

rlk 2

4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot down.

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.

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PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945

FROM MacARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

1. We are continuing local investigation.
2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have already been sent to Washington.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45)GB

8 November 1945

SUBJECT: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack
on Pearl Harbor.

TO: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945)GB, and AG 350.05 (26 October 1945)GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. Allen
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in
Answer to Questionnaire.

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Doc No. 1668

2 ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

3 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

4 NOTE: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief
5 of Staff, G-2.

6 PEARL HARBOR QUESTIONNAIRE

7 26 October 1945

8 The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
9 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S questionnaire of 17 October,
10 the PEARL HARBOR Attack are contained herein.

11 NOTE: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira
12 (28 December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August
13 1943), who were staff officers in the Intelligence Depart-
14 ment of the Naval General Staff, and because of the pertinent
15 records have been burned, these answers are based upon the
16 recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty
17 in the Intelligence Department at that time.

18 14. Sources of intelligence?

19 Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES
20 Fleet in the HAWAII area, the condition of military in-
21 stallations, the days upon which the fleet moved out of and
22 into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters
23 in which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc; were used
24 as basic intelligence material. This material was collated
25 by the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff

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and used as the basis for the operation plan.

The primary sources were:

1. Naval attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington
2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
3. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at

HONOLULU.

5. General information.

Incl 1

15. Characteristics of intelligence?

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of years.

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of the air units obtained?

A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled from the sources listed in "14".

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force and the air units were determined

rlk 4 1 from information provided by the previously named source.
2 Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American
3 air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were
4 judged to be those upon which there was slight chance of
5 encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.

6 17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information
7 while it was underway?

8 As information was gathered from the sources mentioned
9 in "14" it was forwarded to the Attack Force.

10 18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII?

11 None.

12 19.-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and oppor-
13 tunities for same.

14 Applicable facts not available.

15 48. What pertinent information was received from merchant
16 ships prior to the attack?

17 Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on
18 moorages in PEARL HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the
19 names of vessels encountered in the HAWAII area, etc. This
20 information was used in the statistical collation of informa-
21 tion mentioned in "14".
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (1 Nov 45) GB

1 November 1945

SUBJECT: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack
on Pearl Harbor.

TO : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D.C.
(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October (referred to above) and includes detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive, thereof.

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interrogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Estab-

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lishments of the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text.

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General

1 Incl: Partial Report in
Answer to Questionnaire.

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1032

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of a document requested by Colonel
MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-3,
17 October - 20 October 1945.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING
THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WARD A PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Doc. #1032

DRM/FMO/HDP

PP 1 I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the information therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded later.

II. The reply to Paragraph 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people concerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in preparation.

PP 2 (Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on the recollections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Comdr MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji.)

1. Who conceived and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack?

Adm YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.

2. When was this done?

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMAMOTO ordered Rear Adm ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)

3. Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a war against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN's

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prewar plans?

(No.

4. If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans.

(No statement.)

PP 3 (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the recollections of Adm NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

5. When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?

3 Nov 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO.

6. Who made the foregoing decision?

Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.

7. If the decision was made in conference, give time of said conference and names of all persons present.

It was not made in conference.

4 (Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; and Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff.)

8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent

rlk 6

the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.

9. Who were the persons who worked out the details of the actual plan?

Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

10. When was the above undertaking started?

In the first part of September 1941.

11. Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

PP 5

12. When was the final confirmation of this plan made?

1 Dec 41.

13. Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?

(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm NAGANO, Osami; Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; and Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)

Those connected with the Navy are as follows:

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:

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Chief of the Naval General Staff

Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff

Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff

Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff

The commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff

Navy Minister

Navy Vice-Minister

Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry

Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval

Affairs, and some of their personnel

Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.

(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government

rlk 8

had been delivered.)

(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. However, it is certain that none of the Japanese officials who were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)

PP 7 (Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji; and the commanding officer of the AKAGI Air Unit, Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)

21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved.

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome.

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the

rlk 9

1 destroyers had a cruising radius extending to approximately
 2 E Long 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to
 3 refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return.
 4 In actual fact, however, the sea was comparatively calm and
 5 the scheduled refueling was possible.

6 (2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against
 7 anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the
 8 main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the
 9 HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period of
 10 time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

11 (a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and
 12 shallow.

13 (b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably
 14 equipped with torpedo nets.

15 (c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to
 16 attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from
 17 an extremely low altitude.

18 (d) In regard to point (b), since success could
 19 not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

20 b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom?

21 There were none.

22 c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to
 23 participate selected (surface forces and air forces)?

24 PP 9 Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching
 25 the flight personnel of Car Div 4 (RUMBO and RUMHC) to Car

rlk 10

Div 1 (AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time the most highly trained units in the Combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.

Surface forces: As for a possible, vessels with a long cruising range were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.

d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected?

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON

WARD A. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

PP 10

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Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack could be made.

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery enroute?

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.

(3) Complete radio silence was carried out.

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been taken?

The day of the attack was designated as X-day.

If discovered prior to X-2 Day, we would have returned without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an

PP 11

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attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions.

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU Area.

h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been taken?

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.

PP 12 22. State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 7 December.

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational stand point and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday

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and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.

PP 13 23. How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (HAPAN time). (Sunrise that day was at 0230 hours.)

PP 14 24. Explain in detail the organization of the Task Force (Ships and air strength).

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was then commander of the AKAGI Air Unit.)

(1) Ships.

UNIT	COMMAND	STRENGTH	DUTY
Air Attack Force	Under direct commander	Six aircraft carriers AKAGI ZUIKAKU KAGA HIRYU SORYU SHOKAKU	Air attack
Screening Unit	Com Des Ron 1 Rear Adm OMORI, Sentaro	One light cruiser NAGARA Nine destroyers URAKAZE ISOKAZE TANIKAZE HAMAKAZE AKIGUMO	Screen; cover
Support Force	CinC 1 Air Fleet, Vice Adm Com Bat Div 3 Rear Adm MIKAWA, Gunichi	Two battleships HIBI KIRISHIMA Two heavy cruisers TONE CHIKUMA	Screen; support
Task Force	Task Force HAGUMO, Chuichi	Com Sub Div 2 Capt IMAIZUMI, Kijiro	Patrol ship lanes
Midway Neutralization Unit	Com Des Div 7 Capt KONISHI, Kaname	Three submarines I-19 I-21 I-23	Patrol ship lanes
1 Supply Unit	Com Des Div 7 Capt KONISHI, Kaname	Two destroyers AKEBONO USHIO	Attack air base on Midway
Supply Force	Captain of KYOKUTO (極東) MARU (special) duty ship)	Captain of KYOKUTO MARU Five tankers KENYO (健洋) MARU KYOKUTO MARU KOKUYO (國洋) MARU SHINKOKU (神國) MARU AKEBONO MARU	Supply
2 Supply Unit	Captain of TOHO (東邦) MARU	Three tankers TOHO MARU TOEI (東栄) MARU NIPPON MARU	Supply

pp 15 (2) Air Strength


(a) Reconnaissance Unit

TYPE	TYPE OF AIRPLANES	NUMBER OF AIRPLANES	SHIPS ON WHICH BASED	DUTY
Airplanes for reconnaissance just before the attack	Type Zero Reconnaissance Sea-planes	2	TONE (1) CHIKUMA (1)	Reconnaissance of PEARL HARBOR and LAHAINA Anchorage just before the attack.
Search-patrol planes	Type 95 Reconnaissance Sea-planes	4	HIEI (1) KIRISHIMA(1) TONE (1) CHIKUMA (1)	Patrolling waters around OAHU

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(THE SKETCH OF MOVEMENTS OF AIR UNITS AFTER THEY CAME IN SIGHT OF CANU.)



1. Second Attack Unit.
2. Ordered to deploy at 0410 hours.
3. Dive bombing unit
4. Attack run ordered at 0425 hours.
5. Horizontal Bombing Unit
6. **KANBORE**
7. **HICKHAM**
8. **FORD** Island
9. First Attack Unit.

10. Ordered to deploy at 0310 hours.
11. Attack run ordered at 0320 hours.
12. Dive Bombing Unit.
13. **WHEELER**.
14. Torpedo Bombing Unit.
15. Horizontal Bombing Unit.
16. **BARBERS POINT**
17. Note: The Fighter Striking Units in each attack operated at will after deploying.

pp 16 (b) Attack Units

UNIT		COMMANDER	TYPE OF AIRPLANE	NUMBER OF AIRPLANES	TYPE OF ATTACK	ARMAMENT (EACH AIRPLANE)	TARGET		
First Attack Unit	1 Group (SHIDAN)	Comdr FU- CHIDA	1 Attack Unit	Comdr. FUCHIDA	15	Horizontal bombing attack	One 800-kg armor pierc- ing bomb	Battleships	
			2 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr HARIGUCHI	15				
			3 Attack Unit	Lt ABE	10				
			4 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr KUSURI	10				
	2 Group	Comdr FU- CHIDA	1 Special Attack Unit	Lt Comdr MURATA	12	Torpedo bombing attack	One 800-kg aerial torpedo	Battleships Aircraft carriers	
			2 Special Attack Unit	Lt KITAJIMA	12				
			3 Special Attack Unit	Lt NAGAI	8				
			4 Special Attack Unit	Lt MATSUMURA	8				
	3 Group	15 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr TAKAHASHI	Type 99 Carrier	27	Dive bombing attack	250-kg land bomb	Air Bases FORD Island WHEELER	
				16 Attack Unit	Lt SAKAMOTO				27
		1 Group	Lt Comdr SHIMAZAKI	1 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt Comdr ITAYA	9	Air control and strafing attack	Two 20-mm MGs Two 7.7-mm MGs	1. Airborne airplanes 2. Strafing of grounded airplanes FORD Island HICKHAM WHEELER BARBERS POINT KANEHOE
				2 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SHIGA	9			
				3 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SUGAWAMI	9			
				4 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt OKAJIMA	6			
				5 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SATO	6			
				6 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt KANEKO	6			
2 Group		6 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr SHIMAZAKI	Type 97 Carrier	27	Horizontal bombing attack	One 250-kg land bomb. Six 60-kg ordinary bombs	Air Bases HICKHAM KANEHOE FORD Island BARBERS POINT	
				5 Attack Unit	Lt ICHIHARA				27
	13 Attack Unit	Comdr SHIMA- ZAKI	Lt Comdr MURA	18	Dive bombing attack	One 250-kg ordinary bomb	Aircraft carriers Cruisers		
			Lt KORAYASHI	18					
			Lt CHINAYA	18					
			Lt MAKINO	27					
	1 Group	Lt SHINDO	1 Fighter Striking Unit	Type Zero	9	Air control and strafing attack	Two 20-mm MGs Two 7.7-mm MGs	1. Airborne airplanes 2. Strafing of grounded airplanes HICKHAM FORD Island WHEELER KANEHOE	
			2 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt NIKAIJO	9				
			3 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt IIDA	9				
			4 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt WANO	9				

pp 17 (c) Combat Air Patrol

Patrols	Type of Airplane	Number of Airplanes	Ship on Which Based	Type of Patrol
Patrol 1	Type Zero	18	AKAGI - 9 KAGA - 9	Direct air escort.
Patrol 2	Carrier Fighter	18	54 SONO - 9 HIRYU - 9	Airplanes ready on flight deck
Patrol 3		18	SUIKAKU - 9 SHOKAKU - 9	Airplanes ready on hangar deck (fueled and armed)
Notes	<p>1. Direct air escort was carried out from an hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset.</p> <p>2. The patrols alternated every two hours.</p>			

pp 18 25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.

(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.

pp 19 26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target.

(1) First Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships.

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Reasoning:

- (1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.
- (2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of bombers.
- (3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many of them as possible. however, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:
- (a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be unsuccessful.
 - (b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in PEARL HARBOR requires special technique.
 - (c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs

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abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.

(b) Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships and aircraft carriers.

Reasoning:

Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)

(c) Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Air bases.

- 15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)-
Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD Island.
- 16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)-
Hangars and grounded airplanes at WHEELER.

Reasoning:

- (1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet

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temporarily out of action, the attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our main attack units - the horizontal bombing and torpedo bombing units.

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.

(d) Fighter striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit - FORD Island and HICKHAM.

4 Fighter Striking Unit - WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.

6 Fighter Striking Unit - KANEHOHE.

Reasoning:

(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.

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(2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.

(2) Second Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Air bases.

6 Attack Unit-

Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.

5 Attack Unit-

Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.

Reasoning:

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a counter-attack against the Task Force could be prevented.

(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.

Reasoning:

(1) Although the 250-kg bombs which the airplanes were able to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleship, it was estimated that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers of that time.

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)

(c) Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit - FORD Island and HICKHAM.

4 Fighter Striking Unit - WHEELER and KANEHOE.

Reasoning:

Same as stated previously.

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.

WLC7

Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the carriers at OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows:

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

pp 26 The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is shown in the appended sketch.

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.

First Attack Unit

Dive Bombing Unit

WHEELER Field - 0325 hours.

Torpedo Attack Unit

Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage - 0327 hours.

Horizontal Bombing Unit

Same as above - 0235 hours.

Fighter Striking Unit

Began ground strafing - 0330 hours.

Second Attack Unit.

All three units - Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter Striking Unit - attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.

(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).

pp 27 d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their slight back to the carriers? Why were these courses chosen?

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to the carriers.

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on courses designed to deceive possible opposition.

pp 29 27. How were midget submarines used?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)

a. Reasons for use:

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in the assault by the air forces.

b. How many were used?

Five.

c. Were they expected to return?

While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)

d. Did any return?

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon.

pp 30

The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on 8 December; but it was verified that the night attack

WLC10

on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.

pp 31 28. Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed for the emergency?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been discarded or modified?

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been modified?

(Replies by FUCHIDA:)

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have counter-attacked.

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.

pp 32 (Note: The following replies, Paragraphs 30 - 38, are based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo,

LC11

Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

30. When did the Task Force begin to form?

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.

31. Where was the rendezvous?

TANKAPPU-WAN.

32. When did the Task Force get underway on its mission?

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.

33. Was there any provision to receive word of a settle-

ment while this Task Force was underway? What steps

would have been taken if a compromise had been reached?

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.

34. Did everything proceed according to plan?

Yes.

pp 33 35. If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen and why?

(No statement.)

36. Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?

No.

37. Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway?

WLC12

None.

38. If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been taken?

(No statement.)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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pp 34 39. Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without detection.

pp 35 (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA,

Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

40. What damage did the Japanese receive?

In the First Attack:

Fighter planes	3
Dive bombers	1
Torpedo bombers	<u>5</u>
Total	9

In the Second Attack:

Fighter planes	6
Dive bombers	<u>14</u>
Total	20
Grand total	29

41. What was the estimated damage to American forces?

(1) Naval vessels:

Sunk: 4 battleships

1 cruiser

2 tankers

Heavily damaged: 4 battleships

Lightly damaged: 1 battleship

(2) Airplanes

Shot down: Approximately 10 Airplanes.

Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes.

Total: Approximately 260 airplanes.

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It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a considerable number were destroyed in the hangars.

42. How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined?

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.

(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)

pp 37 43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the main attack?

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)

Apart from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.

f2
38 (Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of the attack.)
45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR:

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

46a. If there were, where were these submarines based?

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJALEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.

b. What were their operation orders?

The orders given to the submarines were as follows: Part were to proceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters by the evening of 7 December, while the midget submarines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.

At the same time, they were given strict

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1 orders not to attack until the Task Force strike
2 had been verified.

3 c. Were reports made during and after the attack?

4 When the Task Force and the midget submarine
5 strikes were completed, the midget submarines
6 reported as follows:

7 (1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget
8 submarine on the night of 8 December.

9 (2) A midget submarine radioed the same night
10 "Suprise attack succeeds".

11 (3) A report on the departure of midget sub-
12 marines and that it was impossible to recover their
13 personnel though all recovery measures had been
14 tried.

15 d. What damage was sustained by the submarines?

16 One submarine was detected and depth-charged
17 by patrol vessels near the entrance
18 pp 40 to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the anti-
19 submarine net, it extricated itself, after some
20 damage, and returned safely. Apart from this case there
21 was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; the time
22 and place of its sinking are unknown.

23 47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian
24 waters?

25 The submarines continued operations in the
vicinity of HAWAII from 8 December, the day of the

1 attack, until early January of the following year.
2 During this time, most of the submarines proceeded
3 to the west coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy
4 shipping, and part of the submarines returned to
5 JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the
6 Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.

7 END

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45)GB

26 October 1945

SUBJECT: Additional data with reference to Japanese Attack
on Pearl Harbor

TO: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attn: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in amplification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which has been furnished the Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage possible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. Allen,

Colonel, A.G.D.

Ass't Adjutant General

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5 incls:

- Incl 1 - Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.
- Incl 2 - Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.
- Incl 3 - Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.
- Incl 4 - Questionnaire to Liaison Committee
- Incl 5 - Map, routes of Jap Fleet.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO)
FOR THE
IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

8 October 1945

N.D. No. 108

TO: Colonel F. P. Munson, USA

G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Commander Yamaguchi, I.J.N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.

K. Nakamura

Rear Admiral, I.J.N.

Representing the I.J.

Minister of the Navy

(Incl. #1)

02

General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in
Accordance with Oral Instructions by Col. Munson to
Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Committee for
the Imperial Army and Navy.

1. Operation Orders

A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters

(1) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 1 December)

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be given later.

(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General staff under the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).

(a) (Issued 1 December)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.

(3) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 2 December)

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The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8.

- (4) Naval General Staff Instruction
(a) (Issued 2 December)

Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

- B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and other Headquarters.

The subject matters are being investigated through members connected with the said forces of that period.

- II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources.

(1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)

(2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.

(3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters immediately preceding the outbreak of

war.

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(4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.

III. Organization of Attacking Force

First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)

Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu)

Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku)

Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)

Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma)

First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division

17th Destroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division.)

Supply Force (8 Transports)

Submarine Force (2 Submarines)

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)

V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy.

Sunk - 2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma)

1 Destroyer

1 Transport

Seriously Damaged - 4 Battleships

4 Heavy Cruisers

Aircraft shot down or burned - over 350

VI. Losses of Japanese Navy

Failed to Return - 27 aircrafts.

N.B. As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be made.

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LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO)
FOR THE
IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

10 October 1945

N. D. No. 123

TO: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2,
General Headquarters of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Re: N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1945.

Subject: Additions to the Answers already given to the
questions regarding the Attack on Hawaii.

1. Additional operational orders:

a) Units of the attacking forces assembled in
Hitokappu Bay (Etorofu-jima), by order of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Combined Fleet.

N. B. - About 14 November the Commander-in-
Chief of the Combined Fleet issued the above order because
he recognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable place for
enabling the attacking force to meet any new development
in the situation, as well as to keep its location and
movements secret.

b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by
order of the Imperial General Headquarters.

N. B. - Around 21 November the situation
had seemed to be approaching to a stage where commencement

of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following order (Imperial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such situation promptly."

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United States proving successful.

2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of the Japanese Navy.

Even within the Navy, the only ones who knew of the above fact were in addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and

a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet operation.

3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.

K. Nakamura

Rear Admiral, I. J. N.

Representing the

I. J. Minister of the Navy.

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO)
FOR THE
IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

11 October 1945

N. D. No. 130

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
General Headquarters of
The Supreme Commander
For the Allied Powers.

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our report as follows:

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 7 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and

aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).

"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan".

b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".

3. Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission:

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete re-fuelling".

4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon.

a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval operations against the

United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.

b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December.

c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor:

The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet.

N.B. - Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made as a result of further investigation.

K. Nakamura

Rear Admiral, IJN

Representing the

I.J. Minister of the Navy.

rlk 1

QUESTIONNAIRE

17 October 45

To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other official documents available. In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official position.

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral _____, General Staff, Naval General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)

2. When?

(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922 -- any time such a proposal first was considered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion.)

3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese plans for possible use in event of war with U.S.?

4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans.

(State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected to accomplish, etc.)

5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.

(Give date as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September

rlk 2

1941, Spring of 1941)

6. Who made this decision? (e.g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry, or some combination of persons or agencies.)
7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.
8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision?
(e.g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P.I.?; Destroy U.S. main Pacific base?; Gain time for P.I. campaign? Protect mandated islands? or what?
(incl #4)
9. Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed?
(e.g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) Note: When I say Plan, I differentiate between plans or staff studies and the actual orders issued to put the plan in effect.
10. When did this work begin?
11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?
12. When was the plan finally approved?
13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan?
(e.g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the General Staff,

rlk 3

the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to _____ The Ambassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc) Note: Names of individuals and agencies are both desired -- for example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also, state persons who had partial knowledge, e.g. the Emperor might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc.

14. What sources furnished information on which the plan was based? Give names, rank and positions. (e.g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles).
15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed sources?
16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps carried by your aviators obtained? (e.g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.).
17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?
18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?

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19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in the harbor?
20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).
21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed.
- Discuss:
- a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.
 - b. Partial decisions made and by whom.
 - c. How were the commanders and particular units to (Both fleet units and air units) selected?
 - d. Why was the route you selected chosen?
 - e. What provision was made against discovery en route?
 - f. What action was to be taken if discovered?
 - g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were employed?
 - h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?
22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?
23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?
24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).
25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time during the operation, e.g. to attack secondary targets?
26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack.
- Include:

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Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?

Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?

Time each group was to strike its target.

Route(s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?

27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.

(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any back, any other details, conclusions as to usefulness of this weapon).

WLC

28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give details: (e.g. If the U.S. had made some concession was it to be abandoned or changed? If the U.S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have been made?)

29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:

- a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.
- b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.
- c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.

Note: If any document is not available give all details of it you can from memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked).

30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?

31. Where did it assemble?

32. When did it move out on its mission?

33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.


34. Did everything go as planned?

35. If not, what changes or mishaps occurred and why?

36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

- WLC2
37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?
38. If so, what was done about them?
39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a landing?
40. List your losses.
41. List estimated U. S. Losses.
42. From what sources did you determine U.S. losses?
43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the attack.
(e.g. night after attack, following day, etc.)
44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. (e.g. "All copies of order burned on surrender", "ads. _____ who is only person who knew this was killed on (date).").
45. Did you have any submarines operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation instructions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were there any casualties among these submarines?
47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in Hawaiian area?
48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



**ROUTES FOLLOWED
 BY
 JAPANESE FLEET
 TO AND FROM
 PEARL HARBOR**
 DATA FURNISHED BY THE "LIASON COMMITTEE (TOKYO)
 FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY"

Mr. Mitchell: Now, Mr. Chairman, in connection with the story of the Jap attack I have been awaiting an opportunity to take a few minutes to read into the record certain of these so-called diplomatic intercepts that were picked up and decoded.

The Congressman from California has already referred to some, I think, which are pertinent but he only gave extracts from the Judge Advocate General's report.

Mr. Gearhart: It was the Judge Advocate General's summary, not mine.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes. And I think there are many obscure statements in these diplomatic decoded messages which you cannot understand except by paralleling them with the movements of the Japanese attacking force, and with the permission of the committee, - I have just a few pages, - I would like to put into the record at this point these portions so as to connect them up with the story.

The first one is on page 96 of our exhibit 1, which contains all of these messages. It is from Tokyo to Washington. That means their ambassador at Washington. It is their number 727. It is dated November 4, 1941. (Reading):

"Proposal "B":

"This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If

there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put for-

ward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows."

Then I will omit certain portions which are not pertinent right at this moment and it follows: (Reading):

"The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return" -- this is part of his proposal to the United States -- "mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the Government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs."

Turning over on page 98, if the committee want to follow me on this, of exhibit 1, we have another message, No. 731, Tokyo to Washington, November 4, 1941: (Reading):

"In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reached an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.

"Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results." Then follows another message from Tokyo to Washington on the same page, dated November 5, 1941. (Reading):

"If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals, we feel that the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate ratification.

"We have been led to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and that it would be classified as one type of an 'Executive Agreement' as the President is authorized to do. We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. Will you please ascertain the U.S. attitude on this point?

"In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into along the lines given in the

message referred to in the heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolutely essential factor."

Then on page 99, a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 5, 1941. The first two paragraphs I will not read at present. The third: (Reading)

"If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B. Please, therefore, ascertain the U.S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

"As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.

"We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal."

On page 100, from Tokyo to Washington, a message of November 5, 1941. That is numbered 736. (Reading):

"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you."

On page 116 of exhibit 1, Tokyo to Washington, November 11, 1941. (Reading):

"Judging from the progress of the" --

The Chairman: When you say "from Tokyo to Washington," do you mean from the Japanese government to their ambassador in Washington?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. (Reading):

"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736" -- that is on the 25th -- "is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential

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that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

"I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U.S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal."

Page 122 of exhibit 1. I only have two or three of these. This is from Washington, from Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, under date of November 12th, 1941. (Reading):

"Departmental secret.

"Continuing he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force -- not by any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, I don't think that

the United States will have any objection to our proposal."

8 Page 137 of exhibit 1. This is from Tokyo to Washington, November 16, 1941. (Reading):

"For your Honor's own information.

"I have read your #109C and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

"What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you please try to realize what that means."

That is the one fixing the 25th as the deadline.

"In your opinion, we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further.

Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals.

and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."

Page 165 of Exhibit 1 --

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire? I understand counsel is now reading for the purposes of the record, certainly, these code cablegrams, these decoded cablegrams that are printed at length in an exhibit already in evidence.

Mr. Mitchell: They are already in evidence, but my point about them is that you cannot understand the hidden suggestions in here, particularly the ones I am about to read, unless you parallel it with the story of the Japanese movements and planning for the Japanese attack. That is the reason I am putting them in now, sir, in order to make the comparison for the committee, so they can form their own judgment about it.

Mr. Keefe: I see.

Mr. Mitchell: Page 165, from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 22, 1941. (Reading):

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my 4736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out

for you -- twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanges; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."

Now, there is just one more. It is a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 24th, for both Ambassadors.

"The time limit set in my message of 812" -- that is the one I have just read -- "is Tokyo time 29th."

Now, Mr. Chairman, will you call Admiral Richardson?

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question?

The Chairman: The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas: You have read to us decoded messages, continuously referring to Japanese Number 736. Now, I presume that that 736, of course, is in that exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell: I read that. It is a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 5th, stating that because of various circumstances it is absolutely essential and necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed

by the 25th.

Senator Lucas: Yes. Well, now, I was going to follow that up with whether or not the agreement that they discuss in these messages is now a part of the record?

Mr. Mitchell: Well, the terms that they proposed to our government.

Senator Lucas: That is what I mean.

Mr. Mitchell: There never was any yielding to them.

Senator Lucas: Of course, I was wrong in using the word "agreement". I meant to inquire whether or not the terms proposed by the Japanese government, upon which they based these messages, are a part of the record and even so I think it would be apropos at this time to include them in at the end of the messages that counsel read.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, I will say this: The terms that they transmitted to their Ambassadors to be submitted to our government, about doing away with the freezing and furnishing them oil and things of that kind are in other intercepted messages in this very same exhibit 1, but there will be evidence introduced after Admiral Richardson from the State Department, giving the full story of the negotiations and just what proposals they made.

Senator Lucas: All right. My only thought was that if it would come in at this particular point it would clarify the record.

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Witness Richardson

Question by: Mr. Mitchell

1 The Chairman: We can hold that up until later.

2 Senator Lucas: Very well then, I withdraw the request.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I was just referring to some vague hap-
4 penings and things that would happen and the reason for the
5 deadline.

6 The Chairman: All right, General, call the next witness.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Richardson.

8 The Chairman: Admiral, will you be sworn?

9 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON

10 (being first duly sworn by the chairman)

11 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral, please state your full name.

12 Admiral Richardson: Admiral James Otto Richardson.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Richardson, how long did you
14 serve in the United States Navy?

15 Admiral Richardson: I entered the Naval Academy in
16 September, 1898; graduated in 1902.

17 Mr. Mitchell: What is your present rank?

18 Admiral Richardson: Admiral, U. S. Navy, retired.

19 Mr. Mitchell: You were giving us --

20 Admiral Richardson: Oh, would you like for me to give
21 you --

22 Mr. Mitchell: No. During your Navy service have you spent

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1 some of your duty time in Asiatic areas and Pacific areas?
2 Would you give us a brief review of your Asiatic experience?

3 Admiral Richardson: If it meets the wishes of the coun-
4 sel to the committee, I will give a brief summary of my ser-
5 vice record using my own judgment to select those items which
6 might be of interest to the matter under investigation.
7

8 In 1902, in accordance with my request, I was ordered to
9 the Asiatic station where I remained until 1905. During
10 that time I served one year in the Southern Philippines. The
11 remainder of the time I was on the China coast and in Japan.

12 It so happened that I arrived in Yokohama in time to
13 see the Russian Minister depart immediately preceding the be-
14 ginning of the Russo-Japanese War. I was in Yokohama when that
15 war was initiated by the surprise attack of the Japanese on
16 the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and the Russian ship at Che-
17 mulpo.

18 I remained in Japan for approximately three months. I
19 returned to Japan again in time to be in Tokyo when the
20 Japanese government received the first news on the battle of
21 Tsushima which in effect closed the Russo-Japanese War.

22 I went to the China station again in 1922, where I re-
23 mained until 1924. During that time I served on the China
24 coast and the last year I was in command of the South China
25 patrol. I was in Amoy when the first news of the earthquake

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

on the 1st of September, 1923 occurred.

From 1924 until 1931 I performed various duties in Washington, at the Naval Academy and on the Atlantic Coast. In 1931 I placed the U. S. S. AUGUSTA in commission and she served as flagship for the scouting force then in the Atlantic and proceeded to the Pacific when practically all of our combatant ships were concentrated in the Pacific.

I was detached in 1933 and was a student at the Naval War College for one year.

From 1934 to 1935 I was budget officer of the Navy Department. From 1935 to 1936 I served for a short period in command of Cruiser Division 6 and then chief of staff to the Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet.

From 1936 to 1937 I commanded the destroyers of the scouting force. From 1937 to 1938 I was the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, during which period the China incident started and during which period the attack on the Panay occurred.

From 1938 to 1939 I was the Chief of what was then called the Bureau of Navigation, now known as the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

From 1939, the summer, until 1940 I was commander of the battle force. From 1940 to 1941 I was Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet. At that time the United States

Witness Richardson;

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

Fleet comprised all combatant ships in commission that were not assigned to the Asiatic Fleet or not operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

I reported for duty as Commander of Battle Force on 24 June 1939. On 6 January 1940 I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch as Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet. On the 5th of January 1941 I received a secret dispatch in a code held only by the Chief of Naval Operations and myself informing me that I would be detached on the 1st of February.

On 1 February 1941 I was relieved by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. At that time the fleet was reorganized and Admiral Kimmel became Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and another officer became Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

I departed from Honolulu on 14 February 1941 and on 25 March 1941 I reported for duty as a member of the General Board.

Mr. Mitchell: At that time when you were commander of the United States Fleet was there a separate command known as the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Richardson: There was not.

Mr. Mitchell: Who was Chief of Naval Operations while you were Chief in command of the United States Fleet?

Admiral Richardson: Admiral Harold R. Stark, who was my

immediate superior.

Mr. Mitchell: When you were at that time commander of the United States Fleet at what Pacific city or was it on the Pacific side or the Atlantic side that you went to?

Admiral Richardson: When I assumed command of the United States Fleet there was a portion of the fleet serving in the Atlantic. There was a detachment of the United States Fleet serving in the Hawaiian area, known as the Hawaiian detachment, which was composed of heavy cruisers and destroyers and if my memory serves me correctly one aircraft carrier. The Hawaiian detachment was under the command of Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, who was also commander of the scouting force.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, were you located on the Pacific coast?

Admiral Richardson: All the fleet in the Pacific assigned to the United States Fleet, that did not form a part of the Hawaiian detachment, was based at San Diego and San Pedro, Long Beach.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, that is where you made your headquarters then?

Admiral Richardson: I actually assumed command of the fleet in the harbor of San Pedro, Long Beach and I remained there until approximately the 1st of April, when the fleet departed for their annual fleet exercises.

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

Mr. Mitchell: What was your flagship at that time?

Admiral Richardson: The U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA.

Mr. Mitchell: You say the Pacific Fleet that you were in command of out there that was not included in these other detachments, that was based on the Pacific coast, was ordered out to manoeuvres in the spring of 1940?

Admiral Richardson: It had been the custom for many years to have annual fleet exercises, including fleet problems and other exercises under simulated war conditions, where all available ships and aircraft were employed in training.

Mr. Mitchell: What were the base ports of the Pacific Fleet at that time other than the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic vessels you spoke of?

Admiral Richardson: Well, each ship had a home port.

Mr. Mitchell: Generally speaking I mean what were the principal points?

Admiral Richardson: They were based practically all the time at San Pedro and Long Beach but the ships periodically proceeded to Bremerton and to San Francisco for overhaul and normal operations in training and gunnery exercises were off the coast of Southern California.

Mr. Mitchell: When the fleet vessels under your command made that movement in the spring of 1940, to what area did they proceed?

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

Admiral Richardson: They proceeded to sea divided into two task forces representing opposing fleets and conducted a war game and various exercises and then united with the Hawaiian detachment and proceeded to the Hawaiian area, arriving there on the -- I actually arrived at Lahina Roads at 1500 on 10 April.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, you had been ordered to move out into Hawaiian waters after these exercises, or had you --

Admiral Richardson: Each year the fleet exercises were held in a different part of the world, a different part of the ocean, to familiarize the officers with the weather conditions and the terrain and everything else that it was necessary to know and before I became Commander-in-Chief the plans for this exercise had already been drawn up and approved and I carried out exercises which were planned by my predecessor.

When I arrived in Pearl Harbor according to the published plan the fleet, with the exception of the Hawaiian detachment, was to depart from the Hawaiian area on the 9th of May -- no, the 9th of April. Wait a minute, let me see. No, the 9th of May.

Mr. Mitchell: This is 1940?

Admiral Richardson: 1940.

Mr. Gearhart: What was the date?

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Admiral Richardson: The 9th of May, 1940.

3 Mr. Mitchell: And you say, do you----

4 Admiral Richardson: From the Hawaiian area the return
5 would normally have been to the Pacific coast.

6 Mr. Mitchell: The point is that when you went to Hawaiian
7 waters at that time you expected that that would be a tem-
8 porary arrangement and that you would shortly return to the
9 Pacific coast?

10 Admiral Richardson: That was an arrangement the schedule
11 for which had been prepared and approved and was known to all
12 the officers and men in the Fleet.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you understood it was temporary?

14 Admiral Richardson: Oh, yes.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. Now, we have a file of correspond-
16 ence that includes some letters between you and Admiral Strak,
17 Chief of Naval Operations, running from January 1940 to
18 January 1941. You have examined that file and have a copy
19 of it?

20 Admiral Richardson: Yes, sir. You have supplied me
21 with a copy of that file.

22 Mr. Mitchell: At this point I would like to offer in
23 evidence as exhibit 9 the file of correspondence that I
24 have just referred to, of which each member of the committee
25 has a copy.

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, just so that I will be able
3 to follow the questioner, is there any way of telling how
4 many parts there are in particular in exhibit 9? I have seen
5 several groups of papers.

6 Mr. Gesell: I think, Congressman, that there are really
7 basically two parts; the letters called "Stark to Admiral
8 Richardson" are mimeographed and the letters of Admiral Ri-
9 chardson to Admiral Stark are the ones you have there in your
10 hand; they are photostatic copies.

11 Senator Brewster: Does this purport to be a complete
12 record of their correspondence in that period?

13 Mr. Gesell: No, it does not.

14 Senator Brewster: How were the eliminations made?

15 Mr. Mitchell: Well, there are a great many personal let-
16 ters. I think these letters were chosen because they relate
17 to the reasons for the fleet going out there and the objec-
18 tions that Admiral Richardson later developed as to their
19 staying there. That was, really, what I think they are mostly
20 pertinent to.

21 Senator Brewster: Has your staff been over the complete
22 file to select those which they consider pertinent?

23 Mr. Mitchell: These letters were furnished us both by
24 Admiral Stark and his counsel and by Admiral Richardson. I
25 won't say that I have seen every letter that passed between

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 during that period.

3 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, has counsel or have
4 any of the counsel staff seen all of the letters?

5 Mr. Gesell: We have seen all the letters that we have
6 been able to read.

7 Senator Ferguson: What do you mean that you have been
8 able to read?

9 Mr. Gesell: Just exactly that, Senator, the ones we
10 have been able to find. This correspondence is personal cor-
11 respondence and we asked counsel for Admiral Stark to submit
12 to us all of the letters that he had exchanged with Admiral
13 Richardson and counsel submitted us a file which they stated
14 was the complete file of correspondence which they had.

15 We have also had searches made in the Navy Department for
16 any correspondence between these two officers.

17 Admiral Stark and his counsel have reviewed the selection
18 of the letters made here and we have also shown the file to
19 Admiral Richardson and he has double checked the selections,
20 so that we have taken such precautions as we can to assure
21 that the correspondence is representative of the topics that
22 the documents were selected for and have done everything we
23 can to make sure that we have obtained any letters that we can
24 find.

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1 Senator Ferguson: Are you through?

2 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

3 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, on page 14-c there seems
4 to be no beginning to that letter. Can that be explained?

5 Mr. Gesell: That is a last sheet which came in there by
6 error and connects to another letter which is not offered in
7 evidence.
8

9 Senator Ferguson: You have the other letter?

10 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

11 Senator Ferguson: Do you have, for submission to the
12 committee, the other letters?

13 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

14 Senator Ferguson: How many letters will that be?

15 Mr. Gesell: A small number. I have not counted them. You
16 are welcome to see them. Many of them are personal letters
17 that do not seem to us to be germane.

18 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I make one suggestion.

19 As these exhibits go into this record it seems to me, in
20 order for anyone to clearly understand the letters and the
21 answers thereto, the letters should go in and then they should
22 be followed by the answers.

23 Mr. Mitchell: I have mine arranged that way.

24 Senator Lucas: The exhibits that were given to us were
25 not arranged that way.

Witness Richardson

Mr. Mitchell: I know it, so I tore mine down and put them in chronological order.

The letters I have here are letters that seem to me to be pertinent to the inquiry that I was going to make of Admiral Richardson here. If there are any more of those letters that you want to see I will get them for you.

Admiral Richardson: May I make a statement, Mr. Chairman, in regard to this correspondence?

The Chairman: Yes, go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral Richardson: When I relieved Admiral Bloch as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet I found that quite a little official business had been conducted in personal correspondence, so that when I relieved Admiral Bloch it was necessary for me to write to Admiral Stark for information which I needed. I did not want that to occur when I was relieved, so before I was relieved I gave my file of personal letters to my relief.

The Chairman: To whom?

Admiral Richardson: To the officer who relieved me.

The Chairman: Oh, yes.

Mr. Gesell: Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Richardson: Admiral Kimmel, with the request that he and his prospective Chief of Staff look over the file of letters and indicate those that they felt would be useful.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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in the conduct of the affairs of the fleet, and I would retain them and deliver them to Admiral Kimmel. The majority of the other letters were destroyed by me because I was unwilling to take away and have in my custody letters that referred to fleet business. So that I could not supply counsel with my file of letters. I have been able to secure some copies from the Department and from various sources, so that my supply of letters, which will be essential to refresh my memory on many of these points, would not have been made available to me except through the counsel.

The Vice Chairman: Just a minute, Mr. Chairman.

I understood you to say, Admiral, those letters that were not being desirable by your relief you destroyed.

(2) Admiral Richardson: I did. A few found their way into my papers when my effects were packed up, so I did have a few, but by no means a complete file.

The Chairman: All right, go ahead.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, Admiral, I have here a letter dated March 15, 1940.

Admiral Richardson: March what?

Mr. Mitchell: March 15, 1940, addressed to "Dear J. O." and signed "Betty". Who is "J. O."?

Admiral Richardson: I am J. O.

Mr. Mitchell: Who is "Betty"?

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Admiral Richardson: Admiral H. R. Stark.

Mr. Mitchell: Is that the way you usually addressed each other in this personal correspondence?

Admiral Richardson: It was.

Mr. Mitchell: I notice in the letter of March 15, 1940 on page 2 there is a paragraph that reads as follows:

"I still think that the decision to send the detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy."

What did the word "orange" stand for in naval parlance? Was it Japan?

Admiral Richardson: Japan.

Mr. Mitchell: "The State Department is strong for the present set-up and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc."

That is a letter from Admiral Stark to you?

Admiral Richardson: Yes, and that was in reply to my letter to him asking about why the Hawaiian detachment was there, and I would like to invite your attention to the second paragraph in that letter of 15 March, 1940.

Mr. Mitchell: When you went there you expected to come back soon and then you found you were not ordered back, that is right, isn't it?

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

Mr. Mitchell: Then you wanted to know why you were kept out there?

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

Mr. Mitchell: And this correspondence started, and you asked Admiral Stark why you were there, and this reference I just made is to that discussion, is it?

Admiral Richardson: No, I think not. It is 15 March, is it not?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: I was not out there. This 15th of March letter relates to the presence in the Hawaiian area of the Hawaiian detachment.

Mr. Mitchell: I see.

Admiral Richardson: Which had proceeded to the Hawaiian area in the fall preceding.

Mr. Mitchell: That is right. Then we pass on to the letter of May 7, 1940 by Admiral Stark to you, and I find that contains this statement:

"When the fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the fleet schedule be so arranged that on extremely short notice the fleet be able to return concentrated to Hawaiian waters. This will present somewhat of a

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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problem in lugging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board, because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your proposed schedule meets this requirement, and unless you hear to the contrary, you may assume it is O.K."

That is on May 7, 1940, and up to that time you expected to come back in the course of two weeks?

Admiral Richardson: No -- oh, yes.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: I thought it was possible.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: We have here a letter of May 22 that is written by you to Admiral Stark, May 22, 1940, in which you write him:

"As you no doubt well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule, and employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is necessary to know more than I know now about why we are here and how long we will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely dependent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on.

"For instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require wholesale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following are pertinent questions:

"(a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as we can under the limitations on anchorages, airfields, facilities and services) have on this purpose? The effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered.

"(b) Are we here as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? If so, we should devote all of our

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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time and energies to preparing for war. This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, filling up complements, docking, and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completion.

"As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is a diversification of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment of neither.

"If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration should be given to the certain decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, airfields, facilities, services, recreation conditions, for so large a fleet. If only peacetime training is involved, should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer details?"

Now, with that statement before you, will you state to the committee just what your situation had been up to that time, and how you happened to write that letter?

Admiral Richardson: Well, a fleet composed of a large number of ships and men and planes must secure careful planning. In order that time not be wasted and that something be accomplished. When the Fleet went to the Hawaiian area as a part of the Fleet exercises, we had a definite schedule of gunnery exercises, steaming competitions, full power

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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drives, inspections, and everything else that is required to keep a fleet busy, and keep them under training.

When the Fleet went to the Hawaiian area we did not take with us tugs, targets, target rafts, target planes, towing planes, repair ships, so that if the Fleet was to remain in the Hawaiian area, in order that it could be usefully employed, it was essential that I know that we remain there long enough to bringing out all of the gear that was necessary for training the ship, for fear that I would start all this material to Hawaii and then, after it once started and got half-way there I would return, and then have to wait for several weeks for it to get back to the normal bases on the West Coast, so I could continue training.

So that, from my point of view, my effectiveness in the Fleet and continued training in the Fleet demanded an early decision, so that plans could be made.

Mr. Mitchell: When did you first learn, and how, that the decision had been made here in Washington to base your Fleet at Pearl Harbor instead of on the Pacific Coast?

Admiral Richardson: The first notice that I received was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, 4 May, which reads --

Mr. Mitchell: What is the date of it?

Admiral Richardson: May 4.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: 1940?

3 Admiral Richardson: May 4, 1940.

4 "It looks probable but not final that Fleet will remain
5 Hawaiian waters for short time after May 9. Will expect
6 to apprise you further Monday or Tuesday next."

7 The 4th of May was Saturday. On the 7th of May I
8 received from the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed to
9 CINCUS -- CINCUS was the abbreviation for Commander-in-Chief
10 United States Fleet -- "CINCUS make immediate press release
11 instructions as follows:

12 "I request permission to remain in Hawaiian waters to
13 accomplish some things I wanted to do while here. The Depart-
14 ment has approved this request."

15 "Delay Fleet departure Hawaiian area is for about two
16 weeks prior to the end of which time you will be further ad-
17 vised regarding future movements. Carry out regular scheduled
18 overhauls of individual units, movements of base force units
19 at your discretion."

20 Mr. Mitchell: Did you issue the press release?

21 Admiral Richardson: I did.

22 Mr. Mitchell: You had not requested or asked to be left
23 out there, had you?

24 Admiral Richardson: I had not.

25 Mr. Keefe: I am having difficulty, Mr. Mitchell. I have

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2 the answer but I did not get your full question.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I probably did not have my nose in
4 the microphone again. My question was whether he had given
5 the press release, and he said he did, and I asked him if
6 he had asked to be kept out there at Hawaii, and he said
7 "no."

8 Mr. Keefe: Thank you.

9 Mr. Mitchell: I refer now to a letter of May 27, 1940,
10 which was written by Admiral Stark to you in response to the
11 letter of May 22nd that I just read from, and in which you
12 wanted to know about what you were supposed to do, and he
13 said, among other things:

14 "Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor
15 to answer it paragraph by paragraph.

16 "First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly
17 what you are up against, and to tell you that here in the
18 Department we are up against the same thing.

19 "Why are you in the Hawaiian area?

20 "Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect
21 which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs
22 going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have
23 hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The
24 connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs
25 might feel just that much freer to take independent action.

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"We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned, she, Japan has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies."

Then later in the letter:

"Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask - suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know, and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thought contained in your recent letter.

"I would point out one thing, and that is even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do, and so long as they don't know, they may hesitate or be deterred. These facts I have kept very secret here.

"The above, I think will answer the question 'why you are there.' It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get

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2 this information I will rush it to you. Nobody can answer
3 it just now. Like you, I have asked the question and also -
4 like you - I have been unable to get the answer.

5 "I realize that you are up against in even a curtailed
6 gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department
7 is concerned, you are at liberty to play with the gunnery
8 schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices
9 for the time being and substituting others which you may con-
10 sider important, and which you have the means at hand to
11 accomplish. Specifically, if you want to cut short range
12 battle practice and proceed with long range practices, or
13 division practices or experimental or anything else, including
14 anti-air etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage
15 of the Fleet in its present uncertain status -- go ahead.
16 Just keep us informed."

17 Later on, he says:

18 "You ask whether you are there as a stepping-off place
19 for belligerent activity?

20 "Answer: Obviously it might become so under certain
21 conditions, but a definite answer cannot be given as you
22 have already gathered from the foregoing.

23 "I realize what you say about the advantages of returning
24 to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time
25 is out of the question. If you did return, it might nullify

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1 the reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question
 2 has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you
 3 have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking,
 4 taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in
 5 any case."

6 He says later:

7 "You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area
 8 as a peacetime operating base, but this will naturally flow
 9 to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

10 "As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet
 11 and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages,
 12 airfields, service, recreation conditions, for so large a
 13 fleet:

14 "I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first
 15 years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies."

16 Now, that brings to our minds the question of your
 17 attitude about the basing of the Fleet, and I call your
 18 attention to a letter you wrote to Admiral Stark -- before
 19 we get to that, I have a letter here of June 22, Stark to
 20 Richardson.

21 Mr. Keefe: Is that contained in this file?

22 Mr. Mitchell: I am not so sure. It is a loose sheet.

23 Mr. Gesell: It was sent to you subsequently, Congressman
 24 Keefe. There were additional letters discovered after the
 25

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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 first mimeographing, and they were sent to the members of
3 the committee, and they did not come in the same attachment
4 as the others.

5 The Chairman: They were put in a folder marked "Addi-
6 tional Letters Between Stark and Richardson."

7 Mr. Keefe: All right.

8 Mr. Mitchell: I am sorry we did not have them all
9 together at the start.

10 This letter is from Stark to Richardson, June 22:

11 "Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because
12 of uncertainty as to the movement of the Fleet in the
13 immediate future. Tentatively, decision has been made for
14 the Fleet to remain for the present where it is."

15 Is that about the first --

16 Admiral Richardson: What letter is that?

17 Mr. Mitchell: June 22, 1940. Maybe the Admiral hasn't
18 got a copy of it.

19 Mr. Gesell: I will get him one.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Admiral Richardson: I have my letter.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir. There is one from you dated June 22, but this is one from Admiral Stark to you dated June 22, which was supplied to us later from the original file.

I am sorry, I thought you had seen it.

Admiral Richardson: All right; I have that letter.

Mr. Mitchell: Had you received any information more definite than that as to the permanency of your station at Pearl Harbor prior to that letter? It says:

"Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This decision may be changed at any time."

Admiral Richardson: No, I had received no prior information.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, you had developed by that time very definite ideas in your own mind in opposition to the advisability of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, had you not? Will you please state in your own way just what the situation was and what your objections were grounded upon?

Admiral Richardson: My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for the men, a long distance from Pearl Harbor to the City of Honolulu, inadequate transportation, inadequate airfields.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields available, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying fields.

There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time.

Another reason, which was a substantial one, Americans are perfectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal peacetimes, away from the Coast and away from their families, away from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of morale that is essential to successful training.

For those reasons, and because I believe that the fleet could be better prepared for war on a normal basis on the West Coast, I wanted to return to the West Coast.

Mr. Mitchell: There is also a letter from you -- or rather a memorandum from the Secretary, it is called, dated September 12, 1940. Will you please turn to that?

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Admiral Richardson: I have it.

Mr. Mitchell: You have it.

Admiral Richardson: September 12, 1940.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes. Was that prepared while you were out in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral Richardson: It was. At that time I had shifted my flag and was then flying it from the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, an aircraft carrier.

The Secretary of the Navy visited the Hawaiian area from 5 September until 15 September. During that time I had him off Lahaina for dinner aboard the ENTERPRISE with all the flag officers present. He was aboard the ENTERPRISE for awhile. Then he was shifted to other types of ships, battleships, destroyers, cruisers.

I did that in order that he might see the operations conducted by various types of ships and in order that he might meet other flag officers in the fleet. I was particularly careful to see that he had an opportunity to talk with Admiral Kimmel, Vice Admiral Andrews, Admiral Snyder, and a destroyer Captain named Binford.

I knew that he would hear the news of many officers and I was anxious that he remember the things that I had said to him and in order that he might not confuse what I had said to him with the things that had been said to him by others I

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 prepared a memorandum setting forth a brief outline of the
3 points that I had covered in very extensive conversations and
4 I filed a copy of that memorandum with the Chief of Naval Oper-
5 ations, because I endeavored at all times to let the Chief of
6 Naval Operations know what I was doing, or what it was my in-
7 tention to do.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Will you please turn to that memorandum of
9 the 12th of September 1940, at the bottom of page 2, under
10 "4 (A)" is the title "Retention of the Fleet in the Hawaiian
11 Area".

12 Was that statement intended to sum up your views about
13 the retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian area?

14 Admiral Richardson: It was.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Would you mind reading that, Admiral?

16 Admiral Richardson: "Retention of the fleet in the
17 Hawaiian Area.

18 "(a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many
19 disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some
20 of which are:

21 "(1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men,
22 munitions, and supplies.

23 "(2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to
24 lack of security.

25 "(3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due