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*7/9/46*

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2263

26 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

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PERSONS IMPLICATED: HATA; DOIHARA; SUZUKI; ISHIHARA;  
ITAGAKI; TATEKAWA; HAYASHI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian  
Aggression

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Affidavit of the 1st Asst. Consul General at Mukden.

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps (Mr. Darsey)

Doc. No. 2263

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HATA; DOIHARA; SUZUKI; ISHIHARA;  
ITAGAKI; TATEKAWA; HAYASHI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian

*See morning*

54245

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. )

- AGAINST - )

ARAKI, SADA0, et al. )

A F F I D A V I T

I, MORISHIMA, Morito, make oath and say as follows:

I am 50 years old, having been born in the City of Kanazawa on February 16, 1896.

I speak, read and understand the English language.

In September 1928, I was sent to Mukden to serve in the capacity of consul as First Assistant to Consul General FAYASPI, Kyujiro. I served in this office until December 1932, during which period I served as Acting Consul General on the occasions when the Consul General was out of the jurisdiction; especially did I serve as Acting Consul General from December 1931 to December 1932, the Consul General having been recalled to Japan at that time on other business.

As the First Assistant to the Consul General, my duties were largely of an executive nature. The office of the Consul General was concerned with matters relating to Chinese affairs, particularly Japan's interests in Manchuria, and all political matters relating to foreign countries, and arranging for the protection of Japanese nationals in peace time. It was the particular duty and obligation of our office to keep posted on current trends and developments which might adversely affect the political policies of the Japanese Government; to anticipate such trends and developments and to currently report conclusions in these respects to the Japanese Foreign Office. In order effectively to perform these duties and functions, the Consul General's office availed itself of all accessible channels of information. Such channels of information consisted among others of the Consular Police, several hundred in number, who were stationed throughout the jurisdiction of our Mukden office; the officials of the South Manchurian Railway; and the Kwantung Government; the officers in the headquarters of the Special Mission of the Army located in Mukden; the Chinese representative in the three Eastern Provinces comprising Manchuria; Japanese nationals located in Manchuria; and many other such sources of information. It was the duty of the Consular Police to make daily reports to our office of any unusual happenings, events or information as to trends and developments. This they did regularly. I, personally, conducted conferences daily with such

of the aforementioned officials and officers as circumstances and conditions suggested the advisability of.

In the performance and discharge of the duties and functions of our office, we were required to and did avail ourselves of the aforementioned channels of information. The office of the Consul General took appropriate official action predicated upon the information so acquired and received and made many reports to the Japanese Government in connection therewith. It was the duty and responsibility of our office to draw conclusions from information so obtained and to advise the Japanese Government as to such trends and developments which might involve Japan's political policies, as such information indicated. This, we endeavored to do as effectively as possible.

In 1928 and 1929, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army was located normally at Port Arthur and the Commander of that Army was Lt. General MURAOKA. Major-General HATA, Shinji, was Chief of the Special Mission of the Army, with headquarters at Mukden and Major MORIOKA was assistant to the Chief of that Mission. These two officers were succeeded by Major-General SUZUKI, Yoshimitsu and Major FANAYA, Tadashi. Later, Major-General SUZUKI was succeeded by Major-General DOIFABA, Kenji. These were the officers whom I normally contacted in the headquarters of the Army Special Mission in Mukden when the desirability of conferences with the military was suggested. Occasionally, it became desirable for me to visit the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army in Port Arthur to confer about special matters. Also, I often conferred with the Governor-General of the Kwantung Province and other officials in that office.

When Premier TANAKA came into office, he announced a more positive policy toward Manchuria than had been followed in the predecessor Cabinet. This policy placed the greatest importance on the maintenance of peace and order throughout the whole of Manchuria. It was the first time that Japan had definitely asserted that she would take upon herself the responsibility and task of preserving peace and order in Manchuria. The positive policy also resulted in troops being sent into China proper; that is, Teinan, on two occasions; namely, May 1927 and April 1928, to insure the safety and protect the rights of Japanese nationals there. The sending of troops into China proper in April 1928 had the effect of deterring the advance of the Chiang-kai-Shek armies toward Peiping and Tientsin.

At this time, Marshal Chang Tso-lin was marshal of Manchuria. In the administration of this positive policy, Premier TANAKA was lending support to and collaborating with Chang Tso-lin. It was the policy of the TANAKA Government to endeavor to promote and expand Japan's interests in Manchuria

through collaboration and negotiation with Chang Tso-lin. This policy of collaboration and negotiation with Chang Tso-lin met with strong disapproval on the part of a group and clique of officers in the Kwantung Army which at that time was led by Colonel KAWAMOTO Taisaku. There were other younger officers of the Kwantung Army associated in this group and clique whose names I do not now recall. This element in the Kwantung Army felt that the Government should discontinue collaboration and negotiation with constituted authorities in Manchuria and should employ force to preserve and promote Japan's interest there.

At this time, Chang Tso-lin had ambitions to establish his leadership in China proper and as Grand Marshal of his armies had moved his headquarters to Peiping. This met with the staunch disapproval of Premier TANAKA who consistently advised Chang Tso-lin that he should abandon his ambitions in China proper, return to Manchuria and concern himself solely with maintaining his leadership there.

Chang Tso-lin ignored such advice and requests on the part of Premier TANAKA until he suffered defeat in the summer of 1928 when the Southern Army of Chiang Kai-Shek was making a strong advance into North China. At this time, Chang Tso-lin was compelled by military circumstances to return to Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin departed from North China for Mukden in the first week of June 1928. As the train on which he was traveling approached Mukden, he was killed by an explosion which wrecked his train. This explosion was planned and brought about by the element of the Kwantung Army which was dissatisfied with TANAKA's policy of collaboration with Chang-Tso-lin. This murder of Chang Tso-lin created quite a crisis in the TANAKA Cabinet and ultimately resulted in its fall in 1929.

From the date of the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet until the late summer of 1931, the influence of this element of the Kwantung Army in governmental policies grew progressively stronger. During this period, Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Lt. Colonel ISHIFARA, Kanji, and Major FANAYA are among those in the Kwantung Army who became definitely identified with the leadership in this group. This group and clique of officers in the Kwantung Army in this period were of the strong opinion that the use of armed forces was necessary to preserve and project Japan's interests in Manchuria. They seemed to want to occupy it and to establish a government there separate from China proper and which would be subservient to Japan. During this period, many incidents occurred which might be attributed to anti-Japanese feeling prevailing in Manchuria and the policy of restoration of national rights under the leadership of Chang Fsuch-Liang. The Consulate made the greatest efforts to settle these incidents by negotiation and peaceful means so that they might not be used as pretexts for the use of force. However, the determination

on the part of the group and clique in the Army to employ force in Manchuria grew progressively stronger throughout the summer of 1931 and it became more and more difficult for the office of the Consul General and the Government to keep the situation in hand. By late summer it became apparent to all concerned that it was only a question of days until the military would be on the move in Manchuria. In the latter part of August and until the middle of September, the Consular office was seriously concerned with the adjustment and settlement of the NAKAMURA affair. This involved the killing of NAKAMURA, a Japanese officer who allegedly was on an investigation tour in inner-Mongolia for the Kwantung Army. He had obtained a passport from the Chinese under the false representation that he was an agricultural scientist who wanted to conduct research in this field. While engaged in his real mission, his true identity became known and he was killed by a number of soldiers belonging to the regular Army of Chang Fsuch-Liang. On the afternoon of September 18, 1931, negotiations with respect to adjustment and settlement of this affair were in progress between the Consulate and the Chinese representatives. A further conference in the Consulate was adjourned at about eight o'clock in the evening because it had been concluded that since a member of the military was involved, it would be necessary to confer with appropriate representatives of the Army before any further representations should be made to the Chinese officials.

Upon the conclusion of this conference at 8:00 P.M., I was delegated the responsibility to arrange for the attendance of appropriate military representatives at a further conference which was to be held later in the evening. At this time, I endeavored to contact the responsible officers of the Special Mission of the Army in Mukden in order to arrange for them to attend this conference. The officers I endeavored particularly to contact were Colonel DOIWARA, Chief of the Special Mission, and Major FANAYA, the Assistant Chief, who were in charge of the Headquarters office. I was unable to locate either of these officers or any other responsible military officer. After I had sought to locate these officers at their respective offices, billets, and the usual hotels, restaurants and other places which they frequented, I so reported to the Consulate and retired to my personal quarters adjacent to the Consulate.

Earlier in the afternoon of September 18, I had received a report from the Consular Police to the effect that a citizen who was traveling on the train from Antung to Mukden had recognized General TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugi who was dressed in civilian clothing and who was traveling from Tokyo to Mukden. This citizen had sought to have General TATEKAWA acknowledge his identity but was evaded. It seemed strange to me at the time that the Consulate should not have been advised of General TATEKAWA's special mission to Mukden.

My inability to locate any of the responsible military officers at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of September 18, coupled with the report with respect to General TATEKAWA traveling in civilian clothes to Mukden created quite a bit of apprehension in my mind and I so reported to the Consul.

Earlier in the summer, I had learned that the Army had moved a large gun from Hai-chang, the headquarters of the Artillery Regiment to the Infantry Barracks in Mukden. I inquired of the Army about the significance of this movement but only received evasive answers. Also, I had received many reports that the Army was planning unusual military maneuvers; particularly had I previously learned that the Kwantung Army in Fu-shun the important coal mining district, had planned a maneuver which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fu-shun at 11:30 P.M. the night of September 18.

All of such reports had served to create an atmosphere of tenseness in the Consulate. It was apparent to me that some unusual military activity was in the making.

By this time, Lt. Colonel ISHIMURA had become an assistant on Colonel ITAGAKI's staff and I from time to time had occasion to speak with him. I learned that he was supporting Colonel ITAGAKI's philosophy that force should be employed to occupy Manchuria.

I was in my personal quarters about 10:30 P.M., September 18 1931, when I received a telephone call from the Army Special Mission advising me that an explosion had occurred on the South Manchurian Railway and that I should come over immediately to the Military Special Mission Headquarters. I arrived there about 10:45 P.M. and met Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Major FANAYA, and some other officers whose names I do not recall. Colonel ITAGAKI said to me that members of the regular Chinese Army had exploded the South Manchurian Railway; that this constituted a serious violation of important Japanese rights; that Japan must take appropriate defense measures through the use of military force; and that general orders had already been issued to this effect to the Army. I tried to reason with him that we should resort to peaceful negotiations in an effort to adjust the matter and that I believed that it could be satisfactorily settled in this manner. Colonel ITAGAKI then chastised me and wanted to know if the office of the Consul General intended to interfere with the right of military command. I insisted that there was no question involved of interference with the right of military command but rather that I was certain the matter could be adjusted amicably through normal negotiations and that the latter course would be advisable from the viewpoint of the interests of the Japanese Government. At this point in the conversation, Major FANAYA unsheathed his sword in an angry gesture and stated that if I insisted upon interference with the right of military

command, I should be prepared to suffer the consequences. He stated further that he would kill anyone who endeavored to so interfere. This outburst on the part of Major FANAYA broke up the conversation and I returned to my headquarters to make a full report, which I did. By the time I reached my headquarters, Consul General FAYASPI had returned from a visit with an acquaintance and I reported to him the developments of the evening in detail.

Upon receipt of my report, the Consul General talked by phone a number of times during the night of September 18 and the early morning of the 19th with Colonel ITAGAKI in an effort to persuade him to cease the fighting and to permit the Consulate to endeavor to settle the matter through peaceful negotiations. Colonel ITAGAKI remained defiant and consistently informed the Consul General that he should cease interference with the right of the military command; that general orders had been issued to the Army and that the Army would proceed as planned. Throughout the night of September 18 we received numerous representations on the part of the Supreme Advisor for Chang Fsuch-Liang, then Marshal of Manchuria, that the Chinese were proceeding on a policy of non-resistance and implored the office of the Consul General to persuade the Japanese Army to cease attacks and to resort to peaceful negotiations. All such representations were communicated to the military to no avail and the occupation of Mukden continued. On the day of September 19, in my continued efforts to persuade the Army to cease military activities, I visited the headquarters of the Kwantung Army several times and conferred with officers in the Kwantung Army, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army having been moved by this time from Port Arthur to Mukden. On one of these visits, I observed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, General TATEKAWA who was dressed in civilian clothes. At this time, General TATEKAWA held the office of Chief of one of the departments of the General Staff in Tokyo and I could not understand why he should be in Mukden dressed in civilian attire.

Under the general orders which were issued on the night of September 18, all of the Japanese armies in Manchuria came into operation. The Korean Army which was stationed on the border crossed the Yalu River and came over to participate in the activities. Despite all efforts to control the situation, the Army continued with its occupation of Manchuria which was consolidated by the spring of 1932. In March of 1932, a puppet government was established with Pu-yi as its head. There was no popular movement in Manchuria for the establishment of any independent government. This movement was sponsored and inspired by the Kwantung Army and the Self-Government Guiding Board, which was created by the Kwantung Army. All of the important and controlling positions in the puppet government were filled by Japanese selected by the Kwantung Army.

Upon the establishment of the puppet government, the Province of Jehol in Inner-Mongolia was declared to be within its sphere of influence. This move proved ineffectual because it did not have the support of the Government nor the people of Jehol. When the Kwantung Army realized this situation, and the continued existence of the exiled Government of Chang Hsueh-Liang in Jehol, the Army proceeded to occupy Jehol and make it a part of the puppet regime by force. This puppet government continued to be dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army until 1945. Japan officially recognized the independence of this Government in September 1932. This gesture in nowise altered the control and domination of the Government by the Kwantung Army.

/s/ MORISFIMA, Morito  
MORISFIMA, Morito

SWORN and SUBSCRIBED to before the undersigned Officer by the above-named MORISFIMA, Morito, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 26th day of June 1946.

/s/ CAPTAIN ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, JAGD  
IPS, GPO, SCLP

極東國際軍事裁判所

北米合衆國等

對

荒木貞夫等

口供書

2263-1

私、守島守人ハ宣誓ノ上次ノ如ク述ベマス。

私ハ一八九六年（明治廿九年）二月十六日金澤市ニ生レ、年齢五十歳デアリマス。

私ハ英語ヲ話シ、讀ミ且ツ諳解シマス。

一九二八年（昭和三年）九月、私ハ總領事林久治郎ノ首席補佐トシテ、領事ノ資格デ奉天へ赴任シマシタ。

私ハ一九三二年（昭和七年）十二月迄、右奉天總領事館ニ勤メマシタガ、此期間中、私ハ總領事ガ管轄地ヲ離レテ居ル場合ハ、總領事代理トシテ勤メマシタ、特ニ、私ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）十二月カラ一九三三年（昭和七年）十二月迄ハ、總領事ガ當時他ノ要件デ歸朝中ダツタノデ、總領事代理ノ事務ヲ執リマシタ。總領事ノ首席補佐トシテノ任務ハ、主トシテ行政的性質ノモノデアリマシタ。總領事ノ任務ハ、支那問題關係事項、就中滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ權益、外國ニ對スル一切ノ政治的事項、平和時ニ於ケル日本國民保護ノ手配等

ニ關スルモノデアリマシタ。此ノ總領事館ノ特別  
ナ責務ハ、日本政府ノ政治的政策ニ逆効果ヲ及ボ  
スガ如キ其ノ當時ノ趨勢ヤ進展等ニ就テ通曉スル  
コト、前記ノ如キ趨勢ヤ進展ヲ豫見スルコト、是  
等ノ點ニ關スル結論ヲ日本外務省へ絶へズ報告ス  
ルコト等デアリマシタ。是等ノ任務及職分ヲ有效  
ニ遂行スルタメ、總領事務所ハ、其ノ接近シ得ル  
凡テノ情報機關ヲ利用シマシタ。斯カル情報機關  
ハ、我々ノ奉天事務所ノ管轄内到期ル所ニ駐在セル  
數百人ノ領事巡查、(南)滿鐵(道)ヤ關東廳ノ  
職員、在奉天陸軍特務機關本部ノ將校、滿洲ヲ包  
括スル東部三省ニ駐在スル支那代表者、滿洲在留  
ノ日本國民等ノカラ成リ、更ニ斯種情報源ハ他ニ  
モ多數アリマシタ。領事巡查ノ任務ハ、一般ノ趨  
勢ヤ進展等ニ關シテハ如何ナル異常ノ出來事、事  
件又ハ情報ニモ、我々ノ總領事館事務所へ毎日報  
告スルコトデアリマシタ。彼等巡查ハ報告ヲ宜ク  
勵行シマシタ。私ハ四國ノ事情ヤ狀態カラ其ノ有  
益ナルコトヲ感行イタノデ前記官吏ヤ將校連ト、  
毎日自ラ司宰シテ會議ヲ開キマシタ。  
本領事館ノ職務ト機能トヲ履行並ニ遂行スルニ當  
ツテ、上記情報入手手段ヲ利用スルコトガ我々ニ  
ハ必要デアリ、且ツソレヲ我々ハ實際ニ利用シタ。  
本領事館ハカクシテ獲得及ビ接受シタ情報ヲ基礎

トシテ断定シタ適宜ナル公的行動ヲ採リ、是ニ際シテ日本政府ニ多クノ報告ヲ爲シタ。如斯クニシテ獲タ情報ヨリ結論ヲ引出シ、カカル情報ノ示スガ如ク日本ノ政策ニ累ヲ及ボス恐シノアルヤウナ領告及ビ展開ニ關シテ、日本政府ニ忠言ヲ送ルノガ本領事館ノ義務デアリ又責任デアツタ。

我々ハ出來得ル限り之ヲ有効ニ爲スシコトヲ務メタ。一九二八年及ビ一九二九年ニハ、關東軍司令部ハ通常ハ旅順ニアリ、軍司令官ハ村岡中將デアツタ。ニハタ、シンジ」少將ガ陸軍ノ特務機關長デアリ奉天ニ其本部ヲ有シ、森岡少佐ガ機關長副官デアツタ。是等二名ノ後任者ハ鈴木「ヨシミチ」少將及「ハマヤ、タダシ」少佐デアツタ。後鈴木少將ノ後任ハ土肥原賢二少將デアツタ。軍ト協議スルコトガ望マシイト考ヘラレタ場合ニ、奉天特務機關本部ニテ私ノ普通接シタルモノハ上記ノ將校デアツタ。時ニハ、自分トシテ旅順ノ關東軍司令部ニ行ツテ特殊事項ニツキ協議ヲ成シタイトイフ事ガ起ツタ。又屢ニ關東州長官並ニ該官廳ノ他ノ職員ト協議シタ。

田中首相ガ就任サレタ時、前内閣ニ於テ行ハレタルモノヨリモ夏ニ積極的ナル對露政策ノ發明ヲ見タ。此政策ハ滿洲全土ノ平和ト秩序ノ維持ニ最重點ヲ指イタ。

滿洲ニ於ケル平和ト秩序ノ維持ノ責任並ニ實行ハ日本ガ引受ケルトイフ事ヲ日本ガ目的ニシテノハ之ガ最初デアツタ。又此積極的政策的結果ハ中國本土ニ對スル軍隊ノ派遣デアツタ。即チ二回ニ互リ濟南ニ、即チ一九二七年五月、一九二八年四月ニ灣地居住日本人ノ安全ヲ保證シ且ツ其權利ヲ擁護センガ爲メノモデアツタ。一九二八年四月ニ於ケル中國本土ヘノ派兵ハ蔣介石軍ノ北平及ビ天津進撃ヲ妨害スル結果トナツタ。此時三八張作霖元帥ハ滿洲ノ（最高ノ武力ヲ有スル）者デアツタ。此積極政策施行ニ於テ、田中首相ハ張作霖ヲ支援シ且ツ之ト協力シツ、アツタ。張作霖トノ協力及協調ヲ通ジテ滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ利益ヲ促進且ツ擴張セント努力スルコトハ、田中内閣ノ政策デアツタ。此張作霖トノ協力及協調政策ハ當時川本大作大佐指導下ニアリシ關東軍將校ノ一派ノ強烈ナル反對ニ遭ツタ。尙此外ニ氏名ハ忘失シガ、上記ノ一派ト聯繫アル若干ノ關東軍青年將校モ存在シテ居タ。此等ノ關東軍内部ノ分子ハ、滿洲ニ於ケル既成政權當局者ト我政府トガ協力乃至協調スルコトヲ中止シ、該地域ノ日本ノ利益ヲ武力行使ニヨツテ維持推進スベキデアルト考ヘタ。

當時張作霖ハ中國本土ニ彼ノ指導權ヲ確立セントスル野望ヲ懷キ、彼ノ臣僚ノ大元帥トシテ司令部ヲ北平ニ進メタ。此ノコトハ田中首相ノ斷然不可トスルトコロデアツテ、彼ハ張作霖ニ中國本土ニ對スル野望ヲ捨テ、滿洲ニ歸リ、其他ノ指導權ヲ保持スルコトニ專念セヨトノ忠告ヲ絶エズ與ヘテ居タノデアアル。

張作霖ハ田中首相ノ新カル忠告及要索ヲ無視シ遂ニ一九二八年夏蔣介石ノ率イル南軍ガ北支ニ溢進擊シテ來タ時敗北ヲ喫シタ。此時張作霖ハ軍事的事情ニ依ツテ滿洲ニ歸還ヲ餘儀ナクサレタ。張作霖ハ一九二八年六月ノ第一週ニ北支ヲ渡ツテ奉天ニ向ツタ。彼ノ乗ツテ居タ列車ガ奉天ニ近ヅイタ時列車ヲ破壞シタ爆發ノ爲ニ彼ハ殺サレタ。此ノ爆發ハ田中首相ノ張作霖トノ協同政策ニ不審ヲ抱ク關東軍ノ分子ニ依リ計畫サレ實行セラレタノデアアル。此ノ張作霖殺害事件ガ田中内閣ニ大ナル危機ヲ齊シ、遂ニ一九二九年ノ總辭職トナツタ。

田中内閣ノ倒レタ日カラ一九三一年晩夏ニ至ル迄此ノ關東軍分子ノ政府ノ政策ニ及ボス勢力ハ暴進的ニ強大トナツテ行ツタ。此ノ期間ニ於テ關東軍ニ於ケル此ノグループノ指導者トシテ確認サレル人達ノ中ニ板垣征四郎大佐、石原莞爾中佐及花谷

少佐ガ居タ。此ノ期間中、東直ノ此ノ將校一派ハ日本ノ在滿利益ヲ保持シ保護スルニハ、使ガ必要デアルトノ強硬意見ヲ抱イテ居タ。彼等ハ滿洲ヲ占領シ、其處ニ中國本土カラ分離シ且ツ日本ニ從屬セントスル政府ヲ樹立セント欲シテ居タヨウデアツタ。此ノ期間ニ於テ滿洲ニ廣マツタ反日感情及張學良ノ指導下ニ於テ國權ヲ恢復セントスル政策ニ懸ラク起因シテキル多クノ事變ガ發生シタ。領事館ハ其等ノ事變ガ武方行使ノ口實ニナラヌヨウ事變ヲ交涉及平和的手段ニ依リ解決セント最大ノ努力ヲ拂ツタ。乍然軍ノ此ノ一派ガ滿洲ニ於テ武力ヲ用ヒントスル決意ハ一九三一年夏ヲ通ジ漸次強大トナリ總領事及政府ノ時局救済ハ益々困難トナツタ。夏ノ終リ頃迄ニハ軍ノ滿洲ニ於ケル行動開始ガ單ニ時日ノ問題ニ過ぎナイトイフコトガ關係者全部ニ分ツテ來タ。八月ノ後半カラ九月ノ半頃迄領事館ハ中村事件ノ調整及解決ニ重大ナ關心ヲ拂ツテ居タ。此レハ關東軍ノ爲ニ内蒙古ヲ觀察旅行ヲシテ居タト言ハレル一日本軍人中村ノ殺害事件デアツタ。彼ハ其ノ地方ヲ調査セント欲スル一農業科學者ダト偽ツテ中國人カラ旅券ヲ得タノデアツタ。彼ガ本來ノ使命ニ從ツテ居ル時、彼ノ素性が知レテ張學良ノ正親軍ニ屬スル數名ノ兵士ニ殺サレタノデアアル。一九三一年九月

十八日ノ午後此ノ事件ノ訂定及解決ニ關スル交渉ガ領事館ト中國側代表トノ間ニ行ハレテ居タ。領事館ニ於テ更ニ會議ガ開カレ同夜八時頃ニ散會シタ。ソレハ軍ノ一員ガ關係シテ居ル以上中國官憲ニコレ以上ノ意思表示ヲ爲ス前ニ軍ノ當該代表ト協議スルコトガ必要デアルトノ決斷ニ達シタカラデアツタ。

午後八時ノ會議ノ結果私ハ夜通ク歸電サレルコトニナツテキタ續會ニ適當ナル陸軍代表ヲ出席サセル手筈ヲ整ヘル責任ヲ負フコトニナツタ。ソコデ私ハコノ會議ニ奉天特務機關ノ担任將校ノ出席ヲ求メル爲彼等ト接觸スルヤウニ努メタ。私ガ特ニ近付カウト努メタ將校ハ特務機關長土肥原大佐ト特務機關次長花谷少佐デアツタ。花谷少佐ハ司令部附デモアツタ。私ハコノ二人ヤソノ他ノ担任將校ノ居所ヲ突キトメヨウトシタガ駄目ダツタ。私ハコレヲノ將校ヲ彼等ノ役所ヤ宿舍行キツケノホテル、料理屋ソノ他彼等足築ク通フ場所等デ探シ出サウト試ミタ後、領事館ニ其ノ様ニ報告ヲシテ、領事館ノ近クニアル自分ノ宿舍ニ退イタ。

九月十八日午後ヨリ前ニ

安東ヨリ奉天ヘ向ツテ汽車ニ乘ツテ居ター市民ガ平服ヲ纏ツテ東京カラ奉天ヘ旅行中ノ達川美次將

軍ヲ認メタト云フ意味ノ報告ヲ、領事警察ヨリ受ケタ。此ノ市民ハ建川將軍ニ本人デアルト確認サレルコトヲ求メタガ、返事ハ巧ニゴマ化サレタ。ソノ時ニ領事館ニ對シテ、建川將軍ノ奉天行ノ特別使命ガ通知サレテキナカツタ事ハ、私ニハ裏ニ思ハレタ。

九月十八日夜九時ニ私ガ責任アル陸軍將校ノ詰モノ所在ヲツキトメル事ガ出来ナカツタ事ハ、平服デ奉天ニ旅行サレテ居タ建川將軍ニ口スル報告ト聞知シテ私ノ心中ニ少カラヌ不安ヲ生ゼシメタノデ、私ハ領事館ニ報告ヲシタ。

此ノ夏ノ始メニ、私ハ陸軍ガ大キイ大砲ヲ、砲兵聯隊本部ノ「ハイ・チヤン」ヨリ奉天ノ歩兵兵營ニ移シタトイフ事ヲ聞イテキタ。私ハ此ノ移動ノ意義ニツイテ陸軍ニ尋ネタガ、促ヘ所ノナイ答ヲ得タ許リデアツタ。又、私ハ陸軍ガ異常ノ演習ヲ計畫シツツアルトイフ多クノ報告ヲ受ケテ居タ。殊ニソノ前ニ、重要ナ炭礦地區デアル撫順ニ居タ關東軍ガ、九月十八日ノ夜午後十一時三十分ニ撫順ヲ出發シ、奉天占領ヲ完了スル演習ヲ計畫シタトイフ事ヲ私ハ聞イテ居ツタ。

2263-10  
以上ノ如キ報告ハ、總ベテ領事館ニ稟達シタ。尋常氣ヲ醸成スルニ役立つタ。私ニハ或ル異常ナ軍事活動ガ形成サレツツアルヤウニ思ハレタ。

此ノ時、石原中佐ハ板垣大佐ノ參謀補佐官トナツテ居テ、私ハ時折彼ト話ス機會ガアツタ。私ハ彼ガ滿洲ヲ占領スルタメニハ武力ヲ用ヒルベキデアルトイフ板垣大佐ノ哲學ヲ支持シテ居ル事ヲ知ツタ。

一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日午後十時三十分頃、私ガ自分ノ宿舍ニ居タ時、陸軍特務機關カラ電話ガカ、ツテ、南滿洲鐵道ノ爆發ガアツタ事、及び、私ニ即刻陸軍特務機關本部へ出張スルヤウニトイフ通知ガアツタ。私ハ十時四十五分頃本部ニ着キ、板垣徳四郎大佐、花谷少佐及び名前ハ記憶シテ居ナイガ其ノ他若干名ノ將校ニ會ツタ。板垣大佐ハ左ノ如ク語ツタ。民國正規軍ノ兵ガ南滿洲鐵道ヲ爆發シタ。此レハ日本ノ重大權利ノ容易ナラザル侵犯ヲ構成スル。日本ハ武力行使ニヨリ適當ナル防禦手段ヲ採ラナケレバナライ。陸軍ニ對シ此ノ意味ノ一般命令ガ既に發セラレタ。我々ハ、此ノ事件ノ調整ノ努力ヲスルニ當ツテハ平和的手段ニ訴ヘルベキデア。又自分ハ此ノ様ニシテ滿洲ニ解決シ得ルト信ズルトイフ事ヲ彼ニ説得シヨウト試ミタ。スルト板垣大佐ハ私ヲ叱咤シテ、總領事ノ任務ハ軍ノ指揮權ニ

干涉スルヤウニ企圖サレタカドウカ知リタイモノダ  
ト云ツタ。私ハ軍ノ指揮權ノ干涉ニ觸レル固ヲハ何  
モナイ、併シ私ハ此ノ事件ハ普通ノ交渉ニ依リ圓滿  
ニ調整シ得ルモノト確信シ、又後者ノ課程ガ日本政  
府ノ權益ノ立場ヨリ觀テ望マシイデアラウトイフ事  
ヲ主張シタ。話ガ此ノ點ニ來タ時、花谷少佐ハ怒ツ  
タ様子ヲシテ、刀ヲ拔キ、軍ノ指揮權ニ干涉スルコ  
トヲ主張スルテラ、ソノ結果ヲ預フ覺悟ヲセヨト云  
ツタ。彼ハ更ニ、左様ニ干涉スル者ハ誰デモ殺シ  
テシマフト云ツタ。花谷少佐ノ此ノ感情ノ爆發ハ會  
話ヲ途絶シ、私ハ詳細ニ報告ヲ作成スルタメ事務所  
ニ歸ヘリ、報告ヲ作成シタ。事務所ニ着イタ時迄ニ  
ハ林總領事ハ知人ヘノ訪問ヲ終ヘテ戻ツテ居ラレタ  
ノデ、私ハ委シクソノ夜ノ頃末ヲ彼ニ報告シタ。

私ノ報告ヲ受ケトツテカラ總領事ハ九月十八日  
ノ夜カラ十九日ノ朝ニカケテ幾度モ電話ヲ板垣大佐  
ニカケテ職ヲ止メル様ニ説得シ平和的交渉ニヨツテ  
事件ヲ解決スル事ヲ領事館ニ委セル様ニ努力シタ。  
板垣大佐ハ傍若無人ノ態度ヲ持シ總領事ニ對シ、軍  
指揮權ニ對シ干涉ヲ止ムベキデアル。軍ニハ一殺命  
令ガ發セラレ、軍ハ既定ノ計畫ノ通り事ヲ進メルデ  
アロウト絶エズ通告シタ。九月十八日ノ夜間中ニ我  
々ハ當時ノ滿洲ノ總師タル張學良ノ最高顧問カラノ

頻々タル申シ入レヲ受ケ取ツタ。即チ支那側ハ無抵抗政策ヲ以テ進ミ、總領事ガ日本軍ニ對シソノ攻撃ヲ止メ、平和的交渉ヲ用ヒル様ニ説得シレタイト懇請シテ來タノデアアル。スベテノ軍ニ對スルコノ様ナ申入レハ軍ニ通達サレタガ無欺ニ終リ、奉天ノ占領ハ繼續サレタ。私ハ軍事行動ヲ止メル様ニ軍ニ説得シヨウトシテ引續キ努力ヲ致シ、九月十九日ニ關東軍司令部ヲ數回ニ亘リ訪問シ、關東軍ノ將校達ト會談ヲシタ。關東軍司令部ハ、此ノ時迄ニ旅順カラ奉天ニ移サレテ居タノデ。數回ノ訪問ノ内ノ或ル場合、私ハ關東軍ノ司令部デ私服ノ建川將軍ヲ見カケタ。コノ時建川將軍ハ東京ノ參謀本部ノ或ル部ノ部長ヲ勤メテ居タノデ私ハ何故將軍ガ私服ヲ奉天ニナド居ルノカ了解出來ナカツタ。

九月十八日ノ夜ニ發セラレタ一連命令ニ依リ滿洲ニ在ル全日本軍ハ行動ヲ開始シタ。國境ニ陸屯シテ居タ朝鮮軍モ鴨綠江ヲ渡ツテ戰鬪ニ參加シタ。事變ヲ收拾スル爲ニナサレタアラユル努力ニモ拘ラズ、軍ハ滿洲占領ヲ續ケ、一九三二年ノ春ニハ之ヲ統合シタノデアアル。一九三二年三月、溥儀氏ヲ首班トスル傀儡政權ガ樹立サレタ。滿洲ニハ獨立政府樹立ノ爲ノ民間運動ナドハナカツタ。コノ運動ハ關東軍ニ依ツテ創造サレタ自治指導局ニ依ツテ主唱サレ鼓吹

サレタ。コノ傀儡政權ノ重要ナ又ハ支配的位置ハ總  
ベテ關東軍ニ依ツテ選バレタ日本人ニ依ツテ・ロノラ  
レタ。此ノ傀儡政府設立ト同時ニ、內蒙古ニ在ル熱  
河省ハ此ノ傀儡政府ノ勢力範圍内ニアリト宣言サレ  
タ。此ノ宣言ハ何等有效デハナカッタ、何故ナレバ  
此ノ宣言ニ對シテハ政府カラモ熱河省民カラモ支持  
ガナカッタカラデアアル。關東軍ガ斯ノ如キ情勢及ビ  
且ツ熱河ニ張學良亡命政府ガ存續シテ居ルコトヲ認  
メタ時ニ陸軍ハ兵ヲ進メテ熱河ヲ占領シ兵方ヲ以テ  
之レヲ傀儡政府ノ一部ニ加ヘタノデアアル。此ノ傀儡  
政府ハ一九四五年マデ關東軍ガ之レヲ支配シ操縱シ  
續ケテ來タノデアアル。日本國ハ一九三二年九月正式  
ニ此ノ政府ノ獨立ヲ承認シタノデアアル。ガ然シナガ  
ラ此ノ意志表示ハ關東軍ノ傀儡政府ニ對スル支配及  
ビ操縱ヲ何等變更シナカッタ。

森 島 守 人 署名

右ハ一九四六年六月廿六日日本東京陸軍省ニ於テ前記  
森島守人ハ下記將校面前ニ於テ宣誓ノ上署名ス

聯合軍最高司令部

國際檢閲局

アーサー、ジー、サンダスキー法務大尉