

category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application. ... In addition, antiaircraft defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; ... Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided. ... (Page 39)

And the purpose of coastal frontier defense was stated to be "Protecting our Military and Civil Installations and Facilities; ... Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial and commercial operations."

It was also provided that there be furnished "a communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy." This was a responsibility of the Army.

Pursuant to the foregoing plan, an agreement was entered into entitled "Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan." (Prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District.) This agreement was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and provided the fundamental plan for the defense of Hawaii.

The third agreement was that entitled "Joint Air Agreement", signed March 28, 1941. This document was prepared by Major General Martin, U. S. Army Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Force Commander, and signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short. It provided for the combined air action as follows:



"Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army Bombardment strength to participate in each mission, etc."

"Defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practical. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control." (Roberts Record 555)

This Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941, signed by Bloch and Short, was implemented by certain additional documents signed by Bellinger and Martin as operating plans. The date of these operating plans was April 9, 1941. (Roberts Record 556a-0 Vol. 5)

Under this agreement Admiral Bloch, not an air officer, was acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief in signing the document, and there operated under him Admiral Bellinger, who had the command of the planes, so far as the Navy could implement the Agreement, as Commander of the Air Base Force. Bellinger, however, was under the command of Admiral Kimmel, and Bloch, who was charged with the responsibility for the operation orders and plans of operation for the base defense air force, had no air force with which to implement the Agreement. Bellinger had the job to do and such means as existed to do it with was Fleet aviation. Bloch had supervisory control over Bellinger, but the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, had to approve the Agreement. (R. 1522)



Bloch was called upon to designate the condition of readiness of the aircraft, but did not have control of the aircraft, the readiness of which he was to determine. The confusion inherent from the Navy's organization is best expressed in the following question:

"General Grunert: Who would the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger?"

"Admiral Bloch. I do not know." (R. 1522)

This agreement was the result of a report of a Joint Army and Navy board dated October 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Islands. This report was signed by Major General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. (R. 1581)

Under such circumstances the Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.

Plans which must wait to be put into practice and only become operative when war strikes under all the unexpected and changing conditions of an attack inevitably prove unsound in practice. The basic difficulty of the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements was inherent in all such agreements, as they constituted a vain paper attempt to predict war procedure without having properly tested out the proposed arrangements in training and by joint staff action to see if they were practical measures.

The proof of the soundness of the plans is whether they work, and the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements were never tested out far enough to find out if their plans were sound in practice. There was inadequate practice of them to enable



the respective organizations to acquire that automatic facility in their execution so that the plans would be carried out effectively despite all the stresses, strains and unexpected developments to personnel and equipment that were incidents of a conflict. We desire to emphasize this synthetic structure of agreements and plans based upon them. The following analysis of these agreements shows that:

There were two joint agreements. The first was known as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. It was based on the war plan and the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" of 1935. The second agreement was the Joint Air Force Agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and based upon it as Appendix #7 was an operating plan worked out by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger.

As Admiral Bloch said:

"Ordinarily it would not be operative." (R. 1478)

He also testified:

"The plan was never operative as a plan because the War and Navy Departments never ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole. The local commanders never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part." (R. 1474)

And again he testified:

"General Russell. So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, according to your construction of the agreement, reconnaissance missions were not effective until December 7, 1941?

"Admiral Bloch. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility in that agreement for distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my responsibility by demanding patrol planes for that purpose, but I never had any; I never had one." (R. 1487)

The agreements entered into between the Navy and the Army



had two basic defects. First, they did not become operative until an emergency arose. The agreement said (paragraph 15 (c), 2):

"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders." (R. 1584)

The local commanders as testified to by Admiral Bellinger were understood to be General Short and Admiral Bloch. These commanders apparently took no action to "mutually agree" to implement parts of the plan and, evidently were going to let the agreements go until an emergency arose, when they became operative automatically. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

"That could have been done at any time by the commandant of the 11th Naval District, who was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, if it was approved by and agreed upon by General Short." (R. 1591)

But it was not done. The selection of M-Day to initiate the putting of the joint plan and agreements thereunder into effect according to the terms of the agreement just quoted was a function of the War and Navy Departments. They took no action to put it into effect although a copy of this agreement was forwarded to the War Department and presumably to the Navy Department. (R. 1474)

The consequence was that not until the morning of December 7th did the agreement become operative, when it was too late to have gotten the benefit of the cooperative action that it implied, and the training which would result from this close teamwork by the Army and Navy. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

"The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority to place that organization in the functioning status, except in case of an actual emergency." (R. 1582)



This brings us to the second defect: unity of command. If that had been put into effect as provided in paragraph 9(b) of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this air agreement would have become effective by reason of such unity of command. As Admiral Bellinger again testified:

"I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have a unity of command to make such an operation a success.

"General Frank. You mean a unity of command before something happened?

"Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

"General Frank. Rather than when it happened?

"Admiral Bellinger. Yes." (R. 1589)

Under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the unity of command/could be put into effect either by the President of the United States or by joint agreements of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy or when the commanders of Army and Navy forces agreed that the situation required unity of command who was to exercise it. No one of these agencies took steps to effectuate what all of the witnesses have concurred in stating was the principal cause of difficulties on December 7, 1941, and the events leading up to and causing those difficulties, that is, unity of command. (R. 1587-1588)

It is interesting to observe the reason why this air agreement was not put into effect, in addition to lack of equipment to make it effective. As Admiral Bellinger testified:

"The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status



would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense." (R. 1532)

Likewise General Short testified:

"General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or ferrying group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews.

"That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3." (R. 286)

"As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours (4:00 to 7:00 A.M.). In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4." (R. 298)

"By making it 4 hours (time for aircraft to get into the air) it gave the possibility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried about getting that alert. They could go right ahead with their normal functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would take them an hour to get back in." (R. 460)

"Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training of the infantry divisions." (R. 528)

The reason for not so doing is shown by Kimmel's words:

"We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize." (R. 1811)

Admiral Kimmel observed that while the responsibility was on the Commandant, 14th Naval District and himself, on behalf of the Navy, for putting this plan into effect, yet it would have been necessary to refer to Washington for a decision. When asked why this would be so, he said:



"It would have alarmed the population. It might have been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it would have required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and certain action which should not have been taken without reference to the Department." (R. 1756)

Therefore it is apparent that the local commanders waited for Washington and Washington took no action under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, relying upon Hawaii to do so; and that in turn meant that the Martin-Bellinger Air Plan of Cooperation, which depended upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, did not go into operation.

The second reason why the air plan was ineffective was that Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, "had no planes assigned to him at this time" (R. 1751), so that he could do nothing to carry it out. As to the Army, Admiral Kimmel pointed out:

"There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any." (R. 1753)

When asked why the Navy accepted the responsibility for distant reconnaissance without any effective means of carrying it out, Admiral Kimmel testified "he accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." (R. 1753)

Admiral Bellinger confirms Admiral Kimmel's statement on long-distance reconnaissance means not being available. (R. 1595, 1606) Therefore, paragraph 18 in the air agreement providing the Navy will furnish distant reconnaissance was without effect. (R. 1605-1606) Bloch had no planes and such planes as Bellinger had were under command of Kimmel and were



being used for other purposes in connection with reconnaissance with the fleet for protecting maneuver areas against submarines.

For the dual reason that the instrumentalities were not available and to the extent that any planes were available the use of them would have interfered with training, and for the further reason that the agreements were not to go into effect until an emergency, the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Martin-Bellinger Air Agreement signed by Short and Bloch were ineffectual. The Army and Navy agreed that when and if the time came that they had to put the plan into effect, the documents could only show what the working scheme would be. The inherent weakness in making such plans was the fact of their not being operative in time to meet the attack. Neither the local commanders nor Washington took steps to make them operative as they could have done. (R. 1606-1607, 1609) However, unity of command in Washington would have been a condition precedent to unity of command in Hawaii.

9. Estimate of the Situation: The best indication of what the Army and Navy recognized as the primary danger to the defense of Hawaii is found in the estimate of the situation in the implementing, operating plans signed by Bellinger and Martin on April 9, 1941, in execution of the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941. This estimate was prophetic in its accuracy and called for vigorous implementation to meet the worst the enemy could do, as estimated in this document. The document says:

"b. In the past Orange (Japan) has never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war.

"c. A successful, sudden raid against our



ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective defensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

"d. It appears possibly that Orange (Japan) submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service. ...

II(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines, and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. ... III(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. ...

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start. ..." (Roberts Record 556-D-F)

It is also significant that in this estimate of the situation it was stated:

"Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier." (Roberts Record 556-F)

It will be recalled that a submarine appeared off the entrance to Pearl Harbor and was sunk at about 6:45 a. m. on December 7th, but was not reported by the Navy to the Army. Such a report would have been a sure warning of an hour before the attack of what was coming as recognized by paragraph 3(d) of the Estimate of the Situation, forming a part of the Martin-Bellinger Plan.

In reviewing the situation as Short knew it in order to judge of the information that he had upon which to premise a successful course of action, it is necessary both to take into consideration the background in the first chapter and of the official communications and official actions of those estimates



of the situation at the time.

It will be recalled that Ambassador Grew had warned the State Department on January 27th by wire of the possibility of an air attack upon Pearl Harbor. This possibility had already been apparently thoroughly considered by the War and Navy Departments, and it had been concluded that that was the strongest danger to Hawaii. In early January, Admiral Richardson, with the concurrence of Admiral Kimmel and General Herron, had written at length to the Navy Department on this subject, with particular reference to the weaknesses of the Army defenses against air attack. This letter and the resulting correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War must be read in the light of the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan of 1935, which places upon the Army the following mission:

"b. Army - Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against hostile sympathizers."

General Marshall testified, however, as follows:

"We anticipated, beyond a doubt, Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack." (R. 9)

As a result, Secretary of Navy Knox wrote to Secretary of War Stimson on January 24, 1941, in part as follows:

"My dear Mr. Secretary:

"The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports



from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo-plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.

"In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

"The dangers envisioned in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack
- (2) Air torpedo-plane attack
- (3) Sabotage
- (4) Submarine attack
- (5) Mining
- (6) Bombardment by gunfire

"Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfactorily."

It will be noted that an anxiety of Secretary Knox was as to air attack and that he was satisfied that precautions as to sabotage were sufficient by the Army. It will be recalled that Admiral Richardson's letter stimulating this letter of Secretary Knox was based on Richardson's personal inspection and knowledge of the Army situation:

Secretary Knox concludes his letter with the following recommendations to the Army:

"Assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii...that the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor."

"(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty exists."

So this letter clearly outlined the considered judgment



then existing that the most serious threat was an air attack and that all means should be taken to implement against it.

On February 7, 1941, the Secretary of War replied to this letter of the Secretary of the Navy under the subject "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," and said:

"In reply to your letter of January 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the fleet or naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and of the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort..."

"(6) With respect to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and of this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective."

On the same day another communication was addressed to General Short, and this time by General Marshall:

"Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Navy materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns."

"The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid and by submarine, constitute the real peril of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands, as long as we have air superiority."

And not satisfied with this first letter, General Marshall on March 5, 1941, again addressed General Short, saying:

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority."

And to that General Short replied on March 15, 1941, at length with reference to the vulnerability of Hawaii to air attack and the measures being taken to meet this situation.



He points out that antisabotage measures and suppression of local disorders could be handled by battalions of National Guard, which come from the islands. The rest of the letter dealt with defenses against air attacks. His estimate of the situation was:

"The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack."

Short realized the necessity for the dispersion of planes, the use of emergency fields on the outlying islands and the preparation of bunkers to protect the dispersed planes, as he discusses such a problem at length and its solution. (R. 21-25)

On April 14, 1941, Short wrote the Chief of Staff sending him the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure; Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement, and Field Orders No. 1-NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement. (R. 26-27)

He also stated that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and himself felt all steps had been taken "which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together with the unity of command as the situation requires." (R. 27)<sup>(1)</sup>

This statement was in error at the time it was made, as the agreements could not be implemented for lack of means to do so in any material way and there was no unity of command, none

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Footnote:

(1) Excerpts from letter dated April 14, 1941 (R. 27).



proposed and none was ever put into effect under these agreements. Open hostilities were necessary to make the agreement operative.

This communication was acknowledged by General Marshall on May 5th.

This brings us to the estimate of the air situation thus transmitted to the Chief of Staff on April 14th as indicating the best judgment in estimating the situation by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch.

It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situation to select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks. (R.1121, 2662) In the present instance, it was clearly recognized, not only in the foregoing correspondence, but in this formal joint estimate by the Army and Navy of the situation, that the most serious attack to be met by the Army and Navy was an air attack by Japan. Herewith is the following statement from that estimate signed by the Army and Navy through General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by Kimmel, Short and Bloch. This estimate is prophetic in its accuracy and uncanny in its analysis of the enemy's intention.

"2. Assumptions:

\* \* \*

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on Oahu.



e. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu.

\* \* \*

c. \* \* \* The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.

"2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should base our plans of operation, is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

(1) Cross circle 331 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before attack.

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.

\* \* \*

"4. \* \* \* The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground, and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base.  
\* \* \*

"It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action."



C. CRITICAL PERIOD: OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. Vital Messages: In view of the foregoing, the estimate of the situation showed that an all-out attack by air was the judgment of the best military and naval minds in Hawaii. Under established military doctrine, that called for preparation for this worst eventuality. (R. 436-437) Short so admitted that this was the correct procedure. (R. 436-437)

The contrast between the written statements of many of the responsible actors in this matter prior to Pearl Harbor and after Pearl Harbor, as to their estimate of an air attack by Japan on Oahu, is startling.

The Secretary of the Navy wrote on January 24, 1941, to the Secretary of War:

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

"(1) air bombing attack.

"(2) air torpedo attack.

"(3) sabotage." (Roberts Record, 1824-1825)

However, when Secretary of the Navy arrived in Hawaii a few days after December 7, following the Japanese attack, Admiral Pye testified his (Secretary Knox) first remark was: "No one in Washington expected an attack--even Kelly Turner." Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division of the Navy and was the most aggressive-minded of all. (R. 1070)

General Marshall, in a letter to General Short on February 7, 1941, said:

"The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and submarine constitute the real perils of the situation." (R. 17)



On October 7, 1944, General Marshall testified before this Board:

"We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack upon Hawaii." (R. 9)

It will be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin were responsible for the Joint Estimate, particularly with reference to air, and that this was based upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. In that estimate they put attack by air as the primary threat against Hawaii.

Contrast what Admiral Bellinger said on this record:

"If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been in a functioning status." (R. 1626)

Contrast what General Martin said:

"I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is from a surprise attack with the information we had." (R. 1827)

Admiral Kimmel said:

"We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor." (R. 1771)

The foregoing statement by Kimmel was in 1944 before this Board, whereas the joint agreements he entered into with the Army and the instructions from the Secretary of the Navy as well as his own recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy show that an air attack was the principal concern.

Likewise, Admiral Bloch, who signed the Joint Air Agreement based on the air estimate of Bellinger and Martin, testified as follows:

"General Frank. Was the attack a complete surprise to you?"

"Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir." (R. 1518)

General Short was the signer of the agreements specifying



the air attack as a primary threat and he had received the Marshall letter of February 7, 1941, and similar letters of General Marshall, and had replied setting forth in letters that the air attack was his primary concern.

Witness what General Short says on this record to the contrary:

"General Grunert. Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?"

"General Short. It was." (R. 536)

We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor. As a general statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it.

Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified:

"Well, I was not surprised." (R. 4072)

Short's Standard Operating Procedure, which he had formulated with his staff in July and finally put into complete form on November 5, 1941, (R. 335) had been sent to the Chief of Staff. (R. 431) General Marshall wrote General Short on October 10th that it had just come to his attention and that upon an examination of the Standard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, containing those three alerts, "I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units." (R. 29)

He objected to the assignment to the Hawaiian Air Force of the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all



airfields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks, and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. He thereby clearly warned General Short that the air force should not be used for antisabotage, for General Marshall further said in his letter:

"This (the action of using the air force for antisabotage duty) seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided." (R. 29)

General Short replied on October 14, as follows:

"The plan was to use them (Air Force personnel) for guarding certain essential utilities. ... However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon."

General Marshall again wrote General Short on the 28th of October, and in it he clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert plan (of which there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the Air Force for guard during the last stage when the Air Force as such had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. General Marshall further indicated that no potential ground duty should be used as an excuse for not continuing the specific Air Force training, saying:

"I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

"It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned." (R. 30)



Here, again, General Marshall cautioned Short to use his Air Force for its normal purposes and not upon anti-sabotage guard duty and emphasizes that the use of the Air Force must be free and unfettered.

On October 16 Short received the following Navy message:

"The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the C.N.O. which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote: 'Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye Cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include reapproachment with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.'" (R. 279)

On October 18, 1941, a radiogram was sent by the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reading as follows:

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remain strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." (R. 4253)

This message was dated October 18, 1941, according to the Gerow statement, Exhibit 63, but in the copy of communications produced by General Marshall, the same message was dated October 20, 1941, as 4266.

On October 23, General Marshall wrote General Short as to details of the training of the air corps personnel.

On November 24 the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message that Short thinks he saw, reading as follows:



"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military force is, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action. ... inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action." (R. 4258)

On November 26, 1941, the following secret cablegram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24s on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines X X X before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24s are fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (R. 4259)

On November 27 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message which was delivered by the liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, to G-3 of General Short, which reads as follows:

"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spence." (R. 1775)

And on the same day the Chief of Staff sent the following radio to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:



No. 472. "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (R. 280-281, 4259-4260)(1)

This completes the pattern of the communications and information that was in Short's possession when he made the fatal decision to elect the antisabotage Alert No. 1 and not select either Alert No. 2 or No. 3 which would have constituted the defense against the most serious attack that could be made upon him in view of the previous estimate of the situation and warnings he had received from all quarters of an air raid.(2)

On the same day, November 27, 1941, but after his decision to select Alert No. 1 and the sending of a reply to the message, Short received from G-2, War Department, through his G-2, Hawaiian Department, the following message:

"Advise only the C.G. and the C. of S. It appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possibilities that hostilities may begin." (R. 4260)

Footnotes:

- (1) A full discussion of the message follows.
- (2) Significant naval messages from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, under dates of December 3, 4, and 6, 1941, relating to the destruction of codes and secret documents by Japanese consulates and instructions regarding destruction of similar means of our own evidently never reached General Short. (R. 424-425)



Short was asked what were his reasons for his action.

The following colloquy is important:

"General Frank. I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?

"General Short. Yes.

"General Frank. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our War College teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?

"General Short. The worst.

"General Frank. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in this instance?

"General Short. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had." (R. 436-437)

\* \* \*

"General Frank. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in general may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of Naval opinion and to a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages between the 16th of November and the 27th?

"General Short. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions of the War Department in not replying to my message and stating they wanted more, and in sending planes without any ammunition.



"General Frank. All right. Did you feel that the wording of messages coming in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control?

"General Short. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things: That they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures.

"General Frank. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the answer--

"General Short. You mean the estimate of the year--you mean the year before?

"General Frank. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate.

"General Short. Oh.

"General Frank. Of 1941.

"General Short. Yes.

"General Frank. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the question asked two or three questions back.

"General Short. Yes." (R. 471-472)

General Short within an hour after receiving the message from the Chief of Staff of November 27 ordered the No. 1 Alert, which continued up to the attack on December 7. (R. 232)  
His message in reply to General Marshall was:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. Reward four seventy two Nov. 27th." (R. 33, 236)

The indorsements so appearing on this reply are as follows: In the handwriting of the Secretary of War there appear the words "Noted HLS", written in pen; "Noted - Chief of Staff", stamped by a rubber stamp on the message without initials; and a rubber stamp "Noted, WPD" (in red ink) followed by pen initials "L.T.G." (R. 33, 4237)



An examination of the wire received from General MacArthur, in response to a similar message sent to General Short, (1) shows the same indorsements, including "Noted - Chief of Staff", with a rubber stamp but no initials. However, this message has written in General Marshall's handwriting the words "To Secretary of War, OCM". This indorsement does not appear on the following message that came from Short. (See General Marshall's explanation below.)

The message from Short to the Chief of Staff indicates that it was the "Action Copy" as noted in pencil at its foot "OCS/18136-120".

When questioned about this vital message, the Chief of Staff said:

"General Russell: Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by number. That message of General Short reporting action merely states:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh."

"The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp "Noted - Chief of Staff," and was initialed by General Gerow.

"The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages?"

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Footnote:

(1) On November 27th the War Department sent messages similar to one sent to General Short, to MacArthur in the Philippines, Andrews in Panama, and Hewitt on the West Coast, each of which called for a report of measures taken. All replies except that from Short indicated the taking of measures of greater security than those envisaged in the Hawaiian Alert No. 1.



"General Marshall. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, "Noted - Chief of Staff."

"General Russell. That is true.

"General Marshall. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will find my initials.

"General Russell. Yes; I do see them.

"General Marshall. But not on the other one. I do not know about that. I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all; that is my practice. One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution; I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified, I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection at all.

"General Russell. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's office and was by him initialed-- would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else?

"General Marshall. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not initial it. They evidently came in together.

"General Russell. If they were together you might or might not have seen them?

"General Marshall. I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it." (R. 38-40)

No one of these persons, or any of their subordinates, have any record, either internally in the War Department or externally, of any message to Short showing the slightest exception taken to his course of action. It will be noted as to the Chief of Staff, that while he did not initial the Short reply, he did initial the top message from General



MacArthur on the same subject, and apparently they both went together to the Secretary of War, as they had come at substantially the same time in answer to the same message from the Chief of Staff. The inference from General Marshall's testimony is that possibly he only initialed the top one, but that is speculation, as he said, "I do not know what the explanation is." (R. 39)

2. Analysis of the Situation from November 24 to November 27.

The vital message of November 27, #472, heretofore quoted as having been sent by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, can be understood and its proper place in this narrative determined only when we know the events which led up to its being sent; when we know by whom drafted and by what procedure the drafting was accomplished; and the circumstances under which it was forwarded. Its relationship to surrounding circumstances and other documents must also be understood before we proceed to analyze the message and the meaning of each part of it. (1)

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Footnote:

(1) The Secretary of War has cleared some ambiguity in this record, and an ambiguity in the White Papers by defining with precision the War Council. There were really three bodies that were loosely referred to from time to time by this title. The true War Council was that established under the National Defense Act of 1920, solely within the War Department. The second body was that created by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, when they entered into their positions, by which they gathered together at regular intervals with the Secretary of State, and sometimes with General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The third group was that which joined the President at fairly regular intervals, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and from time to time General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and occasionally, General Arnold. (R. 4041-4042-4043-4044, 4047-4048, 5-6)



The War Council met on the 25th of November 1941.

Fortunately, we have the advantage of the contemporaneous diary of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who has pictured in his diary with great clarity and precision the events as they transpired, which were material to this issue. This diary reads:

"At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic. ... We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. Then at twelve o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as--perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem." (R. 4050-4051)

This was the end of the discussions on the 25th of November, 1941 (R. 4050-4051), with the exception that when the Secretary of War returned to his office, he found a G-2 message that a Japanese expedition had started southward, south of Formosa; and he at once called Mr. Hull and sent him copies of the report and a copy to the President.

On the following day, November 26, 1941, the diary continues:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had no other proposition at all." (R. 4051-4052)

There is some proof that, before General Marshall left Washington for North Carolina on maneuvers on the afternoon of



the 26th, he had drafted in the rough a proposed message to General Short apprising him of the situation as it was developed. General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, testifies that he believes he discussed such a draft with General Marshall. (R. 4244-4246)

General Marshall was away on the 27th and returned on the 28th, at which time he saw the complete draft of the message of the 27th together with the report from General Gerow of the events during the 27th which we are now about to relate. (R. 36-37)

Before the closing of the story of the 26th, Mr. Stimson defines it as:

"The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it."  
(R. 4051-4052-4053)

What the Secretary of State appears to have done was to have his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors and to hand to them the "Ten Points". As Ambassador Grew testifies, the Japanese considered these "Ten Points" to be an ultimatum. (R. 4221) Whether or not the Secretary of State considers now that this is not an ultimatum (see his letter of September 28, 1943), nevertheless, the Japanese did so consider it and acted upon it as such by notifying the task force, as the evidence shows was waiting at Takan Bay, to start the movement against Hawaii, and it did move out on the 27th-28th of November. As well put by Ambassador Grew:

"Naturally, they (the Japanese) had all their plans made for years beforehand, in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those respects, and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail; but as for the moment at which the button was touched, I don't myself know exactly how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the point at which



they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always been my belief that it was about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26 that the button was touched." (R. 4215)

On the morning of the 27th of November 1941, Mr. Stimson's diary reads:

"The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese--whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.'"

Then the Secretary of War states:

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

He (Stimson) then approved the orders presented to him by General Arnold to move two large planes over the Mandated Islands to take pictures. (R. 4053)

The Secretary related that General Marshall "is down at the maneuvers today," and "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow." At this point he says:

"A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed." (R. 4054)

This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more time within which to prepare; but it was too late, as the die had been cast by the Secretary of State in handing the "Ten Points" counter-proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, which was, as the Secretary of State remarked, "washing his hands of the matter".



When Ambassador Grew so testified he apparently did not know of the very complete evidence in this record of the movement of the Japanese task force starting on the 27th-28th from Takan Bay to the attack. Mr. Hull's statement on this subject is of interest:

"I communicated on November 26 to the Japanese spokesmen--who were urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of November 20--what became the last of this Government's counter-proposals. ... It will thus be seen that the document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultimatum." (Letter from Secretary of State to the Army Pearl Harbor Board, September 28, 1944.)

3. The Drafting of the Message #472 of the 27th: We now turn to the drafting of the message of the 27th as related by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and other witnesses. The first meeting was between Mr. Stimson, General Bryden and General Gerow. (R. 4239-4240) A second meeting between Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark and General Gerow was held later in the day. (R. 4240) As the diary of Mr. Stimson says:

"But the main question at this meeting was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was." (R. 4055)

To continue with the diary:

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him (Mr. Stimson here verbally testified--'We were sending the messages to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska'). So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was." (R. 4056)



The Secretary of War then stated:

"The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments, and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right." (R. 4056)

The two sentences which the Secretary of War apparently wrote in the message of the 27th were these:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."(1)

The Secretary continues his testimony:

"That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and the envoys from Mr. Hull; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely, that the man should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was here." (R. 4056)

The task that the Secretary of War was engaged upon was normally that of the Chief of Staff. As Mr. Stimson said:

"That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally do; to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts." (R. 4057)

The message to Hawaii now under consideration of the 27th has endorsed upon it, "Shown to the Secretary of War".  
(R. 4057)

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Footnote:

(1) However, General Gerow (R. 4247) testified that he believed that the sentence "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was inserted by him or Colonel Bundy.



The Secretary testified:

"I went over very carefully the whole message. ... And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as was shown by the memorandum there." (R. 4058)

With reference to the other meeting that took place on the 27th in the drafting of this message, #472, General Gerow's testimony is that at the meeting with the Secretary of War the first two sentences, reported by the Secretary of War as being drafted by him, were sentences which were softened by instructions or information furnished by the Secretary of State in a conversation over the telephone with the Secretary of War the morning of the 27th. (R. 4247) General Gerow testifies that the sentences so softened originally read "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated." (R. 4270)

The sentence, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was put in by General Gerow or Colonel Bundy. (R. 4247)

The sentence, "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act," was thus phrased because as Gerow said he testified before the Roberts Commission:

"We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act." (R. 4251-4252)

The next sentence:

"This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense"

was inserted by General Gerow or by Colonel Bundy. The



purpose of this language was to insure freedom of action to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. (R. 4252)

General Gerow said that there had been no discussion of the ambiguity of the message or its apparent conflicting instructions as a "Do-or-Don't" message. (R. 4252)

He said that nothing in the message told General Short about the relations between the American Government and the Japanese Empire. (R. 4256) The sole information passed on to General Short by the War Department from October 20th to November 27th about what the soldier calls "enemy information" was in this particular message. (R. 4263) The only previous message that Short had had of the international situation from the War Department was on October 20, which read: (1) (2)

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Footnotes:

(1) However, General Gerow testified (R. 4258) that there was a Navy Department message of November 24th which contained information of the Japanese situation and indicated possible Japanese aggressive action and which directed the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to inform General Short of its contents.

(2) Information gleaned by the Board indicates that G-2, War Department, on November 3, 1941, sent a letter to G-2, Hawaiian Department, in which was set forth the prophecy of war between Japan and the United States in December 1941 or February 1942, as made by a prominent Japanese.



"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." (R. 4264)

The sentence:

"This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense"

was put in by the War Plans Division. (R. 4271)

With reference to the phrase, "You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary": apparently at that time no investigation was made by the War Department to ascertain just what means General Short had of conducting the reconnaissance; but aside from this fault, the fact is that General Short did have some planes plus radar to conduct a degree of reconnaissance. This the record shows he did not fully and gainfully employ these means for this purpose. General Short was recalled at substantially the end of all the testimony and questioned on this point. Short's position on this message was that the direction to him to conduct reconnaissance was a futile directive and that it indicated to him that the man who wrote the message was entirely unfamiliar with the fact, "that the Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance". He said this was

"in spite of the fact that the Chief of Staff had approved that plan that provided for that, whoever wrote the message was not familiar with it, or it had slipped his mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that was responsible." (R. 4436-4437)

He said when questioned as to why he did not call attention to this matter in his reply to the War Department:

"I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate that agreement, they would have told me so."



He said he based everything on the responsibility of the Navy for long distance reconnaissance, because it had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. (R. 4438)

He could not explain why he failed to use his own reconnaissance aircraft even though the agreement was not actually in effect at that time or the War Department had overlooked the agreement because he says, as elsewhere admitted, that the Army and Navy agreement was not to go into effect until hostilities, or their equivalent, had occurred. His reconnaissance planes were still under his control and could have been used by him to carry out this direct order in this message.

For instance, the following colloquy occurred:

"62. General Grunert. You might clear up two additional points. First, we will take up the point that you have brought out, there, that the War Department had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with the Navy, as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Department's attention to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about that agreement?

"General Short. I did not, but I reported to them exactly what I was doing.

"63. "General Grunert. Then you considered your report the answer to that?

"General Short. They called on me for a report. If they had not called on me for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different; but they definitely told me to 'report action taken,' which I did; and I heard nothing further from them.

"64. General Grunert. We have had testimony before the Board, from a member of the Navy, calling the Board's attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and apparently the emergency, or the imminency of



such an emergency, was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that understanding, was it the Navy's business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance, prior to such an emergency?

"General Short. If the emergency existed, it was their business; if it did not exist, there was no necessity.

"65. General Grunert. Then, when do you judge the emergency came about?

"General Short. It very definitely came about, at 7:55 on the morning of the 7th." (R. 4438-4439)

This is sufficient in itself to clearly demonstrate that Short was not taking the action which he could and should have taken of either more fully carrying out the order, or of specifically and definitely reporting the complete circumstances of his inability to do so. He did not call the attention of the War Department to what was an apparent misunderstanding on its part. He was relying upon the Navy reconnaissance without any reasonable energetic inquiry to ascertain the correctness of his assumption that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance. He has no adequate explanation for not using the radar 24 hours a day (which was in full operation Sunday prior to December 7) after getting the message of the 27th, and which was used continuously after December 7. (R. 4441-4444) For some time after December 7th the situation as to the dearth of spare parts was the same as before December 7th.

The Secretary of War did not know the authorship of the part, "Report measures taken ... Limit dissemination ... to minimum essential officers". (R. 4071) He said he knew it was there and he understood it.

There were two conferences with the Secretary of War, one



at 9:30 the morning of the 27th, and one later in the day. At the first conference, the Secretary of War, General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, and General Gerow were there. At that time General Gerow received instructions with reference to the preparation of the message. He then consulted Admiral Stark. (R. 4239-4240) The second conference took place later with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and Mr. Stimson. (R. 4240) General Bryden has testified that although he was Deputy Chief of Staff, and Acting Chief of Staff in General Marshall's absence, he does not remember the message nor the conference thereon. (R. 900) While the Chief of Staff reviewed the message of the 27th on the 28th, it is unfortunate that during this critical period he was off on maneuvers in North Carolina and missed the drafting of the message which was the composite work of a number of people, which may account for its confusing and conflicting tenor. Possibly had he been present, the Marshall-Stark memorandum might have reached the President in time to have influenced the momentous decisions of November 26th.

It is equally obvious that the November 27th message was the only message that attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course of events terminating in the counter-proposals on the 26th of November to Japan.

No other picture of the situation was given to Short, except in this message. It is apparent that the message of November 27 was entirely inadequate to properly and adequately translate to Short's mind the background of events that had been taking place. While this does not excuse Short, it does necessitate an assessment for the responsibility on others.



The three principal Major Generals who were commanders under Short have testified that they received substantially nothing by way of information as to the international situation except what they read in the newspapers. The fact that the newspapers were urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted by them, because they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the War Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous value both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and other high officers of the War Department had, was not transmitted to Short. The only summary of this information was the brief and conflicting tone of the message of November 27, which was but a faint echo of what had actually occurred.

It is significant that the Japanese upon the termination of negotiations by the counter-proposals of the 26th, considered by them as an ultimatum, were thereby in full possession of all the information, which our ultra-secrecy policy did not permit of full transmission to field commanders. The Japanese knew everything. The War and Navy Departments transmitted to Short and Kimmel only so much of what they knew as they judged necessary. (1)

It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the practical cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had occurred in 1941. If it had not been for

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Footnote:

(1) Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark expressed themselves as of the opinion that the warnings transmitted to Short and Kimmel were sufficient to properly alert their respective commands.



Mr. Stimson's initiative in calling the Secretary of State, it is uncertain as to when he would have been advised of this most important event. As it turned out, the delay of from ten to twelve hours in getting the information was not material, since the Japanese delayed striking until December 7th.

The effect of the counter-proposals of November 26th on the resulting responsibilities of the Army and Navy is indicated in Mr. Stimson's quotation of Mr. Hull's comment to him, as follows:

"Now it is up to the Army and Navy to take care of the matter. I have washed my hands of the Japanese."

4. Analysis of the November 27, 1941, Message. The message of November 27, 1941, from the Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, consists of the following component parts:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government may come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

Comment: This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not convey to Short the full import of the information concerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese-American relations, i.e., that war might not come. The War Department was convinced then that war would come.

The statement that "Japanese future action unpredictable"



was in conflict with the Navy message which the War Department had directed be shown to Short, to the effect that the attack would be in the Kra Peninsula and elsewhere in the Far East. It did not convey to Short the fixed opinion of the War Department General Staff as to the probable plan of Japanese operations.

A warning that "hostile action possible at any moment" indicated the necessity of taking adequate measures to meet that situation. This is particularly true in view of the Navy message of 16 October, 1941, which said that there was a possibility that Japan might attack. There was also received from the Navy on November 27 a message containing these words,

"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days."

The next statement in the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided comma the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense."

Comment: This instruction embodied our well known national policy against initiating war. The responsibility for beginning the war must be Japan's. It gives Short the right of defense, notwithstanding the restriction, but creates an atmosphere of caution which he must exercise in preparing for such defense.

The third portion of the message is this:

"Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma alarm



the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken."

Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere.

Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the weight of evidence indicates that a higher form of alert than that taken would not have alarmed the public.

Short did report within an hour the measures taken.

(R. 286)

Short's answer to General Marshall's radio said:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Reuard four seven two twenty seventh."

This in itself was sufficient to show that such steps were inadequate, but as he did not say he was taking any other steps, the War Department erroneously assumed that its responsible commander was alert to sabotage and to liaison with the Navy and was taking the necessary responsible other steps mentioned in the radio because he had been warned in this radio of the 27th by General Marshall.

Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War Department placed itself in the position of sharing the responsibility if it did not direct Short to take such measures as they considered adequate to meet this serious threat. This is particularly true in view of the fact that much material information relating to Japanese-American relations was in the War Department, which had not been made available to Short.



The next and last portion of the message:

"should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Number 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

Comment: (a) This was a clear recognition, and advice to Short, that his basic war plan and all joint Army and Navy plans based upon it was to be used and was a clear indication to him to adopt adequate preparatory measures to insure the execution of Rainbow Number 5.

(b) As to the directive to "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers":

The War Department was security-conscious. The construction which Short appears to have placed upon this language may have unduly limited the information which reached responsible subordinate commanders. This part of the message left broad discretion in Short as to the dissemination of the information contained in the message, and had the personnel operating the Air Warning Service on the morning of December 7th known of the absolute imminence of war they doubtless would have interpreted the information obtained from the radar station much differently.

It is of a piece with the other provisions of the instructions--not to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and to avoid commission of the first overt act.

Comment on the message as a whole: General Short, as the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and as such had a fundamental duty to properly employ all available means at his disposal for that purpose in the face of any threat, with or without notification of impending hostilities.



Notwithstanding receipt of conflicting and qualifying information, which undoubtedly had its effect on Short's mental conception of the situation, the responsibility rested on him to take measures to meet the worst situation with which he might be confronted, and such action on his part, as Commander on the spot, was mandatory despite the fact that he was not kept fully advised by the War Department of the critical situation and of the positive, immediate imminence of war.

The same day G-2 of the War Department wired to G-2 Hawaiian Department, which clearly indicated that both sabotage and hostilities might begin and be concurrent. This message said:

"Advise only the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Actions of sabotage and espionage probable. Also probable that hostilities may begin."

This G-2 message nullifies all Short's explanation that his mind was put on sabotage because of the War Department's emphasis on this subject. The message shows that hostilities were just as possible as sabotage. His decision to adopt Alert Number 1 came on the 27th, before receipt of any message having reference to sabotage. He had two threats: he only took measures as to one. The third message, upon which he particularly relies as to sabotage, which came on November 28 from the War Department (G-2), came after he had made his decision to go to Alert Number 1. This last message again mentions the critical situation as to sabotage activities. It does not in any way change previous messages. Short should have known, as a trained soldier, that a G-2 message is informative and is of



lesser authority than a command message from the Chief of Staff.

When General Short was asked if he had known that negotiations with Japan had practically ended when he received the message of November 27th, he said:

"I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically unavoidable.....If I knew it was immediately imminent.....but if I had known it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert Number 3.....It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost upon us." (R. 450)

"General Russell. General Short, did you know that on the 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum which G-2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese government?

"General Short. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out.

"General Russell. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received that message that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?

"General Short. I did not.

"General Russell. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor?

"General Short. At that time I was not in command; but I have known of that later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about it at that time." (R. 451)

This concludes the status of affairs to the 27th. There still remained the period from the 27th to the 6th of December, inclusive, during which time messages and even letters could have been sent outlining and completely delineating the entire



situation to Short. Even a courier could have reached Honolulu in 36 hours from Washington. The War Department, although it had additional information of a most positive character, left Short with this fragment of information regarding the U.S.-Japanese negotiations contained in the two sentences inserted in the message of the 27th by the Secretary of War, and took no action either to investigate Short's reply to the message of November 27 to determine the steps being taken for defense, or to assure that adequate defensive measures were being taken.

5. Messages 23th November To 6th December, Inclusive: On November 23th the War Department sent message No. 482 to Short, reading as follows:(1)

"Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department (See paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty-five) stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions."

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Footnote:

(1) A similar message, No. 484, was sent on the same day to the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by General Arnold.



Short sent a reply to wire 482, of November 28th on the same day which outlined at length the sabotage precautions he was taking. The War Department copy of this wire, which is addressed to the A.G.O., shows that a copy was sent to the Secretary of the General Staff, but no other indorsements are on it showing it was read or considered by anyone else. This wire reads:

"Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Dept paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this Hqrs by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the Commanders of Military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this Hqrs to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Dept. to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. Short."

It is to be noted that the official file does not show a copy of radio #482, sent to Short by the War Department on



November 28th.

On December 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following wire to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet:

"On 3d December we have, 'Op Nav informs' -- this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir. \* \* -- 'informs C in C Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents.'" (Admiral Bloch, Vol. 13, Page 1513, AFHB)<sup>(1)</sup>

The story as to whether Short ever saw or received this message is as follows: Admiral Kimmel visited Short December 2 and December 3, 1941. (R. 1513) Short says: "I never saw that message" (R. 424), referring to the 3 December message. He also denied seeing the message from the Navy of December 4th and 6th hereinafter quoted. (R. 424-425) However, Short was advised by the F.B.I. that it had tapped the telephone line of the Japanese Consuls' cook and had found the Consul was burning his papers. (R. 3204) All other lines were tapped by the Navy. (R. 3204) Phillips testified Short was "informed of it," but nothing was done about it. (R. 1243) Short denies such G-2 information, saying: "I am sure he didn't inform me." (R. 525) Colonel Fielder says the matter was discussed by Colonel Phillips at a staff conference, but nothing was done about it. Colonel Bicknell, G-2, Hawaiian Department, confirmed Fielder. (R. 1413-1414)

Footnote:

(1) This message also paraphrased by General Grunert, Vol. 4, Page 424. This same message also paraphrased in Roberts Testimony, Vol. 5, Page 583, and Vol. 17, Page S-85.



This record does not provide either a true copy or a paraphrase copy of the message of December 4, 1941, or December 6, 1941. The information we have is no better than that contained in the Roberts Report, which reads as follows:

"the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment." (Roberts Report, page 8)

These messages were received because Admiral Bloch testified that he remembered them. (R. 1513-1514)

Irrespective of any testimony on the subject the record shows that on December 3, 1941, Short and Kimmel had a conference about a cablegram relative to the relief of marines on Wake and Midway. (R. 302, 394)

There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not give instructions to Short direct which would have put him on his guard as to the tenseness of the situation.

On December 6 there was reported to the Chief of Staff, Phillips, the message about the Japanese burning their papers, and he reported it at a staff meeting on December 6. (R. 1414)

6. December 7, 1941 Message: This brings us to the final message from Washington. It was filed by the Chief of Staff at 12:13 p.m. Washington time, December 7th, which was 6:48 a.m. Honolulu time.

"Japanese are presenting at 1 p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum.



Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this communication."

The story of the sending of this message, which, if it could have been sent so as to have reached Short a few hours prior to the attack might at least have greatly lessened the results of the attack, will be set forth at length. It was sent by commercial radio, the R.C.A. This is a commercial line. Early in the morning in Honolulu the Hawaiian Department radio had had great difficulty in keeping in communication with the War Department radio. It is significant that the Hawaiian Department only had a small 10 k.g. set. It was not a powerful set, like that of the Navy or the R.C.A. The Message Center of the War Department, which is charged with the expeditious handling of messages, decided to send this vital message by commercial R.C.A. instead of War Department radio, because it could not get through on its own net. Why this message was not sent by the Navy radio, by F.B.I. radio, or by telephone, and why these means of possibly more rapid communication were not investigated, is not satisfactorily explained. The explanation that "secrecy" was paramount does not appear to apply to these means.

Shivers of the F.B.I. testified:

"We had our own radio station...I would say within--depending on the length of the message; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington by--could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of twenty minutes...our channels were not jammed...We used a frequency that was assigned to us by the F.C.C... All of the stuff that went out from here to--that went out over that radio, was coded." (R. 3221)



"General Grunert. Then any message that Washington wanted to get to you during that morning or just prior to the attack on that morning you think could have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour?"

"Mr. Shivers. The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes. Yes, sir." (R. 3221)

It is to be noted in this connection that not only was the F.B.I. radio working between Washington and Honolulu on December 6-7, but that testimony shows numerous telephone conversations were conducted just after the attack, over the telephone between Washington and Honolulu.

The story of the sending of this message in the War Department is as follows:



This message arrived in Honolulu at 7:33 a.m., Honolulu time, December 7th. The attack struck 22 minutes later. The message was not actually delivered to the signal office of the Hawaiian Department until 11:45 a.m., the attack having taken place at 7:55 a.m. The message was decoded and delivered to The Adjutant General at 2:58 p.m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack.

The status of communications between Washington and Hawaii on the morning of December 7th and for 24 hours previous to that time was as follows: The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily get a message through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen minutes. After the attack on December 7, Colonel Fielder (G-2) himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a call from Washington on the same phone: it took no more than an hour as a maximum to get the call through despite the heavy traffic to Hawaii by reason of the attack (R. 2999) Furthermore, a war message could have demanded priority.

It is important to observe that only one means of communication was selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency. In addition to the War Department telephone there also existed the F. B. I. radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Washington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty minutes to send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa. Shivers of F. B. I. so testified. (R. 3222) Short testified:

"General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it took some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was a



possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy was more important than the time element in getting the information to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information seven hours after the attack." (R. 310)

Apparently, the War Department at that time did not envisage an immediate attack, rather they thought more of a breaking of diplomatic relations, and if the idea of an attack at 1:00 p.m. E.S.T. did enter their minds they thought of it as probably taking place in the Far East and not in Hawaii. Hence secrecy was still of paramount interest to them. We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or F.B.I. radio or the scrambler telephone or all three.

The result was the message did not get through in time due to the failure of the War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of Staff used it to the Philippines (Short R. 310) or take steps to insure that the message got through by multiple channels (by code over naval or F.B.I. radio to Hawaii), if the War Department radio was not working. He left Short without this additional most important information. Short testified as follows:

"If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer idea of danger from that message and we would have had time to warm up the planes and get them in the air to meet any attack." (R. 310)

Colonel French, in charge of Traffic Operations Branch, Chief Signal Office, in the War Department testified that on December 7, 1941, Colonel Bratton brought the message to the code room in the handwriting of the Chief of Staff which "I had typed for clarity" in a few minutes. Colonel Bratton read and authenticated it. The message was given to the code clerk and transmission facilities checked. It was decided to send



the message by commercial means, choosing Western Union, as the fastest. He stated that he personally took the message from the code room to the teletype operator and advised Colonel Bratton it would take 30 to 45 minutes to transmit message to destination. It left at 12:01 (Eastern Standard Time, 6:31 a.m. Honolulu time). The transmission to Western Union was finished 12:17 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, or 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. It took 45 minutes in transmission. The message was actually delivered at 11:45 a.m. Honolulu time. The messenger was diverted from his course during the bombing. (R. 189-202)

Colonel French had no knowledge of the type of communication the F. B. I. used to Hawaii; he never used the scrambler telephone and sometimes he used the Navy to send messages, but did not inquire on the morning of December 7, although the Navy has a more powerful radio. (R. 203-204)

7. Failure of Navy to Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl Harbor on morning December 7, 1941.

The second failure was by the Navy Department, upon whom Short so trustingly relied. A two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor area at 6:30 a.m. Between 6:33 and 6:45 a.m. it was sunk by the Navy. This was reported at 7:12 a.m. by naval base officers to the Chief of Staff but the Navy made no such report to Short. (R. 310-311; See Roberts Report p.15) As Short said:

"That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of



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it and just failed to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not--at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack." (R. 311)

8. Failure of Aircraft Warning Service to Advise of Approaching Planes, December 7, 1941.

The third event that might have saved the day was the following:

The aircraft warning service had established mobile aircraft warning stations on the Island of Oahu, as elsewhere related in detail, and had set up an Information Center to utilize the aircraft warning information, plot the course of any incoming planes and to advise the responsible authorities. The organization was set up and operating and was being utilized from 4 a.m. to 7 o'clock on the morning of December 7th as a training method and had been so used for some time past. The Navy was supposed to have detailed officers in the Information Center to be trained as liaison officers, but had not yet gotten around to it. In the Information Center that morning was a Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps, whose tour of duty thereat was until 8 o'clock. It was Tyler's second tour of duty at the Center and he was there for training and observation, but there were no others on duty after 7 o'clock except the enlisted telephone operator. He was the sole officer there between 7 and 8 o'clock that morning, the rest of the personnel that had made the Center operative from 4:00 to 7:00 a.m. had departed.

At one of the remote aircraft warning stations there were two privates who had been on duty from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. One of them was Private Lockard, who was skilled in operating the radar aircraft detector, and a Private George E. Elliott, who was



the plotting man to plot the information picked up on the radar. This plotter was anxious to learn how to operate the radar, and Private Lockard agreed to show him after the station was supposed to close at 7 o'clock and while they were waiting for the truck to take them to breakfast. He kept the radar open for further operation to instruct his partner, Private Elliott. While Lockard was adjusting the machine to begin the instruction of Private Elliott, he observed on the radar screen an unusual formation he had never seen in the machine. He thought there was something wrong with it, as the indicator showed such a large number of planes coming in that he was sure that there was nothing like it in the air and there must be a machine error. He continued to check, however, and finally concluded that the machine was operating correctly and that there was a considerable number of planes 152 miles away from the island approaching from a direction 3 degrees east of north. The time was 7:02 a.m., December 7, 1941.

In this record Private Elliott, now Sergeant Elliott, testified that he plotted these planes and suggested to Lockard that they call up the Information Center. After some debate between them, Lockard did call the Information Center and reported to the switchboard operator. The switchboard operator, an enlisted man who testified, was unable to do anything about it, so he put Lieutenant Tyler on the phone. Tyler's answer proved to be a disastrous one. He said, in substance, "Forget it." Tyler's position is indefensible in his action, for he says that he was merely there for training and had no knowledge upon which to base any action; yet he assumed to give directions instead of seeking someone competent to make a decision.

If that be a fact, and it seems to be true, then he should



not have assumed to tell these two men, Private Lockard and Private Elliott, to "forget it", because he did not have the knowledge upon which to premise any judgment. (R. 1102) He should, in accordance with customary practice, have then used initiative to take this matter up with somebody who did know about it, in view of the fact that he said he was there merely for training and had no competent knowledge upon which to either tell the men to forget it or to take action upon it. By his assumption of authority, he took responsibility and the consequences of his action should be imposed upon him.

If Tyler had communicated this information, the losses might have been very greatly lessened. As General Short testified:

"If he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air. . . It would have made a great difference in the loss. . . It would have been a question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action." (R. 312-313)

The attack actually took place at 7:55 a.m.

When the information that showed up on the oscilloscope was communicated, apparently Lieutenant Tyler had in his mind that a flight of B-17s was coming from the mainland and he thought that they might represent what was seen on the screen of the radar machine. As a matter of fact, that probably had something to do with it, as they did come in about this period and were attacked by the Japanese, some of them being destroyed.

9. Navy Failure to Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration in the Jaluits.

About November 25, 1941, the Navy through its intelligence sources in the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington had reports showing the presence in Jaluit in the



Marshall Islands of the Japanese fleet composed of aircraft carriers, submarines, and probably other vessels. Information of this fleet ceased about December 1, 1941. As Jaluit was 1,500 miles closer to Oahu than the mainland of Japan, the presence of such a strong force capable of attacking Hawaii was an important element of naval information. This information was delivered to G-2 of the War Department as testified<sup>to</sup> by General Miles. No information of this threat to Hawaii was given to General Short by either the War or Navy Departments in Washington nor the Navy in Hawaii. Short and his senior commanders testified that such information would have materially altered their point of view and their actions.

Such information should have been delivered by the War Department or the Navy for what it was worth to permit Short to evaluate it; this was not done.

The fact that the actual force which attacked Hawaii has now been identified does not change the necessity for the foregoing action.

10. The Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked Pearl Harbor; Sources of Information to Japanese.

The following account is based upon the testimony of Captain Layton, who has been Fleet Combat Intelligence Officer, and was at the time of December 7th and shortly before Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

He said that the task force which had been identified by the Navy through numerous captured documents, orders, maps, and from interviewing prisoners who were in a position to know personally the orders and preparations for the attack, had the following history, according to the Navy view of the correct



story: (1)

Japan started training its task force in either July or August, 1941, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. They were evidently trained with great care and precision as disclosed by the maps which were found in the planes which were shot down in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in the two-man submarines. These papers and orders show meticulous care in planning and timing, which would take very considerable practice. The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Takan Bay was about November 22nd, and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the 27th-28th of November, 1941. (2)

The elements of the fleet for this task force consisted of six carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and a destroyer division. This is one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled and after the date of

Footnotes:

(1) The Japanese striking force assembled in home waters during November and departed from the Bungou Channel area in Japan about 22 November, proceeding to Takan Bay (sometimes called Hittokapu Bay). This assembly had started between the 7th and 22nd of November. Takan Bay is located at Etorofu Island in North Japan. It does not appear on the ordinary maps or charts, but is shown in a map of the Japanese Empire in a Japanese encyclopedia under the title "Hittokapu Bay." The task force arrived in this bay approximately November 25th. The entire force departed on the 27th-28th of November (see footnote 2), taking a northerly route south of the Aleutians directly to the east (to avoid being sighted by shipping) and then headed for a position to the north of Oahu, arriving there on the early morning of the 8th of December (Japanese time) or the 7th of December (Hawaiian time). The date of departure of November 27th-28th, according to the numerous documents and prisoners interviewed who had intimate knowledge of this matter and who independently picked the same date, is confirmed beyond doubt according to Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. This force consisted of six aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some destroyers as well as submarines.

(2) Japanese time and date must be taken into consideration because our December 7th at Honolulu is Japanese December 8th. The time difference between Tokyo and Hawaii is 4½ hours. The time difference between Washington and Tokyo is 10 hours.



the attack upon Pearl Harbor, it took part in a number of similar successful and very disastrous attacks in the Pacific southwest. The elements of this task force left individually from the Japanese mainland and assembled at Tonkan Bay in an uninhabited spot where they would be unobserved. The assembly was completed and the task force departed on November 27th-28th, Eastern Longitude Time, which was apparently after the date that the counter-proposals (considered by the Japanese as an ultimatum) were delivered by the President of the United States to Japan through Secretary Hull on November 26, 1941. It is significant that the attack of the Japanese task force aircraft upon the Army and Navy planes parked together wing-to-wing as protection against sabotage (Alert #1) must have been as a result of knowledge of that fact, in view of their carefully rehearsed and scheduled attack formations in which they ran down the aprons, setting the planes on fire with incendiary ammunition: it is equally significant that it was well known in the island that Alert #1 was put into effect November 27th and therefore can be assumed to have been communicated to Japan, and that advantage of such information was apparently taken by reason of the nature of the attack and the way it was conducted.

It is also significant, a map having been found upon the pilot of a shot-down Japanese attacking plane, and another map having been found upon one of the crew in a two-man submarine, that there had been entered on these map, which were old Geodetic Survey maps of the Pearl Harbor area, the location of the hangars that had been built on Hickam Field and of those that were yet to be built. Five of these hangars had been built. Earlier 1936 maps issued by the Hawaiian Department



or by the Air Force, showing Hickam Field, showed five of these hangars in full lines and three in dotted lines as being hangars yet to be built. The Japanese are well known as precise copyists. It is apparent that when they made the maps found on the aviator and the submarine crew members they had knowledge later than 1936 of construction either that had been constructed or was to be constructed, because they entered on such maps the additional three hangars in full lines.

The task force proceeded in radio silence due east to a point substantially due north of Oahu and thence proceeded southward under forced draft to a point between 300 and 250 miles from Oahu, from which the flight took off. The two-man submarines were carried on top of the mother submarines and released adjacent to the harbor.

Captain Layton further testified that the orders that were captured and those that they had knowledge of did exist, as reported by captured prisoners, show that the attacking forces were to destroy without a trace any third power's vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force; to capture and maintain in radio silence any such vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force, but if such vessels had sent any radio communications to destroy them.

(R. 3043) This is a good evidence of Japanese character, being unwilling to trust their own people and to sink them without mercy because they happened to be operating by accident in this vacant sea where no vessels normally operate.

This task force was very powerful in the air, having a total of approximately 424 planes; (R. 3048) of this number about 300 actually attacked Pearl Harbor. (R. 3053) The pilots



were of the highest quality and training that have ever been encountered in this war with the Japanese, with the exception of the Battle of Midway where four of these same carriers were engaged and were sunk. (R. 3046) The maximum total number of airplanes on carriers that the United States could muster on December 7th, on the carriers "Lexington" and "Enterprise", was approximately 180 planes. (R. 3049)

Captain Layton testified that our Navy in Pearl Harbor would have been unable to have brought the Japanese task force under gunfire because our battleships were too slow and the remainder of our force would probably have suffered severe damage if not defeat on the high seas by reason of the great superiority in the air before our superior gunfire could have been brought to bear. The only possible hope of overcoming such a Japanese force would be in weather that prevented flight of their planes so that the United States force would have superiority of gunfire, irrespective of Japanese superiority of air power.

He stated that no word of this task force was received in any way, from any source, by the Navy. The attack was wholly unexpected, and if it had been expected the probability of the United States' winning in any engagement of this task force was not a bright one. He stated that this task force represented a substantial per cent of the entire Japanese Navy. It provided alone on the Jap carriers 424 aircraft against a possible 180 which we might have mustered if we had had our own two carriers available to operate against them. (R. 3048-3049)

The information upon which the story of the attack is based has been revealed so far as coming from several sources.



First, the Otto Kuehn trial revealed his complete disclosure of the fleet dispositions and locations in Pearl Harbor in the period December 1 to December 6, and a code delivered with the information, so that communication of the information to Japanese offshore submarines adjacent to Oahu could be used. The same information was delivered by the Japanese Consul direct to the homeland.

Otto Kuehn and his co-conspirators, Japanese of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, had conspired to send information as to the units of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and their exact positions in the harbor. This information the Japanese Consul communicated principally by commercial lines to Japan. Additionally Kuehn provided a code indicating what units were in the harbor and what were out and means of signaling consisting of symbols on the sails of his sailboat, radio signals over a short-wave transmitter, lights in his house, and fires in his yard, all in order to signal to Japanese submarines offshore. The period during which the signals were to be given was December 1 to 6. If such information had been available to our armed forces it would have clearly indicated the attack. The messages taken from the Japanese Consulate on the subject show clearly what was done and the intention of the Japanese. If authority had existed to tap these lines, this information would have been available to both the Army and Navy. Kuehn was tried by a military commission after signed confessions of his actions and sentenced to death. This was later commuted to imprisonment for fifty years. It is significant that Kuehn was a German agent and had for a long time been living on funds forwarded to him from Japan and had conducted his espionage with impunity until after Pearl Harbor, right



under the nose of the Army, the F.B.I., and Naval Intelligence.

As Shivers, head of the F.B.I. in the islands, said:

"If we had been able to get the messages that were sent to Japan by the Japanese Consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that the attack would come, somewhere, on December 7; because, if you recall, this system of signals that was devised by Otto Kuehn for the Japanese Consul general simply included the period from December 1 to December 6." (R.3218)

Shivers testified that the reason why the information being sent over the commercial lines to Japan, other than telephone, was not secured was that while he had the approval of the Attorney General to tap the telephone wires and to intercept telephone conversations, yet they could not get the information out of the cable offices. He testified:

"Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask him one question. What other means of communication did the Japanese Consul have with the homeland other than a telephone connection?"

"Mr. Shivers. He had commercial communication system.

"Colonel Toulmin. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial lines or of securing any information off the commercial lines?"

"Mr. Shivers. Off of the lines themselves?"

"Colonel Toulmin. Yes.

"Mr. Shivers. No, sir.

"Colonel Toulmin. So that he did have a free, undisturbed communication over those lines?"

"Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir." (R. 3223)

It was later discovered, when the torn messages of the Japanese Consul were reconstructed after they had been taken on December 7th, that many vital messages were being sent by the Japanese Consul, who was keeping Japan advised of the entire military and naval situation and every move we made in Hawaii.

Another example of this Japanese activity is the telephone



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message on December 5th from the house of Dr. Mori by a woman newspaper reporter, ostensibly to her newspaper in Japan, an apparently meaningless and therefore highly suspicious message. It was this message that was tapped from the telephone by the F.B.I., translated, and delivered to Military Intelligence and submitted by it to General Short at six o'clock on December 6th. (R. 1417-1419, 2993) As Short was unable to decipher the meaning, he did nothing about it and went on to a party. (R. 1420) The attack followed in the morning.

In this same connection, the story of the spying activities of the German, von Osten, is in point. (R. 2442-2443, 3003) The telephone lines of the Japanese Consulate were tapped by the Navy with the exception of one telephone line to the cook's quarters, which was overlooked, and this was tapped by the F. B. I. (R. 3204)

The last and one of the most significant actions of the Japanese was the apparent actual entry of their submarines into Pearl Harbor a few days prior to December 7th, their circulation in the harbor, by which they secured and presumably transmitted complete information as to our fleet movements and dispositions.

The story of the bold Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor prior to the attack on December 7th is even more astounding as to the complete freedom with which Japan operated in getting intelligence out of Hawaii. Shivers of the F.B.I. produced maps 1 and 2, which were copies of maps captured from the Japanese two-man submarines that came into Pearl Harbor on December 7th. The F.B.I., in endeavoring to reconstruct the



intelligence operations of any agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack, secured these maps from Naval Intelligence. (R. 3210) Maps 1 and 2 have a legend translating all of the Japanese characters and writing appearing on the maps. Shivers said:

"An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that there had been Japanese submarines in Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack." (R. 3210)

"Now, on this map is various information relating to the installations at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places." (R. 3211)

There appeared on the map a code in Japanese which was translated by the F.B.I. and shows that it was intended for use by the submarine commanders in communicating with the Japanese task force enroute to Hawaii. It contains such messages as "indication strong that enemy fleet will put out to sea," or "enemy fleet put out to sea from or through;" in other words, describing the presence, size, composition, and movement of the fleet. (R. 3212)

As this map shows the complete timed movement in and out of the harbor of the submarine and this information had been prepared partly written in Japanese, it is obvious that the Japanese must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were moving into and out of the harbor at will. The data on the chart shows the submarine was so well advised that it went in at about 0410 when the submarine net was open to permit the garbage scow to leave the harbor, and stayed in the harbor until about 0600 and then left by the same route. The map shows the location of our battleships and other naval vessels observed by the submarine. (R. 3212-3213) As the ships actually in the harbor on December 7th were somewhat different from those shown on the map, it is conclusive proof



that this submarine was in the harbor and probably advising the fleet of Japan as to our dispositions prior to December 7th.

(R. 3210-3213)

The real action that should have been feared from the Japanese was not open sabotage, but espionage. It is obvious that the reason why the Japanese aliens did not commit sabotage was that they did not want to stimulate American activity to stop their espionage and intern them. That was the last thing they intended to do; and Short appears to have completely misapprehended the situation, the psychology and intentions of the enemy, by putting into effect his sabotage alert.

Undoubtedly the information of the alert, the placing of planes wing-to-wing, etc., as well as the disposition of the fleet was reported by Kuehn through the Japanese Consul, were all known to the Japanese task force proceeding toward Hawaii. That will explain why they were able to conduct such precise bombing and machine-gunning. The bomb pattern on Hickam Field and the machine-gunning of that field, as well as other fields, show that the attack was concentrated on the hangars, marked on the Japanese maps, and upon the ramps where the planes were parked wing to wing. There was no attack of any consequence upon the landing strips.

From the foregoing it appears that there were a large number of events taking place bearing on the attack; and that a clue to such events and the Japanese actions was in part available to Short and in part not available to him. Both the War Department and the Navy failed to inform him of many vital matters, and our governmental restrictions as to intercepting the communications of the Japanese Consul prevented him from getting still additional information.



If General Short had any doubt on the subject of his authority, he had ample opportunity from November 27th to December 6th to inquire of higher authority and make his position and his actions certain of support and approval. This he did not do.

11. Information Not Given Short. In judging the actions of General Short and whether he carried out his responsibilities, there must be taken into account information that he was not told either by the War Department or by the Navy. Briefly summarized, the fundamental pieces of information were the following:

1. The presence of the task force in the Marshall Islands at Jaluit from November 27th to November 30th and the disappearance of that force. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department saw fit to advise Short of this important piece of information.
2. The fact that the Chief of Staff with the Chief of Naval Operations had jointly asked (on November 27th) the President not to force the issue with the Japanese at this time. (R. 9)
3. The delivery on the 26th of November to the Japanese Ambassadors by the Secretary of State of the counter-proposals; and the immediate reaction of the Japanese rejecting in effect these counter-proposals which they considered an ultimatum and indicating that it was the end of negotiations.
4. Short not kept advised of the communications from Grew reporting the progressive deterioration of the relationship with the Japanese.



5. No reaction from the War Department to Short as to whether his report of November 27th as to "measures taken", i.e., a sabotage alert and liaison with the Navy, were satisfactory or inadequate in view of the information possessed by the War Department.

6. The following information not furnished also existed in the War Department:

Information from informers, agents and other sources as to the activities of our potential enemy and its intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know their potential moves against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions and proposals.

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by the Army and Navy gave only a small fraction of this information. It would have been possible to have sent safely, information ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives for an all-out alert.

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital



bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and cannot be disclosed to them, it would appear incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directives to such commanders.

Short got neither form of assistance after November 28th from the War Department, his immediate supervising agency. It is believed that the disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been lessened to the extent that its defenses were available and used on December 7 if properly alerted in time. The failure to alert these defenses in time by directive from the War Department, based upon all information available to it, is one for which it is responsible. The War Department had an abundance of vital information that indicated an immediate break with Japan. All it had to do was either get it to Short or give him a directive based upon it. Short was not fully sensitive to the real seriousness of the situation, although the War Department thought he was. It is believed that knowledge of the information available in the War Department would have made him so.

General discussion of the information herein referred to follows:

The records show almost daily information on the plans of the Japanese Government. In addition to that cited above and in conjunction therewith the War Department was in possession of information late in November and early in December from which it made deductions that Japan would shortly commence an aggressive war in the South Pacific; that every effort would be made to reach an agreement with the United States Government which would result in eliminating the American people as a contestant in the war to come; and that failing to <sup>reach</sup> the agreement the



Japanese Government would attack both Britain and the United States. This information enabled the War Department to fix the probable time of war with Japan with a degree of certainty.

In the first days of December this information grew more critical and indicative of the approaching war. Officers in relatively minor positions who were charged with the responsibility of receiving and evaluating such information were so deeply impressed with its significance and the growing tenseness of our relations with Japan, which pointed only to war and war almost immediately, that such officers approached the Chief of the War Plans Division (General Gerow) and the Secretary of the General Staff (Colonel Smith) for the express purpose of having sent to the department commanders a true picture of the war atmosphere which, at that time, pervaded the War Department and which was uppermost in the thinking of these officers in close contact with it. The efforts of these subordinate officers to have such information sent to the field were unsuccessful. They were told that field commanders had been sufficiently informed. The Secretary to the General Staff declined to discuss the matter when told of the decisions of the War Plans Division.

Two officers then on duty in the War Department are mentioned for their interest and aggressiveness in attempting to have something done. They are Colonel R. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadler.

The following handling of information reaching the War Department in the evening of December 6 and early Sunday morning December 7 is cited as illustrative of the apparent lack of appreciation by those in high places in the War Department of the seriousness of this information which was so



clearly outlining the trends that were hastening us into war with Japan.

At approximately 10:00 o'clock p.m. on December 6, 1941, and more than 15 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, G-2 delivered to the office of the War Plans Division and to the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army information which indicated very emphatically that war with Japan was a certainty and that the beginning of such war was in the immediate future.

The officers to whom this information was delivered were told of its importance and impressed with the necessity of getting it into the hands of those who could act, the Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of the War Plans Division.

On the following morning December 7 at about 8:30 a.m. other information reached the office of G-2, vital in its nature and indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan. Colonel Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section, G-2, attempted to reach the Chief of Staff of the Army in order that he might be informed of the receipt of this message. He discovered that the General was horseback riding. Finally and at approximately 11:25 a.m. the Chief of Staff reached his office and received this information. General Miles, then G-2 of the War Department, appeared at about the same time. A conference was held between these two officers and General Gerow of the War Plans Division who himself had come to the Office of the Chief of Staff. Those hours when Bratton was attempting to reach someone who could take action in matters of this importance and the passing without effective action having been taken prevented this critical information from reaching General Short in time to be of value to him.



About noon a message was hastily dispatched to overseas department commanders including Short in the Hawaiian Department. This message which has been discussed elsewhere in this report, came into Short's possession after the attack had been completed.

D. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES  
IN 1941 AND THEIR STATE OF READINESS ON  
DECEMBER 6, 1941, OR THE REASONS FOR THEIR  
LACK OF READINESS.

1. Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Command. The Aircraft Warning Service on the morning of December 7, 1941, was in operative condition for all practical purposes. It had an information center and five mobile stations. It was sufficiently operative to successfully pick up the Japanese force 132 miles from Oahu. This was done by Private Lockard and Private Elliott, respectively radar operator and plotter, and reported by these privates on their own initiative to the information center, where the Sergeant in charge of the switchboard received the information and relayed it to Lieutenant Tyler, who was a pursuit officer of the Air Corps on temporary duty for training. The stations had been used from 0400 to 0700 hours each morning for the training personnel, and the personnel was reasonably trained by that time, with the exception of certain liaison officers who were still getting their training, like Lieutenant Tyler. If the radar system and information center had been fully manned, as it could have been and as it was immediately upon the disaster at Pearl Harbor and thereafter without further physical additions, it could have been successfully operated on December 7th.

The Air Warning Service had been operating on tactical exercises and maneuvers prior to December 7th for some weeks.



On December 7, 1941 this service could have been a great asset to the defense of the islands had the Command and Staff understood its value and capabilities and had taken more interest in implementing the temporary setup instead of awaiting completion of the permanent installations.

The only mechanical difficulty that was being experienced was in connection with the stand-by motor generator sets, which were to be used to supplement commercial power in case the latter failed. There had been some minor difficulty with the pumps on the motor generator set for the internal combustion engines, but that was not of serious character.

The story of the delay in installing both the temporary, mobile sets and the permanent sets is as follows:

Army personnel had been receiving radar instructions on Navy surface ships and had gone to sea with the ships and had had the benefit of such practical training. Unfortunately the Navy had not detailed its liaison officers to the Information Center, and in that it failed. There also had not been brought about, due to the failure on the part of General Short and Admirals Hammel and Bloch, a complete integration into a single system of Army and Navy defense including radar and particularly the Army, Navy and Marine fighters which were to pass to the jurisdiction of the Army to form a composite interceptor command, so that the three elements of the system would be working--the aircraft warning service, the interceptor command, and the antiaircraft artillery.

The only reason that the aircraft warning service was not on a full operating basis on the morning of December 7th was due to the type of alert put into effect but otherwise it should have been in full effect. It was a fully operating



service and did so operate shortly after the attack.

Major Bergquist and Major Tindal had been sent to the Interceptor School at Mitchell Field in the early summer of 1941. At that time the AWS was new to the U. S. Army and its organization and development had just started in the United States. For the system to be operative required a considerable amount of highly technical electrical and radar equipment, the supply and manufacture of which was critical.

The whole AWS project was new, novel, and somewhat revolutionary in practice. It took time to get the equipment through War Department priorities, and it took time to teach and train operating personnel, and to indoctrinate the whole Army as well as the public to its operation and value. This process had been going on since May and June, 1941.

Testimony before the Board has indicated that neither the Army, Navy, nor civilian population of the United States or Hawaii anticipated the necessity for immediate use of this service. There was, however, a small group directly in charge of the AWS development in Hawaii, including Major Bergquist, Major Tindal, Major Tetley, and Major Powell, all of the Army, and Lieutenant Taylor of the Navy, who were pushing the AWS project to the fullest extent that their level of authority would permit. As a result of their efforts it is believed that this service in the normal course of events would have been established and in operation in another two or three weeks, which in view of the lack of war-mindedness of the services would have been to the great credit of this group.

Since the No. 1 Alert was the decision due to the logic and judgment of the Department Commander, it is very doubtful had the AWS been 100 per cent completed that it would have been



on a full-out operating basis on the 7th of December. General Short has stated in the Roberts report testimony, Volume 14, page 1642, that had he had the material and fully equipped radar stations he probably would have operated them just as he did.

Nevertheless, had General Short's judgment led him to have decided to go to Alert 2 or 3 on November 27th, or at any time prior to December 7th, the AWS could have functioned and the fighter airplanes could have been ready for active defense within a period of minutes. From the damage that was accomplished by the few fighters that did get into the air from the Haliewa Airdrome it can be assumed that the seventy or eighty fighters that could have been in the air under a normally active alert system would have made the Jap attack a much more costly venture. This paragraph, however, is hypothesis.

2. Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on December 7th.

The aircraft warning service consisting of the Information Center and five mobile radar stations was in operation on the morning of December 7th and had been for several weeks prior to that date. The fact that the Information Center was not in its permanent location and the radar stations were not permanently built had no bearing upon the operation and effectiveness of the aircraft warning system.

"It was set up and the men were being trained for, I would say, possibly a month prior to the attack on December 7th."

As testified by General Martin (R. 1825)

The difficulty of putting the AWS into full operation as a practical matter was the insistence of General Short that he retain control for training purposes whereas the best training would have been to put the system into practical operation.



Of this General Martin said:

"The Department commander would not turn those (the operating stations) over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he (Short) had completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn them over unless he considered they were properly trained. So they were still training under those conditions and had not been turned over to the Air Force the morning of the attack on December 7th." (R. 1824)

Here again is another example of the whole organization of the Army in Hawaii being held in a training status instead of acquiring its training in or near combat positions, where it would have been ready for any eventuality. As General Martin said:

"They were capable of operating . . . the equipment used primarily in the training of personnel to take over the operation of the control area." (R. 1824)

General Martin is confirmed in this by Commander Taylor, loaned by the Navy for the purpose of getting this service into operation. Commander Taylor confirmed the fact that:

"On December 7th the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit Squadrons at Wheeler Field. . . We had no liaison people to man any of the positions . . . On December 7 all the communication lines were in; the radar stations; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come back without being intercepted." (R. 1082)

However, the radio equipment that would have enabled control through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been given to the Ferry Command. This situation is treated elsewhere, but it should be pointed out, to avoid confusion, that on and before December 7th the aircraft warning center was able to pick up incoming planes and to give notification of that fact. It was not fully able to perform its other function,



which was supplementary to the Information Center, that is, for full cooperation in conjunction with an Interceptor Command to intercept the incoming planes in the full sense of that arrangement.

So far advanced was the organization and apparatus that it would have been fully complete within ten days to two weeks at the time of the attack. As Commander Taylor said:

"The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting (a conference to wind up the details of organization) to bring the thing into operation at the end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it." (R. 1083)

Taylor, in turn, is confirmed in this by one of the most energetic officers who was working with Taylor in pressing this aircraft warning system to conclusion, Colonel Bergquist, then a Major. He endeavored to have 24-hour service by November 24th and stated that the mobile units could have stood it. There was some minor trouble with the stand-by power gas engines, but this was of little importance and the system could have run 24 hours a day. He had been running a school since October known as the "Air Defense School" in which he was training Army and Marine officers and as many pursuit officers of the Air Corps as he could get. The delay was from the Signal Corps. As Colonel Bergquist said:

"I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating." (R.1201)

Despite the efforts of General Martin with Department Headquarters, very few results were secured in making the Signal Corps let go their technical operation and allow the practical people who were going to operate it go to work. This is described by Colonel Bergquist, who said:

"One of the big arguments was: we wanted to take over the radar stations and get them set up and operating. The



Signal Corps said no, that was their job; they wanted to get them up and get them operating and then turn them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters decided in favor of the Signal Corps." (R.1196)

This delayed the ultimate completion of the system by a month. (R. 1196)

He stated that:

"My opinion on that is that they (the enlisted men) were fairly well trained at that stage of the game." (R. 1197)

This state of training is further described by him as follows:

"Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We had plotters and information center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which is one of the positions on the board--on the control platform, that is--by running a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in order to do two things: to both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out instructions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only controllers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal--I mean Colonel Tindal; he was a Major at that time--and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that they were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department headquarters." (R. 1191-1192)

At this time the system had a maximum range of approximately 130 miles. (R. 1190)

On November 24th there was a conference of interested Army and Navy officers on this subject, and the consensus of opinion of these experts among the younger officers who were actually getting this Information Center into operation was expressed by Commander Taylor:



"It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks. (The conference was on November 24, 1941.) We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communication equipment we had at that time." (R. 1077)

This confirms the testimony of others that the only thing lacking was the IFF equipment on the planes to enable identification of the planes in the air by ground personnel. Considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for this purpose for the use of the Ferry Command. (R. 1079)

As to the operability of the aircraft warning service on the morning of December 7th, Commander Taylor testifying said:

"If we had had the Information Center completely manned there would have been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that (the Japanese) flight was." (R. 1085)

The Navy had not yet participated in the operation, although Commander Taylor said they had been requested to do so about a week before Pearl Harbor. (R. 1086)

This brings us to the question of why General Short or his staff did not take more vigorous action in putting this most important part of the defenses into operation, particularly in view of the fact that both the long-distance reconnaissance by the Navy and the inshore reconnaissance by the Army were, for all practical purposes, non-existent. Commander Taylor was asked, when he found these delays, whether he had ever seen General Short, to which Taylor replied in the negative by saying:

"I saw his chief of staff. I saw his operations officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff." (R. 1089)



"We saw every chief of staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible." (R. 1088)

Colonel Powell, Hawaiian Department Signal Officer, said repeated efforts to get the Navy to cooperate by supplying naval officers to complete the working of the service were fruitless. They were not interested. (R. 3906).

It is significant that when Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, was asked if Short had tried to expedite these matters he professed ignorance (R. 1143), but it was Phillips, as Chief of Staff to Short, who Taylor and others said was principally responsible for acting on Short's behalf in this matter. (R. 1088)

Colonel Powell testified that the construction of permanent installations did not hold up the placing of the Information Center and the radar stations into operation because there was adequate equipment for this purpose that was actually installed in temporary buildings for the Information Center and that radar mobile stations were placed around the Island.

As a consequence the Information Center and the radar stations were in operation some time prior to December 7th. The only reason they were not operated continuously 24 hours a day was the desire to conserve tubes, as they were short of tubes and other spare parts.

Two permanent radars, No. 271, were received on June 3, and a third radar, No. 271-A, was also received on June 3. On August 1 six mobile radar stations were received and shortly thereafter put into operation. They were complete and self-contained and only needed to be placed at some appropriate elevation.

Colonel Powell testified that the entire service was oper-



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ative about the 1st of November, 1941. The installations for the permanent radar and Information Center were held up by the Engineer construction and were not held up by any lack of information or drawings or equipment of the Signal Corps.

Colonel Powell testified that the location of the centers was made by a board from Washington. This board ordered the abandonment of Kaala at 4,000 feet on the theory that while the range would be extended to 150 miles from Hawaii yet there would be no detection of planes within the 20-mile radius close to shore. This does not sound logical because the great necessity was the locating of planes at a maximum distance from Hawaii. The other stations lower down were fully capable of picking up the close, inshore approach of aircraft.

Colonel Powell added the significant statement that the Navy took little interest in the radar system and "We were never able to get any liaison officer over from the Navy to take part in the exercises or carry on the work." (R. 3906) This is confirmed by the fact that Navy liaison officers never were supplied for the Information Center although it had been in operation for some weeks prior to December 7 and the Army had supplied a number of officers to be trained. (R. 3906)

General Short testified again as to the reason why he was interested in keeping the aircraft warning service in training. He said:

"We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the aircraft warning service would function those hours. In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4.



"Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too great a strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, so that there was a little more chance for maintenance work and keeping them in shape. But that was the situation, and the Interceptor Command was working with them. We were trying to educate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service, and using this training period as an opportunity to give them work at what we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The Navy had a liaison officer functioning with this outfit." (R. 298)

Two explanations have been advanced as to the reason why the aircraft warning service was not put into operation fully. The first was that the signal equipment was not ready until very late; the testimony of Colonel Powell, in charge of this matter for the Signal Corps, plus what actually occurred as to its actually going into operation for nearly a month before the permanent construction was erected, is ample to overrule this objection. (R. 3896-3898)

The second explanation was that there were serious delays in construction. But such delays in permanent construction did not delay the aircraft warning service because it was using temporary housing for its Information Center, and its mobile radar stations were operative without any permanent housing. (R. 3885)

As to the Interceptor Command and the Information Center of the aircraft warning service, General Burgin, Commanding General of the antiaircraft artillery, said:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over." (R. 2604)

He explained how the Interceptor Command had been working during previous trials and exercises. While the Interceptor Command was not fully functioning due to the lack of IFF instruments on the planes, yet there was ample AWS means for



defense and interception that it could have used to a material degree on the morning of December 7, 1941. The Interceptor Command was just being set up, but the nucleus of its operation was there, and it would have been an effective instrument had it been used when the attack came. This was not done.

3. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses. General Burgin commanded the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment.

He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary basis saying:

"We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the anti-aircraft was turned over to Interceptor Command. . . For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7 . . . On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor."

And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the Interceptor Command, is that the Interceptor Command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire." (R. 2602-2604.)

This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning of December 7, then it could have worked for the attack. He said in his opinion it would not



have made any difference anyway, "because we d'in't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were." (R. 2604)

He said of his antiaircraft batteries:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)

A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to troops when they went out for exercises in the field.

Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not even put his guns into final positions because of the conditions now described.

General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described the situation as follows:

"General Russell. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7, 1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?

"General Burgin. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in.

"General Frank. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned the land?

"General Burgin. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice." (R. 2628)

He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly



those who compose what is known as the Big Five.

As to this he said:

"General Russell. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3?"

"General Burgin. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.

"General Russell. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3--and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity--if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?"

"General Burgin. I feel positive it would.

"General Grunert. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?"

"General Burgin. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.

"General Grunert. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?"

"General Burgin. Oh, my!

"General Grunert. Is Dillingham one of them?"

"General Burgin. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.

"General Frank. Which Walker?"

"General Burgin. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells." (R. 2629)

He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapples, etc.

In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that one of the things that may have influenced Short in selecting Alert Number 1 and not sitting up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed then and



later from the large commercial interests on the Island using Japanese labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned. (R. 2654)

As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have been locked up before the war started and not afterwards. (R. 2649)

4. Ammunition Issue: Short's and the Ordnance Department's Responsibility.

The Ordnance Department in the Hawaiian Department in its misdirected effort to safeguard and maintain ammunition in a serviceable condition objected to a full issue thereof to troops except in an emergency. Such issues in an emergency entailed delays which delayed troops in getting into position and action. (R. 2607)

General Burgin, who commanded the antiaircraft artillery, stated that he and General Murray, who commanded one of the infantry divisions, personally went to the staff and to General Short, who turned them down and refused to allow the issue of the ammunition for the artillery and the infantry. Later there was some relaxation of the issue of infantry ammunition. Colonel Weddington testified that on the morning of December 7th he had insufficient ammunition, that there was none for his rifles and ground machine guns, and that the only extra supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his aircraft machine guns. (R. 3026-3027)

The artillery ammunition situation is summed up by General Burgin as follows:



"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this anti-aircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Port Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions." (R. 2604-2605)

He described the efforts of General Murray and himself to get the Ordnance Department to release this ammunition and how he was overruled by General Short's staff and General Short himself, in the following language:

"General Burgin. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose ammunition from our storehouses and from the ordnance during peacetime. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck.

"General Frank. Was that putting off made directly by the Commanding General or by a staff department?

"General Burgin. Both; staff departments first, then the Commanding General in person.

"General Frank. Supported them?



"General Burgin. In his own office, to General Murray and to me.

"General Frank. Well, what were the staff departments who opposed it?

"General Burgin. The Gs; G-4s, the Ordnance.

"General Frank. And their reasons were?

"General Burgin. Same old reason, that they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on and renovate it; and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise." (R. 2607-2608)

Apparently one of the reasons in General Short's mind was sabotage, if the ammunition was out with the guns. As General Burgin testified:

"As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent." (R. 2608)

He testified that without ammunition for his guns it would take from a few minutes to six hours before he could get his guns into position and firing. He was never permitted to take live ammunition on any of his practices and as 50% of the mobile guns were on private land he had been unable to even place half of his guns in position, and they were unable to take ammunition with them. (R. 2608-09-10)

Therefore on the morning of December 7th he was caught in this position with only ammunition adjacent his fixed gun batteries, but half of his guns were without ammunition.

As General Burgin summed it up,

"It was just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the G-4s, or from General Short himself." (R. 2612)

General Maxwell Murray testified as to his difficulties in getting ammunition for both his field artillery and his



infantry, as follows:

"General Grunert. . . . First, I would like to talk to you about artillery ammunition, and ask you this question: Why was not sufficient ammunition at hand for the artillery, on December 7?

"General Murray. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it had not been issued to troops.

"General Grunert. I mean 'at hand,' not 'on hand.'

"General Murray. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from the magazines. I requested authority from General Short to draw artillery ammunition and stack it; I suggested either in the gun parks or the division review field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large area immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the dispersal area for the artillery." (R. 3075-3076)

"General Grunert. Now, we get back to the ammunition. You say that there was no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action; is that right?

"General Murray. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammunition in the gun parks.

"General Grunert. And, in case you were turned out, to go on an alert which required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from somewhere?

"General Murray. We had to draw it.

"General Grunert. Where did it come from?

"General Murray. We drew it directly; the majority of it was drawn at Schofield Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery, which came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately adjacent to it, were to draw ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, which was down here near Pearl Harbor." (R. 3080)

General Murray had made arrangements to have separate entrances to get the ammunition out of the storage houses, but even with that effective arrangement, plus piling ammunition in the warehouses according to unit, it would take at least an hour to get the ammunition so the guns could



go to the beaches to defend the island.

As General Murray said:

"I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition for either the infantry or the artillery." (R. 3081)

He had a limited amount of machine gun ammunition and rifle ammunition. He had a large number of machine guns in each rifle company, extra guns, and

"It was obviously impossible--most of our ammunition was not belted--it was obviously impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without serious delay." (R. 3081)

He had only two belt loading machines for each heavy weapon company, and it had taken three days to load up the belted ammunition on a previous trial. (R. 3081) After applying to General Short he had been authorized to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the necessary rifle ammunition, and store it in the parks. He was not allowed to have mortar ammunition or high-explosive grenades inside the barracks; that ordnance had to be left in the Ordnance Depot, as was the artillery ammunition. He testified (R. 3081) that it was General Short who was personally supporting his ordnance officer and G-4, in following the peacetime practice of holding ammunition in depots where it would take hours to get it out in the event of a raid.

He testified that his movement of ammunition into the barracks was in violation of the standing orders of the post, but he had made that movement of ammunition on the express authorization of General Short. (R. 3091)

It is to be recalled that when the War Department ordered General Herren, in 1940, into an alert in which he stayed for six weeks, he was able to draw his ammunition immediately and



take it with him into the field.

The testimony of General Burgin as to his inability to get ammunition for use with his antiaircraft guns is borne out by the testimony of Colonel Weddington of the Air Corps that when he was in command of the Bellews Field base his efforts to get ammunition for his machine guns and rifles were met by a response from the Ordnance Department, on each request he made, that the ammunition was not available and was not authorized and that this was by General Short's order.

Lack of ammunition preparations was shown in the testimony of Colonel Weddington, who was in command of Bellews Field prior to and on December 7th. (R. 3026-3027) He testified that it was the custom for the ships (aircraft) that were at gunnery practice to be parked on the ramp on Saturday afternoon, close to one another. The guns were taken off the planes for cleaning, the planes were out of gas and were not to be refueled until Sunday, and the gas was brought over by truck from Honolulu and did not arrive until sometime later in the day. He also indicated that many of the pilots were away over the weekend.

It was in this condition that the attack was launched upon them and they were unable to defend themselves. He said they had 30,000 rounds of belted ammunition but no rifle ammunition for their guards and no machine-gun ammunition. When the attack came they were also without any 30-caliber machine-gun bullets. His repeated efforts to get ammunition from the Ordnance Department met with the statement that it was not available and not authorized, and its failure to be issued was on General Short's order.



5. Status of Aircraft Defenses: The difficulties with supply of both aircraft and parts to maintain aircraft, due to the conditions depicted in Chapter 2, Background, are no better illustrated than in the case of aircraft. The failure previous to 1941 to provide extended aircraft programs and the necessity for revising designs to meet modern combat conditions, as revealed by the European War, joined together to put the War Department in a difficult situation with respect to a sufficiency of aircraft.

On the deficiency of equipment in Hawaii, General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, testified he had written General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, personal letters as well as sent official communications with reference to his obsolete aircraft, the lack of spare parts for the modern craft that he had, and the necessity for placing his aircraft in combat condition with adequate weapons, et cetera. (R. 1858-A, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1874 to 1889, inclusive)

While correspondence shows a failure on the part of the Army Air Forces to supply the correct equipment, adequate equipment, spare parts, and enough of it to be effective, yet Hawaii was better off than other commands. As General Marshall expressed it:

"As to Hawaii, that had the largest troop concentration we possessed, it had the maximum of materiel that we possessed, and we were accumulating the first fighter planes, of the type that we possessed at that time, in the Hawaiian garrison.

"As to Panama: if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible."



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As elsewhere stated, on December 7, 1941, General Martin had under his command 123 modern pursuit and bombardment planes, 15 observation planes, 2 transports, 5 observation amphibians, and 8 basic trainers. He had non-modern medium bombers to the number of 39, 9 light bombers, and 62 non-modern pursuit ships.

General Martin testified:

"When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands we had, you might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s, an old obsolete type of fighter which we then called a pursuit airplane. We had some old observation planes, some B-18 bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at all. They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as fast as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always recognized as not being a combat ship. In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. They were obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later--as I remember it, about May--we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were brought in on carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived in Hawaii. About May we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over by air. 9 of these, about the 5th or 6th of September, were transferred to the Philippines by air. The 12 remaining were ordered to proceed to the Philippines; and upon our request that they be delayed, that we could continue the training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombardment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with that type of airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. ... The types of ships which could have been used in combat, which is the P-40, B-17, and ten A-20s, were always possibly 50 percent out of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning of our production program all monies, as possible, were placed into the producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements were neglected at the time. Therefore the new airplanes coming out were deficient to meet the requirements of spare parts. We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation as rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships we used what they call cannibalism to reb it of certain spare parts to repair other ships. ... Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advance training at the time: that is, a limited advance training but not



on any of the modern equipment. So they were put through a demonstration of their ability to handle the old, obsolescent P-26, then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and considerable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P-40 equipment. ... The bombers, as soon as we got B-17s, in I think it was sometime in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown the B-17s. They started training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers remained with the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other additional crews. So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots, and all other members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any of its equipment. ... In other words, they had consumed some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technically school facility. We were getting but a few technical trained men. ... There were possibly 400 men in these schools, as I remember."  
(R. 1853-A to 1861)

It is to be remembered that the record shows that the Japanese carriers had over 400 modern aircraft which they brought against the Island, so that the superiority was overwhelming.

Although General Short gave a high priority to airfield construction, there were many delays due in part to slowness in getting funds and to the inefficiency of contractors under the supervision of the District Engineer.

Some elements of the Air Force in Hawaii had been used during 1941 primarily as a training force for officers and men who were being sent into the Philippines and into the outlying islands. The personnel of these elements, therefore, were largely untrained or partially trained personnel, as the more competent were constantly being forwarded into what was then advance theaters where the danger was deemed to be greater. Therefore, much of the Air Force was in a training status primarily. This has been pictured elsewhere in this report through the testimony of General Short, General Martin,



Colonel Mollison, and others.

The great effort in the latter part of 1941 was to get B-17s, of which 180 had been allotted to Hawaii. As there were only 109 B-17s in the entire Army (R. 154) it was obviously impossible to comply with this request. General Marshall testified that he had sent General Arnold to the West Coast to see what he could do to get these B-17s to the Philippines via Hawaii, and that they had been held up by contrary winds and production delays for more than three or four weeks. (R. 167-168) General Arnold testified as follows:

"General Frank. Had anything held up B-17 production that in any way had an effort on this situation?

"General Arnold. No; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our endeavor to get B-17s we had 90 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 109, and by November it had only gone up to 148. That was the total number of B-17s produced by the Boeing Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers required." (R. 180)

Due to this condition the planes had been flown out with their guns, but without their ammunition, to save weight, a factor that was interpreted by Short as indicating that no attack was expected on Hawaii. (R. 305)

However, the impression in Washington, as testified to by General Arnold, was that the Hawaiian Air Force was in good shape despite its heavy training mission. He testified:

"We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably better trained than any of our air forces. That is the impression we had here in Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in active combat." (R. 179)



In order to develop this further, the following question was put and answer gained:

"General Frank. What I was about to approach was this point, which your present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were charged with training a lot of crews to fly B-17s from California to Honolulu and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain training work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps they got themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of mind.

"General Arnold. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time to time, and the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were assured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition on in Hawaii than if it were done in the United States. In other words, we had no air force, as such, anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that training, it was going to disrupt something. Where could we put that training so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force that we did have? And it looked to us as if they could carry on this transition in Hawaii and interfere less with the training than anywhere else because we would have the airplanes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most needed." (R. 179-180)

It will, therefore, be seen that the Hawaiian Air Force was handicapped by conducting a training program not only for itself but also for other theaters of action; its ships were mainly obsolete, its modern ships were few, and there was a marked deficiency of spare parts, and its airfield construction was lagging. Such was the status on December 7, 1941, of the Army Air Force installations.



B. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING,  
DECEMBER 7, 1941.

1. Army Aircraft. On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the status of the island defenses was at the minimum.

As General Burgin testified:

"A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy.

"Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7.

"General Frank. On Sunday?

"General Burgin. On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor." (R. 2603)

On that morning, due to Alert #1, all planes, with some minor exceptions, were grouped together wing to wing. There were 80 pursuit planes in commission and 69 out of commission in various states of repair. There were 39 bombers in commission and 33 out of commission. Of the bombers in commission the only ones available for a real mission were 6 flying fortresses and 10 A-20s. The old B-18s were of minor value. There were a few fighter aircraft that morning that were at a remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where a squadron was practicing short landings. It was out of this group that there came the brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant) Welch, who courageously got his ship off the ground, together with his wing man. Major Welch and his wing man shot down a number of Japanese



aircraft.

The Navy had no PBVs in the air that morning, although they usually had four to six for doing reconnaissance. Perhaps this is explained by General Burgin's testimony that while every Sunday morning the antiaircraft artillery had an exercise with the Navy when the Navy sent its carrier-based planes from ship to shore, and this continued up to the Sunday before December 7th, the Navy planes did not get into the air on this particular December 7th. (R. 2603) The fleet was also in the harbor that Sunday, the only vessels of material character that were out being the carriers ENTERPRISE and LEXINGTON. The ENTERPRISE, with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu. Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles southeast of Midway, with the carrier LEXINGTON (R. 444-445); therefore there was not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning. (R. 540)

2. Naval Long-Distance Reconnaissance. The situation as to the long-distance reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the Navy is admirably and frankly explained by Admiral DeLany, who was assistant chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, during this period: Admiral DeLany testified that there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out by the Navy on the morning of December 7th, and no attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack upon Oahu. He further testified, "There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to conduct and maintain such a