kill caterpillars instead of using a water-plot, or to kill mosquitoes and flies in a whole island in the Pacific spraying insecticide from the air. Or they make a wide road in the country, or a vast tomato field! How large scaled they are! And they are scientific and rational. Comparing to these, how small-scaled are the ways of life of the Japanese. Japanese people are skillful in making a type of miniature gardens. But on one side, we can say that roughness of the American and minuteness of the Japanese are a good contrast. The difference came from their countries own nature.

7.) In addition to this large-scaled idea, the Americans have another specialty, - "thoroughgoingness". I have heard of the floating of the sunken ships in Pearl Harbor, of irrigation, and shipbuilding. Whatever they do at all, they are sure to master their subject. If necessary they call every expert from all the world, and make any kind of tools and machines.

8.) The Americans have initiative, the Japanese have a talent for imitation - the talent contains an ability to Japanize everything. I cannot but criticize the manners in which the Japanese authorities floated the ships in the Socrabaya channel. It was childish.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 10)

9.) Freedom of speech and press are, too, at higher degree than I thought before. I was astonished to read in an American paper a contribution, "Fair enough", criticizing boldly and unshamefully even the private life of President Roosevelt. In Japan they do not dare to make such a personal attack. Very recently I have read a contribution about China's present condition in the "Newsweek". The reports of the correspondent exposed the disorder in China and the poorness of her power, even saying she can hardly be called a country. Reading this report I thought how foolish it is that the U.S. pretends that China is one of the 5 big powers. And at about the time General Stilwell came back from China, a correspondent reported to some magazine that China is unworthy to be given any arms by the Allies, because troops of China do not know how to handle them, and even if they were taught they would only break or otherwise deteriorate the arms by leaving them rust. Therefore, he said, to give excellent arms to Chinese means to throw them away.

While the American government is evidently trying to be very careful of Soviet Russia, people or newspapermen or others are criticizing and attacking the ambition of Russia. Such facts being open to the public, regardless of its effect on foreign policy, is very interesting to us. However, looking from another side, the censorship is likely pretty severe. One day I read in a paper a contribution telegraphed from Rome by a representative, which urged easing of the censorship of reports, because the conditions he found in his travels in Europe are quite different from the ideas held by Americans at home.

10.) "Strike" in industrial factories in America in war time cannot easily be understood by the Japanese. The people of America seem to draw a line between the national and the private life. In a magazine (Time) a contribution by a mother asks that since her three sons had done their duties on the European front, they should be omitted from fighting in the Pacific theater. These are some examples of a national sense overpowered by a personal sense. It may be more suitable, I think, to say that such ideas result from the course of national composition rather than to give an unpleasant sounding name of "egoistic" to their personal ways of life.

11.) To suppress the personal will is instilled in the Japanese people, while in America they say loudly it is "against freedom" as if that were criminal. "Public interest must be first, even to sacrificing self-interest", is highly respected from ancient-times in Japan as oriental morality. Therefore various mottos such as "Duty is first rather than right" can be found in the ways of life of the Japanese. In America they rather insist on exercising their right freely.

I may find many more distinctive differences in the ways of life. Anyhow it is difficult to judge which and what is better, because it is of a subject view. In my case I would like to adopt more scientific and initiative ways in our life.

F. Opinions of Proposals for Abdication of the Emperor.

An announcement by the Allies that the present Emperor must abdicate in favor of his son or one of his brothers would serve only to deepen the conviction of every Japanese that the foreigners have misunderstood the relation between the Emperor and the people, especially from the spiritual point of view. They will feel sure that these great misunderstandings in America had been one of the causes of this war. The moderates especially (I believe there are a lot of people who had

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 11)

and have anti-military extremists' ideas) will be extremely disappointed in this announcement, because such an idea will seriously effect the spirit in which they are eagerly searching for some basis for an understanding between Japan and America. Since the war began, America has never touched the Emperor, at least in public announcements or declarations. This fact has given to the moderates the most encouraging feeling of being able to shake hands and cooperate with America in the future, because it not only most effectively reassures the Japanese people that their social order will be retained, but also confirms America's understanding, recognition, and sympathy for Japan and the Japanese, and results in a fading of anti-Americanism. Therefore I would prefer to have the suggestion of retaining the present Emperor for Japan announced. It will lay a foundation for maintaining peace after the war and in some cases, I think, it will even hasten the end of the war. As described above, the Japanese people's idea for their Emperor is absolute and immutable; the Emperor has done no evil, therefore no crime can be attached to him. This belief is, I think, much like "Christ is the father." Indeed this belief in the Emperor is said to be super-religious. Judging from the Japanese nation's belief or sense for the "Emperor" of Japan, the "abdication" cannot be considered by them spiritually or legally. They will say that the abdication means to them what denying God means to Christians. Therefore it is sure that to treat the Emperor, as if he were an artificial organ of the government is to force the people to a serious religious uneasiness and a great revulsion.

In the history of Japan, if the Emperor could not govern because of serious illness or because of his youth, his son or his brother governed in his name as "Sessho"(regent), but still in this case the Emperor keeps the throne. In ancient times some Emperors abdicated the throne in favor of their sons or brothers, but this form is now out of the Imperial Household Laws. If worst come to worst in the war, and if the Emperor was forced to abdicate by the Allies, the people would be absolutely unreconciled. Japanese people, except so-called intelligentsia, have likely been inspired and enraged by the "Unconditional Surrender" propaganda as indicating that the Allies are planning the complete destruction of Japan and the Japanese. The military leaders have likely been making use of the declaration to raise and maintain the national hostility and the fighting spirit. In my opinion the Japanese people are most anxious about the Allied unconditional surrender declaration including the problem of the Emperor.

In like manner an announcement that the Allies will demand that Japan abolish the monarchy will cause an insane excitement among the people, and will promote a strong national movement to strengthen the unity, and determination to fight to the last man. Thus it would result only in prolonging the war and increasing human misery. As I stated before, the Japanese Emperor is the symbol of the Japanese people, the center of their spiritual lives, and is a super-religious object. It should be said that this national belief of 2,600 years could never be destroyed by only a few years' war. Even though some one should do it, there is nothing to gain from it. It will not be a way to maintain peace.

A Leading Private Comments on the Importance of Propaganda:

A. "Subject of Propaganda."

The first thing to consider in a Propaganda Program is the contents of the leaflets used. Those that have been distributed in Japan in the past only arouse an adverse reaction in the people. In other words the contents of the propaganda leaflets are the biggest problem:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 12)

1. They fail to understand the Japanese people.
2. The method of using the propaganda leaflets is wrong. They should be used throughout Japan, in the cities, villages and in the country.
3. One must have the tenacity and will for hard work, in other words the organization itself must be a permanent set up, and not be temporary.

The most important thing to do is to tell the people the truth, and give them something to think over. If the leaflets have both of these qualities, they can be said to be flawless. In order to get the best results, the contents must be methodically arranged, that is to say alphabetically. If the subject matter is presented haphazardly the Japanese people will never believe it. The sequence should be as follows:

1. Let them know that Japan will be defeated by giving true battle information from all possible angles.
2. Point out the futility of mass suicides; that those will only result in the fine Japanese people being wiped off the face of the earth.
3. Tell the people that the Americans will not kill the Japanese nationals. Even front-line American soldiers do not kill or beat up their Japanese Ps/W, but treat them the same as their own soldiers. Allay the fear of the Japanese people that they will be butchered or enslaved. This fear is fostered by the militarists and the government.

The above three items are important and must be the basis of all propaganda messages. Without these, all propaganda is useless. Success of the propaganda can be assured if the aforementioned "contents, utilization and organization" is kept in mind. When America carries those three items through and the Japanese people begin to consider them seriously, then there will be other methods that must be used, but it will only be an elaboration of the three fundamental items mentioned before, for example:-

1. The exposing of the true meaning of the so-called "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."
2. The truth about battle conditions and sufferings of the Japanese soldiers on the islands of the South Seas, about the atrocities they have committed, about the prevalence of suicides and assassinations in the Japanese Army at home.
3. The murderous orders that the army issues to the individual units.
4. The deaths from starvation, and cannibalism due to hunger among the 4000 soldiers on Maloelap Island in the Marshals.
5. The cruel treatment of soldiers by Staff Members in connection with "banzai" charges.
6. The mistreatment and misery of the Chinese people and the cruel murder of natives.
7. The true condition of the Ps/W, their confessions and laments.
8. The humanitarianism and friendliness of the U.S.A.
9. The voice of the Japanese soldiers who fell in battle.
10. The mothers of Japan.

There are countless other subjects, but it should be stressed again that the importance of the contents must not be overlooked.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 13)

B. Propaganda Pamphlets to Prevent Mass Suicides.

The more pamphlets used, the better the results. There will be better results from 1000 kg of pamphlets than a 1000 kg bomb. Of course the bombing of military installations is important, but if America thinks that better results can be obtained by bombing residential districts and killing as many people as possible, than she will be greatly disappointed. If by this means America thinks she can divide the people and the Army she is wrong. Indiscriminate bombings can and will be taken advantage of by the militarists as an act of savagery and will result in ever stronger opposition to the U.S. In such a case, when America lands in Japan proper, she will be placed in a position where she will have to kill even the women and children. This will be pitiful not only for America, who is advocating peace, but also for the Japanese people. If the war cannot be won by leaving the residential district intact, then it is a different problem, but this can only come about because the U.S. does not understand the Japanese people. If the U.S. understands the Japanese people then she will know that they are not to be blamed for this war. If the U.S. does not attempt to understand the Japanese people, then our work and our hopes for peace will never be realized. I firmly believe that with the help of America the militarists can be destroyed. With the help of the U.S. I would like to save the Japanese people from their suffering. I ask America for guidance and help, therefore I plead with you that America take the right road toward victory. I also ask the U.S. War Dept to contemplate what I have said and to execute my plans. America will be the victors and when that day comes Japan will be in a worse condition than any country in Europe. This ruinous condition will be brought about by the greatest mass suicides in history. If the U.S. does not consider this carefully and continues this war to its end, she will inevitably witness the mass suicides of the Japanese people."

There were forwarded, attached to the original copy of this report, propaganda posters drawn by prisoner. Translations of these follows:

EXHIBIT X

"Listen to the pitiful voices of those who have died and have now become the glorious spirits of Yasukuni Shrine:

"Parents, brothers, sisters! Please wait! The mad orders of the Army are suicidal for the nation. The people constitute the nation and the Army. We (the soldiers) have died in your place. Please live to correct the wrong. Parents, brothers, sisters! We have been watching the objectives of both Japan and America from our shrine. We are not worried about the policy of brotherly love of America, but the policy of Japanese militarists does not let us rest in peace. We know well that America is an advocate of peace."

EXHIBIT Y

"You are the only ones who can save Japan. You have no idea what the soldiers were saying when they had to fight with bamboo spears and stones and were starving to death and committing suicide. Those villains at the head of the Japanese Army who ordered mass suicides on every front and are causing you to go through hell are the enemies of world cooperation. The suicide of the military leaders, who have killed many of our people in this long war, is their punishment by Heaven. If you follow in their footsteps and die, the souls of the soldiers who

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-220 (P. 14)

have died in battle will never rest in peace. The white boxes with the ashes of soldiers which you received do not contain their heroic souls, and are as worthless as the bonds you purchased. They are the lies of the military villains and merely cruel mementoes. There are a great many survivors of those suicide attacks so do not become discouraged. Do not believe the Imperial Hq reports. America is truly the heaven-sent messenger of peace. There is nothing to fear. This can be verified anywhere. Sever at once all relations with those abominable military leaders and let us live vigorously in a new peaceful Japan."

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

P. E. Peabody S. 8. 13.
 P. E. PEABODY
 Brigadier General, GSC
 Chief, Military Intelligence
 Service

DISTRIBUTION

MIS	1-16
CPM FILES	17-40
ASF	41
AAF (AIR INT)	42-54
NAVY	55-60
G-2 SWPA	61
G-2 USAFFE	62
G-2 HONOLULU	63
G-2 USAFIB	64
G-2 10TH ARMY	65
G-2 USAFC	66
CINCPOA (AIC)	67,68
SEAC	69
JANIS	70
WD (LONDON)	71
DC	72,73
WDICC	74
JIS	75
JSC	76
JICPOA	77-80
OSS	81-84
FEA	85,86
OWI	87,88
CAD	89,90
IED CORPS	91
STATE DEPT	92
AGF	93-95

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

May 26, 1947

NA
Mr. Borton

Please note. Will you want to comment, or should we advise Gen. McCoy accordingly?

EAG
EAG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*DC/R
file*

19 May 1947

received General MacArthur's comments on the Far Eastern Commission paper on the demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces in Japan. His comments, which are as follows:

with the United States position letter. The demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces has been conducted under the SCAP directive and is complete except insofar as the demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces outside of Japan is not yet processed in accordance with that directive. Apart from the fact that the SCAP directive clearly implies a criticism of SCAP's decision relating to the demobilization

and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces at this stage of the occupation is clearly artificial and misleading and can serve no purpose other than to confuse contemporary public thinking and slant the historical record from the true sequence of events to the discredit of the United States position. There seems to be a growing tendency by the Far Eastern Commission to adopt as its own, policy decisions embodying the entire pattern of previous United States directives on which SCAP implementing action has already been taken. This in turn may well create the illusion that the Far Eastern Commission had been the sole originator of such occupational policy and that all implementing action required thereunder has been held in abeyance pending the issuance of its own corresponding directive.

"While by its terms of reference the Far Eastern Commission has the authority to review United States directives concerning the occupation and to revise the same if it sees fit, its proper procedure would seem to be to embody in its action only points in which it finds disagreement with the directive already in force. This would avoid confused thinking and preserve a clear and truthful historical record.

"I most strongly urge that the United States firmly adhere to the course suggested in par 5b referenced letter on this issue, and that the United States adopt as a policy the principle that Far Eastern Commission policy decisions on matters already covered by United States directives be limited to those points with which the Commission disagrees."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

NND 750063

By *CRP* NARS, Date 22 OCT. 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DC/R Central Files

894.20/5-1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

894.20/5-1947

CS/R

1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Dc/R
file*

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 May 1947

Dear General Hilldring:

The War Department has just received General MacArthur's comments with respect to SC-020/13, the Far Eastern Commission paper on the Control of Japanese Military Activity in Japan. His comments, which apply to the attached letter, are as follows:

"I am in complete agreement with the United States position suggested in par 5b of referenced letter. The disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces has been conducted under the provisions of a United States directive and is complete except insofar as the demobilization of prisoners of war still held outside of Japan is concerned. The latter are being processed in accordance with that directive as they arrive on Japanese soil. Apart from the fact that the controversial Soviet amendment clearly implies a criticism of SCAPS discharge of his function, a policy decision relating to the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces at this stage of the occupation is clearly artificial and misleading and can serve no purpose other than to confuse contemporary public thinking and slant the historical record from the true sequence of events to the discredit of the United States position. There seems to be a growing tendency by the Far Eastern Commission to adopt as its own, policy decisions embodying the entire pattern of previous United States directives on which SCAP implementing action has already been taken. This in turn may well create the illusion that the Far Eastern Commission had been the sole originator of such occupational policy and that all implementing action required thereunder has been held in abeyance pending the issuance of its own corresponding directive.

894.20/5-1947
Dc/R Central Files

"While by its terms of reference the Far Eastern Commission has the authority to review United States directives concerning the occupation and to revise the same if it sees fit, its proper procedure would seem to be to embody in its action only points in which it finds disagreement with the directive already in force. This would avoid confused thinking and preserve a clear and truthful historical record.

no

"I most strongly urge that the United States firmly adhere to the course suggested in par 5b referenced letter on this issue, and that the United States adopt as a policy the principle that Far Eastern Commission policy decisions on matters already covered by United States directives be limited to those points with which the Commission disagrees."

Ind

1951

CS/R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
894.20/5-1947

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

NND 750063

By CRD NARS, Date 22 OCT. 1974


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The War Department concurs with General MacArthur's views regarding SC-020/13. It would appear that the paper is satisfactory as now written and that it would be inappropriate to amend SC-020/13 to include the proposed Soviet paragraph regarding the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces.

I would appreciate it if you would inform General McCoy of General MacArthur's comments with regard to SC-020/13.

Sincerely yours,



HOWARD C PETERSEN
Assistant Secretary of War

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

15 April 1947

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Commission Paper on Control of Japanese Military Activity in Japan.

TO : The Commander in Chief, Far East
Tokyo, Japan

1. Enclosed are Far Eastern Commission (FEC) committee papers dealing with the control of Japanese Military Activity in Japan.
2. SC-020/7 was a revision of the original U.S. policy paper with regard to the Disarmament and Demobilization of the Japanese armed forces as contained in SWNCC 58/9 (FEC 017). As a result of your statement that, for all practical purposes, the disarmament and demobilization of Japanese armed forces in Japan was complete (C 63473 of 26 July 1946, in reply to WAR 94949), SC-020/11 was prepared as a substitute for SC-020/7. This paper was approved by all save the Soviet member of the committee.
3. Recently, after several months delay, the Soviet member has approved SC-020/11 subject to certain amendments as shown in SC-020/12. In the light of frequent Soviet criticisms of the execution of the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces, it is possible to construe the proposed paragraph "2" of the first Soviet amendment as a further implied criticism.
4. SC-020/13, a revision of SC-020/11 in the light of committee discussion of the proposed Soviet amendments, omits the proposed Soviet paragraph "2". This paper will be discussed in the Steering Committee at an early date, but it is expected that the Soviet member will again insist upon the inclusion of his proposed paragraph "2".
5. The following alternative courses of action in approving SC-020/13 are proposed:
 - a. Agreement to insertion of the Soviet proposed paragraph "2", subject to the understanding that the U.S. will (1) publish its original policy paper (SWNCC 58/9) on the subject simultaneously with the publication of the FEC policy, and (2) add a statement, to be included in the minutes and in the JCS directive to you, to the effect

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

that SCAP has been operating under a U.S. directive in the disarmament and demobilization of Japan, that in the opinion of the U.S. Government he has completely carried out the provisions of this directive save for Japanese armed forces not yet returned to his jurisdiction, and that the reference to completion of the disarmament and demobilization of Japanese armed forces is necessary only because certain Japanese armed forces have not yet been returned to Japan from theaters not under control of SCAP.

b. Insistence that, in the light of the situation in Japan, this paper need contain no reference to disarmament and demobilization, but should concern itself only with control of future military activity in Japan.

6. It is believed here that course a would facilitate agreement and passage of the paper, and would contribute to future collaboration within the FEC. The War Department is reluctant to propose this course, however, if you feel that it contains an implied FEC criticism of the manner in which disarmament and demobilization has been carried out in Japan.

7. In order to assist in the formulation of a definitive U.S. position, your views with regard to the adoption of one of the courses proposed in paragraph 5 are urgently requested by radio.

6 Incls

1. SC-020/7 (3 cys)
2. SC-020/9 (3 cys)
3. SC-020/10 (3 cys)
4. SC-020/11 (3 cys)
5. SC-020/12 (3 cys)
6. SC-020/13 (3 cys)

LAURIS NOBSTAD
Major General, GSC
Director of Plans & Operations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

110

AIRGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED

Department of State

NO. A-110

Washington,

CONFIDENTIAL

TIME

Sept. 17, 1947

1221

1221

AMCONSUL

RANGOON (BURMA)

The following from Civil Censorship Detachment
"CIS-MIS-GHQ-SCAP" (JP/TOP/PPB/9656) dated August 7, 1947
may be of interest:

ARMED FORCES, FOREIGN: FORMER JAPANESE ARMY PERSONNEL SAID
HOLDING OUT IN BURMA

YR
894.2345C

"About a regiment of Japanese, former members of the 18th
Division (KIKU CORPS) and the 4th Division (YASU CORPS) are
still holding out in the Paom Mountains, Caroe Area, Burma,
with regimental commander and staff officers as a nucleus.
They seem to have a stock of arms and food sufficient to
last about two years, and managed to get in touch with us
now and then. They have not waked from their dream and
insist on fighting until they die."

Examiner's Note: The above was related by Masayoshi IDE, CSN
4-chome, Shinnoyama-machi, Kurume, Fukuoka-ken, an
ex-Lieutenant of the now defunct Japanese Army, who was
recently repatriated from Burma.

894.20/9-1747

Anal.	
Rev.	
Dist.	

MEI:XXX EDahl:jm
9-11-47

LOVETT ACTING

LOVETT
ACTING

FC
S. W. G.

CONFIDENTIAL

894.20/9-1747
mk

DO NOT DETACH THIS FORM.

RECORD COPY

FILE NO.

894.20/10-1347

DESP. 1330 FROM TOKYO

THE ATTACHED COPY OF A DESPATCH HAS BEEN DESIGNATED THE RECORD COPY TO REPLACE THE ORIGINAL ACTION COPY WHICH WAS NOT RETURNED TO THE CENTRAL RECORDS BY THE ACTION OFFICE.

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R FOR FILING.

---000---

JUN 1 - 1946

FILED

FE

d/r

Tokyo, October 13, 1947.

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 1330

NOV 1 1947

Recd.
Oct. 23, 1947ACTION
FESUBJECT: Reorganization of Agencies Supervising the
Demobilization of Japanese Military and Naval
Forces.INFO
DCR
AS enc
OCD enc
FC enc

0-0-0

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose five copies of a directive dated October 4, 1947 (SCAPIN 1791) from this Headquarters to the Japanese Government concerning the reorganization of agencies supervising the demobilization of Japanese military and naval forces.

The directive provides for the transfer of the First Demobilization Bureau (army) intact to the jurisdiction of the Welfare Ministry. In addition the Japanese Government is given instructions upon which to base a plan for the elimination of separate demobilization agencies and the absorption of their functions into the permanent administrative structure of the government. The Second Demobilization Bureau (navy) is to be eliminated and, after previous approval by this Headquarters, any of its functions which may prove to be necessary are to be turned over to appropriate agencies of the Government.

Enclosures:

Five copies of GHQ, SCAP directive, October 4, 1947.

Original and ozalid to the Department.

820
RHBushner:

62473

894. 20/10-1347



OFFICE OF THE EDITOR

ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA
20 NORTH WACKER DRIVE • CHICAGO 6, ILLINOIS

NA
DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

JAN 12 1948

Office of
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 12 1948
DIRECTOR
Department of State

January
7
1948

Director,
Office of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The following statements appear in the article JAPAN which was prepared by Mr. George Atcheson, Jr., last year for our new publication, Ten Eventful Years:

"Demobilization proceeded rapidly through use of Japanese demobilization machinery; 2,576,085 Japanese troops within the home islands were demilitarized by December. The remainder, totalling 5,852,000, were spread from Manchuria to the Solomons and across the islands of the Central and Southwest Pacific, as were 1,300,000 navy personnel.

"Of the remaining 3,147,000 army and 234,000 navy personnel in overseas areas, all were disarmed in southern Korea, the Philippines, Ryukyus, Volcanos, Siam, Malaya, Borneo, the Celebes and the Lesser Sundas, with some 18,000 remaining armed in Sumatra and Java. Most of the original 1,542,000 troops in China (exclusive of Manchuria) and the 165,000 in Formosa were disarmed. (The status of Japanese troops which fell into soviet hands, estimated at 800,000 remained unknown)."

and

"The tremendous military organization--approximately 4,000,000 organized and armed men in the home islands and 2,500,000 abroad--had been liquidated, and within another year the approximately..."

As you can see, the totals of the figures in both sections do not agree and we are wondering which set of figures is correct and should be used? We would appreciate any comments you might have. Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

John V. Dodge
John V. Dodge
Assistant to the Editor

JVD:df

FOR NE U
Encl. *mps*
Rev. _____
Cat. *vart*
Dist. _____

894.20/1-748

CS/A

FEB 10 1948
FILED

894.20/1-748

JAN 28 1948

In reply refer to
NA

Dear Mr. Dodge:

In reply to your letter of January 7, 1948, inquiring which set of figures prepared by Mr. Atcheson on Japanese demobilization is correct, it would appear that neither set conforms with the latest information available on this subject. According to a report submitted to the Allied Council for Japan by the U.S. Member on March 5, 1947, all Japanese Armed Forces in the Japanese home islands at the time of surrender or subsequently repatriated had been demobilized, a total of 6,420,000 men. Since there were also at that time approximately 500,000 unrepatriated members of the Japanese armed services (mostly in Soviet-held territory), it would appear that the over-all size of the Japanese armed services at the time of the surrender was 6,920,000.

From the accompanying table you will note that at the close of the war 455,943 Japanese naval personnel and 3,197,425 Japanese army personnel were located in overseas areas. Accordingly, the second set of Mr. Atcheson's figures might be revised as follows:

"The tremendous military organization... approximately 3,270,000 organized and armed men in the home islands and 3,650,000 abroad ...had been liquidated, and within another year the approximate..."

It is hoped that the foregoing figures, together with those set forth in the accompanying table, will prove to be of use in the compilation of Ten Eventful Years.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

Table of
Figures.

W. Walton Butterworth
Director for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. John V. Dodge,
Assistant to the Editor,
Encyclopaedia Britannica,
20 North Wacker Drive,
Chicago 6, Illinois.

NA: MGreen/hhc
January 27, 1948.

FE

894.20/1-748

12178

CS/A

894.20/1-748

CR
JAN 28 1948

NA: MGreen/hhc
January 27, 1948.




Japanese Military and Naval Personnel Located Outside the Japanese Home Islands on August 15, 1945. (Based on Japanese Official Figures Published in Jiji Nenkan, 1947.)

<u>Area</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Total</u>
Karafuto, Kuriles	10,000	62,000	72,000
Manchuria, Korea	16,000	954,000	970,000
China, Hainan	67,930	1,173,000	1,240,930
Ryukyu, Ogasawara (Volcano) Nanto, Daito Islands	19,823	58,393	78,216
Formosa	35,000	200,000	235,000
Philippines	62,000	51,000	113,000
French Indo-China	5,030	54,221	59,251
Siam	1,130	82,500	83,630
Malaya	29,740	105,484	135,224
Burma, Andamans, Nicobars	1,730	16,750	18,480
Dutch East Indies (except New Guinea)	54,061	181,587	235,648
Marshalls, Marianas, Carolines	51,437	61,569	113,006
New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, Admiralty, Nauru & Ocean Islands	81,500	147,000	228,500
Australia	<u>20,562</u>	<u>49,921</u>	<u>70,483</u>
Total	455,943	3,197,425	3,653,368

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA

Office of the Editor: 20 NORTH WACKER DRIVE • CHICAGO 6

January
30
1948



~~1008~~
~~1008~~
~~1008~~
file

Mr. W. Walton Butterworth
Director for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Butterworth:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 28 with the latest information concerning Japan's armed forces.

Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

John V. Dodge
John V. Dodge
Assistant to the Editor

JVD:df

894.20/1-748
894.20/1-748
110 894.20/1-748

In reply refer to
NA

March 26, 1948

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL
FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

In accordance with a memorandum dated March 23, 1948, from the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, there is enclosed a certified copy of Directive, Serial No. 89, to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers regarding Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment, to be filed with the Far Eastern Commission under the provisions of paragraph III, 4, of its Terms of Reference.

XR 894.24

CHARLES E. SALTZMAN

Charles E. Saltzman
Assistant Secretary

894.20/3-2348

CS/V

Enclosure:

✓ Copy No. 1 (certified)
of Directive to SCAP,
Serial No. 89.

2K
CK
MAR 24 1948 P.M.
MAR 26 1948 P.M.

gma *alD*
NA:ALDunning/ggg
3/24/48

FE

A true copy of
the signed original
CR/21C

AE

894.20/3-2348

0-300

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 2Serial No. 89

17 March 1948

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSPROHIBITION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN JAPAN AND
DISPOSITION OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY EQUIPMENT

The following directive, Serial Number 89, prepared by the State Department to implement the policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on February 12, 1948, under the provisions of Paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference, has been received from the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments for transmission to you for your guidance in accordance with Paragraph III, 1, of those terms of reference:

Preamble

"In accordance with Paragraph 1, Part III of the basic post-surrender policy for Japan (FEC-014/9), adopted unanimously by the Far Eastern Commission on 19 June 1947, which states, 'disarmament and demilitarization are the initial tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination,' the Far Eastern Commission approves the following policy decision on the prohibition of military activity in Japan and disposition of the Japanese military equipment.

"1. a. For the purposes of this document, the term 'military' is defined to mean 'Military, Naval, and Air', except where the context otherwise requires.

b. For the purpose of this document 'Japanese Armed Forces' are defined to be all Japanese land, sea and Air Forces; Japanese military and para-military organizations, formations and units; gendarmerie and secret military police and their organized Japanese auxiliaries;

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

together with the administrative organs of the Armed Forces mentioned above.

c. 'Japanese Military equipment' is defined as:

(1) All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and any equipment, or other property whatsoever belonging to, used by, or intended for use by Japanese Armed Forces and Japanese-controlled armed forces or any members thereof.

(2) Naval combatant and auxiliary vessels and craft of all kinds, both surface and submarine, including those under repair, alteration, remodeling, reconstruction or construction, as well as those which were reconstructed for military purposes.

(3) All aircraft of all kinds, both military and civilian, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices.

(4) All military, naval and Air installations and establishments, including airfields, landing grounds and strips, seaplane bases, naval bases, military equipment of harbors, establishments engaged in military research, military storage depots, including underground depots, all equipment and facilities primarily used for military communication and transport, permanent and temporary land and coast fortification fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.

(5) Proving grounds and laboratories, all technical data, patents, plans, inventions and laboratory samples of weapons and means of war, including those which may be or have been under study, in the process of manufacture, finished or patented.

RESTRICTED

"2. Possession of arms, ammunition and implements of war by any **Japanese** should be prohibited save that the Supreme Commander may authorize the use:

a. By Japanese Civil Police agencies for the purpose of maintaining law and order of rifles and pistols and the necessary ammunition for them and other small arms exclusively used by civil police.

b. By licensed hunters of duly registered hunting weapons.

"3. The development, manufacture, importation and exportation of arms, ammunition and implements of war, and materials intended for military use should be prohibited for Japan, except for the importation of no more than the quantities of arms and ammunition necessary for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 2.

"4. The manufacture of aircraft of all kinds should be prohibited in Japan.

"5. The construction of any naval combatant and auxiliary vessel or craft, the conversion of any commercial vessel or craft to military purposes, and the reconstruction or remodeling of commercial vessels or craft so as to render them more suitable for military purposes should be prohibited.

"6. Military equipment seized from the former Japanese Armed Forces or from members of the Japanese civil populace should after examination be destroyed or scrapped except for:

a. Military equipment required for operational needs of the occupation forces or for the lawful activities of the Japanese Civil Police.

b. Items convertible to peacetime civilian uses; such equipment may be drawn upon for:

(1) The maintenance and subsistence of the occupation forces, prisoners of war, and nationals of members of the United Nations;

RESTRICTED

(2) The relief of the local civil population to the extent necessary to prevent or alleviate epidemic or serious disease and serious unrest which would endanger the occupying forces and the objectives of the occupation:

(3) Reparations, including such military equipment as:

(a) Plant and machinery for shipbuilding and nautical instruments other than those limited to purposes of an exclusively military nature.

(b) Diving gear,

(c) Optical glass,

(d) Chain and chain cables,

(e) Machine tools convertible to peacetime uses,

(f) Military research facilities

"7. All former United Nations naval craft, equipment, and facilities found in Japanese possession should be safeguarded and as soon as practicable should be delivered to the nations to which they belong at such points as may be designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

"8. Japanese disarmed naval craft may be used for the purpose of repatriation or such other purposes connected with carrying out the terms of surrender as the Supreme Commander may direct.

"9. All records of military registration of demobilized personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Forces, Gendarmerie and Secret Police should be confiscated and transferred to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for subsequent destruction. No further records of this nature should be compiled or maintained by the Japanese.

"10. Reestablishment of the following should be prohibited: the War and Navy Ministries, the Japanese Imperial High Command, the Supreme Military Council, the Council of

RESTRICTED

Marshals and Admirals, the Inspectorate of Military Training, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the Naval General Headquarters, the Headquarters of Armies and Fleets, and also any military or para-military organizations, military academies and schools, military scientific and research institutions and military laboratories, as well as the officers corps in any form. Such demobilization agency as is retained for the purpose of demobilizing returning Japanese Armed Forces should be of a civilian character and should be abolished immediately after completion of the demobilization. The former Japanese demobilization system involving special privileges of demobilized members of the Japanese Armed Forces should also be abolished.

"11. All military and para-military organizations in Japan, including ex-officers' organizations, together with their affiliates and the clubs which were used for making propaganda for militarism and ultra-nationalism should be dissolved and their revival or establishment in any form, including a disguised form, should be prohibited. The application of this paragraph should extend also to various associations created under the guise of production associations, such as cooperative societies for joint cultivation of land, for fishing, and others, which are composed wholly or substantially of ex-officers of the Army and Navy and Gendarmerie and headed by their former military commanders. This paragraph should apply also to any other associations composed wholly or substantially of ex-officers of the Japanese Army and Navy and Gendarmerie, ostensibly created for legitimate purposes, but which are, in reality, disguised forms of military or para-military organizations, or which have some other disguised subversive purpose.

"12. Military training of the civilian population and military instructions in schools should be prohibited.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

"13. For the purpose of prevention of the revival of Japanese militarism persons who have at one time fallen within any of the following categories should not be nominated or employed in the Government service, public office, or educational institutions except as they may be necessary in performing duties essential to the demobilization of repatriated military and naval personnel.

a. Generals, admirals, and all other senior officers and all career officers of the Army, Navy and Gendarmerie;

b. Other officers of the Army, Navy and Gendarmerie, including members of the reserve, if their employment would harm the cause of peace and security; and

c. Officials of ex-officers; and other military and paramilitary associations and of bodies closely associated with the Armed Forces.

"The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may authorize the nomination or employment of a person coming within categories a and c if his record shows that he has been an opponent of Japanese expansionism and totalitarianism.

"14. All measures necessary should be undertaken to prevent any revival of the Japanese Army, Navy, Gendarmerie, Secret Police and their administrative organs."

RESTRICTED

THE STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Washington, D.C.

memo to Sec. Gen. 78C 3/24/48 A-L-D
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
MAR 24 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE SANA-5993
23 March 1948

DC/R

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
(Attention: Mr. J. K. Penfield - FE)

Subject: Directive Transmitted to SCAP by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Reference: SANA-5980 dtd 12 Mar 1948.

Enclosed are four copies of Directive, Serial
No. 89, transmitted to SCAP by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Copy No. 1 is for transmittal to the Far
Eastern Commission, and Copies Nos. 2, 3, and 4 are
for the files of the State Department.

For the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating
Committee:

H. W. Moseley
H. W. MOSELEY
Secretary

Enclosure:
Directive, Serial No. 89,
Copies Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 4.

THIS DOCUMENT IS DECLASSIFIED
WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED

ve
class. sheet written

RESTRICTED

894.20/3-2348

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

894.20/3-2348

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

APR 9 1948

file
action
file

RESTRICTED

Control DEPT OF STATE

Rec'd April 8, 1948 2:35 p.m.

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 9 1948
DIRECTOR
Department of State

4
ACTION: FE
INFO:
P
SAM
EUR
OCD
CIA
OIE
PA
DCR

Action	NA
FE	
Info	
UN	
CA	
NA	
PI	
SEA	

FROM : Moscow
TO : Secretary of State
NO : 634, April 8, 8 p.m.

Most papers April 8 carry one column New York Tass despatch criticizing Jap demilitarization decision Far East Commission. Article states "In an effort to hide from public opinion attitude Soviet Delegation and present it in false light, US representative in FEC ...said that Soviet Union allegedly abstained from formal approval of decision for reasons of technical nature... Actually Soviet delegation abstained because of extremely weighty considerations of principle."

Article reviews arguments allegedly presented by Soviet delegation including appendix re definition small arms and majority support for Soviet proposal delete "after investigation". Implies US voting machinery thwarted passage Soviet proposal.

Department please pass Tokyo as Moscow's 5.

SMITH

WFS:KC

Note: Passed to Tokyo 2:45 p.m. 4/8/48

RESTRICTED

APR 16 1948
FD-30

894.20/4-848

CW

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTION
is assigned to

FE

No. 134

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RESTRICTED

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
to be DC/R Files
when ACTION is completed.

American Mission in Korea,

Seoul, March 10, 1949.

DCR

Subject: Reported Statement of Korean Foreign Minister in
Regard to Rearmament of Japan

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on March 9, 1949, it was reported to this Mission that the Korean Foreign Minister, Colonel Ben C. LIMB, was reported in a press conference held on the preceding day to have made some remarks with regard to the alleged rearmament of Japan. According to the report received by this Mission, the Foreign Minister was asked the following question: "What do you think of Japanese rearmament?" To the foregoing question the Foreign Minister is reported to have made the following reply: "The United States is probably rearming the Japanese in view of the attitude of Russia. Our Government is paying attention and making efforts so that Korea will not be harmed because of Japanese rearmament."

In view of the above-cited statement, an officer of the Mission was directed to call on the Foreign Minister and to inquire with regard to the veracity of the statement attributed to him. There is enclosed in this connection a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held between the Foreign Minister and the Mission officer on March 9, 1949.

Respectfully yours,

Everett F. Drumright
Everett F. Drumright
Counselor of Mission

Enclosure: *att*

Copy of Memorandum of
Conversation, as stated

Original and hectograph to Department
Copy to Embassy, Moscow
Copy to POLAD, Tokyo

EFDrumright/jcg

RESTRICTED

*FE
X/R
MD
11.1
XR
4.242
119
(Japan)*

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 16 AM 9 42

DC/M
FACILITIES BRANCH

894.20/3-1049

MAR 28 1949

PTMAD

DMR

L.R.A.

MAR 18 1949

RESTRICTED

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 134 dated March 10, 1949, from American Mission in Korea, Seoul.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

March 9, 1949

Subject: Japanese Rearmament

Participants: Mr. Ben Limb, Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. B. E. Kuniholm, First Secretary

I discussed privately with Mr. Limb the statement attributed to him on the subject of Japanese rearmament which he is reported to have made at his press conference on the eighth. The Minister denied categorically that he had made a positive allegation on the subject, and said that his statement was conditional and preceded by the word "if".

He insists that he had said in substance, "If it is true that the United States is rearming the Japanese, because of the Russian attitude, the Korean Government will have to take measures so that it will not be harmed by such rearmament." It was a very hypothetical question, he said, and posed in such a way as to be readily subject to misinterpretation. It was, he said, a leading question.

I explained to Mr. Limb the substance of the Department's telegrams of February 15 (circular) and February 21, 6 p.m. (intel), so that there should be no doubts as to the attitude of the American Government.

BEKuniholm/jcg

RESTRICTED

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

file DC/R
ACTION COPY
Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
8 1949
DIRECTOR
Department of State

18

CONFIDENTIAL

Action: FE
Info :
SS
P
G
H
SAM
OLI
CIA
AAN
POS
EURX
DCR



*AP
X PMS
X CA*

Control 2741

Rec'd August 7, 1949
2:14 a.m.

FROM: Nanking
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1735, August 7, 1 p.m.

NCNA English-language broadcast August 6 states that MacArthur has approved KMT plan recruit 100,000 Japanese troops, that so-called "anti-Communist Pacific Union" includes organizing "international volunteers" for armed intervention in China by "US imperialism and its lackeys in Philippines". Embassy of opinion denial by MacArthur, statements reaffirming Department's attitude regarding proposed pact timely.

Sent Department, repeated OFFEMB Canton 728.

JONES

MAM:ME

Action Assigned to *CH*

Action Taken *no action*

this is one more in the series of NCNA
Date of Action *series of NCNA*

Action Office Symbol *CH*

Name of Officer *RP*

Direction to DC/R *file*

AUG 24 1949

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

894.20/8-749

HH

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

*Brown Special Files
11/18 Japan*

November 15, 1949

To : The Secretary
From : FE - Mr. Butterworth
S - Mr. Howard

*OK
DL*

OK file

Subject: Reactivation of Japanese Armed Forces

Policy decision to be made

The policy decision to be made is whether to advise the Department of Defense now of the views of the Secretary of State concerning some of the reasons why he does not regard it as feasible to authorize the reactivation of Japanese armed forces in the proposed peace treaty with Japan.

*MR
740.00119 Central
(Japan)*

Discussion

At the request of the Department of State, the Department of Defense is actively considering U.S. security requirements in relation to the proposed Japanese peace treaty. In view of the shortness of time before a U.S. draft treaty should be presented to Secretary Bevin in order to meet the deadline of the meeting of British Commonwealth nations in January, the Department of State is endeavoring to expedite the decisions within the Department of Defense. It is believed that if the Secretary of State firmly indicated now, as a guide to the Department of Defense officials, some of the reasons why he does not regard it as feasible in the peace treaty to authorize reactivation of Japanese armed forces, the determination by the Department of Defense of U.S. security requirements in Japan in the post-treaty period can be more clearly focused on such other issues as the bases and U.S. forces, if any, that need to be retained in Japan. If on the other hand the Department of Defense should decide, in the face of the reasons advanced by the Secretary of State, that the security of the U.S. would require the authorization of Japanese rearmament in a peace treaty, then the Secretaries of State and Defense could at once consult as to whether it is possible to have any peace treaty at this time.

General MacArthur has already indicated to the Department of Defense his strong opposition to the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. Although his preferred solution of the security problem in relation to Japan would be the demilitarization and neutralization of Japan guaranteed by the Big Powers, he recognizes that this solution would not be acceptable to the United States so long as the word of the Soviet Union can not be relied upon

and he

061567

TOP SECRET

This Document Must Be Returned to
894.20/11-1549

CS/M TOP SECRET

894.20/11-1549

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

and he therefore endorses the retention in the post-treaty period of U.S. bases in Japan and limited U.S. forces to man and protect them.

Nevertheless, there are strong supporters among officials of the Department of Defense for Japan's rearmament and a paper prepared at the working level recommended that the peace treaty authorize the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. The problem has not yet reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Underlying almost all the reasons given by the military planners for rearming Japan is the strategic concept that Japan must be defended by armed force, if necessary, to prevent its falling into the Soviet orbit. If the peace treaty does not authorize Japanese armed forces, it is reasoned that the above strategic concept would require the retention in Japan of a disproportionately large share of U.S. armed forces for the purpose of defending Japan, whereas reactivation of Japanese armed forces would permit withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Japan without basically altering our security position in the Pacific and would be a valuable and perhaps indispensable asset in the event of all-out war. It is further reasoned that once a peace treaty comes into force the pressure of U.S. public opinion to bring American boys back home and let the Japanese defend Japan, coupled with military emphasis on the European theater, would make a reduction in U.S. forces in Japan below the safety margin from the security standpoint almost inevitable. It is further reasoned that because of the time that is required to train Japanese armed forces, postponement of their reactivation would only result in further delay which the United States cannot risk.

It is noteworthy that the reactivation of Japanese armed forces, for which there is strong support among military officers in the Department of Defense, would be diametrically opposite to the views expressed by the JCS in NSC 49 "there should be prior assurance of Japan's economic, psychological, and political stability, and of her democracy and western orientation" before the peace negotiations are undertaken. Whereas the Department of State believes that the conclusion of a peace treaty will work in favor of Japan's pro-Western orientation, it believes that the safeguard referred to by the JCS is important before authorizing Japan to have armed forces. A proposal for present reactivation of Japanese armed forces would completely ignore the safeguard referred to by the JCS.

Recommendation

That the Secretary approve the informal submission of the attached paper to the Department of Defense officials as an

indication

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

indication of his views on the issue of the authorization of Japanese armed forces in the peace treaty.

S:JHoward:bb

Cleared by
Mr. Jessup
S/ACleared by
Mr. Davies
S/P**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

POSITION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON
REACTIVATION OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Department of Defense, for the purpose of facilitating their determination of U.S. security requirements in Japan in the period following the proposed peace treaty, with some of the reasons why the Department of State does not regard it as feasible in the treaty to authorize reactivation of Japanese armed forces.

It is assumed (a) that a treaty of peace with Japan should be entered into promptly, provided that U.S. security can be adequately provided for; (b) that Japan should be permitted to maintain a well equipped constabulary, including a coast guard, for the purpose of preserving internal order; and (c) that the Department of Defense may determine as a result of its study that U.S. security requires the retention of U.S. bases and U.S. armed forces in Japan in the immediate post-treaty period.

The position of the Department of State is that, for political reasons, it is not feasible in the treaty of peace to authorize the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. No decision should be made now in favor of reactivation of Japan's armed forces, either now or at a future time designated now. At the same time the United States should not foreclose by a present decision the possible reactivation of Japanese armed forces at some future time when this course might appear to be in our best interests.

Accordingly it is thought that, in the absence of a possible United Nations formula for this security problem, the treaty of peace should envisage the continued demilitarization of Japan but should provide for a general review of the security clauses of the treaty by the signatory powers at a time or times in the future to be flexibly determined. In practical implementation of this provision, the security arrangements could be subjected to continuous reappraisal by the representatives of the signatory powers in the light of changing conditions in Japan and elsewhere so that a review conference of the signatory powers could be promptly called whenever circumstances might warrant. Although the provision for review would not refer specifically to the question of Japanese rearmament, when such a review were made the possibility of reactivation of Japan's armed forces in partial substitution for, or in conjunction with a withdrawal of, U.S. security forces could be explored.

The principal reasons for this position are as follows:

1. The primary objective of the United States in relation to the security aspects of a Japanese peace treaty under present conditions of a cold war is the prevention of the outbreak of war rather than measures of military defense against actual armed attack by the Soviet Union. Prevention can be best achieved in

the immediate

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

the immediate post-treaty period, in the absence of a possible United Nations formula, through the presence of U.S. forces in Japan on behalf of the signatory powers and at Japan's request as evidence of U.S. determination to regard an armed attack against Japan as provocation to an all-out war.

2. U.S. aid and the efforts and resources of Japan should be concentrated, on the one hand, upon the accomplishment of the objective in paragraph 1 and the maintenance of a strong Japanese constabulary and, on the other hand, upon the achievement of economic and social progress which in the long run will greatly influence the continued orientation of Japan toward the United States. This balance would be upset by the premature diversion of aid, efforts and resources to the maintenance of a Japanese military establishment.

3. A decision to rearm Japan should not be made without relation to the determination of the Japanese to continue or abandon the renunciation of war and armed forces in their Constitution. It is significant that to date no strong pressures have developed within Japan in favor of abandonment. Authorization of rearmament in the peace treaty without the expressed will of the Japanese through voluntary amendment of their Constitution would appear to be imposed upon the Japanese for the purpose of promoting the strategic military interests of the United States.

4. A decision to reactivate Japanese armed forces should not be made without more adequate assurances than are now present that Japan will continue to be friendly, or at least not hostile, toward the United States. Should Japan become hostile, any armed forces and war supporting industry in Japan would, if made available for use against the United States, greatly augment the war potential of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

5. A present proposal for the reactivation of Japanese armed forces either now or in the future would constitute a sharp break with Japan's renunciation of war and armed forces and with U.S. occupation policies. The result might be to cast serious doubts among the Japanese concerning the sincerity of U.S. purposes and the validity of the objectives of the occupation, thereby weakening U.S. influence and the influence of democratic principles in Japan, both of which are necessary to offset communist influence in Japan.

6. A proposal to rearm Japan would probably be viewed with alarm by Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and other Allied

powers

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

powers that continue to fear a renaissant nationalistic and aggressive Japan. It is also likely that the attitude of France and certain other European powers toward the peace treaty would take into account its possible affect as a precedent for the reactivation of Germany's armed forces. It is preferable to retain the full support and cooperation of the other Allied powers friendly to the United States as well as the moral and psychological advantages that would derive from the position that U.S. security forces are being maintained in Japan on behalf of the other signatory powers in the absence of the United Nations' assumption of full responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security with respect to Japan.

S:JBHoward: bh
11/16/49

Cleared by
Mr. Jessup
S/A

Cleared by
Mr. Davies
S/P

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM ON

REACTIVATION OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

Need for Department Position

At the request of the Department of State, the Department of Defense is actively considering U.S. security requirements in a Japanese peace treaty. It is contemplated that the position of the Department of Defense will first be formulated under the direction of Under Secretary Voorhees, assisted by a representative whom General MacArthur has sent to Washington for the purpose, and will then go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense for final determination.

In view of the shortness of time before a U.S. draft treaty should be presented to Secretary Bevin in order to meet the deadline of the meeting of British Commonwealth nations in January, the Department of State is endeavoring to expedite the decisions within the Department of Defense at every stage by making the position of the Department of State known on particular issues as soon as feasible.

The first basic issue now apparent on which it is possible that there may be disagreement between the two Departments concerns the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. This issue arises on the assumption, which it is believed will be shared by both Departments, that the peace treaty to be signed with Japan, with or without the participation of the Soviet Union and possibly China, will envisage a supplementary agreement, probably bilateral between the U.S. and Japan, under which, with the termination of the occupation, certain specified naval and air bases in Japan would continue to be garrisoned by U.S. security forces for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in that area. It is also assumed that adequate Japanese security forces for the maintenance of internal order--a national constabulary including a coast guard--will be provided for in an agreed treaty. It is further assumed that the overriding objective of the United States in relation to the security aspects of the peace treaty is that in the event of war Japan should be denied to the Soviet Union as a base of operations and should contribute to military operations against the Soviet Union.

It is convenient to consider the question of reactivation of Japanese armed forces in the form in which it is most likely to be presented within the Department of Defense for decision. This is the proposal that whereas the responsibility for all naval and strategic air functions would fall upon U.S. security forces, Japan should be authorized to maintain ground forces, probably with tactical air support. This view has already been expressed with considerable determination by certain military officers and has substantial reasons in its favor from the military standpoint, so that it is advisable for the Department of State to determine its own position as soon as possible for the purpose of influencing the decision of the Department of Defense, if this appears necessary, and of the Government on this important question. Although the issue discussed in this memorandum is the narrow one stated above, nevertheless it must be recognized that a decision to reactivate Japanese armed forces will raise collateral questions concerning the reactivation of Japanese industries supporting these forces and U.S. aid to assist in maintaining the forces.

Statement of Issues for Determination

It is useful to state the issue of reactivation of Japanese armed forces (i.e., of Japanese ground forces, probably with tactical air support) in

the form

TOP SECRET

894.20 / 11-749

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

the form of the following alternative positions:

1. Decide now not to reactivate Japanese armed forces. (Under this alternative the treaty would be silent on this issue and would presumably provide for the continued demilitarization and disarmament of Japan.)
2. Decide now to reactivate Japanese armed forces. (The treaty would presumably contain restrictions as to strength, equipment, etc., of the armed forces allowed Japan.)
3. Decide now to reactivate Japanese armed forces up to agreed limits at the end of five years, or sooner if a majority of the signatory powers so decide. (The treaty would so provide.)
4. Defer decision on the issue until some future time or times for review of the security provisions of the treaty, say at the end of every five years or, should a majority of the signatory powers request a conference for the purpose, at any intervening time. (The treaty would provide for review of the security clauses in the manner indicated and would contain no reference whatever to reactivation of Japanese armed forces.)

Recommended Position and Supporting Reasons

It is recommended that the Department endorse alternative 4 above, i.e., to defer a decision on the reactivation of Japanese armed forces until a future time or times when a review is made of the entire security situation in relation to Japan.

Merits of Reactivation

The reasons given in favor of reactivation of Japanese armed forces are primarily military in nature. It is argued that for the purpose of defending Japan against a Soviet armed attack, Japanese armed forces, supported by a tactical air force, would be extremely useful—for example, in resisting amphibious landings on Japanese shores. It is further argued that should armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union break out in Europe, the heavy requirements of U.S. forces in the European theater would be more easily satisfied if the United States were relieved by Japan of the responsibility for ground force and tactical air force functions in Japan; this aspect of the reactivation of Japanese armed forces would also be consistent with the overall strategy of the United States of concentrating its power in Europe and maintaining minimum strength in the Far East. It is further reasoned that such a reactivation of Japanese armed forces would not provide Japan with the capacity for aggression against the other allied powers inasmuch as Japan would not have any navy or strategic air force with which to carry offensive blows to other nations. So far as expense is concerned, it is said that the Japanese soldier is one of the least expensive soldiers in the world to maintain. So far as the renunciation of war and armed forces in the Japanese Constitution is concerned, it is said that this was largely an American idea adopted by the Japanese in the comfortable security provided by the United States occupation.

General MacArthur, in the latest expression of his views on this subject, opposes the reactivation of Japanese armed forces on the ground that the primary objective is the prevention of war rather than measures of military defense against an actual armed attack, especially at a time when war does not appear imminent; and that this can be achieved through the presence of U.S. garrison forces in Japan and a U.S. foreign policy that makes unmistakably clear to the Soviet Union that an armed attack against Japan means all-out war. It is his position that

reactivation

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

reactivation of Japanese armed forces (1) involves an expense which the Japanese could not and the United States would not willingly in peacetime afford and the expense would be for Japanese forces that would not be capable of defending Japan against a determined Soviet attack, and (2) that such a sudden break with the present Japanese Constitution and U.S. occupation policies would cast serious doubts among the Japanese concerning the sincerity of U.S. purposes and the objectives of the occupation.

In addition to the reasons advanced by General MacArthur, there are the following reasons against reactivation of Japanese armed forces at this time:

a. The question of reactivation of Japanese armed forces cannot be decided without relation to assurances that these forces would be used on behalf of and not against the security of the United States. The military usefulness to the U.S. of Japanese armed forces assumes a Japan which is friendly toward the United States, or at least not hostile. Should Japan become hostile to the U.S., any armed forces and war supporting industry in Japan would tremendously increase the war potential of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

b. Nor can rearmament of Japan be considered without relation to the determination of the Japanese to continue or abandon the renunciation in their constitution of war and armed forces. It is significant that to date no strong pressures have developed within Japan in favor of abandonment. On the contrary there appears to be considerable sentiment that the future of Japan lies in continued demilitarization. A peace treaty providing for rearmament would, therefore, appear to impose upon the Japanese people the necessity of maintaining local ground and air force to supplement the strategic military interests of the United States.

c. Reactivation of Japan's armed forces up to specific limits would require the continuation of U.S. and probably allied controls, such as inspection. In the absence of Japanese armed forces no such controls would appear to be necessary. These controls would cause irritation and diminish the benefits to be gained from granting to Japan an equal and independent status in the treaty.

d. A proposal to rearm Japan would probably be viewed with alarm by Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and other Allied powers that continue to fear a renaissant nationalistic and aggressive Japan. It is preferable to retain the full support of the other Allied powers for our policy in Japan. Should it become necessary to strengthen our forces in Europe at the expense of our forces in Japan, the security arrangements should be sufficiently flexible that the U.S. can call upon our Allies in the Pacific to assist in supplying the deficit.

e. Reactivation of Japanese armed forces at this time--thus placing Japan in a position not unlike a military ally--would tend to destroy the credibility of the argument that the retention of United States security forces in Japan is an arrangement in which the United States is acting on behalf of the other signatory powers until such time as the United Nations is able to assume full responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security with respect to Japan.

While this memorandum does not for the above reasons recommend a position in favor of reactivation, neither does it recommend that the United States should now decide against ever reactivating Japanese armed forces. Should the political considerations appear favorable at some future time for reactivation, the advantages to our security demand that the possibility of reactivation should not

be foreclosed

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

be foreclosed through any present decision. There appears to be no need for such a decision at this time, and if pressure arises for making such a decision, it should be resisted.

Timing of Reactivation

A decision now that Japanese armed forces shall be reactivated at a future time, say at the end of five years or such earlier time as a majority of the signatory powers might in a future conference determine (alternative 3) has an advantage over a decision in favor of immediate reactivation in that it provides for a more gradual transition from demilitarization to rearmament in Japan. Presumably also, a provision to this effect in the peace treaty would make the future rearmament of Japan conditional on the desire of the Japanese people at that time to amend their constitution. It would further give the Allied Powers some time in which to adjust to the anticipated rearmament.

Moreover it is said in favor of alternative 3 that deferral of the entire question of rearmament to a future decision of the Allied powers (alternative 4) tends to leave the United States committed to bearing indefinitely the sole responsibility for the maintenance of peace in respect of Japan. From the standpoint of the other Allied Powers friendly to the United States, it may be true that the ideal solution of the security problem in Japan is the retention of U.S. garrison forces on bases in a disarmed Japan. In such a situation the Allies need have no fear of renewed Japanese aggression and need not share the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the area of Japan. This being the case, it is reasoned that unless a present decision is made to reactivate Japanese armed forces at some future time, the other Allied Powers will have no interest in such reactivation and will continue to resist it.

However, alternative 4 provides no assurance of a friendly Japan as a condition precedent to rearming Japan and therefore does not adequately protect U.S. security. Moreover, adequate provision can be made in the treaty in order to avoid a situation in which the United States is indefinitely committed to retain United States security forces in Japan. Thus the treaty might make the continuance of such forces in Japan after a stated period, say ten or twenty years, dependent upon the continued assent of the United States and might provide that the other Allied Powers will assist the United States on its request in the maintenance of adequate security forces in Japan.

The preferable alternative in the light of the above considerations is to provide in the treaty for the continued demilitarization of Japan but to provide also that the security clauses in the treaty shall be reviewed at the end of every five years, or at any intervening time if a majority of the signatory powers request a conference for the purpose. Such a review would cover the entire security problem including the question of withdrawal or reduction in size of United States security forces and the reactivation of Japanese armed forces and Japanese war supporting industries in phase therewith. A decision at that time could be made on the basis of further experience concerning Japan's continued friendliness and concerning the durability of Japan's desire to remain demilitarized.

S:JBHoward:bh
11/7/49

TOP SECRET



2 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 16, N.Y.
MURRAY HILL 3 6810

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

November 14, 1949

TOP SECRET
COPY NO. 1
OF 6 COPIES

This Document Must Be Returned to
RMM
Central
Files
894.20/11-1449

Dear John:

I am answering your memorandum of November 10th on the re-activation of Japanese armed forces by this personal letter rather than by a formal memorandum because I have not had time to study the problem sufficiently to state a firm view.

My general reaction is strongly against the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. The various reasons set forth in the memoranda you sent me against such reactivation seem to me to be much stronger than those in favor of it. I am impressed by the fact that both General MacArthur and the JCS in their views expressed in NSC 49 took what seems to me to be the sound position that our interests and security require us to win Japan to our way of thinking. I have not studied all of the military opinions, but I agree vehemently with General MacArthur's view "that the primary objective is the prevention of war rather than measures of military defense against an actual armed attack." It seems to me that we are not anywhere in the world determining our political policy on the theory that war is imminent, although we do proceed on the theory that it is by no means impossible and that we must take proper precautions. The difference between these two approaches seems to me to be vast.

Any remilitarization of Japan would seem to me to have such adverse reactions throughout the Pacific area as to make this course unwise unless we were unfortunately driven to the conclusion that war is imminent and that we must be in a posture of ready defense against attack. I do not believe we have reached that conclusion. Moreover, as noted in some of the memoranda, the effect of such a decision with its implications would have violent repercussions in Europe where we know with what fear the Western European nations would regard the rearming of Germany.

The problem

The Honorable John Howard,
Department of State.

7/
Rev _____
Cat _____

319220

TOP SECRET

894.20/11-1449
TOP SECRET FILE

- 2 -

TOP SECRET


The problem of retention of United States security forces in Japan seems to me less clear. If this can be done on the request of Japan and on behalf of the United Nations, its political effects might not be injurious, but I do not feel confident that this would be the case. Would the retention of rights to bases in Japan necessarily require the presence of American forces there? I do not know what the comparable situation is in the Philippines. What size forces do we maintain there at our bases? What information do we have regarding the maintenance of Russian forces in Port Arthur and Dairen? This information would be important in meeting the inevitable Soviet attacks. Have we explored every variation of formulas suggested in other connections whereby we would be entitled to act on the vote of any seven members of the Security Council?

Approaching this whole problem with an ignorance of the details of military thinking, I am forced to wonder just how clear and permanent are the military views which call for Japanese bases. My recollection is at the close of the war there was a most insistent demand by the Navy for a number of bases in the Philippines which not very much later they decided they did not want and wished to give up. I understand there have been fluctuations in the views of the three services concerning the importance and usefulness of retaining Okinawa as a base. I gather at times, when bases are under discussion, people talk about having them in their own firm possession while at other times they talk merely about denying them to some hostile power.

From the over-all point of view, I believe that our real strength lies in the attitude of various Asiatic countries toward the United States, particularly as that attitude would reveal itself in time of war. I have frequently been struck by the contrast between the kind of local approval and support we had in Panama and the Philippines and the corresponding lack of help and support which the British had in Singapore and the Dutch in Java to take only two examples. If the insistence on United States bases in Japan created suspicion of our intentions and undermined all of the general building up of our attitude in the area, I wonder whether the base would be worthwhile. Again I say I don't know enough about the military planning to know precisely what role a base in Japan would play in case of the outbreak of war.

I shall be in the Department Wednesday and hope to have an opportunity to discuss this matter with you, if that is not too late.

Sincerely yours,



Philip C. Jessup

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

005635

MEMORANDUM

To : The Secretary

November 15, 1949

From : FE - Mr. Butterworth

S - Mr. Howard

Subject: Reactivation of Japanese Armed Forces

Policy decision to be made

The policy decision to be made is whether to advise the Department of Defense now of the views of the Secretary of State concerning some of the reasons why he does not regard it as feasible to authorize the reactivation of Japanese armed forces in the proposed peace treaty with Japan.

Discussion

At the request of the Department of State, the Department of Defense is actively considering U.S. security requirements in relation to the proposed Japanese peace treaty. In view of the shortness of time before a U.S. draft treaty should be presented to Secretary Bevin in order to meet the deadline of the meeting of British Commonwealth nations in January, the Department of State is endeavoring to expedite the decisions within the Department of Defense. It is believed that if the Secretary of State firmly indicated now, as a guide to the Department of Defense officials, some of the reasons why he does not regard it as feasible in the peace treaty to authorize reactivation of Japanese armed forces, the determination by the Department of Defense of U.S. security requirements in Japan in the post-treaty period can be more clearly focussed on such other issues as the bases and U.S. forces, if any, that need to be retained in Japan. If on the other hand the Department of Defense should decide, in the face of the reasons advanced by the Secretary of State, that the security of the U.S. would require the authorization of Japanese rearmament in a peace treaty, then the Secretaries of State and Defense could at once consult as to whether it is possible to have any peace treaty at this time.

General MacArthur has already indicated to the Department of Defense his strong opposition to the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. Although his preferred solution of the security problem in relation to Japan would be the demilitarization and neutralization of Japan guaranteed by the Big Powers, he recognizes that this solution would not be acceptable to the United States so long as the word of the Soviet Union can not be relied upon

and he

BC/R

71

319221

TOP SECRET

11/22

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO
CENTRAL
FILES
894.20/11-1549

894.20/11-1549
TOP SECRET FILE

740.0011 Pu (Peace)

OK DE

463

GR

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

and he therefore endorses the retention in the post-treaty period of U.S. bases in Japan and limited U.S. forces to man and protect them.

Nevertheless, there are strong supporters among officials of the Department of Defense for Japan's rearmament and a paper prepared at the working levels recommended that the peace treaty authorize the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. The problem has not yet reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Underlying almost all the reasons given by the military planners for rearming Japan is the strategic concept that Japan must be defended by armed force, if necessary, to prevent its falling into the Soviet orbit. If the peace treaty does not authorize Japanese armed forces, it is reasoned that the above strategic concept would require the retention in Japan of a disproportionately large share of U.S. armed forces for the purpose of defending Japan, whereas reactivation of Japanese armed forces would permit withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Japan without basically altering our security position in the Pacific and would be a valuable and perhaps indispensable asset in the event of all-out war. It is further reasoned that once a peace treaty comes into force the pressure of U.S. public opinion to bring American boys back home and let the Japanese defend Japan, coupled with military emphasis on the European theater, would make a reduction in U.S. forces in Japan below the safety margin from the security standpoint almost inevitable. It is further reasoned that because of the time that is required to train Japanese armed forces, postponement of their reactivation would only result in further delay which the United States cannot risk.

It is noteworthy that the reactivation of Japanese armed forces, for which there is strong support among military officers in the Department of Defense, would be diametrically opposite to the views expressed by the JCS in NSC 49 "there should be prior assurance of Japan's economic, psychological, and political stability, and of her democracy and western orientation" before the peace negotiations are undertaken. Whereas the Department of State believes that the conclusion of a peace treaty will work in favor of Japan's pro-Western orientation, it believes that the safeguard referred to by the JCS is important before authorizing Japan to have armed forces. A proposal for present reactivation of Japanese armed forces would completely ignore the safeguard referred to by the JCS.

Recommendation

That the Secretary approve the informal submission of the attached paper to the Department of Defense officials as an

indication

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

indication of his views on the issue of the authorization of Japanese armed forces in the peace treaty.

S:JBHoward:bh

Cleared by
Mr. Jessup
S/A

Cleared by
Mr. Davies
S/P

GR

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

POSITION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON REACTIVATION OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Department of Defense, for the purpose of facilitating their determination of U.S. security requirements in Japan in the period following the proposed peace treaty, with some of the reasons why the Department of State does not regard it as feasible in the treaty to authorize reactivation of Japanese armed forces.

It is assumed (a) that a treaty of peace with Japan should be entered into promptly, provided that U.S. security can be adequately provided for; (b) that Japan should be permitted to maintain a well equipped constabulary, including a coast guard, for the purpose of preserving internal order; and (c) that the Department of Defense may determine as a result of its study that U.S. security requires the retention of U.S. bases and U.S. armed forces in Japan in the immediate post-treaty period.

The position of the Department of State is that, for political reasons, it is not feasible in the treaty of peace to authorize the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. No decision should be made now in favor of reactivation of Japan's armed forces, either now or at a future time designated now. At the same time the United States should not foreclose by a present decision the possible reactivation of Japanese armed forces at some future time when this course might appear to be in our best interests.

Accordingly it is thought that, in the absence of a possible United Nations formula for this security problem, the treaty of peace should envisage the continued demilitarization of Japan but should provide for a general review of the security clauses of the treaty by the signatory powers at a time or times in the future to be flexibly determined. In practical implementation of this provision, the security arrangements could be subjected to continuous reappraisal by the representatives of the signatory powers in the light of changing conditions in Japan and elsewhere so that a review conference of the signatory powers could be promptly called whenever circumstances might warrant. Although the provision for review would not refer specifically to the question of Japanese rearmament, when such a review were made the possibility of reactivation of Japan's armed forces in partial substitution for, or in conjunction with a withdrawal of, U.S. security forces could be explored.

The principal reasons for this position are as follows:

1. The primary objective of the United States in relation to the security aspects of a Japanese peace treaty under present conditions of a cold war is the prevention of the outbreak of war rather than measures of military defense against actual armed attack by the Soviet Union. Prevention can be best achieved in

the immediate

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

the immediate post-treaty period, in the absence of a possible United Nations formula, through the presence of U.S. forces in Japan on behalf of the signatory powers and at Japan's request as evidence of U.S. determination to regard an armed attack against Japan as provocation to an all-out war.

2. U.S. aid and the efforts and resources of Japan should be concentrated, on the one hand, upon the accomplishment of the objective in paragraph 1 and the maintenance of a strong Japanese constabulary and, on the other hand, upon the achievement of economic and social progress which in the long run will greatly influence the continued orientation of Japan toward the United States. This balance would be upset by the premature diversion of aid, efforts and resources to the maintenance of a Japanese military establishment.

3. A decision to rearm Japan should not be made without relation to the determination of the Japanese to continue or abandon the renunciation of war and armed forces in their Constitution. It is significant that to date no strong pressures have developed within Japan in favor of abandonment. Authorization of rearmament in the peace treaty without the expressed will of the Japanese through voluntary amendment of their Constitution would appear to be imposed upon the Japanese for the purpose of promoting the strategic military interests of the United States.

4. A decision to reactivate Japanese armed forces should not be made without more adequate assurances than are now present that Japan will continue to be friendly, or at least not hostile, toward the United States. Should Japan become hostile, any armed forces and war supporting industry in Japan would, if made available for use against the United States, greatly augment the war potential of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

5. A present proposal for the reactivation of Japanese armed forces either now or in the future would constitute a sharp break with Japan's renunciation of war and armed forces and with U.S. occupation policies. The result might be to cast serious doubts among the Japanese concerning the sincerity of U.S. purposes and the validity of the objectives of the occupation, thereby weakening U.S. influence and the influence of democratic principles in Japan, both of which are necessary to offset communist influence in Japan.

6. A proposal to rearm Japan would probably be viewed with alarm by Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and other Allied

powers

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

powers that continue to fear a renascent nationalistic and aggressive Japan. It is also likely that the attitude of France and certain other European powers toward the peace treaty would take into account its possible affect as a precedent for the reactivation of Germany's armed forces. It is preferable to retain the full support and cooperation of the other Allied powers friendly to the United States as well as the moral and psychological advantages that would derive from the position that U.S. security forces are being maintained in Japan on behalf of the other signatory powers in the absence of the United Nations' assumption of full responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security with respect to Japan.

S:JBHoward:bh
11/16/49

Cleared by
Mr. Jessup
S/A

Cleared by
Mr. Davies
S/P

TOP SECRET



No. 329

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESTRICTED

American Embassy, Wellington, New Zealand
December 23, 1949

Subject: New Zealand Apprehensions over Poss
Rearmament of Japan

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OVERSEAS PROGRAM STAFF
British Commonwealth Section (Europe)

JAN 4 - 1950
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

894.20/12-2349

3
REC'D
DEC 31

ACTION
EUR

INFO
DCR
FE
ITP
OLI
POS
EUR/X

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

EUR INDEX
[Handwritten initials]

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit a copy of an article entitled "Beware of Munich", appearing in the December 22, 1949 issue of the Standard, described on its mast-head as "The Official Organ of the N.Z. Labor Movement". The article, which is an attack on the alleged "U.S. Appeasement Policy" towards Japan, is one of a series of weekly commentaries on world affairs signed by "Criticus". The editor of the Standard has on previous occasions explained that these articles are not subject to his review and are not to be taken as expressing the official opinions either of the paper or of the Labor Party. The identity of "Criticus" has never been publicly revealed, but it is understood on good authority that he is Mr. W. ROSENBERG, Lecturer in Economics at Canterbury University College, Christchurch.

While "Criticus" has on previous occasions expressed a line on foreign affairs which is considerably to the left of the regular editorials in the Standard, or in the Labor Party's daily, the Southern Cross, and in some cases indistinguishable from that of the Communist Party, there is other internal evidence to suggest that he is not a consistent adherent of the Moscow line. In the present instance, he is expressing a point of view which is very widely held in New Zealand and is to be found, albeit in less extreme form, in some conservative papers. The Christchurch Press, for instance, in an editorial on November 12, 1949, declared:

"Politically, the State Department has regarded Japan as a potential ally and bulwark against Communism. At the best, this is an uncertain basis for military and foreign policy."

Newspapers such as the Press and the New Zealand Herald (Auckland) are fully conscious of the danger of Asiatic communism extending to Japan, and they do not accuse the U.S. occupation authorities of having already rearmed Japan, but they consider that there is a dangerous possibility that such rearmament may be permitted in the future. They are extremely skeptical as to the success of SCAP's efforts at democratizing Japan, and are alarmed at what the Herald describes as "unpleasant signs of reaction - the formation of something very like the old secret police and the rapid decay of academic freedom in the universities."

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.
RESTRICTED

894.20/12-2349

FILED FAP
JAN 13 1950

847 W. 9111

Despatch no.329, December 23, 1949
Wellington, New Zealand

-2-

versities." The same paper considers that "the old mercantile and military oligarchy" is equally as menacing as Communism."

The value of the "Criticus" article is that it assembles many of the overseas news reports which have given rise to this apprehension, although the conclusion which it draws from these is expressed in more extreme terms than is to be found in other New Zealand press comments.

The Far Eastern Affairs officer of the Department of External Affairs, in a conversation with an officer of the Embassy, referred to the reported remark of General Michelberger (cited in the attached article) as being typical of recent statements by American officials which were giving rise to anxiety in New Zealand as to whether the United States intends to keep Japan disarmed.

The general feeling on this subject in New Zealand is well summed up by the Evening Star (Dunedin), which declared on November 23 that "the Western world has not yet accepted the principle that Japan should be developed as a bulwark against the Communistic advance."

Respectfully yours,

Robert M.Scotten

Enclosure: *AM*

Copy of article appearing in the Standard
(Labor weekly, Wellington) of December 22, 1949

File no. 321/350/430

Armistead M. Lee/gh

RESTRICTED

(13/12)

Enclosure to Despatch no. 329, December 23, 1949, Wellington, New Zealand, entitled: N.Z. APPREHENSIONS OVER POSSIBLE REARMAMENT OF JAPAN. Source: Standard (Wellington) December 22, 1949

BEWARE OF MUNICH

There exist dangerous trends at the present time to a repetition of the fatal mistakes of the policy of Munich 11 years ago. Munich was the climax of a policy which tried to appease Germany, Italy (and impliedly Japan) with a view to diverting their aggressive designs. The aggressor States, however, double-crossed the Munichites and used their strength in an attack on Britain and France, still governed by those responsible for Munich: Neville Chamberlain and M. Daladier.

The same policy seems to be gaining strength again. First with regard to Japan:

"NEW YORK, May 23.

The United States is determined to push strongly ahead with plans for the economic rehabilitation of Japan in spite of some doubts and objections of the other Allied Powers in the Pacific.

"The Authorities do not regard the fulfilment of United States plans for Japan as constituting a danger to other and smaller Pacific Powers, since industrial reconstruction and POSSIBLE REARMAMENT on a small scale would be under United States supervision."

The way how Japanese re-militarisation is carried out is similar to the way Germany re-armed after the first war. Under the camouflage of "fighting striking workers and communists" a huge well-armed, paramilitary police force was built up which was a good nucleus for Hitler's later rearmament:-

"TOKIO, July 13.

The available strength of the Japanese police-force was increased yesterday from 125,000 to 2,125,000. The National Public Safety Commission ordered that, in case of emergency, 2,000,000 volunteer firemen of the Fire Defense Corps should be mobilised to assist the regular police.

"The firemen will be empowered to suppress riots, arrest criminals, control traffic and suppress crime in an emergency."

The result of the growth of the police force under a right-wing Government must be as has always been the case in the past - a definite swing towards aggressive Fascism:

"LONDON, October 25.

American policy in Japan has now become simply an attempt to conciliate the Japanese in every way, in

the

Enclosure to Despatch no. 329, Dec. 23, 1949, Wellington,
New Zealand.

-2-

the hope that in any future war they will not side with the enemies of the United States," says the Tokio correspondent of 'The Times'.

"Corruption is now flourishing on a gigantic scale, and there are indications that the Japanese are fully prepared to start again the unfair practices by which they drove foreign competition out of Japan before the war. In spite of denials by the Japanese Government, it is a fact that the secret police have been re-established and have been operating since last April. There is also widespread conviction that on the pretext of carrying out a purge of communists, the Japanese will get rid of liberal thinking as well."

The Japanese are becoming increasingly conscious that America wants to re-arm them; in the words of Lieutenant-General Lichelberger:

"NEW YORK, November 2.

"In the event of war with the Soviet, the Russians will see what strange bedfellows we have. Eighty-five million Japanese would be on our side."

No wonder that Mr. Yoshida, Japan's right-wing Prime Minister is getting more outspoken every day:

"TOKIO, November 13.

"Mr. Yoshida on Friday told the Diet he believed that Japan had the right to refuse too unfavorable peace terms. He said: 'Since a peace treaty is in fact a treaty we can probably assert our rights. In a case where a peace treaty is too unfavorable, it is merely a matter of leaving the conference or of not concluding the peace treaty.'"

And although Mr. Yoshida was compelled to retract the words quoted above he stated in a cable dated Tokio, November 23:

"A peace treaty disregarding the wishes of the Japanese people is unthinkable because such a treaty is bound once more to disturb the world order."

U.S. appeasement policy may see to it that the wishes - not of the Japanese people - but of the Japanese ex-war lords are not being ignored. There is the danger of a new Munich. Reporting from Sydney, C.R. Wentiplay, Special Correspondent of the N.Z. Press Association, described the plans that were in the air to "appease" Japan with a view to gaining her army as an ally for future wars:

"The most recent report from Japan is that - with the support of General MacArthur's advisers - Japan proposed to settle five million Japanese in South Pacific islands in five years after the signing of the peace treaty.

"In

Enclosure to Despatch no. 329, Dec. 23, 1949, Wellington
New Zealand.

-3-

"In a report from Tokio, the 'Sydney Sun's' correspondent said that the areas marked by Japan for a huge migration scheme were Borneo, New Guinea, Celebes, Malacca and Ceylon."

The parallel with the policy of Munich is perfect. Japanese expansion is once more advocated - still slightly veiled - her re-armament becomes only a matter of time. The Soviet Union (and incidentally the Pacific Dominions who are in the position of the victims-to-be) are virtually excluded from any scheme of guaranteeing the peace in the Pacific area as the following cable indicates:

"MANILA, November 5.

"General MacArthur expected a peace treaty with Japan to be signed in Tokio next year. Communist China and the Soviet Union might be present when the Allies laid down their terms, BUT ONLY IF THEY AGREED TO THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN PLANS THAT WERE WELL DEVELOPED.

"After the conclusion of the treaty Japan would be invited to assure herself of security by entering into a pact providing her with military defences."

And whereas the above cable, at least, suggests that Britain would have a voice in the future rearmament or otherwise of Japan, a cable dated London, November 8, mentions that "some Americans are concerned about the strength of the Commonwealth representation at the peace conference. A previous understanding would be necessary before the conference could begin."

I feel - and this is, of course, only my personal opinion - that we are running into the danger of over-stressing the anti-Soviet bias in our policy to the extent of rearming nations which in the past have shown that they are prepared to go to war with us. There is no reason why these nations should have changed their minds. Chamberlain thought he could buy off Hitler. Are the Americans making the same mistake of thinking they can buy off Mr. Yoshida?

FR - Mr. Bright

Enclosure to Despatch no. 329, December 23, 1949, Wellington, New Zealand, entitled: N.Z. APPREHENSIONS OVER POSSIBLE REARMAMENT OF JAPAN. Source: Standard (Wellington) December 22, 1949

DCR

BEWARE OF MUNICH

There exist dangerous trends at the present time to a repetition of the fatal mistakes of the policy of Munich 11 years ago. Munich was the climax of a policy which tried to appease Germany, Italy (and impliedly Japan) with a view to diverting their aggressive designs. The aggressor States, however, double-crossed the Munichites and used their strength in an attack on Britain and France, still governed by those responsible for Munich: Neville Chamberlain and M. Daladier.

The same policy seems to be gaining strength again. First with regard to Japan:

"NEW YORK, May 23.

The United States is determined to push strongly ahead with plans for the economic rehabilitation of Japan in spite of some doubts and objections of the other Allied Powers in the Pacific.

"The Authorities do not regard the fulfilment of United States plans for Japan as constituting a danger to other and smaller Pacific Powers, since industrial reconstruction and POSSIBLE REARMAMENT on a small scale would be under United States supervision."

The way how Japanese re-militarisation is carried out is similar to the way Germany re-armed after the first war. Under the camouflage of "fighting striking workers and communists" a huge well-armed, paramilitary police force was built up which was a good nucleus for Hitler's later rearmament:-

"TOKIO, July 13.

The available strength of the Japanese police-force was increased yesterday from 125,000 to 2,125,000. The National Public Safety Commission ordered that, in case of emergency, 2,000,000 volunteer firemen of the Fire Defense Corps should be mobilised to assist the regular police.

"The firemen will be empowered to suppress riots, arrest criminals, control traffic and suppress crime in an emergency."

The result of the growth of the police force under a right-wing Government must be as has always been the case in the past - a definite swing towards aggressive Fascism:

"LONDON, October 25.

American policy in Japan has now become simply an attempt to conciliate the Japanese in every way, in

the

FW 894.20/12-2349

Enclosure to Despatch no.329, Dec.23, 1949, Wellington, New Zealand.

-2-

the hope that in any future war they will not side with the enemies of the United States," says the Tokio correspondent of 'The Times'.

"Corruption is now flourishing on a gigantic scale, and there are indications that the Japanese are fully prepared to start again the unfair practices by which they drove foreign competition out of Japan before the war. In spite of denials by the Japanese Government, it is a fact that the secret police have been re-established and have been operating since last April. There is also widespread conviction that on the pretext of carrying out a purge of communists, the Japanese will get rid of liberal thinking as well."

The Japanese are becoming increasingly conscious that America wants to re-arm them; in the words of Lieutenant-General Eichelberger:

"NEW YORK, November 2.

"In the event of war with the Soviet, the Russians will see what strange bedfellows we have. Eighty-five million Japanese would be on our side."

No wonder that Mr. Yoshida, Japan's right-wing Prime Minister is getting more outspoken every day:

"TOKIO, November 13.

"Mr. Yoshida on Friday told the Diet he believed that Japan had the right to refuse too unfavorable peace terms. He said: 'Since a peace treaty is in fact a treaty we can probably assert our rights. In a case where a peace treaty is too unfavorable, it is merely a matter of leaving the conference or of not concluding the peace treaty.'"

And although Mr. Yoshida was compelled to retract the words quoted above he stated in a cable dated Tokio, November 23:

"A peace treaty disregarding the wishes of the Japanese people is unthinkable because such a treaty is bound once more to disturb the world order."

U.S. appeasement policy may see to it that the wishes - not of the Japanese people - but of the Japanese ex-war lords are not being ignored. There is the danger of a new Munich. Reporting from Sydney, C.R. Mentiplay, Special Correspondent of the N.Z. Press Association, described the plans that were in the air to "appease" Japan with a view to gaining her army as an ally for future wars:

"The most recent report from Japan is that - with the support of General MacArthur's advisers - Japan proposed to settle five million Japanese in South Pacific islands in five years after the signing of the peace treaty.

"In

Enclosure to Despatch no.329, Dec.23, 1949, Wellington
New Zealand.

-3-

"In a report from Tokio, the 'Sydney Sun's' correspondent said that the areas marked by Japan for a huge migration scheme were Borneo, New Guinea, Celebes, Malakhera and Ceram."

The parallel with the policy of Munich is perfect. Japanese expansion is once more advocated - still slightly veiled - her re-armament becomes only a matter of time. The Soviet Union (and incidentally the Pacific Dominions who are in the position of the victims-to-be) are virtually excluded from any scheme of guaranteeing the peace in the Pacific area as the following cable indicates:

"MANILA, November 5.
"General MacArthur expected a peace treaty with Japan to be signed in Tokio next year. Communist China and the Soviet Union might be present when the Allies laid down their terms, BUT ONLY IF THEY AGREED TO THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN PLANS THAT WERE WELL DEVELOPED."

"After the conclusion of the treaty Japan would be invited to assure herself of security by entering into a pact providing her with military defences."

And whereas the above cable, at least, suggests that Britain would have a voice in the future rearmament or otherwise of Japan, a cable dated London, November 8, mentions that "some Americans are concerned about the strength of the Commonwealth representation at the peace conference. A previous understanding would be necessary before the conference could begin."

I feel - and this is, of course, only my personal opinion - that we are running into the danger of overstressing the anti-Soviet bias in our policy to the extent of rearming nations which in the past have shown that they are prepared to go to war with us. There is no reason why these nations should have changed their minds. Chamberlain thought he could buy off Hitler. Are the Americans making the same mistake of thinking they can buy off Mr. Yoshida?
