



United States Department of State

Voting Practices in the United Nations 1996

Report to Congress
Submitted Pursuant to
Public Law, 101-167

March 31, 1997

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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This report assesses the voting practices of the governments of UN member states in the General Assembly and Security Council for 1996, and evaluates the actions and responsiveness of those governments to U.S. policy on issues of special importance to the United States.

Two copies of this report are being sent to each U.S. diplomatic mission abroad, with instructions that one copy be provided to the government and the other retained for the use of the mission.

Sincerely,



Peter Tarnoff
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:
Report on UN Voting Practices.

The Honorable
Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


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The Honorable
Al Gore,
President of the Senate.

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I - INTRODUCTION

The fourteenth annual report to Congress on voting practices in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council in 1996 is submitted in compliance with Public Law 101-167. The report statistically measures voting records of UN member states individually, by geographical regions, and by selected bloc groupings, in comparison with the U.S. voting record. It also lists and describes important General Assembly resolutions adopted by the 51st General Assembly in the fall of 1996, as well as all Security Council resolutions for the entire year.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The 51st session of the General Assembly opened on September 17 and held 89 plenary sessions before recessing on December 18. It adopted 269 resolutions, down somewhat from the past three years, and significantly below the 332 resolutions of 1990. This reflects continued success in the effort of the United States and others to reduce the number of resolutions—by combining some issues, considering others only every two or three years, and dropping some entirely. The main subjects of the resolutions continued to be arms control, the Middle East, and human rights.

Of the 269 resolutions adopted, 72.9% (196) were adopted by consensus, a decrease from 76.6% in 1995, 77.4% in 1994, and 77.2% in 1993. It nevertheless represents a high rate of consensus agreement.

Voting Coincidence with the United States

On non-consensus issues, the average overall General Assembly voting coincidence of all UN members with the United States in 1996 was 49.4%, down modestly from 1995. This measure of agreement of UN members with U.S. positions increased steadily and dramatically in the several years since the end of the Cold War. (See the graphs at the end of this section.) It reached 50.6% in 1995, the first time it had exceeded 50% since 1978. This figure is more than three times the low point of 15.4% in 1988. When consensus resolutions are factored in as votes identical to those of the United States, an even higher measure of agreement with U.S. positions is reached. This figure, which more accurately reflects the work of the General Assembly, was 87.3% in 1996, a slight decrease from 88.2% in 1995 and 88.8% in 1994. Although the decrease in these two measurements was small, it reverses the con-

stant trend upwards of recent years. The issues voted upon differ somewhat each year, and the votes of UN members reflect a number of considerations, but this decrease in voting coincidence may be attributable in whole or in part to resentment by other UN members toward the United States for its mounting budgetary arrears, strong campaign for reform and budget restraint, and unilateral drive to unseat then Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.

The coincidence figure on votes considered important to U.S. interests (63.9%) is once again higher than the percentage registered on overall votes (49.4%). The graphs at the end of this section illustrate this point. A side-by-side comparison of important and overall votes for each UN member is at the end of Section III.

While the decrease in 1996 from 1995 in voting coincidence with the United States on overall votes was modest (from 50.6% to 49.4%), the drop was much greater on human rights votes (from 81% to 68.3%) and on Middle East votes (from 35.2% to 28.3%). Arms control issues, on the other hand, registered another small increase (from 60.9% to 62.3%). Until 1996, all major issue categories showed large increases in voting coincidence since the end of the Cold War, although the figure for the sensitive and still contentious Middle East issues experienced a somewhat more checkered up-and-down history. (See the graph on votes by issue categories at the end of this section.)

As in past years, Israel (95.0%) and the United Kingdom (79.1%) were among the highest in voting coincidence with the United States. Most members of the Western European and Others group (WEOG) continued to score high coincidence levels (the average was 70.7%). The Eastern European group also scored high again (average 68.6%), a slight drop from 1995 and the first break in the group's meteoric rise in coincidence with the United States following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. Most other geographic and political groups also decreased in voting coincidence with the United States in 1996. (See the graph at the end of this section.)

The lowest scoring countries were China, Cuba, India, Iran, DPR of Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Vietnam, all under 30%.

Realization of U.S. Priorities

At the 51st General Assembly, realization of U.S. priorities was mixed. Little progress was made, for instance, on Security Council expansion and the fissile material cutoff treaty. A resolution calling for multilateral negotiations aimed at prohibiting use of nuclear weapons

was not helpful. Unhelpful rhetoric again characterized the debate on Cuba and the Middle East, although resolutions supporting the Middle East peace process and noting the shortcomings of human rights practices in Cuba were adopted. U.S. arrears in payment of assessed dues continued to make difficult the process of exerting U.S. leadership at the United Nations. The U.S. embargo of Cuba—viewed as violating international norms proscribing extraterritoriality and intervention, restricting free trade, and contradicting the post-Cold War spirit of cooperation—remained a contentious issue.

However, active U.S. engagement and assertive multilateral efforts did lead to a number of successes, several of them notable:

— **Appointment of a new Secretary General** who is committed to reform and who possesses strong management and administrative skills.

— **Adoption of resolutions that continue to contain UN budget growth** and retain emphasis on activities of high priority to the United States, including human rights, drug control, crime prevention, and combatting international terrorism.

— **Continuation of the process of reform** within the United Nations to eliminate duplication and cut costs. Committees made efforts to discuss several items as a group to avoid duplication of tasks. Some greater transparency has been achieved in the work of UN organs. Some paperwork reduction and personnel downsizing were implemented. There is a growing willingness to live within the budget cap. The mandate of the high-level working group on UN reform—which is considering ways to improve the institutional design, managerial functioning, and intergovernmental routines of the United Nations—was extended. This working group has helped to engender a sense of urgency for reform.

— **Adoption of U.S.-initiated resolutions on human rights** situations in Cuba, parts of the former Yugoslavia, and Sudan. Adoption of these and a number of other resolutions on human rights sent a strong message that such matters are not purely internal issues. The Assembly also adopted a resolution strengthening the Center for Human Rights and improving its management.

— **Adoption of resolutions on trade and external debt** that recognize the importance of an open multilateral trading system, affirm the primary responsibility of developing countries for their own development, and include reference to measures necessary for sustainable development: sound economic policies, a favorable investment climate, accessible markets, and participation in international trade.

— **Adoption of a resolution on the Middle East peace process** sponsored by the United States, Russia, and Norway, again by an overwhelming majority. This resolution welcomes the peace process started at Madrid and supports the subsequent bilateral negotiations and the series of agreements reached. Most other Middle East resolutions retained the outdated rhetoric of the past, and continued to interject the General Assembly into negotiations on permanent status issues best left to negotiation by the parties. Israel continued to enjoy wide acceptance and participated normally in the General Assembly, albeit at some disadvantage due to lack of membership in any regional group. Israeli credentials were again accepted without challenge, and an Israeli was appointed to the UN Administrative Tribunal.

— **Adoption of a resolution accepting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty** and opening it for signature. Also, adoption of two other U.S. initiatives on arms control: U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, **and a ban on anti-personnel landmines**. The landmine resolution was adopted overwhelmingly, but not by consensus as in the past three years because it was more ambitious, moving the goal from export moratoria to an outright ban. For the third year in a row, the Assembly failed to take action on the U.S.-supported cutoff of fissile materials. The United States opposed a resolution calling for multilateral negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention because such negotiations would be impractical and counterproductive; continued bilateral discussions with the Russian Federation is the better course of action.

— **Further progress on President Clinton's initiatives on international organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism**. The U.S.-drafted Declaration on Crime and Public Security calls on countries to combat transnational crime, including illicit arms trafficking, smuggling of persons, terrorist crimes, and money laundering. The Assembly also adopted a separate resolution on cooperation to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking in drugs. The UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions was also adopted. The Assembly also made progress toward establishment of an international criminal court, which would help deter transnational crimes and punish offenders. A resolution on terrorism included the U.S. initiative to develop the text of a convention on terrorist bombings.

— **Election of U.S. candidates** to the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission. The failure, for the first time, of the U.S. candidate to secure election to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions was a setback. Resentment at U.S. arrears in payments to the United Nations was clearly a decisive factor in this election. Continued failure to meet financial obligations

could make it increasingly difficult for the United States to prevail in contested elections.

SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council was again in 1996 a major focus of U.S. attention in the United Nations. The continuing tendency toward consensus among its members facilitated the Council's adoption of 57 resolutions during the year, fewer than in each of the past four years, but still far more than during the Cold War era when Council action was often frustrated. The large number of resolutions adopted reflects the continuing reliance of member countries on Security Council action to assist in resolving threats to peace and security following the end of the Cold War.

The Security Council was again heavily involved in giving direction to UN peacekeeping and mediation efforts throughout the world in 1996. These efforts are described in Section IV.

Voting coincidence percentages for Security Council members were again high. Most resolutions were adopted unanimously: 48 out of 57 (84%). There was only one veto (by the United States), on a resolution recommending that Boutros Boutros-Ghali be reappointed Secretary General for a second 5-year term (see description in the Security Council section). The U.S. veto was the only negative vote in 1996; there were only 10 abstentions out of the 855 votes cast on the 57 resolutions adopted. The abstentions were by Russia (5 times, of which 2 were on Sudan, 2 on The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 1 on Cuba), China (4 times, of which 2 were on Sudan, 1 on Cuba, and 1 on Georgia), and the United States (1 on the Middle East). One resolution on Lebanon failed to get enough affirmative votes and was not adopted; the vote was 4-0-11(US).

FORMAT AND METHODOLOGY

The 1996 voting report continues the feature added in 1993: an additional column in the tables in Section II (Overall Votes), which presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. Since not all states are equally active at the United Nations, we have credited to each country a portion of the 196 consensus resolutions based on its participation in the 93 recorded plenary votes. Each country's participation rate was calculated by dividing the number of Yes/No/Abstain votes

it cast in plenary (i.e., the number of times it was not absent) by the total of plenary votes. This is the same methodology used to combine important votes and important consensus actions since 1989.

This report, for the first time, merges the former Section IV (Consensus Actions) into Section III (Important Votes). It adds to the Important Votes tables an additional column presenting the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including important consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. The figures in this column are those previously included in the Consensus Actions section. They are comparable to the figures for overall votes plus consensus resolutions described in the above paragraph.

These columns that include consensus actions provide another perspective on UN activity. In our view, they reflect more accurately the extent of cooperation and agreement in the General Assembly.

Other columns in the report remain the same. The presentation is consistent with provisions of PL 101-167, and the methodology employed is the same since the report's inception.


The tables in this report provide a measurement of the voting coincidence of UN member countries with the United States. However, readers are cautioned about interpreting voting coincidence percentages. The percentages in the last column, using the older methodology, are calculated using only votes on which both the United States and the other country in question voted Yes or No; not included are those instances when either abstained or was absent. Abstentions and absences are often difficult to interpret, but they make a mathematical difference, sometimes major, in the percentage results. Inclusion of the number of abstentions and absences in the tables of this report enables readers to include them in calculating voting coincidence percentages if they wish to do so. The percentages in the second column from the right reflect more fully the activity of the General Assembly. However, this calculation assumes, for want of an attendance record, that all countries were present or absent for consensus resolutions in the same ratio as for recorded votes. Moreover, the content of resolutions should be considered in interpreting the figures in either column. There may be overwhelming agreement with the U.S. position on a matter of less importance to us and less support on a resolution we consider more important. These differences are difficult to quantify and to present in one or two coincidence figures.

A country's voting record in the United Nations is only one dimension of its relations with the United States. Bilateral economic, strategic, and political issues are often more directly important to U.S. interests. Nevertheless, a country's behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral relationship with the United States, a point the Sec-

retary of State regularly makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors. This is also why copies of this report are presented to UN member foreign ministries throughout the world and to member state missions to the United Nations in New York. The Security Council and the General Assembly are arguably the most important international bodies in the world, dealing as they do with such vital issues as threats to peace and security, disarmament, development, humanitarian relief, human rights, the environment, and narcotics—all of which can and do directly affect major U.S. interests.

OVERALL PLENARY VOTES


by Geographic Groups



Percent of Voting Coincidence with the United States

OVERALL PLENARY VOTES


by Political Groups



Percent of Voting Coincidence with the United States

OVERALL PLENARY VOTES


By Issues by Year



Percent of Voting Coincidence with the United States

IMPORTANT VOTES


by Geographic Groups



Percent of Voting Coincidence with the United States

IMPORTANT VOTES

by Political Groups



Percent of Voting Coincidence with the United States

II - GENERAL ASSEMBLY — OVERALL VOTES

There were 93 recorded plenary votes at the 51st UNGA—73 on resolutions as a whole, 12 on separate paragraphs, 4 on amendments, 1 on a procedural motion, and 3 on decisions. Of these 93 votes, the United States voted Yes 34 times and No 44 times; it abstained on 15 votes.

COMPARISON WITH U.S. VOTE

The tables which follow are based on the 78 instances the United States voted either Yes or No in plenary. Columns show the number of times the United States and the country listed cast identical (Yes/Yes or No/No) and opposite (Yes/No or No/Yes) votes, as well as the number of times the country abstained and was absent for these 78 votes. The voting coincidence percentages are derived by dividing the number of identical votes by the total of identical and opposite votes, the same method used in all previous editions of this report. The column headed “Voting Coincidence (Including Consensus)” —which was new with the 1993 report—presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. Extent of participation was also factored in (see the section on format and methodology in the Introduction).

Section II has four parts. The first lists UN member states both alphabetically and in rank order by voting coincidence percentage. The second lists them by UN regional grouping, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage. The third lists countries by other important groupings, again in rank order. The final part compares 1996 voting coincidence percentages of UN members with the preceding five years.

Countries with asterisks in the Voting Coincidence columns did not vote during the session. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, Central African Republic, Iraq, and Somalia did not vote at the 51st UNGA because their financial contributions were in arrears. Sao Tome and Principe did not participate. In 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was denied permission to participate further in Assembly proceedings until it applied for and was granted readmission.

The United States once again voted No in plenary more often than any other UN member. It voted No alone in plenary only twice at the 51st UNGA (fewer times than in any recent year, and far fewer than the 20 times at the 44th session in 1989). The United States voted with only one other country on 14 occasions (13 with Israel and once with the

United Kingdom). Eight times it voted No with two other countries (with Israel 6 times, joined by Uzbekistan, Palau, Micronesia, or Vanuatu; and twice with France and the United Kingdom). Four times the United States voted No with three others (with Israel three times, joined variously by the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Japan, Uzbekistan, or Micronesia; and once with the United Kingdom, France, and Russia). The U.S. votes in isolation were on arms control issues. Votes with Israel were mostly on issues regarding the Middle East, Palestine, and the occupied territories. Those with the United Kingdom and France were on decolonization and arms control issues.

All Countries (Alphabetical)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Afghanistan	22	36	4	16	83.3%	37.9%
Albania	37	17	13	11	92.5%	68.5%
Algeria	23	42	8	5	83.2%	35.4%
Andorra	44	16	18	0	93.6%	73.3%
Angola	22	40	4	12	82.8%	35.5%
Antigua/Barbuda	29	39	6	4	84.5%	42.6%
Argentina	34	22	22	0	91.3%	60.7%
Armenia	31	24	15	8	89.7%	56.4%
Australia	40	22	16	0	91.5%	64.5%
Austria	43	19	16	0	92.6%	69.4%
Azerbaijan	27	27	14	10	88.0%	50.0%
Bahamas	31	34	10	3	86.6%	47.7%
Bahrain	28	39	6	5	84.6%	41.8%
Bangladesh	23	42	6	7	82.9%	35.4%
Barbados	28	29	11	10	87.3%	49.1%
Belarus	30	21	27	0	91.5%	58.8%
Belgium	46	15	16	1	94.1%	75.4%
Belize	28	35	10	5	85.8%	44.4%
Benin	27	40	10	1	84.7%	40.3%
Bhutan	22	38	11	7	84.1%	36.7%
Bolivia	31	38	9	0	85.7%	44.9%
Bosnia/Herzegovina	30	22	15	11	90.1%	57.7%
Botswana	29	41	6	2	84.3%	41.4%
Brazil	28	38	10	2	85.3%	42.4%
Brunei	29	43	6	0	84.0%	40.3%
Bulgaria	40	15	23	0	94.0%	72.7%
Burkina Faso	27	41	8	2	84.1%	39.7%
Burundi	21	40	11	6	83.3%	34.4%
Cambodia	29	36	10	3	85.7%	44.6%
Cameroon	22	38	12	6	84.2%	36.7%
Canada	46	17	15	0	93.4%	73.0%
Cape Verde	21	35	6	16	83.8%	37.5%
Central Afr. Rep.	0	0	0	78	*	*

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL OPPOSITE ABSTEN-				VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Chad	23	37	5	13	83.7%	38.3%
Chile	34	39	5	0	85.5%	46.6%
China	19	45	10	4	82.1%	29.7%
Colombia	27	42	8	1	84.0%	39.1%
Comoros	4	6	2	66	84.8%	40.0%
Congo	23	27	9	19	86.8%	46.0%
Costa Rica	30	28	6	14	87.4%	51.7%
Cote d'Ivoire	23	34	14	7	85.7%	40.4%
Croatia	41	17	14	6	93.0%	70.7%
Cuba	8	47	15	8	79.9%	14.5%
Cyprus	36	23	19	0	91.0%	61.0%
Czech Republic	46	16	16	0	93.8%	74.2%
DPR of Korea	7	47	8	16	77.8%	13.0%
Denmark	46	16	16	0	93.8%	74.2%
Djibouti	24	36	3	15	83.6%	40.0%
Dominica	26	28	2	22	85.8%	48.1%
Dominican Rep.	12	11	4	51	87.2%	52.2%
Ecuador	31	41	4	2	84.3%	43.1%
Egypt	26	40	9	3	84.4%	39.4%
El Salvador	31	36	3	8	85.1%	46.3%
Equatorial Guinea ...	16	10	17	35	92.5%	61.5%
Eritrea	21	29	6	22	85.2%	42.0%
Estonia	39	13	23	3	94.6%	75.0%
Ethiopia	25	33	10	10	85.7%	43.1%
Fiji	26	28	23	1	88.7%	48.1%
Finland	45	15	18	0	94.1%	75.0%
France	49	14	14	1	94.6%	77.8%
Gabon	20	30	8	20	85.1%	40.0%
Gambia	20	37	6	15	82.8%	35.1%
Georgia	33	16	23	6	93.1%	67.3%
Germany	46	16	16	0	93.8%	74.2%
Ghana	23	45	9	1	82.8%	33.8%
Greece	4	3	4	67	91.3%	57.1%
Grenada	31	32	8	7	86.8%	49.2%
Guatemala	26	28	12	12	87.2%	48.1%
Guinea	23	40	10	5	83.8%	36.5%
Guinea-Bissau	20	36	8	14	83.7%	35.7%
Guyana	30	42	4	2	83.9%	41.7%
Haiti	30	38	5	5	84.9%	44.1%
Honduras	31	39	4	4	84.9%	44.3%
Hungary	47	16	15	0	93.8%	74.6%
Iceland	46	17	14	1	93.3%	73.0%
India	15	50	13	0	80.8%	23.1%
Indonesia	22	47	7	2	81.8%	31.9%
Iran	18	46	5	9	80.9%	28.1%
Iraq	0	0	0	78	*	*
Ireland	42	20	16	0	92.2%	67.7%
Israel	57	3	16	2	98.8%	95.0%

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Italy	47	17	14	0	93.5%	73.4%
Jamaica	29	38	11	0	85.6%	43.3%
Japan	42	16	20	0	93.7%	72.4%
Jordan	27	40	7	4	84.2%	40.3%
Kazakstan	36	22	20	0	91.3%	62.1%
Kenya	25	35	18	0	86.3%	41.7%
Kuwait	32	39	4	3	85.0%	45.1%
Kyrgyzstan	25	17	22	14	91.7%	59.5%
Laos	14	41	6	17	80.8%	25.5%
Latvia	43	10	22	3	95.8%	81.1%
Lebanon	16	44	10	8	81.4%	26.7%
Lesotho	18	20	1	39	85.6%	47.4%
Liberia	22	25	15	16	87.8%	46.8%
Libya	20	48	6	4	81.2%	29.4%
Liechtenstein	42	19	17	0	92.6%	68.9%
Lithuania	43	11	24	0	95.6%	79.6%
Luxembourg	47	15	16	0	94.2%	75.8%
Madagascar	25	30	4	19	85.5%	45.5%
Malawi	26	39	6	7	84.2%	40.0%
Malaysia	29	43	6	0	84.0%	40.3%
Maldives	31	39	4	4	84.9%	44.3%
Mali	22	29	11	16	86.0%	43.1%
Malta	33	33	9	3	87.0%	50.0%
Marshall Islands	37	17	23	1	93.1%	68.5%
Mauritania	11	25	11	31	83.1%	30.6%
Mauritius	27	37	6	8	84.6%	42.2%
Mexico	26	41	11	0	84.4%	38.8%
Micronesia	29	16	30	3	93.2%	64.4%
Moldova	37	15	23	3	93.7%	71.2%
Monaco	43	14	13	8	94.0%	75.4%
Mongolia	29	33	9	7	86.4%	46.8%
Morocco	30	39	5	4	84.5%	43.5%
Mozambique	22	26	7	23	86.1%	45.8%
Myanmar	20	45	13	0	82.8%	30.8%
Namibia	20	34	8	16	84.0%	37.0%
Nepal	25	40	13	0	84.7%	38.5%
Netherlands	45	14	17	2	94.4%	76.3%
New Zealand	40	25	13	0	90.4%	61.5%
Nicaragua	28	33	4	13	85.4%	45.9%
Niger	26	40	6	6	83.7%	39.4%
Nigeria	21	46	9	2	82.2%	31.3%
Norway	45	16	16	1	93.7%	73.8%
Oman	26	42	3	7	83.1%	38.2%
Pakistan	25	44	9	0	83.4%	36.2%
Palau	12	1	16	49	98.8%	92.3%
Panama	28	39	11	0	85.2%	41.8%
Papua New Guinea	13	25	11	29	84.4%	34.2%
Paraguay	27	35	9	7	85.5%	43.5%

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Peru	29	39	10	0	85.2%	42.6%
Philippines	26	40	11	1	84.6%	39.4%
Poland	44	17	15	2	93.3%	72.1%
Portugal	45	16	15	2	93.7%	73.8%
Qatar	28	42	2	6	83.4%	40.0%
Rep. of Korea	33	22	23	0	91.2%	60.0%
Romania	44	15	18	1	94.1%	74.6%
Russia	35	24	19	0	90.5%	59.3%
Rwanda	4	1	2	71	96.2%	80.0%
St. Kitts/Nevis	25	31	2	20	84.9%	44.6%
St. Lucia	31	39	6	2	85.1%	44.3%
St. Vincent/Gren.	19	15	3	41	87.8%	55.9%
Samoa	33	33	12	0	87.4%	50.0%
San Marino	40	25	11	2	90.2%	61.5%
Sao Tome/Principe .	0	0	0	78	*	*
Saudi Arabia	27	40	7	4	84.3%	40.3%
Senegal	25	35	11	7	85.5%	41.7%
Seychelles	15	13	0	50	88.0%	53.6%
Sierra Leone	25	37	14	2	85.3%	40.3%
Singapore	29	38	10	1	85.4%	43.3%
Slovak Republic	44	17	17	0	93.3%	72.1%
Slovenia	44	17	16	1	93.3%	72.1%
Solomon Islands	32	35	10	1	86.5%	47.8%
Somalia	0	0	0	78	*	*
South Africa	31	39	6	2	85.1%	44.3%
Spain	46	15	16	1	94.1%	75.4%
Sri Lanka	23	42	13	0	83.9%	35.4%
Sudan	24	48	4	2	81.8%	33.3%
Suriname	31	37	10	0	86.0%	45.6%
Swaziland	27	33	12	6	86.2%	45.0%
Sweden	43	20	15	0	92.3%	68.3%
Syria	13	47	9	9	80.0%	21.7%
Tajikistan	23	6	19	30	96.0%	79.3%
Thailand	27	40	10	1	84.5%	40.3%
TFYR Macedonia	43	17	18	0	93.4%	71.7%
Togo	26	38	13	1	85.3%	40.6%
Trinidad/Tobago	27	38	7	6	84.6%	41.5%
Tunisia	28	42	5	3	83.8%	40.0%
Turkey	42	26	10	0	90.1%	61.8%
Turkmenistan	6	2	0	70	92.0%	75.0%
Uganda	23	43	9	3	83.2%	34.8%
Ukraine	36	25	16	1	90.2%	59.0%
United Arab Emir.	26	38	8	6	84.6%	40.6%
United Kingdom	53	14	11	0	94.7%	79.1%
UR Tanzania	22	43	11	2	83.3%	33.8%
Uruguay	32	34	11	1	86.9%	48.5%
Uzbekistan	31	10	18	19	94.8%	75.6%
Vanuatu	30	39	3	6	84.4%	43.5%

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Venezuela	29	40	9	0	84.9%	42.0%
Vietnam	16	45	4	13	80.4%	26.2%
Yemen	24	40	0	14	82.5%	37.5%
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	78	*	*
Zaire	1	2	12	63	94.2%	33.3%
Zambia	30	40	5	3	84.6%	42.9%
Zimbabwe	26	44	8	0	83.3%	37.1%
Average	28.2	28.9	10.6	10.3	87.3%	49.4%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Israel	57	3	16	2	98.9%	95.0%
Palau	12	1	16	49	98.9%	92.3%
Latvia	43	10	22	3	96.1%	81.1%
Rwanda	4	1	2	71	96.5%	80.0%
Lithuania	43	11	24	0	95.9%	79.6%
Tajikistan	23	6	19	30	96.3%	79.3%
United Kingdom	53	14	11	0	95.1%	79.1%
France	49	14	14	1	94.9%	77.8%
Netherlands	45	14	17	2	94.8%	76.3%
Luxembourg	47	15	16	0	94.6%	75.8%
Uzbekistan	31	10	18	19	95.1%	75.6%
Monaco	43	14	13	8	94.4%	75.4%
Belgium	46	15	16	1	94.5%	75.4%
Spain	46	15	16	1	94.5%	75.4%
Estonia	39	13	23	3	95.0%	75.0%
Finland	45	15	18	0	94.6%	75.0%
Turkmenistan	6	2	0	70	92.5%	75.0%
Hungary	47	16	15	0	94.2%	74.6%
Romania	44	15	18	1	94.5%	74.6%
Czech Republic	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Denmark	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Germany	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Norway	45	16	16	1	94.2%	73.8%
Portugal	45	16	15	2	94.1%	73.8%
Italy	47	17	14	0	93.9%	73.4%
Andorra	44	16	18	0	94.1%	73.3%
Canada	46	17	15	0	93.9%	73.0%
Iceland	46	17	14	1	93.8%	73.0%
Bulgaria	40	15	23	0	94.5%	72.7%
Japan	42	16	20	0	94.2%	72.4%
Poland	44	17	15	2	93.8%	72.1%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Slovak Republic	44	17	17	0	93.8%	72.1%
Slovenia	44	17	16	1	93.8%	72.1%
TFYR Macedonia	43	17	18	0	93.8%	71.7%
Moldova	37	15	23	3	94.2%	71.2%
Croatia	41	17	14	6	93.5%	70.7%
Austria	43	19	16	0	93.2%	69.4%
Liechtenstein	42	19	17	0	93.1%	68.9%
Albania	37	17	13	11	93.0%	68.5%
Marshall Islands	37	17	23	1	93.6%	68.5%
Sweden	43	20	15	0	92.8%	68.3%
Ireland	42	20	16	0	92.8%	67.7%
Georgia	33	16	23	6	93.6%	67.3%
Australia	40	22	16	0	92.1%	64.5%
Micronesia	29	16	30	3	93.7%	64.4%
Kazakstan	36	22	20	0	91.9%	62.1%
Turkey	42	26	10	0	90.8%	61.8%
Equatorial Guinea	16	10	17	35	93.1%	61.5%
New Zealand	40	25	13	0	91.1%	61.5%
San Marino	40	25	11	2	90.9%	61.5%
Cyprus	36	23	19	0	91.6%	61.0%
Argentina	34	22	22	0	91.9%	60.7%
Rep. of Korea	33	22	23	0	91.9%	60.0%
Kyrgyzstan	25	17	22	14	92.3%	59.5%
Russia	35	24	19	0	91.2%	59.3%
Ukraine	36	25	16	1	90.9%	59.0%
Belarus	30	21	27	0	92.1%	58.8%
Bosnia/Herzegovina	30	22	15	11	90.8%	57.7%
Greece	4	3	4	67	91.9%	57.1%
Armenia	31	24	15	8	90.5%	56.4%
St. Vincent/Gren.	19	15	3	41	88.6%	55.9%
Seychelles	15	13	0	50	88.8%	53.6%
Dominican Rep.	12	11	4	51	88.1%	52.2%
Costa Rica	30	28	6	14	88.3%	51.7%
Azerbaijan	27	27	14	10	88.8%	50.0%
Malta	33	33	9	3	87.9%	50.0%
Samoa	33	33	12	0	88.3%	50.0%
Grenada	31	32	8	7	87.7%	49.2%
Barbados	28	29	11	10	88.2%	49.1%
Uruguay	32	34	11	1	87.8%	48.5%
Dominica	26	28	2	22	86.8%	48.1%
Fiji	26	28	23	1	89.5%	48.1%
Guatemala	26	28	12	12	88.1%	48.1%
Solomon Islands	32	35	10	1	87.4%	47.8%
Bahamas	31	34	10	3	87.6%	47.7%
Lesotho	18	20	1	39	86.6%	47.4%
Liberia	22	25	15	16	88.7%	46.8%
Mongolia	29	33	9	7	87.4%	46.8%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN-TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Chile	34	39	5	0	86.5%	46.6%
El Salvador	31	36	3	8	86.1%	46.3%
Congo	23	27	9	19	87.7%	46.0%
Nicaragua	28	33	4	13	86.4%	45.9%
Mozambique	22	26	7	23	87.1%	45.8%
Suriname	31	37	10	0	87.0%	45.6%
Madagascar	25	30	4	19	86.5%	45.5%
Kuwait	32	39	4	3	86.1%	45.1%
Swaziland	27	33	12	6	87.2%	45.0%
Bolivia	31	38	9	0	86.7%	44.9%
St. Kitts/Nevis	25	31	2	20	86.0%	44.6%
Cambodia	29	36	10	3	86.8%	44.6%
Belize	28	35	10	5	86.8%	44.4%
Honduras	31	39	4	4	85.9%	44.3%
Maldives	31	39	4	4	85.9%	44.3%
St. Lucia	31	39	6	2	86.1%	44.3%
South Africa	31	39	6	2	86.1%	44.3%
Haiti	30	38	5	5	85.9%	44.1%
Paraguay	27	35	9	7	86.5%	43.5%
Morocco	30	39	5	4	85.6%	43.5%
Vanuatu	30	39	3	6	85.5%	43.5%
Jamaica	29	38	11	0	86.6%	43.3%
Singapore	29	38	10	1	86.5%	43.3%
Mali	22	29	11	16	87.0%	43.1%
Ethiopia	25	33	10	10	86.7%	43.1%
Ecuador	31	41	4	2	85.4%	43.1%
Zambia	30	40	5	3	85.7%	42.9%
Antigua/Barbuda	29	39	6	4	85.6%	42.6%
Peru	29	39	10	0	86.3%	42.6%
Brazil	28	38	10	2	86.3%	42.4%
Mauritius	27	37	6	8	85.7%	42.2%
Venezuela	29	40	9	0	86.0%	42.0%
Eritrea	21	29	6	22	86.2%	42.0%
Bahrain	28	39	6	5	85.6%	41.8%
Panama	28	39	11	0	86.2%	41.8%
Guyana	30	42	4	2	85.1%	41.7%
Kenya	25	35	18	0	87.3%	41.7%
Senegal	25	35	11	7	86.5%	41.7%
Trinidad/Tobago	27	38	7	6	85.6%	41.5%
Botswana	29	41	6	2	85.4%	41.4%
Togo	26	38	13	1	86.3%	40.6%
United Arab Emir.	26	38	8	6	85.7%	40.6%
Cote d'Ivoire	23	34	14	7	86.8%	40.4%
Sierra Leone	25	37	14	2	86.3%	40.3%
Benin	27	40	10	1	85.7%	40.3%
Brunei	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Jordan	27	40	7	4	85.3%	40.3%
Malaysia	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Saudi Arabia	27	40	7	4	85.4%	40.3%
Thailand	27	40	10	1	85.6%	40.3%
Comoros	4	6	2	66	85.9%	40.0%
Djibouti	24	36	3	15	84.8%	40.0%
Gabon	20	30	8	20	86.2%	40.0%
Malawi	26	39	6	7	85.3%	40.0%
Qatar	28	42	2	6	84.6%	40.0%
Tunisia	28	42	5	3	84.9%	40.0%
Burkina Faso	27	41	8	2	85.2%	39.7%
Egypt	26	40	9	3	85.5%	39.4%
Niger	26	40	6	6	84.8%	39.4%
Philippines	26	40	11	1	85.7%	39.4%
Colombia	27	42	8	1	85.1%	39.1%
Mexico	26	41	11	0	85.5%	38.8%
Nepal	25	40	13	0	85.8%	38.5%
Chad	23	37	5	13	84.8%	38.3%
Oman	26	42	3	7	84.3%	38.2%
Afghanistan	22	36	4	16	84.5%	37.9%
Cape Verde	21	35	6	16	84.9%	37.5%
Yemen	24	40	0	14	83.7%	37.5%
Zimbabwe	26	44	8	0	84.5%	37.1%
Namibia	20	34	8	16	85.1%	37.0%
Bhutan	22	38	11	7	85.2%	36.7%
Cameroon	22	38	12	6	85.4%	36.7%
Guinea	23	40	10	5	84.9%	36.5%
Pakistan	25	44	9	0	84.6%	36.2%
Guinea-Bissau	20	36	8	14	84.8%	35.7%
Angola	22	40	4	12	84.0%	35.5%
Algeria	23	42	8	5	84.4%	35.4%
Bangladesh	23	42	6	7	84.1%	35.4%
Sri Lanka	23	42	13	0	85.1%	35.4%
Gambia	20	37	6	15	84.0%	35.1%
Uganda	23	43	9	3	84.4%	34.8%
Burundi	21	40	11	6	84.5%	34.4%
Papua New Guinea	13	25	11	29	85.5%	34.2%
UR Tanzania	22	43	11	2	84.4%	33.8%
Ghana	23	45	9	1	84.0%	33.8%
Sudan	24	48	4	2	83.1%	33.3%
Zaire	1	2	12	63	94.7%	33.3%
Indonesia	22	47	7	2	83.1%	31.9%
Nigeria	21	46	9	2	83.5%	31.3%
Myanmar	20	45	13	0	84.0%	30.8%
Mauritania	11	25	11	31	84.3%	30.6%
China	19	45	10	4	83.4%	29.7%
Libya	20	48	6	4	82.5%	29.4%
Iran	18	46	5	9	82.2%	28.1%
Lebanon	16	44	10	8	82.8%	26.7%
Vietnam	16	45	4	13	81.8%	26.2%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN-TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Laos	14	41	6	17	82.1%	25.5%
India	15	50	13	0	82.2%	23.1%
Syria	13	47	9	9	81.4%	21.7%
Cuba	8	47	15	8	81.4%	14.5%
DPR of Korea	7	47	8	16	79.4%	13.0%
Central Afr. Rep.	0	0	0	78	*	*
Iraq	0	0	0	78	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe ..	0	0	0	78	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	78	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	78	*	*
Average	28.2	28.9	10.6	10.3	87.3%	49.4%

UN REGIONAL GROUPS

The following tables show the percentage of voting coincidence with U.S. votes in plenary. They list UN member states by UN regional grouping, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage.

African Group

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN-TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Rwanda	4	1	2	71	96.5%	80.0%
Equatorial Guinea ...	16	10	17	35	93.1%	61.5%
Seychelles	15	13	0	50	88.8%	53.6%
Lesotho	18	20	1	39	86.6%	47.4%
Liberia	22	25	15	16	88.7%	46.8%
Congo	23	27	9	19	87.7%	46.0%
Mozambique	22	26	7	23	87.1%	45.8%
Madagascar	25	30	4	19	86.5%	45.5%
Swaziland	27	33	12	6	87.2%	45.0%
South Africa	31	39	6	2	86.1%	44.3%
Morocco	30	39	5	4	85.6%	43.5%
Mali	22	29	11	16	87.0%	43.1%
Ethiopia	25	33	10	10	86.7%	43.1%
Zambia	30	40	5	3	85.7%	42.9%
Mauritius	27	37	6	8	85.7%	42.2%
Eritrea	21	29	6	22	86.2%	42.0%
Kenya	25	35	18	0	87.3%	41.7%
Senegal	25	35	11	7	86.5%	41.7%
Botswana	29	41	6	2	85.4%	41.4%

African Group (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Togo	26	38	13	1	86.3%	40.6%
Cote d'Ivoire	23	34	14	7	86.8%	40.4%
Sierra Leone	25	37	14	2	86.3%	40.3%
Benin	27	40	10	1	85.7%	40.3%
Comoros	4	6	2	66	85.9%	40.0%
Djibouti	24	36	3	15	84.8%	40.0%
Gabon	20	30	8	20	86.2%	40.0%
Malawi	26	39	6	7	85.3%	40.0%
Tunisia	28	42	5	3	84.9%	40.0%
Burkina Faso	27	41	8	2	85.2%	39.7%
Egypt	26	40	9	3	85.5%	39.4%
Niger	26	40	6	6	84.8%	39.4%
Chad	23	37	5	13	84.8%	38.3%
Cape Verde	21	35	6	16	84.9%	37.5%
Zimbabwe	26	44	8	0	84.5%	37.1%
Namibia	20	34	8	16	85.1%	37.0%
Cameroon	22	38	12	6	85.4%	36.7%
Guinea	23	40	10	5	84.9%	36.5%
Guinea-Bissau	20	36	8	14	84.8%	35.7%
Angola	22	40	4	12	84.0%	35.5%
Algeria	23	42	8	5	84.4%	35.4%
Gambia	20	37	6	15	84.0%	35.1%
Uganda	23	43	9	3	84.4%	34.8%
Burundi	21	40	11	6	84.5%	34.4%
UR Tanzania	22	43	11	2	84.4%	33.8%
Ghana	23	45	9	1	84.0%	33.8%
Sudan	24	48	4	2	83.1%	33.3%
Zaire	1	2	12	63	94.7%	33.3%
Nigeria	21	46	9	2	83.5%	31.3%
Mauritania	11	25	11	31	84.3%	30.6%
Libya	20	48	6	4	82.5%	29.4%
Central Afr. Rep.	0	0	0	78	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe .	0	0	0	78	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	78	*	*
Average	20.8	31.8	7.7	17.6	84.8%	39.6%

Asian Group

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Palau	12	1	16	49	98.9%	92.3%
Tajikistan	23	6	19	30	96.3%	79.3%
Uzbekistan	31	10	18	19	95.1%	75.6%
Turkmenistan	6	2	0	70	92.5%	75.0%
Japan	42	16	20	0	94.2%	72.4%
Marshall Islands	37	17	23	1	93.6%	68.5%
Micronesia	29	16	30	3	93.7%	64.4%
Kazakstan	36	22	20	0	91.9%	62.1%
Cyprus	36	23	19	0	91.6%	61.0%
Rep. of Korea	33	22	23	0	91.9%	60.9%
Kyrgyzstan	25	17	22	14	92.3%	59.5%
Samoa	33	33	12	0	88.3%	50.0%
Fiji	26	28	23	1	89.5%	48.1%
Solomon Islands	32	35	10	1	87.4%	47.8%
Mongolia	29	33	9	7	87.4%	46.8%
Kuwait	32	39	4	3	86.1%	45.1%
Cambodia	29	36	10	3	86.8%	44.6%
Maldives	31	39	4	4	85.9%	44.3%
Vanuatu	30	39	3	6	85.5%	43.5%
Singapore	29	38	10	1	86.5%	43.3%
Bahrain	28	39	6	5	85.6%	41.8%
United Arab Emir.	26	38	8	6	85.7%	40.6%
Brunei	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Jordan	27	40	7	4	85.3%	40.3%
Malaysia	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Saudi Arabia	27	40	7	4	85.4%	40.3%
Thailand	27	40	10	1	85.6%	40.3%
Qatar	28	42	2	6	84.6%	40.0%
Philippines	26	40	11	1	85.7%	39.4%
Nepal	25	40	13	0	85.8%	38.5%
Oman	26	42	3	7	84.3%	38.2%
Afghanistan	22	36	4	16	84.5%	37.9%
Yemen	24	40	0	14	83.7%	37.5%
Bhutan	22	38	11	7	85.2%	36.7%
Pakistan	25	44	9	0	84.6%	36.2%
Bangladesh	23	42	6	7	84.1%	35.4%
Sri Lanka	23	42	13	0	85.1%	35.4%
Papua New Guinea .	13	25	11	29	85.5%	34.2%
Indonesia	22	47	7	2	83.1%	31.9%
Myanmar	20	45	13	0	84.0%	30.8%
China	19	45	10	4	83.4%	29.7%
Iran	18	46	5	9	82.2%	28.1%
Lebanon	16	44	10	8	82.8%	26.7%
Vietnam	16	45	4	13	81.8%	26.2%
Laos	14	41	6	17	82.1%	25.5%
India	15	50	13	0	82.2%	23.1%
Syria	13	47	9	9	81.4%	21.7%

Asian Group (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
DPR of Korea	7	47	8	16	79.4%	13.0%
Iraq	0	0	0	78	*	*
Average	24.3	33.5	10.5	9.7	85.6%	42.0%

Latin American and Caribbean Group (LAC)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Argentina	34	22	22	0	91.9%	60.7%
St. Vincent/Gren.	19	15	3	41	88.6%	55.9%
Dominican Rep.	12	11	4	51	88.1%	52.2%
Costa Rica	30	28	6	14	88.3%	51.7%
Grenada	31	32	8	7	87.7%	49.2%
Barbados	28	29	11	10	88.2%	49.1%
Uruguay	32	34	11	1	87.8%	48.5%
Dominica	26	28	2	22	86.8%	48.1%
Guatemala	26	28	12	12	88.1%	48.1%
Bahamas	31	34	10	3	87.6%	47.7%
Chile	34	39	5	0	86.5%	46.6%
El Salvador	31	36	3	8	86.1%	46.3%
Nicaragua	28	33	4	13	86.4%	45.9%
Suriname	31	37	10	0	87.0%	45.6%
Bolivia	31	38	9	0	86.7%	44.9%
St. Kitts/Nevis	25	31	2	20	86.0%	44.6%
Belize	28	35	10	5	86.8%	44.4%
Honduras	31	39	4	4	85.9%	44.3%
St. Lucia	31	39	6	2	86.1%	44.3%
Haiti	30	38	5	5	85.9%	44.1%
Paraguay	27	35	9	7	86.5%	43.5%
Jamaica	29	38	11	0	86.6%	43.3%
Ecuador	31	41	4	2	85.4%	43.1%
Antigua/Barbuda	29	39	6	4	85.6%	42.6%
Peru	29	39	10	0	86.3%	42.6%
Brazil	28	38	10	2	86.3%	42.4%
Venezuela	29	40	9	0	86.0%	42.0%
Panama	28	39	11	0	86.2%	41.8%
Guyana	30	42	4	2	85.1%	41.7%
Trinidad/Tobago	27	38	7	6	85.6%	41.5%
Colombia	27	42	8	1	85.1%	39.1%
Mexico	26	41	11	0	85.5%	38.8%
Cuba	8	47	15	8	81.4%	14.5%
Average	27.8	34.7	7.9	7.6	85.7%	44.5%

Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
United Kingdom	53	14	11	0	95.1%	79.1%
France	49	14	14	1	94.9%	77.8%
Netherlands	45	14	17	2	94.8%	76.3%
Luxembourg	47	15	16	0	94.6%	75.8%
Monaco	43	14	13	8	94.4%	75.4%
Belgium	46	15	16	1	94.5%	75.4%
Spain	46	15	16	1	94.5%	75.4%
Finland	45	15	18	0	94.6%	75.0%
Denmark	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Germany	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Norway	45	16	16	1	94.2%	73.8%
Portugal	45	16	15	2	94.1%	73.8%
Italy	47	17	14	0	93.9%	73.4%
Andorra	44	16	18	0	94.1%	73.3%
Canada	46	17	15	0	93.9%	73.0%
Iceland	46	17	14	1	93.8%	73.0%
Austria	43	19	16	0	93.2%	69.4%
Liechtenstein	42	19	17	0	93.1%	68.9%
Sweden	43	20	15	0	92.8%	68.3%
Ireland	42	20	16	0	92.8%	67.7%
Australia	40	22	16	0	92.1%	64.5%
Turkey	42	26	10	0	90.8%	61.8%
New Zealand	40	25	13	0	91.1%	61.5%
San Marino	40	25	11	2	90.9%	61.5%
Greece	4	3	4	67	91.9%	57.1%
Malta	33	33	9	3	87.9%	50.0%
Average	42.6	17.7	14.3	3.4	92.9%	70.7%

Eastern European Group (EE)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Latvia	43	10	22	3	96.1%	81.1%
Lithuania	43	11	24	0	95.9%	79.6%
Estonia	39	13	23	3	95.0%	75.0%
Hungary	47	16	15	0	94.2%	74.6%
Romania	44	15	18	1	94.5%	74.6%
Czech Republic	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Bulgaria	40	15	23	0	94.5%	72.7%
Poland	44	17	15	2	93.8%	72.1%
Slovak Republic	44	17	17	0	93.8%	72.1%
Slovenia	44	17	16	1	93.8%	72.1%
TFYR Macedonia	43	17	18	0	93.8%	71.7%
Moldova	37	15	23	3	94.2%	71.2%

Eastern European Group (EE) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Croatia	41	17	14	6	93.5%	70.7%
Albania	37	17	13	11	93.0%	68.5%
Georgia	33	16	23	6	93.6%	67.3%
Russia	35	24	19	0	91.2%	59.3%
Ukraine	36	25	16	1	90.9%	59.0%
Belarus	30	21	27	0	92.1%	58.8%
Bosnia/Herzegovina	30	22	15	11	90.8%	57.7%
Armenia	31	24	15	8	90.5%	56.4%
Azerbaijan	27	27	14	10	88.8%	50.0%
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	78	*	*
Average	37.0	16.9	17.5	6.5	92.8%	68.6%

OTHER GROUPINGS

The following tables show the voting coincidence percentage with U.S. votes for UN member states in plenary. It lists countries by other important groupings, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage.

Arab Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Kuwait	32	39	4	3	86.1%	45.1%
Morocco	30	39	5	4	85.6%	43.5%
Bahrain	28	39	6	5	85.6%	41.8%
United Arab Emir.	26	38	8	6	85.7%	40.6%
Jordan	27	40	7	4	85.3%	40.3%
Saudi Arabia	27	40	7	4	85.4%	40.3%
Djibouti	24	36	3	15	84.8%	40.0%
Qatar	28	42	2	6	84.6%	40.0%
Tunisia	28	42	5	3	84.9%	40.9%
Egypt	26	40	9	3	85.5%	39.4%
Oman	26	42	3	7	84.3%	38.2%
Yemen	24	40	0	14	83.7%	37.5%
Algeria	23	42	8	5	84.4%	35.4%
Sudan	24	48	4	2	83.1%	33.3%
Mauritania	11	25	11	31	84.3%	30.6%
Libya	20	48	6	4	82.5%	29.4%
Lebanon	16	44	10	8	82.8%	26.7%
Syria	13	47	9	9	81.4%	21.7%

Arab Group (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Iraq	0	0	0	78	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	78	*	*
Average	21.7	36.6	5.4	14.5	83.4%	37.2%

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Singapore	29	38	10	1	86.5%	43.3%
Brunei	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Malaysia	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Thailand	27	40	10	1	85.6%	40.3%
Philippines	26	40	11	1	85.7%	39.4%
Indonesia	22	47	7	2	83.1%	31.9%
Average	27.0	41.8	8.3	0.8	84.1%	39.2%

European Union (EU)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
United Kingdom	53	14	11	0	95.1%	79.1%
France	49	14	14	1	94.9%	77.8%
Netherlands	45	14	17	2	94.8%	76.3%
Luxembourg	47	15	16	0	94.6%	75.8%
Belgium	46	15	16	1	94.5%	75.4%
Spain	46	15	16	1	94.5%	75.4%
Finland	45	15	18	0	94.6%	75.0%
Denmark	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Germany	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Portugal	45	16	15	2	94.1%	73.8%
Italy	47	17	14	0	93.9%	73.4%
Austria	43	19	16	0	93.2%	69.4%
Sweden	43	20	15	0	92.8%	68.3%
Ireland	42	20	16	0	92.8%	67.7%
Greece	4	3	4	67	91.9%	57.1%
Average	43.1	15.3	14.7	4.9	93.7%	73.9%

Islamic Conference (OIC)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Tajikistan	23	6	19	30	96.3%	79.3%
Uzbekistan	31	10	18	19	95.1%	75.6%
Turkmenistan	6	2	0	70	92.5%	75.0%
Albania	37	17	13	11	93.0%	68.5%
Turkey	42	26	10	0	90.8%	61.8%
Kyrgyzstan	25	17	22	14	92.3%	59.5%
Azerbaijan	27	27	14	10	88.8%	50.0%
Kuwait	32	39	4	3	86.1%	45.1%
Maldives	31	39	4	4	85.9%	44.3%
Morocco	30	39	5	4	85.6%	43.5%
Mali	22	29	11	16	87.0%	43.1%
Bahrain	28	39	6	5	85.6%	41.8%
Senegal	25	35	11	7	86.5%	41.7%
United Arab Emir.	26	38	8	6	85.7%	40.6%
Sierra Leone	25	37	14	2	86.3%	40.3%
Benin	27	40	10	1	85.7%	40.3%
Brunei	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Jordan	27	40	7	4	85.3%	40.3%
Malaysia	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Saudi Arabia	27	40	7	4	85.4%	40.3%
Comoros	4	6	2	66	85.9%	40.0%
Djibouti	24	36	3	15	84.8%	40.0%
Gabon	20	30	8	20	86.2%	40.0%
Qatar	28	42	2	6	84.6%	40.0%
Tunisia	28	42	5	3	84.9%	40.0%
Burkina Faso	27	41	8	2	85.2%	39.7%
Egypt	26	40	9	3	85.5%	39.4%
Niger	26	40	6	6	84.8%	39.4%
Chad	23	37	5	13	84.8%	38.3%
Oman	26	42	3	7	84.3%	38.2%
Afghanistan	22	36	4	16	84.5%	37.9%
Yemen	24	40	0	14	83.7%	37.5%
Cameroon	22	38	12	6	85.4%	36.7%
Guinea	23	40	10	5	84.9%	36.5%
Pakistan	25	44	9	0	84.6%	36.2%
Guinea-Bissau	20	36	8	14	84.8%	35.7%
Algeria	23	42	8	5	84.4%	35.4%
Bangladesh	23	42	6	7	84.1%	35.4%
Gambia	20	37	6	15	84.0%	35.1%
Uganda	23	43	9	3	84.4%	34.8%
UR Tanzania	22	43	11	2	84.4%	33.8%
Sudan	24	48	4	2	83.1%	33.3%
Indonesia	22	47	7	2	83.1%	31.9%
Nigeria	21	46	9	2	83.5%	31.3%
Mauritania	11	25	11	31	84.3%	30.6%
Libya	20	48	6	4	82.5%	29.4%
Iran	18	46	5	9	82.2%	28.1%
Lebanon	16	44	10	8	82.8%	26.7%

Islamic Conference (OIC) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Syria	13	47	9	9	81.4%	21.7%
Iraq	0	0	0	78	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	78	*	*
Average	23.0	34.4	7.6	13.0	84.7%	40.1%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Rwanda	4	1	2	71	96.5%	80.0%
Uzbekistan	31	10	18	19	95.1%	75.6%
Turkmenistan	6	2	0	70	92.5%	75.0%
Equatorial Guinea ...	16	10	17	35	93.1%	61.5%
Cyprus	36	23	19	0	91.6%	61.0%
Seychelles	15	13	0	50	88.8%	53.6%
Malta	33	33	9	3	87.9%	50.0%
Grenada	31	32	8	7	87.7%	49.2%
Barbados	28	29	11	10	88.2%	49.1%
Guatemala	26	28	12	12	88.1%	48.1%
Bahamas	31	34	10	3	87.6%	47.7%
Lesotho	18	20	1	39	86.6%	47.4%
Liberia	22	25	15	16	88.7%	46.8%
Mongolia	29	33	9	7	87.4%	46.8%
Chile	34	39	5	0	86.5%	46.6%
Congo	23	27	9	19	87.7%	46.0%
Nicaragua	28	33	4	13	86.4%	45.9%
Mozambique	22	26	7	23	87.1%	45.8%
Suriname	31	37	10	0	87.0%	45.6%
Madagascar	25	30	4	19	86.5%	45.5%
Kuwait	32	39	4	3	86.1%	45.1%
Swaziland	27	33	12	6	87.2%	45.0%
Bolivia	31	38	9	0	86.7%	44.9%
Cambodia	29	36	10	3	86.8%	44.6%
Belize	28	35	10	5	86.8%	44.4%
Honduras	31	39	4	4	85.9%	44.3%
Maldives	31	39	4	4	85.9%	44.3%
St. Lucia	31	39	6	2	86.1%	44.3%
South Africa	31	39	6	2	86.1%	44.3%
Morocco	30	39	5	4	85.6%	43.5%
Vanuatu	30	39	3	6	85.5%	43.5%
Jamaica	29	38	11	0	86.6%	43.3%
Singapore	29	38	10	1	86.5%	43.3%
Mali	22	29	11	16	87.0%	43.1%
Ethiopia	25	33	10	10	86.7%	43.1%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Ecuador	31	41	4	2	85.4%	43.1%
Zambia	30	40	5	3	85.7%	42.9%
Peru	29	39	10	0	86.3%	42.6%
Mauritius	27	37	6	8	85.7%	42.2%
Venezuela	29	40	9	0	86.0%	42.0%
Eritrea	21	29	6	22	86.2%	42.0%
Bahrain	28	39	6	5	85.6%	41.8%
Panama	28	39	11	0	86.2%	41.8%
Guyana	30	42	4	2	85.1%	41.7%
Kenya	25	35	18	0	87.3%	41.7%
Senegal	25	35	11	7	86.5%	41.7%
Trinidad/Tobago	27	38	7	6	85.6%	41.5%
Botswana	29	41	6	2	85.4%	41.4%
Togo	26	38	13	1	86.3%	40.6%
United Arab Emir.	26	38	8	6	85.7%	40.6%
Cote d'Ivoire	23	34	14	7	86.8%	40.4%
Sierra Leone	25	37	14	2	86.3%	40.3%
Benin	27	40	10	1	85.7%	40.3%
Brunei	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Jordan	27	40	7	4	85.3%	40.3%
Malaysia	29	43	6	0	85.1%	40.3%
Saudi Arabia	27	40	7	4	85.4%	40.3%
Thailand	27	40	10	1	85.6%	40.3%
Comoros	4	6	2	66	85.9%	40.0%
Djibouti	24	36	3	15	84.8%	40.0%
Gabon	20	30	8	20	86.2%	40.0%
Malawi	26	39	6	7	85.3%	40.0%
Qatar	28	42	2	6	84.6%	40.0%
Tunisia	28	42	5	3	84.9%	40.0%
Burkina Faso	27	41	8	2	85.2%	39.7%
Egypt	26	40	9	3	85.5%	39.4%
Niger	26	40	6	6	84.8%	39.4%
Philippines	26	40	11	1	85.7%	39.4%
Colombia	27	42	8	1	85.1%	39.1%
Nepal	25	40	13	0	85.8%	38.5%
Chad	23	37	5	13	84.8%	38.3%
Oman	26	42	3	7	84.3%	38.2%
Afghanistan	22	36	4	16	84.5%	37.9%
Cape Verde	21	35	6	16	84.9%	37.5%
Yemen	24	40	0	14	83.7%	37.5%
Zimbabwe	26	44	8	0	84.5%	37.1%
Namibia	20	34	8	16	85.1%	37.0%
Bhutan	22	38	11	7	85.2%	36.7%
Cameroon	22	38	12	6	85.4%	36.7%
Guinea	23	40	10	5	84.9%	36.5%
Pakistan	25	44	9	0	84.6%	36.2%
Guinea-Bissau	20	36	8	14	84.8%	35.7%
Angola	22	40	4	12	84.0%	35.5%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Algeria	23	42	8	5	84.4%	35.4%
Bangladesh	23	42	6	7	84.1%	35.4%
Sri Lanka	23	42	13	0	85.1%	35.4%
Gambia	20	37	6	15	84.0%	35.1%
Uganda	23	43	9	3	84.4%	34.8%
Burundi	21	40	11	6	84.5%	34.4%
Papua New Guinea .	13	25	11	29	85.5%	34.2%
UR Tanzania	22	43	11	2	84.4%	33.8%
Ghana	23	45	9	1	84.0%	33.8%
Sudan	24	48	4	2	83.1%	33.3%
Zaire	1	2	12	63	94.7%	33.3%
Indonesia	22	47	7	2	83.1%	31.9%
Nigeria	21	46	9	2	83.5%	31.3%
Myanmar	20	45	13	0	84.0%	30.8%
Mauritania	11	25	11	31	84.3%	30.6%
Libya	20	48	6	4	82.5%	29.4%
Iran	18	46	5	9	82.2%	28.1%
Lebanon	16	44	10	8	82.8%	26.7%
Vietnam	16	45	4	13	81.8%	26.2%
Laos	14	41	6	17	82.1%	25.5%
India	15	50	13	0	82.2%	23.1%
Syria	13	47	9	9	81.4%	21.7%
Cuba	8	47	15	8	81.4%	14.5%
DPR of Korea	7	47	8	16	79.4%	13.0%
Central Afr. Rep.	0	0	0	78	*	*
Iraq	0	0	0	78	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe	0	0	0	78	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	78	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	78	*	*
Average	22.8	34.4	7.8	13.1	84.6%	39.8%

Nordic Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Finland	45	15	18	0	94.6%	75.0%
Denmark	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Norway	45	16	16	1	94.2%	73.8%
Iceland	46	17	14	1	93.8%	73.0%
Sweden	43	20	15	0	92.8%	68.3%
Average	45.0	16.8	15.8	0.4	93.5%	72.8%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

COUNTRY					<u>VOTING COINCIDENCE</u>	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
United Kingdom	53	14	11	0	95.1%	79.1%
France	49	14	14	1	94.9%	77.8%
Netherlands	45	14	17	2	94.8%	76.3%
Luxembourg	47	15	16	0	94.6%	75.8%
Belgium	46	15	16	1	94.5%	75.4%
Spain	46	15	16	1	94.5%	75.4%
Denmark	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Germany	46	16	16	0	94.2%	74.2%
Norway	45	16	16	1	94.2%	73.8%
Portugal	45	16	15	2	94.1%	73.8%
Italy	47	17	14	0	93.9%	73.4%
Canada	46	17	15	0	93.9%	73.0%
Iceland	46	17	14	1	93.8%	73.0%
Turkey	42	26	10	0	90.8%	61.8%
Greece	4	3	4	67	91.9%	57.1%
Average	43.5	15.4	14.0	5.1	93.7%	73.9%

HISTORICAL COMPARISON

The following table shows percentage of voting coincidence with the United States in plenary for each UN member in the 51st UNGA and each of the prior five years.

COUNTRY	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991
Afghanistan	37.9%	31.7%	33.3%	31.4%	25.0%	17.5%
Albania	68.5%	69.5%	77.8%	80.8%	36.8%	55.0%
Algeria	35.4%	32.8%	31.3%	23.1%	18.5%	12.3%
Andorra	73.3%	75.0%	76.0%	85.7%	*	*
Angola	35.5%	36.4%	31.3%	22.0%	23.4%	12.8%
Antigua-Barbuda ...	42.6%	50.0%	45.5%	27.7%	30.0%	28.2%
Argentina	60.7%	68.8%	67.9%	53.8%	44.4%	41.0%
Armenia	56.4%	61.7%	56.6%	48.8%	53.8%	*
Australia	64.5%	60.0%	66.7%	55.8%	57.4%	58.8%
Austria	69.4%	72.7%	71.7%	63.4%	55.8%	51.1%
Azerbaijan	50.0%	52.0%	48.0%	35.0%	34.0%	*
Bahamas	47.7%	52.3%	47.1%	32.1%	19.6%	26.2%
Bahrain	41.8%	37.7%	43.5%	29.6%	23.5%	19.1%
Bangladesh	35.4%	39.7%	36.2%	25.0%	22.4%	17.6%
Barbados	49.1%	56.3%	44.9%	34.0%	25.4%	24.6%
Belarus	58.8%	61.4%	56.9%	37.8%	34.0%	41.7%
Belgium	75.4%	76.6%	77.8%	72.5%	63.8%	70.0%
Belize	44.4%	50.7%	43.5%	36.0%	23.7%	24.6%
Benin	40.3%	38.2%	41.8%	29.4%	25.0%	21.0%
Bhutan	36.7%	48.3%	41.2%	28.6%	26.7%	19.0%
Bolivia	44.9%	45.6%	43.7%	33.3%	32.7%	25.8%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	57.7%	67.3%	58.6%	34.8%	19.4%	*
Botswana	41.4%	46.1%	40.3%	28.6%	23.9%	20.9%
Brazil	42.4%	41.1%	39.1%	28.0%	22.7%	22.7%
Brunei Darussalam	40.3%	40.5%	37.7%	23.1%	21.2%	16.4%
Bulgaria	72.7%	73.4%	77.6%	71.1%	60.5%	64.4%
Burkina Faso	39.7%	33.3%	34.8%	27.3%	22.1%	18.6%
Burundi	34.4%	36.1%	30.4%	23.3%	20.5%	19.7%
Cambodia	44.6%	48.3%	49.2%	29.4%	**	20.7%
Cameroon	36.7%	38.6%	39.0%	31.3%	21.4%	19.7%
Canada	73.0%	73.5%	74.5%	66.7%	60.0%	69.6%
Cape Verde	37.5%	34.9%	40.0%	24.0%	33.3%	21.9%
Central African Rep.	**	**	41.7%	28.6%	18.2%	25.9%
Chad	38.3%	38.2%	**	22.4%	20.0%	18.2%
Chile	46.6%	45.0%	46.4%	33.9%	28.4%	25.0%
China	29.7%	21.5%	22.8%	10.6%	16.4%	16.4%

Historical Comparison (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991
Colombia	39.1%	38.7%	35.3%	25.0%	22.7%	22.7%
Comoros	40.0%	**	45.0%	22.9%	22.6%	19.0%
Congo	46.0%	41.5%	34.5%	23.8%	37.0%	20.8%
Costa Rica	51.7%	47.5%	50.0%	35.7%	32.8%	27.1%
Cote d'Ivoire	40.4%	40.0%	44.8%	27.1%	24.5%	31.0%
Croatia	70.7%	75.0%	71.1%	84.0%	78.9%	*
Cuba	14.5%	14.5%	15.5%	6.3%	11.1%	7.8%
Cyprus	61.0%	46.6%	40.3%	32.7%	22.4%	21.5%
Czech Republic (3)	74.2%	77.4%	78.8%	70.0%	61.9%	63.0%
DPR of Korea	13.0%	8.7%	9.1%	7.8%	12.9%	15.5%
Denmark	74.2%	72.1%	75.0%	67.5%	56.5%	61.2%
Djibouti	40.0%	31.8%	42.4%	26.9%	21.2%	17.9%
Dominica	48.1%	46.7%	52.9%	41.9%	28.9%	29.3%
Dominican Republic	52.2%	**	**	37.0%	46.2%	28.2%
Ecuador	43.1%	47.4%	37.8%	30.9%	26.1%	23.5%
Egypt	39.4%	33.3%	34.8%	22.9%	25.0%	19.4%
El Salvador	46.3%	48.0%	47.5%	30.6%	30.5%	23.1%
Equatorial Guinea ..	61.5%	79.2%	**	**	0.0%	**
Eritrea	42.0%	58.9%	70.4%	0.0%	*	*
Estonia	75.0%	81.8%	75.0%	70.6%	57.5%	67.6%
Ethiopia	43.1%	45.7%	38.7%	27.3%	22.8%	20.3%
Fiji	48.1%	50.8%	50.0%	42.2%	33.3%	28.6%
Finland	75.0%	79.0%	77.8%	69.2%	58.1%	62.5%
France	77.8%	76.9%	75.8%	71.1%	63.8%	70.6%
Gabon	40.0%	39.1%	46.2%	24.3%	25.8%	21.2%
Gambia	35.1%	33.3%	46.3%	26.5%	28.8%	21.9%
Georgia	67.3%	85.7%	81.0%	76.2%	**	*
Germany	74.2%	76.9%	77.8%	74.4%	63.8%	71.4%
Ghana	33.8%	32.8%	30.9%	20.5%	18.9%	16.1%
Greece	57.1%	69.2%	71.4%	58.5%	50.0%	48.9%
Grenada	49.2%	60.7%	43.3%	29.3%	33.3%	26.3%
Guatemala	48.1%	46.2%	45.1%	32.7%	25.8%	24.1%
Guinea	36.5%	40.6%	42.6%	27.3%	25.0%	20.6%
Guinea-Bissau	35.7%	36.4%	**	22.0%	26.8%	18.8%
Guyana	41.7%	48.6%	41.9%	33.3%	21.9%	22.9%
Haiti	44.1%	39.7%	42.6%	24.5%	24.6%	15.4%
Honduras	44.3%	45.7%	45.1%	28.6%	28.8%	23.9%
Hungary	74.6%	83.1%	79.6%	71.1%	61.4%	56.8%
Iceland	73.0%	75.4%	77.4%	67.5%	56.5%	61.7%
India	23.1%	17.2%	16.1%	15.7%	18.5%	17.5%
Indonesia	31.9%	33.3%	31.5%	18.9%	20.6%	12.5%

Historical Comparison (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991
Iran	28.1%	27.3%	24.2%	18.9%	21.4%	15.4%
Iraq	**	**	23.7%	12.2%	9.3%	7.6%
Ireland	67.7%	69.7%	70.6%	65.8%	54.5%	53.2%
Israel	95.0%	97.0%	95.2%	93.5%	92.3%	87.5%
Italy	73.4%	74.2%	79.2%	73.7%	63.8%	66.0%
Jamaica	43.3%	50.0%	42.9%	32.0%	24.2%	26.2%
Japan	72.4%	75.4%	78.4%	65.8%	53.7%	61.7%
Jordan	40.3%	38.9%	34.8%	22.0%	19.7%	13.6%
Kazakstan	62.1%	60.3%	60.0%	46.2%	38.3%	*
Kenya	41.7%	40.0%	39.4%	31.9%	25.9%	19.0%
Kuwait	45.1%	40.5%	45.7%	34.5%	26.8%	20.6%
Kyrgyzstan	59.5%	55.9%	48.9%	52.2%	50.0%	*
Laos	25.5%	27.0%	19.6%	12.2%	12.9%	9.8%
Latvia	81.1%	87.0%	80.0%	65.8%	55.6%	60.5%
Lebanon	26.7%	25.8%	28.8%	17.5%	18.5%	15.4%
Lesotho	47.4%	46.4%	39.3%	24.5%	23.9%	21.0%
Liberia	46.8%	**	**	**	29.6%	22.6%
Libya	29.4%	22.5%	26.4%	12.2%	15.2%	12.3%
Liechtenstein	68.9%	72.3%	70.6%	64.1%	54.8%	51.2%
Lithuania	79.6%	81.0%	81.0%	68.6%	54.5%	56.5%
Luxembourg	75.8%	74.6%	77.8%	74.4%	63.8%	68.0%
Madagascar	45.5%	45.1%	42.1%	22.9%	19.0%	18.2%
Malawi	40.0%	38.5%	41.7%	26.5%	39.5%	26.9%
Malaysia	40.3%	39.4%	37.0%	20.8%	16.9%	13.6%
Maldives	44.3%	42.3%	45.8%	30.9%	23.5%	20.6%
Mali	43.1%	36.2%	34.8%	21.3%	26.8%	19.0%
Malta	50.0%	68.2%	70.2%	60.0%	43.4%	30.0%
Marshall Islands	68.5%	65.1%	65.5%	55.8%	60.5%	39.5%
Mauritania	30.6%	38.0%	40.0%	18.4%	19.0%	15.2%
Mauritius	42.2%	43.0%	43.3%	33.3%	28.6%	16.4%
Mexico	38.8%	41.6%	33.3%	28.3%	20.3%	20.6%
Micronesia	64.4%	66.7%	69.2%	55.0%	63.6%	26.2%
Moldova	71.2%	73.3%	76.6%	69.4%	57.1%	*
Monaco	75.4%	75.8%	75.4%	84.6%	*	*
Mongolia	46.8%	47.9%	41.8%	30.8%	23.0%	25.9%
Morocco	43.5%	40.6%	46.9%	26.5%	21.9%	16.9%
Mozambique	45.8%	41.1%	33.3%	23.8%	23.3%	19.0%
Myanmar (Burma)	30.8%	25.4%	25.4%	18.4%	14.3%	15.0%
Namibia	37.0%	46.7%	36.2%	23.1%	20.3%	17.9%
Nepal	38.5%	46.4%	39.7%	32.7%	27.5%	23.2%
Netherlands	76.3%	80.6%	81.5%	74.4%	63.8%	70.0%

Historical Comparison (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991
New Zealand	61.5%	64.2%	63.0%	54.8%	51.1%	55.8%
Nicaragua	45.9%	46.6%	47.8%	35.2%	23.1%	22.1%
Niger	39.4%	36.1%	39.7%	29.1%	23.5%	20.9%
Nigeria	31.3%	31.4%	37.5%	26.5%	24.2%	19.4%
Norway	73.8%	79.7%	74.5%	67.5%	55.3%	61.2%
Oman	38.2%	35.2%	38.0%	29.1%	23.7%	19.4%
Pakistan	36.2%	28.4%	32.4%	26.3%	21.7%	17.6%
Palau (5)	92.3%	66.7%	**	*	*	*
Panama	41.8%	47.4%	43.8%	44.0%	35.6%	37.2%
Papua New Guinea	34.2%	47.2%	41.4%	38.8%	31.6%	23.9%
Paraguay	43.5%	51.6%	45.1%	45.5%	26.2%	25.9%
Peru	42.6%	46.6%	45.5%	31.5%	26.9%	24.6%
Philippines	39.4%	43.8%	38.8%	17.0%	21.5%	22.1%
Poland	72.1%	77.4%	78.4%	68.4%	58.1%	61.7%
Portugal	73.8%	71.6%	75.0%	69.2%	58.7%	59.6%
Qatar	40.0%	32.9%	38.8%	29.6%	25.0%	18.6%
Republic of Korea	60.0%	64.3%	55.9%	44.2%	36.2%	35.3%
Romania	74.6%	75.0%	76.5%	71.4%	61.4%	65.2%
Russia (1)	59.3%	73.1%	66.7%	68.6%	59.6%	41.9%
Rwanda	80.0%	53.2%	60.0%	30.2%	26.5%	25.0%
St. Kitts-Nevis	44.6%	83.3%	44.9%	0.0%	27.5%	22.7%
St. Lucia	44.3%	52.9%	46.3%	25.5%	29.1%	25.0%
St. Vincent-Gren. ..	55.9%	84.6%	49.2%	26.0%	24.5%	26.3%
Samoa	50.0%	55.6%	57.1%	48.4%	46.3%	36.0%
San Marino	61.5%	65.0%	51.4%	73.1%	54.5%	*
Sao Tome-Principe	**	**	**	**	28.3%	21.0%
Saudi Arabia	40.3%	32.9%	41.8%	30.2%	25.7%	17.4%
Senegal	41.7%	38.4%	45.8%	23.4%	24.6%	17.2%
Seychelles	53.6%	25.0%	35.7%	20.0%	25.9%	22.0%
Sierra Leone	40.3%	30.6%	46.0%	27.8%	17.9%	23.2%
Singapore	43.3%	43.7%	41.2%	33.3%	27.9%	23.5%
Slovak Republic	72.1%	76.2%	79.6%	70.6%	*	*
Slovenia	72.1%	78.9%	76.0%	65.7%	63.6%	*
Solomon Islands ...	47.8%	55.6%	56.9%	57.7%	75.0%	26.1%
Somalia	**	**	**	**	**	12.1%
South Africa	44.3%	47.4%	41.7%	**	**	**
Spain	75.4%	70.1%	68.3%	59.5%	51.0%	52.0%
Sri Lanka	35.4%	36.2%	30.3%	25.9%	21.2%	17.6%
Sudan	33.3%	21.7%	25.9%	20.0%	14.1%	10.9%
Suriname	45.6%	50.0%	43.8%	32.1%	26.5%	22.1%
Swaziland	45.0%	50.7%	50.0%	28.6%	24.2%	24.6%

Historical Comparison (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991
Sweden	68.3%	71.2%	69.8%	61.9%	54.3%	58.0%
Syria	21.7%	20.0%	22.6%	13.7%	16.4%	14.1%
Tajikistan	79.3%	91.3%	62.0%	30.8%	19.0%	*
Thailand	40.3%	40.0%	37.7%	17.4%	23.9%	23.2%
TFYR Macedonia (4)	71.7%	78.0%	76.6%	47.5%	*	*
Togo	40.6%	34.3%	37.7%	19.1%	25.0%	23.9%
Trinidad-Tobago ...	41.5%	48.5%	45.7%	25.5%	24.6%	17.9%
Tunisia	40.0%	36.1%	38.2%	25.0%	20.0%	15.2%
Turkey	61.8%	70.6%	65.0%	57.1%	42.6%	41.2%
Turkmenistan	75.0%	76.5%	55.3%	40.0%	38.5%	*
Uganda	34.8%	40.0%	34.8%	18.6%	16.0%	14.5%
Ukraine	59.0%	59.6%	63.3%	41.3%	35.1%	31.6%
United Arab Emir. ..	40.6%	37.7%	44.9%	30.4%	24.6%	18.8%
United Kingdom ...	79.1%	85.1%	84.4%	80.0%	73.6%	79.6%
UR Tanzania	33.8%	35.7%	29.9%	18.4%	20.3%	16.7%
Uruguay	48.5%	46.1%	47.1%	37.5%	35.7%	35.8%
Uzbekistan	75.6%	85.7%	53.1%	**	**	*
Vanuatu	43.5%	40.4%	48.8%	83.3%	27.3%	20.3%
Venezuela	42.0%	42.9%	37.9%	29.6%	25.4%	23.5%
Vietnam	26.2%	18.8%	19.7%	6.5%	11.3%	10.9%
Yemen	37.5%	33.8%	33.3%	20.0%	14.5%	12.3%
Yugoslavia (S/M) (2)	**	**	**	**	0.0%	19.4%
Zaire	33.3%	45.0%	0.0%	36.1%	33.3%	15.4%
Zambia	42.9%	44.6%	38.6%	36.1%	22.1%	19.0%
Zimbabwe	37.1%	36.8%	29.9%	18.4%	19.4%	18.5%
Average	49.4%	50.6%	48.6%	36.8%	31.0%	27.8%

* Not yet a UN member

** Non-participating UN member

(1) Figure before 1992 is for the U.S.S.R.

(2) Not permitted to participate since the 47th UNGA.

(3) Figures before 1993 are for Czechoslovakia.

(4) Listed alphabetically as "The Former Yugoslav Republic...".

(5) Admitted as a member 12/15/94, but did not vote in 49th UNGA.

III - GENERAL ASSEMBLY: IMPORTANT VOTES AND CONSENSUS ACTIONS

PL 101-167 calls for analysis and discussion of “all such votes on issues which directly affected important United States interests and on which the United States lobbied extensively.” For the 51st General Assembly in 1996, 12 votes meet these criteria.

Section III consists of five parts: (1) a listing and description of the 12 important votes at the 51st UNGA; (2) a listing and description of the 16 important consensus resolutions adopted at the 51st UNGA; (3) voting coincidence percentages with the United States on these important votes, arranged both alphabetically by country and in rank order of agreed votes; (4) voting coincidence percentages by UN regional groupings and other important groupings; and (5) a comparison of voting coincidence percentages on important votes with those on overall votes from Section II. Beginning with this report, an additional column is included in the tables of important votes (parts 3 and 4 above). This column presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including the 16 important consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. Since not all states are equally active at the United Nations, these coincidence percentages were refined to reflect a country’s rate of participation in all UN voting overall. The participation rate was calculated by dividing the number of Yes/No/Abstain votes cast by a UN member in plenary (i.e., the number of times it was not absent) by the total of plenary votes (93).

IMPORTANT VOTES

The following 12 important votes are identified by a short title, document number, date of vote, and results (Yes-No-Abstain), with the U.S. vote noted. The first paragraph summarizes the subject matter of each vote, and the second provides background and the U.S. position. The resolutions are listed in chronological order of adoption.

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba

A/Res/51/17

November 12

137-3(US)-25

Calls on states to refrain from promulgating and applying laws and measures, such as the “Helms-Burton Act,” whose extraterritorial effects affect the sovereignty of other states and the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction, as well as the freedom of trade and navigation; and urges states that have such laws to repeal them.

This Cuba-sponsored resolution, couched in terms of blocking efforts to extend extraterritorially the effects of the U.S. embargo against Cuba, gained increasing support again in 1996. By introducing this resolution in the General Assembly, Cuba has exploited the concerns of some in the international community to claim support for its policies of intolerance and repression. The Cuban regime withholds fundamental freedoms and human rights from its citizens. The U.S. Government is committed to pursuing a multilateral approach to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. The United States has the sovereign right to choose with whom it trades, to protect the rights of its own citizens, and to pursue its national interests. The U.S. Government continues to believe strongly that the embargo provides important leverage to promote peaceful change in Cuba. In addition, U.S. policy toward Cuba includes the important element of direct support for the Cuban people. This effort is aimed at supporting Cuban human rights organizations and other nongovernmental organizations working to better the lives of average Cubans. The United States permits travel to Cuba for research, for news gathering, and for cultural, educational, religious, or human rights purposes. The United States licensed nearly \$140 million in humanitarian assistance to Cuba over the past four years, and U.S. efforts to better the lives of the Cuban people will continue. While a number of countries criticized the Cuban Government's record on human rights, only Israel and Uzbekistan voted with the United States.

2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures

A/Res/51/22 November 27 56-4(US)-76

Calls for immediate repeal of unilateral extraterritorial laws that impose sanctions on companies and nationals of other states, and calls on all states not to recognize unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures or legislative acts imposed by any state.

Libya introduced this resolution as a device to help it break out of the international isolation imposed by the world community and to lend some legitimacy to its campaign to end terrorism-related sanctions.

3. Middle East Peace Process

A/Res/51/29 December 4 159(US)-3-2

Welcomes the peace process started at Madrid and supports the subsequent bilateral negotiations; expresses full support for the achievements of the peace process thus far; and encourages regional development and cooperation.

The United States, Norway, and Russia introduced this resolution, which follows up on similar resolutions adopted since 1993, to support the progress made in peace negotiations and to urge the parties onward. The resolution renews the General Assembly's support for the Middle East peace process begun in Madrid in 1991.

4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons

A/Res/51/45M

December 10

115-22(US)-32

Notes the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on July 8, 1996, on use of nuclear weapons; underlines its conclusion that there exists an obligation to conclude negotiations toward nuclear disarmament under strict international control; and calls for multilateral negotiations to begin in 1997 toward early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting all forms of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

The U.S. Government takes seriously its obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to negotiate in good faith on measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control. At this stage, however, the multilateral negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention called for in this resolution would be impractical and counterproductive. The U.S. Government will begin discussions with the Russian Federation on further reductions in strategic forces immediately upon Russia's ratification of START II. This is the only sensible method to follow. In practice, the ICJ's finding on responsibilities related to nuclear disarmament is the same as the obligation in the NPT. The U.S. Government agrees with the Court's finding that the use of nuclear weapons is subject to the general rules of international law on the use of force and armed conflict, but there is no prohibition in treaty or customary international law on the use of nuclear weapons as such, including international law on human rights and the environment. It is the U.S. view that use of nuclear weapons would be legal when used in compliance with the law of armed conflict applicable to all weapons. Nuclear deterrence has played a vital role in maintaining the common security and in defending the United States and its allies over the past 50 years. Nuclear deterrence continues to make an essential contribution to preserving peace, security, and stability. For these reasons, it is the U.S. view that the Court's opinions do not provide reasons to alter the common defense policy of the United States and its allies.

5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines

A/Res/51/45S

December 10

155(US)-0-10

Urges states to negotiate as soon as possible a binding international agreement to ban use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines; and urges states that have not done so to accede to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

The United States introduced this resolution, with a record number of cosponsors (115). The United States has introduced a resolution on landmines annually for the past four years. In 1993-1994, the resolution was centered on the need for states to adopt export moratoria. During the past two years, the resolution also called on states to take steps toward the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines. In 1996, however, the resolution was more ambitious in scope. It called for an international agreement to ban use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible. Unlike its three predecessors, this year's resolution was not adopted by consensus. However, in adopting the resolution by an overwhelming majority, the international community strongly endorsed President Clinton's call for the ban.

6. Palestinian Self-Determination

A/Res/51/82

December 12

159-3(US)-12

Reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination; expresses the hope that the Palestinian people will soon be exercising their right to self-determination in the current peace process; and urges all states and the UN system to assist the Palestinian people in their quest for self-determination.

The U.S. Government generally supports the principle of the right of self-determination, and is profoundly committed to the achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East. The United States did not find it possible, however, to support this resolution because it takes positions on issues supported by one party to the ongoing negotiations and not by the other. The U.S. view is that the United Nations is not the forum to debate permanent status issues, which are for the parties to discuss and resolve. Instead of interjecting itself into the controversy by taking positions which could be seen as prejudging such issues, the United Nations should promote and support the agreements the parties have reached. Israel and Palau also voted against the resolution.

7. Human Rights in Iraq

A/Res/51/106

December 12

103(US)-3-59

Expresses strong condemnation of massive and extremely grave violations of human rights, including summary and arbitrary executions, systematic torture, and mutilation as a penalty for certain offenses; expresses grave concern about action of military forces against civilian targets in northern Iraq; and urges Iraq to cooperate with the United Nations to ensure implementation of Security Council Resolution 986 (1995) whereby humanitarian supplies purchased with proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum are distributed to the Iraqi population.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, introduced by the European Union, to highlight and condemn Iraq's continuing abysmal human rights record.

8. Human Rights in Iran

A/Res/51/107

December 12

79(US)-30-54

Expresses concern about the high number of executions, torture, and discriminatory treatment of minorities by reason of their religious beliefs and widespread discrimination against women; also expresses concern about continuing threats to the life of Salman Rushdie and harassment of writers and members of the press; and welcomes Iran's cooperation with the Special Representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights and hopes he will again be allowed to visit Iran.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, introduced by the European Union, to highlight and condemn Iran's continuing systematic and gross violations of human rights.

9. Human Rights in Sudan

A/Res/51/112

December 12

100(US)-16-50

Expresses deep concern about Sudan's continuing human rights violations, including summary executions, detentions without due process, violations of rights of women and children, and torture; urges investigation and end to cases of slavery and forced labor; calls on Sudan to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur for human rights and allow unlimited access to Sudanese territory and persons with no threats or reprisals; recommends continued monitoring of the Sudan human rights situation; and continues to urge placement of human rights monitors in Sudan.

The United States introduced this resolution to highlight Sudan's abysmal human rights record and to provide pressure for improvement.

10. Human Rights in Cuba

A/Res/51/113 December 12 62(US)-25-84

Calls on Cuba to cooperate with the UN Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur on Cuba by permitting him to establish contact with the government and citizens of Cuba; urges Cuba to allow for freedom of expression, information, and assembly; and calls on Cuba to release persons detained for political activities.

The United States introduced this resolution in its effort since the mid-1980s to focus international attention on the continuing violations of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. It is essential that the international community make clear to the Government of Cuba that its repressive policies—and the marked deterioration of the human rights situation in Cuba during the past year—are unacceptable.

11. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia

A/Res/51/116 December 12 136(US)-1-28

Expresses serious concern about continuing human rights violations and delays in fully implementing human rights provisions of the peace agreement; strongly condemns forcible expulsion of people from and destruction of their homes, and restrictions on freedom of movement between Republika Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina; expresses concern for women and children, and calls for perpetrators of rape to be brought to justice; insists all parties implement commitments to human rights in the Dayton peace agreement and promote democratic institutions of government; demands that the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) end repression of the non-Serb population in Kosovo; strongly condemns the refusal of the Republika Srpska, the FRY, and Croatia to arrest and surrender indicted war criminals in their territory; calls on all states to cooperate with the International Tribunal; demands that the Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia ensure full access to their territories for all concerned organizations, including nongovernmental organizations; commends the efforts of the Special Rapporteur and field operation of the UN Human Rights Commission in the former Yugoslavia; and calls on the parties to the peace agreement to determine the fate of missing persons.

The United States again in 1996 introduced this resolution on human rights in parts of the former Yugoslavia to highlight the continu-

ing extensive violations of human rights and to provide pressure for improvement.

12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

A/Res/50/245

September 10

158(US)-3-5

Adopts the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as contained in UN document A/50/1027; asks the Secretary General, as depositary of the Treaty, to open it for signature, at UN headquarters, at the earliest possible date; and calls upon all states to sign and to become parties to the Treaty at the earliest possible date. (The Treaty was opened for signature at the 51st session of the UN General Assembly. President Clinton was the first to sign it.)

This resolution adopting a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, cosponsored by the United States and more than 120 other countries, and adopted overwhelmingly, brings to a historic close more than 40 years of search for a treaty to end nuclear-weapon-test explosions for all time. This treaty was negotiated in Geneva during the past three years, with U.S. leadership. Its adoption by the General Assembly is a milestone in the transition from the Cold War era to a new and safer time. The treaty supports a total ban on nuclear-test explosions, and other nuclear explosions, of any size, in any place, at any time. The effect will be greater security and a healthier environment, and brings the world a step closer towards ending a nuclear arms race that has endangered human survival for the past half century. An end to nuclear-test explosions will create a climate of confidence that will sustain the trend toward smaller nuclear arsenals, and it will reduce substantially the risk that the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons will grow. It reduces the danger of nuclear war. (Although this resolution was adopted at a resumed session of the previous General Assembly, it has been included in this report because it did occur in 1996 and because it has considerable importance for U.S. and world security interests. It is included in the calculation of voting coincidence with the United States on important votes.)

CONSENSUS ACTIONS

Of the 269 resolutions adopted by the 51st UNGA in 1996, 196 (72.9%) were by consensus. In addition, 76 of 79 decisions were adopted by consensus. Combining resolutions and decisions, the percentage of those adopted by consensus was 78.2%. This constitutes a drop in the percentage of resolutions adopted by consensus below the level of the past three years. Nevertheless, it remains higher than in the

earlier years for which these reports were compiled. The number of plenary votes is considerably below what it was just a few years ago. The number of plenary votes on resolutions and decisions is less than half the total nine years earlier at the 42nd UNGA.

The following table illustrates these developments:

Resolutions and Decisions

UNGA	Votes	Consensus	Total	Percentage Consensus
51st	76	272	348	78.2%
50th	69	293	362	80.9%
49th	70	301	371	81.1%
48th	66	298	364	81.9%
47th	78	265	343	77.3%
46th	76	272	348	78.2%
45th	90	297	387	76.7%
44th	119	272	391	69.6%
43rd	138	245	383	64.0%
42nd	154	224	378	60.6%

IMPORTANT CONSENSUS RESOLUTIONS

The 16 important resolutions listed and discussed below were adopted by consensus at the 51st UNGA. All were selected on the same basis used in determining important votes discussed above, i.e., they were "issues which directly affected United States interests and on which the United States lobbied intensively." For each resolution, the listing provides a short title, the resolution number, date of adoption, a summary description, and an explanation of the U.S. position. The resolutions are listed in numerical order.

1. Chemical and Biological Weapons

A/Res/51/45T December 10

Welcomes the fact that the required 65 instruments of ratification have now been deposited and that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction will enter into force on April 29, 1997; stresses the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical weapons and production and development facilities should be

among the original parties to the Convention and, in this context, the importance of the United States and the Russian Federation being among the original parties; calls upon all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention without delay; and urges the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to intensify efforts to complete its remaining work.

The United States joined consensus on this resolution, considering a ban on such weapons a major arms-control objective. Absent the attempts of prior years to add resolution language reinterpreting the Convention to ban all export controls and trade controls, the United States was able to join consensus on this simple procedural resolution encouraging ratification of the Convention.

2. UN Declaration on Crime and Public Security

A/Res/51/60 December 12

Approves the annexed UN Declaration on Crime and Public Security; and urges states to combat serious transnational crime. The Declaration calls on member states to: combat transnational crime, including organized crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking, smuggling of other illicit articles, organized trafficking in persons, terrorist crimes, and laundering of proceeds from serious crimes; pledge cooperation in these efforts; promote law enforcement cooperation; strengthen systems for sharing information; become parties to treaties on international terrorism and conventions on international drug control; combat transnational flow of the proceeds of crime; strengthen the professionalism of criminal justice systems; and combat and prohibit corruption and bribery.

The U.S. Government supports UN efforts in crime prevention. The Declaration, for which the United States prepared the first draft, reflects a U.S. initiative, personally put forward by President Clinton at the UN General Assembly in 1995. President Clinton called on the international community to conclude a declaration on combatting transnational crime in all its forms. Its adoption without substantive change at the General Assembly in 1996 was a high-priority U.S. objective.

3. Drug Abuse and Illicit Production and Trafficking in Drugs

A/Res/51/64 December 12

Calls upon all states to intensify their actions to promote effective cooperation in efforts to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking; urges all states to implement provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; calls on states to adopt adequate national laws, strengthen national judicial systems, and carry out effective drug control activities;

asks the UN International Drug Control Program to continue to support the focus on regional and national strategies for drug abuse control, cooperate with multilateral development banks on activities related to drug control, and provide legal assistance to states in adjusting their national laws to implement drug control conventions; encourages governments to deal with the threat posed to civil society by drug trafficking and its links to terrorism, transnational crime, money laundering, and the arms trade, and to cooperate to prevent channeling of funds to and between those engaged in such activities; calls upon states to implement the mandates of the Global Program of Action to combat illicit drug production, demand, and trafficking; decides to convene a special session of the General Assembly for three days in June 1998 to consider the fight against illicit drug production, sale, demand, traffic, and distribution, and to propose new strategies and measures to strengthen international cooperation; decides that the preparatory process for the special session should be funded through the regular UN budget; supports the UN System-Wide Action Plan on Drug Abuse Control as a vital tool for coordination, and requests that it be updated and reviewed biennially; and notes with concern the decline of available resources for the Fund of the UN International Drug Control Program, and urges all governments to give the organization the fullest possible financial and political support.

The fight against illicit drugs is a high priority for the U.S. Government. President Clinton underscored the importance of the counternarcotics effort as part of his anti-crime initiative in his statements to the General Assembly in 1995 and 1996. The United States supports the substance of this omnibus resolution on drugs. However, it cannot support actions which have the effect of increasing the UN regular budget beyond the cap adopted by the General Assembly for the current biennium. The preparations for the 1998 special session on drugs require resources which were not foreseen in the work plan for the current biennium, and offsets have been found for only part of these costs. Further, some of the proposed offsets have significant implications for ongoing drug programs. In the U.S. view, effective prioritization would allow all the costs of the special session to be absorbed within the budget cap. On the basis of the expectation that all costs would be so absorbed, the United States joined in the consensus adoption of the resolution.

4. Follow-Up to the Fourth World Conference on Women

A/Res/51/69

December 12

Calls upon states to implement the Platform for Action adopted by the Conference in Beijing; calls for intensified efforts toward equal status of women in UN activity; urges governments to establish or

strengthen national machineries for advancement of women; reaffirms that adequate financial resources should be committed at the international level for implementation of the Platform for Action in the developing countries; requests that governments ensure equal access to education, training, employment, and promotion of entrepreneurial activities; calls upon member states to commit themselves to gender balance, through creation of special mechanisms, in government-appointed committees, boards, and other official bodies, as well as in the United Nations and other international bodies, by presenting and promoting more women candidates; asks the Secretary General to formulate a new system-wide medium-term plan for the advancement of women; welcomes the resolution of the Economic and Social Council in which it strengthens the mandate of the Commission on the Status of Women; asks the Secretary General to present action-oriented recommendations to the Economic and Social Council on means to enhance system-wide coordination on gender issues and to mainstream a gender perspective throughout the UN system; and encourages international financial institutions to review and revise policies, procedures, and staffing to ensure that investments and programs benefit women.

The U.S. Government strongly supports implementation of the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and worked for adoption of this resolution, stressing mainstreaming, coordination, and monitoring. This resolution meets the U.S. goals of promoting a coordinated, active, and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective throughout the UN system. It also strengthens the monitoring role of the Commission on the Status of Women.

5. Strengthening Office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

A/Res/51/90

December 12

Supports and encourages the efforts of the Secretary General to enhance the role and further improve the functioning of the Center for Human Rights under the overall supervision of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; reiterates the need to ensure that all the necessary resources are provided without delay to the UN human rights program to enable it to carry out its mandates efficiently, effectively, and expeditiously; asks the Secretary General to enhance the capability of the High Commissioner and the Center to fulfill their mandates; supports the Secretary General and the High Commissioner in their efforts to strengthen UN human rights activities through reorganization of the structure of the Center to improve its efficiency and effectiveness; and emphasizes the need for full participation of the Office of the High Com-

missioner and the Center in all mechanisms related to the follow-up to major UN conferences.

The United States, believing strongly in the work of the Center for Human Rights, joined in cosponsoring this resolution, which strengthens the Center and supports efforts by the High Commissioner to restructure the Center and improve its management.

6. Human Rights in Myanmar (Burma)

A/Res/51/117

December 12

Deplores the continued violations of human rights in Myanmar; requests that the Government of Myanmar permit unrestricted communication with and access to political leaders, and urges release of detained political leaders and political prisoners; urges the Government of Myanmar to engage in a substantive political dialogue with political leaders, including representatives of ethnic groups, as the best means of promoting national reconciliation and the full and early restoration of democracy; urges the Government of Myanmar to restore democracy and to ensure that political parties and nongovernmental organizations can function freely; expresses concern that most of the representatives elected in 1990 are still excluded from participating in meetings for drafting a new constitution; urges the Government of Myanmar to ensure full respect for human rights, including freedom of expression and assembly, right to a fair trial, protection of minorities, and an end to practices of torture, abuse of women, forced labor and relocation, enforced disappearances, and summary executions.

The United States strongly supported this resolution, which reflects the consensus view of UN members that every government of every society should be held to certain minimum standards of respect for the rights and freedoms of its own people. The U.S. Representative said that the current government in Burma is not meeting these standards. It has subjected democratic forces to a kind of rolling repression in which small steps forward alternate with crackdowns and episodes of intimidation and violence. The Burmese authorities have refused to enter into a meaningful dialogue with democratic leaders, and they have continued to deny to their citizens the fundamental political freedoms of expression and assembly. And they have engaged in torture, forced labor, forced relocations, and summary executions. The proposition that harsh policies are necessary in light of Burma's turbulent history and multiethnic nature is unacceptable. The right of people to participate freely in a democratic political process is an ally—not an enemy—of national unity and social peace. Stability achieved through repression is sterile, superficial, and temporary. Lasting stability comes when people are free to make use of their full talents and abilities, when those who

govern respect those who are governed, and when the people have confidence in those they have chosen to make and enforce their laws.

7. Solution to External Debt Problem of Developing Countries

A/Res/51/164

December 16

Recognizes that effective, equitable, development-oriented, and durable solutions to the external debt and debt-servicing problems of developing countries can contribute substantially to the strengthening of the global economy and to the efforts of developing countries to achieve sustainable development; stresses the importance for developing countries of continuing their efforts to promote a favorable environment for attracting foreign investment, thereby promoting economic growth so as to favor their exit from debt-servicing problems, and stresses the need for continued concessional lending to individual developing countries as well as new financial flows to support developing countries' economic reform, stabilization, and structural adjustment efforts; stresses the need for the international community to promote a conducive external economic environment through improved market access, stabilization of exchange rates, effective stewardship of international interest rates, increased resource flows, access to international financial markets, flow of financial resources, and improved access to technology for the developing countries; welcomes the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative, which will provide multilateral and increased bilateral debt reduction for the poorest and most heavily indebted countries that have demonstrated a commitment to reform; and recognizes the efforts of indebted developing countries to fulfill their commitments on debt servicing, and encourages private creditors to continue their efforts to address the commercial debt problems of middle-income developing countries.

The United States was able to join consensus again in 1996 on the resolution on external debt problems of developing countries because it was relatively balanced, acknowledging the concerns of the heavily indebted countries while respecting the rights of the donors and the prerogatives of the lending institutions that assist developing countries. The resolution also includes reference to measures necessary for sustainable development: sound economic and structural adjustment policies, a favorable investment climate, accessible markets, and participation in international trade. The resolution also endorses the current strategy of supporting debt-reduction agreements in the context of structural adjustment efforts in developing countries and the efforts of the international financial institutions to develop a comprehensive strategy for the heavily indebted poor countries.

8. Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

A/Res/51/165 December 16

Endorses the outcome of the ninth session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); welcomes the fact that UNCTAD adopted far-reaching reforms, as embodied in the Midrand Declaration and the Partnership for Growth and Development document; stresses the urgent need to continue trade liberalization, including through a substantial reduction of tariff and other barriers to trade, in particular non-tariff barriers, and the elimination of discriminatory and protectionist practices; recognizes that the World Trade Organization (WTO) provides the framework for an open, rule-based, equitable, secure, nondiscriminatory, transparent, and predictable multilateral trading system; emphasizes the importance of attaining greater universality of the international trading system, and welcomes the process directed towards accession to the WTO of developing countries and countries with economies in transition; emphasizes that the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO is a key element with regard to the integrity and credibility of the multilateral trading system; deplores any attempt to bypass or undermine multilaterally agreed procedures on the conduct of international trading, and affirms that environmental and social concerns should not be used for protectionist purposes; reaffirms that governments should ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive so as to achieve sustainable development; recognizes the important progress made by the WTO, UNCTAD, and others in understanding the relationship between trade and environment; asks UNCTAD to continue its special role in promoting integration of trade, environment, and development by examining trade and environment issues from a development perspective, in close cooperation with the UN Environment Program and the WTO as task manager for the Commission on Sustainable Development; invites preference-giving countries to continue to improve and renew their Generalized System of Preferences schemes with the objective of integrating developing countries into the international trading system; encourages UNCTAD to further promote South-South cooperation; and asks the Secretary General of UNCTAD to submit a proposal on savings resulting from improved overall cost-effectiveness achieved, including restructuring of the inter-governmental machinery and reform of the Secretariat.

This resolution, because it concerns the future of UNCTAD, the UN role in multilateral trade policy, and implications of the Uruguay Round trade agreements, was of great importance to the United States. It was possible to join consensus on the resolution because it focuses adequately on UNCTAD reform, supports the role of the WTO, affirms the

primary responsibility of developing countries for their own sustainable development, and recognizes the importance of an open multilateral trading system.

9. Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions

A/Res/51/191 December 16

Adopts the UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions annexed to the resolution; invites member states to take appropriate measures and cooperate at all levels to combat corruption and bribery in international commercial transactions; asks UN system bodies, including the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, to take action as appropriate within their mandates to promote the objectives of this resolution and the annexed Declaration; and encourages private and public corporations and individuals engaged in international commercial transactions to cooperate in implementation of the Declaration. The Declaration includes a commitment to take effective and concrete action to combat all forms of corruption, bribery, and related illicit practices in international commercial transactions; to criminalize such bribery of foreign public officials, with bribery defined as either the giving or the receiving of any payment, gift, or other advantage as undue consideration for performing or refraining from the performance of an official's duty; to deny the tax deductibility of bribes paid; to cooperate and assist with criminal investigations of corruption and bribery, including providing documents, information about proceedings, and extradition where appropriate; and to ensure that bank secrecy provisions do not hinder criminal investigations relating to corruption, bribery, or related illicit practices.

The United States strongly supported this resolution as part of a high-priority effort to implement President Clinton's anti-crime, anti-corruption initiative. Approval of the Declaration sends a strong message that member states are committed to the battle against bribery in commercial transactions. It provides an impetus to the effort to criminalize such activity.

10. Strengthening Coordination of UN Emergency Humanitarian Aid

A/Res/51/194 December 17

Encourages member states to help promote development and strengthening of cooperation among organizations and programs of the UN system in order to improve the system-wide capability for a quick and coordinated response to complex humanitarian emergencies and

natural disasters; calls upon the Secretary General to ensure that the Inter-Agency Standing Committee develop options and proposals to further define operational responsibilities, identify cooperative arrangements, and strengthen priority setting and formulation of coherent strategies; asks the Secretary General to recommend ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund; asks the Secretariat to further develop Reliefweb as the global humanitarian information system for dissemination of reliable and timely information on emergencies and natural disasters, and encourages support for and participation in the Reliefweb information exchange; encourages the Secretariat to further develop the Humanitarian Early Warning System, and to make it fully operational as soon as possible; calls upon the UN system to strengthen accountability in humanitarian assistance, in particular through improved monitoring and evaluation, to ensure that common methodologies are developed for data collection, situation analyses, and needs assessments to provide an effective and timely response, and clearer arrangements are made for system-wide evaluation, and that lessons learned are systematically applied at the operational level and for the planning stage.

The United States cosponsored this resolution. It reaffirms the obligations of states receiving assistance to protect the rights of humanitarian workers and to facilitate access to affected populations; it reaffirms the need for improved accountability; and it contains recommendations for improved coordination and cooperation.

11. Appointment of Secretary General

A/Res/51/200 December 17

Appoints Mr. Kofi Annan Secretary General of the United Nations for a term of office beginning on January 1, 1997, and ending on December 31, 2001.

The U.S. Government supported election of a new Secretary General, one who was committed to UN reform and who possessed both leadership abilities and management and administrative skills.

12. Establishment of an International Criminal Court

A/Res/51/207 December 17

Decides to reaffirm the mandate of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court and directs it to proceed in accordance with its report; also decides that the Preparatory Committee will meet in 1997 and 1998 to complete the drafting of the text of a convention, to be submitted to a diplomatic conference; and

decides that a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries will be held in 1998, with a view to finalizing and adopting a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court, subject to review of its decision at the 52nd session of the General Assembly.

The United States has participated actively in meetings at the United Nations on establishment of an international criminal court, and would support a court that is fair and effective, does not impair U.S. law enforcement and military justice interests, and meets all relevant standards of due process.

13. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

A/Res/51/210 December 17

Strongly condemns all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed, and whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them; calls upon states to prevent terrorism and to strengthen cooperation in combatting terrorism; reiterates the call on states to refrain from financing, encouraging, training, or otherwise supporting terrorist activities; urges states to become parties to conventions related to terrorism; approves the annexed Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism; and decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate an international convention for suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism. The annexed Declaration reaffirms condemnation of terrorism, reaffirms that states should ensure that asylum-seekers have not participated in terrorist acts before granting them refugee status and should ensure that refugee status is not used to prepare or organize terrorist acts against other states, that persons awaiting processing of asylum applications may not thereby avoid prosecution for terrorist acts, that states commit themselves to work together to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism, including by facilitating extradition of suspected terrorists and sharing information about terrorists, their movements, their support and weapons, and their investigation and prosecution.

The United States supported this resolution, which includes the U.S. initiative to establish an ad hoc committee to develop the text of a convention on terrorist bombings. This convention will fill a gap in the counter-terrorism regime. The U.S. delegation successfully deflected attempts to exempt national liberation groups from condemnation for terrorist acts.

14. UN Common System

A/Res/51/216 December 18

Reconfirms the continued application of the Noblemaire principle; takes note of the steps taken by the International Civil Service Commission to identify the highest paid national civil service; decides that the net remuneration methodology without the modifications in the Commission's 21st annual report should continue to apply; approves the revised scale of gross and net salaries for staff contained in Annex I of this resolution; asks the Secretary General to make proposals on introducing a system of performance awards; asks the Secretary General and heads of organizations of the common system to end the practice of some states of making supplementary payments to their nationals, and invites member states to discontinue such practices; asks the Commission to review all issues relating to the post adjustment system; approves an increase of 7.98% in the children's allowance; asks the Commission to submit a report to the 52nd session of the General Assembly on its review of the methodology for salary setting for locally recruited staff; approves the revised staff assessment scale recommended by the Commission; takes note of the Commission's intention to undertake in 1997 a review of the methodology for determining the education grant; calls upon the Board of Auditors to conduct a management review of the work of the secretariat of the Commission; and asks the Commission to take the lead in analyzing new approaches in the human resources management field so as to develop standards, methods, and arrangements that will respond to the needs of the organizations of the common system.

This resolution accepted some of the recommendations of the Commission in its annual report, but, importantly, rejected its new methodology for determining the margin and a 4.1% real increase in professional and other staff salaries. Nevertheless, the resolution grants a 0.4% real increase.

15. Budget Outline for 1998-1999

A/Res/51/220 December 18

Invites the Secretary General to prepare his proposed program budget for 1998-1999 on the basis of a total preliminary estimate of \$2.480 billion at revised 1996-1997 rates; decides that the contingency fund shall be set at the level of 0.75% of the preliminary estimate at 1998-1999 rates, namely at \$19 million; decides that the proposed program budget shall contain provisions for recosting on the basis of the existing methodology; and decides that the priorities for the biennium

are maintenance of international peace, promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development, development of Africa, promotion of human rights, effective coordination of humanitarian assistance efforts, promotion of justice and international law, disarmament, drug control, crime prevention, and combatting international terrorism.

Adoption of this resolution was a positive step in the effort to contain budget growth in the United Nations.

16. Revised Estimates for 1996-1997 Budget

A/Res/51/222 December 18

Resolves that for the biennium 1996-1997 the appropriated amount of \$2,608,274,000 shall be adjusted by \$4,993,100, providing a revised appropriation of \$2,603,280,900.

The United States joined consensus on this resolution, which reflects a reduction of nearly \$5 million from the initial budget approved in December 1995, putting the budget for the biennium at \$2.603 billion. The reduction was attributable largely to favorable exchange rates for the U.S. dollar and to UN efforts in reducing operating costs. A major U.S. goal was to keep the budget within the \$2.608 billion previously agreed upon. Due to the exchange rate gains and other savings, the United Nations was able to offset a number of budget add-ons, including special missions of importance to the United States in Haiti and Central America, without exceeding the budget cap.

COMPARISON WITH U.S. VOTES

The tables which follow summarize UN member performance at the 51st UNGA in comparison with the United States on the 12 important votes. In these tables, "Identical Votes" is the total number of times the United States and the listed state both voted Yes or No on these issues. "Opposite Votes" is the total number of times the United States voted Yes and the listed state No, or the United States voted No and the listed state Yes. "Abstentions" and "Absences" are totals for the country being compared on these 12 votes. "Voting Coincidence" is calculated by dividing the number of identical votes by the total of identical and opposite votes. The column headed "Voting Coincidence (Including Consensus)"—which is new with this report—presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including the 16 important consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. The extent of participation was also factored in. (See the section on format and methodology in the Introduction.)

The first table lists all UN member states in alphabetical order. The second lists them by identical votes in descending order; those states with the same number of identical votes are further ranked by the number of opposite votes in ascending order. Countries with the same number of both identical votes and opposite votes are listed alphabetically. Subsequent tables are comparisons of UN members by regional and other groupings to which they belong, again ranked in descending order of identical votes.

All Countries (Alphabetical)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Afghanistan	4	6	2	0	73.8%	40.0%
Albania	8	2	2	0	91.7%	80.0%
Algeria	5	4	3	0	83.4%	55.6%
Andorra	8	2	2	0	92.2%	80.0%
Angola	5	5	2	0	79.1%	50.0%
Antigua and Barbuda	7	3	1	1	88.0%	70.0%
Argentina	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Armenia	6	3	2	1	87.3%	66.7%
Australia	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Austria	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Azerbaijan	5	2	2	3	90.4%	71.4%
Bahamas	7	3	1	1	88.2%	70.0%
Bahrain	4	2	4	2	90.5%	66.7%
Bangladesh	3	4	3	2	81.6%	42.9%
Barbados	7	3	2	0	87.5%	70.0%
Belarus	4	2	6	0	90.9%	66.7%
Belgium	8	2	1	1	92.3%	80.0%
Belize	7	3	2	0	88.0%	70.0%
Benin	4	3	5	0	86.9%	57.1%
Bhutan	4	3	5	0	86.1%	57.1%
Bolivia	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Bosnia-Herzegovina.	6	2	1	3	90.9%	75.0%
Botswana	6	4	2	0	84.4%	60.0%
Brazil	7	3	2	0	88.3%	70.0%
Brunei Darussalam ..	4	4	4	0	83.3%	50.0%
Bulgaria	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Burkina Faso	3	4	5	0	82.2%	42.9%
Burundi	2	4	5	1	80.6%	33.3%
Cambodia	5	4	3	0	83.5%	55.6%
Cameroon	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Canada	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Cape Verde	4	3	4	1	85.1%	57.1%
Central African Rep.	0	0	0	12	*	*
Chad	3	3	4	2	84.7%	50.0%

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Chile	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
China	2	7	3	0	71.2%	22.2%
Colombia	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%
Comoros	1	1	0	10	77.3%	50.0%
Congo	3	2	5	2	88.6%	60.0%
Costa Rica	6	3	1	2	86.6%	66.7%
Cote d'Ivoire	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Croatia	7	1	2	2	95.6%	87.5%
Cuba	1	7	4	0	69.1%	12.5%
Cyprus	7	2	3	0	92.0%	77.8%
Czech Republic	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
DPR of Korea	0	6	2	4	68.3%	0.0%
Denmark	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Djibouti	4	2	0	6	89.5%	66.7%
Dominica	7	3	1	1	86.2%	70.0%
Dominican Republic	4	2	1	5	82.1%	66.7%
Ecuador	7	3	2	0	88.2%	70.0%
Egypt	4	3	4	1	86.7%	57.1%
El Salvador	8	2	1	1	91.8%	80.0%
Equatorial Guinea ...	2	2	5	3	84.3%	50.0%
Eritrea	3	3	4	2	83.2%	50.0%
Estonia	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
Ethiopia	4	3	4	1	85.8%	57.1%
Fiji	4	3	5	0	86.9%	57.1%
Finland	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
France	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Gabon	3	2	5	2	88.5%	60.0%
Gambia	4	5	1	2	77.2%	44.4%
Georgia	6	0	4	2	100.0%	100.0%
Germany	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Ghana	3	6	3	0	75.8%	33.3%
Greece	2	1	1	8	80.9%	66.7%
Grenada	7	3	1	1	87.8%	70.0%
Guatemala	6	2	2	2	90.7%	75.0%
Guinea	3	4	5	0	81.8%	42.9%
Guinea-Bissau	4	4	4	0	81.3%	50.0%
Guyana	7	4	1	0	84.9%	63.6%
Haiti	7	3	1	1	88.0%	70.0%
Honduras	8	3	0	1	88.6%	72.7%
Hungary	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Iceland	8	2	1	1	92.2%	80.0%
India	2	8	2	0	69.2%	20.0%
Indonesia	4	7	1	0	73.6%	36.4%
Iran	2	8	0	2	67.3%	20.0%
Iraq	0	0	0	12	*	*
Ireland	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Israel	10	0	2	0	100.0%	100.0%

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Italy	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Jamaica	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Japan	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Jordan	4	4	4	0	82.7%	50.0%
Kazakstan	6	2	4	0	91.6%	75.0%
Kenya	3	3	6	0	86.4%	50.0%
Kuwait	6	2	3	1	91.5%	75.0%
Kyrgyzstan	4	1	7	0	94.5%	80.0%
Laos	2	5	3	2	74.9%	28.6%
Latvia	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
Lebanon	2	5	5	0	76.7%	28.6%
Lesotho	3	4	0	5	73.8%	42.9%
Liberia	1	2	6	3	87.4%	33.3%
Libya	1	9	1	1	64.4%	10.0%
Liechtenstein	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Lithuania	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
Luxembourg	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Madagascar	3	3	0	6	83.7%	50.0%
Malawi	5	3	1	3	86.8%	62.5%
Malaysia	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Maldives	5	4	2	1	83.5%	55.6%
Mali	1	4	5	2	77.4%	20.0%
Malta	8	3	1	0	88.6%	72.7%
Marshall Islands	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Mauritania	3	3	4	2	80.2%	50.0%
Mauritius	7	3	2	0	87.7%	70.0%
Mexico	7	4	1	0	85.2%	63.6%
Micronesia	7	1	3	1	95.7%	87.5%
Moldova	7	0	5	0	100.0%	100.0%
Monaco	9	2	1	0	92.1%	81.8%
Mongolia	7	3	2	0	87.9%	70.0%
Morocco	4	3	4	1	86.3%	57.1%
Mozambique	4	4	3	1	79.3%	50.0%
Myanmar	4	7	1	0	74.1%	36.4%
Namibia	4	5	3	0	77.2%	44.4%
Nepal	4	2	6	0	90.9%	66.7%
Netherlands	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
New Zealand	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Nicaragua	7	3	0	2	87.2%	70.0%
Niger	3	4	3	2	81.5%	42.9%
Nigeria	3	6	2	1	75.7%	33.3%
Norway	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Oman	4	4	3	1	82.5%	50.0%
Pakistan	3	6	3	0	76.0%	33.3%
Palau	5	0	2	5	100.0%	100.0%
Panama	5	3	4	0	87.5%	62.5%
Papua New Guinea	2	3	4	3	80.0%	40.0%

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Paraguay	8	3	1	0	88.3%	72.7%
Peru	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Philippines	4	3	4	1	86.9%	57.1%
Poland	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Portugal	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Qatar	4	4	1	3	82.6%	50.0%
Republic of Korea ...	5	1	6	0	95.5%	83.3%
Romania	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Russia	6	4	2	0	84.5%	60.0%
Rwanda	1	0	1	10	100.0%	100.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis ...	6	3	1	2	85.9%	66.7%
St. Lucia	7	3	1	1	88.3%	70.0%
St. Vincent-Gren.	6	3	1	2	81.5%	66.7%
Samoa	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
San Marino	8	4	0	0	85.4%	66.7%
Sao Tome/Principe .	0	0	0	12	*	*
Saudi Arabia	5	3	3	1	87.1%	62.5%
Senegal	5	1	4	2	95.2%	83.3%
Seychelles	1	2	0	9	79.0%	33.3%
Sierra Leone	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Singapore	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%
Slovak Republic	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Slovenia	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Solomon Islands	7	3	2	0	88.3%	70.0%
Somalia	0	0	0	12	*	*
South Africa	6	4	1	1	84.4%	60.0%
Spain	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Sri Lanka	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Sudan	3	8	1	0	70.0%	27.3%
Suriname	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Swaziland	5	3	3	1	86.7%	62.5%
Sweden	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Syria	1	8	3	0	65.6%	11.1%
Tajikistan	3	0	3	6	100.0%	100.0%
Thailand	4	4	4	0	83.1%	50.0%
TFYR Macedonia	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Togo	3	2	7	0	90.4%	60.0%
Trinidad/Tobago	7	3	2	0	87.9%	70.0%
Tunisia	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Turkey	7	4	1	0	85.1%	63.6%
Turkmenistan	1	2	0	9	54.3%	33.3%
Uganda	4	5	3	0	79.6%	44.4%
Ukraine	6	2	3	1	91.6%	75.0%
United Arab Emir.	4	2	5	1	90.5%	66.7%
United Kingdom	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
UR Tanzania	3	5	4	0	78.9%	37.5%
Uruguay	8	3	0	1	88.8%	72.7%

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Uzbekistan	8	0	2	2	100.0%	100.0%
Vanuatu	8	3	0	1	88.4%	72.7%
Venezuela	7	4	1	0	85.2%	63.6%
Vietnam	2	7	1	2	69.2%	22.2%
Yemen	3	4	0	5	80.4%	42.9%
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	12	*	*
Zaire	1	2	5	4	64.2%	33.3%
Zambia	5	5	1	1	80.4%	50.0%
Zimbabwe	4	5	3	0	79.9%	44.4%
Average	5.3	3.0	2.4	1.4	86.5%	63.9%

All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Israel	10	0	2	0	100.0%	100.0%
Canada	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Czech Republic	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
France	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Germany	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Hungary	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Italy	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Luxembourg	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Monaco	9	2	1	0	92.1%	81.8%
Netherlands	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Poland	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Portugal	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Romania	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Slovak Republic	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Slovenia	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Spain	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
United Kingdom	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Estonia	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
Latvia	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
Lithuania	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
Uzbekistan	8	0	2	2	100.0%	100.0%
Argentina	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Japan	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Marshall Islands	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Norway	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
TFYR Macedonia	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Albania	8	2	2	0	91.7%	80.0%
Andorra	8	2	2	0	92.2%	80.0%

All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Australia	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Austria	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Belgium	8	2	1	1	92.3%	80.0%
Bulgaria	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Denmark	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
El Salvador	8	2	1	1	91.8%	80.0%
Finland	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Iceland	8	2	1	1	92.2%	80.0%
Liechtenstein	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Chile	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Honduras	8	3	0	1	88.6%	72.7%
Ireland	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Malta	8	3	1	0	88.6%	72.7%
New Zealand	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Paraguay	8	3	1	0	88.3%	72.7%
Samoa	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Sweden	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Uruguay	8	3	0	1	88.8%	72.7%
Vanuatu	8	3	0	1	88.4%	72.7%
San Marino	8	4	0	0	85.4%	66.7%
Moldova	7	0	5	0	100.0%	100.0%
Croatia	7	1	2	2	95.6%	87.5%
Micronesia	7	1	3	1	95.7%	87.5%
Cyprus	7	2	3	0	92.0%	77.8%
Antigua/Barbuda	7	3	1	1	88.0%	70.0%
Bahamas	7	3	1	1	88.2%	70.0%
Barbados	7	3	2	0	87.5%	70.0%
Belize	7	3	2	0	88.0%	70.0%
Bolivia	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Brazil	7	3	2	0	88.3%	70.0%
Dominica	7	3	1	1	86.2%	70.0%
Ecuador	7	3	2	0	88.2%	70.0%
Grenada	7	3	1	1	87.8%	70.0%
Haiti	7	3	1	1	88.0%	70.0%
Jamaica	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Mauritius	7	3	2	0	87.7%	70.0%
Mongolia	7	3	2	0	87.9%	70.0%
Nicaragua	7	3	0	2	87.2%	70.0%
Peru	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
St. Lucia	7	3	1	1	88.3%	70.0%
Solomon Islands	7	3	2	0	88.3%	70.0%
Suriname	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Trinidad/Tobago	7	3	2	0	87.9%	70.0%
Guyana	7	4	1	0	84.9%	63.6%
Mexico	7	4	1	0	85.2%	63.6%
Turkey	7	4	1	0	85.1%	63.6%
Venezuela	7	4	1	0	85.2%	63.6%

All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENSES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Georgia	6	0	4	2	100.0%	100.0%
Bosnia/Herzegovina	6	2	1	3	90.9%	75.0%
Guatemala	6	2	2	2	90.7%	75.0%
Kazakstan	6	2	4	0	91.6%	75.0%
Kuwait	6	2	3	1	91.5%	75.0%
Ukraine	6	2	3	1	91.6%	75.0%
Armenia	6	3	2	1	87.3%	66.7%
Costa Rica	6	3	1	2	86.6%	66.7%
St. Kitts and Nevis ...	6	3	1	2	85.9%	66.7%
St. Vincent/Gren.	6	3	1	2	81.5%	66.7%
Botswana	6	4	2	0	84.4%	60.0%
Russia	6	4	2	0	84.5%	60.0%
South Africa	6	4	1	1	84.4%	60.0%
Palau	5	0	2	5	100.0%	100.0%
Rep. of Korea	5	1	6	0	95.5%	83.3%
Senegal	5	1	4	2	95.2%	83.3%
Azerbaijan	5	2	2	3	90.4%	71.4%
Malawi	5	3	1	3	86.8%	62.5%
Panama	5	3	4	0	87.5%	62.5%
Saudi Arabia	5	3	3	1	87.1%	62.5%
Swaziland	5	3	3	1	86.7%	62.5%
Algeria	5	4	3	0	83.4%	55.6%
Cambodia	5	4	3	0	83.5%	55.6%
Colombia	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%
Maldives	5	4	2	1	83.5%	55.6%
Singapore	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%
Angola	5	5	2	0	79.1%	50.0%
Zambia	5	5	1	1	80.4%	50.0%
Kyrgyzstan	4	1	7	0	94.5%	80.0%
Bahrain	4	2	4	2	90.5%	66.7%
Belarus	4	2	6	0	90.9%	66.7%
Djibouti	4	2	0	6	89.5%	66.7%
Dominican Republic	4	2	1	5	82.1%	66.7%
Nepal	4	2	6	0	90.9%	66.7%
United Arab Emir.	4	2	5	1	90.5%	66.7%
Benin	4	3	5	0	86.9%	57.1%
Bhutan	4	3	5	0	86.1%	57.1%
Cape Verde	4	3	4	1	85.1%	57.1%
Egypt	4	3	4	1	86.7%	57.1%
Ethiopia	4	3	4	1	85.8%	57.1%
Fiji	4	3	5	0	86.9%	57.1%
Morocco	4	3	4	1	86.3%	57.1%
Philippines	4	3	4	1	86.9%	57.1%
Brunei Darussalam .	4	4	4	0	83.3%	50.0%
Guinea-Bissau	4	4	4	0	81.3%	50.0%
Jordan	4	4	4	0	82.7%	50.0%
Mozambique	4	4	3	1	79.3%	50.0%

All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Oman	4	4	3	1	82.5%	50.0%
Qatar	4	4	1	3	82.6%	50.0%
Sierra Leone	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Thailand	4	4	4	0	83.1%	50.0%
Tunisia	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Gambia	4	5	1	2	77.2%	44.4%
Malaysia	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Namibia	4	5	3	0	77.2%	44.4%
Sri Lanka	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Uganda	4	5	3	0	79.6%	44.4%
Zimbabwe	4	5	3	0	79.9%	44.4%
Afghanistan	4	6	2	0	73.8%	40.0%
Indonesia	4	7	1	0	73.6%	36.4%
Myanmar	4	7	1	0	74.1%	36.4%
Tajikistan	3	0	3	6	100.0%	100.0%
Congo	3	2	5	2	88.6%	60.0%
Gabon	3	2	5	2	88.5%	60.0%
Togo	3	2	7	0	90.4%	60.0%
Cameroon	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Chad	3	3	4	2	84.7%	50.0%
Cote d'Ivoire	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Eritrea	3	3	4	2	83.2%	50.0%
Kenya	3	3	6	0	86.4%	50.0%
Madagascar	3	3	0	6	83.7%	50.0%
Mauritania	3	3	4	2	80.2%	50.0%
Bangladesh	3	4	3	2	81.6%	42.9%
Burkina Faso	3	4	5	0	82.2%	42.9%
Guinea	3	4	5	0	81.8%	42.9%
Lesotho	3	4	0	5	73.8%	42.9%
Niger	3	4	3	2	81.5%	42.9%
Yemen	3	4	0	5	80.4%	42.9%
UR Tanzania	3	5	4	0	78.9%	37.5%
Ghana	3	6	3	0	75.8%	33.3%
Nigeria	3	6	2	1	75.7%	33.3%
Pakistan	3	6	3	0	76.0%	33.3%
Sudan	3	8	1	0	70.0%	27.3%
Greece	2	1	1	8	80.9%	66.7%
Equatorial Guinea ...	2	2	5	3	84.3%	50.0%
Papua New Guinea .	2	3	4	3	80.0%	40.0%
Burundi	2	4	5	1	80.6%	33.3%
Laos	2	5	3	2	74.9%	28.6%
Lebanon	2	5	5	0	76.7%	28.6%
China	2	7	3	0	71.2%	22.2%
Vietnam	2	7	1	2	69.2%	22.2%
India	2	8	2	0	69.2%	20.0%
Iran	2	8	0	2	67.3%	20.0%
Rwanda	1	0	1	10	100.0%	100.0%

All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Comoros	1	1	0	10	77.3%	50.0%
Liberia	1	2	6	3	87.4%	33.3%
Seychelles	1	2	0	9	79.0%	33.3%
Turkmenistan	1	2	0	9	54.3%	33.3%
Zaire	1	2	5	4	64.2%	33.3%
Mali	1	4	5	2	77.4%	20.0%
Cuba	1	7	4	0	69.1%	12.5%
Syria	1	8	3	0	65.6%	11.1%
Libya	1	9	1	1	64.4%	10.0%
Central African Rep.	0	0	0	12	*	*
Iraq	0	0	0	12	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe .	0	0	0	12	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	12	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	12	*	*
DPR of Korea	0	6	2	4	68.3%	0.0%
Average	5.3	3.0	2.4	1.4	86.5%	63.9%

UN REGIONAL GROUPS

The following tables show the voting coincidence percentage with U.S. votes on the 12 important votes. They list countries by UN regional groups.

African Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Mauritius	7	3	2	0	87.7%	70.0%
Botswana	6	4	2	0	84.4%	60.0%
South Africa	6	4	1	1	84.4%	60.0%
Senegal	5	1	4	2	95.2%	83.3%
Malawi	5	3	1	3	86.8%	62.5%
Swaziland	5	3	3	1	86.7%	62.5%
Algeria	5	4	3	0	83.4%	55.6%
Angola	5	5	2	0	79.1%	50.0%
Zambia	5	5	1	1	80.4%	50.0%
Djibouti	4	2	0	6	89.5%	66.7%
Benin	4	3	5	0	86.9%	57.1%
Cape Verde	4	3	4	1	85.1%	57.1%

African Group (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Egypt	4	3	4	1	86.7%	57.1%
Ethiopia	4	3	4	1	85.8%	57.1%
Morocco	4	3	4	1	86.3%	57.1%
Guinea-Bissau	4	4	4	0	81.3%	50.0%
Mozambique	4	4	3	1	79.3%	50.0%
Sierra Leone	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Tunisia	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Gambia	4	5	1	2	77.2%	44.4%
Namibia	4	5	3	0	77.2%	44.4%
Uganda	4	5	3	0	79.6%	44.4%
Zimbabwe	4	5	3	0	79.9%	44.4%
Congo	3	2	5	2	88.6%	60.0%
Gabon	3	2	5	2	88.5%	60.0%
Togo	3	2	7	0	90.4%	60.0%
Cameroon	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Chad	3	3	4	2	84.7%	50.0%
Cote d'Ivoire	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Eritrea	3	3	4	2	83.2%	50.0%
Kenya	3	3	6	0	86.4%	50.0%
Madagascar	3	3	0	6	83.7%	50.0%
Mauritania	3	3	4	2	80.2%	50.0%
Burkina Faso	3	4	5	0	82.2%	42.9%
Guinea	3	4	5	0	81.8%	42.9%
Lesotho	3	4	0	5	73.8%	42.9%
Niger	3	4	3	2	81.5%	42.9%
UR Tanzania	3	5	4	0	78.9%	37.5%
Ghana	3	6	3	0	75.8%	33.3%
Nigeria	3	6	2	1	75.7%	33.3%
Sudan	3	8	1	0	70.0%	27.3%
Equatorial Guinea ...	2	2	5	3	84.3%	50.0%
Burundi	2	4	5	1	80.6%	33.3%
Rwanda	1	0	1	10	100.0%	100.0%
Comoros	1	1	0	10	77.3%	50.0%
Liberia	1	2	6	3	87.4%	33.3%
Seychelles	1	2	0	9	79.0%	33.3%
Zaire	1	2	5	4	64.2%	33.3%
Mali	1	4	5	2	77.4%	20.0%
Libya	1	9	1	1	64.4%	10.0%
Central African Rep.	0	0	0	12	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe .	0	0	0	12	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	12	*	*
Average	3.2	3.4	3.0	2.4	82.6%	48.7%

Asian Group

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN-TIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Uzbekistan	8	0	2	2	100.0%	100.0%
Japan	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Marshall Islands	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Samoa	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Vanuatu	8	3	0	1	88.4%	72.7%
Micronesia	7	1	3	1	95.7%	87.5%
Cyprus	7	2	3	0	92.0%	77.8%
Mongolia	7	3	2	0	87.9%	70.0%
Solomon Islands	7	3	2	0	88.3%	70.0%
Kazakstan	6	2	4	0	91.6%	75.0%
Kuwait	6	2	3	1	91.5%	75.0%
Palau	5	0	2	5	100.0%	100.0%
Republic of Korea ...	5	1	6	0	95.5%	83.3%
Saudi Arabia	5	3	3	1	87.1%	62.5%
Cambodia	5	4	3	0	83.5%	55.6%
Maldives	5	4	2	1	83.5%	55.6%
Singapore	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%
Kyrgyzstan	4	1	7	0	94.5%	80.0%
Bahrain	4	2	4	2	90.5%	66.7%
Nepal	4	2	6	0	90.9%	66.7%
United Arab Emir.	4	2	5	1	90.5%	66.7%
Bhutan	4	3	5	0	86.1%	57.1%
Fiji	4	3	5	0	86.9%	57.1%
Philippines	4	3	4	1	86.9%	57.1%
Brunei Darussalam .	4	4	4	0	83.3%	50.0%
Jordan	4	4	4	0	82.7%	50.0%
Oman	4	4	3	1	82.5%	50.0%
Qatar	4	4	1	3	82.6%	50.0%
Thailand	4	4	4	0	83.1%	50.0%
Malaysia	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Sri Lanka	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Afghanistan	4	6	2	0	73.8%	40.0%
Indonesia	4	7	1	0	73.6%	36.4%
Myanmar	4	7	1	0	74.1%	36.4%
Tajikistan	3	0	3	6	100.0%	100.0%
Bangladesh	3	4	3	2	81.6%	42.9%
Yemen	3	4	0	5	80.4%	42.9%
Pakistan	3	6	3	0	76.0%	33.3%
Papua New Guinea .	2	3	4	3	80.0%	40.0%
Laos	2	5	3	2	74.9%	28.6%
Lebanon	2	5	5	0	76.7%	28.6%
China	2	7	3	0	71.2%	22.2%
Vietnam	2	7	1	2	69.2%	22.2%
India	2	8	2	0	69.2%	20.0%
Iran	2	8	0	2	67.3%	20.0%
Turkmenistan	1	2	0	9	54.3%	33.3%
Syria	1	8	3	0	65.6%	11.1%

Asian Group (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Iraq	0	0	0	12	*	*
DPR of Korea	0	6	2	4	68.3%	0.0%
Average	4.2	3.6	2.8	1.4	83.7%	53.9%

Latin American and Caribbean Group (LAC)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Argentina	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
El Salvador	8	2	1	1	91.8%	80.0%
Chile	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Honduras	8	3	0	1	88.6%	72.7%
Paraguay	8	3	1	0	88.3%	72.7%
Uruguay	8	3	0	1	88.8%	72.7%
Antigua/Barbuda	7	3	1	1	88.0%	70.0%
Bahamas	7	3	1	1	88.2%	70.0%
Barbados	7	3	2	0	87.5%	70.0%
Belize	7	3	2	0	88.0%	70.0%
Bolivia	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Brazil	7	3	2	0	88.3%	70.0%
Dominica	7	3	1	1	86.2%	70.0%
Ecuador	7	3	2	0	88.2%	70.0%
Grenada	7	3	1	1	87.8%	70.0%
Haiti	7	3	1	1	88.0%	70.0%
Jamaica	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Nicaragua	7	3	0	2	87.2%	70.0%
Peru	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
St. Lucia	7	3	1	1	88.3%	70.0%
Suriname	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Trinidad/Tobago	7	3	2	0	87.9%	70.0%
Guyana	7	4	1	0	84.9%	63.6%
Mexico	7	4	1	0	85.2%	63.6%
Venezuela	7	4	1	0	85.2%	63.6%
Guatemala	6	2	2	2	90.7%	75.0%
Costa Rica	6	3	1	2	86.6%	66.7%
St. Kitts and Nevis ...	6	3	1	2	85.9%	66.7%
St. Vincent/Gren.	6	3	1	2	81.5%	66.7%
Panama	5	3	4	0	87.5%	62.5%
Colombia	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%
Dominican Republic	4	2	1	5	82.1%	66.7%
Cuba	1	7	4	0	69.1%	12.5%
Average	6.7	3.1	1.5	0.7	87.4%	68.3%

Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Canada	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
France	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Germany	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Italy	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Luxembourg	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Monaco	9	2	1	0	92.1%	81.8%
Netherlands	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Portugal	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Spain	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
United Kingdom	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Norway	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Andorra	8	2	2	0	92.2%	80.0%
Australia	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Austria	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Belgium	8	2	1	1	92.3%	80.0%
Denmark	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Finland	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Iceland	8	2	1	1	92.2%	80.0%
Liechtenstein	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Ireland	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Malta	8	3	1	0	88.6%	72.7%
New Zealand	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Sweden	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
San Marino	8	4	0	0	85.4%	66.7%
Turkey	7	4	1	0	85.1%	63.6%
Greece	2	1	1	8	80.9%	66.7%
Average	8.1	2.2	1.3	0.4	91.3%	78.4%

Eastern European Group (EE)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Czech Republic	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Hungary	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Poland	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Romania	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Slovak Republic	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Slovenia	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Estonia	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
Latvia	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
Lithuania	8	0	4	0	100.0%	100.0%
TFYR Macedonia	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Albania	8	2	2	0	91.7%	80.0%

Eastern European Group (EE) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Bulgaria	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Moldova	7	0	5	0	100.0%	100.0%
Croatia	7	1	2	2	95.6%	87.5%
Georgia	6	0	4	2	100.0%	100.0%
Bosnia/Herzegovina	6	2	1	3	90.9%	75.0%
Ukraine	6	2	3	1	91.6%	75.0%
Armenia	6	3	2	1	87.3%	66.7%
Russia	6	4	2	0	84.5%	60.0%
Azerbaijan	5	2	2	3	90.4%	71.4%
Belarus	4	2	6	0	90.9%	66.7%
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	12	*	*
Average	7.0	1.5	2.4	1.1	93.6%	82.4%

OTHER GROUPINGS

The following tables show percentage of coincidence with U.S. votes for other major groups, in rank order by identical votes.

Arab Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Kuwait	6	2	3	1	91.5%	75.0%
Saudi Arabia	5	3	3	1	87.1%	62.5%
Algeria	5	4	3	0	83.4%	55.6%
Bahrain	4	2	4	2	90.5%	66.7%
Djibouti	4	2	0	6	89.5%	66.7%
United Arab Emir.	4	2	5	1	90.5%	66.7%
Egypt	4	3	4	1	86.7%	57.1%
Morocco	4	3	4	1	86.3%	57.1%
Jordan	4	4	4	0	82.7%	50.0%
Oman	4	4	3	1	82.5%	50.0%
Qatar	4	4	1	3	82.6%	50.0%
Tunisia	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Mauritania	3	3	4	2	80.2%	50.0%
Yemen	3	4	0	5	80.4%	42.9%
Sudan	3	8	1	0	70.0%	27.3%
Lebanon	2	5	5	0	76.7%	28.6%
Syria	1	8	3	0	65.6%	11.1%
Libya	1	9	1	1	64.4%	10.0%

Arab Group (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Iraq	0	0	0	12	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	12	*	*
Average	3.3	3.7	2.6	2.5	81.7%	46.8%

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Singapore	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%
Philippines	4	3	4	1	86.9%	57.1%
Brunei Darussalam .	4	4	4	0	83.3%	50.0%
Thailand	4	4	4	0	83.1%	50.0%
Malaysia	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Indonesia	4	7	1	0	73.6%	36.4%
Average	4.2	4.5	3.2	0.2	81.6%	48.1%

European Union (EU)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
France	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Germany	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Italy	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Luxembourg	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Netherlands	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Portugal	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Spain	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
United Kingdom	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Austria	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Belgium	8	2	1	1	92.3%	80.0%
Denmark	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Finland	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Ireland	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Sweden	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Greece	2	1	1	8	80.9%	66.7%
Average	8.1	2.1	1.2	0.6	91.8%	79.7%

Islamic Conference (OIC)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Uzbekistan	8	0	2	2	100.0%	100.0%
Albania	8	2	2	0	91.7%	80.0%
Turkey	7	4	1	0	85.1%	63.6%
Kuwait	6	2	3	1	91.5%	75.0%
Senegal	5	1	4	2	95.2%	83.3%
Azerbaijan	5	2	2	3	90.4%	71.4%
Saudi Arabia	5	3	3	1	87.1%	62.5%
Algeria	5	4	3	0	83.4%	55.6%
Maldives	5	4	2	1	83.5%	55.6%
Kyrgyzstan	4	1	7	0	94.5%	80.0%
Bahrain	4	2	4	2	90.5%	66.7%
Djibouti	4	2	0	6	89.5%	66.7%
United Arab Emir.	4	2	5	1	90.5%	66.7%
Benin	4	3	5	0	86.9%	57.1%
Egypt	4	3	4	1	86.7%	57.1%
Morocco	4	3	4	1	86.3%	57.1%
Brunei Darussalam .	4	4	4	0	83.3%	50.0%
Guinea-Bissau	4	4	4	0	81.3%	50.0%
Jordan	4	4	4	0	82.7%	50.0%
Oman	4	4	3	1	82.5%	50.0%
Qatar	4	4	1	3	82.6%	50.0%
Sierra Leone	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Tunisia	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Gambia	4	5	1	2	77.2%	44.4%
Malaysia	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Uganda	4	5	3	0	79.6%	44.4%
Afghanistan	4	6	2	0	73.8%	40.0%
Indonesia	4	7	1	0	73.6%	36.4%
Tajikistan	3	0	3	6	100.0%	100.0%
Gabon	3	2	5	2	88.5%	60.0%
Cameroon	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Chad	3	3	4	2	84.7%	50.0%
Mauritania	3	3	4	2	80.2%	50.0%
Bangladesh	3	4	3	2	81.6%	42.9%
Burkina Faso	3	4	5	0	82.2%	42.9%
Guinea	3	4	5	0	81.8%	42.9%
Niger	3	4	3	2	81.5%	42.9%
Yemen	3	4	0	5	80.4%	42.9%
UR Tanzania	3	5	4	0	78.9%	37.5%
Nigeria	3	6	2	1	75.7%	33.3%
Pakistan	3	6	3	0	76.0%	33.3%
Sudan	3	8	1	0	70.0%	27.3%
Lebanon	2	5	5	0	76.7%	28.6%
Iran	2	8	0	2	67.3%	20.0%
Comoros	1	1	0	10	77.3%	50.0%
Turkmenistan	1	2	0	9	54.3%	33.3%
Mali	1	4	5	2	77.4%	20.0%
Syria	1	8	3	0	65.6%	11.1%

Islamic Conference (OIC) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Libya	1	9	1	1	64.4%	10.0%
Iraq	0	0	0	12	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	12	*	*
Average	3.5	3.7	2.9	1.9	82.4%	49.2%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Uzbekistan	8	0	2	2	100.0%	100.0%
Chile	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Honduras	8	3	0	1	88.6%	72.7%
Malta	8	3	1	0	88.6%	72.7%
Vanuatu	8	3	0	1	88.4%	72.7%
Cyprus	7	2	3	0	92.0%	77.8%
Bahamas	7	3	1	1	88.2%	70.0%
Barbados	7	3	2	0	87.5%	70.0%
Belize	7	3	2	0	88.0%	70.0%
Bolivia	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Ecuador	7	3	2	0	88.2%	70.0%
Grenada	7	3	1	1	87.8%	70.0%
Jamaica	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Mauritius	7	3	2	0	87.7%	70.0%
Mongolia	7	3	2	0	87.9%	70.0%
Nicaragua	7	3	0	2	87.2%	70.0%
Peru	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
St. Lucia	7	3	1	1	88.3%	70.0%
Suriname	7	3	2	0	88.5%	70.0%
Trinidad/Tobago	7	3	2	0	87.9%	70.0%
Guyana	7	4	1	0	84.9%	63.6%
Venezuela	7	4	1	0	85.2%	63.6%
Guatemala	6	2	2	2	90.7%	75.0%
Kuwait	6	2	3	1	91.5%	75.0%
Botswana	6	4	2	0	84.4%	60.0%
South Africa	6	4	1	1	84.4%	60.0%
Senegal	5	1	4	2	95.2%	83.3%
Malawi	5	3	1	3	86.8%	62.5%
Panama	5	3	4	0	87.5%	62.5%
Saudi Arabia	5	3	3	1	87.1%	62.5%
Swaziland	5	3	3	1	86.7%	62.5%
Algeria	5	4	3	0	83.4%	55.6%
Cambodia	5	4	3	0	83.5%	55.6%
Colombia	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Maldives	5	4	2	1	83.5%	55.6%
Singapore	5	4	3	0	83.9%	55.6%
Angola	5	5	2	0	79.1%	50.0%
Zambia	5	5	1	1	80.4%	50.0%
Bahrain	4	2	4	2	90.5%	66.7%
Djibouti	4	2	0	6	89.5%	66.7%
Nepal	4	2	6	0	90.9%	66.7%
United Arab Emir.	4	2	5	1	90.5%	66.7%
Benin	4	3	5	0	86.9%	57.1%
Bhutan	4	3	5	0	86.1%	57.1%
Cape Verde	4	3	4	1	85.1%	57.1%
Egypt	4	3	4	1	86.7%	57.1%
Ethiopia	4	3	4	1	85.8%	57.1%
Morocco	4	3	4	1	86.3%	57.1%
Philippines	4	3	4	1	86.9%	57.1%
Brunei Darussalam .	4	4	4	0	83.3%	50.0%
Guinea-Bissau	4	4	4	0	81.3%	50.0%
Jordan	4	4	4	0	82.7%	50.0%
Mozambique	4	4	3	1	79.3%	50.0%
Oman	4	4	3	1	82.5%	50.0%
Qatar	4	4	1	3	82.6%	50.0%
Sierra Leone	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Thailand	4	4	4	0	83.1%	50.0%
Tunisia	4	4	4	0	83.0%	50.0%
Gambia	4	5	1	2	77.2%	44.4%
Malaysia	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Namibia	4	5	3	0	77.2%	44.4%
Sri Lanka	4	5	3	0	80.0%	44.4%
Uganda	4	5	3	0	79.6%	44.4%
Zimbabwe	4	5	3	0	79.9%	44.4%
Afghanistan	4	6	2	0	73.8%	40.0%
Indonesia	4	7	1	0	73.6%	36.4%
Myanmar	4	7	1	0	74.1%	36.4%
Congo	3	2	5	2	88.6%	60.0%
Gabon	3	2	5	2	88.5%	60.0%
Togo	3	2	7	0	90.4%	60.0%
Cameroon	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Chad	3	3	4	2	84.7%	50.0%
Cote d'Ivoire	3	3	5	1	85.6%	50.0%
Eritrea	3	3	4	2	83.2%	50.0%
Kenya	3	3	6	0	86.4%	50.0%
Madagascar	3	3	0	6	83.7%	50.0%
Mauritania	3	3	4	2	80.2%	50.0%
Bangladesh	3	4	3	2	81.6%	42.9%
Burkina Faso	3	4	5	0	82.2%	42.9%
Guinea	3	4	5	0	81.8%	42.9%
Lesotho	3	4	0	5	73.8%	42.9%
Niger	3	4	3	2	81.5%	42.9%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Yemen	3	4	0	5	80.4%	42.9%
UR Tanzania	3	5	4	0	78.9%	37.5%
Ghana	3	6	3	0	75.8%	33.3%
Nigeria	3	6	2	1	75.7%	33.3%
Pakistan	3	6	3	0	76.0%	33.3%
Sudan	3	8	1	0	70.0%	27.3%
Equatorial Guinea ...	2	2	5	3	84.3%	50.0%
Papua New Guinea .	2	3	4	3	80.0%	40.0%
Burundi	2	4	5	1	80.6%	33.3%
Laos	2	5	3	2	74.9%	28.6%
Lebanon	2	5	5	0	76.7%	28.6%
Vietnam	2	7	1	2	69.2%	22.2%
India	2	8	2	0	69.2%	20.0%
Iran	2	8	0	2	67.3%	20.0%
Rwanda	1	0	1	10	100.0%	100.0%
Comoros	1	1	0	10	77.3%	50.0%
Liberia	1	2	6	3	87.4%	33.3%
Seychelles	1	2	0	9	79.0%	33.3%
Turkmenistan	1	2	0	9	54.3%	33.3%
Zaire	1	2	5	4	64.2%	33.3%
Mali	1	4	5	2	77.4%	20.0%
Cuba	1	7	4	0	69.1%	12.5%
Syria	1	8	3	0	65.6%	11.1%
Libya	1	9	1	1	64.4%	10.0%
Central African Rep.	0	0	0	12	*	*
Iraq	0	0	0	12	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe .	0	0	0	12	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	12	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	12	*	*
DPR of Korea	0	6	2	4	68.3%	0.0%
Average	4.0	3.6	2.6	1.8	83.1%	52.8%

Nordic Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Norway	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Denmark	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Finland	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Iceland	8	2	1	1	92.2%	80.0%
Sweden	8	3	1	0	88.9%	72.7%
Average	8.0	2.0	1.8	0.2	92.3%	80.0%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Canada	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
France	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Germany	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Italy	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Luxembourg	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Netherlands	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Portugal	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
Spain	9	2	1	0	92.5%	81.8%
United Kingdom	9	2	1	0	92.6%	81.8%
Norway	8	1	3	0	96.0%	88.9%
Belgium	8	2	1	1	92.3%	80.0%
Denmark	8	2	2	0	92.3%	80.0%
Iceland	8	2	1	1	92.2%	80.0%
Turkey	7	4	1	0	85.1%	63.6%
Greece	2	1	1	8	80.9%	66.7%
Average	8.1	2.0	1.2	0.7	92.1%	80.3%

COMPARISON OF IMPORTANT AND OVERALL VOTES

The following table shows the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States for both important votes and all plenary votes, in a side-by-side comparison.

Comparison of Important and Overall Votes

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT
Afghanistan	4	6	40.0%	22	36	37.9%
Albania	8	2	80.0%	37	17	68.5%
Algeria	5	4	55.6%	23	42	35.4%
Andorra	8	2	80.0%	44	16	73.3%
Angola	5	5	50.0%	22	40	35.5%
Antigua and Barbuda	7	3	70.0%	29	39	42.6%
Argentina	8	1	88.9%	34	22	60.7%
Armenia	6	3	66.7%	31	24	56.4%
Australia	8	2	80.0%	40	22	64.5%
Austria	8	2	80.0%	43	19	69.4%
Azerbaijan	5	2	71.4%	27	27	50.0%
Bahamas	7	3	70.0%	31	34	47.7%
Bahrain	4	2	66.7%	28	39	41.8%
Bangladesh	3	4	42.9%	23	42	35.4%
Barbados	7	3	70.0%	28	29	49.1%
Belarus	4	2	66.7%	30	21	58.8%
Belgium	8	2	80.0%	46	15	75.4%
Belize	7	3	70.0%	28	35	44.4%
Benin	4	3	57.1%	27	40	40.3%
Bhutan	4	3	57.1%	22	38	36.7%
Bolivia	7	3	70.0%	31	38	44.9%
Bosnia-Herzegovina ..	6	2	75.0%	30	22	57.7%
Botswana	6	4	60.0%	29	41	41.4%
Brazil	7	3	70.0%	28	38	42.4%
Brunei Darussalam ...	4	4	50.0%	29	43	40.3%
Bulgaria	8	2	80.0%	40	15	72.7%
Burkina Faso	3	4	42.9%	27	41	39.7%
Burundi	2	4	33.3%	21	40	34.4%
Cambodia	5	4	55.6%	29	36	44.6%
Cameroon	3	3	50.0%	22	38	36.7%
Canada	9	2	81.8%	46	17	73.0%
Cape Verde	4	3	57.1%	21	35	37.5%
Central African Rep. ..	0	0	*	0	0	*
Chad	3	3	50.0%	23	37	38.3%
Chile	8	3	72.7%	34	39	46.6%
China	2	7	22.2%	19	45	29.7%
Colombia	5	4	55.6%	27	42	39.1%
Comoros	1	1	50.0%	4	6	40.0%

Comparison of Important and Overall Votes (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT
Congo	3	2	60.0%	23	27	46.0%
Costa Rica	6	3	66.7%	30	28	51.7%
Cote d'Ivoire	3	3	50.0%	23	34	40.4%
Croatia	7	1	87.5%	41	17	70.7%
Cuba	1	7	12.5%	8	47	14.5%
Cyprus	7	2	77.8%	36	23	61.0%
Czech Republic	9	2	81.8%	46	16	74.2%
DPR of Korea	0	6	0.0%	7	47	13.0%
Denmark	8	2	80.0%	46	16	74.2%
Djibouti	4	2	66.7%	24	36	40.0%
Dominica	7	3	70.0%	26	28	48.1%
Dominican Republic ..	4	2	66.7%	12	11	52.2%
Ecuador	7	3	70.0%	31	41	43.1%
Egypt	4	3	57.1%	26	40	39.4%
El Salvador	8	2	80.0%	31	36	46.3%
Equatorial Guinea	2	2	50.0%	16	10	61.5%
Eritrea	3	3	50.0%	21	29	42.0%
Estonia	8	0	100.0%	39	13	75.0%
Ethiopia	4	3	57.1%	25	33	43.1%
Fiji	4	3	57.1%	26	28	48.1%
Finland	8	2	80.0%	45	15	75.0%
France	9	2	81.8%	49	14	77.8%
Gabon	3	2	60.0%	20	30	40.0%
Gambia	4	5	44.4%	20	37	35.1%
Georgia	6	0	100.0%	33	16	67.3%
Germany	9	2	81.8%	46	16	74.2%
Ghana	3	6	33.3%	23	45	33.8%
Greece	2	1	66.7%	4	3	57.1%
Grenada	7	3	70.0%	31	32	49.2%
Guatemala	6	2	75.0%	26	28	48.1%
Guinea	3	4	42.9%	23	40	36.5%
Guinea-Bissau	4	4	50.0%	20	36	35.7%
Guyana	7	4	63.6%	30	42	41.7%
Haiti	7	3	70.0%	30	38	44.1%
Honduras	8	3	72.7%	31	39	44.3%
Hungary	9	2	81.8%	47	16	74.6%
Iceland	8	2	80.0%	46	17	73.0%
India	2	8	20.0%	15	50	23.1%
Indonesia	4	7	36.4%	22	47	31.9%
Iran	2	8	20.0%	18	46	28.1%
Iraq	0	0	*	0	0	*
Ireland	8	3	72.7%	42	20	67.7%
Israel	10	0	100.0%	57	3	95.0%
Italy	9	2	81.8%	47	17	73.4%
Jamaica	7	3	70.0%	29	38	43.3%
Japan	8	1	88.9%	42	16	72.4%
Jordan	4	4	50.0%	27	40	40.3%

Comparison of Important and Overall Votes (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT
Kazakstan	6	2	75.0%	36	22	62.1%
Kenya	3	3	50.0%	25	35	41.7%
Kuwait	6	2	75.0%	32	39	45.1%
Kyrgyzstan	4	1	80.0%	25	17	59.5%
Laos	2	5	28.6%	14	41	25.5%
Latvia	8	0	100.0%	43	10	81.1%
Lebanon	2	5	28.6%	16	44	26.7%
Lesotho	3	4	42.9%	18	20	47.4%
Liberia	1	2	33.3%	22	25	46.8%
Libya	1	9	10.0%	20	48	29.4%
Liechtenstein	8	2	80.0%	42	19	68.9%
Lithuania	8	0	100.0%	43	11	79.6%
Luxembourg	9	2	81.8%	47	15	75.8%
Madagascar	3	3	50.0%	25	30	45.5%
Malawi	5	3	62.5%	26	39	40.0%
Malaysia	4	5	44.4%	29	43	40.3%
Maldives	5	4	55.6%	31	39	44.3%
Mali	1	4	20.0%	22	29	43.1%
Malta	8	3	72.7%	33	33	50.0%
Marshall Islands	8	1	88.9%	37	17	68.5%
Mauritania	3	3	50.0%	11	25	30.6%
Mauritius	7	3	70.0%	27	37	42.2%
Mexico	7	4	63.6%	26	41	38.8%
Micronesia	7	1	87.5%	29	16	64.4%
Moldova	7	0	100.0%	37	15	71.2%
Monaco	9	2	81.8%	43	14	75.4%
Mongolia	7	3	70.0%	29	33	46.8%
Morocco	4	3	57.1%	30	39	43.5%
Mozambique	4	4	50.0%	22	26	45.8%
Myanmar	4	7	36.4%	20	45	30.8%
Namibia	4	5	44.4%	20	34	37.0%
Nepal	4	2	66.7%	25	40	38.5%
Netherlands	9	2	81.8%	45	14	76.3%
New Zealand	8	3	72.7%	40	25	61.5%
Nicaragua	7	3	70.0%	28	33	45.9%
Niger	3	4	42.9%	26	40	39.4%
Nigeria	3	6	33.3%	21	46	31.3%
Norway	8	1	88.9%	45	16	73.8%
Oman	4	4	50.0%	26	42	38.2%
Pakistan	3	6	33.3%	25	44	36.2%
Palau	5	0	100.0%	12	1	92.3%
Panama	5	3	62.5%	28	39	41.8%
Papua New Guinea ...	2	3	40.0%	13	25	34.2%
Paraguay	8	3	72.7%	27	35	43.5%
Peru	7	3	70.0%	29	39	42.6%
Philippines	4	3	57.1%	26	40	39.4%
Poland	9	2	81.8%	44	17	72.1%

Comparison of Important and Overall Votes (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT
Portugal	9	2	81.8%	45	16	73.8%
Qatar	4	4	50.0%	28	42	40.0%
Republic of Korea	5	1	83.3%	33	22	60.0%
Romania	9	2	81.8%	44	15	74.6%
Russia	6	4	60.0%	35	24	59.3%
Rwanda	1	0	100.0%	4	1	80.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis	6	3	66.7%	25	31	44.6%
St. Lucia	7	3	70.0%	31	39	44.3%
St. Vincent-Gren.	6	3	66.7%	19	15	55.9%
Samoa	8	3	72.7%	33	33	50.0%
San Marino	8	4	66.7%	40	25	61.5%
Sao Tome/Principe ...	0	0	*	0	0	*
Saudi Arabia	5	3	62.5%	27	40	40.3%
Senegal	5	1	83.3%	25	35	41.7%
Seychelles	1	2	33.3%	15	13	53.6%
Sierra Leone	4	4	50.0%	25	37	40.3%
Singapore	5	4	55.6%	29	38	43.3%
Slovak Republic	9	2	81.8%	44	17	72.1%
Slovenia	9	2	81.8%	44	17	72.1%
Solomon Islands	7	3	70.0%	32	35	47.8%
Somalia	0	0	*	0	0	*
South Africa	6	4	60.0%	31	39	44.3%
Spain	9	2	81.8%	46	15	75.4%
Sri Lanka	4	5	44.4%	23	42	35.4%
Sudan	3	8	27.3%	24	48	33.3%
Suriname	7	3	70.0%	31	37	45.6%
Swaziland	5	3	62.5%	27	33	45.0%
Sweden	8	3	72.7%	43	20	68.3%
Syria	1	8	11.1%	13	47	21.7%
Tajikistan	3	0	100.0%	23	6	79.3%
Thailand	4	4	50.0%	27	40	40.3%
TFYR Macedonia	8	1	88.9%	43	17	71.7%
Togo	3	2	60.0%	26	38	40.6%
Trinidad and Tobago .	7	3	70.0%	27	38	41.5%
Tunisia	4	4	50.0%	28	42	40.0%
Turkey	7	4	63.6%	42	26	61.8%
Turkmenistan	1	2	33.3%	6	2	75.0%
Uganda	4	5	44.4%	23	43	34.8%
Ukraine	6	2	75.0%	36	25	59.0%
United Arab Emirates	4	2	66.7%	26	38	40.6%
United Kingdom	9	2	81.8%	53	14	79.1%
UR Tanzania	3	5	37.5%	22	43	33.8%
Uruguay	8	3	72.7%	32	34	48.5%
Uzbekistan	8	0	100.0%	31	10	75.6%
Vanuatu	8	3	72.7%	30	39	43.5%
Venezuela	7	4	63.6%	29	40	42.0%
Vietnam	2	7	22.2%	16	45	26.2%

Comparison of Important and Overall Votes (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT
Yemen	3	4	42.9%	24	40	37.5%
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	*	0	0	*
Zaire	1	2	33.3%	1	2	33.3%
Zambia	5	5	50.0%	30	40	42.9%
Zimbabwe	4	5	44.4%	26	44	37.1%
Average	5.3	3.0	63.9%	28.2	28.9	49.4%

IV - SECURITY COUNCIL

In addition to the five Permanent Members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the Security Council in 1996 was composed of Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Poland, and South Korea. The following table summarizes the activity of the Security Council for the year, and compares it with the previous nine years. (See also the graph at the end of this section.)

Year	Meetings	Resolutions Considered	Resolutions Adopted	U.S. Vetoes	Presidential Statements
1996	114	59	57	1	49
1995	130	67	66	1	63
1994	160	78	77	0	82
1993	171	95	93	0	88
1992	129	74	74	0	94
1991	53	42	42	0	21
1990	69	40	37	2	14
1989	69	25	20	5	17
1988	55	26	20	6	8
1987	49	15	13	2	12

The Security Council in 1996 maintained an active post-Cold War pace. While the number of formal meetings and the number of resolutions adopted were again lower than the record set in 1993, there were far more than in the Cold War years. During the year, the Council continued to be heavily engaged in the world community's efforts to resolve conflicts.

Of the 57 resolutions adopted by the Council, two were adopted by acclamation and 48 won unanimous approval. Of the seven resolutions adopted without unanimous approval, the United States voted in favor of six and abstained on one Middle East resolution concerning the situation in the occupied territories. The United States vetoed the draft resolution that recommended appointment of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali for a second five-year term. No other negative votes were cast during 1996. There were only 10 abstentions on the 57 resolutions adopted: 5 by Russia on resolutions concerning the former Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Sudan; 4 by China on Sudan, Cuba, and Georgia; and 1 by the United States on the Middle East. A resolution on Lebanon failed to obtain enough votes for adoption: 4-0-11(US).

The Security Council's attention in 1996 was focused heavily on the former Yugoslavia: 23 of 114 formal meetings, 12 of 59 resolutions, and 13 of 49 presidential statements dealt with this area. The situation in Burundi, Rwanda, and eastern Zaire also heavily occupied the Council's attention: 14 meetings, 7 resolutions, and 6 statements. Other resolutions and statements by the Council addressed security concerns elsewhere in Africa, and in Cyprus, Georgia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, and Tajikistan. Presidential statements, less formal than Council resolutions, are consensus documents issued by the Council president on behalf of the members. All were endorsed by the United States. The number of presidential statements has approximately matched the number of formal resolutions in recent years. The Council also elected a new prosecutor for the war crimes tribunals and nominated Kofi Annan of Ghana to succeed Boutros Boutros-Ghali as Secretary General.

Council resolutions on peacekeeping are summarized in the following paragraphs. Each resolution is described in more detail later in this section.

AFRICA

Angola: The Council extended the mandate of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) several times during the year, the last time to February 28, 1997. It expressed concern in February about delays in implementing elements of the peace process agreed to by the parties and urged them to implement their agreements. It identified quartering of UNITA troops, as a first step in transformation of UNITA to a legitimate political party, as a crucial component of the peace process. It called for a halt to dissemination of hostile propaganda and asked the Angola Government to provide facilities to UNAVEM for independent functioning of a radio to disseminate impartial information. In May the Council expressed regret that implementation of the peace process was far behind schedule, pointing to the failure of UNITA to complete the quartering of its troops and underlining the importance of talks on integration of UNITA troops into the Angolan Armed Forces and formation of a joint military command. The Council urged the parties to take steps for UNITA deputies to enter the National Assembly and for incorporation of UNITA personnel into the state administration, armed forces, and national police. In July the Council commended the parties for adoption of an agreement on military matters. It urged a phased demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants, formation of a government of unity and national reconciliation, and incorporation of UNITA personnel into the government, armed forces, and national

police. It reminded the parties that it expected UNAVEM III to complete its mission by February 1997. In October the Council expressed concern at the lack of progress in the peace process and disappointment with UNITA for delaying full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. It expressed its readiness to consider imposition of "measures" (trade and travel restrictions) unless UNITA made substantial progress in fulfilling its agreements. It took note of the Secretary General's intent to initiate in December the downsizing of UNAVEM III. In December the Council noted some positive steps in implementation of the peace process but expressed concern at its slow pace. It approved withdrawal of UNAVEM in February 1997, with the understanding that the pace of withdrawal would be commensurate with progress achieved in elements of the peace process.

Burundi: The Council in January appealed for restraint and non-violence, called for participation in a dialogue, invited cooperation in identifying and dismantling radio stations that incite hatred and violence, welcomed the Secretary General's sending of a security mission to examine ways to improve security for UN personnel, and declared its readiness to consider an arms embargo and travel restrictions on leaders who encourage violence. In March the Council condemned acts of violence and assassination of government officials, and it demanded that all parties not seek to destabilize the security situation or depose the government by force. It reiterated its call for dismantling radio stations that incite hatred and violence, and it asked the Secretary General to report on the possibility of establishing a UN radio station to promote reconciliation. The Council encouraged contingency planning for a rapid humanitarian response in case of widespread violence or serious deterioration of the humanitarian situation. In August the Council condemned the overthrow of the legitimate government and constitutional order, and called for a return to constitutional order and legality. It also decided to consider imposition of an arms embargo if negotiations were not initiated. It encouraged contingency planning for an international presence to help consolidate a cessation of hostilities and to make a rapid humanitarian response in the event of widespread violence.

Liberia: The Council in January extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to May 31, 1996. It called on the parties to implement their ceasefire and demobilization agreements, condemned attacks on peacekeepers, and warned that the support of the international community for the peace process required a commitment by the parties to resolve their differences peacefully. In May the Council extended the UNOMIL mandate for three months, to August 31, 1996. It supported the Secretary General's decision to reduce the strength of UNOMIL temporarily because of the deteriorating situation on the ground, and it expressed grave concern at the collapse of the

ceasefire. It condemned attacks on UN and other international personnel, as well as looting of their equipment and supplies. It stressed that continued support by the international community for the peace process in Liberia, including participation by UNOMIL, was contingent on demonstration of a commitment by the Liberian parties to resolve their differences peacefully. In August the Council extended UNOMIL's mandate to November 30, 1996. It welcomed the agreement by the Economic Community of West African States to adopt a mechanism to verify compliance, and propose measures for noncompliance, with the Abuja agreement. It also condemned the use of children for combat. In November, the Council again extended the mandate of UNOMIL, to March 31, 1997.

Rwanda: The Council in March noted arrangements by the Secretary General for withdrawal of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and authorized UNAMIR to help protect personnel and premises of the war crimes tribunal until its departure. The Council also encouraged the Secretary General to maintain a UN office and a radio station in Rwanda after UNAMIR's departure. This office will coordinate UN agencies involved in reconstruction and development, and will help promote national reconciliation. In April the Council called on states in the region to ensure that their territory is not used as a base for armed groups to launch incursions or attacks in Rwanda, urged all states to ensure effective implementation of the arms embargo, and asked the Secretary General to consult with Zaire about possible deployment of UN observers at airfields and border crossing points for better implementation of the arms embargo.

Sudan: The Council in January called on Sudan to extradite three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on the life of the President of Egypt in 1995. It also called on Sudan to stop sheltering terrorists and supporting terrorist activities. In April, because Sudan still had not complied with these requirements, the Council imposed sanctions: reduction in the number and level of staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions, with restrictions on their movements, and restrictions on entry into or transit through UN member countries by Sudanese government officials and members of Sudan's armed forces. In August the Council, absent compliance by Sudan with the demands set out above, decided to impose restrictions on Sudanese aircraft flights, but it provided a 90-day period for Sudan to comply with the demands before setting a date for the restrictions to enter into force.

Western Sahara: The Council in January extended the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to May 31, 1996. It expressed concern about the stalemate hindering the process for identifying voters for the referendum. It also asked the Sec-

retary General to submit a program for phased withdrawal of MINURSO in case no progress was made toward completion of the Settlement Plan. In May the Council extended the MINURSO mandate to November 30, 1996. It expressed regret that the parties were unwilling to resume and complete the identification process or implement the Settlement Plan. It decided to suspend the identification process and reduce the military component of MINURSO by 20 percent. It decided to maintain a political office to continue the dialogue with the parties and neighboring countries. In November the Council welcomed steps taken by the parties to demonstrate goodwill and indications that the parties were taking steps toward resolving outstanding questions. It extended the MINURSO mandate to May 31, 1997, while asking the Secretary General to propose alternative steps if no meaningful progress toward implementing the Settlement Plan is made. The Secretary General was also asked to focus on reviewing the staff size and composition to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

Zaire: The Council in November welcomed the Secretary General's proposal that a multinational force be set up for humanitarian purposes in eastern Zaire, with the cost to be borne by participating member states and other voluntary contributions. It asked the Secretary General to draw up a concept of operations and a framework for such a humanitarian task force, with military assistance if necessary, to assist in delivering humanitarian aid and assisting in protection and voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees and displaced persons caught in the fighting between rebel and government forces in eastern Zaire. It also invited the Secretary General to determine the modalities of convening a peace conference for the region. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council then authorized establishment of a multinational force to facilitate humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of refugees and welcomed the offers of member states, under Canada's leadership, to contribute to the force. It decided the operation should terminate at the end of March 1997 unless its objectives were achieved earlier. Shortly after, however, a majority of the refugees returned to Rwanda, obviating the need to deploy such a force, and the Council in December accepted the Canadian proposal to terminate the force's mandate.

EASTERN EUROPE

Bosnia and Herzegovina: In October the Council, noting that elections had taken place in September, terminated the arms embargo and economic sanctions that still existed on the Bosnian Serb party and on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Council also decided to con-

sider imposition of (undefined) measures if any party failed significantly to meet its obligations under the peace agreement. In December the Council authorized member states to establish a multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) for 18 months as the legal successor to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), and it extended the mandate of the UN Mission, including its International Police Task Force (IPTF) to December 1997 to continue assistance in reforming law enforcement agencies.

Croatia: The Council in January established the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), a peacekeeping operation with both military and civilian components. UNTAES, which was authorized to govern the region for the short term, comprised a force of 5,000 troops to facilitate demilitarization, and a civilian component to establish a temporary police force and develop a training program, monitor the prison system, undertake tasks relating to civil administration and functioning of public services, organize elections, and assist in plans for development and economic reconstruction. Separately, the Council in January authorized military observers to continue to monitor demilitarization on the Prevlaka Peninsula in Croatia. In July it authorized the observers to continue their monitoring to January 15, 1997. In November, the Council extended the mandate of UNTAES to July 15, 1997, and asked the Secretary General to give the Council his recommendations regarding a further UN presence, possibly a restructured UNTAES, for the six-month period beginning July 16, 1997.

Georgia: The Council in January extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), while expressing deep concern about the continued deadlock in efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia. In July the Council extended the mandate of UNOMIG to January 31, 1997. It condemned the ethnically motivated killings and violence and asked the Secretary General to report on arrangements for establishment of a human rights office in Sukhumi. In October, following the Secretary General's reports on the human rights office, the Council decided to establish the office, with the participation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Council also asked the Secretary General to work closely with the Government of Georgia in determining priorities for the office.

(The Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia: The Council in February increased the strength of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) by 50 military personnel to provide for a continued engineering capability. In May it extended UNPREDEP's mandate to November 30, 1996. In November it extended the mandate to May 31, 1997, and called for a reduction of the military component by 300 by April 30, 1997.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Cuba: The Council in July endorsed ICAO's conclusions and resolution on the unlawful shooting down by the Cuban Air Force of two U.S. civil aircraft, and condemned the use of weapons against civil aircraft as incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity and the rules of international law.

Haiti: In February the Council welcomed the democratic election of a new president in Haiti and the peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected president to another. It extended the mandate of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a final period of four months to help the Government of Haiti sustain the secure and stable environment that had been established and professionalize the Haitian national police. The Council reduced the number of UNMIH's troops and civilian police to 1,200 and 300, respectively. In June the Council established the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) with a force of 300 civilian police and 600 troops, and with a mandate extending to November 30, 1996, to assist the Government of Haiti in professionalization of the police and in maintenance of a secure and stable environment. The Council urged the Haitian Government and the international financial institutions to agree on steps for additional financial support for reconstruction. In December the Council extended UNSMIH to May 31, 1997, with a reduction of the troop level to 500, and with the possibility of a final extension, following Council review, to July 31, 1997.

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan: The Council in October called upon the Afghan parties to cease hostilities and engage in a political dialogue to achieve a political settlement and establish a representative government of national unity. It called on all states to refrain from outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and to end the supply of arms and ammunition. It also denounced discrimination against girls and women and other violations of human rights.

Cyprus: The Council in June extended the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to December 31, 1996. It deplored the fatal shooting of a Greek Cypriot National Guardsman in the buffer zone. It expressed serious concern about the upgrading of military forces, the recent military exercises in the region, and the lack of progress towards reduction in the number of foreign troops. The Council urged the parties to work toward resumption of direct negotiations. In December the Council again extended the UNFICYP mandate, to June 30, 1997, while deploring the violent incidents that had

occurred, expressing disappointment that no progress had been made on arms control measures recommended by UNFICYP, reiterating concern about the excessive levels of military forces and armaments, and calling upon leaders of the two communities to create a climate of reconciliation.

Iraq: The Council in March approved the monitoring mechanism formulated by the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iraq does not develop weapons of mass destruction. In June, following Iraq's refusal to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, the Council demanded that the Commission's inspection teams be allowed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records, and means of transportation they wish to inspect.

Middle East: The Council in January extended the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to July 31, 1996. It welcomed the streamlining of the force and stressed the need to continue efforts to achieve savings in administrative and support services. In April, following the death of civilians at a UNIFIL site as a result of Israeli military action in retaliation for Hezbollah strikes against Israel, the Council called on the parties to cease hostilities and to respect the security and freedom of movement of UNIFIL. It rejected a one-sided Arab-sponsored draft resolution that would have strongly condemned Israel while ignoring the Hezbollah attacks. In July the Council welcomed the completion of the streamlining of UNIFIL and extended its mandate to January 31, 1997.

The Council extended the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Syrian Golan Heights to November 30, 1996, and then to May 31, 1997.

In September, after the demonstrations and violence that followed Israel's opening of a pedestrian tunnel in Jerusalem near Muslim holy sites, the Council called for cessation and reversal of all acts that resulted in aggravation of the situation and have negative implications for the Middle East peace process. The Council called for immediate resumption of negotiations and timely implementation of agreements.

Tajikistan: The Council in June extended the mandate of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) to December 15, 1996, subject to the proviso that the parties demonstrate their commitment to a ceasefire, national reconciliation, and democracy. It called on the parties to cease hostilities, comply with their agreement in Tehran, resume their talks, and cooperate with UNMOT. In December, the Council condemned violations of the ceasefire, acts of violence, and mistreatment of UNMOT personnel, and it approved a shorter, three-month mandate for UNMOT, to March 15, 1997.

OTHER ACTIONS

The Council in February appointed Mrs. Louise Arbour as prosecutor of the war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to replace Richard Goldstone, whose resignation was to be effective in October. The Council also elected six judges, including one from the United States, to the International Court of Justice. The Council decided in March to convene ad hoc meetings with countries contributing troops to peacekeeping operations should unforeseen developments require Council action. These meetings would be in addition to those organized by the Secretariat for troop contributors to meet with the Secretary General's special representatives or force commanders. In November, the United States vetoed a draft resolution nominating Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali for a second 5-year term as Secretary General. The Council in December recommended to the General Assembly that Mr. Kofi Annan (Ghana) be appointed the next Secretary General. It also acknowledged the contributions of Dr. Boutros-Ghali and expressed appreciation for his dedication to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

RESOLUTIONS

Substantive resolutions formally addressed by the Security Council in 1996 are listed and described below. They are organized by topic. Each listing provides the number of the resolution, date of the vote, results (Yes/No/Abstain), with the U.S. vote indicated, and a summary description. The descriptions, which include key elements of the resolutions, are composed of excerpts from the resolution language; "Security Council" is the subject of the verbs. The U.S. position, drawing on the statement made by the U.S. spokesman when the resolution was adopted, is given in the paragraph following the resolution description.

AFGHANISTAN

S/Res/1076

October 22

15(US)-0-0

Calls upon all Afghan parties to cease hostilities, renounce the use of force, and engage in a political dialogue aimed at achieving national reconciliation and a lasting political settlement and establishing a fully representative government of national unity; calls on all states to end the supply of arms and ammunition to all parties to the conflict; calls upon all parties to desist from the indiscriminate use of landmines; and denounces the discrimination against girls and women and other violations of human rights.

The U.S. Representative, in Council debate before adoption of the resolution, called upon all parties to stop fighting and begin negotiations. There can be no durable peace until a broad-based government is formed which represents and respects the rights of all of Afghanistan's diverse peoples. The UN special mission, which is in contact with all the groups, is uniquely placed to serve as an impartial facilitator among them. The U.S. Government urges all outside parties to refrain from meddling, continues to support an arms embargo, and urges the international community to continue working with the parties to establish a process that will unite Afghanistan and lead to stability, economic recovery, and the rule of law. Such a future would contribute to stability elsewhere in the region, reduce illegal flows of arms and narcotics, and result in a closing of military training camps that have supported terrorist activities in the region and beyond. The U.S. Government does not support or favor any particular party. It remains concerned that all parties in Afghanistan respect international human rights standards. The approach to women's rights, if reports are accurate, cannot be justified or defended; if continued, it will doom prospects for economic and social progress, and will make it extremely difficult for the international community to administer badly needed humanitarian aid.

ANGOLA

S/Res/1045

February 8

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) until May 8, 1996; expresses concern at the numerous delays in implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, reminds the parties of their obligation to consolidate the peace process, and urges them to maintain an effective ceasefire, conclude their talks on integration of the armed forces, undertake the demining process, and commence integration of personnel of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) into administrative and governmental institutions to further national reconciliation; expresses concern at the slow pace of quartering and disarming UNITA troops, and reiterates the conviction that quartering of UNITA forces, as the first step in its transformation to a legitimate political party, is a crucial component of the peace process; calls upon UNITA to proceed with the quartering of its troops; and calls upon the Government of Angola to provide all facilities necessary for independent functioning of UNAVEM radio in dissemination of impartial information.

The U.S. Representative noted that UNAVEM III is the largest UN peacekeeping operation deployed anywhere in the world, with 6,500 soldiers from over 30 countries, and is critical to the peace process. But

in the final analysis the future of Angola rests with the Government of Angola and UNITA. The Government of Angola has been moving in the right direction; but to accomplish reconciliation in Angola, it must continue to integrate UNITA fully into the political and military institutions of the country and to help UNITA soldiers make the transition into either civilian life or a reconstituted Angolan army. UNITA's poor performance under the Lusaka Protocol has jeopardized the peace process and undermined the viability of UNAVEM III. The opportunity for peace will be lost unless UNITA follows through on schedule with the quartering of the rest of its soldiers. If the Secretary General reports insufficient progress by the parties in the weeks ahead, Council members will reevaluate the merit of continuing the mandate of UNAVEM III to February 1997. The United States will not allow a sound peacekeeping operation, which costs nearly \$1 million per day, to be slowly undermined by the failure of Angola's leaders to fulfill their promises.

S/Res/1055

May 8

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III until July 11, 1996; notes with deep concern the failure of UNITA to complete the quartering of all its troops, and reiterates that quartering and disarming of UNITA troops are crucial components of the peace process; calls upon UNITA to release prisoners; underlines the importance of the talks on military issues regarding integration of UNITA troops into the Angolan Armed Forces and formation of a joint military command; urges the parties to abide by their agreements in the Lusaka Protocol and at Libreville, including selection of UNITA troops for incorporation into the Angolan Armed Forces; urges the parties to take steps for UNITA deputies to take their places in the National Assembly, for movement of UNITA troops out of quartering areas, for incorporation of UNITA personnel into the State administration, the armed forces, and the national police, for the orderly transition of demobilized troops to civilian life, and for formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation by July 1996; and calls upon the Government of Angola to provide the requisite facilities for establishment of an independent UN radio.

The U.S. Deputy Representative criticized delays in quartering of UNITA troops but welcomed the progress made, while noting UNITA's typical pattern of lurching forward in fits and starts toward its goals. The Angolan Government must complete its obligations to pull back its forces, too, and to barrack the anti-riot police. Both sides must work together to finalize arrangements for military integration, including agreement on the UNITA generals who are to be part of the joint military command. This resolution reflects the Council's continuing impatience with the overall slow pace of implementation of the Lusaka

Protocol. In the next two months the joint military command should be formed and UNITA forces should commence integration into the armed forces of Angola, the essential foundation for the government of national reconciliation. The parties must also take decisive action on the threat posed by landmines.

S/Res/1064

July 11

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III until October 11, 1996; commends both parties for adoption of the agreement on military matters; calls upon UNITA to complete the quartering of all its troops; urges UNITA to make available for duty the generals and other military officers designated to enter the Angolan Armed Forces, as well as the UNITA officials designated to take up posts in the government administration at the national, provincial, and local levels; urges the Government of Angola and UNITA to complete the formation of the national armed forces and orderly transition of demobilized troops to civilian life; condemns the use of mercenaries; reminds the parties of their obligation to cease dissemination of hostile propaganda with a view to promoting a spirit of tolerance and mutual trust; urges the Government of Angola to provide facilities for establishment of the independent UN radio, and urges UNITA to transform its radio station into a non-partisan station; demands that all parties ensure the safety of UN and other international personnel and premises; declares that it will place special emphasis, during future discussion of the mandate of UNAVEM III, on the progress demonstrated by the parties; and reminds the parties of the expectation that UNAVEM III will complete its mission by February 1997.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the U.S. Government is strongly committed to the Angolan peace process, and this resolution demonstrates that the Council shares that commitment. The progress made is welcome, but implementation is still behind schedule. Rapid progress is essential, including in such vital areas as demobilization, reintegration, and demining. There has been substantial movement since the mandate renewal on May 8, and in the right direction. Rapid and orderly demobilization of those who will not enter the integrated military must begin in order to sustain confidence in the peace process. The considerable energy and talent of some 67,000 demobilized soldiers must be properly developed and channeled. International support is essential to ensure that demobilization and reintegration of former combatants is rapid. This resolution rightly calls attention to the urgent task of demining. Demining is essential to enable the free circulation of people and goods throughout Angola, and thus crucial to demobilization and reconstruction efforts. The coming few months are of critical impor-

tance for the peace process. Creation of the joint military, and demobilization of those troops not selected for its ranks, will be an important cornerstone in building the trust and confidence that are key to the future of Angola. Another pivotal step will be establishment of a government of unity and national reconciliation. With the requisite political will, in the current climate of growing cooperation, the necessary steps can be taken within the time frame agreed to by the two parties. The U.S. Government expects to hail the formation of a new government of unity and national reconciliation, and the irreversibility of the peace process, within the current mandate period of UNAVEM III.

S/Res/1075

October 11

15(US)-0-0

Expresses deep concern at the lack of significant progress in the peace process and at the protracted delay in beginning demobilization of UNITA personnel; decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III to December 11, 1996; urges the President of Angola and the leader of UNITA to meet to resolve all outstanding issues; expresses deep disappointment with UNITA for delaying full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, and calls upon UNITA to complete the tasks enumerated in the Mediation Document formulated by the Secretary General's Special Representative; expresses readiness to consider imposition of measures unless UNITA has made substantial and genuine progress in fulfilling these tasks by November 20; condemns actions by UNITA with regard to UN aircraft flights; expresses serious concern about interference by UNITA with mine-clearing activities; and takes note of the Secretary General's intention to initiate downsizing of UNAVEM military forces by the end of December 1996.

The U.S. Deputy Representative, in the October 10 debate on this resolution, noted that Angola is now poised for the most significant, and to some the most difficult, step in the process of achieving peace and national reconciliation: the integration of two warring parties into a single entity politically unified under a government of unity and national reconciliation and militarily unified under a single high command with a single armed force. With so much accomplished, and with the end in sight, the United States is very troubled to find the peace process nearly at a standstill. It is time now for UNITA to act boldly, to take the remaining steps toward compliance with the obligations it set for itself in the Lusaka Protocol. It must integrate its senior generals into the high command and designate its combatants for service in the nation's armed forces. It must take its place in a government of national unity, with its representatives rejoining the National Assembly. And the Government of Angola must put aside past differences and make use of the resources of talent being provided by UNITA. The U.S. Government

strongly urges UNITA to avail itself of the security of the few remaining months of UNAVEM's mission to complete these commitments.

S/Res/1087

December 11

15(US)-0-0

Expresses concern at the overall slow pace of the peace process, but notes some positive steps in its implementation; decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III until February 28, 1997; approves the Secretary General's recommendation to resume withdrawal of UNAVEM III military units during February 1997, with the understanding that the pace of withdrawal will be commensurate with progress achieved in the quartering areas, in demobilization, and in the extension of state administration; urges the parties to reach agreement on the special status of the President of UNITA as the president of the largest opposition party; calls upon the President of UNITA to travel to Luanda for the creation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, and to maximize the amount of time spent in Luanda in order to enhance confidence in the country's democratic institutions and the irreversibility of the peace process; stresses the need for more effective implementation of the program for disarmament of the civilian population; and asks the Secretary General to continue planning for a follow-on UN presence which would include military observers, police observers, a political component, human rights monitors, and a Special Representative.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said there has been significant progress in the past two months to identify the UNITA members for integration into the Angolan Armed Forces, to dissolve UNITA's military command structure, and to complete other tasks specified in Resolution 1075. Despite these advances, the military tasks remain incomplete, and the Council is once again considering how to urge or compel the parties to meet the obligations they undertook in Lusaka two years ago. The time has come for the quartering camps to close and UNAVEM to begin withdrawing. The Government of Angola must work with UNITA to empty the camps rapidly and move on to the political tasks in order to reintegrate UNITA into a process in which problems are resolved through negotiation and compromise rather than violence. UNAVEM must now begin to withdraw. The time has come for former military units to be replaced by a follow-on international presence to assist Angola in the reconciliation and reconstruction process. This resolution takes into account all of these issues. It also contains an urgent message for other UN member states: this critical stage of the peace process cannot succeed without immediate funding, and the international community must act urgently to provide funds. The U.S. Government will contribute an additional \$6.85 million for demobilization, reconciliation, and demining. The international community has devoted years of

its attention to helping the Angolans put the hostilities of the past behind them. The U.S. Government hopes the Angolans will seize the opportunity for cementing the lasting peace which is so nearly in their grasp.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

S/Res/1074

October 1

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: notes with satisfaction that elections took place on September 14, 1996, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and notes that this was an essential step toward achieving the objectives of the peace agreement; decides to terminate, with immediate effect, the arms embargo and economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serb party and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia referred to in Resolution 1022 (1995); decides to consider imposition of measures if any party fails significantly to meet its obligations under the peace agreement; and decides to dissolve the sanctions committee for Yugoslavia established by Resolution 724 (1991).

S/Res/1088

December 12

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: stresses that without compliance and active participation by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in rebuilding a civil society, they cannot expect the international community to continue shouldering the burden of implementation and reconstruction efforts; underlines the link between availability of international financial assistance and the degree to which the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina implement the peace agreement, including cooperation with the International Tribunal; stresses the importance of full normalization of relations among the successor states to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; underlines the importance of establishing the remaining common institutions provided for in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina; underlines that cooperation with the International Tribunal includes the surrender for trial of all persons indicted by the Tribunal and provision of information to assist in Tribunal investigations; calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the work of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber, and calls upon the authorities to cooperate with the UN Commission on Human Rights and other intergovernmental or regional human rights missions or organizations to monitor closely the human rights situation; authorizes member states to establish for a planned period of 18 months a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as the legal successor to the multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control; authorizes member states, acting through SFOR, to

take all necessary measures to effect implementation of and ensure compliance with the peace agreement, and recognizes the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself; and decides to extend the mandate of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), which includes the International Police Task Force (IPTF), for an additional period terminating on December 21, 1997, reaffirming the legal basis in the UN Charter on which IPTF was given its mandate in Resolution 1035 (1995).

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the Council—in authorizing SFOR and extending the IPTF—has taken two important steps in the international community's efforts to assist in resolving the tragic problems confronting the former Yugoslavia. Instrumental to the successes in Bosnia have been IFOR and the IPTF. Under NATO's leadership, IFOR has assured compliance with military aspects of the Dayton accords, created secure conditions for conducting other tasks associated with the peace process, and assisted in other aspects of implementation. The IPTF has promoted long-term civil security by working with the parties to achieve fundamental reforms in law enforcement institutions. Bearing in mind the still very delicate nature of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the U.S. Government believes the deployment of SFOR is an appropriate next step. SFOR will carry out IFOR's crucial functions, but, in view of the progress made, at a reduced scale. The U.S. Government also firmly supports extension of the IPTF mandate. The law enforcement reform process, which the IPTF initiated with the parties and will continue to oversee, is vital to maintaining not just basic law and order but also broader peace and stability. The U.S. Government urges the parties to abide by the IPTF-promulgated "internationally accepted principles of policing in a democratic state." This will require a vigorous process for screening, investigating, and evaluating police officials. Improvements in this area, rather than any numerical increases in the number of IPTF personnel, will be key to the IPTF's success. The U.S. Government has pledged to provide assistance where significant progress toward these ends can be demonstrated. It must be emphasized that, ultimately, the responsibility for maintaining peace and achieving reconciliation rests with the parties. All states and parties must fully cooperate with the war crimes tribunal. The obligation to cooperate includes, as a matter of urgency, the arrest of individuals indicted by the tribunal and their expeditious transfer to The Hague to stand trial. All parties need to secure for each and every individual, regardless of religious or ethnic background, the highest level of human rights. The U.S. Government remains committed to the peace process and to promoting international engagement to help the parties achieve peace.

BURUNDI

S/Res/1040

January 29

15(US)-0-0

Demands that all concerned exercise restraint and refrain from acts of violence; invites cooperation in identification and dismantling of radio stations that incite hatred and violence; welcomes the sending by the Secretary General of a security mission to Burundi to examine ways to improve security arrangements for UN personnel and premises; asks the Secretary General to report to the Council by February 20, 1996, on progress in facilitating a dialogue; and declares readiness to consider imposition of measures to ban the supply of arms to Burundi and to impose travel restrictions against those leaders who continue to encourage violence.

The U.S. Representative said President Clinton called on all Burundians to reject extremism and resolve their differences peacefully. The United States will not support, recognize, or assist any government that comes to power by force in Burundi, and would lead an effort to isolate such a regime. The Government of Burundi must guarantee the safety of aid workers, who fear for their lives and may have to leave the country. The United States deplores the continuing instability and violence, and is seeking ways to defuse tensions. The leaders of Burundi should isolate the extremists and seek a lasting peace. It is up to them to ensure their country does not commit national suicide.

S/Res/1049

March 5

15(US)-0-0

Condemns all acts of violence against civilians, refugees, and international humanitarian personnel and the assassination of government officials; demands that all concerned refrain from seeking to destabilize the security situation or depose the Government by force; calls upon all to engage in serious negotiations; reiterates its invitation to cooperate in dismantling radio stations which incite hatred and acts of violence; asks the Secretary General to report on the possibility of establishing a UN radio station in Burundi to promote reconciliation and dialogue and to relay constructive information and support UN activities regarding refugees and returnees; calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the Commission of Inquiry; expresses strong support for the efforts of the Secretary General and his Special Representative, the Organization of African Unity, the European Union, former Presidents Nyerere and Carter, and the other facilitators appointed by the Cairo Conference; invites cooperation with the Government of Burundi in initiatives for rehabilitation, including in military and police reform, judicial assistance, development programs, and support at international financial institu-

tions; encourages the Organization of African Unity to increase the size of its observer mission in Burundi; and encourages the Secretary General to continue his consultations with member states on contingency planning for a rapid humanitarian response in the event of widespread violence or a serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation.

The U.S. Representative described this resolution as a reflection of the Council's determination to prevent in Burundi the kind of massive violations of human rights that consumed Rwanda in 1994. The resolution calls upon the leaders of Burundi to settle their differences through dialogue, and it asks the Secretary General to plan, on a contingency basis, for a rapid humanitarian response in the event of widespread violence or a serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation. The fate of Burundi is in Burundian hands, but the Council and others can help the moderate elements surmount pressure for violence that comes from the extremes. The United States will not support or assist any government that comes to power by force in Burundi, and indeed would make every effort to isolate such a government from the international community. The United States urges the Government of Burundi to take advantage of the resources of the international community to help overcome obstacles to reconciliation: e.g., a neutral place for dialogue, human rights monitors, economic aid, or assistance in building effective political and judicial institutions. It is essential to plan for the contingency that widespread violence might resume. The contingency planning called for in this resolution is precisely the type of exercise envisioned when the UN established its stand-by arrangements system over the past two years. It is designed to identify, in advance, the resources member states might be willing to make available on short notice to carry out an emergency humanitarian mission.

S/Res/1072

August 30

15(US)-0-0

Condemns the overthrow of the legitimate government and constitutional order in Burundi and condemns also those parties and factions which resort to force and violence to advance their political objectives; calls upon the regime to ensure a return to constitutional order and legality, to restore the National Assembly, and to lift the ban on political parties; demands a cessation of hostilities; demands that all parties abstain from attacking civilians, ensure the security of humanitarian personnel, and guarantee safe passage out of the country for members of the former government and members of parliament; demands that all of Burundi's political parties and factions initiate unconditional negotiations immediately; asks the Secretary General to undertake preparations for convening of a pledging conference to assist in reconstruction and development of Burundi following achievement of a political settle-

ment; decides to reexamine the matter on October 31, 1996, and asks the Secretary General to report on the situation by that time; decides, if negotiations are not initiated, to consider imposition of measures to include a ban on sale or supply of arms to the regime in Burundi and all factions which continue to encourage violence and obstruct a peaceful resolution of the political crisis; and encourages the Secretary General and UN member states to facilitate contingency planning for an international presence to help consolidate a cessation of hostilities, as well as to make a rapid humanitarian response in the event of widespread violence or a serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation.

CROATIA

S/Res/1037

January 15

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides to establish for an initial period of 12 months a UN peacekeeping operation in Eastern Slavonia, with both military and civilian components, called the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES); asks the Secretary General to appoint, in consultation with the parties and the Security Council, a transitional administrator with authority over the civilian and military components of UNTAES; decides that demilitarization of the region shall be completed within 30 days after UNTAES has been deployed; decides that the military component of UNTAES shall consist initially of 5,000 troops with a mandate to supervise and facilitate demilitarization, to monitor the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons, to contribute by its presence to the maintenance of peace and security, and to assist in implementation of the basic agreement between the parties; decides that the civilian component of UNTAES shall establish a temporary police force to develop and oversee a training program and monitor treatment of offenders and the prison system, undertake tasks relating to civil administration and the functioning of public services, facilitate return of refugees, organize elections and assist in their conduct, and assist in coordination of plans for development and economic reconstruction of the region; and asks the Secretary General to submit a report to the Council on the possibility of contributions from Croatia in offsetting the costs of the operation.

S/Res/1038

January 15

15(US)-0-0

Authorizes UN military observers to continue to monitor the demilitarization on the Prevlaka Peninsula for three months; asks the Secretary General to report by March 15 on the situation there as well as

progress made by Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia toward a settlement that would peacefully resolve their differences; and asks the military observers and the multinational implementation force (IFOR) to cooperate fully with each other.

The U.S. Representative said Resolutions 1037 and 1038 would further advance the peace process in the former Yugoslavia. The United States played a facilitating role in the negotiations that led to the November 12 basic agreement between Croatia and the local Serbs. This agreement provides an opportunity to resolve the conflict over Eastern Slavonia. It calls for peaceful reintegration of those territories with Croatia, and it protects the human rights of all residents, including the local Serb population, and provides for the return of refugees. Strict implementation of the agreement will lead to a peaceful solution in which people are allowed to choose their leaders through free and democratic elections. The resolution creating UNTAES provides, as requested by the parties, that this operation will be able to govern the region in an authoritative fashion for the short-term future, to provide the kind of stewardship the region and its people deserve. In agreeing to undertake this complex responsibility, the international community demands that both the Serb and Croat sides fully implement the November 12 agreement; it will not tolerate actions that endanger the lives of the peacekeepers, and it has the capability to punish anyone who endangers the lives of UNTAES personnel.

S/Res/1043 January 31 15(US)-0-0

Decides to authorize, as part of UNTAES, the deployment of 100 military observers for a period of six months.

S/Res/1066 July 15 15(US)-0-0

Authorizes the UN military observers to continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula, in accordance with Resolutions 779 (1992) and 981 (1995) and the Secretary General's report of December 13, 1995, until January 15, 1997; urges the parties to continue their negotiations with a view to normalizing fully their bilateral relations; and encourages the parties to adopt the practical options proposed by the UN military observers to reduce tension.

S/Res/1069 July 30 15(US)-0-0

Authorizes, as part of UNTAES and in accordance with the provisions of Resolution 1037 (1996), the deployment of 100 military observers for an additional period of six months, until January 15, 1997.

S/Res/1079

November 15

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: calls upon the Government of Croatia and the local Serb community to cooperate with UNTAES in creating the conditions for holding local elections; reaffirms the importance of compliance by all parties with their commitments to respect human rights; reaffirms the right of all persons originating from Croatia to return to their homes; emphasizes the responsibility of both the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb community to improve the transitional police force; decides to maintain the UN presence in the region until the end of the extended transitional period as provided for in the basic agreement between the parties; decides to extend the mandate of UNTAES until July 15, 1997; and asks the Secretary General, after successful holding of elections, to give the Council his recommendations regarding further UN presence, possibly a restructured UNTAES for the six-month period beginning July 16, 1997.

CUBA

S/Res/1067

July 26

13(US)-0-2

Endorses the conclusions of the report of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the resolution adopted by the Council of ICAO on June 27, 1996; notes that the unlawful shooting down by the Cuban Air Force of two civil aircraft on February 24, 1996, violated the principle that states must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, when intercepting civil aircraft, the lives of persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must not be endangered; expresses deep regret over the loss of lives; calls on all parties to comply with international civil aviation law and procedures; reaffirms the principle that each state shall take appropriate measures to prohibit deliberate use of any civil aircraft registered in or operated by a resident of that state for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the Chicago Convention of 1944 regarding civil aviation; condemns the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight as incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity, the rules of customary international law, and the standards and practices set out in the annexes of the Chicago Convention, and calls upon Cuba to join with other states in complying with their obligations under these provisions. (China and Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Representative thanked Security Council members for this overwhelming support and for the condolences expressed for the deaths of the pilots. Despite all the words of the Cuban representative there was nothing to change the fact that ICAO concluded that Cuba

shot down two civilian planes over international waters in violation of all norms of civil aviation. And the Council has now endorsed ICAO's conclusions and thereby rejected Cuba's case completely. Also, there was nothing to indicate regret by the Cuban Government, no condolences, and no willingness to take responsibility for this act in violation of international law. Without inquiry, without warning, without regard to law and decency, the Cuban Government sentenced four U.S. civilians to death over international waters. Now the Council has declared Cuba guilty of violating international law. It is time for Cuba to accept the judgment.

CYPRUS

S/Res/1062

June 28

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to December 31, 1996; deplores the fatal shooting of a Greek Cypriot National Guardsman inside the UN buffer zone; expresses serious concern about the continuing modernization and upgrading of military forces in Cyprus, the excessive levels of military forces and armaments, and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops, and stresses the importance of eventual demilitarization of Cyprus; expresses serious concern also about recent military exercises in the region, including overflights in the airspace of Cyprus; calls upon the military authorities on both sides to: (a) respect the integrity of the UN buffer zone, (b) enter immediately into discussions with UNFICYP to prohibit along the ceasefire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone, (c) clear all minefields in the buffer zone, (d) cease military construction in the immediate vicinity of the buffer zone, and (e) enter immediately into discussions with UNFICYP about extending the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other; urges all concerned, especially the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to lift and prevent all obstacles to the contacts provided by bi-communal events; asks the Secretary General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring; and urges the leaders of the two communities to break the present impasse and establish common ground on which direct negotiations can be resumed.

S/Res/1092

December 23

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNFICYP until June 30, 1997; deplores the violent incidents in August, September, and October, in

particular the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side; calls upon the parties to accept the reciprocal measures proposed by UNFICYP: extending the unarming agreements, prohibiting loaded weapons along the ceasefire lines, and adopting a code of conduct based on the concept of minimal force and proportional response; calls upon the military authorities on both sides to clear minefields, cease military construction in the vicinity of the buffer zone, and refrain from military exercises along the buffer zone; expresses concern about military exercises in the region, including overflights of Cyprus airspace; calls upon the leaders of both Cypriot communities to create a climate of reconciliation and confidence; reaffirms its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a state of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession; and asks the Secretary General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring.

GEORGIA

S/Res/1036

January 12

15(US)-0-0

Expresses deep concern at the continued deadlock in efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia; demands that the Abkhaz side accelerate significantly the process of voluntary return of refugees; condemns the ethnic killings and human rights violations committed in Abkhazia, and calls upon the Abkhaz side to ensure the safety of all persons; calls upon the parties to improve their cooperation with the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to provide a secure environment for the return of refugees and calls upon them to honor their commitments regarding security and freedom of movement of all UN and CIS personnel and regarding UNOMIG inspections of heavy weapons storage sites; and decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG to July 12, 1996, subject to a review by the Council in the event of any changes that may be made in the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force.

The U.S. Deputy Representative expressed the firm support of the U.S. Government for extension of UNOMIG, which has served as a positive element in the international community's efforts to resolve the conflict in Georgia. The United States deeply regrets the lack of

progress in achieving a political solution. The Abkhaz side should note that the Security Council has not wavered in its absolute support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. But broad autonomy is available to the Abkhaz people. The Abkhaz side should accelerate significantly the voluntary return of refugees, and human rights in Abkhazia should be protected. All parties are called upon to cooperate with UNOMIG and to allow its personnel to carry out their mission without interference or opposition.

S/Res/1065

July 12

15(US)-0-0

Affirms the unacceptability of demographic changes resulting from the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia; condemns ethnically motivated killings and other violence; calls upon the parties to prevent mine laying; decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG to January 31, 1997, subject to review if changes are made in the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force; asks the Secretary General to report to the Council by August 15, 1996, on possible arrangements for establishment of a human rights office in Sukhumi; and asks the Secretary General to consider means of providing technical and financial assistance for reconstruction of the economy of Abkhazia following the successful outcome of the political negotiations.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the situation in Abkhazia has not improved, the talks are stalled, the Abkhaz are apparently as intransigent as ever, a quarter of a million refugees are still deprived of the comfort of their homes, and the threat to the unarmed observers of UNOMIG has grown. This resolution addresses these issues. It reaffirms the territorial integrity of Georgia, and it calls for intensified efforts to achieve a comprehensive political settlement. It reflects the fact that the parties have not displayed equal amounts of flexibility. The Abkhaz leadership acts as if an independent Abkhazia were a possibility. It is not. President Shevardnadze, on the other hand, has offered Abkhazia broad autonomy that could include a parliament and a supreme court. Agreement on opening a human rights center in Sukhumi represents a first step in breaking down the barriers of mistrust and hatred. The U.S. Government expects that serious consideration will be given to financing this office through voluntary contributions, rather than adding this financial and administrative burden to UNOMIG. The United States expects to be able to make a substantial voluntary contribution to the office. The U.S. Government shares the Secretary General's observation that the international community cannot continue to request resources for peacemaking and peacekeeping in situations where there is little prospect of making progress. It is only the parties who can establish peace, and they must do it through dialogue and mutual

accommodation. If the parties do not demonstrate the necessary will to cooperate, and if the status quo continues for another six months, they must face the possibility that the international community will take an even closer look at whether UNOMIG belongs in Georgia.

S/Res/1077

October 22

14(US)-0-1

Decides that the human rights office in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, referred to in the Secretary General's reports of July 1 and August 9, 1996, shall form part of UNOMIG; asks the Secretary General to continue to work closely with the Government of Georgia in determining the office's priorities and in implementation of its monitoring of human rights; and asks the Secretary General to pursue follow-up arrangements with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. (China abstained.)

HAITI

S/Res/1048

February 29

15(US)-0-0

Welcomes the democratic election of a new President in Haiti and the peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected President to another on February 7, 1996; reaffirms the importance of a professional national police force to the consolidation of peace, stability, and democracy and revitalization of Haiti's system of justice; decides that to assist the Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities to (a) sustain, by the presence of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), the secure and stable environment that has been established, and (b) professionalize the Haitian National Police, the mandate of UNMIH is extended for the final period of four months; decides to decrease the troop level of UNMIH to no more than 1,200 and to reduce the current level of civilian police personnel to no more than 300; asks the Secretary General to implement steps for further reduction of the strength of UNMIH consistent with implementation of this mandate; and asks the Secretary General to initiate planning not later than June 1, 1996, for the complete withdrawal of UNMIH.

The U.S. Representative said this resolution marks another milestone in Haiti's journey from tyranny to democracy. In response to the request of Haiti's new president, the international community has approved an extension of the UN mission, renewing its support of Haitian security and stability and of assisting the national police. This will allow the Haitian Government to consolidate and expand further its recent political, social, and economic advances. A new era has now dawned. Haiti's government is committed to providing justice to all its

citizens, not to depriving them of security. The United States welcomes that commitment, but an effective and professional national police cannot be invented overnight. The police need more time. The continued presence of a modest number of peacekeepers will help provide that time and thus reduce the likelihood of violence and disruption. The U.S. Government is heartened by the decision of Canada to offer to play a leadership role in the next phase of the UN mission. It also welcomes the call in this resolution for voluntary contributions to fulfill this mandate. The United States urges every UN member to assist in appropriate ways, and urges continued efforts on behalf of the emergency economic recovery program. The door to private investment must be open. The value of this resolution is also reflected in the unanimous support for it demonstrated by all Western Hemisphere states. The future of Haiti rests, as it must, in Haitian hands. Democratic institutions cannot be imposed upon a society; they must be nourished from within.

S/Res/1063

June 28

15(US)-0-0

Affirms the importance of a professional, self-sustaining, fully functioning national police force of adequate size and structure to consolidate democracy and revitalize Haiti's system of justice; decides to establish the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) until November 30, 1996, to assist the Government of Haiti in professionalization of the police and in maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of efforts to establish and train an effective national police force; decides that UNSMIH initially will be composed of 300 civilian police personnel and 600 troops; recognizes that major tasks facing the Haitian Government and people include economic reconstruction and stresses the importance that the Government of Haiti and the international financial institutions agree as soon as possible on the steps necessary to enable provision of additional financial support; and asks that all states provide appropriate support and make voluntary contributions to the trust fund established to support the Haitian police to ensure that they are adequately trained and fully operational.

The U.S. Representative said that UNMIH, since assuming responsibility from the U.S.-led multinational force early in 1995, has helped to ensure a climate of security within which free elections could be held, economic activity could increase, political reconciliation could occur, and construction of democratic institutions could begin. Thanks in part to the actions of the Council, Haiti is recovering. The government chosen by the people is committed to serving the people. The systematic deprivation of human rights has come to an end. The pervasive fear has been replaced by a resurgence of hope. The process of economic revitalization is under way. But Haiti continues to need a helping hand

against those who will use violence or corruption to obtain what they cannot—or will not—earn through honest work. The past perversion of power has required that this capability be built from the ground up. The process of building effective law enforcement, judicial, and prosecutorial capabilities takes time. In the months ahead, the UN's role in Haiti will continue to diminish. Not long ago, there were 22,000 troops in Haiti. In February 1995, a UN deployment of 6,000 was approved. This resolution authorizes a UN-funded force of 600 military, with the understanding that additional troops will be funded on a voluntary basis by the United States and Canada to keep 1,300 troops ready to assist the Haitian Government and the civilian police monitors. This trend is a dramatic rebuttal to those who suggested that any intervention in Haiti would lead to occupation. It is vital that the Haitian Government and the international financial institutions agree on the terms of economic assistance. Friends of Haiti must continue their efforts to help Haitian society move ahead. And the door to private investment must be open. Ultimately, Haitian authorities will have to assume full responsibility for public order. They understand and desire that. Our shared objective is to accomplish that transition in a manner that allows economic and social progress to accelerate. This Council has kept faith with the people of Haiti and honored its own responsibility as a guardian of international security, law, and peace.

S/Res/1085

November 29

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend UNSMIH's mandate for an additional period terminating on December 5, 1996.

S/Res/1086

December 5

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNSMIH to May 31, 1997, with 300 civilian police personnel and 500 troops, except that, if the Secretary General reports by March 31, 1997, that UNSMIH can make a further contribution to the goals of consolidating democracy and revitalizing Haiti's system of justice, it will be further extended, following a review by the Council, for the final time until July 31, 1997.

The U.S. Deputy Representative noted that gains have been made in Haiti. A new civilian police force has been established. The economy is beginning to improve. Privatization reforms have been passed. The climate of democratization has made it possible for the average people of Haiti to go about their daily lives free from the fear of officially sanctioned violence. Despite the progress, however, obstacles remain. There are individuals and groups that oppose the democratic path. The

continuation of UNSMIH will allow the transition to public safety to go forward.

IRAQ

S/Res/1051

March 27

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: approves the provisions for the monitoring mechanism contained in Annex I of the letter of December 7, 1995, from the Chairman of the Special Commission monitoring certain sales or supplies to Iraq; approves also the general implementing principles in Annex II of that letter; and demands that Iraq unconditionally meet all obligations under this mechanism.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the unanimous vote on the resolution underlines the Council's complete faith in the UN Special Commission. He saluted the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for formulating the monitoring mechanism. This monitoring mechanism is essential if the Council is ever to be convinced that Iraq is committed not to develop weapons of mass destruction again. In that sense, this very technical step is a prerequisite for the lifting of sanctions, but the only step that will truly bring closer the lifting of sanctions will be a new Iraqi attitude of cooperation—with the IAEA, the Special Commission, and the Council—in meeting all Iraq's obligations.

S/Res/1060

June 12

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: deplores the refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, which constitutes a clear violation of Council Resolutions 687, 707, and 715; and demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission and allow its inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records, and means of transportation they wish to inspect.

The U.S. Representative said the Council must not tolerate challenges to its authority. The Iraqi regime must not be allowed to interfere with the work of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Iraq will respond only if the Council acts quickly and forcefully; that is why it is important that the Council's message be swift and strong, and this resolution meets those tests. UNSCOM has been empowered by the Council to ensure the end of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and to act within that mandate to see that Iraq never again threatens the international community. The progress in dismantling

Iraq's WMD capability is the result of UNSCOM's determination to follow the evidence wherever it might lead and whether the Iraqi regime likes it or not. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, its campaign against the Kurds and Shia, and its use of terrorism are ample and incontrovertible proof that this regime still poses a serious threat to the security of the region. Blocking UNSCOM inspectors from an entire category of suspect sites is a new situation and is a matter of grave concern to the U.S. Government.

LIBERIA

S/Res/1041

January 29

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until May 31, 1996; calls upon the parties to implement agreements entered into, in particular with regard to the ceasefire, disarmament, and demobilization of combatants, and national reconciliation; condemns the recent armed attacks against personnel of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG); stresses that continued support by the international community for the peace process in Liberia, including the participation of UNOMIL, is contingent on the demonstrated enduring commitment by the Liberian parties to resolve their differences peacefully and to achieve national reconciliation; and reminds states of their obligation to comply strictly with the arms embargo.

The U.S. Representative expressed support for the extension of the UNOMIL mandate, but said this support is not without reservations. The United States and the international community can offer a helping hand, but only Liberians can pull themselves out of the horror of war. Further delay will not be tolerated. The forces of peace and reconciliation must demonstrate that they are more powerful than those that would wreak further destruction on the innocent Liberian people. It is time to implement the provisions of the Abuja Agreement—getting the fighters to give up their weapons and rejoin society. There must be strict implementation of disarmament and demobilization agreements. ECOMOG must deploy as quickly as possible to help create the conditions necessary for peace, and the Council of State must redouble its efforts to move the peace process forward. UNOMIL personnel must investigate and report on human rights abuses. Extension of the UNOMIL mandate is an important demonstration of the Council's commitment to restore peace in Liberia, but this commitment demands equal goodwill from the Liberian side. Liberia's leaders must seize the opportunity for peace which their neighbors in West Africa and the entire international com-

munity have created. Their failure to act will endanger further assistance from the international community.

S/Res/1059

May 31

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIL until August 31, 1996; recognizes that the deterioration of the security situation on the ground warranted the Secretary General's decision to temporarily reduce the strength of UNOMIL; condemns all attacks against personnel of ECOMOG, UNOMIL, and international humanitarian organizations and agencies as well as the looting of their equipment, supplies, and property; calls upon the Liberian parties to implement fully and expeditiously all the agreements and commitments they have already entered into, in particular the Abuja Agreement, and in this regard demands that they restore an effective and comprehensive ceasefire, withdraw all fighters and arms from Monrovia, and allow deployment of ECOMOG; stresses that continued support by the international community for the peace process in Liberia, including participation of UNOMIL, is contingent on the Liberian parties' demonstrating their commitment to resolve their differences peacefully; and expresses support for the resolve of ECOWAS ministers not to recognize any government in Liberia that comes to office through the use of force.

S/Res/1071

August 30

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIL until November 30, 1996; welcomes the agreement of ECOWAS in Abuja on August 17 which extended the 1995 Abuja Agreement to June 15, 1997, established a timetable for implementation of the Agreement, adopted a mechanism to verify compliance, and proposed possible measures against the factions in the event of noncompliance; condemns all attacks against and intimidation of personnel of ECOMOG, UNOMIL, and the international organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance as well as the looting of their equipment, supplies, and personal property; condemns the practice of some factions of recruiting, training, and deploying children for combat; and stresses the obligation of all states to comply strictly with the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 788 (1992).

The U.S. Deputy Representative noted that the bloody, destructive civil war in Liberia had gone on for seven years and that use of children in combat was an especially abhorrent practice. The regional leaders, meeting in Abuja in August, took a bold step. They agreed to reinvalidate their 1995 agreement, including a timetable for implementation and the threat of sanctions for those who obstructed progress. The Liberian

faction leaders appear to have accepted this new timetable. The United States will be monitoring their actions closely. It is only on the basis of honest implementation of the new timetable that the United States is able to support the Secretary General's call for increased deployments of UNOMIL. The U.S. Government will follow events closely and calibrate its actions to coincide with progress toward implementation of the Abuja Agreement.

S/Res/1083 November 27 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIL until March 31, 1997.

(THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF) MACEDONIA

S/Res/1046 February 13 15(US)-0-0

Decides to authorize, for the duration of the present mandate, an increase in the strength of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by 50 military personnel in order to provide for a continued engineering capability; approves establishment of the position of Force Commander of UNPREDEP; and asks the Secretary General to submit to the Council by May 20 further recommendations on the composition, strength, and mandate of UNPREDEP in the light of developments in the region.

S/Res/1058 May 30 14(US)-0-1

Decides to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP for a period terminating on November 30, 1996; and asks the Secretary General to review the composition, strength, and mandate of UNPREDEP and to report to the Council by September 30. (Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Representative said UNPREDEP has been a success; it has prevented the conflict in the region from spreading into The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) for three and a half years. While the imminent risk of war has been reduced, the peace process in the former Yugoslavia remains fragile, and underlying tensions remain. The presence of UNPREDEP clearly continues to have a reassuring, stabilizing, and confidence-building effect in the FYROM and in the region. Hence, the continuation of UNPREDEP is well worth the cost. Any change to UNPREDEP's mandate or structure now would have a potentially destabilizing effect on the peace process in the Balkans. It is vital to avoid adding any elements of uncertainty to the election process to be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-September. The U.S. Gov-

ernment believes strongly that peacekeeping mandates, including that of UNPREDEP, should be examined periodically to determine whether they are still necessary or can be implemented with fewer resources, and it looks forward to the day when peace in the Balkans is so strong that there will no longer be a need for UNPREDEP. But that day has not yet arrived; and continuation of UNPREDEP will contribute to the likelihood that peace will endure and that that day will come.

S/Res/1082

November 27

14(US)-0-1

Decides to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP to May 31, 1997, with a reduction of its military component by 300 by April 30, 1997, with a view to concluding the mandate as and when circumstances permit; and asks the Secretary General to make recommendations on a subsequent international presence. (Russia abstained.)

MIDDLE EAST

S/Res/1039

January 29

15(US)-0-0

Decides, responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, to extend the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for six months, to July 31, 1996; welcomes the streamlining of the force; and stresses the need to continue efforts to achieve further savings by rationalizing the administrative and support services of the Force.

Not Adopted

April 18

4-0-11(US)

Strongly condemns the Israeli aggression against Lebanon. (The resolution did not receive enough affirmative votes for adoption. China, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, and Indonesia voted for it.)

The U.S. Representative pointed out that this draft resolution did not mention the Hezbollah strikes launched from Lebanese territory against civilian centers in Israel that led to the actions taken by Israel. Instead, it was one-sided and highly selective in its discussion of the violence. By singling out Israel for condemnation, it would have set back, not advanced, negotiations toward an end to the fighting. (Resolution 1052 below—which calls upon both sides to respect the safety and security of civilians—better reflects a sense of fairness and balance.)

S/Res/1052

April 18

15(US)-0-0

Deplores the incident on April 18 in which shelling resulted in heavy loss of life among civilians at a UNIFIL site; calls for immediate cessation of hostilities; calls upon all concerned to respect the safety and security of civilians and to respect the safety, security, and freedom of movement of UNIFIL and to allow it to fulfill its mandate without obstacle or interference; and calls for offers of humanitarian assistance and aid in reconstruction of Lebanon.

The U.S. Representative joined in expressing deep sorrow and shock at the loss of innocent civilian lives at a UNIFIL site in Lebanon and offered condolences. An end to the fighting is essential if diplomatic efforts, in which Secretary of State Christopher is fully engaged, are to move forward. The goal is a comprehensive and lasting peace throughout the Middle East. Unfortunately, the resolution put before the Council by Lebanon and others was not one the United States could support. That resolution did not mention that Israel's actions were in response to Hezbollah strikes launched from Lebanese territory against civilian centers in Israel. Instead, the draft resolution was one-sided and highly selective in its discussion of the violence. By singling out Israel alone for condemnation, it would have set back the negotiations toward an end to the fighting. A movement toward reconciliation requires restraint and a sense of fairness and balance that is present in the resolution just adopted, but not in the resolution put forward by Lebanon and others.

S/Res/1057

May 30

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for another six months, until November 30, 1996.

S/Res/1068

July 30

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months until January 31, 1997; condemns all acts of violence committed against UNIFIL; and welcomes the completion of the streamlining of the Force described in the Secretary General's report of July 20, 1996, and encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the Force's operational capacity.

S/Res/1073

September 28

14-0-1(US)

Calls for immediate cessation and reversal of all acts that have resulted in aggravation of the situation and have negative implications

for the Middle East peace process; calls for ensuring the safety and protection of Palestinian civilians; and calls for immediate resumption of negotiations in the Middle East peace process and timely implementation of agreements reached.

The U.S. Representative, during the debate leading up to this resolution, expressed regret at the loss of life during demonstrations that followed Israel's opening of a pedestrian tunnel in Jerusalem near Muslim holy sites, and extended condolences. The focus should be on how to stop the violence, which is a tragedy for the victims and for the hopes invested in the peace process. To restore that process is the best way to end the continuing sorrows. That process is the way to resolve key outstanding issues for implementation of the interim agreement. Both sides must reach out to each other as real partners. Partners must take into account the needs of others. Both sides must feel a sense of mutuality which underscores partnership and enables it to work. Both sides should keep that reality in mind as they consider their actions. Council members should focus on how to help, how to restore calm, how to encourage the peace process. Words in the Council are no substitute for action in the region. Only through action can hope be restored. Rhetoric offers no comfort to the victims and does not advance the cause of peace. Instead, it encourages extremism and diverts attention from the task of making progress toward a comprehensive and lasting peace. Attention should be turned not toward condemnation, but toward encouraging the parties to restore the peace process. The U.S. Representative told the press that the U.S. Government was working intensively to try to get the parties to a meeting. Hoping to give the parties every opportunity to come together, the U.S. Government abstained on the resolution.

S/Res/1081

November 27

15(US)-0-0

Decides to renew the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months, to May 31, 1997.

RWANDA

S/Res/1050

March 8

15(US)-0-0

Notes arrangements by the Secretary General for withdrawal of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) pursuant to Resolution 1029 (1995); authorizes elements of UNAMIR remaining in Rwanda prior to their withdrawal to contribute to protection of personnel and premises of the International Tribunal for Rwanda; encourages the Secre-

tary General to maintain in Rwanda a UN office, including the present UN communications system and radio station; underlines the importance of efforts to facilitate return of refugees; calls for assistance for reconstruction of Rwanda and rehabilitation of infrastructure, including the justice system; calls for contributions to the costs of the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda; and asks the Secretary General to report on arrangements agreed upon with Rwanda for protection of personnel and premises of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

The U.S. Deputy Representative noted that UNAMIR was drawing to a close and a new era of relations with the Government of Rwanda was beginning. UNAMIR was created to oversee a peace agreement, but the former Rwandan government had not honored that agreement. Instead, Rwanda experienced the worst genocide in Africa, and had not yet fully recovered. The Government of Rwanda has now made great progress in bringing peace and security, UNAMIR has made a significant contribution to that progress, and the international community must continue to help with the hard tasks ahead. This resolution lays a solid foundation for continuing cooperation between the UN and Rwanda in a new form. After UNAMIR departs, the UN will maintain a political office in Rwanda headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General. The Special Representative will have the authority to coordinate UN agencies involved in reconstruction and development, and will play an active role in promoting national reconciliation. There cannot be long-lasting peace and stability in Rwanda and the region unless the refugees return. The Special Representative should encourage repatriation as one of his highest priorities. Sufficient resources must be made available to the International Tribunal for Rwanda so it can accomplish its difficult task with as much speed as justice permits. Rwanda's neighbors must offer full support to the Commission of Inquiry in its investigation of reports of sale or supply of arms to former Rwandan government forces.

S/Res/1053

April 23

15(US)-0-0

Asks the Secretary General to maintain the Commission of Inquiry to follow up its earlier investigations and to pursue any further allegations of violations; calls upon states in the region to ensure that their territory is not used as a base for armed groups to launch incursions or attacks; urges all states to intensify efforts to prevent military training and sale or supply of weapons to militia groups or former Rwandan government forces and to ensure effective implementation of the arms embargo; and asks the Secretary General to consult with states neighboring Rwanda, in particular Zaire, on appropriate measures, including possible deployment of UN observers in the airfields and other trans-

portation points in and around border crossing points, for the purpose of better implementation of the arms embargo.

The U.S. spokesman, stating that the Commission of Inquiry had done an excellent job and that evidence of violations of the arms embargo were shocking, called on all governments to cooperate fully with the Commission's investigations. All UN members are obligated to assist the Commission. The embargo on sales and transfers of arms to former Rwandan armed forces and militias was imposed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, such arms sales being threats to international peace and security. The ex-Rwandan armed forces have already used their weapons to commit genocide, and now they are using their arms to spread terror and insecurity inside Rwanda. Their armed insurgency must be stopped. Those leaders of the ex-Rwandan armed forces who committed genocide should be prosecuted by the International Tribunal for Rwanda. The United States is determined to enforce this arms embargo, and this Commission of Inquiry is part of that enforcement effort. The U.S. Government calls upon all UN members to enforce the embargo and to cooperate with the Commission.

SECRETARY GENERAL APPOINTMENT

Not Adopted November 19 14-1(US)-0

Recommends to the General Assembly that Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali be appointed Secretary General of the United Nations for a second term of office from January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2001.

The United States vetoed this draft resolution, hence it was not adopted. It is the U.S. view that the United Nations should elect a new Secretary General, one committed to UN reform, and who has the management and administrative skills and leadership abilities to guide the United Nations effectively.

S/Res/1090 December 13 Adopted by Acclamation

Recommends to the General Assembly that Mr. Kofi Annan be appointed Secretary General of the United Nations for a term of office from January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2001.

S/Res/1091 December 13 Adopted by Acclamation

Acknowledges the contribution of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to international peace, security, and development, his exceptional efforts to solve international problems in economic, social, and cultural fields, as well as his endeavors to meet humanitarian

needs and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all; and expresses deep appreciation to Secretary General Boutros-Ghali for his dedication to the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter and to the development of friendly relations among nations.

SUDAN

S/Res/1044

January 31

15(US)-0-0

Calls upon the Government of Sudan to comply with the requests of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to: (a) extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects sheltering in Sudan and wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on the life of the President of Egypt in Addis Ababa on June 26, 1995, and (b) desist from assisting, supporting, and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements and act in its relations with its neighbors in full conformity with the UN and OAU charters; and asks the Secretary General, in consultation with the OAU, to seek Sudan's cooperation in implementing this resolution and report to the Council within 60 days.

The U.S. Representative said the terrorist attack on President Mubarak, carried out by Egyptian nationals who had used Khartoum as a base of operations, would have undermined the peace and stability of the north African and Middle East regions if it had succeeded. It must be condemned for this reason and also to demonstrate the international community's condemnation of terrorism as a means to affect internal and bilateral conflicts. This resolution gives the message to terrorists and their sponsors that the number of places of refuge is becoming ever smaller. The Government of Sudan, which must bear responsibility for the acts it allows its guests to perform, also has the responsibility to extradite those guests to face justice. Positive bilateral relations between the United States and Sudan are not built on declarations but on concrete actions. The United States supports this resolution because, like the OAU decisions on which it is based, its requirements are logical and justified. Indeed, the obligation to extradite dangerous criminals is among the minimum obligations of states that wish to live in peace with their neighbors.

S/Res/1054

April 26

13(US)-0-2

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: demands that the Government of Sudan comply without further delay with the requests set out

in Resolution 1044 by: (a) extraditing to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects sheltered in Sudan and wanted in connection with the assassination attempt of June 26, 1995, on the life of the President of Egypt in Addis Ababa, and (b) desisting from assisting, supporting, and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements; decides that all states shall: (a) significantly reduce the number and level of staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain, and (b) restrict entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of Sudan and members of the Sudanese armed forces; and calls upon all international and regional organizations not to convene any conference in Sudan. (China and Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the U.S. Government supports this resolution, but with reservations, believing the sanctions outlined are insufficient to convince the Government of Sudan to cease its sponsorship of international terrorism. This resolution shows that the world community is not yet as prepared as it should be to fight with determination against state-sponsored terrorism. Resolution 1044 required that Sudan surrender the three remaining suspects in the Mubarak assassination attempt and to cease its support for terrorism. The Sudan Government has refused to comply. Instead, it smuggled the three suspects out of Sudan. The United States will not be satisfied until Sudan has fulfilled its responsibility; its claim that it has tried to locate the suspects has no credibility. Sudan has harbored them and protected them. Sudan's complicity in and efforts to cover up the attack on President Mubarak are only part of a broader pattern of Sudanese support for terrorism. Sudan has welcomed a long list of terrorist organizations, providing a meeting point and training center for their violent activities outside Sudan. To support its terrorist clients, Sudan regularly abuses the prerogatives of sovereign states by giving Sudanese passports to help non-Sudanese terrorists travel freely, by using Sudan Airways to transport terrorists and their weapons, by making financial resources and safe refuges available to terrorists, and by providing them weapons. Today's resolution is a step toward action. It includes a determination that Sudan's actions in supporting terrorist attacks are a threat to international peace and security. By imposing initial sanctions, the Council is telling the Government of Sudan that it will not be content with mere words. The U.S. Government favors these steps, but they are not big enough. Firmer measures must be taken. If the Government of Sudan does not turn over the suspects and stop supporting other terrorists, the Council will be back here in two months to do whatever it takes to compel Sudan to abide by the rules of civilized nations.

S/Res/1070

August 16

13(US)-0-2

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: demands once again that the Government of Sudan comply fully and without further delay with the requests set out in Resolutions 1044 and 1054; decides that all states shall deny aircraft permission to take off from, land in, or overfly their territories if the aircraft is registered in Sudan, or owned, leased, or operated by or on behalf of Sudan Airways or the Government or public authorities of Sudan; and decides that the Council shall, 90 days after adoption of this resolution, determine the date of entry into force of the aforementioned provisions, unless the Secretary General reports before then that Sudan has complied with Resolutions 1044 and 1054. (China and Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Deputy Representative noted that Sudan has refused so far to comply with the two straightforward requirements demanded of it: surrender of the three suspects responsible for plotting the terrorist attack on Egyptian President Mubarak and the end of its support for terrorism. What the world has witnessed instead is a phony Sudanese public relations campaign to try to convince the world that Sudan has cooperated in the security field. But the international community is neither confused nor distracted by such tactical ploys. Instead, it is prepared to apply measured, incremental pressure on the Government of Sudan until it meets fully its obligations. The Council has carefully avoided aggravating the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. This resolution is a wake-up call to Sudanese authorities. In 90 days, the Council will meet to decide the entry into force of the sanctions agreed upon in this resolution, and to set up their modalities. Because of the binding nature of this decision, there can be no question of backtracking if Sudan remains obstinate. There must be no confusion on that point. The purpose of this grace period is to give Sudan a chance to abandon its attempt to defy the will of the Security Council and the norms of international decency. To avoid these sanctions, the Sudanese Government must take meaningful and convincing steps to cooperate in tracking down the three suspects and to bring an end to Sudanese support of these terrorist groups. The Council's patient approach must not be misread; continued noncompliance will bring these measures into force and compel consideration of further steps.

TAJIKISTAN

S/Res/1061

June 14

15(US)-0-0

Calls upon the parties to cease hostilities immediately and to comply fully with the Tehran Agreement; decides to extend the mandate of

the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) until December 15, 1996, subject to the proviso that the Tehran Agreement remains in force and the parties demonstrate their commitment to an effective ceasefire, national reconciliation, and promotion of democracy; and calls upon the parties to resume the inter-Tajik talks, cooperate fully with UNMOT, and resume the activities of the Joint Commission.

The U.S. Representative said the United States supports extension of the mandate of UNMOT, but underlines its serious concern about the deterioration of the military situation in Tajikistan and the continued lack of progress in the inter-Tajik talks. The U.S. Government urges both sides to end the fighting and to abide strictly by the terms of the ceasefire. The lack of progress in the peace talks is also a serious problem; the United States is dismayed by the seeming inability of the two sides thus far to agree even on confidence-building measures such as prisoner exchanges. One key element toward national reconciliation would be resumption of the operations of the Joint Commission for monitoring the ceasefire accord. The two sides must also abide by their commitment to allow UNMOT observers freedom of movement and unfettered access to areas where ceasefire violations may have occurred. The U.S. Government strongly endorses this resolution's call for a review of UNMOT's future should prospects for the peace process not improve during the mandate period. UNMOT's presence is a concrete demonstration of the international community's commitment to helping the Tajik parties achieve peace and national reconciliation, but UNMOT can be truly effective only if the parties themselves recommit themselves to these objectives.

S/Res/1089

December 13

15(US)-0-0

Condemns violations of the ceasefire; condemns terrorist acts and other acts of violence; decides to extend the mandate of UNMOT until March 15, 1997, subject to the proviso that the Tehran Agreement remains in force and the parties demonstrate their commitment to an effective ceasefire, to national reconciliation, and to the promotion of democracy; calls upon the parties to cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary General in resuming the inter-Tajik talks in order to achieve a political settlement of the conflict; welcomes the efforts of the Joint Commission in defusing tensions; strongly condemns the gross mistreatment of members of UNMOT by both parties; urges the Tajik parties to cooperate fully with the Red Cross to facilitate the exchange of prisoners and detainees; expresses serious concern at the indiscriminate use of landmines and the threat it poses to the population; expresses deep concern over the worsening of the humanitarian situation; and encourages states to contribute to the voluntary fund (to

support implementation of the ceasefire agreement) established by the Secretary General in accordance with Resolution 968 (1994).

WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS

S/Res/1047

February 29

15(US)-0-0

Appoints Mrs. Louise Arbour as Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for Rwanda with effect from October 1, 1996, when Mr. Richard J. Goldstone's resignation takes effect.

WESTERN SAHARA

S/Res/1042

January 31

15(US)-0-0

Reiterates its commitment to the holding of a free, fair, and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan accepted by the parties; decides to extend the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until May 31, 1996; expresses deep concern about the stalemate hindering the identification process and the lack of progress toward completion of the Settlement Plan; and invites the Secretary General, in the absence of progress toward completion of the Settlement Plan, to submit for consideration a detailed program for a phased withdrawal of MINURSO.

In a press statement, the U.S. Representative expressed U.S. support for the Settlement Plan, including the referendum on the future status of the territory. The Plan remains the best course of action to resolve this long-standing dispute between Morocco and the Polisario. To fulfill their commitment to the Plan, the parties must show the will and determination to overcome problems with the identification process. They should undertake confidence-building measures to help destroy the walls of suspicion that stand between them. The Council, in this resolution, has expressed its strong commitment to assisting the parties in resolving their dispute. That commitment involves allocation of scarce resources at a time when peacekeeping operations are coming under strong scrutiny. The international community simply cannot afford to maintain operations where the disputants' commitment to overcoming obstacles is in question, where there is no discernible progress toward resolution, and where no end is in sight. The United

States supports extension of MINURSO's mandate, but, in the absence of progress, will immediately consider other options regarding MINURSO's future. The Council's efforts cannot continue indefinitely in the face of persistent procrastination and failure. Time is running out for MINURSO.

S/Res/1056

May 29

15(US)-0-0

Regrets that the required willingness does not exist to give MINURSO the cooperation needed for it to resume and complete the identification process, and that there has therefore been no significant progress towards implementation of the Settlement Plan; agrees with the recommendation of the Secretary General that the identification process be suspended, supports his proposal to reduce the strength of the military component of MINURSO by 20 percent, and endorses his view that the decision to suspend temporarily the work of the Identification Commission and to reduce the number of civilian police and military personnel does not imply any lessening of resolve to secure implementation of the Settlement Plan; supports the proposal of the Secretary General to maintain a political office to continue the dialogue with the parties and the two neighboring countries; encourages the parties to consider ways to create confidence between themselves in order to remove obstacles to implementation of the Settlement Plan; decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until November 30, 1996; and reminds the parties that if significant progress is not achieved during this period, the Council will have to consider other measures, including possible further reductions in the strength of MINURSO.

S/Res/1084

November 27

15(US)-0-0

Welcomes the steps taken by the parties to demonstrate goodwill, including the release of prisoners, and the recent indications that the parties are moving forward in their efforts to resolve outstanding questions concerning implementation of the Settlement Plan; decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until May 31, 1997; asks the Secretary General to provide an interim report by February 28, 1997, on his efforts with the parties to break the impasse blocking implementation of the Settlement Plan, and asks that he include in this report his proposed alternative steps should there be no meaningful progress; asks the Secretary General to keep the staffing size and configuration of the components of MINURSO under active review in order to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness; and asks the Secretary General to submit a comprehensive report on implementation of this resolution by May 9, 1997.

The U.S. Representative said in a press statement that the criterion for future U.S. support of MINURSO is the demonstrated political will of the parties to move forward. There are some signs of hope. The desire for dialogue still exists. Release of prisoners is also a sign of progress. But there is still a long way to go. The positions of the parties regarding the identification process remain at odds. And there is no indication that direct contacts have yielded anything tangible so far. The United States stands ready to facilitate any process, but cannot continue indefinitely without more practical results, particularly in light of the mounting cost. Therefore, attention must be given on an urgent basis to transforming MINURSO to support a genuine political process. The U.S. Government is gratified that the Secretary General has reduced the size of MINURSO's military and civilian elements, bringing the operation into closer conformity with today's fiscal realities and helping tailor it to the work at hand, which now centers on activities of the political office and in monitoring the ceasefire. The UN's ability to assist in resolving the conflict will be limited, however, unless more is done. For this reason, the U.S. Government wishes to highlight the request that the Secretary General propose alternative steps should no meaningful progress occur before the next renewal, and to focus on reviewing the staff size and components of MINURSO to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. Unless there is significant progress in reaching a political settlement, the United States could not support a further renewal of MINURSO in its present form.

YUGOSLAVIA

Resolutions concerning areas of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and included in this section in previous reports, are now listed in the Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and (TFYR) Macedonia sections above.

ZAIRE

S/Res/1078

November 9

15(US)-0-0

Condemns all acts of violence in eastern Zaire and calls for an immediate ceasefire; urges all parties to engage in a process of political dialogue and negotiation; welcomes the Secretary General's proposal that a multinational force be set up for humanitarian purposes in eastern Zaire; urges states to prepare arrangements to allow the immediate return of humanitarian organizations and the safe delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk in eastern

Zaire, and to create conditions for voluntary, orderly, and secure repatriation of refugees; decides that the cost of implementing such an operation will be borne by the participating member states and other voluntary contributions; asks the Secretary General to draw up a concept of operations and framework for a humanitarian task force, with military assistance if necessary, to deliver short-term humanitarian assistance and shelter to refugees and displaced persons in eastern Zaire, assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees with protection and voluntary repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and establish humanitarian corridors to deliver assistance and to assist in repatriation after carefully ascertaining the will to repatriate; asks the Secretary General to seek cooperation of the Government of Rwanda in building confidence and ensuring a safe return of refugees; calls on the Organization of African Unity and other international organizations to help defuse tension; and invites the Secretary General to determine the modalities of convening an international conference for peace in the region and to make arrangements to convene such a conference.

S/Res /1080

November 15

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: welcomes the offers by member states concerning establishment of a temporary multinational force for humanitarian purposes to facilitate the return of humanitarian organizations and effective delivery by civilian relief organizations of humanitarian aid in eastern Zaire, and to facilitate the voluntary, orderly repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; welcomes the offer by a member state (Canada) to take the lead in organizing and commanding this temporary multinational force; decides that the operation shall terminate on March 31, 1997, unless the Council, on the basis of a report of the Secretary General, determines that the objectives of the operation have been fulfilled earlier; decides that the cost of implementing this operation will be borne by the participating member states and other voluntary contributions; expresses its intention to authorize establishment of a follow-on operation to succeed the multinational force, and asks the Secretary General to submit a report by January 1, 1997, giving his recommendations regarding the possible mandate, structure, size, duration, and estimated costs of such an operation; and asks the Secretary General to initiate detailed planning and to determine the willingness of member states to contribute troops for the anticipated follow-on operation.

The U.S. Representative said the United States strongly supports the initiative of the Canadian Government to lead a multinational force to allow delivery of humanitarian assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the current crisis, with the dual function of facilitating

voluntary repatriation of refugees to their home countries. The United States welcomes the offers to participate in the force and the offers of humanitarian assistance. The long-term solution is voluntary repatriation of the refugees, and it appears that tens of thousands are taking advantage of the opportunity to return to Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda has taken credible steps and made further pledges to ensure the security of returning refugees and is working with international relief agencies to assist them upon their return. The United States is consulting with the governments of the region on arrangements for potential deployment of U.S. forces. The United States is also working closely with the Canadian and other governments, UN agencies, and the humanitarian community to determine humanitarian requirements and how to participate most usefully in the humanitarian efforts and in facilitating the orderly repatriation of the refugees. The United States applauds the efforts being made by the Secretary General's special envoy, the OAU and regional leaders, the European Union, and other mediators to address the underlying political problems that must be resolved before the region can achieve true peace and stability.

VOTING SUMMARIES

The table below lists the votes of Security Council members on the 59 resolutions introduced in 1996. Resolutions on which a Security Council member voted No or abstained are indicated by number in parentheses. The U.S. veto was the only negative vote during the year. There were only 10 abstentions on the 57 resolutions adopted: five by Russia, four by China, and one by the United States. A draft resolution on Lebanon on April 18 received only four affirmative votes and was not adopted. Eleven members abstained, including the United States.

COUNTRY	YES	NO	ABSTAIN
United States	56	1**	2 (*, 1073)
Botswana	58	0	1 (*)
Chile	58	0	1 (*)
China	55	0	4 (1054, 1067, 1070, 1077)
Egypt	59	0	0
France	58	0	1 (*)
Germany	58	0	1 (*)
Guinea-Bissau	59	0	0
Honduras	58	0	1 (*)
Indonesia	59	0	0
Italy	58	0	1 (*)
Korea, Republic of	58	0	1 (*)
Poland	58	0	1 (*)
Russia	53	0	6 (*, 1054, 1058, 1067, 1070, 1082)
United Kingdom	58	0	1 (*)


* Draft resolution on Lebanon on April 18, not adopted.

** Veto on November 19 of draft resolution recommending appointment of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali for a second term.


In the following table, Security Council votes are tabulated on the same basis as overall votes for the General Assembly in this report, and voting coincidence percentages are calculated accordingly. Hence, the two resolutions on which the United States abstained are not used in the calculations. Council members are ranked by coincidence with the United States. When the percentage is the same, members are ranked by the number of identical votes, and alphabetically when the number of votes is the same. It should be noted that group dynamics in the Security Council, whose 15 members frequently consult closely on issues before resolutions are presented for adoption, are quite different from those in the General Assembly.

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	VOTING COINCIDENCE
Botswana	56	1	0	98.2%
Chile	56	1	0	98.2%
Egypt	56	1	0	98.2%
France	56	1	0	98.2%
Germany	56	1	0	98.2%
Guinea-Bissau	56	1	0	98.2%
Honduras	56	1	0	98.2%
Indonesia	56	1	0	98.2%
Italy	56	1	0	98.2%
Korea, Republic of	56	1	0	98.2%
Poland	56	1	0	98.2%
United Kingdom	56	1	0	98.2%
China	52	1	4	98.1%
Russia	51	1	5	98.1%
Average	55.4	1.0	0.6	98.2%

Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements



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V - COUNTRY LISTINGS

This section pulls together information contained in previous sections, and presents it by country for 184 UN members (all except the United States). They are listed in alphabetical order, with Democratic People's Republic of Korea under "D", Republic of Korea under "R", The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under "T", and United Republic of Tanzania under "U", as they are seated at the UN General Assembly. Western Samoa is known in the United Nations as Samoa and is listed under "S". Burma, now known as Myanmar, is listed under "M". Each country listing contains the following:

— Summary coincidence percentages drawn from Sections II and III, and, for Security Council members, Section IV. Coincidence percentages for selected issue categories are included; they are derived by the same methodology used for overall plenary votes.

— Vote totals in the plenary and on the 12 important votes.

— Every vote on the 12 important issues (with the U.S. vote in parentheses for comparison). Symbols used here are Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, and X=Absent.

AFGHANISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 36, Abstain 4, Absent 16: 37.9%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 21.4%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 40.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 73.8%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

ALBANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 37, Disagree 17, Abstain 13, Absent 11: 68.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

— Arms Control: 88.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 29.4%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ALGERIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 42, Abstain 8, Absent 5: 35.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.2%

— Arms Control: 44.0%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 23.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 55.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.4%

Important Issues	VOTES
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

ANDORRA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 44, Disagree 16, Abstain 18, Absent 0: 73.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.6%

— Arms Control: 91.7%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.2%

Important Issues	VOTES
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ANGOLA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 40, Abstain 4, Absent 12: 35.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 82.8%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 21.1%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.1%

Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 4: 42.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.5%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 23.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(Y) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ARGENTINA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 34, Disagree 22, Abstain 22, Absent 0: 60.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 91.3%

— Arms Control: 75.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 41.2%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 88.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

ARMENIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 24, Abstain 15, Absent 8: 56.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 89.7%

— Arms Control: 76.2%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 27.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

AUSTRALIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 40, Disagree 22, Abstain 16, Absent 0: 64.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 91.5%

— Arms Control: 71.4%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

AUSTRIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 43, Disagree 19, Abstain 16, Absent 0: 69.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

— Arms Control: 80.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

AZERBAIJAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 27, Abstain 14, Absent 10: 50.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

— Arms Control: 66.7%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 22.7%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 3: 71.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BAHAMAS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 34, Abstain 10, Absent 3: 47.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.6%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 35.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

BAHRAIN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 28, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 5: 41.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

— Arms Control: 53.3%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BANGLADESH

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 42, Abstain 6, Absent 7: 35.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 82.9%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 2: 42.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

BARBADOS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 28, Disagree 29, Abstain 11, Absent 10: 49.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 87.3%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 45.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BELARUS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 30, Disagree 21, Abstain 27, Absent 0: 58.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 91.5%

— Arms Control: 68.2%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 27.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

BELGIUM

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 46, Disagree 15, Abstain 16, Absent 1: 75.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.1%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	N
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BELIZE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 28, Disagree 35, Abstain 10, Absent 5: 44.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.8%

— Arms Control: 53.3%; Human Rights: 83.3%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

BENIN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 40, Abstain 10, Absent 1: 40.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

— Arms Control: 60.7%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 57.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BHUTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 38, Abstain 11, Absent 7: 36.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.1%

— Arms Control: 48.3%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 57.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	N

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

BOLIVIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 38, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 44.9%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

— Arms Control: 56.7%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 30, Disagree 22, Abstain 15, Absent 11: 57.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 90.1%

— Arms Control: 75.0%; Human Rights: 83.3%; Middle East: 26.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 3: 75.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

BOTSWANA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 41, Abstain 6, Absent 2: 41.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.3%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 31.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 60.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.4%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BRAZIL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 28, Disagree 38, Abstain 10, Absent 2: 42.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 52.0%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 26.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 43, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 40.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

— Arms Control: 53.1%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 18.2%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BULGARIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 40, Disagree 15, Abstain 23, Absent 0: 72.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.0%

— Arms Control: 91.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

BURKINA FASO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 41, Abstain 8, Absent 2: 39.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.1%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 42.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

BURUNDI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 21, Disagree 40, Abstain 11, Absent 6: 34.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 15.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 1: 33.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

CAMBODIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 36, Abstain 10, Absent 3: 44.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

— Arms Control: 58.1%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 55.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

CAMEROON

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 38, Abstain 12, Absent 6: 36.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.2%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 16.7%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 5, Absent 1: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

CANADA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 46, Disagree 17, Abstain 15, Absent 0: 73.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.4%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 38.9%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

CAPE VERDE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 21, Disagree 35, Abstain 6, Absent 16: 37.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.8%

— Arms Control: 52.0%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 18.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 57.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 78: 0.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 12: 0.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

CHAD

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 37, Abstain 5, Absent 13: 38.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.7%

— Arms Control: 53.3%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

CHILE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 34, Disagree 39, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 46.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 70.0%; Middle East: 30.4%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

CHINA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 19, Disagree 45, Abstain 10, Absent 4: 29.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 82.1%

— Arms Control: 41.7%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 7, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 22.2%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 71.2%

Security Council Votes: 98.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

COLOMBIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 42, Abstain 8, Absent 1: 39.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 23.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 55.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

COMOROS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 2, Absent 66: 40.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.8%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 1, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 77.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

CONGO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 27, Abstain 9, Absent 19: 46.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.8%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 40.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 2, Abstain 5, Absent 2: 60.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

COSTA RICA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 30, Disagree 28, Abstain 6, Absent 14: 51.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 87.4%

— Arms Control: 58.6%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 54.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

COTE D'IVOIRE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 34, Abstain 14, Absent 7: 40.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

— Arms Control: 55.2%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 5, Absent 1: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

CROATIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 41, Disagree 17, Abstain 14, Absent 6: 70.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.0%

— Arms Control: 84.6%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 35.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 2: 87.5%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

CUBA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 8, Disagree 47, Abstain 15, Absent 8: 14.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 79.9%

— Arms Control: 11.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 7, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 12.5%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 69.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	A

CYPRUS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 36, Disagree 23, Abstain 19, Absent 0: 61.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 91.0%

— Arms Control: 81.8%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 2, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 77.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

CZECH REPUBLIC

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 46, Disagree 16, Abstain 16, Absent 0: 74.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.8%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 7, Disagree 47, Abstain 8, Absent 16: 13.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 77.8%

— Arms Control: 20.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 9.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 0, Disagree 6, Abstain 2, Absent 4: 0.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 68.3%

Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

DENMARK

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 46, Disagree 16, Abstain 16, Absent 0: 74.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.8%

— Arms Control: 92.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

DJIBOUTI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 24, Disagree 36, Abstain 3, Absent 15: 40.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.6%

— Arms Control: 56.0%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 0, Absent 6: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 89.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

DOMINICA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 28, Abstain 2, Absent 22: 48.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.8%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 50.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 12, Disagree 11, Abstain 4, Absent 51: 52.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 87.2%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 75.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 5: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(Y)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ECUADOR

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 41, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 43.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.3%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

EGYPT

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 40, Abstain 9, Absent 3: 39.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.4%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 57.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

EL SALVADOR

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 36, Abstain 3, Absent 8: 46.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 87.5%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.8%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 16, Disagree 10, Abstain 17, Absent 35: 61.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

— Arms Control: 71.4%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 50.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 2, Abstain 5, Absent 3: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ERITREA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 21, Disagree 29, Abstain 6, Absent 22: 42.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

— Arms Control: 57.1%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 31.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

ESTONIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 39, Disagree 13, Abstain 23, Absent 3: 75.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.6%

— Arms Control: 90.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 35.7%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 0, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ETHIOPIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 33, Abstain 10, Absent 10: 43.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

— Arms Control: 56.7%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 29.4%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 57.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.8%

Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

FIJI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 28, Abstain 23, Absent 1: 48.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 88.7%

— Arms Control: 56.7%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 38.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 57.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.9%

Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

FINLAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 45, Disagree 15, Abstain 18, Absent 0: 75.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.1%

— Arms Control: 88.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

FRANCE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 49, Disagree 14, Abstain 14, Absent 1: 77.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.6%

— Arms Control: 93.1%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

GABON

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 20, Disagree 30, Abstain 8, Absent 20: 40.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 22.2%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 2, Abstain 5, Absent 2: 60.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

GAMBIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 20, Disagree 37, Abstain 6, Absent 15: 35.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 82.8%

— Arms Control: 45.8%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 21.4%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 44.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 77.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

GEORGIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 33, Disagree 16, Abstain 23, Absent 6: 67.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.1%

— Arms Control: 73.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 30.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 0, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

GERMANY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 46, Disagree 16, Abstain 16, Absent 0: 74.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.8%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(N)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

GHANA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 45, Abstain 9, Absent 1: 33.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 82.8%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 33.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 75.8%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

GREECE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 67: 57.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 91.3%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 60.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 1, Abstain 1, Absent 8: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

GRENADA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 32, Abstain 8, Absent 7: 49.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.8%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 83.3%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.8%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

GUATEMALA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 28, Abstain 12, Absent 12: 48.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 87.2%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 71.4%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 2: 75.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

GUINEA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 40, Abstain 10, Absent 5: 36.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.8%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 21.1%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 42.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.8%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

GUINEA-BISSAU

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 20, Disagree 36, Abstain 8, Absent 14: 35.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.7%

— Arms Control: 56.5%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 21.1%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.3%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

GUYANA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 30, Disagree 42, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 41.7%
 — Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%
 — Arms Control: 53.3%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 63.6%
 — Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

HAITI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 30, Disagree 38, Abstain 5, Absent 5: 44.1%
 — Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%
 — Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 26.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 70.0%
 — Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

HONDURAS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 39, Abstain 4, Absent 4: 44.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

— Arms Control: 56.3%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 31.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 1: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

HUNGARY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 47, Disagree 16, Abstain 15, Absent 0: 74.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.8%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ICELAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 46, Disagree 17, Abstain 14, Absent 1: 73.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

INDIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 15, Disagree 50, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 23.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 80.8%

— Arms Control: 21.7%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 8, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 20.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 69.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	N

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

INDONESIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 47, Abstain 7, Absent 2: 31.9%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 81.8%

— Arms Control: 40.7%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 18.2%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 7, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 36.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 73.6%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

IRAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 18, Disagree 46, Abstain 5, Absent 9: 28.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 80.9%

— Arms Control: 41.7%; Human Rights: 22.2%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 8, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 20.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 67.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	N
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(N)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

IRAQ

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 78: 0.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 12: 0.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

IRELAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 42, Disagree 20, Abstain 16, Absent 0: 67.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 92.2%

— Arms Control: 76.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ISRAEL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 57, Disagree 3, Abstain 16, Absent 2: 95.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 98.8%

— Arms Control: 85.7%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 95.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 10, Disagree 0, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	N
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	N
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	N
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

ITALY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 47, Disagree 17, Abstain 14, Absent 0: 73.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.5%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

JAMAICA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 38, Abstain 11, Absent 0: 43.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

JAPAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 42, Disagree 16, Abstain 20, Absent 0: 72.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.7%

— Arms Control: 85.7%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 88.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

JORDAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 40, Abstain 7, Absent 4: 40.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.2%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

KAZAKSTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 36, Disagree 22, Abstain 20, Absent 0: 62.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 91.3%

— Arms Control: 73.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 26.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 75.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

KENYA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 35, Abstain 18, Absent 0: 41.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

— Arms Control: 56.7%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 26.7%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

KUWAIT

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 32, Disagree 39, Abstain 4, Absent 3: 45.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.0%

— Arms Control: 56.3%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 75.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

KYRGYZSTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 17, Abstain 22, Absent 14: 59.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 91.7%

— Arms Control: 80.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 23.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 1, Abstain 7, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 94.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

LAOS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 14, Disagree 41, Abstain 6, Absent 17: 25.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 80.8%

— Arms Control: 35.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 11.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 2: 28.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 74.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(X)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(Y)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

LATVIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 43, Disagree 10, Abstain 22, Absent 3: 81.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 43.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 0, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

LEBANON

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 16, Disagree 44, Abstain 10, Absent 8: 26.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 81.4%

— Arms Control: 37.5%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 5, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 28.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 76.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	N
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

LESOTHO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 18, Disagree 20, Abstain 1, Absent 39: 47.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 5: 42.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 73.8%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

LIBERIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 25, Abstain 15, Absent 16: 46.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 87.8%

— Arms Control: 55.2%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 66.7%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 6, Absent 3: 33.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

LIBYA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 20, Disagree 48, Abstain 6, Absent 4: 29.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 81.2%

— Arms Control: 42.3%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 13.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 9, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 10.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 64.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	A
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	N
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	N

LIECHTENSTEIN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 42, Disagree 19, Abstain 17, Absent 0: 68.9%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

— Arms Control: 80.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 80.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

LITHUANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 43, Disagree 11, Abstain 24, Absent 0: 79.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 95.6%

— Arms Control: 95.8%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 43.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 0, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

LUXEMBOURG

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 47, Disagree 15, Abstain 16, Absent 0: 75.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.2%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MADAGASCAR

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 30, Abstain 4, Absent 19: 45.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 44.4%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 6: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

MALAWI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 7: 40.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.2%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 23.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 3: 62.5%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.8%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MALAYSIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 43, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 40.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

— Arms Control: 53.1%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 18.2%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 44.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

MALDIVES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 39, Abstain 4, Absent 4: 44.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

— Arms Control: 56.3%; Human Rights: 60.0%; Middle East: 26.1%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 55.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(Y)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MALI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 29, Abstain 11, Absent 16: 43.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

— Arms Control: 57.1%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 2: 20.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 77.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

MALTA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 33, Disagree 33, Abstain 9, Absent 3: 50.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 87.0%

— Arms Control: 66.7%; Human Rights: 87.5%; Middle East: 23.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MARSHALL ISLANDS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 37, Disagree 17, Abstain 23, Absent 1: 68.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.1%

— Arms Control: 62.1%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 75.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 88.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

Important Issues

	VOTES	
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

MAURITANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 11, Disagree 25, Abstain 11, Absent 31: 30.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.1%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 16.7%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.2%

Important Issues

	VOTES	
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MAURITIUS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 37, Abstain 6, Absent 8: 42.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 87.5%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	A

MEXICO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 41, Abstain 11, Absent 0: 38.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.4%

— Arms Control: 48.1%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 63.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MICRONESIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 16, Abstain 30, Absent 3: 64.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.2%

— Arms Control: 56.0%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 100%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 87.5%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.7%

Important Issues

	VOTES	
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	N
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

MOLDOVA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 37, Disagree 15, Abstain 23, Absent 3: 71.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.7%

— Arms Control: 90.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 0, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

	VOTES	
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MONACO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 43, Disagree 14, Abstain 13, Absent 8: 75.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.0%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

MONGOLIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 33, Abstain 9, Absent 7: 46.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.4%

— Arms Control: 56.7%; Human Rights: 83.3%; Middle East: 35.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MOROCCO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 30, Disagree 39, Abstain 5, Absent 4: 43.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.5%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 57.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

MOZAMBIQUE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 26, Abstain 7, Absent 23: 45.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 50.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(Y)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

MYANMAR (BURMA)

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 20, Disagree 45, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 30.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 82.8%

— Arms Control: 45.8%; Human Rights: 12.5%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 7, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 36.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 74.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

NAMIBIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 20, Disagree 34, Abstain 8, Absent 16: 37.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 44.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 77.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

NEPAL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 40, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 38.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

NETHERLANDS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 45, Disagree 14, Abstain 17, Absent 2: 76.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.4%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

NEW ZEALAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 40, Disagree 25, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 61.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 90.4%

— Arms Control: 65.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

NICARAGUA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 28, Disagree 33, Abstain 4, Absent 13: 45.9%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 55.2%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 38.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

NIGER

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 40, Abstain 6, Absent 6: 39.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.7%

— Arms Control: 53.3%; Human Rights: 42.9%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 2: 42.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

NIGERIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 21, Disagree 46, Abstain 9, Absent 2: 31.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 82.2%

— Arms Control: 46.4%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 18.2%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 6, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 33.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 75.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

NORWAY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 45, Disagree 16, Abstain 16, Absent 1: 73.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.7%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 41.2%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 88.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

OMAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 42, Abstain 3, Absent 7: 38.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.1%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(N)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

PAKISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 44, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 36.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.4%

— Arms Control: 48.1%; Human Rights: 28.6%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 33.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 76.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

PALAU

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 12, Disagree 1, Abstain 16, Absent 49: 92.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 98.8%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 100%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 0, Abstain 2, Absent 5: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	N
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

PANAMA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 28, Disagree 39, Abstain 11, Absent 0: 41.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 62.5%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 13, Disagree 25, Abstain 11, Absent 29: 34.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.4%

— Arms Control: 72.7%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 26.7%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 3: 40.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

PARAGUAY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 35, Abstain 9, Absent 7: 43.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 77.8%; Middle East: 29.4%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

PERU

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 39, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 42.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

PHILIPPINES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 40, Abstain 11, Absent 1: 39.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 57.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

POLAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 44, Disagree 17, Abstain 15, Absent 2: 72.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

PORTUGAL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 45, Disagree 16, Abstain 15, Absent 2: 73.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.7%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

QATAR

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 28, Disagree 42, Abstain 2, Absent 6: 40.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.4%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 28.6%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 3: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 33, Disagree 22, Abstain 23, Absent 0: 60.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 91.2%

— Arms Control: 77.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 1, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 83.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.5%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

ROMANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 44, Disagree 15, Abstain 18, Absent 1: 74.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.1%

— Arms Control: 92.6%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N) Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N) A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y) Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N) N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y) Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y) Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y) Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

RUSSIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 35, Disagree 24, Abstain 19, Absent 0: 59.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 90.5%

— Arms Control: 77.3%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 60.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.5%

Security Council Votes: 98.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	N
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

RWANDA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 4, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 71: 80.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 96.2%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 0, Abstain 1, Absent 10: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 31, Abstain 2, Absent 20: 44.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

ST. LUCIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 2: 44.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

— Arms Control: 56.7%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 19, Disagree 15, Abstain 3, Absent 41: 55.9%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 87.8%

— Arms Control: 54.2%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 60.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

(WESTERN) SAMOA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 33, Disagree 33, Abstain 12, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 87.4%

— Arms Control: 58.1%; Human Rights: 87.5%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(Y)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SAN MARINO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 40, Disagree 25, Abstain 11, Absent 2: 61.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 90.2%

— Arms Control: 71.4%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 78: 0.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 12: 0.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SAUDI ARABIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 40, Abstain 7, Absent 4: 40.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.3%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 62.5%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

SENEGAL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 35, Abstain 11, Absent 7: 41.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

— Arms Control: 58.3%; Human Rights: 60.0%; Middle East: 16.7%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 1, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 83.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SEYCHELLES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 15, Disagree 13, Abstain 0, Absent 50: 53.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

— Arms Control: 90.9%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 9.1%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 0, Absent 9: 33.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

SIERRA LEONE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 25, Disagree 37, Abstain 14, Absent 2: 40.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 23.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SINGAPORE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 38, Abstain 10, Absent 1: 43.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 58.1%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 26.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 55.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 44, Disagree 17, Abstain 17, Absent 0: 72.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SLOVENIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 44, Disagree 17, Abstain 16, Absent 1: 72.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 32, Disagree 35, Abstain 10, Absent 1: 47.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SOMALIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 78: 0.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 12: 0.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

SOUTH AFRICA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 2: 44.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 60.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SPAIN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 46, Disagree 15, Abstain 16, Absent 1: 75.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.1%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 38.9%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

SRI LANKA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 42, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 35.4%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 44.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SUDAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 24, Disagree 48, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 33.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 81.8%

— Arms Control: 48.3%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 9.5%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 8, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 27.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 70.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(X)	A
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	N
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

SURINAME

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 37, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 45.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(Y)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SWAZILAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 33, Abstain 12, Absent 6: 45.0%
 — Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.2%
 — Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 60.0%; Middle East: 38.9%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 62.5%
 — Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.7%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

SWEDEN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 43, Disagree 20, Abstain 15, Absent 0: 68.3%
 — Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%
 — Arms Control: 76.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 72.7%
 — Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

SYRIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 13, Disagree 47, Abstain 9, Absent 9: 21.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 80.0%

— Arms Control: 36.4%; Human Rights: 12.5%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 8, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 11.1%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 65.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	N
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	A

TAJIKISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 6, Abstain 19, Absent 30: 79.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

— Arms Control: 85.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 60.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 0, Abstain 3, Absent 6: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

THAILAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 40, Abstain 10, Absent 1: 40.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.5%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 43, Disagree 17, Abstain 18, Absent 0: 71.7%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 93.4%

— Arms Control: 85.2%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 88.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

TOGO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 38, Abstain 13, Absent 1: 40.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 62.1%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 23.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 2, Abstain 7, Absent 0: 60.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 27, Disagree 38, Abstain 7, Absent 6: 41.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 83.3%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 70.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

TUNISIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 28, Disagree 42, Abstain 5, Absent 3: 40.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.8%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

TURKEY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 42, Disagree 26, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 61.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 90.1%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 70.0%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 63.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	A
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

TURKMENISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 0, Absent 70: 75.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 0, Absent 9: 33.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 54.3%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(Y)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	N
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

UGANDA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 23, Disagree 43, Abstain 9, Absent 3: 34.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.2%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 15.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 44.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

UKRAINE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 36, Disagree 25, Abstain 16, Absent 1: 59.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 90.2%

— Arms Control: 69.2%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 75.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.6%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 38, Abstain 8, Absent 6: 40.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

— Arms Control: 51.7%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 5, Absent 1: 66.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.5%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	A
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

UNITED KINGDOM

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 53, Disagree 14, Abstain 11, Absent 0: 79.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.7%

— Arms Control: 93.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 36.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 81.8%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

Security Council Votes: 98.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	A
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	N
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 22, Disagree 43, Abstain 11, Absent 2: 33.8%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

— Arms Control: 48.3%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 37.5%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 78.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

URUGUAY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 32, Disagree 34, Abstain 11, Absent 1: 48.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 86.9%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 70.0%; Middle East: 41.2%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 1: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.8%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

UZBEKISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 31, Disagree 10, Abstain 18, Absent 19: 75.6%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.8%

— Arms Control: 88.2%; Human Rights: 87.5%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 0, Abstain 2, Absent 2: 100%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	N
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	N
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	A
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

VANUATU

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 30, Disagree 39, Abstain 3, Absent 6: 43.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.4%

— Arms Control: 53.3%; Human Rights: 70.0%; Middle East: 31.8%

Important Votes (12): Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 1: 72.7%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

VENEZUELA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 29, Disagree 40, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 42.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

— Arms Control: 56.7%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 63.6%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	Y
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

VIETNAM

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 16, Disagree 45, Abstain 4, Absent 13: 26.2%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 80.4%

— Arms Control: 34.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (12): Agree 2, Disagree 7, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 22.2%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 69.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	N
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

YEMEN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 24, Disagree 40, Abstain 0, Absent 14: 37.5%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 82.5%

— Arms Control: 54.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 17.6%

Important Votes (12): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 5: 42.9%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 78: 0.0%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 12: 0.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	X
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	X
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	X
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

ZAIRE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 12, Absent 63: 33.3%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 94.2%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 5, Absent 4: 33.3%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 64.2%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	X
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	X
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	X
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

ZAMBIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 30, Disagree 40, Abstain 5, Absent 3: 42.9%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

— Arms Control: 56.3%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 30.4%

Important Votes (12): Agree 5, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 50.0%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.4%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	X

ZIMBABWE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (78): Agree 26, Disagree 44, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 37.1%

— Including All 196 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

— Arms Control: 53.1%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (12): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 44.4%

— Including the 16 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.9%

Important Issues

VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	(N)	Y
2. Eliminating Coercive Economic Measures	(N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process	(Y)	Y
4. Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	(N)	Y
5. Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	(Y)	Y
6. Palestinian Self-Determination	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Sudan	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Cuba	(Y)	N
11. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia	(Y)	A
12. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ()=U.S. Vote

1996 VR

