

(37)

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Bound File of Messages on Japanese-American Negotiations, October 1941.

Date: 1-30 October '41 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL
Japanese Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:
HONDA, Kumatare; AMAU, Eiji; TOYODA, Teijiro;
NUMURA, Kichisaburo; TOGO, Shigenori

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:
Japanese-American Negotiations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS
Most of these telegrams have been covered previously in IPS Documents 15,1532, and 2593, but a few may be of further interest. Complete scanner's notes are attached to the document and may be consulted. Included are many telegrams from HONDA, Kumatare then Ambassador at NANKING. In one he gives his opinion to TOYODA, Foreign Minister that already 16 Oct. '41 a state of war existed between Japan and America, and that there was little hope of success in the Japanese-American negotiations then in progress.

An especially interesting note dated 13 Oct. '41 from AMAN, Eiji, then Vice-Foreign Minister, (pp 468-475) states that:

"...It is most dangerous for our Empire to launch out into the exercise of military force, to the exhaustion of her national strength, and to stake the fate of the State upon the outcome of the European War. Our Empire must be patient, thereby to build up her dominant strength first in EAST ASIA. It is advisable at present to secure the recognition of MANCHUKUO by CHINA through JAPANESE-AMERICAN negotiations in order to strengthen the position of MANCHUKUO, then to consolidate the position of our Empire in CHINA through the settlement of the CHINA incident, and further to exercise our remaining power to extend our influence to F.I.C., thereby to lay the foundation for our Southward advance in the future."

Other telegrams include the following:

From TOYODA to NOMURA
Telegram No. 637

4 Oct. 1941

Premier KONO's endorsement of the four principles is in principle and is not an unconditional support of the principles.

From TOYODA to NOMURA dated 6 October

Our impressions of the Memorandum of the 2nd of this month are as follows:

1. The U.S. has written the memorandum purposely as if Japan were fully subscribing to the four principles but it is not true.

2. Japan will consider the withdrawal of her army from China and French-Indo-China on the following conditions:
Postpone the withdrawal from certain territories with China's consent.

Withdrawal from French-Indo-China shall not be earlier than the termination of the China Incident.

From NOMURA to TOYODA
Telegram No. 917

10 October 1941

The U.S. view points concerning the Japanese military advance toward north or south indiscriminate treatment in the Pacific withdrawal of the army in China, and the problem of the Tripartite Pact, are that they shall not be determined by any other principles except the Four Principles. On the part of the U.S. the draft of 21 June will not be changed in its fundamental principle.

From NOMURA to TOYODA
Telegram No. 941

14 October 1941

The details of the conversation between WAKASUGI and WELLS are as follows.....

WAKASUGI asked the possibility of solving the Southern problems and the indiscriminative trade by setting aside the China problems. Wells gave a definite answer that it was impossible.

From TOYODA to NOMURA
Telegram No. 667

15 October 1941

Judging from your report the WAKASUGI-WELLS conference will continue and I fear that it might give America the chance to insist on putting the four principles in the main articles of the proposed understandings. The plan we presented on 26 September is the revised plan of the 6 September into the form of the American plan presented on 21 September. (pp 515-517)

Analyst: WH Wagner

Dec. No. 3075
Page 3

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

3075

Date

7 July 47.

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NOMURA, Kichisaburo; TOGO, Shigenori.

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SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Most of these telegrams have been covered previously in Documents 15, 1532, and 1593.

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but a few may be of further interest. Complete documents are attached to the document and may be consulted. Included ~~the~~ telegrams from HONDA, Kumataro, then Ambassador at NANKING.

In one ~~Kumataro~~ ^{to TOYODA, Foreign Minister} (16 Oct 41) he gives his opinion that already a state of war existed between Japan and America, and that there was little hope of

Analyst: *W. Wagner*

Doc. No.

(m)

Success in the Japanese-American
negotiations then in progress.

especially
an interesting ~~telegram~~ note dated 13 Oct 1941,
Eiji, then vice foreign minister, pp. 468-475
states that:

(Typist, please see insert "A")

Other telegrams ~~of~~ include the following:

(Typist please see above-bracketed
material in scanner's notes)

mostly been made public, — so the present scanner thinks. Therefore the present scanner submits the following two summaries for what they are worth.

~~PP 10/15~~
~~Opinion of His Foreign Minister AHO, 13 Oct. 1941.~~

Summ "A" — It is most dangerous for our Empire to launch out into the exercise of military force, to the exhaustion of her national strength, and to stake the fate of the State upon the outcome of the European War. Our Empire must be patient, thereby to build up her dominant strength ^{first} in ~~the~~ EAST ASIA. It is advisable at present to secure the recognition of MANCHUKOU by CHINA through JAPANESE-AMERICAN negotiations, ^{in order} to strengthen the position of MANCHUKOU, then to consolidate the position of our Empire in CHINA through the settlement of CHINA Incident, and further to exercise our remaining power to extend our influence to FIC, thereby to lay the foundation for our ^{southward} advance in the future.

Doc 6902 P15

- (二) 内閣ハ議會ガ左記何レノ條項ヲモ減額或拒否スルコトヲ防止シ得ルコト
 - (イ) 憲法ニ基キ天皇ニ屬スル權限上ノ支出
 - (ロ) 條約義務履行ノ如キ法律實施上惹起スベキ支出
 - (ハ) 政府ノ法律上ノ義務履行ニ屬スル支出
- (三) 内閣ハ下記ノ例ニ於テ議會ノ禁止的抑制ヲ受ケザル廣範ナル財政上ノ權限ヲ保有ス
 - (イ) 逆境時ノ支出ニ備ヘ預メ友好的議會ニ於テ取極メタル繼續的支出基金ノ使用
 - (ロ) 議會ガ被命令的ニ作成セル預備基金
 - (ハ) 預算超過金ノ支出ニ對シ、其ノ支出決済後ニ於テハ殆ド無用ニ等シキ次期議會ノ承諾ヲ受クルコトヲ條件トスル權限
 - (ニ) 議會開催中ニアラザル場合或ハ議會召集不可能ナル場合ニ於ケル財政上ノ處置ニ對シ事項終了後ノ不價值ニ等シキ次期議會ノ單ナル承認ヲ得ルコトヲ條

3075

COLLECTION OF CODE TELEGRAMS
EXCHANGED BETWEEN JAPANESE
FOREIGN OFFICE AND HER ENVOYS

FROM 1 OCT. TO 22 OCT. 1941

Transmission number 37999 1 OCT. 1941
FROM TOYODA, Foreign Minister to Ambassador NOMURA
Telegraphic code No. 617.

~~Nothing~~

page 272

Transmission number 38004 - 38008 1 OCT. 1941

FROM TOYODA to NOMURA

Telegraphic code No. 618

page 273

according to the view of the authorities of the USA.
Kono Cabinet is not trustworthy in her political
power, which arises from their lack of true
knowledge on the side of the States

Transmission number 38009

2
1 OCT. 1941

FROM TOYODA to NOMURA

Telegraphic code No. 619

Nothing

293

FROM TOYODA TO NOMURA additional telegram 1 OCT.

It is all right to continue the negotiation with the draft of 27 Sept as its basic materials.

The omission of the line "Japan shall not advance towards North without due reason" will give suspicion to the U.S. The President Roosevelt's mediation of the Sino Japanese conflict is what we had been asking for.

294 - 297

Telegraphic number 889

3 OCT. 1941

FROM NOMURA TO TOYODA

Without having understandings beforehand the interview between leaders of two nations would be dangerous

p. 298

FROM PAGE 318 TO 325. The translation of the preceding pages.

3

Telegraphic Number 884 2 OCT. 1941
From NOMURA to TOYODA
Nothing.

326

Telegraphic Number 894 4 OCT. 1941
From NOMURA to TOYODA

The U.S. is optimistic towards the European War believing the resisting power of the Soviet although the fear for the separate peace between Germany and the Soviet is can not be concealed.

The Kowee message has weaken the hostilities of the U.S. towards Japan but the economic embargo has not been mitigated. It is advantageous to Japan that the U.S. goes deep into the Atlantic War.

327-336

Telegraphic number 898 4 OCT. 1941
From NOMURA to TOYODA
nothing.

337-338

The translation of the subsequent pages

FROM page 339 — 343

Transmission Number 38132 2 OCT. 1941

From TOYODA to NOMURA

Telegraphic code No. 625

News spreads that the KONOE cabinet is facing a danger of destruction but this is nothing but a rumour. It seems to me that Hull is interesting in the general opinion of Japan. In fact it is very calm.

349 — 352

From TOYODA to NOMURA

2 OCT. 1941

Concerning the situation of Chung King

The financial situation of the Chung King Government is getting worse and the desires for the peace have been noticed although pretending to be firm in fighting

353 — 362

Transmission number 38167

From TOYODA to NOMURA

3 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 626

A correspondent of the YOMIURI paper telegraphed to the head office that the America Japan negotiations would come to an end, and it is necessary to take greater care of holding the secret.

363-364

Transmission number 38168

From TOYODA to NOMURA

3 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 627

Ambassador Craigie going over to the U.S. A confidential report that Craigie is feeling the necessity of ^{to give} the ^{successful} conclusion of the American Japan negotiation.

365-366

Transmission number 38169

From TOYODA to NOMURA

3 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 628

KONOE's changing policy from pro axis to the moderate one is dangerous unless the negotiation is carried out smoothly.

367-370

~~Transmission number 38385~~

From TOYODA to NOMURA

4 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic ~~code~~ No. 637

Premier KONO's endorsement of the four principles is in principle and is not an unconditional support of the principles.

FROM NOMURA to TOYODA

5 OCT. 1941.

A decisive reform of the economic life is necessary for Japan to lead a self-sufficing life within the Co-prosperity Sphere. I imagine it is the hardest task. As to the decision of the diplomacy, don't jump into a conclusion in a haste.

381 — 385

Transmission number 38499

From TOYODA to NOMURA

7 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 641

Please pursue the real intention of the U.S. and report it immediately.

Concerning the Telegram No 637

391 — 392

Transmission Number 38626-7-8

From TOYODA to NOMURA.

7 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code NO. 643

Met Ambassador Grew asking his opinion concerning the Memorandum dated 2 OCT. but he gave no concrete answers. I told him that that KONOE did not fully subscribe to the four principles in the conversation with Grew held in 6 last month as is appearing on the said memorandum. KONOE meant to subscribe in principle not fully.

393 - 401

FROM TOYODA to NOMURA dated 6 OCT.

I Enlighten the U.S. and tell her that the Japan's attitude towards the reconciliation is starting from the wide view of things.

II Our impressions of the memorandum of the 2nd of this month are as follow

1. The U.S. has written in the memorandum purposely as if Japan were fully ^{subscribing to} ~~describing~~ the four principle but it is not true.

2. Japan will consider the withdrawal of her army from China and French Indo China on the following conditions

Postpone the withdrawal from certain territories with China's consent

Withdrawal from French Indo China shall not be earlier than the termination of the China Incident

403

3.

4. Japan's advocacy concerning the close relations of the geographical adjacency is not restricting the fundamental principles and this principle which is actually adapted all over the world should be adapted to the relations between Japan & China, which is the vital necessity for the economic survival of Japan.

404

5. The restriction we made concerning the indiscriminate treatment of trade ⁱⁿ the Southern territories only is not decisive, it can be adapted to the whole area of the Pacific.

3975

8B

6 The reason why we made reference to the adjacent territories of the French Indo China, Thailand and the Soviet is that there were inquiries from the U.S. concerning these territories

III Japan has neglected the technique of diplomacy and is endeavouring to solve the problems from the wide view of the things.

405

Transmission Number 38904

From TOYODA to NOMURA

8 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 647

Concerning the NO. 637 waiting for the answer

406-407

From NOMURA to TOYODA

Telegraphic code No. 907

The Government of the U.S. feels the necessity of the principles being interpreted and realizing the real intentions of Japan concerning the detailed problems of the Pacific before arranging the meeting between the heads of the two nations

408-413

From NOMURA to TOYODA

10 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 915

Gave the detailed explanation to Hull concerning the politics, finance, and the military of China recognized from the Japanese side and urged him to reconsider the problem of withdrawing the military forces from China

415 — 417

From NOMURA to TOYODA

10 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 917

The U.S. view points concerning the Japan's military advancement toward north or south, ~~to~~ indiscriminate treatment ^{of} the Pacific withdrawal of the army in China, and the problems of Tripartite pact, are that they shall not be determined by any other principles except the Four principles. On the part of the U.S. the draft of 21 June will not be changed in its fundamental principle.)

418 — 423

11

From NOMURA to TOYODA 11 OCT. 1941
Telegraphic code NO 923

Our proposition of 6 Sept. was recognized by American side as a further narrowing down. No retreat from the answer of 2 Oct. could be attained and without ~~the~~ ^{or} compromise from our side, the meeting of the heads of the respective nation is absolutely impossible.

② [no connection with NOMURA and TOYODA T.N.] 424-426

From the Commander of 21st Air Attack Force to the Chief of the Bureau of Army Affairs.

At 12:30 10 OCT. a 96 style army attacking plane belonging to the KAYA Air Attack Force, put in practice a fish-torpedo discharge ^{manoeuvre} to a merchant ship which was sailing eastwards outside of the KAGOSHIMA Bay. The ship avoided slightly inwards and was found to be an American merchant ship when she approached.

Please keep it strictly secret to the U.S. that the action was a manoeuvre of discharge.

427

From NOMURA to TOYODA

5 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 900

nothing.

428 - 429

From NOMURA to TOYODA

2 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic Code NO. 880 (1)

ŌYAMA Ikuo's mental state and talk on the situation. given to TERASAKI.

1. I was thinking only of the proletarian class and of their welfare before coming over to the U.S. but my mental state has caused a radical change now thinking the Japanese people and the future of Japan.

2. Even after the Great East Asia Coprosperity there is established the economic independence is impossible. ^{with Germany}
He is speaking of various problems, such as the Tripartite Pact, Japanese Constitution etc.

430 - 433

Draft of the reply of the Imperial Government to the memorandum presented by the United States' Government dated 2 Oct.

1. Japanese Government is accepting the four principles as principles but the actual applications corresponding to the real situations of times and places are the source of questions.
2. Misunderstandings about the French Indo China should be removed. Japan has no aggressive intentions to that territory.
3. Withdrawal of the army from China should be after the solution of the China Incident. It must be reconciled by the mutual agreement of the Governments of Japan and China.
4. Japanese Government is agree with the U.S. Government in adopting the indiscriminate treatment of international trade to the whole

Pacific area

5. Further explanations on the attitudes of the respective nation toward the European War shall be given at the meeting between the heads of the respective nation.

6. Japanese Government is asking the U.S. Government to hold a meeting of the heads with its date and the place.

434 — 442

From NOMURA to TOYODA 5 OCT. 1941
Telegraphic code no. 900
Nothing.

From a naval attaché to the Japanese Embassy in the U.S. to the vice minister and the navy Deputy Chief of Staff 2 OCT. 1941
Secret telegraphic No. 625.

The situation is becoming worse for Japan and the U.S. is waiting for the compromise of the Japanese side. It is advisable to continue the negotiation persistently and at the same

time devise a plan to let the U.S. go deep into the European War and realize the mediation of the German Soviet relations and the situation will tend better for Japan.

443-444

From NOMURA to TOYODA 12. OCT. 1941
Telegraphic code No. 924.
Nothing.

445-446

Transmission number 39044
From TOYODA to NOMURA 10. OCT. 1941
Telegraphic code No. 650.
Nothing

447-449

Transmission number 39249
From TOYODA to NOMURA 12 OCT. 1941
Telegraphic code No. 654

Inviting Grew and stated the opinion of our side. Japanese government understood that the main points of the memorandum presented by the U.S. government are as follows.

1. Stationing and withdrawal of the military troops
2. Respective attitude of Japan and the U.S. towards the European War
3. Indiscriminative trade in China

Above points should be discussed at the meeting of the heads of the respective nation instead of exchanging the official documents.

Public opinion can not be ignored in Japan just as in America.

450-453

Transmission number 39290

From TOYODA to NOMURA

13 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code no. 657

nothing

454

Transmission number 39384

From TOYODA to NOMURA

13 OCT 1941

Telegraphic code No. 662

previous arrangement of the passwords

The problem of the stationing of the military troops = MARIKOSAN a girl's name.

reasonable = Does she come and see you?
unreasonable = She doesn't.

General forecast of the negotiation = the health of
the Minister.

four principles = the hanging picture of the Seven
Deities of Good Fortune.

Do you stand out stontly? = Are you pleased?

Do you make some concession? = Arent you pleased?
455 — 456

[AN INSERTED INFORMATION]

Records of the Conference between Dorman and
TERASAKI 9 OCT. 1941

From NOMURA to TOYODA 3 OCT. 1941

Telephic Code No. 887

Tomorrow at 9 o'clock going to visit
Hull because of his request

458

From the branch office of Mitsui in New York to the
main office in Tokyo 9 OCT. 1941

459

17B

According to a confidential report from a reliable source, the America Japan negotiation is not promising and the Japanese banks and companies over here will have no other ways but to close and they shall transact businesses with this in their mind

[The translation of the Japanese part T.N. 7

459

Ambassador Grew's speech at the meeting
held by the American Association

8 OCT. 1941

Japan is in a chaotic condition and the
Government has no political power. Japan
is the military and the military is Japan.
The military breaks all the promises given
by the Government. The real facts since
the Manchurian Incident have been
undisclosed

460 - 462

Transmission Number 39321

From TOYODA to NOMURA

13 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 658

An urgent necessity for the meeting of the heads
of respective nations is felt. Japan should
like to know what the U.S. demands in relating
to the problem of the stationing and withdrawal
of the military troops.

463 - 465

Transmission number 39385

From TOYODA to NOMURA

13 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 663

Nothing

466-467

Opinion of AMOU, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

13 OCT. 1941

1. Complete achievement of the China Incident and the establishment of the Great East Asia Coprosperity sphere are the national policies of Japan but these policies can not be independent from the situation of the world, and so the solutions will never be brought about if the world situation should be ignored.
2. The ABCD line in the South has been strengthened.
3. The war situation in Europe is not favourable to the axis side.
4. Japan is standing at a cross-roads whether to go by fighting or by diplomacy. Japan will have four fronts and ~~the~~ Germany and Italy can give Japan only

the moral supports If a war occurs between America & Japan, the situation will be worse for Japan.

5. From the economic view point, Japan will starve in going into a further war
6. It is very dangerous for Japan to consume her power in advancing by the military power and to stake the existence of the country upon the war situation of Europe. She must
 1. preserve her real power in the Far East and win the acknowledgement of the Manchukuo from China through the America-Japan negotiation

468 - 475

From NOMURA to TOYODA

14 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 939.

In the conference with Wells, WAKASUGI understood that the President Roosevelt was desiring to meet the head of Japan if only the pending three questions would be solved and the State Secretary Hull was of the same opinion.

Concerning the stationing and withdrawal of the military troops, the U.S. has no further insistence. Her opinion is clearly stated on the oral statement of 2 OCT.

WAKASUGI said as his private opinion that the said problem shall be solved by the negotiation between Japan and China and asked

Wells whether the U.S. would be satisfied if Japan promises the withdrawal as principle and the solution of the details are left to Japan and China. Wells said that all what the U.S. wants is the sincerity on the side of Japan

477 — 484

From NOMURA to TOYODA 14 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic Code No. 941

The details of the conversation between WAKASUGI and Wells are as follows...] (typist please see end of this)

1. The present cabinet of Japan is greatly resolved to reconcile the America Japan problems and if she should fail, the situation will be desperate

Wells asked WAKASUGI whether the Japanese Military is supporting this principle

He answered that in the coming meeting of the heads of respective nation the Naval and Army leaders shall attend with the Premier as suites.

2. The fact that little progress has been made so far in the negotiation is not because of the policy of delay.

3. WAKASUGI suggested the meeting of the heads before solving the three pending questions. Wells suggested the solution first prior to the meeting.

4. Wells explained that the counter plan and the intentions of the U.S. have been fully described on the proposition of 21 June and the statement of 2 OCT.

WAKASUGI asked the relations of these plans propositions with the proposition from the Japanese side on 6 Sep.

Wells frankly explained that the proposition of the 21 June was adjusting the intention of the Japanese side but this was reduced by the Japanese advancement to the French Indo China.

5. 6. Wells insisted the solution of the principles first while WAKASUGI insisted the importance of solving each problems first

7. WAKASUGI explained the Japanese advancement to the French Indo China as equal to the American advancement to Iceland in its ideas. Wells answered that the advancement to the 'Iceland' was from the depending idea which is very practical while that of the French Indo China can not be the same.

8. WAKASUGI questioned on the principle of the indiscriminative treatment of trade.

9. WAKASUGI asked the possibility of concluding the provisional pact in case the solution of the important problems could not be brought about. Wells answered that the first step would be the beginning of the second step and so if only the compromise could be brought on the pending three questions there will be a room for the mutual concession.

24

10 WAKASUGI asked the possibility of solving the Southern problems and the indiscriminative trade by setting aside the China problems. Wells gave a definite answer that it was impossible.

485-509

From NOMURA to TOYODA

15 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic code No. 943

Meeting Rear Admiral Turner, who stated as follows

If the meeting of the heads is held without having any preliminary conference and such incident should happen as the advancement to Siberia, the President would get into a scrape. The withdrawal of the troops could not be done all at the same time and so with the principle of withdrawal, Japan should schedule of it in detail with China.

Hoover is informed of the separate peace between the Soviet and Germany

State Secretary Hull in his talk to Thomas, a Senator, made the following points clear.

The U.S. continues the negotiation patiently but Japan should not make any mistake in taking it for the weakpoint of the U.S. According to Kiplinger the separate peace between the Soviet and Germany is not a mere rumore and the war between Japan and America would be fifty to fifty.

510 — 514

Transmission number 39614

From TOYODA to NOMURA 15 OCT. 1941

Telegraphic ~~code~~ No. 667

Judging from your report

the WAKASUGI, WELLS conference will continue and I fear ~~that~~ it might give America the chance to insist to ~~put~~ ^{on putting} the four principles in the main articles of the proposed understandings.

The plan we presented on 26 Sept. is the revised plan of the 6 Sept. into the form of the American plan presented on 21 Sept.

(515 — 517)