

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1627

15 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Book, "The Pearl Harbor Operation"  
(ATIS Doc. #132)

Date: 1 Dec 45 Original  Copy  Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes  No   
Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: ATIS (SCAP)

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CLASSIFICATION: Restricted.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Attack on Pearl Harbor

SUMMARY OR RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains:

Planning stage, (Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1); assembly and outward passage; the attack, (air and submarine); the return voyage; Jap aerial photos of the strike; and illustrations.

See: Date for official declaration of war was announced 10 Nov 1941, in Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3,--"X-Day will be 8 Dec.", (p. 25).

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps

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ALLIED TRANSMISSION AND INTERPRETER SECTION  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
RESEARCH REPORT  
1327 - 1 Dec 45

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

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1327

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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS**

**A.P.O. 500  
1 December 1945**

**Published for the information of all concerned.**

**By command of General MacARTHUR:**


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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

RESEARCH REPORT

<b>SUBJECT:</b> THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION	I.G. No. 6909 6913 B.I.D. No. 0100.0100 0811.0200
DATE OF ISSUE 1 December 1945	No. 132
<b>SUMMARY:</b>  <p>1. This is the second of a series of research reports solely based on documentary evidence held at ATIS, GHQ, prior to 1 January 1945, treating of the planning and execution of the several Japanese strikes which initiated the present hostilities. It was preceded by ATIS Research Report No. 131, entitled "Japan's Decision To Fight."</p> <p>2. It is the purpose of the present report to collate all evidence available at ATIS, GHQ in respect to the planning and execution of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 8 December 1941.</p> <p>3. All evidence adduced in this report is derived from Japanese sources. Consequently dates used are East Longitude Time, except where the contrary is specifically stated.</p>	
HNB/REW/JWW/jg Distribution H	 SIDNEY F. MASHBIR COLONEL, S.C. CO-ORDINATOR
<b>SOURCES:</b> Captured Documents Statements by Prisoners of War Intelligence Reports	
[INFORMATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED ACCORDINGLY]	

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## Section I. THE PLANNING STAGE

### 1. COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

The following excerpts from an account based upon the testimony of an unnamed prisoner of war and published in "Weekly Intelligence" provide a fairly comprehensive insight into the planning of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR:

"When Japanese planes struck clustered United States warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pinpointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

"The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Japanese Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

"The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information proved reliable.

"Most remarkable of the prisoner-of-war's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

"As a yeoman attached to the Staff of Commander in Chief Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became

familiar with Japanese war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

"Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Japanese foes could scarcely have been obscure.

"During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between Commander in Chief Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly 'definitely much keener' than members of other fleet staffs.

"Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when Commander in Chief Combined Fleet ordered all fleet commanders and their key staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's Capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The prisoner of war claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; 'any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in'.

"On 2 September, the final all-important 'games' got underway, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (NIPPON, AMERICA, and ENGLAND) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Japanese naval officer, were made up as follows:



THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

“ UMPIRES :

<u>NAVAL GENERAL STAFF:</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>OFFICIAL DUTIES</u>
NAGANO, Osami	Admiral	
FUKUTOME, Shigeru	Rear-Admiral	Head of First Section (War Plans and Operations). <sup>Division</sup>
UOZUMI, Jisaku	Captain	Member First Section
YAMAMOTO, Chikao	Captain	Head of <del>Sub</del> -Section, First Section
MAYUZUMI, Haruo	Commander	Member <del>Sub</del> -Section, First Section
TAMURA, Saburo	Commander	Member <del>Sub</del> -Section, First Section
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi	Commander	Member <del>Sub</del> -Section, First Section
UOZUMI, Yoriichi	Commander	Member <del>Sub</del> -Section, First Section

NAVY MINISTRY :

TAKATA, Toshitane	Captain	Member of Military Affairs Bureau
SHIKI, Tsuneo	Commander	Member of Military Affairs Bureau
TOIBANA, Kuri	Commander	Member of Office of Military Supply
FUJII, Shigeru	Commander	Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).

N-TEAM :

COMBINED FLEET :

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku	Admiral	Commander in Chief Combined Fleet
ITO, Seiichi	Rear-Admiral	Chief of Staff
KUROJIMA, Kameto	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff
GOTO, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Adjutant
ISOBE, Taro	Commander	Staff Engineering Officer
SUGI, Toma	Commander	Staff Gunnery Officer
SASAKI, Akira	Commander	Staff Air Officer
WADA, Yushiro	Commander	Staff Communication Officer
NAGATA, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer
WATANABE, Yasuji	Commander	Staff Operations and Plans Officer
ARIMA, Takayasu	Commander	Staff Torpedo Officer
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi	Commander	Staff Supply Officer
OTA, Kanai	Commander	Meteorologist attached to Staff

FIRST COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE) :

KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro	Rear-Admiral	Commander
ARISAWA, Naosada	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff

E-TEAM :

SECOND FLEET :

KONDO, Nobutake	Admiral	Commander
YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff
OISHI, Tamotsu	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer

FOURTH FLEET :

INOUE, Semi	Vice-Admiral	Commander
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FIFTH FLEET :

HOSOGAYA, Boshiro	Vice-Admiral	Commander
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ELEVENTH AIR FLEET :

TSUKAHARA, Nishizo	Vice-Admiral	Commander
KUSAKA, Jinichi	Rear-Admiral	Chief of Staff

A-TEAM :

THIRD FLEET (Amphibious forces for southern invasion) :

TAKAHASHI, Ibo	Vice-Admiral	Commander
ISHIHARA, Hajime	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff

SIXTH FLEET :

SHIMIZU, Mitsumi	Vice-Admiral	Commander
KANOAKA, Tomojiro	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff

FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet) :

NAGUMO, Chuichi	Vice-Admiral	Commander
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke	Rear-Admiral	Chief of Staff
GENDA, Minoru	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff

"On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. Prisoner of war was assigned to 'N' Team (Commander in Chief Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE—Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer—handed the prisoner of war an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November Operation Order No. 1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the prisoner of war realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

"On 5 September, the prisoner of war was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japanese apparently expected to catch all major UNITED STATES Fleet units in the PACIFIC in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the ATLANTIC. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that 'N' Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class aircraft carrier and one SORYU Class aircraft carrier were estimated as sunk.

"On 6 and 7 September, the conference of 'N' Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The prisoner of war, who was adept at the abacus—calculating board—was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The prisoner of war believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that—when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded—the basic plan continued as originally intended.

"These early sessions, the prisoner of war said, seemed confined primarily to two

general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, DUTCH EAST INDIES, the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central PACIFIC Islands—including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as an immediate military objective; the Japanese intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The prisoner of war heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked 'that's where friction with GERMANY will begin.'

"The conferences (and 'games') were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the staff were already on board.

"On 15 September, all the staff with four yeomen (not including prisoner of war) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The prisoner of war remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO—then still War Minister—was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

"The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Japanese Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

"On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. Operation Orders No. 2 and No. 3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

"(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his Operation Order—i.e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct East Longitude Time.)

"The prisoner of war once knew the Operation Order intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline it is believed to be substantially as printed.

Notes in parentheses in the following order were added by the editor.

“ ‘Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI BAY  
1 November 1941

‘ COMBINED FLEET SECRET  
OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

‘ The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

‘ War will be declared on X-Day.

‘ This order will become effective on Y-Day.

‘ GENERAL SITUATION :

‘ (a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

‘ In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self-protection for the preservation of our interests in EAST ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC Ocean, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

‘ (b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

‘ BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES in interfering with our program of construction in EAST ASIA. Recently, she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in EAST ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

‘ (c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

‘ Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been under way with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently, she has threatened the fortunes of JAPAN which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

‘ (d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not yet

awakened from the deluding dream of “ Fight the War and Save the Country ” and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a “ scorched earth ” policy for all CHINA.

‘ While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerrilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

‘ (e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

‘ The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan Border is formidable.

‘ The UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

‘ OUR SITUATION :

‘ The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has 11 Air Fleet (Naval Shore-based Air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

‘ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES :

‘ To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater EAST ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the “ Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof—HAKKO ICHIU ”), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

‘ STRATEGY :

‘ The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

‘ If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

‘ If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with “ Strategy

4 *to be adopted in the case of an Enemy Attack.*”

~~to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack.~~

'In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

'Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

'Precaution: Disposal of this Order:

'This Order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

'Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order  
No. 1

'ANNEXED VOLUME

'1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".

'2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having 1 Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 day and will set course, by way of TANKAN Bay (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFU Island, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American Pacific Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

'X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

'3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.

'4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR".  
—"The fate of the Empire".

"No warships in PEARL HARBOR".  
—"The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".

"The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack".—

"Climb Mount FUJI".

"The time to commence the attack is 0520".—"The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520".

"All forces attack".—"Climb Mount NIITAKA!"

etc.

'5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force Commander.

'The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstance whatever.

'6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack, either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION):

'(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.

'(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.

'(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force Commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.

'7. The commander of the Surprise Attack Force (submarine Force), having 6 Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND Sea on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance

before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

'8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

'The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupation Force will probably be PALAU.<sup>(1)</sup>

'9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the China Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and is the responsibility of the Commander, 2 China Expeditionary Fleet.

'10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

'Soviet shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

'It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

'11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of 1 Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND Sea.

'After Y-Day has been determined, the JAPAN Steamship Company passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-PACIFIC liner scheduled to sail in this period).

<sup>(1)</sup> The prisoner is in error on this point. The forces for the invasion of MALAYA departed from HAINAN, while a sizeable portion of the PHILIPPINE Expeditionary Force embarked at MAKO.

'When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another prisoner of war confirms this).

'12. The Commander in Chief of 4 Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of 11 Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

'It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the vast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, UNITED STATES, NETHERLANDS bases were then listed in this paragraph—a few of which follow:)

(1) GUAM—about X plus 2.

(2) WAKE—about X plus 7.

(3) (The dates for the invasions of RA-BAUL and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJI, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

'13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN Islands is scheduled for October 1942.'

'Herewith are two of the above referenced documents:

“THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

'The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to prisoner of war, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows):

'1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, HISAICHI. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.

'2. Plans for escorting large Army con-

voys and the place, time and date for landings.

'3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare, Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes, and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy.

'4. Supply plans.

'Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.

'5. Communications Plans.

'6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The Bandjermasin Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy."

"MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK

(Prisoner of war does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October—and stated in effect):

'It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, 5 Fleet (Northern Force) will counter-attack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy.

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku

Commanding, Combined Fleet"

"Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 1. (Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.):

'1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

'That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

'2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

'3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)

'4. That the campaigns in the NETHER-

LAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

'The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

'5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

'This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

'Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "Waterloo" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

'All of the planes of Carrier Division 1, Carrier Division 2, and Carrier Division 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6 Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (Destroyer Squadron 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of Battleship Division 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the main body of our fleet.

'6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. 6 Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

'7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

will take at least several months for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

'8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.'

"Communications Plans:

(Prisoner of war does not know about these; no details.)

"Supply Plans: (outline):

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

"5 November

"Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 2

"Y-Day will be 23 November."

"10 November

"Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 3

"X-Day will be 8 December."

(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence, Volume 1, No. 22, pages 1-14)

## Section II. ASSEMBLY AND OUTWARD PASSAGE

### 2. ASSEMBLY AT TANKAN BAY<sup>(1)</sup>

#### a. Striking Force Operation Order No. 1

The unnamed Prisoner of War quoted in Paragraph 1 above reproduced from memory "Striking Force Operation Order No. 1", specifying the assembly at HITOKAPPU Bay, as follows:

Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI Bay  
10 November 1941

#### STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

- "1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
- "2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN Bay. (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFU Island KURILES).
- "3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
- "4. Break-down of attack plane units:  
The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit  
Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX  
1st Carrier Attack Unit  
Etc. (details not recalled by Prisoner of War).
- "5. Fleet cruising formation  
(Including retiring formations)

<sup>(1)</sup> TANKAN Bay is also referred to as HITOKAPPU Bay. The latter name represents an alternative manner of reading the ideographs. The bay is located on ETOROFU Island in the KURILES.

"6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.

Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO, Chuichi  
Commanding  
Striking Force"


(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence," Vol I, No. 22, page 11)

#### b. Assembly of Task Force

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), a third class seaman who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the aircraft carrier KAGA, gave the following account of the assembly of the task force at HITOKAPPU Bay. Upon reinterrogation, the prisoner revised his estimates of time in the manner set forth in Paragraph 2d below. All times are East Longitude Time.

"Assembly of Task Force:

"Task force assembled at TANKAN (indicated by prisoner as HITOKAPPU Bay), ETOROFU Island in the KURILES about the middle of November 1941 under the command of Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi. The aircraft carrier KAGA left SASEBO on 7 November, proceeded south of KYUSHU, up the east coast of JAPAN, and arrived at TANKAN on 15 November 1941. The aircraft carrier SORYU, three oilers and one supply ship arrived on 17



(TN Exact tracing from original document)

Figure-1. Sketch showing disposition of Japanese task force at anchor in HITOKAPPU Bay.



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November. The battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA, the aircraft carriers AKAGI and HIRYU, a heavy cruiser (thought by prisoner to be of TONE class) and two destroyers arrived at TANKAN before 20 November.

Three "I" Class submarines joined the

task force upon its departure from TANKAN. At TANKAN units anchored in the position shown in Figure 1, a sketch drawn by the prisoner, .....

Prisoner of War also sketched the terrain and installations surrounding HITOKAPPU Bay. This sketch is set forth as Figure 2.




Figure 2. Sketch of terrain and installations in HITOKAPPU Bay Area.

"HITOKAPPU Bay was surrounded by hills, the highest peak being about 500 meters high. Southwest coast was low lying with a rocky foreshore as far as the center of bay. Low cliffs began here, rising to a maximum of about 200 meters at northeastern side of entrance. Hills were covered with low scrub, not higher than two or three feet, and no trees could be seen. Ground was covered with snow, but there was no ice in bay or ashore. Prisoner of War saw no signs of lakes, rivers or swamps. The coastal area appeared to be uninhabited except by fishermen who lived in three houses near pier. It was, however, impossible to see details of center or northeastern side of bay from KAGA, and view beyond pier was obscured by low hills and an embankment.

"Prisoner of War estimated width of bay to be 6,000 meters and distance between

entrance and opposite shore to be 2,000 meters. He thought there was a large rock close inshore near center of bay. Bay was deeper than most harbors, but he did not know exact depth. There was deep water right up to foreshore.

"Wind was from northwest.

"There was only one pier, situated at southwestern side of bay. It was constructed of concrete and stones, about 15 meters long, 4 meters wide, 2 to 3 meters high, and steps out at the end. Its height was difficult to estimate as waves were fairly high alongside. There was no crane or structure on it. Depth of water at steps was about 5 meters. Prisoner of War had landed at pier on one occasion to burn rubbish, but was not allowed to leave its immediate vicinity or to speak with any local fishermen. It was high tide when he landed.

## ASSEMBLY AT TANKAN BAY

"Ground inshore of pier was stony with short grass showing above snow.

"There were three fishermen's houses inshore and a little to south of pier. They were not visible from KAGA's anchorage, but could be seen from pier. Behind houses earth embankments had been constructed, about 10 feet high. Nothing could be seen beyond embankment except three radio masts. Prisoner of War could not see whether there was a village in vicinity, but stated there was no smoke or other sign of habitation.

"Between houses and embankment there was a narrow and very rough road, which could perhaps be used by cars. Prisoner of War did not know where road led. He saw no cars. There were no fishing boats to be seen.

"Landing would be difficult between pier and southwestern side of entrance, as there were a number of rocks offshore, height above water about 2 feet. Fishing stakes were placed among these rocks. Prisoner of War saw no sand or beach in this area.

"Prisoner of War considered that landing from MLC would be easy between pier and center of bay. There were few rocks offshore, and height of foreshore above water did not exceed about 1 meter. Water appeared to be deep up to shore, but Prisoner of War saw no beaches in immediate vicinity of pier.

"From center of bay to northeastern side of entrance landing would be impossible because of cliffs. Prisoner of War saw no beaches in this area, but was unable to observe details from KAGA's anchorage.

"A radio station was situated behind embankment near pier, but no details of building were visible. Three masts could be seen, but Prisoner of War could not estimate height or arrangement as they were partly obscured by embankment. He saw none of its personnel, but thought it was a naval radio station. He did not know any details of its organization, or number of personnel.

"Prisoner of War saw no defenses, guns, or torpedo tubes mounted ashore. There was no evidence of anti-submarine nets or boom defense. There were no indications of minefields, either across entrance or outside, and no buoys which might mark channels. There were no buildings visible at either side of entrance.

"Prisoner of War saw no airplanes while at TANKAN, and did not know of existence of any airfields or seaplane bases. He could not tell from KAGA's anchorage, or from pier, whether there were any suitable sites

for airfields; ground near southwestern side of entrance was, however, low lying.

"There were no lighthouses or shore lights visible. He thought, but was uncertain, that storm signals were displayed in vicinity of radio station.

"Prisoner saw no airplanes or patrol vessels while at TANKAN, except six torpedo boats which anchored southwest of entrance for about one day. Provisions were embarked in KAGA on 19 November. Prisoner thought she oiled, but was not certain. No shore leave was granted. An order was given however, that no rubbish was to be thrown overboard, but was to be collected and burnt ashore by pier near southwestern side of entrance. Prisoner landed once, on 20 November, for this duty. Officer in charge of working party gave orders that no one was to leave immediate vicinity of pier. Prisoner saw, but did not speak to, about three fishermen who lived in houses nearby. He saw no army or naval shore personnel nor staff of radio station further inland." (ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 2-7)

### c. Greatest Operation Force in History

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987) who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the destroyer KASUMI, wrote out an account of the operation. His written account has been supplemented in respect to several details by additional interrogation:

"Farewell, many memories of the home port. After leaving YOKOSUKA Harbor on the 15th of November our crack 18 Destroyer Division progressed directly towards HITOKAPPU (TANKAN) Bay in the KURILE Islands with the destroyer FUCHIKA leading and followed consecutively by the KASUMI, ARARE, and the YOEN.

"In the early dawn of the 21st we entered TANKAN Bay, our destination. Aircraft carriers, destroyers and other ships entered the bay the following day. This is where our Imperial Navy organized her greatest operation force in history.

(ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published)

### d. State of Readiness

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), (the same prisoner who gave the information quoted in Paragraph 2b above), upon interrogation, revised his version of the time schedule kept by the task force during the PEARL HARBOR operation as follows:

- 11  
1. should be SHIRANUHI  
2. " " KAGERO

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

"15 November 1941—Aircraft carrier KAGA left SASEBO. Proceeded south of KYUSHU and up the east coast of JAPAN...

"22 November—The battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA and the aircraft carriers AKAGI and HIRYU arrived at TANKAN, ETOROFU Islands in the KURILES.

"23 November—Aircraft carrier KAGA arrived at TANKAN.

"24 November—Aircraft carrier SORYU arrived at TANKAN.

"25 November—Aircraft carriers ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU arrived at TANKAN.

"27 November—Task force left TANKAN for Hawaiian Area. Three submarines joined it on leaving the harbor.

"28 November—KAGA assumed Number 2 State of Readiness and antiaircraft look-outs were posted."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 268, page 8)

**e. Task Force Completed**

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki stated that:

"He was aboard the aircraft carrier SHOKAKU, when it participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack and gave the following account (all hours in TOKYO time):

"On 20 November 1941, the SHOKAKU sailed from OITA to an anchorage in the north called TANKAN (Prisoner not sure of location). It arrived about the 25th to find

the battleships KIRISHIMA and HARUNA, the aircraft carriers KAGA, AKAGI, HIRYU, SORYU, ZUIKAKU: two or three cruisers and several destroyers.

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, pages 5-6)

**3. OUTWARD PASSAGE**

**a. Map Showing Date Task Force Departed**

Undated captured map establishes the task force's date of departure from ETOROFU Island as 27 November 1941. The authority responsible for the issuance of this map is not specified, but the source is obviously official.

(SOPAC Translations, Serial No. 04180, Item 643)

**b. Sketch Showing Formation of Task Force**

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, a member of the crew of the aircraft carrier KAGA, quoted in paragraph 2b above, gave the following description of the task force's outward passage. Upon reinterrogation, the prisoner revised his estimate of the dates involved in the manner set forth in paragraph 2d above:

"Task Force sailed at 1400, 22 November 1941, being joined by three submarines upon leaving. Formation on leaving and during passage is depicted in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Formation of Japanese task force during outward passage.

"Task Force proceeded east until 4 December, when course was altered to south. It did not zigzag. Speed was 13 knots. JAPAN time was kept throughout. No airplane patrols were carried out during outward passage. From 23 November antiaircraft look-outs were posted—three men in each of seven antiaircraft machine gun positions on either side. Tricks were two hours. No binoculars were issued to look-outs.

"On 28 November KAGA assumed No. 2 State of Readiness. Gun crews were closed

up in two watches. Ships were darkened from now on.

"On 2 December the Commanding Officer of the KAGA, Captain OKADA, Jisaku, addressed ship's company. He announced that Commander in Chief Combined Fleet had been summoned by the Emperor, who informed him that war would be declared against AMERICA on 8 December; the KAGA was now proceeding towards HAWAII; that at 1 a.m. on Saturday, airplanes would be flown off to attack PEARL HARBOR.

Prisoner stated that he was a little frightened on hearing this, but as a Japanese, he took war for granted.

KAGA oiled 27 November, and again 3 December. Prisoner did not know when other ships of Task Force oiled. Oilers and supply ship left Task Force during night of 4 December and prisoner did not see them again.

"Task Force altered course to south on 4 December."  
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 3-4)

**c. Approached PEARL HARBOR**

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987), who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the destroyer KASUMI, wrote the following account of the task force's outward passage:

"On the morning of the 26th the operational commanding officer, Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi passed the brief order, 'Attack PEARL HARBOR.'

"Thus, we left our Fatherland behind and advanced through high waves of the PACIFIC. Our advance was led by the destroyer OBORO consecutively followed by the 16 destroyer division; the light cruiser ABUKUMA; the battleship, HIEI; the aircraft carriers, AKAGI, KAGA, ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, SORYU, and HIRYU; the battleship, KIRISHIMA; the 18 destroyer division; 2 submarines; 1 heavy oil tanker; and the heavy cruisers, TONE and CHIKUMA on both flanks.

"First the destroyers fired their ball ammunition, followed by the fire of the cruisers and then by that of the battleships ending with the take-off and landing practice of the airplanes from the aircraft carriers at dusk. After 10 or more days of traveling through rough weather and sea in an easterly course on the Northern PACIFIC, we finally approached PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII."  
(ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published)

**d. Men Informed of Strike**

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier SHOKAKU, gave the following account of the task force's outward

passage:

"On 27/28 November the fleet sailed, taking a northerly course south of the ALEUTIANS. On December 4 the Captain of the SHOKAKU informed the crew of the intended strike, and prisoner says that he was worried because he feared that an American counterattack would follow. On the night of 5 December the ships turned south.....

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM 101022, 10 January 1944, pages 5-6)

**e. Method of Fueling**

The article quoted at length in Paragraph 1 above summarizes the task force's outward voyage as follows:

"The Task Force sortied from ETOROFU Island, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (East Longitude Time), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice-Admiral NAGUMO (Commander in Chief First Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (Carrier Division 1) SORYU, HIRYU (Carrier Division 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrier Division 5 less HOSHO); two battleships; HIEI, KIRISHIMA (Battleship Division 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruiser Division 8, plus ABUKUMA); elements of Destroyer Squadron 1; and about twenty submarines.

"One of the Japanese' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a chief petty officer on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel. These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. Oilers coming alongside the Task Force to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use."  
(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence," Volume 1, No. 22, pages 13-14)

*under cover of bad weather*

## Section III. THE ATTACK

### 4. THE AIR-SURFACE STRIKE

#### a. Task Force Sails

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, quoted in paragraph 2b above, a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier KAGA, described the attack on PEARL HARBOR as follows:

"During the night of 7/8 December, the three submarines proceeded on independent patrols in vicinity of Task Force. They were not seen again by prisoner.

"The same night Task Force increased to full speed of 26 knots and commenced zig-zagging. Ship's company of KAGA went to action stations and remained closed up all day. Prisoner was at 20 centimeter gun and saw nothing further. He thought Task Force remained in formation throughout 8 December and did not scatter and that battleships were stationed one on either beam of leading ships.

"Airplanes were flown off at 0100 hours, 8 December 1941 (JAPAN time), and returned about 0500 or 0600. About 30 airplanes failed to return, 15 of which belonged to KAGA. Prisoner of War attributed high proportion of losses from KAGA to fact that her airplanes were last to take off." (ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, page 4).

#### b. Glorious Success

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi, quoted in paragraph 3c above, wrote the following description of the attack on PEARL HARBOR:

"On the early dawn of December 8, we reached a point 400 kilometers off-shore of the HAWAIIAN Islands. As the sun rose the wide expanse of the sky cleared and the sea was calm. The weather was good as if planned for the great initial victory of YAMATO's airplanes.

"As the battle flag rose on the mast of the flagship AKAGI, the carrier-borne planes left the decks one after another from each of the carriers and in a magnificent formation of approximately 300 airplanes disappeared in the direction of PEARL HARBOR. Immediately, reports of glorious

successes came in.

"Again, the second attack unit made up of approximately 200 attack and fighter planes of the ship departed bravely to conquer.

".....another great and glorious victory. However, who would know of the remembrances of the holy sacrifices of the Imperial Army behind the glories. Approximately 15 of our planes and 5 special submarines failed to return. Only one enemy flying boat came to attack."

(ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published).

#### c. General Quarters

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, who participated in the PEARL HARBOR strike as a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier SHOKAKU, stated that:

"General quarters came at 2300 hours, 7 December 1941, and the planes took off at 0200 hours, 8 December. As soon as the last plane had taken off the fleet turned northward. Planes returned between 0600 and 0900 hours. Ten planes of the SHOKAKU failed to return."

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, page 6).

#### d. Succeed in Surprise Attack

Commander NAKAYA, Kenju, commander of the leading air formation in the attack on PEARL HARBOR, wrote an account of the strike which was subsequently edited by the Naval Information Department and published by BUNGEI SHUNJU SHA. A full translation follows:

"WE SUCCEEDED IN THE SURPRISE ATTACK"

"We received the orders to attack the Island of OAHU at sea. At the time, my ship was sailing directly eastward. The long-awaited orders finally came. Notwithstanding all, when I received these orders, I experienced the sensation of becoming hot from excitement and deep emotion. All hands formed ranks on the deck and received these orders. At this time, the signal flag, which went up high on the masthead,

*Signal for  
Battle Stations  
(alarm signal)*

## THE AIR-SURFACE STRIKE

was truly the 'Z' flag. The 'Z' flag which went up 36 years ago in the JAPAN Sea, when the fate of the Empire was at stake, floated again; this time on the PACIFIC. While all hands were looking up at the 'Z' flag waving in the strong wind of the ocean, unawares their eyes were running with tears. Our air unit commander <sup>was directly</sup> ~~intimately~~ issued the following order:

'Each member of the crew make a vow to exert yourself to the utmost in carrying out your duties.' At that time, the rapture of being able to take part in an important, unique battle rose up within me.

"Soon after the 'Z' flag was lowered, I became conscious, for the first time, of the charging speed of the aircraft carrier which was going eastward at full speed. The morale of the officers and men rose up high, verging on the point of suggesting the engulfing of the enemy.

"The weather at that time was poor and variable. However, the triumphant officers and men took no notice of it. The maintenance crew, saying that they would also fight with the aircraft crew, gave us white head bands. The orders to start finally came. The orders of the commander at the time were: 'Succeed in the surprise attack operation; all hands charge.' The large waves just before dawn caused the aircraft carrier to roll and pitch sideways. The sea was still gloomy; the wind which went whistling by my ears was strong, and the weather was as bad as usual. This was to be expected, for a 17-meter northeasterly (sic) was blowing hard and strong. Vast, dark clouds hung over from an altitude between 1500 and 2000 meters. It wasn't the best situation for the large formation of airplane groups to leave the aircraft carrier to rush into that narrow PEARL HARBOR. If this had been the customary practice or training, flying would have been postponed; but, this morning, the training of many years was continued. It made no difference whether the weather was good or bad.

"Starting time 0 hour 00 minutes. One plane after another left from the unsteady deck which was pitching and rolling lengthwise and sideways. As they were arranging their formation in the air, my eyes unconsciously followed the friendly planes which were going up one after the other, and looked up at them encouragingly as if they were saying: 'Go to it!' Our planes which had already organized their formation rushed, at full speed, straight for HAWAII. However, the greatest anxiety of the com-

mander was during the time it took for them to reach HAWAII. Could there have been an error in the position of the aircraft carrier, after it had made a surprisingly long-distance journey of nearly 4000 miles to near the shores of HAWAII where the weather is bad? If there was a mistake, our airplanes would be unable to reach OAHU Island. Before long, the men in the airplanes greeted a magnificent sunrise. Usually in the South Seas area one can see over 30 miles, or even a long distance view of 50 miles when the view is clear. But at this time, a screen of vast, dark clouds almost cut off the view. Since HAWAII is ridged by mountains of a height of 1000 meters, the island should be seen at least 20 minutes before reaching it.

"Thinking that we should soon be reaching the Hawaiian Islands, I was straining my eyes through a telescope, when suddenly the shoreline appeared distinctly before us. Now! Now was the time for all hands to attack! The formation immediately deployed. Each unit, depending upon its duties, some at a high altitude, some at a lower altitude, changed over into a resolute attack formation. PEARL HARBOR was still asleep in the morning mist. It was calm and serene inside the harbor, not even a trace of smoke from the ships at anchor. The orderly groups of barracks; the wriggling white line of the automobile road climbing up to the mountain-top; fine objectives of attack from all directions. In line with these, inside the harbor, were capital ships of the PACIFIC Fleet, strung out and anchored two ships side by side in an orderly manner. The torpedo airplanes cut through the scattered clouds and went charging through in a straight line. A formation torpedo attack was very difficult because PEARL HARBOR is so shallow and narrow. Thereupon, the torpedo airplanes separated individually, some flew so low they skimmed the surface of the waters, others approached within 200 to 300 meters of the belly of the battleships, and discharged their torpedoes when they thought, this is it. Instantaneously, two white streaks of the wake of the torpedoes went rushing along the surface of the water. As I was feasting my eyes upon this scene, a terrific column of water flew up into the air from the side of a capital ship. It was an excellent hit upon the capital ship's side. The column of water went up high enough to compete with the altitude of the clouds. Columns of water continued to gush forth

## THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

one after another. If it were to be timed, it was an incident of three to four seconds. Notwithstanding this, the antiaircraft defense guns were still asleep. Even the fighter planes did not come up to challenge us. The surprise attack was a complete success. The great success of the surprise attack should be said to have been accomplished spectacularly. A message — 'We succeeded in the surprise attack' — was radioed to the aircraft carrier.

"Following this, the dive-bombers rushed straight on in a bee-line. Shortly after this, reddish-black flames were flaring up from the hangars of the enemy airdrome, and from the airplanes which were lined up on the airdrome. When these torpedo airplanes and dive bombers were about to deal freely their first blow and were seemingly standing on their noses about to dive, enemy antiaircraft fire began to burst around us. Next, finally came our large bombers. I was in the spearhead of the formation, and I fixed my sights on a giant battleship below. Since the air currents were rough, I could not fix my sights for horizontal bombing. Thinking that I could not afford to waste any bombs, I began all over again. As we circled midst the anti-aircraft fire, the following formations did the same, and circled calmly midst the anti-aircraft bursts. This time we succeeded. Just as we were about to release our bombs, our plane received a severe jolt. As I glanced backwards, there was a column of smoke rising into the sky 500 meters high.

"This is something which we learned later. But this was one of the successes of the battle which was the result of close co-ordination tactics between the fighter plane formations, torpedo plane formations, dive bomber formations and special submarines which carried out an extremely difficult undersea attack. The powder magazine of an enemy warship had exploded, and the bottom half of it had already burst open, spreading a wide oil film on the surface of the water. It was definitely of the ARIZONA class. The enemy antiaircraft fire finally became intense, and shells burst around our formation in such large numbers that it seemed as though they were throwing rocks at us. Presently a large hole was torn on the port side of the fuselage of the flight commander's plane. Following this, it appeared as though No. 5 plane had been hit; fuel was leaking from its tanks. Nevertheless, it continued in the formation. It seems that he was determined to crash

his plane after fulfilling his mission. When I signalled, 'Let me know your situation;' he calmly answered, 'It is only the auxiliary tank.' His attitude was completely serene, which seemed to ignore life and death.

"Next, we directed our attention upon Target No. 2, WHEELER AIRFIELD, which was situated in the center of the Island. Over 200 fighter planes and bombers were lined up here, but our dive bombers and fighter planes had already bombed and strafed them. Red flames were rising from the planes which had been wheeled out on the airdrome, and dense, black smoke rose from hangars. It was a scene of complete destruction. It was probably gasoline which was burning. Black smoke was spreading to the extent of almost screening the sky. This situation was the reason why the enemy planes could not take off to counterattack. Since these enemy objectives were in such a condition, we again turned our attention to the enemy capital ships.

"Two warships which were anchored side by side offered an excellent target, one which could never be repeated. While one formation aimed at the first ship, the other attacked the second ship. After the torpedo-airplanes and dive bombers had attacked, our large bombers would attack; it was a continuous attack. When No. 1 bomber attacked, a column of water 100 meters in height rose up. If the succeeding planes should dive then, they would be damaged, so they calmly waited until the column of water subsided. Therefore, the period of time during which they would be troubled by enemy antiaircraft fire would be prolonged. Nevertheless, they waited calmly in the air. Just about this time, the torpedo airplane attack reached its height of intensity. They boldly closed in on the enemy and dropped their torpedoes, and when they were about to level off from the dive, they were fired upon. The fuselage of one of our airplanes was enveloped in smoke. The torpedo airplane which became a mass of fire still continued to accurately release its torpedoes, and finally charged directly into an enemy ship and blew itself into a burst of flames. I definitely witnessed this with my own eyes.

"Just about the time that we had accomplished our attack-mission and were about to return, the first rays of the morning sun had already touched upon PEARL HARBOR. As I glanced back, I saw one battleship cut in half surrounded with black

oil; besides that, there were two sunken ships with their ugly, red bellies showing. Then, there was another ship tilted at a 45 degree angle, gradually sinking, and three ships were burning furiously. Every enemy ship along the coast of FORD ISLAND was damaged.

"We circled over PEARL HARBOR several times, as long as our fuel supply permitted. The reason for this was that, although we had clearly seen these with our own eyes, there was a faint hope that one of our crippled airplanes might return. When we returned safely to our aircraft carrier, the second attack formation took off. The reason for the sending of successive attack formations was to thrust home the final blow to the remaining strength of the enemy PACIFIC Fleet."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, pages 3-5)

#### e. Grand Air Raid

Excerpt from communique issued by the Naval Section of Imperial General Headquarters at 1300 hours on 8 December 1941 reads as follows:

"1. At daybreak of the eighth, the Imperial Navy made a desperate, grand air raid upon the American fleet and military strength in the HAWAII Area....."

This communique was supplemented on 18 December 1941 by the following estimate of damages inflicted by the strike:

"Sunk—five battleships, two A or B-class cruisers. Severely damaged—three battleships, two light cruisers, two destroyers. Medium damages—one battleship, four B-class cruisers. Besides these, 450 enemy planes were burnt by bombing and strafing, and 14 planes were shot down. Moreover, it was reported this day that our special assault unit, organized with special submarines, torpedoed and sunk a battleship of the ARIZONA class. However, word that five special submarines have not yet returned, and our losses were 29 airplanes greatly impressed our people".

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, page 2).

#### f. Propaganda Photographs

Various captured propaganda pamphlets and photograph albums have contained aerial photographs of damages inflicted by Japanese air attacks on PEARL HARBOR. These were given wide circulation for publicity purposes in JAPAN. A selection of these are reproduced as Appendix A. Translations of the captions are attached in each case.

## 5. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

### a. PEARL HARBOR Scouted Before Attack

Captured book entitled "Characteristics of Submarines and Anti-Submarine Operations" undated, issuing authority not specified, contains the following passage.

"Reconnaissance and Scouting:

Before the surprise attack on HAWAII, JAPAN's best submarines (about thirty of them) had been assigned to scouting and reconnaissance duty at PEARL HARBOR." (ATIS Document No. 15807, not previously published)

### b. Chart of Proposed Submarine Activities

The Japanese plan of operations called for an attack on American naval units inside the harbor by midget submarines.

"This submarine beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the prisoner but it is believed that the submarine was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this submarine's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear failed.

"The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a UNITED STATES Navy Hydrographic Office chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The submarine also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the submarine was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

"At least three Japanese midget submarines were lost by our counteractions at this time. One submarine actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japanese admitted the loss of five of these undersize submarines."

(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence," Volume 1, No. 22, pages 14-15).

### c. Special Attack Unit

Captain HIRAIDE, Hideo, Chief of the Naval Information Section of Imperial Gener-



## THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

al Headquarters wrote and issued the following account entitled "Heroes of the Special Attack Unit:"

"At the time of the iconoclastic blow against outrageous AMERICA, which disregarded our great motive and mission of world peace and even attempted the life of the Japanese Empire, we furiously struck the first blow at the heart of the enemy at the risk of our lives. With all reverence to those of the Special Naval Attack Unit who lost their lives in this great accomplishment, I make this report.

"Imperial General Headquarters communique (1500 hours, 6 March 1942).

"The glorious, incomparable, strong attack upon PEARL HARBOR by the Special Naval Attack Unit has already been officially published. The plans of attack, which struck terror in the hearts of all the nations throughout the world, were conceived and executed by Lieutenant IWASA and several other officers. The plans were conceived by these men out of their sense of patriotic and loyal duty, several months in advance, in case of such an emergency; and were secretly submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets through their superior officers.

"After the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets had carefully studied these plans, he found that they would be successful and could be followed; so he accepted the fervent desires of the submitters. The non-commissioned officers who took part in this great enterprise were the most superior personnel in the Imperial Navy. All of the men had unshakeable faith in the officers who took part in the battle, and hoped and prayed that they would be able to live and die with their officers. In these plans, there were no volunteers because each officer submitted a request for the non-commissioned officers to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets, which he approved. As a result of the preparatory training and manufacturing experiments, which were carried out night and day without sleep and rest within a short period of time, both by the tacticians and technicians, and even by the workers, —while maintaining strict secrecy within the department,—they were able to complete their work before the beginning of this battle. The spirit of patriotism and loyalty of the officers and men taking part in the attack, the enthusiasm of those connected with the technical work, together with the distinguished ability of the Imperial Navy can be boasted throughout the world.

"Although, at the time of the attack, every available means would be utilized, security measures would have to be made more firm after the attack upon the main forces of the enemy. It is almost impossible to even imagine the extreme difficulties encountered in skirting about the widely scattered sunken hulls of ships within the narrow channel, and to escape and return from the fierce counterattack by the enemy. It is natural that sailors of the Imperial Navy should make preparation for the self-destruction of their ships if the worst should come to the worst.

"Thus, the Special Attack Unit, which was confident of the divine grace of the August virtue of His Majesty, undertook this daring enterprise with sealed lips on 0 day of 0 month, and rushed into PEARL HARBOR. It was through calm and clever maneuvering that they were able to break through the strict enemy security net and the complicated water route; all the ships were able to penetrate into the harbor from a pre-arranged disposition. Some attacked during broad daylight, while others made a night attack, and executed a daring enterprise unparalleled in history. After the completion of their duties, their fate rested with their ships. The sinking of the ARIZONA class battleship during the night attack was even clearly established by friendly naval units, which were far outside of the harbor. At 1631, 8 December (Hawaiian time 2101, 7 December), two minutes after the moon rose, a great explosion took place within PEARL HARBOR. Flames went high up into the sky and incandescent fragments of steel scattered high through the air. In a short time the blaze became extinct. It was established that, at the time, the enemy, thinking that the attack was being made by our air units, opened up a fierce fire. And on the same day at 1811 (Hawaiian time 2241), a radio message that the attack was a success was sent by one of the ships of the Special Attack Unit. After 1914, the radio message was interrupted. There was some belief the ship was self-destroyed or sunk. Although it has been reported that the result of the daylight attack against the enemy fleet was slight, we strongly believe that it was a huge success. However, because of the confusion within the harbor, it was very difficult to discriminate between the successes gained by the air unit and the Special Attack Unit. At the time of their departure, they received orders to return upon the completion of the attack, but none of them returned because

they had no such intentions. Some approached (within a proximity unprecedented in history) and attacked enemy ships under the hail of bombs and torpedoes from friendly air units; others remained concealed in the water until the moon rose. Thus, the entire personnel of the unit made a definite attack upon those enemy capital ships which were slightly damaged during the daylight attack. Their concentration upon contributing to the success of the attack transcended beyond life and death.

"The unprecedented, peerless, sacrificial spirit of attack thoroughly demonstrated the tradition of the Imperial Navy, and should be recognized as one of the greatest achievements of the outbreak of this war.

"Furthermore, I wish to add that, as I recall the great achievements of the guardian spirit of our nation at this third month death commemoration of the Special Attack Unit, which our population of 100,000,000 cannot forget even though they might try, there is another new inspiration.

"These young men were always warmly received by their officers; they were subjects of respect by their comrades and subordinates. They all had excellent characters. But without the thought of fame, promotion, pleasure, and even without self-interest, they cast aside the thought of 'self', and only presented their whole body and soul to their Emperor and country; they bravely died for their country at the age of twenty some years.

"This attack, as in the report, was conceived by Lieutenant IWASA and other officers. They elaborated a plan by themselves. Wishing to do their loyal and patriotic duty, these men planned this achievement which was regarded as humanly impossible. Thereafter, during a period of several months, these men secretly carried out difficult training, indescribable beyond mere words, in order that there might not be any chance errors.

"Thus, as the battle began, they rushed into PEARL HARBOR and carried out the fierce attack, in which they all but threw themselves against the bottoms of the enemy ships; after which they calmly met their deaths. I wish to give my impressions of the situation of the attack, considering the reports from the American side today. When the Special Attack Unit attempted to slip into the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, they found submarine nets stretched across and many mines laid there; indeed, the enemy security measures were very thorough.

But, this group of well trained young men of the Special Attack Unit, through calm and clever maneuvering through these obstructions, easily penetrated into the harbor.

"At the same time, I believe these young men said, "Our mission is already completed,"—and smiled at each other. The commander and his subordinates were truly of one mind, and the ships and personnel were one. The confusion of the water route within the harbor was nothing; controlling their beating hearts, trying not to become delayed behind the others, all the ships penetrated on deeper into the harbor.

"Wasn't it the group of enemy capital ships, lined up orderly in two rows, which was presently reflected in their periscopes? We can easily imagine the satisfaction of these young men. Each ship finally began the attack. Some ships closed in on a large warship located in the middle of the row of ships, and inflicted the first fierce blow; other ships bored into the bellies of other ships nearby. At this time, a glimpse of the activity of friendly planes in the sky was seen in the periscope. The friendly planes appeared to be in the midst of a daring attack. The courage of the young men had grown a hundred-fold; they clenched their teeth and stood fast, determined not to allow even one ship to escape. It was time to begin the next attack. An enemy destroyer, probably having seen our periscope, was coming to crash into our side. There were some submarines, not having time to resist, which dived deeper to escape disaster.

"At this time, enemy shells rained down and our air unit attack became fierce; torpedoes and bombs flying around inside the harbor caused great confusion. I believe that the underwater attack by each vessel was a gigantic success; however, it is a difficult situation to discriminate between the success of the air units and the underwater attack.

"The members of a submarine of the Special Attack Unit which awaited the sunset, restrained themselves on the bottom of the sea, while listening to the fierce daylight battle; they passed the time away by occupying themselves with jig-saw puzzles which they had brought along. This is truly something which cannot be easily done. Finally, after nightfall and waiting for the moon to rise, the situation changes over to the attack. That submarine approached within close quarters looking for enemy capital ships which might have been slightly

damaged during the daylight attack. The large hull of an enemy ship, flooded by moonlight, became a clear silhouette and an excellent target of attack. At the command, "Open fire!" by 00 commander, the final attack was carried out. There was no error in the attack which was full of the spirit of certain death for the enemy within sight. A thunderous explosion shook the interior of the harbor and columns of flames, several hundred meters in height, scorched the sky. Simultaneously, a conning tower began to calmly appear above the surface of the water, kicking up white-crested waves. The calm and courageous commander confirmed the last moments of the enemy ship, which broke in two, crumbled and began to sink.

"The long-cherished objective was now realized. What were the thoughts of these brave, young men in the moonlight? They were thinking about the several months of hardships which they underwent for this day; and now, these young men stood before the glory of death. The thunderous sinking of this enemy ship was distinctly confirmed by our units outside of the harbor; they even distantly saw, at the same time, flames shoot up and fragments of incandescent steel fly high up into the air. The time was 8 December (HAWAIIAN Time 2101, 7 December); two minutes after the moon rose.

"The battle was over. However, the young men of the Special Attack Unit did not return. The final message from one of the submarines—"We succeeded in the attack."—was at 2241 Hawaiian time. The members of the unit, surpassing life and death, devoted themselves to the annihilation of the enemy ships to the ultimate end; they had no thoughts of returning alive. It is confirmed that some of them were sunk, while others destroyed themselves. There were not a few instances of going into the jaws of certain death. However, they calmly attained the deep-rooted conviction of the noblest and purest region of self-effacement (non-egoism). This great spirit of complete sacrifice, which even makes the gods weep, is indeed the flower of BUSHIDO (Chivalry) and the essence of our racial (national) spirit. There isn't even one instance of such in world history. As we recall these meritorious services, we experience a quivering of the blood throughout our bodies.

"The unequalled, pure loyalty of the daring enterprise by the Special Attack Unit has graciously reached His Majesty's ears. When the spirits of these young men now under the ground, who came into this

world to protect His Majesty and to be the corner-stone of peace of the Fatherland, hear about this—how they must be choked with tears of joy! Although these young men were on the threshold of death, and not life, they carried on calmly and self-possessed, no differently than as though they were on a march during their daily training.

"Just before the departure, these young men gathered together with their comrades in arms to chat. One young fellow saying,—'After the attack I will go ashore and make this talk,'—innocently pulled out a pistol and palmed it. Another, after changing his underclothing said,—'I should wear my uniform, but since it is hot, I shall be excused in my fatigue clothes',—and placidly continued to dress himself. Another young one, in reply to,—'Be careful not to be caught in any bombing and torpedo attack,'—by one of this comrades, replied, 'No fear, by that time there will be a big hole in the enemy's hull!' He carefreely engulfed them in smoke and laughed. There was even one who had enough improvised amusement in reserve to recite a stanza, 'I heard ROOSEVELT whimpering before the King of Hell the following day!'

"It was said that another chap who liked his liquor, in reply to an encouraging remark,—'Let's celebrate after your return from a successful battle,'—by one of his comrades, did not smilingly reply, as he usually did,—'Yes, let's drink.' These young men probably thought that they should not utter remarks such as 'return' or 'if I should live.'

"Another young fellow, it is said, tapping the shoulders of his comrades who were remaining behind, encouraged them by saying. 'Let's hold out together until the ultimate end; we will meet next at YASUKUNI SHRINE!'

"Presently, it was the time of departure. It is usually the custom when leaving for ordinary battle, to report to the superior officer, 'I am leaving (with the intentions of returning).' However, these young men boldly reported, 'Lieutenant So and So or Sub Lieutenant So and So, I go now! (to death, without the intention of returning)'. And they did not say, 'I am leaving (with the intention of returning).'

"Go to it!"

"O. K."

"Greetings were exchanged with those going to great achievements. It was a moment of deep, heroic emotion to those leaving, those remaining, those who were

sending the others off, and to those who were being sent off. Even at a time like this, when these young men were about to leave, they remained self-possessed. It is said that one young officer spiritedly climbed into the boat after saying, 'Carrying lunches, soda water, and receiving chocolates is just like going on a hike.' At this time, the happy memory of excursions during his childhood probably flickered in the thoughts of this young man. Heaving their breasts with dear memories of excursions and dancing with joy, these young men jumped into the jaws of death. It was learned later that these young men had disposed of their personal matters in perfect order. There were some who had left written expressions of gratitude to superior officers and comrades, and official recordings of their viewpoints; however, there was very little which appeared like wills. Among them is a swan song by some youth.

"If it be for the Emperor,

Why regret the lives of young warriors?  
If their deaths be not in vain.

Now we go through the nets and mines,  
Smashing into pearly gems after the strike.

Ah! The happiness of this morning sky,  
Meeting again at YASUKUNI SHRINE.

(TN YASUKUNI SHRINE is a Shinto Shrine in TOKYO where the spirits of the dead soldiers and sailors are enshrined).

"I believe that this expressed the deep emotions of all the young men. This understanding, this faith is easily expressed in words. However, these young men actually executed these in a tacit manner.

"I believe that, from the speech and behaviour of these young men, they not only desired to win in battle, but also to execute this with the belief that they had to oust and destroy American and British principles and ideas of selfishness, which penetrated the spirit of the Japanese people through their culture and thoughts over a long period of years.

"Isn't the first step towards the success of the Greater EAST ASIA War dependent upon the ousting of the visible American and British tyrannical power from EAST ASIA, and, at the same time, the sweeping away of the invisible, egotistic, materialistic American and British ideas from our thoughts? It probably can be said that the actions of these young men, from this standpoint, were shining examples.

"At this time, we must bear in mind that the great spirit of self-sacrifice, in which one destroys oneself and dies for one's

country is largely due to the powerful influence of mothers. Everyone of these young men were famous, as if by common consent, for their filial piety. It is said that a certain young man always returned to his home when he had a leave, even when it was but a short period, and derived great pleasure by spending the day with his mother. But this is enough to give you a general idea of the matter. The power behind the scene of the mothers of these young men, who tenderly raised them, is immense. Especially when she continued to work, disregarding herself, for her home, husband, and children. The supreme happiness which these mothers sought in their self-sacrificial, spiritual influence, became a great power which grew within these young men. How could these pure and loyal heroes be born without these great mothers of JAPAN? These mothers, who efface themselves to live only for their children, are mothers who live for the nation. What a great difference there must be when the morale of these young men should be compared with the enemy American and British soldiers, who immediately run at the sight of superior opponents, and who actually keep their distance when they realize that their lives are in danger. Behind this scene, the casualness of the relationship between the selfish, pleasure-seeking American and British mothers and their children, should not be overlooked.

"In AMERICA, a sailor's occupation is defined as one in which a person travels around the world for nothing, receives an enormous pay, and leads a pleasant and happy life. It has even been clearly shown by the speech and actions of survivors from several naval battles up to this time that they are strongly influenced by the self first idea; that is, 'while there is life, there is hope.'

"Isn't there all the difference in the world between the young men who loyally gave their lives for their country, and the natures of the American and British soldiers who make it their philosophy of life to further their own happiness?

"Since the outbreak of the Greater EAST ASIA War, the entire world can only remain amazed at our continued victories. But, behind all this, if they could understand the continuous flow of traditional spirit of first giving their valuable lives in the defense of their country, they would undoubtedly lower their heads in respect for the blood of the YAMATO (Japanese) race.

"However, when we realize that the source,

from which this incomparable and infinite strength gushes forth, lies in the Emperor, we cannot but be deeply stirred by the August Virtue of His Majesty.

"As we look back upon history over 2600 years, since Emperor JIMMU led his armies from MIMITSU HARBOR, the stalwart and heroic spirit of YAMATO has continued to this day! That which flares up and continues to burn is the fierce and high spirit which is exemplified in the following phrases. 'When we put out to sea, we do not intend to return.' 'Die only by the side of our Emperor.'

"The glory of this spirit increases with the advancement of the Japanese Empire. When the opportunity presents itself, this spirit will blossom forth in all its glory, just as in these young men.

"It is pre-destined that no matter how long this Greater EAST ASIA War lasts, no matter if additional strong enemies should appear, the moment the Fatherland should need them, these young men who have served their country will be reborn again and again to defend their country. There isn't the least bit of danger in the lack of such men.

"These young men of the Special Attack Unit are 'Gods of War,' and, at the same time, they are 'Gods who establish Peace.' That which follows the Greater EAST ASIA War must be everlasting peace throughout the world. Then, these 'Gods of War' will be 'Gods of Peace'. The present destruction is not destruction for the sake of destruction, but it is destruction for the sake of construction.

"These young men who defend our nation are the children, the older brothers, and younger brothers of the Japanese people. From the standpoint of the individual who is bewildered, how encouraging it is that it has been clearly shown that such pure, loyal and incomparable blood flows through the veins of our people when the nation is faced with a national emergency.

"I repeat again. It is easy to become

temporarily aroused, but it is difficult to face death calmly. This is still the beginning of one phase of a long period of war. I respectfully end this report, and I pray for the repose of the souls of the nine young men."


(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, pages 6-11).

#### d. Photographs of Special Attack Unit Heroes

The Japanese admit loss of five midget submarines and their crews in the attack on PEARL HARBOR. From the tenor of the article quoted in Paragraph 5c above, it appears probable that this was the total number involved. Each submarine carried a crew of two men, or ten in all for the five ships. Nine of these men have been officially deified as 'military gods'. Their photographs, taken from a captured document, are reproduced as Figure 4. The tenth member of the crew, whose fate has been officially ignored by the Government, is the prisoner of war referred to in Paragraph 5b above.

The manner in which the Japanese had learned by 6 March 1942 that only nine of the ten crew members had died is not clear. At that time the Navy Department officially eulogized the nine young "Gods of War," and were even able to publish their photographs, indicating that they knew which of the two men manning the midget submarine beached on OAHU the day following the attack had survived. On the official publicity the fate of this survivor was pointedly ignored. In view of the fact that all radio communication from the midget submarines had ceased on the night of 8 December, it seems doubtful that the information could have been transmitted in this fashion. They may have gained it as a result of the normal exchange of prisoner of war information specified by the Geneva Convention. If not, however, this may represent an instance of successful espionage.

特別攻撃隊九軍神



稻垣	片山	上田	佐々木	横山	廣尾	古野	横山	岩佐
清兵衛	義雄	定兵衛	直吉	薫範	彰	繁美	正治	直治
(左下)	(右下)	(左上)	(中上)	(右上)	(左下)	(右下)	(左下)	(右下)
曹長	曹長	曹長	特務少尉	特務少尉	大尉	少佐	少佐	中佐

Figure 4. Pictures and names of the Special Attack Unit. Nine gods of the armed forces. (T.N.: These men were killed in action and were deified as gods in the national shrine for war heroes, YASUKUNI SHRINE, TOKYO, JAPAN.)—1. Commdr. IWASA, Naoji. 2. Lt. Commdr. YOKOYAMA, Masaji. 3. Lt. Commdr. FURUNO, Shigemii. 4. Lt. HIROO, Akira. 5. Sub. Lt. 2nd Cl. Sp. YOKOYAMA, Shigenori. 6. Sub. Lt. 2nd Cl. Sp. SASAKI, Naokichi. 7. W. O. KAMITA, Sadamu. 8. W. O. KATA-YAMA, Yoshio. 9. W. O. INAGAKI, Kiyoshi.

## Section IV. THE RETURN VOYAGE

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### 6. THE RETURN VOYAGE

a. Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, quoted in Paragraph 2b above, described the task force's voyage home as follows:

"On completion of attack, the task force proceeded in general direction of TRUK. The weather became very hot. Full speed of 26 knots was maintained until 10 December, when it was reduced to 18 knots. Zigzagging was carried out in vicinity of HAWAII when reports of two enemy submarines were received, off WAKE Island, and on approaching JAPAN.

"WAKE Island was bombed by airplanes from carriers in passing, but the prisoner knew no details except that nothing exceptional occurred. Before reaching TRUK, plans were suddenly changed, and task force altered its course northward, proceeding direct to JAPAN without calling at any port. It arrived at KURE on 27 December 1941.

"During the return passage, continuous single airplane patrols were maintained until shortly before reaching Japanese waters. One airplane from each carrier in turn carried out patrol lasting about three hours. KAGA remained in No. 2 State of Readiness during the day and No. 3 State of Readiness (with gun crews in three watches) at night. Special antiaircraft lockouts were not posted, this duty being carried out by antiaircraft ma-

chine gun crews. Task force did not fuel while on return passage."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 4-5)

b. Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, described the homeward voyage as follows:

"The fleet headed northwest for a few days and then directly for JAPAN. A few days before arrival, the SHOKAKU left formation and proceeded to OITA."

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, page 6)

c. Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987) quoted in Paragraph 3c above, gave the following account of the homeward voyage.

"Thus each ship turned back simultaneously. Enroute to our home port we passed MIDWAY and WAKE safely and sighted our islands on the night of the twentieth.

"I can remember the natural tears which came to each one's eyes. It is the soul in that figure, praying for the eternal welfare of the Fatherland for which he longs, that is the Japanese man.

"Thus to our home port on the twenty-fifth and then to the KURE Naval Depot." (ATIS Interrogation Notes, not previously published)

## Section V. CONCLUSIONS

1. Available evidence indicates that Japanese plans for the attack on PEARL HARBOR were finally formulated at the war games held at the Naval War College in TOKYO from 2-13 September 1941. There appears to have been a considerable amount of preliminary and partial planning, probably extending over the naval games and maneuvers of many years, but culminating in a series of games held at various fleet anchorages prior to late August 1941. It is perhaps significant to note that one source claims that the midget submarine unit had been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard for a year and a half prior to the attack.
2. The essence of Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, specifying naval activities in the opening of hostilities, was embodied in the outline of conditions under which the September 1941 naval war games were to be held. These conditions were printed on 3 September 1941.
3. From 5-7 September 1941, officers participating in the naval war games discussed in concrete terms the problems and possibilities of an attack on PEARL HARBOR. They anticipated catching all major units of the UNITED STATES Fleet in PEARL HARBOR.
4. The advisability of an amphibious landing on HAWAII at the time of the initial strike was discussed. The project was rejected because of the apparently insuperable problems of logistics involved. The eventual occupation of MIDWAY and HAWAII was contemplated, the former in the late spring and the latter in October 1942.
5. Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi, who later commanded the task force making the attack on PEARL HARBOR, participated in the September 1941 war games as a member of "A" Team.
6. On 15 September, 1941 naval staff members conferred with army representatives at IWAKUNI. It was rumored at the time that the Army had no previous knowledge of naval plans for an attack on PEARL HARBOR.
7. On an unknown date at the end of October 1941 the Army Department and the Navy Department of Imperial General Headquarters jointly issued "The Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement." This seems to have been the basic document specifying the relative commands, spheres of jurisdiction, tasks and responsibilities of the two services in all cases where joint army-navy operations were envisaged. It seems a valid presumption that the period between 15 September and the end of October was occupied in large part with the working out of the details of this agreement.
8. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was dated 1 November 1941, aboard Admiral YAMAMOTO's flagship, the Battleship NAGATO, at SAEKI Bay. Together with its annexes, this order sets forth the basic plan of all naval operations attendant upon the commencement of hostilities. The following aspects are noteworthy in respect to the attack on PEARL HARBOR:
  - a. Ships comprising the striking force were ordered to depart from their naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day (24 November 1941).
  - b. Submarines comprising the Surprise Attack Force were ordered to depart from the western part of the INLAND Sea on X-20 Day (20 November 1941). Strength was to be so disposed as to command the mouth of PEARL HARBOR. American warships escaping the harbor were to be attacked.
  - c. If possible, midget submarines were to carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships within PEARL HARBOR after the air attacks were completed.
  - d. Beginning on Y-Day (23 November 1941) the Commander of the First Combined Communication Unit was ordered to send out false messages calculated to give the impression that the main strength of the Japanese Fleet was in the western part of the INLAND Sea.
9. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 2, dated 5 November 1941, designated 23 November 1941 as Y-Day, the day upon which Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was to become effective.
10. The date for the official declaration of war was not finally announced till 10 November 1941, when Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3 stated "X-Day will



THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

be 8 December."

11. Striking Force Operation Order No. 1 was issued by Commander, Task Force, Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi on 10 November 1941, aboard his flagship, the Aircraft Carrier AKAGI, at SAEKI Bay. It ordered all ships to complete battle preparations by 20 November 1941. TANKAN (HITOKAPPU) Bay on ETOROFU Island in the KURILES was designated as the rendezvous for the task force.

12. Between 21-27 November 1941 the task force rendezvoused at TANKAN Bay.

13. Task Force consisted of the following units:

Battleships—

HIEI, KIRISHIMA (Battleship Division 3, less KONGO and HARUNA).

Aircraft Carriers—

KAGA, AKAGI (Carrier Division 1)  
SORYU, HIRYU (Carrier Division 2)  
SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrier Division 5, less HOSHO).

Heavy Cruisers—

TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruiser Division 8)

Light Cruisers—ABUKUMA

Destroyers—

FUCHIKA, KASUMI, ARARE, YOEN  
(Destroyer Division 18 (??)) OBORO, ~~KURE~~  
~~GERO, SUITAN~~ and ~~three~~ unspecified  
destroyers (Destroyer Division 16 (??)).

Submarines—

Submarine force from Sixth Fleet, probably from 20-30 ships in all. (Submarine force, with the exception of three I-Class ships, proceeded independently to the area of operations).

Oilers—

Three.

Supply Ships—

One.

14. Task force left TANKAN Bay on 27 November 1941. It sailed east until 4/5 December, then altered course to the south-

east toward HAWAII.

15. Upon reaching a point approximately two hundred and fifty miles from HAWAII, the first wave of planes was launched. This took place at 0100-0200 hours, JAPAN time. The weather was very poor.

16. Evidence does not agree, but it seems probable that from twenty to thirty Japanese submarines of the Sixth Fleet were assigned to reconnaissance duties outside PEARL HARBOR before the strike. They were to engage any American ships escaping from the harbor.

17. Five midget submarines attempted to gain entrance to the harbor. Evidence indicates that some succeeded, lay concealed on the bottom till night and then attacked. Four seem to have been destroyed by American counter measures. One was beached and captured.

18. The Japanese Navy Department on 18 December 1941 claimed the following damages were inflicted by their PEARL HARBOR Strike:

Battleships—

5 sunk by air attacks.

1 torpedoed and sunk by submarine attacks.

3 severely damaged by air attacks.

1 moderately damaged by air attacks.

Light Cruisers—

2 severely damaged.

4 moderately damaged.

Destroyers—

2 severely damaged.

Airplanes—

450 burnt by bombing and strafing.


14 shot down.

The Japanese officially admitted the loss of 29 planes and 5 midget submarines.


19. Following the attack, task force proceeded northwest then altered course to southwest, bombing WAKE Island in passing. Ships appear to have concluded cruise at either OITA or KURE.

## Appendix A.—JAPANESE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF PEARL HARBOR STRIKE

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1. Just before the attack, 8 Dec. 1941. Naval planes on a carrier ; a surprise attack on HAWAII.




2. "Black smoke rises over WHEELER Army Air Field, which is being reduced to ashes."  
"Navy Investigation B No. 17 (103), Approved 13 January 1942 (Reproduction prohibited)." This data is repeated on all photographs save Nos. 6 and 7


THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION



3. "Beginning of the Battle of HAWAII. The American PACIFIC Fleet just before its destruction."



4. "Concentration of the enemy main fleet covering under our deadly attack."



5. "Enemy installations and warships 'left buried' around FORD Island."



6. Surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR. Main fleet burning and being destroyed near FORD Island. Scattered about in the harbor are enemy ships scurrying in all directions as a result of our sudden attack. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION



7. "Northwest shore of FORD Island. Above, two heavy cruisers have been completely sunk. Hull of the training ship UTAH is visible. A special seaplane tender is trailing oil badly. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."



8. "Grim spectacle of PEARL HARBOR fearstricken under our silver wings."

APPENDIX A



9. Enemy key positions burning up as a result of our accurate attack."



10. "Magnificent !! PEARL HARBOR gasping under our fierce bombardment."

No 1

EX 1265

DOC 1627

部外秘

聯合軍總設及通設課

聯合軍最高司令部

調查報告書

中一三二號

一九四五年三月一日附

真 珠 灣 作 戰

部外秘

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 1627

聯合軍最高司令部

軍事郵便局 五〇〇

一九四五年十二月一日

マウアーサー元帥の指令ニヨリスベテ関係者ノ参考ニテ発行

合衆軍陸軍參謀長 R. K. サザランド中將

公書 情報部參謀長補佐

參謀團陸軍少將 C. A. ウィロウブエー

聯合軍翻譯及通譯課

聯合軍最高司令部

調査報告書

主題「真珠湾作戦」

IG 才六九〇九号

才六九三三号

B. I. D

〇一〇〇〇一〇〇〇号

〇八一〇二〇〇〇号

発行期日

一九四五年十二月一日

才一三三三号

「大要」

No 2

一 本書ハ一九四五年一月一日迄ニ總司令部翻譯及通譯課ガ入手セル文

書ニヨリテ集成シタ処、今次戦争ヲ勃発セシメタ日本攻撃計劃書

ニシテ調査報告書ノ才ニ於テ「日本用戦決意」ト題スル聯合軍翻譯

及通譯課、調査報告書才一三三三号ニ後續スル文ガアル。

二 本報告書ノ目的ハ

一九四五年三月八日日本ノ真珠湾攻撃ノ計劃及遂行ニ

関シテ、最高司令部翻譯及通譯課於テ利用シ得ルスベテノ證據ヲ綜合



セルコトナル

三、此報告書ニ與テ凡テノ證據ハ日本側ノソレヨリ引出サレタモトナル、  
從テ使用ノ日附ハ特別ニ西経時ト述ベシレテナル所ヲ除キハ東経時ナリ。

FNB/REW/JWW/JG

分類 H

統制官

參謀團陸軍大佐

ジドワイ、下・マニピアー

出所

捕獲書類

捕虜陳述

情報報告書

(情報ハ適宜ニ評價セラレベシ)

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一 機密聯合艦隊命令作第一號

「週刊情報」ニ掲載サレタ

一 無名ノ捕虜ノ證言ニ基テ記事ヨリノ抜萃ハ日本ノ真珠湾攻撃ノ計畫ニ関シカカリテハ洞察ヲ與ヘル

日本軍航空機が一九四一年(昭和十六年)三月七日真珠湾ニ集結セル合衆

艦隊及航空機ヲ攻撃シタ時敵ノ數ヶ月以前ニ考案サレ長ク秘密ニシ

ニキタ鏡イ計畫ヲ実行シタ。

最近ニ至ルニテ布哇へ、卑劣ナ襲撃ヲ先立テテ計畫段階ニツイテハタシモ知ラシキ居テカツタ。敵初期ノ意圖、最初、具体的ナ暗示ハ一九四一年(昭和十六年)ノ中頃ノ急迫セル數ヶ月間日本海軍ノ最高幹部ノ下ニ於テ勤務シキヤリ一主計兵曹ノ訊問ノ中ニ表示サシキヤル。

「サイパン」ヲ捕ヘシタコト、捕虜ハ眞珠灣ニ対スル計畫カ之成サレツアル時軍士層ニ於テ情報ト共ニ早機、書類ニ接近スル事ガ出来タ。

捕虜ハ非常ニ記憶力ガヨリ又協調的態度假ヲ持テテキタ。證言ハ他據所カラ得タ確実ナ證言ト正確ニ合致シ戰術上ノ報告ハ確実テアルト言フ事ガ分ワリ。コト、捕虜ニ就イテ注目スベキコトハ一九四一年(昭和十六年)二月一日附ノ「史的」ナ機密聯合艦隊命令作才一号ニツイテ記憶ヲ述リ

「カガ書」イテ記事中ニ示サシキヤル如キ細目ニ且ツテ、彼ノ記憶力テアル記憶ニヨリテ殆ンド再作成サレタ此ノ文書ハカナリ正確ニ書カレキヤルト信ジ

コレ此ノ章ノ後ノ方ニ其ノ全文ヲカ、ゲ様ト思フ。

聯合艦隊司令兼附ノ「N司令長官(山本海軍大將)ノ一主計兵曹トシテニ捕虜ハ日本ノ圖上演習ヲヨリ知ル様ニナツタ。日本ノ各艦隊ノ幕僚ハコレ等(圖上演習)ヲ一枚ノ広イ計畫板ノ上ニ行ワタ。

圖上演習ハシバシバ行ハレ、時ハ一月ニ二度モ行ハレタ。

八月下旬(一九四一年/昭和十六年)ニ先ダツテ圖上演習ハ宿毛佐伯、鹿兒島、鹿屋等、鈎地ヲ行ハレタ。注意カ、中心ハ圖上演習ノ目的トシテ採リエテラレタ。戰略ノ中デモツバラ当面ノ實驗的資料ニ注ガレタ。

コレ等(圖上演習)中ニ特別ニシテ敵兵ノ名前ハ判然ト指示サレテカツタ。捕虜ハ強調ニシテナルカ日本ノ敵トナル可能性ノアツク、本體ハ明白デア

ワタ。此ノ期間中絶エズ聯合艦隊司令兼及ニ軍令部トノ間ニ人員ノ異動ガ行ハレタト捕虜ハ加ヘタ。

二等ノ軍令教ニ勤務シテ其幕僚ハハルカニ他ノ艦隊ノ参謀ヨリモ  
優劣アリタルト云ハシテ居ル 最終計畫段階ハ八月下旬ニ豫告サレソノ時  
聯合艦隊司令長官ハ全艦隊司令長官及ニ彼等ノ主要幕僚ニ更  
ニ東米ヲ圖上演習ヲ行テ事ヲ命令セシメタ。

日本ノ首級ニアル軍令教内事務所ハ不適当ダトイフ事ニ志シ圖上  
演習ハ以後海軍大軍校ヲ行ハレタ  
捕虜ハ大軍校ニ於ケル防諜手段ハ非常ニ不十分デアリト言ハレシマテ  
長ノ授業ハ相變テス續キテ誰モ羊バ公職ニアル風ヲスバ中ニ入事  
か出来タニ違ヒナカッタ。下語ナリ。

九月二日ニ最後ノ最モ重要ト圖上演習カ行ハレソレニ参加スル士官  
ニ対スル開會ノ演説カアッタ。

是ハN組A組E組(日本、アメリカ、英王)ト審判員トニワケラレタ  
事實員工日本海軍ノ最高首腦教ニヨリテ組織サテ参加員ハ次ノ  
人々デアッタ。

審判員

軍令教

階級

職務

永野修身  
福留繁  
奥住次策  
山本親雄  
釜谷治男  
田村三郎  
佐藤教  
奥住頼一

海軍大將  
海軍少將  
海軍大佐  
海軍大佐  
海軍中佐  
海軍中佐  
海軍中佐  
海軍中佐

第一課長 戰爭計畫及作戰  
第一課 員  
第一課 課長  
第一課 課員

海軍省

高田敏種	海軍大佐
志岐常雄	海軍中佐
樋端久利雄	海軍中佐
藤井英	海軍中佐

軍務局之員  
 軍務局之員  
 軍需局之員  
 海軍大臣秘書官  
 高田繁太郎大將

N組

聯合艦隊

山本五十六	海軍大將	聯合艦隊司令長官
伊藤整一	海軍少將	參謀長
黑島慶人	海軍大佐	首席參謀
後藤藤茂	海軍中佐	副官
磯部太郎	海軍中佐	機關參謀
板藤馬	海軍中佐	砲術參謀
佐々木勲	海軍中佐	航空參謀
和田雄四郎	海軍中佐	通信參謀
永田英	海軍中佐	航海參謀
渡辺安次	海軍中佐	戰務參謀
有馬高恭	海軍中佐	水雷參謀
市吉聖美	海軍中佐	補給參謀
太田香苗	海軍中佐	氣象長

第一聯合通信部隊 (十分不恆報)

(註) 少將、司令官、司令官、司令官、中將以上、司令官長官

柳本權一郎 海軍少將 司令官  
 有澤直定 海軍中佐 首席參謀

No 8

Doc 1627

E組

第二艦隊

近藤 信竹

海軍大將

司令長官

柳澤 藏之助

海軍大佐

首席參謀

大石 保

海軍中佐

航海參謀

第四艦隊

井上 成美

海軍中將

司令長官

第五艦隊

細谷 實子郎

海軍中將

司令長官

第十一航空艦隊

塚原 二四三

海軍中將

司令長官

草鹿 任一

海軍少將

參謀長

A組

第三艦隊 (南方侵略水陸部隊)

高橋 伊望

海軍中將

司令長官

石原 肇

海軍大佐

參謀長

第六艦隊

清水 光美

海軍中將

司令長官

鹿岡 友次郎

海軍大佐

參謀長

第一航空艦隊 (母艦艦隊)

南雲 忠一

海軍中將

司令長官

草鹿 龍之助

海軍少將

參謀長

源田 実 (音訳)

海軍中佐

首席參謀

九月三日ニ関係將校ハ分類シテ材料ヲ研究シタ。俘虜  
 ハ「N」組(聯合艦隊司令長官)ニ配属サレタ。當日午後、渡辺  
 中佐—山本大將幕下ノ勤勉デ慧眼ト作戰計劃  
 參謀—ハ俘虜ニ因上演習ヲ實施スル狀況、概要、  
 原稿ヲ手渡シ五十部、複寫ヲ命ジタ。同演習、  
 實施基礎ヲ規定スルコノ條件ニハ未タルヘキ十一月  
 一日附、作命令第一号ノ骨子ガ含マレテ居タ。廣汎ト準  
 備計画ハ裏書キサレテ居タ。俘虜ハ此等ノ計画ハ數  
 月間研究サレタモノニ違キイト信ジタ。此時始メテ俘  
 虜ハ何カ非常ニ重大ト事カアリサウナコトヲ知ツタ。  
 九月五日ニ俘虜ハ聯合艦隊司令長官幕下ノ航空參  
 謀佐々木中佐ニ直屈ニツタ。十時頃紫煙ノ立テコメ  
 タ部室ハ入ツタ時彼ハ真珠湾計畫ガ討議サレテ居ルヲ  
 知ツタ。日本軍ハ明ニ真珠湾内デ太平洋ニ於ケル米國  
 ノ主要艦隊全部ト最近大西洋ヨリ廻航サレタト信ジラ  
 レル艦隊ヲ捕捉セントネラツテタ。俘虜ハ「N」組  
 ハ布哇攻撃ニ参加スル部隊ノ三分ノ一ヲ失フ豫想ヲ  
 漏レ聞イテ驚イタ。撃沈カレルモノト見做サレタ軍艦  
 ハ赤城級空母一隻及蒼龍級空母一隻ヲアツタ。  
 九月六日及七日ニ「N」組デハ真珠湾攻撃ノ最善ノ  
 方法ヲ討議シタ。(算盤—計算盤—ニ巧ミテ俘虜ハ此  
 等ノ會議中種々ノ速力ヲ艦隊ノ使用スル燃料ヲ計  
 算スル爲ニ幾回モ使ハレタ。)  
 黒嶋海軍大佐(首席參謀)ト伊藤海軍少將(參  
 謀長)カ布哇ニ対スル水陸兩面攻撃ヲ實施ノ可能性  
 ニ就キ意見ノ相違ヲ来シタ。ハ計畫中此ノ時デアツタ。

冷静ニシテ正確ナ伊藤ハ(意外ニモ) 早期上陸作戰ノ  
 遂行ヲ主張シ山本モ同意ノ傾向デアツタガ直觀的テ  
 強ク氣質ノ黒嶋ハ如何トモスベカラサル補給問題ヲ指  
 摘シテ討議ニ勝利ヲ得タ。 俘虜ハ伊藤案ハ最後ノ  
 瞬間ノ吐嗟ノ思付デアリ。 黒嶋ノ議論ガ勝ヲ占メターテ  
 基礎案ハ元ノ計画通りテ変更サレナカッタト信ビテ居ル。  
 俘虜ノ言ニ依ルバ此等初期ノ會議ハ主トシテニツノ一般的  
 問題即チ(一)眞珠湾ニ対スル奇襲的攻撃ヲ成功サセル爲  
 ノ細項ト(二)馬來 緬甸 蘭領東印度比律賓群島  
 ソロモン諸島及中部太平洋諸島——(究極ニハ)布哇ヲ包含  
 ム一占領ノ綿密ニ作成セラレタ計画ニ限ラレテ居タ様  
 デアツタ。 豫洲モ新西蘭モ明カニ當面ノ軍事目標トハ  
 考ヘラレテ居ナカッタ。 日本軍ハ之ヲ單ニ外部ノ援助ヨリ  
 遮断スルコトシカ意図シナカッタ。 印度ト云フ言葉ヲ俘  
 虜ハ或ル高級士官ガ其知カラ独逸トノ摩擦ガ始マララト  
 言ツタ時聞イタゲタッタ。

右會議(及演習)ハ九月十三日頃ニ終ツタ。 俘虜ハ右草稿ヲ  
 呉(同所カラ)ラシナデ柱島碇泊中ノ山本ノ旗艦長門へ  
 持参スルヲ援助シタ。 幕僚ノ約半数ハ既ニ帰艦シテイタ。  
 九月十五日ニ幕僚全員ハ四名ノ主計兵曹(俘虜ヲ含マス)  
 ヲ伴ヒ陸軍側ト協議スル爲岩國海軍航空隊(赴イタ)。  
 俘虜ハ寺内ト云フ名カ出サレタ事ヲ記憶シテ居ルカ他ノ名  
 前ハ思ヒ出サナイ。 東條——當時尙陸軍大臣——ハ出  
 席シナカッタト主張シテイタ。 本會議ニ於ケル陸軍側  
 代表ハ眞珠湾攻撃計画ヲ豫メ聞イテ居ナカッタト廣ク噂  
 サレテ居タ(然レ他ノ證據ニ依ツテ確證サレナイ)。



長門ハ更ニ六日位在島ニ滞留シタ。九月末ニ艦隊、主力ハ佐伯湾へ移動シタ。旗艦、佐伯碇泊中ニ重大ナ変更ハ無カッタケレドモ機密聯合艦隊命令作第一号ハ四回改定セラレタ。

十一月一日ニ右命令、最後、印刷が始メラレタ。完成スルニ約三日ヲ要シタ。二部が陸軍へ送ラレタ。佐伯碇泊中他、艦隊ノ参謀達ハ直接命令ヲ受ケトリニキタ。全部テ三百部が配布サレタ。Y日X日ト指定ノ作戰命令第二号及第三号ハ夫々十一月五日ト十日ニ発セラレタ。

(註、敵ハ勿論ソノ作戰命令ニ東経時ヲ用ヒル—即チ真珠湾攻撃ノ十二月八日ハ正ニ東経時デアル) 俘虜ハ嘗テ右作戰命令ヲ詳シク知ツテ居タ。數週間ニ亘ツテ彼ハ右命令ヲ思ヒカセル文ヲ紙上ニ再現セヨウト努メタ。

此ノ命令ハ明ニ不完全テ原本トハ較バズモナイガ主ナル概要ニ於イテハ實質上印刷サレタ通りデアルト信ゾラレル。次ノ命令中括弧内ノ註ハ編輯者ノ追記エタモノデアル。

佐伯湾 旗艦 長門

昭和十六年十一月一日

機密聯合艦隊命令作第一号

大日本帝國ハ米國、英國及和蘭ニ対シ宣戰ヲ布告セラル。

宣戰ハX日ニ布告セラルベシ。

本命令ハY日ニ発動セラルベシ。

## 一般狀況

## (イ) 米國ニ対スル政策

帝國ハ米國ニ対シ終始友好的態度ヲ維持シ来レルニモ拘ラズ米國ハ我等カ東亞ニ於ケル權益維持ノ為自衛上取り来レル總ベテノ処置ニ対シ干渉シ来リ。最近同國ハ蔣介石政權ヲ援助スルコトニヨリ我が方ノ支那事變ノ迅速処理ヲ阻止シ經濟斷交ノ最後の暴擧ヲサハ敢ヘテ斷行セリ。一方同國ハ不當ニ白米交渉ヲ遷延シツ、ソノ軍事力、強化ヲ擴大、艦隊ヲ太平洋ニ集結セシメ、我が方ニ脅威ヲ與ヘタリ。斯クシテ我等ニ經濟的、軍事的壓力ヲ加ヘント企テツ、アリ

## (ロ) 英國ニ対スル政策

英國ハ蔣介石政權ヲ援助シソノ同盟諸國及米國ト協力シテ東亞ニ於ケル我等ノ建設計畫ヲ妨害シツツアリ。最近同國ハ我等ヲ脅威セント企テ東亞ニ於ケルソノ軍事基地ヲ著著ト強化シツツアリ。

## (ハ) 蘭領印度ニ対スル政策

平和的經濟交渉ハ數々月ニ亘リ我が方ト、間ニ行ハツツアリシニモ拘ラズ、蘭領印度ハ英米ノ使囑ヲ受ケ相互的ニ有益ナル經濟關係ノ繼續ヲ拒否スルニ至リ。最近同國ハ多年營業辛苦ノ結果築キ上ゲタル在留日本人ノ財産ヲ脅威スルニ至リ。

(三) 支那沿岸ノ諸港及廣大ニシテ肥沃ナル地域ハ我軍依リ占領サレ又大都市ノ大部分ハ我が占領下ニアリ。然レドモ支那ハ米英ノ援助ニ依リ未ダ「抗戰放棄」ノ悪夢ヨリ醒メズ今支ニ亘ル燒土抗戰ノ形式ニテ日本ニ対シ全面的抵抗ヲ企圖シツツアリ。組織的抵抗ハ次チニ弱化シツツアルモ、ゲリラ戰ノ跳梁ハ我が方ヲシテ多數ノ軍隊ヲ同國ニ於テ恒久的守備任務ニ服セシムルノ止ムキキニ至ラシメタリ。我等若シ決定的勝利ヲ得ントセバ、支那背後ノ米英ヲ數々破セザルベカラズ。

(ホ) ソ聯邦ニ対スル政策

ソ滿國境ノソ聯兵カハ恐ルベキモノナリ「ソウエト」社會主義共和及聯邦ハ虎視眈々トシテ膨脹ノ機会ヲ待チツツアルモ帝皇ヨリソ聯ヲ改數セザル場合ハソ聯ハ敢ヘテ南戰セザルモト信ゼラル。我が狀況

才四艦隊ハ南洋委任統治諸島ニ於テ概ネ準備ヲ完了セリ。才十航空艦隊(沿岸基地ヲ有スル海軍航空隊)ハ支那佛領印支那及泰國ノ重要基地ニ於テ準備ヲ概ネ完了セリ。我が艦船及航空機ノ修理狀況ハ概ネ良好ニシテ將兵ノ技術ハ著シク向上シ、

戰略目的

大東亞ヨリ米英ヲ驅逐シ支那ヲ復シ處理ヲ迅速ナラシムルニト 加之、米英ガ蘭印及比律賓ヲ驅逐セラ

戦

略

レタル曉ニハ独立セル自給自足経済圏ノ確立ヲ期待シ得。  
我が国民ノ精神的指標タル広大な辺土ノ原則（八紘一宇、  
精神）ハ世界ニ闡明セラルベシ。此ノ爲ニ我等ハ必要ナル  
全兵カラ用ヒントス。

英米及蘭ニ対シテ採ルベキ戦略ハ附屬ナルニ指示セラル。

X日及Y日ハ追ウテ発令セラル

若シY日以予ニ敵ガ我が計畫ヲ探知シ得タリト信セラ  
ルル場合ハX日ノ実施ハ特別命令ノ定ムル処ニ依ル。

若シX日以予ニ敵ヨリ攻撃ヲ受ケル場合ハ右攻撃手ハ  
使用シ得ル全カラ以テ敵ヲ滅スベシ。コノ場合各司令官  
ハ敵ノ攻撃ヲ受ケタル場合ニ取ルベキ 戦略ニ從ヒテ  
動スベシ。

ソ聯ニ對シテハ戰軍ノ誘發ヲ極力回避スルヲメニ全努力ヲナスモノトス。同時ニ又我計畫ノ秘密ヲ保護スル爲ニ凡ル努力ヲナスモノトス。万一敵が我計畫ヲ探知セバ、ソ聯ノ攻撃ヲ受ケタル際トラレルベキ方策ニ準據シ直ニ軍ヲ移動ヲ開始スベシ

本命令ノ配布ハ艦隊司令長官及戰隊司令官ノミニ限ラセラル。司令長官及司令官ハ計畫実行前ニ於ケル本計畫ノ漏洩ヲ防止スル爲アラエル方策ヲトルベシ  
注意 本命令ヲ知ル者ノ知照

本命令書日ハ用諸後速ニ燒却スベシ

万一艦船ノ沈没及至ノ他ノ避ケ難キ事故ノ結果本命令が敵手ニ落ケル危険ナル場合責任指揮官ハ自ら直チニソノ知ヲナスベシ

機密聯合艦隊命令作第一号

別冊

一 陸海軍協同作戰ハ「陸海軍中央協定」ニ準據シテ実施セラルベシ。

二 攻撃部隊(空母機動部隊)ハ第一航空艦隊(空母及護衛艦)ヲ主

トシテX-16日頃海軍基地又ハ作戰地域ヲ出發單冠湾(千島列島樺根島單冠湾)ヲ経テ米北太平洋艦隊基地真珠湾ニ向ケ出撃ヲ企及スルヲ決メ  
X日ハ十月上旬若クハ中旬ト予想サルベシ。

三、攻撃目標ハ飛船場、航空母艦、戦艦、巡洋艦及その他、  
軍艦、商船、港湾設備及陸上施設ノ順トス

四、艦隊司令官ヨリ示サレタ攻撃部隊ノ日本出港時以  
後嚴重ナ電波管制ヲ行フベシ。通信ハ通常ノ  
放送通信系ニヨル。使用サルベキ暗号表ハ「不定」  
ナリ。左ノ通信、略語ハ用ヒラル。

「真珠湾ニ多数軍艦」——「帝名ノ運命」

「真珠湾ニ軍艦ナシ」——「桜が満開デス」

「天氣ハ晴朗ニシテ、一帯ノ視界ヨシ。攻撃ニ適当」——  
「富士山ニホレ」

「攻撃開始時皆ハ五ニ〇」——「本能寺ノ壕ノ深サハ五ニ〇」  
「全軍突撃セヨ」——「新高山ニ登シ」

五、攻撃部隊ノ方向及配置ハ機動部隊指揮官之ヲ  
定ムベシ

機動部隊指揮官ハ攻撃部隊ノ方向及配置ヲ  
決定後直チニ関係特官ニ報告スベシ  
一般ノ商船航路ヲ回避シ、如何ナル状況ノ下ニ於テモ  
計画ヲ露顯サセ又注意ヲ拂ハルベキニト

六、攻撃発動以テ於テ宣戦ヲ布告サルベキ船  
船及中立名（ソ聯ヲ含ム）ノ船舶ヨリ発見サレタル場合  
ニ取ラルベキ処置

(イ) 宣戦ヲ布告サルベキ國ノ船舶ニヨリ目標ノ六〇  
マイル以内ニ於テ発見サレタル場合ハ直チニ攻撃準備  
ヲナシ攻撃スベシ

(ロ) 中立名ノ船舶ニヨリ目標ノ六〇マイル以内ニ於テ  
発見サレタル場合ハ該船ヲ直チニ捕獲、我が企圖ノ

実施ニ何ラ切害トモサル時迄拿捕スベシ。該船舶ノ無線通信ハ  
嚴重ニ監視サルルベシ。我々ニ危害ヲ與ヘ又ハ我計畫ヲ  
暴露路サセル惧レアル通信ヲナシ場合ハ駆逐艦ヨリ攻撃ヲ  
テ準備シ捕提セララルベシ

(1) 目標ヨリ六〇マイル以上離レテキル時外國船舶ニ散見サレ  
タ場合該船舶ヲ拿捕シテ通信ヲ禁止スベシ  
モ我一般的企圖が発覚サレタ恐シカ多クハニアルトキニハタト  
×五日ト×日トノ間ト雖モ直ニ攻撃スベシ。モ×一五日以  
前ト雖モ情況ニヨリ機動部隊指揮官ハ該船舶ノ処  
分ヲ決定スベシ

敵船舶抑留ノ場合ハ「B」ノ方法ニ據ル

七、第六艦隊(潜水戦隊)ヲ基幹トスル奇襲部隊ノ指揮  
官ハ×一20日ニ真珠湾攻撃ノ為ニ内海西部カラ潜水  
艦ノ大部ヲ出撃セシムベシ。ソノ全カヲアゲテ湾口ヲ  
制扼スルカ如ク配置セララルベシ。尚同艦隊

湾口カラ逸脱セントスル敵艦ヲ攻撃スベシ。  
ハ攻撃事ヲ偵察ヲ遂行シ、機會アラバ小型潜水艦ヲ  
以下敵艦ニ奇襲攻撃ヲナスベシ。但シ攻撃ノ時期ハ  
航空機隊ガ、オアフ島ヲ攻撃セル後トス。小型潜水艦ノ

收容ノ為ニハアラユル方途ヲ考究セララルベシ。

八、陸海軍協同作戰ハ「中央協定」ニ從ツテ遂行スベシ。  
兵力ノ配備ハ前進部隊(主ニ第二艦隊ノ巡洋艦及  
駆逐艦)ノ指揮官カ之ヲ決定スル。前進部隊ノ指  
揮官ハ攻撃部隊ノ進路及配置ヲ決定後直ニ關係將  
官ニ報告スベシ  
マレイ及佛印軍ノ船舶去発地ハ馬港比島占領

軍ノ出発地ハ「バラオ」トス

(1) コレニ関シ捕虜ハ誤ツテキル。マレイ侵略軍ハ海南ヨリ去ク。一オ「フィリッピン」遠征軍ノカナリ大部カ馬港カラ乗船ス。

九支那ニ於ケル米英軍ノ船舶及將兵、拿捕ハ支那方面艦隊司令長官ニヨリ指揮サル。香港ノ占領ハ「陸海軍中央協定」ノ條項ニ準據シ、第二遣支艦隊司令長官ノ權限ニ屬ス。

十. 日本統治權下ノ港灣若クハ占領サルベキ港灣ニ南戰時碇泊中ノ英米船舶ハ能ク限リ捕獲スベシ。

ソウエツトノ船舶ハ嚴密ニ臨檢ノ後監視下ニオクベシ。南戰時我船舶カ「タダ」一隻ト雖モ外玉ノ港灣ニ碇泊セザルヨウ計畫サルベキデアル。

十一. Y日ヨリ第一通信隊ノ指揮官ハ艦隊重カハ内海西部ニアルカ如ク印象ヲ與ヘル爲偽電ヲ発ス。

Y日決定後米西岸(航約スル)ニ定メラレキ日郵船令社ノ「龍田丸」ハ既定通り出航セシメ、中途テ引返ス準備ガセラルベキコト(コレハ實約サレ聯合島ノ乗客ハ拘禁サレタ。コノ期由ニ出航予定ノ何レノ太平洋

横斷定期船モ同様ノ手順カトラレタデアラウ。)

Y日決定後横須賀鎮守府司令長官ハ虚偽ノ印象ヲアタヘル様ニ彼ノ指揮下ノ海軍將兵ヲ出末得ル限リ东南横濱方面ニ上陸外出セシム(別ノ一捕虜カコレヲ確認ス)



- 十二、南太平洋艦隊（南洋委任統治地方艦隊）司令長官ハ  
南太平洋第一航空艦隊ト緊密ナ協力ノ下ニ行動  
シ北及南太平洋ノ英米蘭ノ基地ノ攻撃ト占領ヲ  
促進スル。我が作戰圏内ノ敵軍力ヲ阻止シ濠洲  
米本土間ノ聯絡ヲ遂ニ杜絶セシム  
コレヨリ濠洲ハ孤立化サレ、完全ニ統治サレルコトガ  
予期サレル。カクテ龐大ナ濠洲大陸ノ誇ル凡テノ天賦  
資源ハ我が手ニ入ルデアラウ
- （英米米及オランダノアレル基地ノ攻撃及占領実施  
ノ日附ハソレカラコノ段ニセラレタソノ少數ハ次ノ如シ）
- (1) グワムー 約X十ヌ
- (2) ウエイクー 約X十ナ
- (3) (ラバウル及「ソモン」群島ヲ「フィジ」サモアニ至ル群島  
及「サンタクル」群島ノ侵襲ノ日取モ全部記入サレヌ)
- 十三、「ミドウェイ」改略ノ日附ハ一九四一年ノ昭和十七年ノ晩春ト  
定メテアツタ。布哇群島ノ占領ノ日附ハ一九四二年ノ昭和  
十七年ノ十月ト計畫サレタ。
- 前述各照ノ書英米ノニツコニ記載ス

## 陸海軍中央協定案

大本營陸軍部及大本營海軍部ノ協同作戰ニ於ケル任務ト指揮ノ限界ヲ明瞭ニスル目的ハ高度ノ能率發揮ノためデアツタ。(挿虜ノ言ニ依レバソレハ一九四一年昭和十六年十月末ニ發行セラレタソノ内容ノ概略ハ次ノ如シ)

- 一、スマトラ、ボルネオ、馬來半島、セレベス及フィリッピン(佛印及泰國ヲ含む)方面陸軍最高司令官ハ寺内壽一元帥ヲアル。彼ノ管区ハ南方軍ト稱シ總司令部ハ西貢ニオカレル。
- 二、陸軍大輸送船團ノ護衛、上陸地点、期日及時向ニツイテ計畫
- 三、陸海兩軍ノ航空機ヲ以テ攻撃スル場処及ヒ陸軍又ハ海軍ノ單獨攻撃ノ場処、期日、時間ニ付テノ航空戰取極メニ固スル協定、使用スベキ飛行場ニ關スル取極メ例ハ「X」飛行場ハ陸軍が主用シ海軍が才二次的ニ使用スルト云フ様ナモノ

## 四、補給計畫

陸軍上陸部隊ニ対シ陸軍輸送船が海軍ノ援助ヨリ成シ遂ケルベキ補給計畫

## 五、通信計畫

六、占領地域、都市及資源ニ關スル取極メ、例ハ「B」バンジャマシン石油精製所ハ海軍ニ依ツテ統制サレトイフ様ナモノ

1627

ソ聯攻撃ノ場合ニ取ラルベキ手段

(傍書ハ曰フ正確ニ記憶シテイナイガ十月ノ末ニアツタト思ヒ左ノ如ク陳ベタ)

吾々が先ニ攻撃セサル限りソ聯カラ先制攻撃ヲ受ケナイテアラウ、然シ日本ガ先ニ攻撃サレタ場合ニハ才五艦隊(北部部隊)ハ全力ヲ擧ゲテ反撃シ局地的覇権ヲ持續スベシ。

聯合艦隊司令長官

山本 五十六

1627

機密聯合艦隊命令作字号中不明瞭ナル点ニ就イテ聯合艦隊  
 参謀長ノナシタル口頭説明(非公式談話)各艦隊司令長官ニ配布  
 サレタ命令ニ含まレタル詳細ノ点ニツイテノ説明ヲ仰刷シクモ一  
 一東タルベキ対米英宣戦布告ハ世見リノニ大海軍団ヲ向フニ迫リテ  
 ノ国家存亡ノ大戦争トナルカラウト云フコト。

コノ戦争ハマコトニ 我カ存亡ヲカケタモノデアリ我カ武カヲモツテ攻  
 撃ヲスル外ニ道ノ無イ戦争デアルト云フコト。

二 我カ海軍ハココニ好敵手ヲエテ帝國海軍一創設以來ヨリ念願ト  
 シテ理想ヲ今実現セントシテキルコト。

三 独逸トノ同盟ハ海軍側カラハ希望シナカツタガソ聯ヲ抑ヘウルトノ  
 見解ノ下ニ陸軍カ支持シテ計画ヲアツタト云フコト(一)

四 蘭印・フィリピンニ於ケル作戦以前ニ泰ト佛印ニ前進基地カ獲  
 得サルベキコト。コレラノ作戦ハ極メテ円滑ニ進行スルト信ズル。  
 今次ノ作戦ニヨリ海軍ハ速ヤカニ石油ノ確實ナ補給源ヲ確保シ  
 得ルベアラウ

五 眞珠湾攻撃ニ関係シテハ大西洋艦隊ヲ含む極大ナル艦隊カ  
 眞珠湾ニ集結シタトイフ報告カアルト云フコト。コノ艦隊ハ戦端開  
 始スルヤ直チニ一撃ヲ完全ニ粉碎スルデアル。コレニヨツテ海軍カ  
 ノ均衡ヲ轉セシメ劈カ頭カラ敵ヲ混乱サセ士氣ヲ沮喪サセル計  
 画デアル。シカシナガラ我々ノ目的ハソレヨリモ三千哩以上ノ彼方ニア  
 ルノ大艦隊ノ集結ヲ攻撃スルニ事ツテ計画ノ嚴秘ヲ保ツ為  
 ニ幾多ノ障碍ト困難ニ遭遇スルコトヲ豫期シナケレバナラナイ。  
 モシコレラノ計画カ何レカノ段階ニ於テ失敗ニ歸スルナラバ我海軍  
 ハ再び起テ上ラレサル慘メテ運命ニ會フデアラウ。我眞珠湾奇襲

成功ハ今後ノ戦局ノウオーターブルートナルヲウコノ理由ニ依リ帝國海軍ハ成功ヲ確定化スルタメ艦艇ニ航空機ニソノ力ノ粹ヲ集メテキルテアル。第一航空戦隊、第二航空戦隊、第五航空戦隊ノ全飛行機ハオアフノ攻撃ニ集中セラレモシ逸脱セントスル艦艇アラハ才六艦隊ハソノ潜水艦ノ殆ド全兵力ヲ以テ湾口ヲオサヘ魚雷ノ集中攻撃ヲ行フ。ソレニ加ヘテ(才一水雷戦隊)ノ駆逐艦勢力ハ(主トシテ夜間攻撃ノタメ)警戒戒部隊トシテ展開シ、才三戦隊ノ高速戦艦ハ第四列梯陣ニ展開スル。モシ敵艦隊ノ主力が真珠湾カラ逃ケテ外海ヘ向ヘバ我艦隊ノ主力がコシテ邀撃スルテアラフ。

六、特殊潜航艇隊ハ一年半ノ間吳軍港ニ於テT.N. 母艦千代田ノ下ニアツテ訓練ヲシテキルモノノマタマタ完全ノ域ニ達シテイカ鬼ニカク乗組員ハ此ノ上ナキ確信ヲモツテキル。才六艦隊ハソレヲ湾内ノ攻撃ニ使用スル計画アル。

七、モシアメリカノ巨大ノ重工業生産力カ直ニ船舶、飛行機及ソノ他ノ軍需物資生産ニ轉換サレテモ我軍ニ対抗スルタメソノ人的資源ヲ勤員スルニ少クトモ数ヶ月ヲ要スルコトハ明白ナルモシアメリカノ準備未ダナラサルウチニ我々が南戦勢頭ニ一撃ノモトニスベテノ接点ヲ攻撃シ占領シ戦略的優位ヲ確保スレバソノ後ノ作戦形勢ヲ我ニ有利ナヤウニ展開スルコトが出来ル。

No. 23

八、天モ我々ノ戦争ノ正シキコトヲ照覽アルテアラフ、各人ハコノ戦カモヲラス未曾有ノ機會ヲ充分ニ認識シテ我々ノ本来ノ目的ヲ断年トシテ遂行シ、コノ聖戦ノ目的實現ノタメ全力ヲ盡クスコトヲ希フ。

通信計画

(俘虜ハコレニツイテハ知ラナイ、詳細不明)

補給計画(概略)

横須賀、吳、佐世保海軍基地ハ後部補給基地トナリ馬港、バラオ、トラウク及大湊ハ前進補給基地トスル之等ニ加ヘテ補給船ガ各艦隊ニ配属セラレル。

十一月五日

機密聯合艦隊命令作第二號

Y.日ハ十一月二十三日トス

十一月十日

機密聯合艦隊命令作第三號

X.日ハ十二月八日トス

(CINCPAC-CINCPDH 週報第一卷第三十二号一十四頁)

第二章 集結及ビ出動

中二節 單冠湾(註)ニ於ケル集結

(1) 攻撃部隊作戦命令第一号

前中一節ニ述べタ某俘虜ハ攻撃部隊作戦命令第一号ニ記憶ヲ辿リ、次ノ如クヒトカワ湾ニ於ケル集結ヲ詳述シタ。

即チ旗艦、赤城、佐伯湾、一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月十日

攻撃部隊作戦命令第一号

(1) 全艦艇ハ十一月二十日迄ニ戦闘準備ヲ完了スベシ。

(2) 本艦隊ハ單冠湾ニ集合スベシ。

(千島列島、擇捉島ヒトカワ湾)

- (三) 来ルベキ作戦計画(厳秘ニ付サル)モノナル故、日本於ケル発航地ヲ出航シタル後ニ乗組員ニ説明セラレシル迄、本計画南シ(厳重ナル秘密ヲ保持スベシ)

四) 攻撃機隊ノ内訳

- 赤城ヲ攻撃機隊一隊長 海軍少佐 X X
- 中一空母攻撃機隊等々 (詳細係劣劣記憶マズ)
- (五) 艦隊巡航編成 (退却編成ヲ含ム)
- (六) 全ベテノ無電通信ハ嚴禁ス。


発信及受信ハ共ニ東京ヲ一發送通信系ヲ使用スベシ

攻撃部隊指揮官 南雲忠一

(CINCPAC-CINCPDA, 週報中一巻中三号一頁)

(註一)

單冠湾ハ又ヒトカッブ湾トモ呼バル、ヒトカッブノ名ハ漢字ノ別ナ讀方ヲ表スモノニシテ、同湾ハ千島列島擇捉島ニアリ。



(譯者註、原本ヨリ、正確寫圖)

第一圖 「ヒトカッブ」湾ニ於ケル日本機動部隊ノ配置圖

(2) 機動部隊ノ集結

俣野横田茂樹(？)(丁A-000三七)三等水兵ハ航空母艦加  
加貝ノ一乗組員トシテ真珠湾攻撃ニ参加シテテアルガ彼  
ヒトカツプ湾ニ於ケル機動部隊ノ集結ニ就テ次ノ如キ説明ヲ行  
ツタ。即チ再認同対シ同俣野ハ第二節(二)以下ノ記述ノ如ク時  
刻対スル彼等昇定ヲ訂正シタ。時刻ハ凡テ東経時デアリ。

機動部隊ノ集結

機動部隊ハ南雲忠一海軍中將指揮ノ下ニ一九四一年  
(昭和十六年)十一月中旬頃千島列島擇捉島ノ單冠  
(俣野ハヒトカツプ湾ト述ベタリ)ニ集結シタ。航空母艦加賀  
八十一月七日佐世保出航九州南ヲ航行シ日本東岸ヲ北上、  
一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月十五日單冠ニ到着シタ。航空母  
艦蒼龍、油槽船三隻及補給船一隻カ十一月十七日到着。戦艦  
比叡及雪務島航空母艦赤城及飛龍、重巡洋艦一隻(俣野利根  
級ト思ヘリ)、駆逐艦二隻カ十一月二十日前ニ單冠ニ到着シタ。  
三隻ノ伊級潜水艦ガ單冠出航ニ際シ同機動部隊ニ加ツタ。  
單冠ニ於テ各部隊ハ第一圖ニ示シアル配置テ碇泊シタ見取圖  
ハ該俣野ガ画イタモデアリ。……  
俣野ハ又「ヒトカツプ湾」周辺ノ地形及施設ヲ画イタガソノ見取  
圖ハ第二圖ノ如クデアリ。



倭虜ハ湾ノ幅員ヲ六、〇〇〇米、入口ト対岸ト、距離ヲ二、〇〇〇米ト算定シタ。彼湾ノ中央附近海岸ノ近クニ大キナ岩ガツアツタト思ヒミシタ。湾ハ多クノ港ヨリ深カツタガ、彼ソノ正確ナ深サヲ知ラナカッタ。濱辺ノ真前ニ深イ所ガアツタ。

「風北西カラ吹イテ中タ。

「棧橋ハ湾ノ南西側ニ只ツアツタノミデソレハ「コンクリート」ト石デ造ラレ、長サ約一五米、幅四米、高サ二乃至三米デ、ソノ出端ニ階段ガアツタ。棧橋ノ高サハソノ側面ノ波ガ可成高カツタノデ算定スルフトハ困難デアツタ。ソノ上ニ起重機モ何モ無ク、階段ノ所ノ水深ハ約五米デアツタ。倭虜ハ屑ヲ焼却スルタメ一度棧橋ニ上ツタコトガアツタガ、ソノ極ク近クモ離レルコトモ、ソノ土地ノ漁夫ト話スコトモ許サレナカツタ。彼ガ上陸シタ時ハ満潮デアツタ。棧橋ノ海岸寄りノ土地ハ石ガ多ク、雪上へ顔ヲ出シテ居ル短イ草デ被ハレテ居タ。

海岸ヨリデ棧橋カラソシ南ニ三軒ノ漁夫ノ家ガアツタ。其家ハ加賀ノ碇泊地莫ヨリハ見エナカツタガ、棧橋カラ見ルコトガ出来タ。家背後ニ土手が十呎位ノ高サニ築イテアツタ。其土手カラ先ハ三本ノ無電塔ノ他ハ何物モ見エナカツタ。倭虜ハ其近クニ村落ガアルカドウカハワカラナカツタガ、煙モ上ラナイシ又人ノ住ンテ居ル気配モナカツタト述ベタ。

「家ト土手トノ間ニ車ガ通ル程狭イ大変悪イ道ガアツタ。倭虜ハ其路ガ何處へ行ツテ居ルカ知ラナカツタ。車ハ無カッタ。渡船ハ見当ラナカツタ。

「沖ノ方ニ水面ヨリ約二呎ノ高サノ多クノ岩ガアルカラ、棧橋ト入口ノ南西側トノ間ハ上陸ハ困難ダラウ。此等岩ノ間ニハ漁棧ガ置カレテアツタ。倭虜ニハ此地ニハ砂地モ浜辺モ見

エナカツタ。

「俘虜ハ大型發動機艇ヨリノ上陸ハ埠頭ト湾ノ中心トノ間  
ナレバ容易デアラウト思ツタ。沖ニ少數ノ山岩カアリ前浜ノ高  
サハ水面ニ出ナカツタ。海ハ浜マデ深イ様ニ思ハレタ。然シ俘  
虜ノ棧橋ノ附近ニ浜辺ハ見ナカツタ。

「湾ノ中央カラ入り北東側ニテノ間ハ懸崖ノアルタニ上陸ハ  
不可能ダラウ。然シ加賀ノ碇泊地カラノ詳細ナフトハ觀察  
出来ナカツタ。

「電信局ノ棧橋近クノ土手ノ北面ニツタ。然シ建物ノ詳細  
ハ見エナカツタ。三本ノ塔が見エタガ其等ハ土手ニテ半バカワサレ  
テ居タレド俘虜ハ其高サモ配置モ測定ハ出来ナカツタ。彼  
ハ其局ノ職員二人モ見エナカツタ。然シツレハ海軍ノ電信  
局ト思ツタ。彼ハ其組織ノ職員數ニ就イテハ何モ知ラナカツタ。

「俘虜ハ何等ノ防禦施設モ砲モ魚雷發射管モ海辺ニ  
設置シテアルノヲ見ナカツタ。對潛防禦網モ防材モナカ  
ツタ。又其ノ外側ニモ機雷原ヲ張ツタ様子モナカツタ。又水路  
ヲ示ス浮標モナカツタ。入り口ノ側ニモ建物モ見エナカツタ。

「俘虜ハ軍冠ニ居タ同ニ飛行機ヲ見ナカツタ。又飛行場ト  
カ或ハ水上飛行基地カアルヲモ知ラナカツタ。彼ハ加賀ノ碇泊地  
カラモ又棧橋カラ見テモ飛行場ニ適スル敷地ガアルト思ハ  
シナカツタ。入り口南西側ノ土地ハガが低ク延ビテ居タ。  
燈台モ海浜ノ燈火モ見エナカツタ。彼ハ不明確ガ暴風信  
号ガ電信局附近掲ゲラレタアツタト思ツタ。

「俘虜ハ軍冠ニ居タ同ニ入り口南西ニ或ル日一日碇泊シタ。後又  
ノ水雷艇ノ他ニ飛行機モ哨戒艇モ見ナカツタ。食糧ハ十日  
十九日加賀ニ積込メレタ。俘虜ハ加賀ガ油ヲ積込メタト思

ツタガ確デハアリマセン。上陸ハ許サレナカッタ。然シ屑物ハ海中ニ投ジナイデ集メテ入口ノ南西側近ク棧橋附近ノ海岸デ燒却セヨトノ命令ガ與ヘラレタ。俘虜ハ十一月二十日ニ此ノ仕ルノタメニ度上陸シタコトガアッタ。作業隊監督ノ將校ハ誰モ棧橋附近ヨリ離レテハイケナイトノ命令ヲ出シタ。俘虜ハ近ク家ニ住ム約三人ノ漁夫ヲ見タガ話シカケナカッタ。彼ハ陸海軍海岸部隊ノ職員又ハ電信局職員モ奥地ニ居ルノヲ見ナカッタ。

(聯合軍飛訊通報部発行訊問報告三三〇号才二一七頁)  
 (ハ史上最大ノ作戦部隊  
 駆逐艦霞ノ乗組員ノストンニテ真珠湾ヲ攻撃シニ参加シタ俘虜  
 川北克巳(音讀) (JAUSA) 二四七九八七)ハ作戦ニツキ記述シ  
 タ。彼ノ手記ハ附加訊問ニヨリテ數箇所ノ詳細ナル處ニ就  
 イテ追補サレタ。

「故郷港ノ多クノ鬼出ヨ左様ナラ。十一月十五日横須賀良出帆後  
 我が精銳ナル才十八駆逐艦ハ駆逐艦不知火ヲ先頭ニ霞霞陽炎  
 ヲ從ヘテ一路牛島列島中ノヒトカッパ(軍冠)湾ヘ向ツタ。

二十一日早朝目的地軍冠湾(入ツタ。空母駆逐艦及他艦船  
 其翌日入港シタ。茲ガ我帝國海軍カ史上最大ノ作戦  
 部隊ヲ編成シタ處デアル。

(聯合軍飛訊部訊問但書從前未榮刊)

(二) 待機状態

俘虏横田茂樹(音讀) (T A 1000三七) (上記第二節(四)報  
道) 提供セル俘虏ナリ) 八訊問ニ際シ真珠湾作戦中攻撃部隊  
時刻表叙述ヲ次、如ク訂正ス

「一九四一年十月十五日」空母加賀 佐世保ヲ出帆。九州南ヲ  
航行。日本、東岸ヲ北上。十月二十日、戦艦比叡、霧島及空母  
赤城、飛龍、八島列島、擇捉島、卓冠ニ到着。

「十月二十三日」空母加賀、卓冠ニ到着。

「十月二十四日」空母蒼龍、卓冠ニ到着。

「十月二十三日」空母瑞鶴、翔鶴、卓冠ニ到着。

「十月二十七日」機動部隊卓冠ヲ出帆。布哇方面ニ向テ  
港出帆ニ際シ三隻ノ潜水艦参加。

「十月二十八日」加賀第二警戒配備ヲトル。対空監視哨設置セル。

(聯合軍翻譯通譯部發刊訊問報告ニ六八号、八頁)  
機動部隊編成完了

俘虏(音讀) 正之(音讀) 次、通り陳述ス

「彼ハ翔鶴ガ真珠湾攻撃ニ参加シ時ニ其レニ乗組ンデ居テ、  
ソレ次、説明ヲナシ、(全ベテノ時間ハ東京時間ナリ)。

「一九四一年十月二十日」翔鶴ハ业方ノ卓冠ト云フ碇泊地ヘ向テ大分ヲ  
出帆シ、(俘虏ハ碇泊地ノ所在地ヲ確實ニ知ラス)

其艦ハ二十五日頃ニ到着シテ戦艦霧島、榛知、空母加賀、赤城、飛

龍、蒼龍、瑞鶴ニ三隻ノ巡洋艦及数隻ノ駆逐艦等ヲ見テ、

(太平洋方面陸海聯合情報部ヲ備訊問報告第七號連續番  
號 ADM 100021944 年一月十日五頁—六頁)

第三節 出撃航路

(1) 地圖ハ機動部隊出發ノ日附ヲ示ス。

日附ニキ捕獲地圖ハ機動部隊ガ一九四一年十月二十七日擇捉島ヲ出帆シテ事ヲ立證。地圖發行責任当局ハ特記シテハナクガ出所ハ官憲ナルト明カチマル。


(南太平洋司令部翻譯書類連續番號第。四八。項目才六四三)

(2) 機動部隊編制ノ見取圖

上記第二節(1)ノ挙ゲラテ居ル空母加賀ノ一乗組員ヲ俘虜横田茂樹ハ機動部隊ノ出撃航路南シテ次ノ如キ陳述ヲナシ。再訊問之際ニ俘虜ハ上記第二節(2)ニ合マレテ日附ノ算定ヲ修正シタリ。

機動部隊ハ一九四一年十月二十二日、出港ニ際シテ三隻ノ潜水艦ヲ伴フテ午後二時出帆シタリ。出帆並ニ航行中、編制ハ第三圖ニ記サレタリ

第三圖 出撃航路中日本機動部隊ノ編成



機動部隊ハ十二月四日マデ東航レ、ソレヨリ南ヲニ航路ヲ轉ジタリ

雁木形ニ航海シタデハナイ。速カ十三節。日本時間ハ  
絡始保タレタ。出撃航行中飛行機哨戒ナシ。

十一月二十三日ヨリ対空監視哨設置セル。三知宛カ兩舷側ニ  
アル七台ノ高射機四銃ニ配置。勤務ニ時間、監視哨三隻眼  
鏡支給サレタ。

十一月二十八日加賀ハ第二警戒戒配備ヲトル。砲手等ハ二直制ニ配  
置サタ。艦船ハ今日ヨリ消燈。

十二月二日加賀艦長岡田治作大佐ハ艦ノ乗組員ニ告グテ聯合艦隊  
司令長官陛下ノ御召ヲ受ケ十二月八日米國ニ対シテ宣戰布告セラル  
旨ノ御沙汰ヲ拜シタリトノ發表ヲシタ。加賀ハ布哇ニ向ッテ航行中  
アル土曜ノ午前一時ニ飛行機ガ真珠湾攻撃ノ為メ進發スルカラ  
ウト語タ。

捕虜ハ此ノ事ヲ聞イテウカ驚愕シタガ日本人トシテ参戦スルハ当  
然ノ事テアルト考ヘタト云ヒシタ。

加賀ハ十一月二十七日ニ給油。更ニ又十二月三日ニモシシタ。捕虜ハ機  
動部隊ノ他ノ艦船ガ何日給油シタ知リモレシタ。給油船ヲ補給船  
ハ十二月四日ノ夜機動部隊ヲ去リ捕虜ハ其後、其等ヲ見受ケセ  
シタ。

機動部隊ハ十二月四日南ヲニ進路ヲ変ヘタ。  
(聯合軍翻譯通譯部訊問報告書、連續番號第百三十九號  
三頁一四頁)

ハ) 真珠湾ニ接近ス。  
駆逐艦「霞」ノ乗組員トシテ真珠湾攻撃ニ参加シタル捕虜  
川北克己(音讀)(JA(USA)一四七九八七號)ハ機動部隊ノ往航ニ就キ次  
ノ如ク記シタ。

十二月二十六日朝作戰指揮官南雲忠海軍中將ハ「真珠湾

ヲ攻撃すトイフ簡潔ナ命令ヲ發シタリ。

斯クシテ吾々ハ祖國ヲアトシテ太平洋ノ荒浪ヲ越テ航行  
シタリシタリ。駆逐艦 阿武隈、戦艦 比叡、航空母艦 加賀、瑞鶴、翔鶴、蒼龍  
艦 阿武隈、戦艦 比叡、航空母艦 加賀、瑞鶴、翔鶴、蒼龍  
及飛龍、戦艦 霧島、第十八駆逐隊、二隻、潜航艇一隻、重  
油油槽船等ガ續行シタリ。重巡洋艦、利根ト筑摩ハ兩側ニタ  
第一ニ駆逐艦ガ真弾射撃ノ演習ヲヤリ、續イテ巡洋艦、次ニ戦艦  
艦ガ此ノ演習ヲヤリシタリ。最後ニ夕暮ニテ航空母艦カラ飛行機、  
離艦着艦ノ練習ヲヤシテ終リマシタリ。北太平洋、東側針路ヲ十日  
或ハ其以上ノ激浪ト悪天候ノ中ヲ航行シタリ。遂ニ布哇、真珠湾  
ニ接近シタリ。

(以前ニ發表セザリシ聯合軍ニ翻譯通譯部訊問書ヨリ)

(二) 將兵ノ攻撃ノ通知ヲ受ク

航空母艦 翔鶴、乗組員トシテ真珠湾攻撃ニ参加シタル捕  
虜ノ古河正之(音讀)ハ機動部隊ノ往航ニ関シテ次ノ如キ陳  
述ヲナシタリ。

十一月二十七日、二十八日ニ艦隊ハ出港シ、アリューシャン群島南、偏北

針路ヲ採ルタリ。十二月四日、翔鶴、艦長ハ乗組員ニ対シテ計畫サシ

攻撃ノ事ヲ通知シタリ。俘虜ハ米軍ノ逆襲ガアルデアラウト心配シ

ト云テ居マス。十二月五日ノ夜、艦隊ハ針路ヲ南ニ変ヘマシタリ。

(太平洋方面陸海軍聯合情報部準備訊問報告書

第七號。連續番號 ADM 第一〇三三號 昭和十九年(一九四四年)

百十日、第五一三頁ヨリ)

(ホ) 給油方法

前述第一節之詳細ニ引用シタル記事ハ機動部隊ノ出撃航  
行ヲ次ノ如ク約言シテ居ル。

機動部隊ハ十月二十七日或ハ其頃(東経時)千島列島ノ擇  
捉島ヨリ出撃シ以撃ヲナスク南ニ針路ヲ変スル前悪天候ヲ  
冒シテ東方ニ針路ヲ向テ進テ故南雲海軍中將(第一航空艦  
隊ノ指揮官)ヨリ指揮サテ艦隊ノ編制ハ可ナリ能ク出来テ居ク  
敵(原文ノ儘)ハ六隻ノ航空母艦加賀、赤城(第一航空戦隊)蒼龍  
飛龍(第二航空戦隊)翔鶴、瑞鶴(第五航空戦隊)鳳翔ヲ除ク  
ニ隻ノ戦艦、比叡、霧島(第三戦隊)ヨリ金剛及榛ヲ除クニ隻  
ノ巡洋艦利根、筑摩(第八戦隊)ニ阿武隈ヲ加ヘタルモノ第一水  
雷戦隊ノ艦船及約二十隻ノ潜水艦等ヲ有シテ居ク

出撃中最近日本軍一頭ヲ惱ミタツモノハ補給内題デタ  
良ク事情ニ通ジ補給作業隊ノ一等兵曹デタツタ一俘虏ハ高速ナ  
蒼龍及飛龍へ給油スルニ用テ應急手段ニ就イテ述ベタ。此ニ隻  
ノ母艦毎日給油セリ。飛行機ノ離艦スベキ地矣ニ向ッテ快速カテ  
猛進シ始ル時ニ番外ノ荷物トシテ積メタ。ドラム罐ガラハケツ隊  
ニ依ッテ「ハ」式ニ給油サレタ。然ルニモ拘ハラス蒼龍が呉ニ到リ着タ  
時ニ油槽ニ僅カニ九十五噸シカナク。艦船ニ給油スル為機動  
部隊ニ横附シテ油槽船ハ相当ナ困難ニアツク。視界モ非常ニ悪  
カッタテ兩船ノ位置ヲ一定スル為ニ曳索カ殆ト絶ヘス用ヒタ。

CINCPAC / CINCPACPOA / 太平洋艦隊司令部 / 太平洋  
面艦隊司令部 / 週間情報第一卷 第三十二、第三十三、三十四頁ヨリ

### 第三章 攻撃

#### 四. 空海両面攻撃

(1) 機動部隊出動ス  
前述第二節(10)ニ引用シテ航海母艦「加賀」ノ乗組員デ



テアツク 捕虜 横田茂樹(音讀)ハ真珠湾攻撃ヲ次ノ如ク陳述  
シタリ。

十二月七日カ或ハ八日ノ夜 三隻ノ潜水艦ハ機動部隊ノ附近テ  
単独哨戒ヲシテ居リシヲ捕虜ハ其後此ノ三隻ノ潜水艦ヲ見受  
ケマセテシタリ。

同夜機動部隊ハ二十六哩ノ全速カヲ出シ乙字形ノ航行ヲ始  
メタリ。加賀ノ乗組員ハ皆戦闘部署ニキリ終日其處ニ居リシヲ  
捕虜ハ二十種砲ニツキ何事ヲモ見方ム。彼ハ機動部隊ガ十二月八  
日終日編隊ヲ保チ

戦艦ガ先導艦ノ左右ニ各一隻配

置シテアタト思ツテ居ル。

飛行機ハ昭和十六年(一九四一年)十二月八日(日本時間)ノ〇時  
ニ離艦シ五時或ハ六時頃帰艦シタリ。約三十機帰艦シタリ。  
其中ノ十五機ハ加賀ニ所屬シテキタリシヲ加賀ノ飛行機ガ  
一番多数損失シタリ。最後ニ離艦シテ行ツタガアルト捕虜

ハ信ジテ居ラス

(聯合軍翻譯通譯部、訊問報告書 連絡巻號  
第二三〇號 第三—四頁ヨリ)

四 輝クキ成功

前記第三節ハニ引用シテ捕虜川北克己(音讀)ハ真珠  
湾ノ攻撃ニ就テ次ノ如ク記事ヲ書キミタリ。

地味

十二月八日早朝、吾々ハ布哇群島ノ沖四〇浬ノ處ニ到着シ  
タリ。太陽ガ昇ルツ時ニ空ハ一面ニ晴シ渡リ海ハ靜穩ニシタリ。天候ハ

大和飛行機ノ初陣ニ勝利ヲ得セシルカ、如ク晴シテキミタリ。  
旗艦、赤城ノ檣頭ニ戦闘旗ガ掲ケレタ時、航空母艦カニハ次ヲ  
次ニ艦載機ハ離艦シテ約三三機ノ堂々タル編隊ヲ、真珠湾ノ方  
向ニ消テ行ツタ。直ニ大成功ヲシタリ、報告ガ参リマシタリ。

日 次三約二百機攻撃機及戦闘機ヲ編制シテ、第二次攻撃隊カ機カ  
利ヲ得ル為ニ勇マシク出陣シシタ。

可……………今度モ大ニテ老練アル勝利ヲシタ。然レ此ノ譽レノ蔭ニ潜ム  
空軍ノ尊キ犠牲者ニ関スル種々ノ思ヒ去テ誰レガ知ツテ居ルテシヨウ。飛行機  
約十五機特殊潜航艇五隻ハ歸還シシタ。敵ノ飛行艇ハ只一機攻撃  
ニ未マシタ。(以前ニハ發表カサル聯合軍翻譯通訊部訊問書)

(一) 戦闘部署

航空母艦、翔鶴、乗組員トシテ、具珠湾攻撃ニ参加シタ。捕虜古川正之  
[音讀]ハ次ノ如クホシタ。

聯合軍翻譯部署ノ命令ハ昭和十六年(一九四一年)十二月七日二十三時ニ發シ  
シタ。飛行機ハ六時カラ、九時ノ間ニ歸艦シシタ。翔鶴ノ十機  
ハ歸艦シマセンシタ。

(聯合軍翻譯部訊問報告書第七、連続番号ADM1003)

号、昭和十九年(一九四四年)一月十日第六頁)

(中) 奇襲攻撃成功

具珠湾攻撃ノ先頭飛行機編隊ノ指揮官ヲアツタ。中谷憲三郎

(音読)中佐ハ此ノ攻撃ニ関シテ筆ヲ掃リ、其ノ後海軍情報局ニ依テ

編纂サレ文藝春秋社ニ発行セマシタ。其ノ全訳ハ次ノ通りアリマス

吾軍奇襲成功

吾々ハ海中ノオアツル島ヲ攻撃セヨト云フ命令ヲ受ケシタ。其時我  
カ乗艦ハ東方ニ直航シテ居タカアル。待テニ待ツタ命令ハ遂ニ来  
カアル。其レニ拘ラズ此ノ命令ヲ受ケタ時ニハ興奮ト激シテ感動ノ大  
感情ノ高カルヲ覺エシタ。全員甲板ニ整列シテ此ノ命令ヲ受ケ取

Doc 1627

ワタノエ。此時橋頭高ク揚ケタ。信号旗ハ突ニ「乙」旗ヲ示シ  
三十年前帝國ノ運命ハ危殆ニ瀕シタ。日本海ニ揚ケラレタ乙旗ハ今  
マ再ヒ揚ケラレタ。今度ハ太平洋上ニ全員ハ大洋ノ強風ニ翻ツテ  
ラ見上ケテ中ウチニ知ラズ。涙カ流シテ来タ。我カ飛行隊長ハ直  
ク二次ノ命令ヲ發シテ

「各員ハ自己ノ任務遂行ニ専ラシメ全カヲ盡シレ。コノ時私ノ体内ニ未  
曽有ノ重大ナ戦争ニ参加シ得ルトイフニ上モノイ喜ビカ起リ

乙旗カ降サルト直クニ私ハ全速力ヲ東方ニ向ツテ中々航空母艦ノ突  
撃ノ速力ニハシメテ急ガツタ。特ニ敵艦ヲ示シテ特兵ノ士氣ヲ昂  
揚シタ。コノ時天候ハ險惡ヲ變リ易カク然シ意氣揚タル特兵ハ  
ソノ格闘トシテ急ニ介シテカフタ。整備員モ搭乗員ト共ニ戦フノ如ク

我々ニ白鉢巻ヲケレタ。遂ニ出陣ノ命令カ下ツタ。奇襲攻撃作戦  
ニ成功シ。全員突撃シ之カノ時ノ飛行隊長ノ命令テアツタ。物々明直  
前ノ大濤ノ多ク航空母艦ハ上下左右ニ動揺シタ。海ハコノ暗カク  
ビユート私ノ耳所ヲ強イ風カ吹イテ通り天候ハ依然トシテ悪カク

コレハ豫期シタ事カツタ。何故ナク十七米ノ風速ヲ持ツ東北風(常文ノミ)  
カ強ク烈シク吹イテ中々一面ニ黒イ雲カ一五〇米乃至二〇〇米ノ高  
度カラ垂レ下ツテ中々大編隊ノ飛行機カ航空母艦ヲ離シテ狭イ真端

湾ハ突入スルノヨイ状態カハナカク。若シモコレカ平素ノ練習日又ハ訓  
練飛行カアツタナラ延期サレタアラウ。然シ今朝ハ長年ノ訓練ノ徒  
続カタク。天候カヨカラウカ悪カラウカ變リハナカク。

出陣時間。時〇〇分。飛行機ハ續々ト上下左右ニ動揺シテキル甲  
板ヲ離シテ行ツタ。ソノ飛行機カ空中カ編隊ヲシテキル時私ハ無意識ニ  
次々ト上ツテ来ル僚機ヲ見守リテキタ。フシテ私ノ眼ハフシカリヤレ

2A

Doc/629

ト云フテキルカノ様ニ飛行機ヲ激勵シテ見上ケテ中々編隊ヲ定メシタ  
飛行機ハ全速カヲ布哇ヘ向テ突進シタ。然レシ飛行機ハ布哇ヘ  
クミテノ間飛行隊長ハ非常ニ心配シテキタ。天候ノ悪イ布哇ノ海  
岸ニ向テ四〇〇哩モノ驚クニ長距離航海ヲシタ航空母艦ノ  
位置ハ間違テ中カクアラウカ。若シ間違テキルハ我等ノ飛行機ハ  
オアフ島ニ着カナイアラウ。間モナク飛行機ニ乗ツテキタ人達ハ素  
晴レイ日ノ出ヲ見タ。平常南洋方面ヲハ普通三十哩展望カ判ク  
時ニ五十哩モ離シタ所ヲ見エタ。然レコノ時ハ暗イ黒雲ノ首  
カ展望ヲ殆ド遮ツタ。布哇ハ一〇〇〇米ノ高サノ山カ峰ヲナレキルノ  
テカキモ到着ニ十分前ニ見エテ警告アラウ。

間モナク布哇ニ着ク警告ト考ヘテ物ハ眼ヲ緊張サセテ望遠鏡  
ヲ覗イテキタ。ソノ時海岸線カ我々ノ前ニ現シタ。サア今カ。全員總  
攻撃ノ時ハ今カ……

編隊ハ直ニ展開シタ。各部隊ハソノ任務ニ依テ或モハ上空ニ或  
モハ低空ニ徹底的攻撃ヲ編成ニトシ又ソノ真珠湾ハコガ朝ノ霧ニ  
包ミテ眼ヲ中々。港ノ内側ハ静カテ艦カアラウ。碇泊シテキル船カラ一條  
ノ煙ヲ見エテカク。整然タル兵舎ノ群。山ノ頂上ニ通ル曲リクネツ  
ク白イ自動車道路ノ線ハ四方カカラヨキ攻撃ノ目標。是等ノ目標  
ト共ニ港ノ内ニ太平洋艦隊ノ主力艦艇カ整然トニ隻カ砲並シテ破  
泊シテキタ。雷撃機カマハラノ雲ヲ割テ直ニ突撃ヲシテ行ク。真珠  
湾ハ狭ク狭イテ雷撃機ノ編隊攻撃ハ非常ニ難カシカク。ソコノ雷撃機  
機ハ巨ニ分シ非常ニ低空飛行ヲシテ水面ヲカスメテ艦カモモアリ。又戦  
艦ノ腹部ニ〇〇米カラ三〇〇米以内ニ近クイテコノカト四ツタ所ヲ重雷  
ヲ放ツモモラタ。直ニ二條ノ白イ重雷ノ航跡カ水面ヲ突進シテ

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行方、コノ光景ヲ見テ喜ビテ中々時津イイ水柱カ主力艦ノ艦側  
カラ空中ニ上ツタソレハ主力艦ノ腹部ヘノスハラレイ命中アラフタ  
水柱ハ雲ノ高サト變フ程高ク上ツタ水柱ハ続々ト上リ續ケタ  
若シ時間ヲ討ツタトシタラソレハ三四秒ノ出来事アラフタソレモ  
カカハラズマケ対空砲ハ眠ツタ  
戦闘機サモ挑戦シヤウトハシテタ  
奇襲攻撃ノ人完全ニ成功シタ、奇襲攻撃ノ大成ハ見事ニ  
為シ遂ケラシタト云スキカ  
我等ハ奇襲攻撃ニ成功セリトソ  
通信ハ無線電信ヲ航空母艦ニ送リタ  
コレニ續イテ急降下爆撃機カ一直線ニ降下シタコレニ續イテ赤黒  
イカ火ノ敵飛行場ノ格納庫ヤ飛行場ニ並チキタ飛行機カラ  
燃エ上ツタ、コレ等ノ雷電機ヤ急降下爆撃機カソノ第一撃ヲ自  
由ニ加ヘヤウトシ今モ急降下シヤウト機首ヲ下ケテ居タソノ時敵  
ノ対空砲火カ我々ノコハリテ一液片ニ破裂シ始メタ、次ニ我等ノ  
大型爆撃機カ来る、私ハ編隊ノ真先ニキタ、ワレテ下方ニアル巨  
大十軍艦ニ狙フ空ヲ、氣流カ烈シイテ私ハ水平爆撃ノ  
照準カ出来ナカ  
爆撃ヲ無駄ニスルニトハ出来ナイト思フヲ又因  
此遣リ直シタ我々ハ防禦砲火ノ真中ヲ旋回シテキル間續ク  
編隊モ同様ニ烈シイ防禦砲火ノ中ヲ靜カニ旋回シテキタ、今度  
ハ我等ハ成功シタ、我々カ爆撃ヲ放タウトシタ丁度ワノ時我カ機ハ  
烈シク動揺シタ後オラ一敵自ルト煙ノ柱カ空中五〇〇米モ高ク  
上ツタ、我々カ後ヲ知ツタ事カアルカコレハ戦闘機編隊ト一雷撃  
機編隊ト急降下爆撃機編隊ト非常ニ難シイ水中攻撃ヲ  
成シトシタ、特殊潜航艇トノ緊密ナル協同戦術ノ戦果アラフタ  
敵軍艦ノ火薬庫ハ爆発シソノ艦底ニ半分ハ既ニ破裂シテ

水雷艦の油ノ薄膜が擴がテタリソレハ確實ニアリカテ敵ノ防禦砲火ハ遂ニ烈シクナラソレテ非常ニ多敷ノ彈が我々ノ編隊ノ周圍ヲ破裂スルハ恰モ石ヲ投ケケレテカノ様アツタ間モテ飛行隊長機ノ機體左側ニ大キテ穴がアケラシタ之ニ續イテ第五号機が射タレタ様アツタ燃料カタクカラ漏レタリソレモ拘ラズソノ飛行機ハ編隊ヲ飛行ヲ續ケテキタソノ搭乗者ハ自己ノ使命ヲ完ウレタ後自分ノ飛行機ヲ破壊スル積リラシム吾ニ状況ヲ知ユヨト合同シタ時彼ハ補助シテウケテト静カニ答ヘタ然レテ態度ハ全く落着イテ生死ノ無現シテカノ様アツタ次ニ我々ハ第二目標即チ島ノ中央ニアルウイラーノ飛行場ニ注意シテ向ケタ此處カハ二〇枚以上ノ戦闘機ヲ爆撃機ハ一列ニ並ハラシテ居リ然レテ我々降下爆撃機ヲ戦闘機ノ既ニ之等ヲ爆撃シテ發射シタ後カタク飛行場ニ押出サレタキ飛行機カタク赤イ火更の上ヲテタリ格納庫カハ濃イ黒煙が上ヲテキタソレハ完全ニ破壊セタキ果カチタ燃エキタリハ各分カソリンカワタラウ黒煙ハ殆ド空ヲ敵ノハカリニ擴ガワキタ敵機が逆襲カシテ来ナイハコトメテアツタ敵ノ目標カヲ格ナ状態カタク我々ハ再ビ敵ノ主力艦ニ注意ヲ向ケタ並ニ破滅シテキタ二隻ノ軍艦ハ再ビハリ得ナイ程スラレイ目標カアツ一編隊カ第一ノ軍艦ヲ狙ヒ他ノ編隊カ第二ノ軍艦ヲ狙フ一雷撃機ヤ急降下爆撃機が攻撃シテ後我々大型爆撃機が攻撃スルカ高カタクソレハ連續攻撃カアツタ第一ノ爆撃機が攻撃シタ時一〇米ノ水柱が上ツタ若シ之ニ續イテ飛行機カ急降下シタラソレハ損害ヲ被ルソコト他等ハ水柱カ静マルマテ静カニ待ツキタ故ニ敵ノ対空砲火ニ怯マセル期由カ長引イタニモ拘ラズ彼等ハ静カニ空中ヲ待ツテキタ

4/ 下度ニ時兩雷撃機が攻撃カソレ極ニ速シタ

彼等ハ大膽ニ敵ニ接近シテ魚雷ヲ放テ降下カウ水平ニ復  
 シタトコロヲ射撃サセタ。我カ一機ノ機體ハ煙ニ包コレタ。火ノ玉  
 トナラタ。雷撃機ハ尚正確ニ魚雷ヲ投下シワケタ。ソレテ最後  
 ニ敵艦ニ突入自爆シ火ノ玉ト化シタ。私ハコレヲハッキリトコノ眼  
 ヲ見タ。

(次頁ニ續ク)

我々カ攻撃ノ使命ヲ果シテ歸ラウトシタ時旭日ノ初光カ既  
 ニ貝珠湾湾ヲ照シテイタ。振返ワテ見ルト一隻ノ戦艦カ黒  
 色ノ煙ニ取り巻カレテ半分ニ割シテキタ。

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其外三隻が醜い赤腹を中て沈没し居る尚他三隻西十五度  
ニ傾斜し漸次沈没しつアア三隻は猛烈に火上らつたア  
オード島、海岸ニアリ敵艦ハ凡テ損害ヲ受ケテ居ル  
我々の燃料が續く限りは真珠湾上空ヲ救回旋回シタ、其ノ理由  
ハ我々の是等事ヲ我々眼デハキリ見タガ、戦ヘナリタラ味方機  
一機ヲ歸ッテ来ハシマイカト云フカスカ切エガアアウラニル、我々ガ  
母艦ハ安全ニ歸着シタ時第ニ次攻撃ヲ編隊ガ出テ攻シタ、攻撃  
機編隊ヲ連續的ニ送リテ理由ハ敵太平洋艦隊残存勢力  
ニメテ刺ス為デアリタ

(聯合軍翻譯通譯部 敵國出版物第六、三一五頁)  
ハ大空襲

昭和十六年十月八日午後一時大本營海軍部發表ハ其ノ中ニ左  
ノ通り述ベテ云

「八日未明帝國海軍ハ布哇地區ノ米國艦隊及ビ軍事勢力ニ  
決死的大空襲ヲ敢行シ……」

此ノ發表ハ昭和十六年十月十八日次ノ存テ攻撃ニ依ル損害見積デ  
補足サレタ即チ

沈没——戰艦五隻、一等若、二等巡洋艦二隻、大破——戰  
艦三隻、輕巡洋艦二隻、驅逐艦二隻、中破——戰艦一隻、  
二等巡洋艦四隻、他ニ敵機四百五十機ヲ爆撃シ又ハ銃撃  
ニ依リ炎上セシメ、十四機ヲ墜シタリ。尚特殊潛航艇ヲ以  
テ組織サレシ我ガ特別攻撃隊ハアリ、レ級戰艦一隻ニ魚雷  
ヲ命中シテ沈没セシメリト本日報告アリタリ。然レ乍ラ五隻  
ノ特殊潛航艇未ダ歸還ス、又我ガ九機ヲ失ヒリトノ報告ハ

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國民強衛隊手ヲ兵ヘソリ

(聯合軍翻譯部) 敵國出版物第六二頁

(一) 宣傳寫真

捕獲セリ各種ノ宣傳用、パンフレットヤ寫真帳ニ日本軍ノ真珠  
湾空襲ニ依ル損害ノ空中寫真アル、之等ハ公表、為メ日本中  
廣ク領布セリ、之等一部分ハ附録Aトシテ再製セリ右ニ表  
題、譯カ附ケテアル

(二) 潜水艦作戰

(三) 真珠湾ヲ攻撃シ前ニ偵察ス  
潜水艦ノ特質ト對潛作戰ト題ス日附ノ本ヲ発行者ハ記シテ  
序ニ捕獲セリ本ノ中ニ左ノ句カアル、  
偵察、哨戒

布哇奇襲ガ日本ノ最優秀潜水艦(其約三十隻)ガ真珠湾  
ノ哨戒、偵察ノ任務ニ就キ

(以前出版セテ本ノ聯合軍翻譯通譯部書類第五八七號)

(四) 潜水艦予定行動圖

日本作戰計畫ハ小型潜航艇ニ依ル港内ニ於テ米國海軍艦艇ノ攻  
撃ヲ要ス

此ノ潜航艇ハ翌日「オア」島ノ對側ノ海岸ニ打上ケラレ、兵士  
ノ一人ガ捕虜トナリ、捕虜カラハ殆ト何ノ情報モ得ラレカワリ、潜  
航艇ハ真珠湾ノ入口近ク、暗礁ニ破損ヲ受ケ聴音装置ヲ破壊  
セ退却ヲ余儀ナリサリモト信セラレ、此ノ潜航艇ノ魚雷発射管  
ヲ後テ調ヘタ結果、魚雷ヲ発射シラウトレガ発射装置ガ故障ヲ  
起シ、コトガ分タ

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「磨損」を再製不能、航海図、原本、周到、日本語、翻譯、詳細、航海資料、ドイツ、米國海軍水路局、海図、ドイツ、明白、海図、三色、書込、が、乱雜、記、サレ、居、り、其、中、三、不、明、瞭、譯、サ、レ、モ、エ、ル、裏、側、に、航海、等、關、ス、ル、コ、ト、が、記、サ、レ、ア、ラ、ウ、潜、航、艇、亦、地、平、線、を、見、テ、真、珠、灣、粗、雜、側、面、ヲ、持、ッ、テ、居、ル、潜、航、艇、任、務、に、攻、撃、手、ト、偵、察、ノ、両、方、ヲ、兼、ネ、テ、居、ル、海、図、上、ニ、亦、サ、シ、テ、假、名、畧、語、に、航、空、機、カ、ラ、見、サ、レ、テ、畧、語、ト、同、様、キ、テ、ア、ラ、ウ、カ、ク、ト、三、隻、又、日、本、十、型、潜、航、艇、カ、此、時、我、ガ、及、撃、手、テ、矢、ハ、シ、一、隻、又、確、ク、港、内、ニ、ハ、ク、カ、五、吋、砲、彈、直、撃、手、ヲ、一、突、受、ケ、其、後、衝、撃、手、サ、レ、爆、雷、攻、撃、手、テ、滅、奔、滅、奔、ニ、破、壞、サ、シ、日、本、側、之、等、十、型、潜、航、艇、一、五、隻、損、失、ヲ、認、メ、テ、居、ル、

(CINCPAC) CINCPAC 週刊情報 一カ一巻、カニニ號 (十四、十五頁)

特別攻撃隊

大本營海軍報道 部長平出英夫大佐、特別攻撃隊ノ勇士ト題スル、存、存、報、告、ヲ、書、イ、テ、發、行、シ、タ、我、ガ、世、界、平、和、偉、大、ノ、目、的、ト、使、命、ヲ、受、シ、テ、日、本、帝、國、生、命、ヲ、支、護、シ、テ、暴、虐、シ、ル、米、國、ニ、對、シ、破、壞、的、打、撃、手、ヲ、行、フ、時、ニ、當、リ、我、々、ノ、生、命、ヲ、賭、シ、テ、敵、ノ、心、臟、ニ、猛、烈、ト、一、撃、手、ヲ、與、エ、タ、ル、此、ノ、偉、大、ノ、企、圖、遂、行、シ、生、命、ヲ、捧、ゲ、シ、海、軍、特、別、攻、撃、隊、ノ、勇、士、ニ、敬、意、ヲ、表、シ、テ、私、ハ、此、ノ、報、告、ヲ、書、ク、ノ、ハ、テ、ア、ル、

大本營発表(昭和十六年三月六日午後三時)

海軍特別攻撃隊ニ依ッテ為サレ、真珠灣ニ對ス、赫々タル比類ナキ猛烈ニ攻撃シ、既ニハ公表セラレ、全世界ノ各國民ノ心膽

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「要」レトク本攻撃計画ニ若佐大尉外数名ノ士官ニ依テ発案サレ  
実行サレ、本計画ニ斯ル非常ノ場合ヲ予期シテ数月前ノ等  
士官ノ愛國ノ忠誠ノ義務ノ念カラ発案サレ、彼等ノ上官ヲ通ジ  
テ聯合艦隊司令長官ニ密ニ提出サレタリテアル、

聯合艦隊司令長官本計画ヲ慎重ニ検討シテ後其ノ成功スベキコト及  
び実行可能ナルコトヲ認メ提案者ノ熱烈ナル希望ヲ容認セラレタリテ  
アル、此ノ大事業ニ共ニカシラ下士官帝國海軍ノ最優秀者ノ人員ヲ  
アツク、彼等ノ皆戦闘ニ共ニカシラ士官ヲ深ク信頼シ共ニ生キ共ニ  
死スルコトガ出来ルコトヲ希望シ祈願シ、本計画ニ各士官聯  
合艦隊司令長官下士官ヲ要求シ承認サレタリテ一人ノ志願兵  
モナカワリテアル、戦術ト技術ノ兩専門員及工員ノ短期間内ニ  
於ケル晝夜ノ別キ不眠不休ノ準備訓練及ビ建造実験ノ結果  
又方部内ニ於ケル秘密ニ嚴守サレタリテ、彼等ノ本戦事開始前  
ニ其ノ任ヲ完成スルコトガ出来タリタル、攻撃ニ共ニカシラ士官ト兵員  
ノ愛國忠誠精神、技術作業ノ關係シテ者ノ熱意、帝國海  
軍ノ卓越シテ技術ト共ニ世界ニ誇ルコトガ出来ルニテアル、

攻撃ニ共ニカシラ凡テ手段ヲ利用サレテアラフ敵主力ニ對シテ攻撃後  
以テ安全帰還ノ方策ヲ更ニ確ニスル必要カアラフテアラフ、狭イ水路  
内ニ於テ廣ク散在シテ敵艦ノ沈没船体ヲ避ケ下ラ迂回シ敵  
ノ熾烈ナ攻撃ヲ脱シテ帰還スルニテ、非常ニ困難ナルコトノ之ヲ  
想像スルニテ殆ト不可能ナル、帝國海軍將兵ガ最悪ノ事  
能ハシト至リテ場合自ラ艦船ヲ自沈セシムル用意ヲシテ之ヲ然テ  
思フ。

斯ク、如ク、天皇陛下ノ神嚴ニ聖徳ヲ確信シテ居リ、特別

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攻撃隊ハメ月メ日ニロコ堅ク閉ジテコロ大冒險ニ着キソシテ眞珠湾ニ突入シテノデアル。彼等が嚴重ナ敵ノ防禦網及び複雑ナ水路ヲ突破出来タノハ冷静沈着ナ操縦ニ依ツタカラデアル。全艦艇ハ事前ニ準備シタ配備カラ港内ニ潜入デキタ。或ハ白晝攻撃ヲ敢行シ或ハ夜襲ヲ行ツタ、ソシテ歴史上類例ナキ大事業ヲナシトゲタ。義務遂行後ノ彼等ハ艇ト運命ヲ共ニシタ。夜襲中「アリゾナ」級戦闘艦ノ沈没ハ湾外遙クニ位置シテ居タ。支軍海上部隊ニヨリテ明瞭ニ認めラレタ。十二月八日午後四時三十一分(布哇時間十二月七日午後九時一分)月出ニ分後、眞珠湾内ニ大爆発が起ツタ。火焰ハ空中高く上リ、鋼鉄ノ白熱セル破片ハ空中高く飛散シタ。暫クノ後火焰ハ尙滅シタ。當時、敵ハ攻撃が我空軍ニ依ツテナサレタモノト思ヒ、益烈ナ砲撃ヲ開始シタコトが確證サレタ。而シテ同日午後六時十一分(布哇時間午後十時四十一分)攻撃成功ノ無線通報が特別攻撃隊ノ一艇カラ發信サレタ。午後七時十四分以後無線通信ハ杜絶シタ。艇ハ自沈又ハ沈没サセラレタモノト信セラレル。敵艦隊ニ対スル白晝攻撃ノ結果ハ輕微デアルト報道サレテ居ルが、我々ハ大成功デアッタト確信シテ居ル併シ乍ラ湾内混乱ノタメ、空軍ニ依テ得ラレタ成功ト特別攻撃隊ニ依ルモノト區別スルコトハ非常ニ困難デアッタ。乗組員ハ出發ニ際シ攻撃終了後歸還スル様命令ヲ受ケテ居タが、其ノ意志がナオツタカラ一人モ歸還シナクッタ。ノデアル。

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敵艦ニ接近シ(史上前例ノナイ至近距離デ)支軍航空隊ノ爆撃及び雷撃下ニ之ヲ攻撃シ、或ハ月出マデ水中ニ潜没シ、カクテ白晝攻撃ニヨリ損害ノ輕微デアツタ敵主力艦ニ対シ部隊全員ハ

決定的攻撃ヲ敢行シテ、攻撃ノ成功ニ資セムトシテ、彼等ノ精神ノ集中ハ生死ヲ超越シタモノデアツタ。

前例ナク比類ナキ犠牲的攻撃精神ハ帝國海軍ノ傳統ヲ如實ニ示シタモノデアツテ、今次開戦ノ最大功績ノ一ツト認メラレルベキモノデアラル。

尚更ニ我が一億同胞カ忘レムトシテ忘ル、事ノ出来ナイ特別攻撃隊ノ戦死後三ヶ月、追悼祭ニアタリ、護國ノ精神ヲ思ヒ起シテ今一ツ新ナル感奮ヲ感ズルノデアラル。

之等若人ハ常ニ彼等ノ上官ニヨリ親シク迎ヘラレ朋友ヤ部下ノ尊崇ノ的デアツタ。彼等ハ皆優レタ性格ヲ持ツテ、快然シ、彼等ハ名聲、昇級、快樂ノ思ヒ、私利ノ心サヘモナク、彼等ハ自己ノ觀念ヲ投ゲ棄テ、彼等ノ全身全靈ヲ唯陛下ト祖國ノ御楯ニ捧ゲタノデアツタ。彼等ハ二十餘歳ニシテ祖國ノ爲ニ雄々シク死ニツイタノデアツタ。

此ノ攻撃ハ報告書ニマル如ク、崇佐中尉ト他ノ將校ニヨリ考ヘラレタモノデアツタ。彼等ハ自分等自身デ計画ヲ作り出シタ。之等ノ人々ハ忠誠愛國ノ任務ヲ

(次頁ニ續ク)

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果サム事ヲ望ンデ人間的ニハ不可能トセラレタル此ノ業績ヲ計  
画シタ。爾後幾月間、之等ノ人々ハ萬一不慮ノ誤ノ無カラムカ  
爲、筆舌ニ盡シ難キ困難ナル訓練ヲ秘密裡ニ實行シタ。  
カクテ戦が始マルヤ、彼等ハ真珠湾ニ突入シ敵艦ノ艦底ニ  
自ララブツケンマデノ激シイ攻撃ヲ取行シタ後從容トシテ  
死ニ就イタ。今日、私ハ米國側ノ祭表ヲ考へ合ハセ、攻撃手狀  
況ニ関スル私ノ印象ヲ述ベタイト思フ。特別攻撃隊が真珠  
湾ニ潜入セムト試ミタ時、彼等ハ潜水艦防禦網が張ラレ  
澤山ノ魚雷敷設シテアルヲ察見シタ。實ニ敵ノ防禦手段  
ハ徹底シタモノデアッタ。然シ此ノ特別攻撃隊ノ充分訓練  
セラレタ青年等ハ之等障害物ノ間ヲ沈着巧妙ニ行動シ  
テ容易ニ湾内ニ侵入シタ。

此ノ時、彼等若人ハ互ニニコリト笑ワテ「我等ノ任務  
ハ既ニ成就セリ」ト言ワタト私ハ信ズル。指揮官ト彼ノ部下  
ハ真ニ一心ニナワテ居タシ彼等ノ艇ト乗組員トハ同体デアッタ。  
港内ノ水路ノ混乱ナド問題デハナカッタ。早鐘打ソ心ヲ抑へ  
他ノ艇ヨリモ遅レタイトシテ全艇ハ港内深ク侵入シタ。

ヤガテ彼等ノ潜望鏡ニウワツタノハ二列ニ行儀ヨリ並ニダ  
敵主力艦ノ群デハナカッタカ。之等若人ノ満足ヲ容  
易ニ想像スルコトが出来ル。遂ニ各艇トモ攻撃ヲ開始シタ。  
幾ツカノ艇ハ艦艇ノ列ノ真中ニアツタ大キナ戦艦ニ迫リ  
最初ノ激シイ一撃ヲ加ヘタ。他ノ艇ハ近ク、他ノ艦艇ノ  
49 胴腹ニ孔ヲ穿ツタ。丁度此ノ時、空中ノ友軍機ノ活動ノ  
片影ガチラツト潜望鏡ニ見ラレタ。友軍機ハ果取ナル攻

撃ノ真最中ノ様デアツタ。青ニ奪ノ勇氣ハ百倍シ彼等  
ハ一艦モ刺サヌ覺悟ヲ固メテ齒ヲ喰ヒシバリ確乎トシテ  
立ツタ。次ノ攻撃ヲ開始スル時ヲ。多ク分我々ノ潛望鏡  
ヲ見タノデアラフ。敵驅逐艦が我々ノ側部ニ衝撃セムト  
突進シテ来タ。抵抗スル間モナカワノテ災厄ニマヌガレムト  
シテ深ク潛行シテ潜水艦モアツタ。

此ノ時敵砲彈ハ雨霰ト降りソク我が空軍部隊ノ攻  
撃ヲ激シクナツタ。港内ヲ飛ビ散ル無彈ヤ魚雷ハ非常ナ  
混乱ヲ来シタ。各艇ニ由ル水中攻撃ハ非常ナ成功デアツタ  
ト信ズル、然シ空軍部隊ト水中攻撃ノ成功ヲ識別スル事  
ハ困難ナ事デアル。

日没ヲ待ツテ居タ處ノ特別攻撃隊ノ潛航艇ノ乗組  
員ハ激シイ日中ノ戦闘ノ音ヲ聞キナガラ海底ニジツトシテ居  
タ。彼等ハ待ツテ来タ敵メ繪遊ビヨシテ時間ヲ過シタ。  
之レハ誠ニ仲々容易ニハ出来ナイ事デアル。遂ニ日没後、月  
ノ上ルヲ待ツテ状況ハ攻撃ヘト移ル。其ノ潛航艇ハ日中  
ノ攻撃ニ由リ輕微ノ被害ヲ被ツタ敵主力艦ヲ求メテ近距離  
ニ接近シテ行ツタ。月光ヲ浴ビタ敵艦ノ大キナ船体カウツキ  
リト浮キ上ツテ攻撃ノ最適ノ目標トナツタ。「撃テト言フ  
〇〇指揮官ノ命令ノモトニ且最後ノ攻撃ヲ決行サレタ。  
眼前ノ敵ニ確實ナル死ヲト云フ心ニ充タタ攻撃ニ間違ヒハナ  
カツタ。物凄イ爆音が港内ヲ揺ルガセ、高サ數百米ノ火柱  
が天ヲモ焦シタ。同時ニ白イ波頭ヲ蹴立テテ司令塔が靜  
カニ水面ニ現ハレ始メタ。沈着勇氣ナル司令官ハニソニ割  
レ碎ケ沈ミユラ敵艦ノ最後ヲ確カメタデアツタ。

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長い間抱イテイタ目的ハ今ヤ達セラレタ。自光ノ中デ  
之等ノ若人達ノ思ヒハドンナデアッタラウ。此ノ日ノ為メニ燃  
ヘテ来タ數ヶ月ノ勞苦ヲ思ワラ居タノデアアラウ。ソレテ今  
ヤ之等ノ人々ハ死ノ祭光ノ前ニ立ワテ居タノデアッタ。此ノ敵  
艦ノ轟沈ハ港外ノ我が部隊ニヨリハッキリ確メラレタ。彼  
等ハ丁度此ノ時、焰カ燃エ上リ灼熱セル鋼鉄片が空中  
高く舞ヒ上ルノヲサ(逢)カ彼方ニ見タ、時刻ハ正ニ十二月  
八日(布哇)時間十二月七日(二時一分)月が上ッテ二カ後デ  
アッタ。

戦闘ハ終ッタ。併シ特別攻撃隊ノ若人達ハ歸ッテ来  
ナカッタ。我々ハ攻撃ニ成功セリトノ或潜水艦ヨリノ且取  
後ノ通信ハ布哇時間二二四一分デアッタ。生死ヲ超エタ  
ル隊員ハ最後マデ敵艦殲滅ニ身ヲ捧ゲタ。彼等ハ生  
キテ歸ラウトハ夢想ダニシカッタ。或ルモノハ沈メラレ或ル  
モノハ自爆シタ事が確證サレテ居ル。確實十死ノ手中ニ入ル  
場合<sup>自己抹殺</sup>ハナカッタ。然レ彼等ハ静カニ且取モ出宗言向ニシテ  
純ナル<sup>無然</sup>一境地ニツイテノ根深イ確信ニ到達シテ居タ。此ノ  
神ヲモ泣カシムル全キ犠牲ノ大精神コソ武士道ノ精華ニシテ  
我が國民精神ノ精髓デアル。吾界ノ歴史ニモカハル例ヲ見ナイ  
デアル。私達ガ之等賞讃スベキ行為ヲ想フ時、我が體內  
ニ熱血ノタギルヲ覺エルモデアル。

特別攻撃隊ノ果取タル業ノ清キ忠誠ハ畏クモ上聞  
ニ達シタ。陛下ヲ御守護奉リ祖國平和ノ礎トシテ此ノ世ニ  
生ヲ享ケ今ハ地下ニ眠ル之等若キ人々ノ靈ガ此ノ事ヲ

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聞イタナラバ必ズヤ感涙ニ咽ブデアラウ。之等若人ハ生ニ  
ハアラス死ノ門口ニ立ワテ居タニモカ、ハラズ、彼等ハアタカ  
モ日々ノ教練ノ行進ト何等変ル所モナク冷静自若トシテ  
居タ。

出奔直前之等若人達ハ戦友ト集リ語ツタ。一人ノ若  
者ハ「攻撃ノ後陸へ上ツテ之ニ物ヲ言ハセルノダ」ト言ヒナガラ  
無邪氣ニ拳銃ヲ取り出シ掌ヲナデタ、モウ一人ハ下着ヲ着  
換ヘナガラ「軍服ヲ着ナケレバイケナイダガ、日者イカラ作業  
服デ矢禮サセテモラウヨ」ト言ツテ落チ着イテ着換ヘテ續  
ケタ。モウ一人ノ若者ハ仲間ノ一人ノ「爆彈ヤ魚雷ニヤラ  
レナイ様ニ注意シロ」トノ言葉ニ對シ「大丈夫ダヨ、ソノ時  
マデ六敵ノ船体ニ大キナ孔ヲアケテヤルカラ」ト答ヘタ。彼ハ  
香氣ニ煙草ノ煙ニ皆ノ者ヲ包シテ笑ヒマシタ。或ル一人ハ  
「翌日ニ地獄ノ鬼ニクルズヴェルト」ガ泣キ事ヲ言フノヲ聞  
キマシタト「言フ一節ヲ口ツサム程ノ即席ノ樂シキヲ持ツテ  
居タ。

一人ノ酒ノ好キナ若者ハ戦友ノ一人ノ「君ガ戦果ヲアゲテ帰  
ツテ来たら祝ハウゲヤナイカ」ト言フ激勵ノ言葉ニ對シ  
「ア、飲マウ」ト笑ヒナガラ「イツモナラ答ヘルニ、何モ答ヘナ  
カソタト言フ事デアル、之等ノ若人達ハ日帰ツテ来ルル  
トカヨモシ生キテ居タラハ」等トイフ事ハ口ニスベキデハナイ  
ト思ヒラウ考ヘテ居タノデアラウ。

又或ル一人ハ後ニ残ル戦友ノ肩ヲタ、キナガラ「最後  
ノ最後マデ皆テ頑張ラウ、今度ハ靖國神社デ會ハシ

ト言ッテ彼等ヲ勵マシタ。

ヤガテ出奔ノ時間トナツタ。普通戦争ニ出ル時ハ出奔ニ際シ上官ニ「行ッテ来マス」(帰ルツモリデ)報告スルノが通例デアル。加之等ノ若人達ハ大膽ニモ「何々中尉、何々少尉、コレカラ行キマス」ト報告シタ。(死ニ行クンデ帰ル意志ハナイノデアツタ)彼等ハ(帰ル意志デ)「行ッテ来マス」トハ言ハナカツタ。

「行ケ」  
「ハイ」

大イナル仕事ニ出奔スル人々トノ間ニ挨拶が取りカハサレタ。行ク者ニトワテモ残ル者ニトワテモ見送ル者ニトワテモ送ラレル者ニトワテモ深い悲心壯ナ感激ノ一時デアツタ。斯カル場合ニ於テモ之等青年ハ出奔セントスルニ當リ尚ホ自若タルモノデアツタ。一青年士官ハ「辨當ニソリダ水ヲ持ッテオマケニテコレト迄受ケテマルデハイキングニ行クヤウダ」ト言ヒナガラ元氣ニ艇ニ乗リ込シタト言フコトデアル。恐ラウ此ノ時少年時代ノ遠足ノ樂シイ思ヒ出ガケラリト頭ニ等ンダラウ。之等ノ青年遠足ノ懐シイ思ヒ出ヲ胸ニ持テ死地へ突進シタ。之等ノ青年が私事ヲキチント處理シテアツタ事が後ニナツテ解ツタ。或ル者ハ上官並ニ戦友ニ感謝ノ遺書ヲ残シ又或ル者ハ己ノ所見ヲ書イタ公文書ヲ残シタ。然レ乍ラ遺言ト言ツタマウモノハ殆ド見受ケラレナカツタ。之等ノ中ニ或ル青年ニ依ル辭世ノ歌ガアル。

ト言ッテ彼等ヲ勵マシタ。

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「行ケル  
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君が爲何か惜まむ 若櫻

散リテ甲斐アル命ナリセバ

イザ行カム網モ機雷モ棄リ超エテ

打ケテ眞珠ノ玉ト碎ケム

嗚呼 今朝ノ空ノ樂レキ

靖國神社ノ庭ニ見エム

(註、靖國神社ハ東京ニアル神道ノ神社ニシテ陸海軍戦死者ノ魂ガ祀ラレテイル)

私ハ之ガ之等青年ノ心底ノ感情ヲ表ハシテイルト信ズル。此ノ悟入、此ノ信念ヲ言葉ニ言フコトハ易イ。然レ乍ラ之等青年ハ如實ニ之ヲ無言ノ行ニ実行シタ之等青年ノ言動ニ依リ我等ハ只戦争ヲ勝タント望ミシレノミナラズ長年月ニ亘リ其ノ文化思想ヲ通ジテ日本ノ精神ニシニ込メ英ノ手前勝手ナ主義理念ヲ粉砕セネバナラヌト云フ信念ヲ以テ之ヲ実行シタモノナルコトヲ信ズ。

大東亞戦争ヲ成功ニ導ク第一段階ハ米英ノ眼ニ見エル專横ナカヲ東亞ヨリ駆逐シ 同時ニ米英ノ眼ニ見エ又利己主義的物質主義的理念ヲ我等ノ思想ヨリ一掃スルコトニ懸クテイルノテハナカラヌカ。此ノ見地ヨリ之等青年ノ行動ハ立派ナ手本デアルト言ヘルダラヌ。

54 茲ニ於テ自己ヲ滅却シ祖國ノ為ニ命ヲ投出ス此ノ自己犠牲ノ大精神ガ母ノ力ニ負フ處大ナルモノアルヲ我等ハシカト心ニ留メネバナラヌ。 之等青年ハ皆申シ

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合ハセタ様ニ親孝行デ有名デアッタ。或ル青年ハ休  
 暇ガアレバ假令夫レガ短期間デモ必ず家へ帰者シ  
 母ト日ヲ過スコトヲ無上ノ喜ビトシタト言フニトデ  
 アル。然レ此デ事ノ大体ヲ知ルニ充分デアラウ。彼  
 等ヲヤサシク育てタ母達ノ蔭ニ働ク力ハ実ニ絶  
 大ナシデアアル。己ヲ省ズ家ノ爲、夫ノ爲、子供等ノ  
 爲ニ働キ續ケテイル時ハ殊ニ然リデアアル。之等ノ母  
 ガエラ犠牲ニシテ心ノ内ニ求メル無上ノ幸福感ハ絶  
 大ナルカトナッテ之等ノ青年ノ心ノ中ニ育ツク。之等  
 ノ純真且忠義ナル英雄達ガ日本ノ偉大ナル母以  
 外ニドウシテ

(次頁ニ續ク)

生れ得ルヲラウ。己ヲ裁却シテ只、子供等ノ為ニ生キル之等ノ母ハ正ニ國ノ  
 為ニ生キル母ナル之等青年ノ士氣ヲ大敵ニ會ハバ直チニ逃ゲ生命カ危険ニ  
 曝レルト如實ニ之ヲ遠ザル敵國米英ノ兵士ト比較スル時何ト大變テ違ハルコトカ  
 此ノ裏ニ利己的安逸ヲ求メル米英ノ母ト子供トノ頼ニ足ラヌ關係ヲ見落シテハ  
 米國ノ水兵職業ハ唯テ世界一周ヲレ巨額ノ給料ヲ受ケ愉快ト樂シイ生活ガ  
 出来ルモトガニナル。彼等ガ自己第一主義思想ニ非常ニ影響サレテキルト今日迄  
 ノ數度ノ海戰ニ生残リテ生存者ノ言行ニ依ツテモ明ラカニ解ルベアル。即チ命アテノ  
 モノ種ト彼等ハ言フ。御國ノ為ニ生命ヲ取テ去ス忠節ヲ青年トヨリ以上自己ノ幸  
 福ヲ追求スル人生觀ヲ持ツ米英兵ノ本質ト雲泥ノ相違デハナイカ。  
 大東亞戰爭勃發以來全世界ハ只我ヲ連勝ニ仰天スルバカリナル。然シテ此ノ  
 裏面ニ於テ自國防衛ノ為ニ自己ノ尊イ命ヲ最先ニ投去ストイフ傳統的精神一  
 環ニ流レテ若シ彼等ガ理解スルトト去来チラハ彼等ハ必マ大和(日本)民族ノ血  
 統ニ頭ヲ下セルデアラウ。

然レテ此ノ無比無窮ノ力ノ逆リ出シ淵源ガ天皇ニ在ルヲ悟ル時我等ハ陛下  
 下ノ御威徳ニ深キ感動ヲ禁ジ得ナイベアル。

我等ニ千六百年ノ歴史ヲ顧ルニ神武天皇ガ其ノ兵クシ美々津港ヨリ御率テニナ  
 ヲテ以來剛健勇猛ナル大和魂ガ今日ニ迄及ニテキルベアル。燃エ上ケリ燃エ續ケ  
 ルモノハ實ニ次ノ言葉ノ中ニ表ハセテキル熱烈崇高ナル精神ナル。コト行カバ水漬  
 ヲ屍ハ大石ノ辺ニコソ死サン。

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此ノ精神ノ榮光、日本帝國ノ發展ト共ニ増大スル時至ラハ此ノ精神ハ丁度之等  
 青年ノ場合ノ稱ニ精華ヲ發揚スルデアリ。

大東亞戰爭ガ如何ニ長クアラトモ又更ニ強敵ガ現ハシヤトモ祖國ガ必要トアラハ  
 何時デモ國ニ盡シタ之等青年ハ護國ノ為ニ幾度トナリ生シ替テタルト云フコトガ  
 豫測カレテ居ルベアル。カ人トガ不足スルト云フガ如キ心配ハ此カモ無イデアアル。之  
 等特攻隊ノ青年ハ軍神デアリ。同時ニ平和建設ノ神デアアル。大東亞戰爭續  
 クモノハ全世界無窮ノ平和デアケハナラヌ。カクテ之等軍神ハ平和ノ神トナルデアリ。

doc. 1527.

今日ノ破壊ハ破壊ノ身ノ破壊ニ非ズニ建設ノ身ノ破壊デア  
我國ヲ護ル之身ノ青茅ハ日本人ノ子孫デアリ又見デアリ弟デア  
戸迷(ル)仙人ノ見地カラ考(テ)ミシバ國家が困難ニ吾田面ニク時ニ斯  
ル純真中心節無比ナル血統が我が國民ノ血脈ニ流レテナル事ヲ明  
シクコトハ如何ニモ頼モシイコトデアハイカ私ハ再ヒ言フ一時  
コトハ容易だが自若トシテ死ニシクコトハ難イ之ハ高長期戦  
面ノ始マリデアルハ茲ニ恭シク摺筆シ九十年ノ英魂ノ安ラカニ鎮  
マリマサニコトヲ祈ル (聯合軍翻譯通譯部敵國出版物中六号  
自六頁下五十一頁)

(三)特攻隊勇士ノ冥冥

日本人ハ其珠湾攻撃ニ於テ立隻ノ小型潜航艇ト其ノ乗員ヲ失  
ツタコトヲ認メタ上記立攻(ハ)ニ引用セリタ記事ノ大意カラ恐ラク之レ  
其ノ全数デアツタト思ハレル各潜航艇ハ三名ノ乗員ヲ乗セタ即チ  
立隻ノ艇ニ全数デ十名デアル其ノ内九名が軍神トシテ既ニハ式ニ祀  
ラレタ押收書類カラ取ラレタ彼等ノ冥冥ハ亦四回ニ揚ゲテアル  
十人目ノ乗組員ノ消息ハ正式ニ政府ニ伝ワテ不問ニ附サレテ中  
上記立攻(ハ)ニ書カレテモ其消息アルハ一九四三年三月六日迄ニ日本人  
十名ノ乗組員中九名が死ニシト言フ事ヲ知ツタカハ不明デアル吾  
海軍省ハ若キ九軍神ヲ稱讃シ彼等ノ冥冥スラ公表ミタガ  
此ハ攻撃ノ初日コアラフ島ニ打ケ上ゲラタ小型潜航艇ノ乗員ニ  
ノ中誰が生存シテ居ルカト言フ事ヲ知ツテ居タ事ヲ示シテアルハ式  
発表テハ此ノ生存者ノ消息ハ明カニ無ク視サレタ小型潜航艇カラ  
無線通信が十二月八日一夜ニ杜絶シタ事実カラ見テ此ノ情報  
方法ヲ傳(ラ)レタト言フ事ハ疑ハシイ彼等ハ多分ガエズバ協約ニ定  
メラレテ捕虜情報交換ニ依ツテ此ノ情報ヲ得タモデアラウ若  
カハラレバ之ハ成功シタ間諜行動ノ例デアラウ

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本四圖特別攻撃隊員ノ官ニ具及ビ姓名

九軍神(此ノ人々ハ戰死シテ戰歿勇カキノ英靈ヲ祀ル日本東京ノ靖國神社ニ神トシテ祀ラレタ、岩佐直治中佐、横山正治中佐、古野繁実中佐、廣尾勲大尉、横山薫中尉、特務少尉佐々木直吉、特務少尉上田定兵衛、長片山義雄兵曹長、稻垣清兵曹長。

六) 帰途航路

川上ノカニ即(口)ニ擧ゲタ傷虜横田茂樹(音讀)ハ機動部隊ノ帰途航路ヲ次ノ如ク述ベタ、攻撃隊完遂後機動部隊ハ大体「トラック」島ヲ指回シテ進ミテ、天候ハ非常ニ暑クナリ、十二月十日迄「トラック」島ノ東カヲ保ツテ、夕カソノ日ニ「ハット」減ジタ、布哇並海ヲニ隻ノ敵潜水艦ノ報道ヲ受ケタ時又「ウエー」島沖及ビ日本ニ近接シツ、マル時乙字形航行ガ執ラレタ、ウエー島ハ通過中ノ田艦カラノ飛行機ヲ爆撃サレタ、然レモ傷虜ハ格別大シタ事ハ起ラナカッタト言フ以外、詳細ノ事ハ知ラナカッタ、「トラック」島ニ到着スルガ、計更ハ突然ハ變更サレテ機動部隊ハ進路ヲ此ニ變(何處ニモ寄港セズ)一路日本ニ伺ツテ進ニカ機動部隊ハ一九四一年十二月二十七日吳ニ到着シタ、帰途航海中日東水域ニ達スル直前迄絶エズ軍機ノ偵察ガ續ケラレタ、各母艦カラ一機ガ引續キ約三時由交代テ偵察ヲ續ケタ、加賀ハ日中ハ警戒警戒配備ヲ、夜間ハ警戒警戒配備(砲手ハ三直交替配備)ヲ保ツテ居タ、特別対空監視ハ配置サレナカッタ、此ノ任務ハ対空機銃手ニ依ツテサレタ、カ「リアル」機動部隊ハ帰航中給油ハシナカッタ(聯合軍翻譯通譯部訊問報告書連續番号中二三〇号四一五五)

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200C1627.

(四) 傍虜古川正之(音讀)ハ歸途航海ヲ次ノ如ク述ベタ。艦隊ハ數日  
 由北西ニ向ツテ進ミ後一路日東ニ向ツタ。到着數日前翔鶴ハ隊  
 列ヲ離レ大分ヘ向ツテ進ニタ。一九四一年十月十日附太平洋方面陸海軍聯  
 合情報部豫備訊問報告書第七号連續番号ADM-010ニシテ(八五)  
 (三)ノ第三節(ハ)ニ詳ゲタ傍虜川比克己(音讀)(J A (U S A) 二四七九八七)  
 ハ歸途航海ニ就キ次ノ如ク述ベタ。「斯クテ各艦ハ同時ニ歸途ニツイタ  
 歸港ノ途中、吾々ハ「ミッドウェイ」及「ビジーキ」ヲ無事ニ通過シ二十日ノ  
 夜母國ノ島ヲ認メタ。私ハ誰モ眼ニ自然ト溢シ出タ涙ヲ思ヒシ。海  
 ベルコトガ出来ル仰慕スル父祖ノ國ニ永遠ニ榮マレト祈ルノ光景  
 ノ心髓コソソレガ日本人ノリアル、斯クテ二十五日、母國ノ港ニ歸リ次イテ  
 吳軍港ニ入ッタ」  
 (以テ発表セラル聯合軍翻譯通訊部訊問書)

カ立章 結 論

一日中ノ真珠湾攻撃手計畧が一九四一年十一月二日ヨリ十三日マデニ東京海  
 軍大臣子校デ催サレタ演習ニ於テ決定的ニ組織セラレタと言フ事ハ有力  
 ナル証拠カ表示シテ居ル處デアル多ク、油軍演習自ヤ機動演習ノ  
 延長トシテ相当數ノ豫備的認分の計畧ガ為サレタイタ様デアルガ  
 然レ一九四一年八月末ニ先之キ舉行サレタ各艦隊碇泊地ニ於ケル  
 連續演習自ニ於イテ最後の十モトナウタ、或ル所助テハ具真珠湾攻撃手  
 ニ先之キ一草半ノ間モ小型潛航艇隊ガ吳海軍根據地デ研究レ且  
 ツ練習自ニテ居タト主張シテ居ルガ此ハ注目ニ値スル事デアラウ、  
 敵対行為開始時ニ於ケル油軍ノ活躍ヲ詳述セル機密聯合艦隊  
 命令作、第一號ノ精髓ナルモノハ一九四一年昭和十六年九月ノ油軍演  
 習ガ依ツテ以テ舉行セラル事ヲツテタタ條件ノ概略ヲ具係化シタモノ

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「アツタ」此等ノ條件ハ一九四二年(昭和十六年)九月三日ニ印刷セタリテアル  
三、一九四二年昭和十六年九月五日ヨリ七日ニ亘リ海軍演習ニ参加シタリ士官  
等ハ眞珠湾ヲ攻撃シノ問題及ソノ可能性ヲ具体的ニ審議シタリ彼等  
ハ眞珠湾ニ碇泊セル合衆國ノ復讐ナル全艦隊ヲ捕捉スル事ヲ豫  
想シタリテアル

四、最初ノ打撃ニ際シテノ布哇上陸ノ否カ論議セラレタ、其ノ計畧ハ引  
用セラレタ補給問題上明ラカニ打撃ノ難キ問題デアルト言フ理由デ  
拒絕セラレタ、ミッドウェイト布哇ノ最良的占領ハ亦ハ一九四二年ノ晩春ニ後ハ  
同年十月ニ豫定セラレテ居タ、

五、後ニ眞珠湾攻撃ヲ為セル機動部隊ヲ指揮セシ海軍中將南西云云ハ  
ハ一九四二年昭和十六年九月一日演習ニ於テ人組ノ一員トシテ参加シタリテアル  
六、一九四二年昭和十六年九月十五日ニ海軍軍令部員ハ陸軍ノ代表者ト  
岩園ニ於テ協議シタ、当時陸軍ハ眞珠湾攻撃ニ対スル海軍側計  
畧ニ対テハ何等ノ豫備知識ヲ有シテ居ナカッタト言フ事デアル、

七、一九四二年(昭和十六年)十月末或ル日ニ日本官ノ陸軍部及海軍  
部ハ陸海軍中央協定ヲ共同聲明シタ、此ハ陸海軍共同作戦カ直  
面スルルニ於テ兩者ノ關係的指揮權並官轄範圍職掌及表  
示ヲ指示スル基本的文書「アツタ」様デアル九月十五日カ十月末ニ至ル期  
間ノ大體分カ此ノ協定ノ細目作製ニ要サレタト言フ事ハ根據アル推  
測カト思ハレル、

八、機密聯合艦隊命令作中(號ハ伍伯亦ウ碇泊ノ山东海軍大將  
ノ旗艦「アル」戰艦長門ノ甲板上ニテ一九四二年(昭和十六年)十一月一日附ニ  
テ為セシタ、本命令ハ其ノ別冊ヲ含ミ戰術開始ニ伴フ凡ソル海軍  
作戦ノ基本的計畧ヲ指示シテイルモノデアルカ次ノ局面ハ眞珠湾

Doc 1627.

攻撃手ニ関シテ注意スベキ價値アルモノトナル。

(A) 攻撃手部隊ヲ構成スル艦艇ハX. マイナス十六日一九四二年(昭和十六年)十一月二十四日(攻其)海軍根據地又ハ作戰海域ヲ出港スル積余(積余)セラレタコト

(B) 奇龍艦隊ヲ構成スル潜航艇ハX. マイナス二十日(一九四二年(昭和十六年)十一月三十日)瀬戸内海ノ西部ヨリ出発スル積余セラレタコト、動力ハ真珠湾口ヲ支配スルニ充テラルヤウ配置サレル事ニツテタコト湾内リウ逸脱スル米戦艦ハ攻撃手サレル事ニツテタコト出乗得レバ小型潜航艇ハ空龍艦完了後真珠湾内ノ激戦艦ニ奇龍艦攻撃手ヲ実行スル事ニツテタコト

(C) Y日ノ初メニ(一九四二年(昭和十六年)十一月廿三日)第一聯合通信隊ハ日米艦隊主力ハ内海西部ニアルカ如キ印象ヲ與ハル為メ電ヲ発信スル様余セラレタコト。

九、一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月五日附、機密聯合艦隊  
命令作第二号ハ機密聯合艦隊命令作第一号  
ガ效力ヲ生ズルノ日ヲ一九四二年(昭和十六年)十月  
廿三日ト指示シテキル。

Nov 16 27

十、機密聯合艦隊命令作第三號ガ日ハ十二月八日  
デアルトト指示シタ。一九四二年(昭和十六年)十月  
十日迄ハ公式ニ宣戰布告ヲスル日ニ遂ニ発表セラレタカ  
タ。

十一、機密機動部隊命令作第一号ハ一九四二年十一月十  
日機動部隊指揮官海軍中將南雲忠一ニヨリ佐伯  
湾碇泊航空母艦旗艦赤城艦上ニ於テ発表セラレタ。  
ソレハ一九四二年(昭和十六年)十一月廿日迄ニ全艦戰  
斗準備ヲ完了スベキト命令ジタ。

十二、一九四二年(昭和十六年)十一月二十一日カラ二十七日迄  
ノ間ニ機動部隊ハ單冠湾ニ集合シタ。  
十三、機動部隊ハ次ノ艦 艇カラ編制セラレテキタ。

比叡、雨務島(第三戰隊中ヨリ金剛及比叡  
名ヲ除キタルモノ)  
航空母艦

加賀、赤城(第一航空戰隊)  
蒼龍、飛龍(第二航空戰隊)  
翔鶴、瑞鶴(第五航空戰隊ヨリ鳳翔ヲ  
除キタルモノ)