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SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS

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SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS

VOLUME II.

BY

FRANCIS GALTON, P. GEDDES, M. E. SADLER,
E. WESTERMARCK, H. HÖFFDING,
J. H. BRIDGES AND J. S. STUART-GLENNIE

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PREFACE

The present volume comprises the papers read before the Sociological Society, and the discussions thereon, during its second Session (*i.e.*, October, 1904, to June, 1905). For the compilation of the present volume, as of the previous one, the Society has been fortunate enough to secure the co-operation of many eminent authorities, both at home and abroad, and these, moreover, representative of many points of view. The international character of the previous volume is thus maintained—a point which while valuable in all the sciences is vital in sociology. The complexity of sociological problems, however, derives not only from national and social differences, but also from methodological differences, and those inherent in the character of the scientific data themselves. The approaches to sociology being so numerous and varied, it follows that their co-ordination and synthesis are only to be achieved by adequate recognition of each. The work of the Sociological Society, in its early stages, may be regarded as affording means for the concrete illustration of these various approaches by investigators and thinkers of known competence.

Definitely to characterise the papers in this volume as illustrative of particular approaches to sociology might be unfair to their authors and misleading to the readers. But

both misunderstandings may be avoided, if it is remembered that any particular paper invariably embodies many different points of view, and consequently in classifying a paper as illustrative of any particular approach, only its predominating characteristics are under consideration. With this reservation in view, it may be useful to make the following grouping of the contents of the volume.

1. The Historical Approach. The first endeavour to construct a science of sociology under that title was, as Comte affirmed, in direct line with Condorcet's "Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind;" and this itself belonged to a traditional system of studies pursued under the designation, Philosophy of History. In continuity with these traditional attempts to give a reasoned account of the historic development of humanity, is Dr. BRIDGES' paper, "Some Guiding Principles in the Philosophy of History." Closely related to the same mode of approach are Mr. J. S. STUART-GLENNIE'S three papers.

2. The Ethical Approach. The relation between ethics and sociology in their abstract and general aspects is discussed by Professor HÖFFDING. Under the designation of Comparative Ethics and Comparative Religion, new systems of studies are growing up, based on the observation and comparison of belief and custom, ideal and conduct, in every social group which can be brought under investigation by its past records or its contemporary manifestations. A notable example of this newer study of comparative ethics is Dr. WESTERMARCK'S paper, "The Influence of Magic on Social Relationships."

3. The Psychological Approach. A new conception of education is growing out of the study which psychol-

ogists are making of mental development in general, and particularly that of the child. The correlation of these studies of child life with the historical evolution of the race, of the nation and of other social groups, is giving a new interpretation to the school as a social institution, with its system of educational aims and means, at once psychological and social. Professor SADLER's paper, "The School in some of its Relations to Social Organisation and to National Life," may be taken as illustrating this mode of approach towards an applied science of sociology.

4. **The Biological Approach.** The theological interest in man has traditionally been divided between his Past and his Future. The scientific interest has, through the doctrine of organic evolution, been mainly concentrated on the past of man. But FRANCIS GALTON has introduced a new thought into the doctrine of organic evolution. The resultant tendency is to emphasise interest in the future of man. If human descent from lower types of life is admitted, it follows that there is in human development a potency of ascent towards higher types. Thus there emerges from the doctrine of organic evolution, the conception of a potential race ideal. What are the conditions which would favour the organic evolution of a higher type of Social Being, and how far may we hope to create such conditions? These are the questions propounded for study by Eugenics. Initiatory studies in Eugenics were brought before the Sociological Society in its first Session by Mr. GALTON. The Society has had the good fortune in its second Session again to welcome Mr. GALTON on its platform. His three new memoirs, "Restrictions in Marriage," "Studies in National Eugenics," and "Eugenics as a Factor in Religion," are included in the present volume.

5. **The Geographical Approach.** The first of two papers on "Civics as Applied Sociology," by Professor GEDDES, was read to the Society in its first Session. The second appears in the present volume. In these papers, the city is first viewed in relation to its geographical surroundings, and to its own historic antecedents. The city is presented first as a culminating phase of the evolution of a particular region, such as the river valley. So far, Civics is a study in geographical determinism. Cities are next interpreted as continuously developing endeavours of the race towards the realisation of certain social ideals. Of civic institutions, this doctrine affirms that, as they embody and transmit the social heritage of the race, so they contain a definite potency of future development. Civic evolution in this view, no less than organic evolution, suggests certain ideals; and Civics as Applied Sociology aims at defining the conditions under which these ideals may be approximately realised. Studies in Eugenics and Civics thus combine in working out an evolutionary idealism, latent alike in the developing human organism and in the civic environment. In their respective origins, Eugenics and Civics thus approach sociology from the assured ground of biological and geographical science. But in their suggestion of an evolutionary idealism, they border upon the ethical treatment of sociology.

In the above attempt at a schematic grouping of the papers in the present volume, it is manifest that only one of many possible lines towards a rational order has been followed. To work out some of the other lines may be left as a useful sociological exercise for the serious student. In the actual order of arrangement of the papers, the precedent of the previous volume has been followed. Those which may be considered as belonging to Applied Sociology are

placed earlier in the volume, their more concrete character giving them a wider and more immediate interest. These are followed by the papers of a more abstract character, and consequently of remoter or at least of less popular interest.

In the preparation of the volume the Editorial Committee* have again to thank Mr. GEORGE LEWIS, J.P., for valuable assistance in proof-reading.

It will be understood that responsibility for statement of fact and doctrine in the various papers, discussions, and communications included in the volume, rests entirely with the respective writers and speakers.

* The Members of this Committee are :—Mr. L. T. HOBHOUSE (Chairman), Mr. V. V. BRANFORD, Professor GEDDES, Mr. G. P. GOOCH, Mr. J. A. HOBSON, Mr. BENJAMIN KIDD, Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON, and Dr. SLAUGHTER (Secretary).

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1

EUGENICS

I.

RESTRICTIONS IN MARRIAGE

By FRANCIS GALTON, F.R.S., D.C.L., Sc.D.

Read before the Sociological Society, on Tuesday, February 14th, at a meeting in the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Clare Market, W.C., Dr. E. WESTERMARCK in the Chair.

It is proposed in the following remarks to meet an objection that has been repeatedly urged against the possible adoption of any system of Eugenics,* namely, that human nature would never brook interference with the freedom of marriage.

In my reply, I shall proceed on the not unreasonable assumption, that when the subject of Eugenics shall be well understood, and when its lofty objects shall have become generally appreciated, they will meet with some recognition both from the religious sense of the people and from its laws. The question to be considered is, how far have marriage restrictions proved effective, when sanctified by the religion of the time, by custom, and by law? I appeal from arm-chair criticism to historical facts.

To this end, a brief history will be given of a few

* Eugenics may be defined as the science which deals with those social agencies that influence, mentally or physically, the racial qualities of future generations.

widely-spread customs in successive paragraphs. It will be seen that with scant exceptions they are based on social expediency, and not on natural instincts. Each paragraph might have been expanded into a long chapter had that seemed necessary. Those who desire to investigate the subject further can easily do so by referring to standard works in anthropology, among the most useful of which, for the present purpose, are Frazer's *Golden Bough*, Westermarck's *History of Marriage*, Huth's *Marriage of Near Kin*, and Crawley's *Mystic Rose*.

I. MONOGAMY. It is impossible to label mankind by one general term, either as animals who instinctively take a plurality of mates, or who consort with only one, for history suggests the one condition as often as the other. Probably different races, like different individuals, vary considerably in their natural instincts. Polygamy may be understood either as having a plurality of wives; or, as having one principal wife and many secondary but still legitimate wives, or any other recognised but less legitimate connections; in one or other of these forms it is now permitted—by religion, customs, and law—to at least one-half of the population of the world, though its practice may be restricted to a few, on account of cost, domestic peace, and the insufficiency of females. Polygamy holds its ground firmly throughout the Moslem world. It exists throughout India and China in modified forms, and it is entirely in accord with the sentiments both of men and women in the larger part of negro Africa. It was regarded as a matter of course in the early Biblical days. Jacob's twelve children were born of four mothers all living at the same time, namely, Leah, and her sister, Rachel, and their respective handmaids Bilhah and Zilpah. Long afterwards, the Jewish kings emulated the luxurious habits of neighbouring potentates and carried polygamy to an extreme degree. For Solomon, see I. Kings, xi. 3. For his son Rehoboam, see II. Chron., xi. 21. The history of the subsequent practice of the custom among the Jews is obscure, but the Talmud contains no law against polygamy. It must have ceased in Judæa by the time of the Christian Era. It was not then allowed in either Greece or Rome. Polygamy

was unchecked by law in profligate Egypt, but a reactionary and ascetic spirit existed, and some celibate communities were formed in the service of Isis, who seem to have exercised a large though indirect influence in introducing celibacy into the early Christian church. The restriction of marriage to one living wife subsequently became the religion and the law of all Christian nations, though licence has been widely tolerated in royal and other distinguished families, as in those of some of our English kings. Polygamy was openly introduced into Mormonism by Brigham Young, who left seventeen wives, and fifty-six children. He died in 1877; polygamy was suppressed soon after. (*Encyc. Brit.*, xvi. 827.)

It is unnecessary for my present purpose to go further into the voluminous data connected with these marriages in all parts of the world. Enough has been said to show that the prohibition of polygamy, under severe penalties by civil and ecclesiastical law, has been due not to any natural instinct against the practice, but to consideration of social well-being. I conclude that equally strict limitations to freedom of marriage might, under the pressure of worthy motives, be hereafter enacted for Eugenic and other purposes.

2. ENDOGAMY, or the custom of marrying exclusively *within* one's own tribe or caste, has been sanctioned by religion and enforced by law, in all parts of the world, but chiefly in long settled nations where there is wealth to bequeath and where neighbouring communities profess different creeds. The details of this custom, and the severity of its enforcement, have everywhere varied from century to century. It was penal for a Greek to marry a barbarian, for a Roman patrician to marry a plebeian, for a Hindu of one caste to marry one of another caste, and so forth. Similar restrictions have been enforced in multitudes of communities, even under the penalty of death.

A very typical instance of the power of law over the freedom of choice in marriage, and which was by no means confined to Judæa, is that known as the Levirate. It shows that family property and honour were once held by the Jews to dominate over individual preferences. The Mosaic law

actually *compelled* a man to marry the widow of his brother if he left no male issue. (Deuteron. xxv.) Should the brother refuse, "then shall his brother's wife come unto him in the presence of the elders, and loose his shoe from off his foot, and spit in his face; and she shall answer and say, so shall it be done unto the man that doth not build up his brother's house. And his name shall be called in Israel the house of him that hath his shoe loosed." The form of this custom survives to the present day and is fully described and illustrated under the article "Halizah" (=taking off, untying) in the *Jewish Cyclopaedia*. Jewish widows are now almost invariably remarried with this ceremony. They are, as we might describe it, "given away" by a kinsman of the deceased husband, who puts on a shoe of an orthodox shape which is kept for the purpose, the widow unties the shoe, spits, but now on the *ground*, and repeats the specified words.

The duties attached to family property led to the history, which is very strange to the ideas of the present day, of Ruth's advances to Boaz under the advice of her mother. "It came to pass at midnight" that Boaz "was startled (see marginal note in the Revised Version) and turned himself, and behold a woman lay at his feet," who had come in "softly and uncovered his feet and laid her down." He told her to lie still until the early morning and then to go away. She returned home and told her mother, who said, "Sit still, my daughter, until thou know how the matter will fall, for the man will not rest until he have finished the thing this day." She was right. Boaz took legal steps to disembarass himself of the claims of a still nearer kinsman, who "drew off his shoe"; so Boaz married Ruth. Nothing could be purer, from the point of view of those days, than the history of Ruth. The feelings of the modern social world would be shocked if the same thing were to take place now in England.

Evidence from the various customs relating to endogamy show how choice in marriage may be dictated by religious custom. That is, by a custom founded on a religious view of family property and family descent. Eugenics deal with what is more valuable than money or lands, namely

the heritage of a high character, capable brains, fine physique, and vigour; in short, with all that is most desirable for a family to possess as a birthright. It aims at the evolution and preservation of high races of men, and it as well deserves to be strictly enforced as a religious duty, as the Levirate law ever was.

3. EXOGAMY is, or has been, as widely spread as the opposed rule of endogamy just described. It is the duty enforced by custom, religion, and law, of marrying *outside* one's own clan, and is usually in force amongst small and barbarous communities. Its former distribution is attested by the survival in nearly all countries of ceremonies based on "marriage by capture." The remarkable monograph on this subject by the late Mr. McLennan is of peculiar interest. It was one of the earliest, and perhaps the most successful, of all attempts to decipher pre-historic customs by means of those now existing among barbarians, and by the marks they have left on the traditional practices of civilised nations, including ourselves. Before his time those customs were regarded as foolish, and fitted only for antiquarian trifling. In small fighting communities of barbarians, daughters are a burden; they are usually killed while infants, so there are few women to be found in a tribe who were born in it. It may sometimes happen that the community has been recently formed by warriors who have brought no women, and who, like the Romans in the old story, can only supply themselves by capturing those of neighbouring tribes. The custom of capture grows; it becomes glorified, because each wife is a living trophy of the captor's heroism; so marriage within the tribe comes to be considered an unmanly, and at last a shameful act. The modern instances of this among barbarians are very numerous.

4. AUSTRALIAN MARRIAGES. The following is a brief clue, and apparently a true one, to the complicated marriage restrictions among Australian bushmen, which are enforced by the penalty of death, and which seem to be partly endogamous

in origin and partly otherwise. The example is typical of those of many other tribes that differ in detail.

A and B are two tribal classes; 1 and 2 are two other and independent divisions of the tribe (which are probably by totems). Any person taken at random is equally likely to have either letter or either numeral, and his or her numeral and letter are well known to all the community. Hence the members of the tribe are sub-classed into four sub-divisions, A₁, A₂, B₁, B₂. The rule is that a man may marry those women only whose letter and numeral are both different to his own. Thus, A₁ can marry only B₂, the other three sub-divisions A₁, A₂, and B₁ being absolutely barred to him. As to the children, there is a difference of practice in different parts: in the cases most often described, the child takes its father's letter and its mother's numeral, which determines class by paternal descent. In other cases the arrangement runs in the contrary way, or by maternal descent.

The cogency of this rule is due to custom, religion and law, and is so strong that nearly all Australians would be horrified at the idea of breaking it. If any one dared to do so, he would probably be clubbed to death.

Here then is another restriction to the freedom of marriage which might with equal propriety have been applied to the furtherance of some form of Eugenics.

5. TABOO. The survival of young animals largely depends on their inherent timidity, their keen sensitiveness to warnings of danger by their parents and others, and to their tenacious recollection of them. It is so with human children, who are easily terrified by nurses' tales, and thereby receive more or less durable impressions.

A vast complex of motives can be brought to bear upon the naturally susceptible minds of children, and of uneducated adults who are mentally little more than big children. The constituents of this complex are not sharply distinguishable, but they form a recognisable whole that has not yet received an appropriate name, in which religion, superstition, custom, tradition, law and authority all have part. This group of

motives will for the present purpose be entitled "immaterial," in contrast to material ones. My contention is that the experience of all ages and all nations shows that the immaterial motives are frequently far stronger than the material ones, the relative power of the two being well illustrated by the tyranny of taboo in many instances, called as it is by different names in different places. The facts relating to taboo form a voluminous literature, the full effect of which cannot be conveyed by brief summaries. It shows how, in most parts of the world, acts that are apparently insignificant have been invested with ideal importance, and how the doing of this or that has been followed by outlawry or death, and how the mere terror of having unwittingly broken a taboo may suffice to kill the man who broke it. If non-eugenic unions were prohibited by such taboos, none would take place.

6. PROHIBITED DEGREES. The institution of marriage, as now sanctified by religion and safeguarded by law in the more highly civilised nations, may not be ideally perfect, nor may it be universally accepted in future times, but it is the best that has hitherto been devised for the parties primarily concerned, for their children, for home life, and for society. The degrees of kinship within which marriage is prohibited, is with one exception quite in accordance with modern sentiment, the exception being the disallowal of marriage with the sister of a deceased wife, the propriety of which is greatly disputed and need not be discussed here. The marriage of a brother and sister would excite a feeling of loathing among us that seems implanted by nature, but which further inquiry will show, has mainly arisen from tradition and custom.

We will begin by giving due weight to certain assigned motives. (1) Indifference and even repugnance between boys and girls, irrespectively of relationship, who have been reared in the same barbarian home. (2) Close likeness, as between the members of a thorough-bred stock, causes some sexual indifference: thus highly bred dogs lose much of their sexual desire for one another, and are apt to consort with mongrels. (3) Contrast is an element in sexual attraction which has not

yet been discussed quantitatively. Great resemblance creates indifference, and great dissimilarity is repugnant. The maximum of attractiveness must lie somewhere between the two, at a point not yet ascertained. (4) The harm due to continued interbreeding has been considered, as I think, without sufficient warrant, to cause a presumed strong natural and instinctive *repugnance* to the marriage of near kin. The facts are that close and continued interbreeding invariably does harm after a few generations, but that a single cross with near kinsfolk is practically innocuous. Of course a sense of repugnance might become correlated with any harmful practice, but there is no evidence that it is *repugnance* with which interbreeding is correlated, but only *indifference*, which is equally effective in preventing it, but quite another thing. (5) The strongest reason of all in civilised countries appears to be the earnest desire not to infringe the sanctity and freedom of the social relations of a family group, but this has nothing to do with instinctive sexual repugnance. Yet it is through the latter motive alone, so far as I can judge, that we have acquired our apparently instinctive horror of marrying within near degrees.

Next as to facts. History shows that the horror now felt so strongly did not exist in early times. Abraham married his half-sister Sarah, "she is indeed the sister, the daughter of my father, but not the daughter of my mother, and she became my wife." (Gen. xx., 12). Amram, the father of Moses and Aaron, married his aunt, his father's sister Jochabed. The Egyptians were accustomed to marry sisters. It is unnecessary to go earlier back in Egyptian history than to the Ptolemies, who, being a new dynasty, would not have dared to make the marriages they did in a conservative country, unless popular opinion allowed it. Their dynasty includes the founder, Ceraunus, who is not numbered; the numbering begins with his son Soter, and goes on to Ptolemy XIII., the second husband of Cleopatra. Leaving out her first husband, Ptolemy XII., as he was a mere boy, and taking in Ceraunus, there are thirteen Ptolemies to be considered. Between them, they contracted eleven incestuous marriages, eight with whole sisters, one with a half-sister, and two with nieces. Of course,

the object was to keep the royal line pure, as was done by the ancient Peruvians. It would be tedious to follow out the laws enforced at various times and in the various states of Greece during the classical ages. Marriage was at one time permitted in Athens between half-brothers and half-sisters, and the marriage between uncle and niece was thought commendable in the time of Pericles, when it was prompted by family considerations. In Rome the practice varied much, but there were always severe restrictions. Even in its dissolute period, public opinion was shocked by the marriage of Claudius with his niece.

A great deal more evidence could easily be adduced, but the foregoing suffices to prove that there is no instinctive repugnance felt universally by man to marriage within the prohibited degrees, but that its present strength is mainly due to what I called immaterial considerations. It is quite conceivable that a non-eugenic marriage should hereafter excite no less loathing than that of a brother and sister would do now.

7. **CELIBACY.** The dictates of religion in respect to the opposite duties of leading celibate lives, and of continuing families, have been contradictory. In many nations it is and has been considered a disgrace to bear no children, and in other nations celibacy has been raised to the rank of a virtue of the highest order. The ascetic character of the African portion of the early Christian church, as already remarked, introduced the merits of celibate life into its teaching. During the fifty or so generations that have elapsed since the establishment of Christianity, the nunneries and monasteries, and the celibate lives of Catholic priests, have had vast social effects, how far for good and how far for evil need not be discussed here. The point I wish to enforce is the potency, not only of the religious sense in aiding or deterring marriage, but more especially the influence and authority of ministers of religion in enforcing celibacy. They have notoriously used it when aid has been invoked by members of the family on grounds that are not religious at all, but merely of family expediency. Thus, at some times and in some Christian nations, every girl who did

not marry while still young, was practically compelled to enter a nunnery from which escape was afterwards impossible.

It is easy to let the imagination run wild on the supposition of a whole-hearted acceptance of Eugenics as a national religion; that is of the thorough conviction by a nation that no worthier object exists for man than the improvement of his own race; and when efforts as great as those by which nunneries and monasteries were endowed and maintained should be directed to fulfil an opposite purpose. I will not enter further into this. Suffice it to say, that the history of conventual life affords abundant evidence on a very large scale, of the power of religious authority in directing and withstanding the tendencies of human nature towards freedom in marriage.

CONCLUSION.—Seven different subjects have now been touched upon. They are monogamy, endogamy, exogamy, Australian marriages, taboo, prohibited degrees and celibacy. It has been shown under each of these heads how powerful are the various combinations of immaterial motives upon marriage selection, how they may all become hallowed by religion, accepted as custom and enforced by law. Persons who are born under their various rules live under them without any objection. They are unconscious of their restrictions, as we are unaware of the tension of the atmosphere. The subservience of civilised races to their several religious superstitions, customs, authority and the rest, is frequently as abject as that of barbarians. The same classes of motives that direct other races direct ours, so a knowledge of their customs helps us to realise the wide range of what we may ourselves hereafter adopt, for reasons as satisfactory to us in those future times, as theirs are or were to them at the time when they prevailed.

Reference has frequently been made to the probability of Eugenics hereafter receiving the sanction of religion. It may be asked, "how can it be shown that Eugenics fall within the purview of our own?" It cannot, any more than the duty of making provision for the future needs of oneself and family, which is a cardinal feature of modern civilisation, can be deduced from

the Sermon on the Mount. Religious precepts, founded on the ethics and practice of olden days, require to be reinterpreted to make them conform to the needs of progressive nations. Ours are already so far behind modern requirements that much of our practice and our profession cannot be reconciled without illegitimate casuistry. It seems to me that few things are more needed by us in England than a revision of our religion, to adapt it to the intelligence and needs of the present time. A form of it is wanted that shall be founded on reasonable bases and enforced by reasonable hopes and fears, and that preaches honest morals in unambiguous language, which good men who take their part in the work of the world, and who know the dangers of sentimentalism, may pursue without reservation.

II.

STUDIES IN NATIONAL EUGENICS

By FRANCIS GALTON, F.R.S., D.C.L., Sc.D.

Communicated at a meeting of the Sociological Society held in the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Clare Market, W.C., on Tuesday, February 14th, 1905.

It was stated in the *Times*, January 26, 1905, that at a meeting of the Senate of the University of London, Mr. Edgar Schuster, M.A., of New College, Oxford, was appointed to the Francis Galton Research Fellowship in National Eugenics. "Mr. Schuster will in particular carry out investigations into the history of classes and families, and deliver lectures and publish memoirs on the subjects of his investigations."

Now that this appointment has been made, it seems well to publish a suitable list of subjects for eugenic inquiry. It will be a programme that binds no one, not even myself, for I have not yet had the advantage of discussing it with others, and may hereafter wish to largely revise and improve what is now provisionally sketched. The use of this paper lies in its giving a general outline of what, according to my present view, requires careful investigation, of course not all at once, but step by step, at possibly long intervals.

I. Estimation of the average quality of the offspring of married couples, from their personal and ancestral data. This

includes questions of fertility, and the determination of the "probable error" of the estimate for individuals, according to the data employed.

(a) "Biographical Index to Gifted Families," modern and recent, for publication. It might be drawn up on the same principle as my "Index to Achievements of Near Kinsfolk of Some of the Fellows of the Royal Society" (see "Sociological Papers," Vol. I., p. 85). The Index refers only to facts creditable to the family, and to such of these as have already appeared in publications, which are quoted as authority for the statements. Other biographical facts that may be collected concerning these families are to be preserved for statistical use only.

(b) Biographies of capable families, who do not rank as "gifted," are to be collected, and kept in MS., for statistical use, but with option of publication.

(c) Biographies of families, who, as a whole, are distinctly below the average in health, mind, or physique, are to be collected. These include the families of persons in asylums of all kinds, hospitals, and prisons. To be kept for statistical use only.

(d) Parentage and progeny of representatives of each of the social classes of the community, to determine how far each class is derived from, and contributes to, its own and the other classes. This inquiry must be carefully planned beforehand.

(e) Insurance office data. An attempt to be made to carry out the suggestions of Mr. Palin Egerton, "Sociological Papers," Vol. I., p. 62, of obtaining material that the authorities would not object to give, and whose discussion might be advantageous to themselves as well as to Eugenics. The matter is now under consideration, so more cannot be said.

II. Effects of action by the State and by Public Institutions.

(f) Habitual criminals. Public opinion is beginning to regard with favour the project of a prolonged segregation of habitual criminals, for the purpose of restricting their opportunities for (1) continuing their depredations, and (2) producing low class offspring. The inquiries spoken of above (see *c*) will measure the importance of the latter object.

(g) Feeble-minded. Aid given to Institutions for the feeble-minded are open to the suspicion that they may eventually promote their marriage and the production of offspring like themselves. Inquiries are needed to test the truth of this suspicion.

(h) Grants towards higher education. Money spent in the higher education of those who are intellectually unable to profit by it lessens the

sum available for those who can do so. It might be expected that aid systematically given on a large scale to the more capable would have considerable eugenic effect, but the subject is complex and needs investigation.

(i) Indiscriminate charity, including out-door relief. There is good reason to believe that the effects of indiscriminate charity are notably non-eugenic. This topic affords a wide field for inquiry.

III. Other influences that further or restrain particular classes of marriage.

The instances are numerous in recent times in which social influences have restrained or furthered freedom of marriage. A judicious selection of these would be useful, and might be undertaken as time admits. I have myself just communicated to the Sociological Society a memoir entitled "Restrictions in Marriage," in which remarkable instances are given of the dominant power of religion, law and custom. This will suggest the sort of work now in view, where less powerful influences have produced statistical effects of appreciable amount.

IV. Heredity.

The facts after being collected are to be discussed, for improving our knowledge of the laws both of actuarial and of physiological heredity, the recent methods of advanced statistics being of course used. It is possible that a study of the effect on the offspring of differences in the parental qualities may prove important.

It is to be considered whether a study of Eurasians, that is, of the descendants of Hindoo and English parents, might not be advocated in proper quarters, both on its own merits as a topic of national importance and as a test of the applicability of the Mendelian hypotheses to men. Eurasians have by this time intermarried during three consecutive generations in sufficient numbers to yield trustworthy results.

V. Literature.

A vast amount of material that bears on Eugenics exists in print, much of which is valuable and should be hunted out and catalogued. Many scientific societies, medical, actuarial, and others, publish such material from time to time. The experiences of breeders of stock of all kinds, and those of horticulturists, fall within this category.

VI. Co-operation.

After good work shall have been done and become widely recognised, the influence of eugenic students in stimulating others to contribute to

their inquiries may become powerful. It is too soon to speculate on this, but every good opportunity should be seized to further co-operation, as well as the knowledge and application of Eugenics.

VII. Certificates.

In some future time, dependent on circumstances, I look forward to a suitable authority issuing Eugenic certificates to candidates for them. They would imply a more than an average share of the several qualities of at least goodness of constitution, of physique, and of mental capacity. Examinations upon which such certificates might be granted are already carried on, but separately; some by the medical advisers of insurance offices, some by medical men as to physical fitness for the army, navy and Indian services, and others in the ordinary scholastic examinations. Supposing constitution, physique and intellect to be three independent variables (which they are not), the men who rank among the upper third of each group would form only one twenty-seventh part of the population. Even allowing largely for the correlation of those qualities, it follows that a moderate severity of selection in each of a few particulars would lead to a severe all-round selection. It is not necessary to pursue this further.

The above brief memorandum does not profess to deal with more than the pressing problems in Eugenics. As that science becomes better known, and the bases on which it rests are more soundly established, new problems will arise, especially such as relate to its practical application. All this must bide its time; there is no good reason to anticipate it now. Of course, useful suggestions in the present embryonic condition of Eugenic study would be timely, and might prove very helpful to students.

DISCUSSION

DR. A. C. HADDON SAID:

We have been greatly favoured this afternoon in listening to one who has devoted his life to science and has just presented us, in so able a paper, with the conclusions of his mature age. Future generations will hold the name of Mr. Galton in high reverence for the work he has done in so firmly establishing the theory of evolution, and I consider that we have listened to a memorable paper which will mark a definite stage in the history of the subject with which Mr. Galton's name will remain imperishably associated. It is refreshing, if Mr. Galton will allow me to say so, to find a man of his years formulating such a progressive policy, for this is generally supposed to be a characteristic of younger men, but he has done so because all his life he has been studying evolution. He has seen what evolution has accomplished amongst the lower animals; he has seen what man can do to improve strains of animals and plants by means of careful selection; and he foresees what man may do in the future to improve his own species by more careful selection. It is possible for people to change their customs, ideas and ideals. We are always accustomed to regard the savages as conservative, and so they are, but, as a matter of fact, savages do change their views. In Australia we find that different tribes have different marriage customs and different social regulations, and it will be generally found that the change in marriage custom or social control is nearly always due to betterment in their physical conditions. The tribes which, as some of us believe, have the more primitive marital arrangements, are those which live in the least favoured countries; and the tribes who have adopted father-right are those who live under more favourable conditions. In Melanesia, Africa, and in India, social customs vary a very great deal, and this proves that even their marriage customs are not in any way hide-bound, and that social evolution is taking place. When circumstances demand a change, then a change takes place, perhaps more or less automatically, being due to a sort of natural selection. There are thinking people among savages, and we have evidence that they do consider and

discuss social customs, and even definitely modify them ; but, on the whole, there appears to be a general trend of social factors that cause this evolution. There is no reason why social evolution should continue to take place among ourselves in a blind sort of way, for we are intelligent creatures, and we ought to use rational means to direct our own evolution. Further, with the resources of modern civilisation, we are in a favourable position to accelerate this evolution. The world is gradually becoming self-conscious, and I think Mr. Galton has made a very strong plea for a determined effort to attempt a conscious evolution of the race.

DR. F. W. MOTT SAID :

I have to say, I think it is of very great importance to the nation to consider this subject of Eugenics very seriously. Being engaged as pathologist to the London County Council Asylums, I see the effect of heredity markedly on the people admitted into the Asylums. The improvement of the stock can in my opinion be brought about in two ways:—(1) By segregation, to some extent carried on at present, which in some measure, checks the reproduction of the unfit ; and (2) by encouraging the reproduction of the fit. Checking the reproduction of the unfit is quite as important as encouraging the reproduction of the fit. This, in my opinion, could be effected to some extent, by taking the defective children and keeping them under control, at least a certain number that are at present allowed to have social privileges. It would be for their own welfare and the welfare of the community ; and they would suffer no hardship if taken when quite young. This is included in the question of Eugenics which Mr. Galton has brought forward, and has shown his practical sympathy with, by establishing a Fellowship, which will, no doubt, do great good in placing the subject on a firm basis, and also in getting a wide intellectual acceptance of the principle. It seems to me the first thing required is that it should become generally known that it is to the advantage of the individual and of the race to have a healthy heritage. Whether any practical steps could be taken to forward this principle when it has a widespread acceptance, is a question ; and I consider that any State interference would be harmful at first, but it would be proper for the State to encourage setting up registry offices where not only a form would be given, with particulars as to marriage, but also a form that would give a bill of health to the contracting parties ; and that bill of health should be of some value not only to the possessors, but to their children. If children had a good heritage, there is no doubt it would have actuarial value, in the matter, for instance, of obtaining life insurance policies at a more reasonable rate ; also in obtaining municipal and government employment, because the chances of paying pensions to people who have a good heritage, is very much less. It seems to me that the subject is one of national importance,

and this Society, by spreading the views of Mr. Galton, will do, not only a very great work for individuals, but for the race as a whole.

MR. A. E. CRAWLEY SAID:

Mr. Galton's remarkable and suggestive paper shows how anthropological studies can be made fruitful in practical politics. Sociology should be founding its science of eugenics upon anthropology, psychology, and physiology. I hope that it will avoid socialistic dreams and that, while chiefly considering the normal individual, it will not forget the special claims of those abnormal persons whom we call geniuses. In a well-ordered state they should be considered before the degenerate and the diseased.

With regard to one or two minor matters: I should like to ask the author if he has examined the evidence for McLennan's examples of marriage by capture. It is not, perhaps, a very important point, but anthropological theories are often houses of cards, and I doubt the existence of a single real case of capture as an institution. As to exogamy, it is important to understand that in the great majority of cases it is really endogamous, that is to say, the favourite marriage in exogamy is between first cousins, and the only constant prohibition is that against the marriage of brothers and sisters. Exogamy, in fact, as Dr. Howitt, Dr. Frazer, and myself agree, reduces to this one principle. McLennan, the inventor of exogamy, never understood the facts, and the term is meaningless. If, as I have suggested in *Nature*, the normal type of primitive marriage was the bisectonal exogamy seen in Australia, which amounts to cross-cousin marriage, two families A and B intermarrying for generation after generation—we have found a theory of the origin of the tribe, an enlarged dual family, and we have also worked out a factor which may have done much to fix racial types. Lewis Morgan suggested something of the latter notion as a result of his consanguine family.

I am still persuaded that one or two forms of union are mere "sports," group-marriage, for instance, which is as rare as the marriage of brother and sister. Neither of these can be regarded as the primal type of union, though anthropologists have actually so regarded them. I think we may take it as certain that there are two permanent polar tendencies in human nature, first against union within the same home, and secondly against too promiscuous marriage.

In questions like this, I think it is most important to avoid confusing sexual with matrimonial concerns. It seems to me, on the evidence of history and anthropology, that polygamy is the result of such a confusion. For efficiency and individuality, monogamy is the best foundation of the family. Mr. Galton has not, I think, shown any cause for concluding that the prohibition of polygamy is due to social considerations. Schopenhauer

indeed suggested the adoption of polygamy as a solution of the problem created by the preponderance of females, and as likely to do away with what he thought to be a false position, that of the lady—a position due to Christian and chivalrous sentimentalism. His suggestion, by the way, shows the same confusion between sexual and domestic matters, but it certainly would solve many social difficulties. The sexual impulse in men seems to have several normal outlets. In spite of defects the ancient Greeks in their best period seem to show the results of an unconscious eugenic tradition; and I believe the same is true of the Japanese.

Mr. Galton's suggestions as to the part religion may play in these matters seem to me to be excellent. Religion can have no higher duty than to insist upon the sacredness of marriage, but, just as the meaning and content of that sacredness were the result of primitive science, so modern science must advise as to what this sacredness involves for us in our vastly changed conditions, complicated needs, and increased responsibilities.

DR. ALICE DRYSDALE VICKERY SAID:

There appeared to her three essentials to success in any attempt to improve the standard of health and development of the human race. These were (1), the economic independence of women, so as to render possible the exercise of selection, on the lines of natural attraction, founded on mental, moral, social, physical and artistic sympathies, both on the feminine and masculine side; (2), the education of the rising generation, both girls and boys, so as to impress them with a sense of their future responsibilities as citizens of the world, as co-partners in the regulation of its institutions, and as progenitors of the future race; (3), an intelligent restriction of the birth-rate, so that children should only be born in due proportion to the requirements of the community, and under conditions which afforded a reasonable prospect of the efficient development of the future citizens.

The present economic dependence of women upon men was detrimental to the physical, intellectual and moral growth of woman, as an individual. It falsified and distorted her views of life, and, as a consequence, her sense of duty. It was above all prejudicial to the interests of the coming generation, for it tended to diminish the free play and adequate development of those maternal instincts on which the rearing and education of children mainly depended. The economic independence of women was desirable in the interests of a true monogamic marriage, for without this economic independence, the individuality of woman could not exercise that natural selective power in the choice of a mate, which was probably a main factor in the spiritual evolution of the race. Where the sympathetic attraction between those concerned was only superficial, instead of being deeply

interwoven in all their mutual interests and tastes, the apparent monogamic relation only too frequently masked an unavowed polygamy, or polyandry, or perhaps both. Therefore it would forward truly monogamic marriage if greater facilities should be afforded for the coming together of those who were spontaneously and pre-eminently attracted to each other.

In respect of limitations of offspring, we had to consider both organic and social criteria. For the determination of these, physiologist must combine with sociologist. From the individual and family point of view, we wanted guidance in determining the size of family adapted to given conditions, and from the social point of view we wanted guidance in determining the numbers of population adapted to a given region at a given time. Incidentally it was here worth noting that in the case of Great Britain, the present birth-rate of 28 per 1000, with death-rate of 15 per 1000, gave an excess of 13 per 1000, compared with a birth-rate of 36 per 1000, and death-rate of 23 per 1000, shown by the vital statistics of 1877; but yet the lower contemporary birth-rate gave the same, or a rather higher, yearly increase, *i.e.*, rather over 400,000 per annum; and with this annual increment of between 400,000 and 500,000, we had to remember that there fell upon the nation the burden of supporting over a million paupers, and a great number of able-bodied unemployed. It seemed, therefore, desirable that sociologists should investigate the conditions and criteria of an optimum increase of population. The remarkable local and class differences in the birth-rate were well known. If the birth-rate of 18 per 1000 and death-rate of 15 per 1000 which prevailed in Kensington could be made universal throughout the United Kingdom, it would give, from our total population of 42 millions, a yearly increment beginning at 130,000. Incidentally she wished to call attention to a paper by M. Gabriel Giroud which went to show that the food supplies of the human race are insufficient, and that one-third of the world's inhabitants exist habitually in a condition of semi-starvation.

The propositions which she desired to submit, were (1), that sexual selection, as determined by the individuality of the natural woman, embodies eugenic tendencies, but that these tendencies are more or less countered and even reversed by a process of matrimonial social selection determined by the economic dependence of woman in contemporary occidental society—in short, that eugenics may be promoted by assuring an income to young women; (2), that artificial control of the birth-rate is a condition of eugenics.

MR. SKRINE SAID:

Mr. Galton, in treating of monogamy, says that polygamy is now permitted to at least one half of the human race. I have lived for twenty-one years amongst polygamists, and having come home to Europe I seem

to see conditions prevailing which are not in essence dissimilar. The conclusion I have arrived at is that monogamy is purely a question of social sanction, a question, as it were, of police. In regard to endogamy we may trace back its origin to periods before the dawn of history. The origin of caste and endogamous marriage is due, I believe, to the rise of powerful or intellectual families, which everywhere tend to draw to themselves less powerful families. The higher family was looked up to, and it was thought an honour to marry within it. And thus a small group was formed by a combined process of social and sexual selection. The history of certain group formations determined by this sort of marriage selection might be compiled from that royal stud book, the *Almanac de Gotha*. There is, it is true, the method of evading the selective process by the custom of morganatic marriage, but that only proves the rule. Mr. Galton has not touched on polyandry; that, I think, may be interpreted as one of the devices for limiting population, and can be accounted for, I believe, by scarcity of land.

DR. WESTERMARCK, speaking from the Chair, SAID :

The members of the Sociological Society have to-day had an opportunity to listen to a most important and suggestive paper, followed by a discussion in which, I am sure, all of us have taken a lively interest. For my own part, I beg to express my profound sympathy and regard for Mr. Galton's ardent endeavours to draw public attention to one of the most important problems with which social beings, like ourselves, could be concerned. Mr. Galton has to-day appealed to historical facts to prove that restrictions in marriage have occurred and do occur, and that there is no reason to suppose that such restrictions might not be extended far beyond the limits drawn up by the laws of any existing civilised nation. I wish to emphasise one restriction not yet touched upon. The husband's and father's function in the family is generally recognised to be to protect and support his wife and children, and many savages take this duty so seriously that they do not allow any man to marry who has not previously given some proof of his ability to fulfil it. Among various Bechuana and Kafir tribes, the youth is not allowed to take a wife until he has killed a rhinoceros. Among the Dyaks of Borneo, and other peoples in the Malay Archipelago, no one can marry unless he has acquired a certain number of human heads by killing members of foreign tribes. Among the Arabs of Upper Egypt the man must undergo an ordeal of whipping by the relations of his bride, and if he wishes to be considered worth having, he must receive

the chastisement, which is sometimes exceedingly severe, with an expression of enjoyment. I do not say that these particular methods are to be recommended, but the idea underlying them is certainly worthy of imitation. Indeed we find in Germany and Austria, in the nineteenth century, laws forbidding persons in actual receipt of poor-law relief to contract marriages, and in many cases the legislators went further still and prohibited all marriages until the contracting parties could prove that they possessed the means of supporting a family. Why could not some such laws become universal, and why could not the restrictions in marriage be extended also to persons who, in all probability, would become parents of diseased and feeble offspring? I say, "in all probability," because I do not consider certainty to be required. We cannot wait till biology has said its last word about the laws of heredity. We do not allow lunatics to walk freely about, even though there be merely a suspicion that they may be dangerous. I think that the doctor ought to have a voice in every marriage which is contracted. It is argued, of course, that to interfere here would be to intrude upon the individual's right of freedom. But men are not generally allowed to do mischief simply in order to gratify their own appetites. It will be argued that they will do mischief even though the law prevent them. Well, this holds true of every law, but we do not maintain that laws are useless because there are persons who break them. There will always in this world be offspring of diseased and degenerated parents, but the law may certainly in a very considerable degree restrict their number by preventing such persons from marrying. I think that moral education also might help to promote the object of eugenics. It seems that the prevalent opinion, that almost anybody is good enough to marry, is chiefly due to the fact that in this case the cause and effect, marriage and the feebleness of the offspring, are so distant from each other that the near-sighted eye does not distinctly perceive the connection between them. Hence no censure is passed on him who marries from want of foresight, or want of self-restraint, and by so doing is productive of offspring doomed to misery. But this can never be right. Indeed there is hardly any other point in which the moral consciousness of civilised men still stands in greater need of intellectual training than in its judgments on cases which display want of care or foresight. Much progress has in this respect been made in the course of evolution, and it would be absurd to believe that we have yet reached the end of this process. It would be absurd to believe that men would for ever leave to individual caprice the performance of the

most important and, in its consequences, the most far-reaching function which has fallen to the lot of mankind.

DR. DRYSDALE SAID:

He would like to ask the Chairman if he was aware that some of the restrictions he had referred to were actually in force in England? In some of the great English banks, for instance, clerks are not allowed to marry until their salary has reached a certain level. But for his part he thought the principle unsound. Would it not be better to say to these young men that they might marry, but that they must restrict the number of their children?

WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS

PROFESSOR YVES DELAGE (*Professor of Biology in the University of Paris*), in a letter to Mr. Galton, wrote:

I am delighted with the noble and very interesting enterprise which you are undertaking.

I have no doubt that if in all countries the men who are at the head of the intellectual movement would give it their support, it would in the end triumph over the obstacles which are caused by indifference, routine, and the sarcasms of those who only see in any new idea the occasion for exercising a satirical spirit, in which they cloak their ignorance and hardness of heart.

We should translate "eugenics" into French by "eugonie" or "eugènese." Could you not, while there is still time, modify the English term into "eugonics" or "eugenesis," in order that it might be the same in both languages?

I see with pleasure that you have had the tact to attack the question on the side by which it can be determined.

Many years ago I had myself examined the subject that you prosecute at this moment, but I had thought only of compulsory, or rather prohibitive means of attaining the object.

You are entirely right in laying aside, at least at the outset, all compulsory or prohibitive means, and in seeking only to initiate a movement of opinion in favour of eugenics, and in trying to modify the mental attitude towards marriage, so that young people, and especially parents, will think less of fortune and social conditions, and more of physical perfection, moral well-being, and intellectual vigour. Social opinion should be modified, so that the opprobrium of *mésalliance* falls not on the union of the noble with the plebeian, or of the rich with the poor, but on the mating of physical, intellectual, and moral qualities, with the defects of these.

As you have so well put it, public opinion and social convention

have a considerable prohibitive force. You will have rendered an incalculable service if you direct these towards eugenics.

The thing is difficult, and will need sustained effort. To impress the public, not only men of science must be asked to help, but those of renown in literature in all countries.

FROM DR. HAVELOCK ELLIS.

The significance of Mr. Galton's paper lies less in what is said than what is implied. The title, "Restrictions in Marriage," bristles with questions. We need to know precisely what is meant by "marriage." Among us to-day marriage is a sexual union recognised by law, which is not necessarily entered into for the procreation of children, and, as a matter of fact, frequently remains childless. Mr. Galton seems, however, to mean a sexual union in which the offspring are the essential feature. The distinction is important, for the statements made about one kind of marriage would not hold good for the other. Then, again, by "restrictions" do we mean legal enactments or voluntary self-control?

Mr. Galton summarises some of the well-known facts which show the remarkable elasticity of the institution of marriage. By implication he asks whether it would not be wise further to modify marriage by limiting or regulating procreation, thus introducing a partial or half monogamy, which may perhaps be called—borrowing a term from botany—*hemigamy*. I may point out that a fallacy seems to underlie Mr. Galton's implied belief that the hemigamy of the future, resting on scientific principles, can be upheld by a force similar to that which upheld the sexual taboos of primitive peoples. These had a religious sanction which we can never again hope to attain. No beliefs about benefits to posterity can have the powerful sanction of savage taboos. Primitive marriage customs are not conventions which every one may preach for the benefit of others and any one dispense with for himself.

There is one point in Mr. Galton's paper which I am definitely unable to accept. It seems to be implicitly assumed that there is an analogy between human eugenics and the breeding of domestic animals. I deny that analogy. Animals are bred for points, and they are bred by a superior race of animals, not by themselves. These differences seem fundamental. It is important to breed, let us say, good sociologists; that, indeed, goes without saying. But can we be sure that, when bred, they will rise up and bless us? Can we be sure that they will be equally good in the other relations of life, or that they may not break into fields for which they were not bred and spread devastation? Only a race of supermen, it seems to me, could successfully breed human varieties and keep them strictly chained up in their several stalls.

And if it is asserted that we need not breed for points but for a sort

of general all-round improvement, then we are very much in the air. If we cannot even breed fowls which are both good layers and good table birds, is it likely that we can breed men who will not lose at other points what they gain at one? (Moreover, the defects of a quality seem sometimes scarcely less valuable than the quality itself.) We know, indeed, that there are good stocks and bad stocks, and my own small observations have suggested to me that we have scarcely yet realised how subtle and far-reaching hereditary influences are. But the artificial manipulation of human stocks, or the conversion of bad into good, is still all very dubious.

It would be something, however, if we could put a drag on the propagation of definitely bad stocks, by educating public opinion and so helping forward the hemigamy, or whatever it is to be called, that Mr. Galton foresees. When two stocks are heavily tainted, and both tainted in the same direction, it ought to be generally felt that union, for the purposes of procreation, is out of the question. There ought to be a social conscience in such matters. When, as in a case known to me, an epileptic woman conceals her condition from the man she marries, it ought to be felt that an offence has been committed serious enough to annul the marriage contract. At the same time, we must avoid an extreme scrupulosity. It is highly probable that a very slight taint may benefit rather than injure a good stock. There are many people whose intellectual ability, and even virtues as good citizens, seem to be intimately bound up with the stimulating presence of some obscure "thorn in the flesh," some slight congenital taint. To sum up: (1) let us always carefully define our terms; (2) let us, individually as a nation, do our best to accumulate data on this matter, following, so far as we can, the example so nobly set us by Mr. Galton; (3) let us educate public opinion as to the immense gravity of the issues at stake; but (4) in the present state of our knowledge, let us be cautious about laying down practical regulations which may perhaps prove undesirable, and in any case are impossible to enforce.

FROM MR. A. H. HUTH

(*Author of "The Marriage of Near Kin"*).

Every one will sympathise with Mr. Galton in his desire to raise the Human Race. He is not the first, and he will not be the last. Long ago the Spartans practised what Mr. Galton has christened "Eugenics"; and in more modern times Frederick I. of Prussia tried something of the sort. I have often thought that if the human race knew what was good for them, they would appoint some great man as Dictator with absolute power for a time. At the expense of some pain to individuals, some loss of liberty for say one generation, what might not be done! Preferably, they should choose me: not because I think myself superior to others, but I would rather make the laws than submit myself to them!

Mr. Galton shows very clearly, and, I think, indisputably, that people do submit to restrictions on marriage of very different kinds, much as if they were laws of nature. Hence the deduction is drawn: that since people submit without (in most cases) a murmur, to restrictions which do not benefit the race, why not artificially produce the same thing in a manner that will benefit the race?

There are, however, two difficulties: One, the smaller, that in our present state of civilisation people will not accept, as they did in the childhood of their race, the doctrine of authority. The other is that all the restrictions on marriage cited by Mr. Galton, with the one exception of celibacy, to which I shall come later, only impeded, but did not prevent marriage. Every man could marry under any of the restrictions, and only very few women could not lawfully be joined to him in matrimony.

Now, what is Mr. Galton's contention? He wishes to hasten the action of the natural law of improvement of the race which works by selection. He wishes to do as breeders have done in creating superior races by the selection of mates. He recognises that, unhappily, we cannot compel people to mate as the scientist directs: they must be persuaded to do so by some sort of creed, which, however, he does not (at least in this paper) expressly define. You could not make a creed that your choice of a wife should be submitted to the approval of a high priest or of a jury. You would not, again, submit the question from a quasi-religious point of view to the like authorities, as to whether you are to marry at all or not. Mr. Galton does indeed point out that people were doomed to celibacy in religious communities: but here you have either a superior authority forcing you to take the vows, or you have the voluntary taking of the vows. Would the undesirable, the weak, the wicked, the frivolous—any of those beings who ought not to propagate their species—take these vows? I fear not. Only the best, those who have strength of mind, the unselfish—in short, only those who should propagate their species—would take the vows with any prospect of respecting them.

I have said that Mr. Galton is seeking to hasten a natural process. We all know the Darwinian law of the selection of the fittest; and also that other law of sexual selection which is constantly going on. I think that even within historical times they have told. I think that if you study the portraits which have come down to us (excluding of course the idealistic productions of the Greeks and some others), if you study even the prints of the grosser multitude, and then walk down any of the more populous streets of London, you will find that you have reason to congratulate the race on a decided general improvement in looks and figure. We have also undoubtedly improved in health and longevity; but this may be due, as also the improvement in looks may be partly due, to improvement in the conditions of life. But with all this, with all these natural forces working untiringly, effectively, and imperceptibly for the

improvement of the race, our whole aims as a social body, all our efforts are directed to thwart this natural improvement, to reverse its action, and cause the race not to endeavour to better its best, but to multiply its worst.

The whole tendency of the organised world has been to develop from the system of the production of a very numerous offspring ill fitted to survive, to the production of much fewer offspring better fitted to survive, and guarded at the expense of the parents until they were started in life. This law so permeates the world, and is so general, that it is even true of the higher and lower plains of humanity. The better classes, the more educated, and those capable of greater self-denial, will not marry till they see their way to bring up children in health and comfort and give them a start in life. The lower class, without a thought for the morrow, the wastrels, the ignorant, the selfish, and thoughtless, marry and produce children. Under the ordinary law of nature, of course, the natural result would follow: the children of the more desirable class, though fewer, would survive in greater proportion than the more numerous progeny of the less desirable class, and the race would not deteriorate. But here legislation, and still worse, the so-called philanthropist steps in. Burdens are heaped upon the prudent; they are taxed and bullied, the means which they have denied themselves to save for their own children are taken from them and given to idle vagabonds, in order that their children may be preserved to grow up and reproduce their like. Not only are these children carefully maintained at the costs of the more prudent, but their wretched parents are fed and coddled also at the expense of the more worthy, and saved against themselves to produce more of the—shall I call them kakogenetics? Not content with this, we freely import from the sweepings of Europe, and add them to our breeding stock.

In the days when England made her greatness, she did not suffer from the cankers of wild philanthropy and a promiscuous alien immigration.

FROM DR. MAX NORDAU.

The shortness of the time at my disposal, and the vastness of the subject treated by Mr. Galton, do not permit me to deal with the paper as it deserves. I must limit myself to a few "*obiter dicta*," for the somewhat dogmatic form of which I crave the indulgence of the Sociological Society.

Theoretically, everybody must hail Eugenics. It is a fine and obviously desirable ideal, to direct the evolution of the individual and the race towards the highest possible type of humanity. Practically, however, the matter is so obscure and complicated that it can only be approached with hesitation and misgivings.

We often hear people, even scientists, say: "We breed our domestic animals and useful plants with the greatest care, while no selection and

foresight is exercised in the case of the noblest creature—Man." This allusion to the methods of breeding choice cattle implies a biological fallacy. The breeder knows exactly what he wants to develop in his stock: now it is swiftness, now it is staying-power; here it is flesh, there it is wool; in this case it is abundance of milk, in that a capacity for transforming, quickly and completely, food into muscle and fat of a high market value. The breeder is working out the one quality he is aiming at, at the cost of *other* qualities which would be of value to the animal, if not to its owner. The selection practised by the breeder in view of a certain aim, creates new types that may be economically superior, but are biologically inferior. To put it flatly: our vaunted thoroughbreds, the triumph of selection exercised for many generations, may be wonderfully adapted to the one particular end they are destined for; they may flatter our utilitarianism and fetch high prices, but their general vital power is diminished, they are less resistant to the injuries of life, they are subject to diseases far less frequently, or not at all, met with in non-selected animals of their kind; and if not constantly fostered and protected by man, they would be unable to hold their own in the struggle for life.

It is clear that we cannot apply the principles of artificial breeding to man. Which quality of his are we to develop by selection? Of course, there is the ready answer: "*Mens sana in corpore sano.*" But this is so general and vague a rule that it means nothing when it comes to practical application. There is no recognised standard of physical and intellectual perfection. Do you want inches? In that case, you have to shut out from your selection Frederick the Great and Napoleon I., who were undersized; Thiers, who was almost a dwarf; and the Japanese as a nation, as they are considerably below the average of some European races. Yet in all other respects than tallness they are very recommendable specimens of our species. What is your ideal of beauty? Is it a white skin, clear eyes and fair hair? Then you must favour the northern type and exclude the Italian, Spaniard, Greek, etc., from your selection, which would not be to the taste of these nations.

If from somatic we turn to intellectual perfection, we encounter the same difficulties. Some highly gifted individuals have inductive, others deductive talents. You cannot easily have in the same man a great mathematician and a great poet, an inventor and a statesman. You must make up your mind whether you wish to breed artists or scientists, warriors or speculative philosophers. If you say you will breed each of these intellectual categories, each of those physical types, then it amounts to confessing that you will let things pretty much have their own way and that you renounce guiding Nature and directing consciously the species towards an ideal type. If you admit that you have *no* fixed standard of beauty and mental attainment, of physical and intellectual perfection, to propose as the aim of eugenic selection; if your artificial man-breeding is

not destined to develop certain well-defined organic qualities, to the detriment of others, then Eugenics means simply that people about to marry should choose handsome, healthy young individuals; and this, I am sorry to say, is a mere triviality, as already, without any scientific consciousness or intervention, people ARE attracted by beauty, health and youth, and repulsed by the visible absence of these qualities.

The principle of sexual selection is the natural promoter of Eugenics; it is a constant factor in biology, and undoubtedly at work in mankind. The immense majority of men and women marry the best individual among those that come within their reach. Only a small minority is guided in its choice by considerations of a social and economical order, which may determine selections to which the natural instinct would object. But even such a choice, contrary as it seems to the principle of Eugenics, might be justified to a certain extent. The noble Ernest Renan would never have been chosen for his physical appearance by any young woman of natural taste; nor would Darmesteter, the great philologist, who was afflicted with gibbosity. Yet these men had high qualities that were well worth being perpetuated in the species. A young and beautiful woman could put in a plausible plea for her marrying an elderly rich financier or nobleman of not very pleasing appearance. In both cases her own organic qualities may vouchsafe fair offspring which will better develop in economically and socially favourable surroundings than it would have done in poverty and obscurity, even if the father had been a much finer specimen of man.

It seems to me that the problem must be approached from another side. There have been pure human races in pre-historical times. Actually every European nation represents a mixture, different in its *proportion* only, of ALL the races of Europe and probably some of Asia and Northern Africa. Probably every European has in his ancestry, representatives of a great number of human types, good and indifferent ones. He is the bearer of all the potentialities of the species. By atavism, any one of the ancestral types may revive in him. Place him in favourable conditions, and there is a fair chance of his developing his potentialities and of his growing into resemblance with the best of his ancestors. The essential thing, therefore, is not so much the selection of particular individuals (every individual having probably latent qualities of the best kind) as the creating of favourable conditions for the development of the good qualities. Marry Hercules with Juno, and Apollo with Venus, and put them in slums—their children will be stunted in growth, rickety and consumptive. On the other hand, take the miserable slum-dwellers *out* of their noxious surroundings, house, feed, clothe them well, give them plenty of light, air and leisure, and their grand-children, perhaps already their children, will reproduce the type of the fine, tall Saxons and Danes of whom they are the offspring.

If Eugenics is only to produce a few Grecian Gods and Goddesses in the sacred circle of the privileged few, it has a merely artistico-æsthetical

but no politico-ethnological interest. Eugenics, in order to modify the aspect and value of the nation, must ameliorate not some select groups, but the bulk of the people, and this aim is not to be attained by trying to influence the love-life of the masses. It can be approached only by elevating their standard of life. Redeem the millions of their harrowing care, give them plenty of food and rational hygienics, and allow their natural sympathies to work out their matrimonial choice, and you will have done all the Eugenics that is likely to strengthen, embellish and ennoble the race. In one word: Eugenics, to be largely efficient, must be considered, not as a biological, but as an economical question.

One word more as to the restriction of marriage. There is no doubt that laws and customs have had at all times and in all places, the effect of narrowing the circle within which the matrimonial selection could take place. But I believe it would be an error to conclude that therefore it would be within the power of the legislator to modify these laws and customs, and to create new restrictions unknown before our own time. The old marriage laws and customs had the undisputed authority of religion; they were considered as divine institutions, and superstitious fears prevented transgression. This religious sanction would be absent from modern restricted laws, and in the case of a conflict between passion or desire and legal prohibition, *this* would weigh as a feather against *that*. In a low state of civilisation, the masses obey traditional laws without questioning their authority. Highly differentiated cultured persons have a strong critical sense; they ask of everything the reason why, and they have an irrepressible tendency to be their own lawgivers. These persons would not submit to laws restricting marriage for the sake of vague Eugenics, and if they could not marry under such laws in England, they would marry abroad, unless you dream of a uniform legislation in all countries of the globe, which would indeed be a bold dream.

FROM PROFESSOR A. POSADA

(Professor of Constitutional Law in the University of Oviedo).

Without entering into a discussion of the bases on which Mr. Galton has raised Eugenics as a science I find many very acceptable points of view in all that is proposed by this eminent sociologist.

The history of matrimonial relationship in itself discloses most interesting results. The relative character of its forms, the transitory condition of its laws, the very history of these would seem to show that the reflex action of opinion influences the being and constitution of the human family.

Granting this, and assuming that the actual conditions of the matrimonial regime—especially those that bear upon the manner of contract—

must not be considered as the final term of evolution (since they are far from being ideal), one cannot do less than encourage all that is being done to elucidate the positive nature of matrimonial union and the positive effects resultant from it, whether such union was effected with regard, or disregard, to the exigencies of generation and its influence on descendants.

Marriage is actually contracted either for love or for gain—more often than not the woman marries because she does not enjoy economic independence. In such circumstances, physiological considerations, the influence of heredity, both physiological and moral, have little or no weight—perhaps because they are neither sufficiently known or demonstrated in such a manner that the disastrous effects of their disregard can induce direct motives of conduct.

On this account I think that we should :

- (1) Work to elucidate, in as scientific a manner as possible, the requirements of progressive selection in marriage, and we should rigorously demonstrate the consequences of such unions as are decidedly prejudicial to vigorous and healthy offspring.
- (2) We should disseminate a knowledge of the conclusions ascertained by scientific investigation and rational statistics, so that these could be gradually assimilated by public opinion and converted into legal and moral obligations, into determinative motives of conduct.

But we must bear in mind that one cannot expect a transformation of actual criteria of sexual relationship, from the mere establishment of a science of eugenics, nor even from the propagation of its conclusions; the problem is thus seen to be very complex.

The actual criteria applied to sexual relationships—especially to those here alluded to—depend on general economic conditions, by virtue of which marriage is contracted under the influence of a multitude of secondary social predispositions, that have no regard to the future of the race; and it is useless to think that any propaganda would be sufficient to overcome the exigencies of economic conditions. On the other hand the actual education of both the woman and the man leaves much to be desired, and more particularly in regard to sexual relationship. And it would be futile to think of any effectual transformation in family life, while both the man and woman do not each of them equally exact, by virtue of an invulnerable repugnance to all that injures morality—a purity of morals in the future spouse.

The day that the woman will refuse as husband the man of impure life, with a repugnance equal to that usually felt by man towards impure womanhood, we shall have made a great step towards the transformation of actual marriage—to the gain of future generations.

FROM PROFESSOR SERGI

(*Director of the Museum and Laboratory of Anthropology, University of Rome*).

As an abstract proposition, I believe Mr. Galton's proposal is entirely right and has many attractions. But, nevertheless, it seems to me to be not easily practicable and perhaps even impossible.

The sexual relations are vital in the life of all animal species. Any restrictions, to be at all tolerable, must irrefutably demonstrate a great and conspicuous gain. But, unfortunately, we are ignorant of the consequences of restrictions in marriage relations.

It is important in this connection to bear in mind that in modern societies there are certain unmistakable new tendencies at work. These tendencies are all in the direction of dissolving the old restrictions, both religious and social. They constitute, in fact, a movement towards what is called "free love." Now this tendency runs, it seems to me, counter to Mr. Galton's proposals, and makes it particularly difficult to initiate any restrictions of a new form and character.

It is, I believe, an illusion to expect that from any intellectual convictions there may arise a conscious inhibition of sex relations in the population generally. Instances are not wanting of men of high culture marrying women who are the daughters of insane and epileptic parents.

But notwithstanding these objections, which I hold to be a most serious obstacle, and even perhaps fatal to the practical application of Mr. Galton's eugenic principles, nevertheless I believe the studies which, in the second of his two papers to the Sociological Society, he proposes to institute will be both interesting and useful.

FROM DR. R. S. STEINMETZ

(*Lecturer on Sociology in the University of Leyden*).

I quite agree with Mr. Galton and others (*e. g.*, Dr. Schallmeyer, of Munich, author of "*Vererbung und Auslese im Lebenslauf der Völker*," 1903) that one of the highest objects of Applied Sociology is the promotion of eugenic marriages. I think there is no worthier object of discussion for a sociological society than that of the means of this promotion. To be sure, the thorough and real knowledge of the true, not the expressed and the reputed motives, for introducing restrictions on marriage might be a means to this end. What we want to know is the real objective cause of these restrictions; there need not, of course, have been any conscious motive at all.

Coming to detailed examination of some points in Mr. Galton's paper on "Restrictions in Marriage," I would ask, is it certain that pro-

hibition of polygamy in Christian nations was due "to considerations of social well-being," as Mr. Galton has it? Surely other causes were also at work. I think, where the number of adult men and women are nearly equal, monogamy is the natural result; polygamy is only possible when by wars and other causes, this proportion is reversed, and when other circumstances, as social inequality, allow some men to take more women than one.

A special distribution of labour between men and women may contribute to this result, but cannot be the cause of it, as every man wants the assistance of more women when he may get them. And in respect of sexual relations, it has to be observed that many men are polygamous in intention, and are only deterred by practical difficulties.

Social inequality, poverty, successful wars are the condition of polygamy. Economical or sexual wants drive men to it.

When these conditions are no longer fulfilled, monogamy will replace it. This is furthered by any rise in the position of women, by the freer play of the purer sentiments between the sexes, and by at least official or public chastity. I believe I am so far in agreement with Westermarck's views on the question. Christianity was very ascetic, as is attested by St. Paul's expressions in the Epistle to the Corinthians. By these ascetic tendencies Christian morals were opposed to polygamy. This tendency was enforced by the Christian ebionistic sympathies, by which all the fathers of the church were governed. Asceticism and social equality can both make for monogamy. Monogamy is certainly in accordance with one very mighty human instinct, that of jealousy; therefore it is the only democratic form of marriage. And I think it is the only one in harmony with the higher sentiments between the sexes, and with a right moral relation between offspring and parents.

But, in considering it, we should never forget that it is largely traversed by irregular love, whether this be sentimental or more sensual, and also by very general prostitution in all ages and classes.

So we must be very cautious in deducing from the fact of monogamy any conclusions as to new and rational marriage regulations, desirable as they may be.

Generally, the term endogamy is employed in a narrower sense than the prohibition of Greeks to marry barbarian women (concubinage with them was allowed, so the restriction was not severe).

I do not consider that Mr. Galton's view of the causes and conditions of endogamy and exogamy is in strict accordance with the results of "anthropology" (the Continental term is "ethnology"); Mr. Galton thinks exogamy is usually to be found in "small and barbarous communities," but combined with the marriage restrictions by blood-ties, and the very general horror of incest, which are only its expression, exogamy is by far the commonest rule of the Chinese; and the Hindus are exogamous in the strict sense, and in the other sense all civilised nations are exogamous,

marriage between close kindred being prohibited (Post, "Grundr. Ethn. Jurispr.," 1897, pp. 37-42).

The possibility of the complicated Australian marriage system, of which we know not yet the real motives and causes, does not at all warrant the conclusion that "with equal propriety" it might be applied "to the furtherance of some form of eugenics" among the Australians or among us. The conclusion from the Australians to us stands in need of demonstration. It cannot be assumed. Is it certain that motives of the same strength as those unknown may be found?

The motives for the horror of incest, we do not yet know quite certainly. Perhaps they are the result of very deep-seated and fundamental causes, which suggest the gravest caution in postulating their analogies.

As yet we are even incapable of restraining the very deplorable neo-Malthusian tendencies in the higher classes and some others in all civilised nations, nor those very generally and strongly operating in the eastern United States, in France, in English Australia. We are powerless against the dangers in this direction with which we are threatened by the widely spread feministic movement.*

The race-love of civilised men and women is regretfully feeble. The real problem is first to enforce it. At present the care for future man, the love and respect of the race, are quite beyond the pale of the morals of even the best.

The nobility of old, yea, the patriarchial family generally, entertained a real love and care for the qualities of their offspring. So, perhaps, the turn for this feeling may come again. The intensification of economic and social life will raise the demands on everybody's mental and bodily capabilities; the better knowledge of the hereditary qualities and their signification in attaining the highest degree of capacity will perhaps, and, I think should, in some degree inevitably waken the care for the qualities of one's own offspring.

I put much more hope on this resultant of intensified social demands, of increase and spreading of pathological knowledge, and of evermore enlightened egoism than on public morals embracing the future of the race. Improved care for one's own offspring according to science may possibly come. The result will be a change in our ideas, morals, and morality.

The next measures that then could be taken by the legislator seem to be those formulated by Dr. Schallmeyer in his excellent paper, "Infection als Morgengaber."

Meantime the chief force for progress in eugenic studies is, I think, the accomplishment of the life work of Mr. Galton, and the next is his establishment of a Research Fellowship in National Eugenics.

* For my own opinions on this, *vide* "Die neueren Forschungen zur Geschichte der menschlichen Familie," *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, 1899; *cf.* my "Der Nachwuchs der Begabten" and "Feminismus und Rasse," *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, 1904.

It is a shameful reflection for Continental universities that this whole range of studies is neglected by them, and may be fittingly compared to their traditional narrowing of the whole field of social science to economics.

FROM SIR RICHARD TEMPLE.

NOTE I.—STUDIES IN NATIONAL EUGENICS.

Topic I.—It seems to me that definitions of “gifted” and “capable” are required. Are the “gifted” to be those who perform the initiative reasoning, out of which the practical results arise? Are the “capable” to be those who bring into effect the reasoning of the “gifted”? It has always seemed to me that the work accomplished in the world is due to both classes in an equal degree. Neither can be effective without the other. Both are equally important. The success of either demands mental powers of a very high order. I am not at all sure that it is going too far to say of an equally high order. Then there are those who combine in themselves both the capacities, the initiative reasoning and the bringing into effect. Where are these to be placed? Many who possess the one in an eminent degree also possess the other; but, as reasoning and giving effect each requires so much thought and absorbs so much energy and time, the majority have not the opportunity to perform both. I suggest that, as regards family eugenics, both the “gifted” and the “capable” be, if the above definitions are to stand, taken as divisions of one class of mankind. This should be the safest method of bringing the inquiry to a practical result, because of the tendency, so strong in human beings, to look on their own description of work as that which is of the most importance to their kind. The great practical difficulty in the inquiry on the lines indicated, that impresses itself on me is that; especially among women—owing to their place in the world’s work,—qualities essential to usefulness are frequently present in individuals who are otherwise possessed of no specially high mental qualities, and are therefore “unknown,” and in no way remarkable: such qualities as initiative, discretion, “common sense,” perseverance, patience, even temper, energy, courage, and so on, without which the “gifted” and “capable” are apt to be of no practical value to the world. I suggest that progress represents the sum of individual capacities, past and present, at any given period among any given population in any given environment. Then again, in the prosecution of Eugenics by statistics of achievement, there is another great difficulty, which may be best expressed in the words of the Preacher in Ecclesiastes: “I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill: but time and chance happeneth to them all.” Existing social conditions and prejudices, all the

world over, will force eugenical philosophy to take root very slowly. This is, perhaps, as it should be, in view of the above practical reflection.

Topic VI.—It would appear that a beginning has been made, as regards men, in the Rhodes Scholarships.

NOTE II.—RESTRICTIONS IN MARRIAGE.

In one sense, Eugenics is the oldest and most universal philosophy in the world, of which the convention called marriage is the outward and visible sign. Everywhere, among all peoples in all times, marriage has originated for the enforcement and maintenance of real or supposed eugenics. The object of the convention has been fundamentally always the same, the direct personal advantage in some tangible form of a group in its environment. All that can be done by individual philosophers is to give marriage a definite turn in a direction deemed beneficial, because human beings in a mass, in a matter affecting every individual, act upon instinct—defining instinct as unconscious reasoning. In human affairs the outward and visible sign of instinct is custom. By reasoning, instinct can be given a definite direction, and hence a definite form can be given to a custom. This has often been accomplished, but, so far as I can apprehend history, reasoning has only succeeded in creating instinct and thus custom, when the masses subjected to its pressure have been able to see the direct personal advantage to be gained by the line taken. This is the practical point that the eugenical philosopher has to keep ever before him. A custom can be created. The questions for the philosopher are what should be created and how it should be created.

All forms of marriage are due fundamentally to considerations of well-being. Exogamy exists where it is thought important to abnormally increase the numbers of a group. Endogamy exists where it is thought important in a settled community to reserve property and social standing or power for a limited group. Monogamy, polygamy, polyandry are all attempts to maintain social well-being in a form that has seemed obviously advantageous to different groups of human beings. Religion, taboo, and the prohibited degrees are all methods of enforcing custom by moral force. The Australian marriage system is merely a primitive, and therefore complicated, method of enforcing custom. But the human instinct as to incest is something going very deep down, as there is the same kind of instinct in some of the "higher" animals of the two sexes when stabled together, *e.g.*, horses, elephants. Celibacy seems to be due to different causes in different circumstances, according as to whether it is enforced or voluntary. In the former case it is a method of enforcing marriage customs maintained for the supposed common good. In the latter it is due to asceticism, itself an universal instinct based on a philosophy of personal advantage.

The restrictions enforced by marriage customs have led to hypergamy, a *mariage de convenance* exchanging position and property, but really an unreasoning form of eugenics adopted because of the supposed personal advantage, and this has led, in one disastrous form, to female infanticide in a distinctly harmful degree. All the restrictions of marriage are modified in uncivilised communities by promiscuity before marriage and in civilised communities by hetairism. The greater the restrictions the more systematic has hetairism become. Illegitimacy has taken on many almost unrecognisable forms in various parts of the world. It really represents the result of rebellion against convention. Every one of these considerations materially affect any proposition for a reform of Eugenics. Caste is the outward manifestation of an endogamic marriage system introduced by the "intellectuals" of a people for the personal advantage of their own group within the nation, and imitated without reasoning by other groups. This system of endogamic marriage, adopted for the real or supposed advantage of a group, has brought about national disaster, for it has made impossible the instinct of nationality, or the larger group, and has brought the peoples adopting it into perpetual subjection to others possessing the instinct of nationality. Its existence and practical effect is a standing warning to the eugenical philosopher, which should point out to him the extreme care that is necessary in consciously directing eugenics into any given channel.

FROM PROFESSOR TÖNNIES

(*Professor of Philosophy in the University of Kiel*).

I fully agree with the scope and aims of Mr. Galton's "Eugenics," and consequently with the essence of the two papers proposed. But with respect to details, I have certain objections and illustrations, which I now try to explain.

1. There can be no doubt but the three kinds of accomplishments are desirable in mankind; physical, mental and moral ability. Surely the three, or as Mr. Galton classifies them, constitution—which I understand to imply moral character—physique and intellect, are not independent variables, but if they to a large extent are correlate, on the other hand they also tend to exclude each other, strong intellect being very often connected with a delicate health as well as with poor moral qualities, and *vice versa*. Now the great question, as it appears to me, will be, whether Eugenics is to favour one kind of these excellencies at the *cost of* another one, or of both the other, and which should be preferred under any circumstances.

2. Under existing social conditions it would mean a cruelty to raise the average intellectual capacity of a nation to that of its better moiety of the present day. For it would render people so much more conscious of the dissonance between the hopeless monotony of their toil and the lack of

recreation, poorness of comfort, narrowness of prospects, under which they are even now suffering severely, notwithstanding the dulness of the great multitude.

3. The rise of intellectual qualities also involves, under given conditions, a danger of further decay of moral feeling, nay, of sympathetic affections generally. Town life already produces a race of cunning rascals. Temptations are very strong, indeed, to outrun competitors by reckless astuteness and remorseless tricks. Intelligence promotes egotism and pleasure-seeking, very much in contradiction to the interests of the race.

4. A strong physique seems to be correlate with some portions of our moral nature, but not with all. Refinement of moral feeling and tact are more of an intellectual nature, and again combine more easily with a weak frame and less bodily power.

5. I endorse what Mr. Galton shows—that marriage selection is very largely conditioned by motives based on religious and social consideration; and I accept, as a grand principle, the conclusion that the same class of motives may, in time to come, direct mankind to disfavour unsuitable marriages, so as to make at least some kinds of them impossible or highly improbable, and this would mean an enormous benefit to all concerned, and to the race in general. But I very much doubt if a sufficient unanimity may be produced upon the question—which marriages *are* unsuitable?

6. Of course this unanimity may be promoted by a sufficient study of the effects of heredity. This is the proper and most prominent task of Eugenics, as Mr. Galton luminously points out in his six topics to be taken in hand under the Research Fellowship. Highly though I appreciate the importance of this kind of investigation, to which my own attention has been directed at a very early date, I am apt to believe, however, that the *practical* outcome of them will not be considerable. Our present knowledge, scanty and incoherent as it is, still suffices already to make certain marriages, which are especially favoured by social convention, by religion and by custom, appear to sober-thinking men, highly unsuitable. Science is not likely to gain an influence equivalent to, or even outweighing, those influences that further or restrain particular classes of marriage. On the other hand the voice of Reason, notably with respect to hygienic as well as moral considerations, is often represented by *parents* in contradiction to inclinations or even passions of their offspring (especially daughters); and the prevailing individualistic tendencies of the present age, greatly in favour of individual choice and of the natural right of Love, mostly, or at least very often, dumb that voice of Reason and render it more and more powerless. Eugenics has to contend against the two fronts: against the *mariage de convenance* on the one side, the *mariage de passion* on the other.

7. But this applies chiefly to the upper strata of society, where a certain influence of scientific results may be presumed on principle with greater likelihood than among the multitude. Mr. Galton wishes the

national importance of Eugenics to be introduced into the national conscience like a new religion. I do not believe that this will be possible, unless the conditions of every day existence were entirely revolutionised beforehand. The function of Religion has always been to give *immediate* relief to pressing discomforts, and to connect it with hopeful prospects of an *individual* life to come. The life of the race is a subject entirely foreign to popular feelings, and will continue to be so, unless the mass should be exempt from daily toil and care, to a degree which we are unable to realise at present.

8. However, the first and main point is to secure the general *intellectual* acceptance of Eugenics as a hopeful and most important study. I willingly and respectfully give my fullest sympathy and approval to this claim.

I have tried to express my sentiments here as evoked by the two most interesting papers. I have been obliged to do so in great haste, and consequently, as I am aware, in very bad English, for which I must apologise.

FROM PROFESSOR AUGUST WEISMANN.

It has given me great pleasure to learn that a Sociological Society has been formed in England, and to see that so many distinguished names are associated with its inauguration and proceedings.

As for the request that I should send "an expression of my views on the subject" of Mr. Galton's two papers, I fear I can have nothing to say that will be at all new.

I think there is one question, however, of very great importance which has not yet, so far as I know, been investigated, and to which the statistical method alone can supply an answer. It is this:—Whether, when a hereditary disease like tuberculosis has made its appearance in a family it is afterwards possible for it to be entirely banished from this or that branch of the family; or whether, on the contrary, the progeny of these members of the family who appear healthy must not sooner or later produce a tuberculous offspring?

I am fully aware that there exists already a great mass of statistical matter on the subject of "tuberculosis," but I cannot say that it seems to me sufficient, thus far, to justify a sure conclusion.

Speaking for myself, I am disposed, both on theoretic grounds and in view of known facts, to opine that a complete purification and re-establishment of such a family is quite possible in the cases of slighter infection.

For I believe that hereditary transmission in such cases depends upon an infected condition of the seed, germ, or generative cell; that it is conceivable that single generative cells of the parent may remain free from bacilli; that an entirely healthy child may be developed from one such

generative cell, and that from this sound shoot an entirely healthy branch of the family may grow in time.

I would almost go so far as to say that if this were *not* the case, then there could hardly be a family on earth to-day unaffected by hereditary disease.

Let me ask the Sociological Society to accept this note as merely an indication of my willingness to make at least a very small contribution to the list of those sociological problems which the Society aims at solving.

FROM THE HON. V. LADY WELBY.

It is obvious that in the question of eugenic restrictions in marriage there are two opposite points of view from which we may work: (1) that of making the most of the race, which concentrates interest, not on the parents—who are then merely, like the organism itself, the germ carriers—but always on the children (in their turn merely race-bearers); and (2) that of making the most of the individual, and thus raising the standard of the whole by raising that of its parts. The problem is to combine these in the future more adequately than has been attempted in the past.

In a small contribution to the discussion on Mr. Galton's first paper I appealed to women to realise more clearly their true place and gift as representing that original racial motherhood, out of which the masculine and feminine characters have arisen. It seems advisable now to take somewhat wider ground.

When, in the interests of an ascending family ideal, we emphasise the need for restrictions on marriage which shall embody all those, as summarised in Mr. Galton's paper, to which human societies have already submitted, we have to consummate a further marriage—one of ideas; we have to combine what may appear to be incompatible aims. In the first place, in order to foster all that makes for a higher and nobler type of humanity than any we have yet known how to realise, we must face the fact that some sacrifice of emotion become relatively unworthy is imperative. Else we weaken "the earnest desire not to infringe the sanctity and freedom of the social relations of a family group." But the sacrifice is of an emotion which has ceased to make for Man and now makes for Self or for reversion to the sub-human.

We are always confronted with a practical paradox. The marriage which makes for the highest welfare of the united man and woman may be actually inimical to the children of that union. The marriage which makes for the highest type of family and its highest and fullest development may often mean, and must always tend to mean, the inhibition of much that makes for individual perfection.

And since the children in their turn will be confronted by the same initial difficulty it may be desirable not only to define our aim and the best

methods of reaching it, but to suggest one or two simple prior considerations which are seldom taken into account. One of these is the fact that, speaking generally, human development is a development of the higher brain and its new organ, the hand. It may, I suppose, be said that the rest of the organism has not been correspondingly developed, but remains essentially on the animal level. What especially concerns us here is that this includes the uterine system, which has even tended to retrograde. Here, surely, we have the key to many social and ethical difficulties in the marriage question.

This relatively enormous complexity of brain, disturbing, or at least altering the organic balance, coupled with the sexual incompleteness of the individual, has cost us dear. All such special developments involving comparative overgrowth must do this. In this case we have gained, of course, a priceless analytical, constructive, and elaborative faculty. But there seem to be many indications that we have correspondingly lost a direct and trustworthy reaction to the stimuli of nature in its widest sense, a reaction that should deserve the name of intuition as representing a practically unerring instinct. An eugenic advance secured by an increase of moral sensitiveness on the subject of parentage may well tend to restore on a higher level these primordial responses to excitation of all kinds. But of course it will still rest with education, in all senses and grades, either (as, on the whole, at present) to blunt or distort them, or to interpret and train them into directed and controlled efficiency.

At present our mental history seems to present a curious anomaly. On the one hand we see what, compared with the animal and even with the lower intellectual human types, is an amazing development of logical precision, ordered complexity of reasoning, rigorous validity of conclusion, all ultimately depending for their productive value on the validity of the presuppositions from which they start. On the other hand, this initial validity can but seldom, if ever, be proved experimentally or by argument, or be established by universal experience. Thus the very perfection of the rational development is always liable to lead us further and further astray. The result we see in endless discussions which tend rather to divide than to unite us by hardening into opposed views of what we take for reality, and to confuse or dim the racial outlook and hinder the racial ascent.

It is to be hoped then that one result of the creation of a eugenic conscience will be a restoration of the human balance, bringing about an immensely increased power of revising familiar assumptions and thus of rightly interpreting experience and the natural world. This must make for the solution of pressing problems which at present cannot even be worthily stated. For there is no more significant sign of the present deadlock resulting from the anomaly just indicated, than the general neglect of the question of effective expression, and therefore of its central value to us; that is, what we are content vaguely to call its meaning.

Such a line of thought may seem, for the very reason of this neglect, far enough from the subject to be dealt with,—from the question of restrictions in marriage. But in the research, studies, and discussions which ought to precede any attempt in the direction of giving effect to an aroused sense of eugenic responsibility, surely this factor will really be all-important. It must be hoped that such discussion will be carried on by those in whom what, for convenience sake, I would call the mother-sense, or the sense of human, even of vital origin and significance, is not entirely overlaid by the priceless power of co-ordinating subtle trains of abstract reasoning. For this supreme power easily defeats itself by failing to examine and rectify the all-potent starting point of its activities, the simple and primary assumption.

I have admitted that the foregoing suggestions—offered with all diffidence—seem to be far from the present subject of discussion, with which, indeed, I have not attempted directly to deal. I would only add that this is not because such questions have not the deepest interest for me, as for all who in any degree realise their urgency.

We shall have to discuss, though I hope in some cases privately, such questions as the influence on descendants of the existence or the lack of reverent love and loyalty between parents, not as “acquired characters,” in the controversial sense, but as giving full play to the highest currents of our mental and spiritual life. We shall have to consider the possibilities of raising the whole moral standard of the race, so that the eugenic loyalty shown in instinctive form on the sub-human plane should be reproduced in humanity consciously, purposively, and progressively. Finally, we shall have to reconsider the two cults of Self and Happiness, which we are so prone to make ultimate. The truly eugenic conscience will look upon self as a means and an instrument of consecrated service; and happiness not as an end or an ideal to strive for, since such striving ignobly defeats its own object, but—as sorrow or disappointment may also become—a means or a result of purifying and energising the human activities to an extent as yet difficult to speak of.

CONTRIBUTORY NOTES

Brief communications were contributed by, amongst others :

Professor B. ALTAMIRA (of the University of Oviedo), who wrote :—
“The subjects of Mr. Galton’s communications are very interesting, and there should be some very valuable information forthcoming on the forms of marriage (endogamy, exogamy, etc.) to be unearthed from the actual juridical manners and customs of Spain.”

Mr. F. CARREL, who wrote :—“I should like to ask Mr. Galton whether the general practice of eclectic mating might not tend to the production of a very inferior residual type, always condemned to mate together until eliminated from an existence in which they would be too unfitted to participate; and, if so, whether such a system can be adopted without inflicting suffering upon the more or less slowly disappearing residuum?”

Mrs. FAWCETT, who wrote :—“Mr. Galton evidently realises that he has a gigantic task before him, that of raising up a new standard of conduct on one of the most fundamental of human relations. At present, the great majority of men and women, otherwise conscientious, seem to have no conscience about their responsibility for the improvement or deterioration of the race. One frequently observes cases of men suffering from mortal and incurable disease who apparently have no idea that it is wrong to have children who will probably enter life heavily handicapped by inherited infirmity. Two thirds of what is called the social evil would disappear of itself, if responsibility for the welfare of the coming generation found its fitting place in the conscience of the average man. I wish all success to Mr. Francis Galton’s efforts.”

Professor J. G. MCKENDRICK, who wrote :—“Mr. Galton is opening up a subject of great interest and importance—more especially in its rela-

tion to improving the physical, mental, and pure qualities of the race. At present much is carried on by haphazard, and I fear the consequence is that we see indications of degeneration in various directions. I heartily wish much success to those who are carrying on investigations of these important problems. We are all indebted to Mr. Galton for his valuable and deeply suggestive papers."

Professor J. H. MUIRHEAD, who wrote:—"I think Mr. Galton's suggestions for the advance of the study and practice of Eugenics most important, and hope our Society may do something to forward the subject."

Professor E. B. POULTON, who wrote:—"I entirely agree with the aims Mr. Galton has in view and profoundly admire his papers on this subject. I think they unfold great possibilities for the human race."

The Hon. BERTRAND RUSSELL, who wrote:—"I have read Mr. Galton's two papers in abstract with much interest, and agree entirely with the view that marriage customs might be modified in a eugenic direction."

Mr. C. A. WITCHELL (*Author of "The Cultivation of Man"*), who wrote:—"There is one factor operating in the selection of husbands and wives which will be extremely difficult to bring within the purview of eugenics, and which is yet supreme in its influence. The union of the sexes in its higher form is not a matter of passion, but of the more powerful and enduring sentiment which we call love. The capturing of mates is not confined to mankind; the polygamous birds exhibit it. But there are birds that sing to win a mate—these have a delayed courtship; and in man this is developed to still nobler ideals. Let a man look around him at a public ball. Would he choose for mother of his children the woman who of all present has the greatest physical attractions? Nothing of the kind. The one he chooses (by instinct) is the one who inspires him with a certain elevation of spiritual sentiment, who, indeed, freezes his physical nature out of his thought—whom he could hardly pay a compliment to, and yet whom he knows he would select from among them all. Why does he choose her? Has he not made selection through the assessors chosen by Nature—certain subtle and undefinable perceptions received through the senses of sight and hearing. These perceptions, fleet and instant messengers, have not been delayed by social distances. They have pierced all the flimsy armour of fashion, they have penetrated the shams of culture, and have told his inmost sense of consciousness—his soul—what hers is like. By that knowledge his soul has chosen hers; and unless science can analyse this subtle process of spiritual selection it must stand aside. By all means let eugenics advance! But let its exponents pause to analyse first what is now the most powerful factor governing the selection of the sexes, and seek to take advantage of it rather than to stifle it with mere physical agencies. To sterilise defective

types is one thing ; to eliminate the criminally weak and diseased is another—equally reasonable. But let us beware lest we do anything that may tend to obliterate by physical means the higher instinctive teachings of sexual selection.”

A MEMBER OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, who is a well-known writer, but wishes here to remain anonymous:—“My own views are on the side of the largest scope being given to what might be called interference in the matter, and for this reason I should even regret the abrogation of the sister-in-law disability, mistaken as it seems to me on its merits. I mean anything which keeps alive the sense that marriage is the affair of the State seems to me to have a certain value. When one knows, as I do, of a certain physician asking a patient, ‘Were your parents first cousins?’ and the affirmative answer, one feels certain that here is a realm of duty to which conscience has yet to awaken.”

MR. GALTON'S REPLY.

This Society has cause to congratulate itself on the zeal and energy which has brought together so large a body of opinion. We have had verbal contributions from four eminent specialists in anthropology: Dr. Haddon, Dr. Mott, Mr. Crawley and Dr. Westermarck, and numerous written communications have been furnished by well-known persons. At the time that I am revising and extending these words no less than twenty-six contributions to the discussion are in print. Want of space compels me to confine my reply to those remarks that seem more especially to require it, and to do so very briefly, for Eugenics is a wide study, with an uncounted number of side issues into which those who discuss it are tempted to stray. If, however, sure advance is to be made, these issues must be thoroughly explored, one by one, and partial discussion should as far as possible be avoided. To change the simile, we have to deal with a formidable chain of strongholds, which must be severally attacked in force, reduced, and disposed of, before we can proceed freely.

In the first place, it is a satisfaction to find that no one impugns the conclusion which my memoir was written to justify, that history tells how restrictions in marriage, even of an excessive kind, have been contentedly accepted very widely, under the guidance of what I called "immaterial motives." This is all I had in view when writing it.

Certificates.—One of the comments on which I will remark is that if certificates were now offered to those who passed certain examinations into health, physique, moral and intellectual powers, and hereditary gifts, great mistakes would be made by the examiners. I fully agree that it is too early to devise a satisfactory system of marks for giving what might

be styled "honour-certificates," because we do not yet possess sufficient data to go upon. On the other hand, there are persons who are exceptionally and unquestionably unfit to contribute offspring to the nation, such as those mentioned in Dr. Mott's bold proposals. The best methods of dealing with these are now ripe for immediate consideration.

Breeding for points.—It is objected by many that there cannot be unanimity on the "points" that it is most desirable to breed for. I fully discussed this objection in my memoir read here last spring, showing that some qualities such as health and vigour were thought by all to be desirable, and the opposite undesirable, and that this sufficed to give a first direction to our aims. It is a safe starting point, though a great deal more has to be inquired into as we proceed on our way. I think that some contributors to this discussion have been needlessly alarmed. No question has been raised by me of breeding men like animals for particular points, to the disregard of all-round efficiency in physical, intellectual (including moral), and hereditary qualifications. Moreover, as statistics have shown, the best qualities are largely correlated. The youths who became judges, bishops, statesmen, and leaders of progress in England could have furnished formidable athletic teams in their times. There is a tale, I know not how far founded on fact, that Queen Elizabeth had an eye to the calves of the legs of those she selected for bishops. There is something to be said in favour of selecting men by their physical characteristics for other than physical purposes. It would decidedly be safer to do so than to trust to pure chance.

The residue.—It is also objected that if the inferior moiety of a race are left to intermarry, their produce will be increasingly inferior. This is certainly an error. The law of "regression towards mediocrity" insures that their offspring, as a whole, will be superior to themselves; and if, as I sincerely hope, a freer action will be hereafter allowed to selective agencies than hitherto, the portion of the offspring so selected would be better still. The influences that now withstand the free action of selective agencies are numerous, they include indiscriminate charity.

Passion of love.—The argument has been repeated that love is too strong a passion to be restrained by such means as would be tolerated at the present time. I regret that I did not express the distinction that ought to have been made between its two stages, that of slight inclination and that of falling thoroughly into love, for it is the first of these rather than the second that I hope the popular feeling of the future will successfully resist. Every match-making mother appreciates the difference. If a girl is taught to look upon a class of men as tabooed, whether owing to rank, creed, connections, or other causes, she does not regard them as possible husbands and turns her thoughts elsewhere. The proverbial “Mrs. Grundy” has enormous influence in checking the marriages she considers indiscreet.

Eugenics as a factor in religion.—Remarks have been made concerning eugenics as a religion; this will be the subject of the brief memoir that follows these remarks.

It is much to be desired that competent persons would severally take up one or other of the many topics mentioned in my second memoir, or others of a similar kind, and work it thoroughly out as they would any ordinary scientific problem; in this way solid progress would be made. I must be allowed to re-emphasise my opinion that an immense amount of investigation has to be accomplished before a definite system of Eugenics can be safely framed.

III.

EUGENICS AS A FACTOR IN RELIGION.

Eugenics strengthens the sense of social duty in so many important particulars that the conclusions derived from its study ought to find a welcome home in every tolerant religion. It promotes a far-sighted philanthropy, the acceptance of parentage as a serious responsibility, and a higher conception of patriotism. The creed of eugenics is founded upon the idea of evolution; not on a passive form of it, but on one that can to some extent direct its own course. Purely passive, or what may be styled mechanical evolution, displays the awe-inspiring spectacle of a vast eddy of organic turmoil, originating we know not how, and travelling we know not whither. It forms a continuous whole from first to last, reaching backward beyond our earliest knowledge and stretching forward as far as we think we can foresee. But it is moulded by blind and wasteful processes, namely, by an extravagant production of raw material and the ruthless rejection of all that is superfluous, through the blundering steps of trial and error. The condition at each successive moment of this huge system, as it issues from the already quiet past and is about to invade the still undisturbed future, is one of violent internal commotion. Its elements are in constant flux and change, though its general form alters but slowly. In this respect, it resembles the curious stream of cloud that sometimes seems attached to a mountain top during the continuance of a strong breeze; its constituents are always

changing, though its shape as a whole hardly varies. Evolution is in any case a grand phantasmagoria, but it assumes an infinitely more interesting aspect under the knowledge that the intelligent action of the human will is, in some small measure, capable of guiding its course. Man has the power of doing this largely so far as the evolution of humanity is concerned; he has already affected the quality and distribution of organic life so widely that the changes on the surface of the earth, merely through his disforestings and agriculture, would be recognisable from a distance as great as that of the moon.

As regards the practical side of eugenics, we need not linger to re-open the unending argument whether man possesses any creative power of will at all, or whether his will is not also predetermined by blind forces or by intelligent agencies behind the veil, and whether the belief that man can act independently is more than a mere illusion. This matters little in practice, because men, whether fatalists or not, work with equal vigour whenever they perceive they have the power to act effectively.

Eugenic belief extends the function of philanthropy to future generations, it renders its action more pervading than hitherto, by dealing with families and societies in their entirety, and it enforces the importance of the marriage covenant by directing serious attention to the probable quality of the future offspring. It sternly forbids all forms of sentimental charity that are harmful to the race, while it eagerly seeks opportunity for acts of personal kindness, as some equivalent to the loss of what it forbids. It brings the tie of kinship into prominence and strongly encourages love and interest in family and race. In brief, eugenics is a virile creed, full of hopefulness, and appealing to many of the noblest feelings of our nature.

CIVICS

CIVICS: AS CONCRETE AND APPLIED SOCIOLOGY, PART II.

By Professor GEDDES.

Read before the Sociological Society at a Meeting in the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Clare Market, W.C., on Monday, January 23rd, 1905, the Rt. Hon. CHARLES BOOTH, F.R.S., in the Chair.

A.—INTRODUCTION: THE NEED OF CIVIC SURVEYS.

To the previous discussion of this subject* the first portion of this present title, "Civics as Concrete Sociology," would have been more suitable than the second, (that of "Civics as Applied Sociology") actually used. For its aim was essentially to plead for the concrete survey and study of cities, their observation and interpretation on lines essentially similar to those of the natural sciences. Since Comte's demonstration of the necessity of the preliminary sciences to social studies, and Spencer's development of this, still more since the evolution theory has become generally recognised, no one disputes the applicability of biology to

* "Sociological Papers," Vol. I., pp. 103-118.*

sociology. Many are, indeed, vigorously applying the conceptions of life in evolution, in geographical distribution and environment, in health and disease, to the interpretations of the problems of the times; while with the contemporary rise of eugenics to the first plane of interest, both social and scientific, these lines of thought, bio-social and bio-geographic, must needs be increasingly utilised and developed.

But Comte and Spencer, with most other biologically-minded sociologists have been more at home among biological generalisations and theories than among the facts they arise from, and hence it is ever needful to maintain and extend a first-hand contact with these. I seek, therefore, to press home the idea that just as the biologist must earn his generalisations through direct and first-hand acquaintance with nature, so now must the sociologist work for his generalisations through a period of kindred observation and analysis, both geographic and historical; his "general laws" thus appearing anew as the abstract of regional facts, after due comparison of these as between region and region.

May not much of the comparative sterility of post-Comtean (or at any rate post-Spencerian) sociology, which is so commonly reproached to us, and to which the difficult formation and slow growth of sociological societies and schools is largely due, be thus explained? Is it not the case that many able and persuasive writers, not only knowing the results, but logically using the generalisations of Comte or Spencer, as of old of Smith or now-a-days of List in the economic field, are yet comparatively sterile of fresh contributions to thought, and still more to action? In fact, must we not apply to much of the literature of recent sociology, just as to traditional economics, the criticism of Comte's well-known law of three states, and inquire if such writers, while apparently upon the plane of generalised science, are not really in large measure at least arrested upon Comte's "metaphysical stage," Mill's "abstractional" one?

Conversely, the revival of sociological interest in this country at present is obviously very largely derived from fresh and freshening work like that of Mr Francis Galton and of the Right Hon. Charles Booth especially. For here in Mr. Galton's biometrics and eugenics is a return to nature, a keen scrutiny of human beings, which is really an orderly fruition of that of the same author's "Art of Travel." Similarly, Mr. Booth's "Survey of London" is as truly a return to nature as was Darwin's Voyage, or his yet more far-reaching studies in his garden and farmyard at home.

Is it not the main support of the subtle theorisings and far-stretched polemic of Prof. Weismann that he can plague his adversaries with the small but literal and concrete mice and hydroids and water fleas with which his theories began? And is it not for a certain lack of such concrete matter of observation that the vast systematisations of M. de Greef, or M. de Roberty, or the original and ingenious readings of Prof. Simon Patten leave us too often unconvinced, even if not sometimes without sufficiently definite understanding of their meaning? The simplest of naturalists must feel that Comte or Spencer, despite the frequently able use of the generalisations of biology, themselves somewhat lacked this first-hand observation of the city and community around them, and suffered thereby; this part of their work obviously not being on a level with the historic interpretations of the one or the psychological productivity of the other. And if, without warlike intent, I may yet strike a conspicuous shield or two within these friendly lists, is it not this one element of concrete observation and illustration which is sometimes lacking to give its full effect to the encyclopædic learning and the sympathetic insight of one of our recent papers, to the historic and poetic interpretations of another, or to the masterly logic of a third?

Before the polemics of our educationists, the voluminous argumentation and casuistic subtlety of our professors of economics and ethics, yet more before the profound speculations of our epistemologists, the mere naturalist observer can but feel abashed like the truant before his schoolmasters; yet he is also not without a certain deep inward conviction, born of experience, that his outdoor world is yet more real, more vast, and more instructive than is theirs. And this impression becomes strengthened, nay verified and established, when he sees that the initiative thinkers from whom these claim to descend, have had in each and every case no merely academic record, but also a first-hand experience, an impulse and message from life and nature. Hence the contributions of Locke, of Comenius, and of Rousseau. Hence the Physiocrats found economics in peasant life; and thus too Adam Smith renewed their science, with due academic logic, doubtless, but from his experience of Glasgow and Kirkcaldy manufactures and trade: Even the idealist Berkeley owed much of his theory to his iridescent tar-water; while surely the greater ethicists are those who have not only been dialecticians, but moral forces in the world of men.

In such ways, then, I would justify the thesis that civics is no abstract study, but fundamentally a matter of concrete and descriptive sociology—perhaps the greatest field of this. Next, that such orderly study is in line with the preliminary sciences, and with the general doctrine of evolution from simple to complex; and finally with the general inquiry into the influence of geographical conditions on social development.

In short, the student of civics must be first of all an observer of cities; and, if so, of their origins and developments, from the small and simple beginnings of which the tiniest hamlet is but an arrested germ. The productive sociologist should thus be of all investigators a wandering student *par excellence*; in the first place, as far as possible, a literal tourist and traveller—and this although, like the homely Gilbert White or the world-voyaging Darwin, he may do his best work around his own home.

B.—INITIAL METHODS OF CONCRETE SURVEY.

Hence our civic studies began (vol. 1, p. 105) with the survey of a valley region inhabited by its characteristic types—hunter and shepherd, peasant and fisher—each on his own level, each evolving or degenerating within his own region. Hence the concrete picture of such a typical valley section with its types of occupation cannot be brought too clearly before our minds.*

What now of the causes of progress or decay? Are not these first of all the qualities and defects inherent in that particular social formation?—though we must also consider how these different types act and react, how they combine with, transform, subjugate, ruin or replace each other in region after region. We thus re-interpret the vicissitudes of history in more general terms, those of the differentiation, progress or degeneracy of each occupational and social type, and the ascending and descending oscillations of these types. In short, these occupational struggles underlie and largely interpret even that conflict of races, upon which Mr. Stuart-Glennie and other sociologists have so ably insisted. The fundamental importance of these initial factors of region and occupation to all studies of races and types, of communities and institutions, of customs and laws, indeed of language and literature, of religion and art, even of ideals and individualities, must be my excuse if I seem to insist, in season and out of season, upon

* Fig. I.

the services of Le Play as one of the main founders of sociology ; and this not only (*a*) on account of his monographic surveys of modern industrial life — those “ Monographies Sociales ” from which our current economic studies of the condition of the worker, of the family budget, etc., descend—but (*b*) yet more on account of his vital reconstruction of anthropology, (albeit still far from adequately realised by most anthropologists) through his renewed insistence upon the elemental rustic origins of industry, family types, and social organisation alike, from these simplest reactions of man in his struggle for existence in varied and varying environment.

It does not suffice to recognise, with many economists, hunting, pastoral and agricultural formations, as states *preliminary* to our present industrial and commercial, imperial, and financial order of civilisation. This view, still too commonly surviving, is rather of hindrance than help ; what we need is to see our existing civilisation as the complex struggle and resultant of all these types and their developments to-day. So far, therefore, from leaving, as at present, these simple occupational types to the anthropologist, or at best giving him some scant hospitality within our city museum, we are learning to see how it is at one time the eager miner, or the conservative shepherd, or at another the adventurous fisher or hunter who comes concretely upon the first plane of national, imperial or international politics, and who awakens new strife among these. We not only begin to see, but the soldier frankly tells us, how the current sports of youth, and the unprecedented militarism of the past century, are alike profoundly connected with the hunting world. Hence the hope of peace lies not only, as most at present think, in the civilised and civilising-development of international law, or of culture intercourse, excellent though these are, but also in a fuller and completer return to nature than has been this recent and persistent obsession of our governing classes with the hunter world almost alone ; in short, in adding the gentler, yet wider, experiences of the naturalist, the sterner experiences of other occupations also. Nor does such elementary recognition of these main social formations content us ; their local differentiations must be noted and compared—a comprehensive regional survey, therefore, which does justice to each local variety of these great types ; speaking henceforth of no mere abstract “ hunter,” but of the specific hunting types of each climate, and distinguishing these as clearly as do our own milder sportsmen of deer-forest and the turnip field from themselves and from each other. After such needed surveys in detail, we may, indeed must, compare and generalise them.

Similarly for the pasture, the forest. Every tourist in this country is struck by the contrast of Swiss towns and cities with our own, and notes

too that on the Swiss pasture he finds a horde of cattle, while in Scotland or Yorkshire he left a flock of sheep. And not only the tourist, but the historian or the economist too often fail to see how Galashiels or Bradford are developments of the wool hamlet, now familiar to many in R. L. Stevenson's native Swanston. Again, not only Swiss wealth, but Swiss character and institutions, go back essentially to the high pasture and the well-filled byre. That this rich Swiss cow-pasture rests on limestone, and the poor Scottish sheep-grazing upon comparatively unmouldering and impermeable gneiss, is no mere matter of geologist's detail; it affords in each case the literal and concrete foundation-stone of the subsequent evolution of each region and population, and this not only in material and economic development, but even in higher and subtler outcomes, æsthetic, intellectual and moral.* It is for such reasons that one must labour and re-labour this geographic and determinist aspect of sociology, and this for no merely scientific reason, but also for practical ones. Nowhere perhaps have more good and generous souls considered how to better the condition of their people than in Swiss, or Irish, or Scottish valleys; yet it is one main reason of the continual failure of all such movements, and of such minds in the wider world as well, that they do not first acquaint themselves with the realities of nature and labour sufficiently to appreciate that the fundamental—I do not say the supreme—question is: what can be got out of limestone, and what can be got out of gneiss? Hence the rare educative value of such a concrete sociological diagram and model as was the Swiss Village at the Paris Exposition of 1900, for here geographic and economic knowledge and insight were expressed with artistic skill and sympathy as perhaps never before. Only as similar object-lessons are worked out for other countries, can we adequately learn, much less popularly teach, how from nature comes "rustics," and from this comes civics. But civics and rustics make up the field of politics; they are the concrete of which politics becomes the abstract—commonly the too remotely abstract.

For final illustration, let us descend to the sea-level. There again, taking the fisher, each regional type must be traced in his contribution to his town. Take for instance the salmon fisher of Norway, the whaler of Dundee, the herring-fisher of Yarmouth, the cod-fisher of Newfoundland, the coral fisher of the Ægean; each is a definite varietal type, one developing or at least tending to develop characteristic normal family relations, and corresponding social outcomes in institutions; in which again the appropriate qualities and defects must be expressed, even as is the quality and twist of the hemp in the strength of the cable, or as is the chemistry and the microscopic structure of the alloy in the efficiency of the great gun.

* For a fuller justification of this thesis as regards Switzerland, see the writer's "International Exhibitions," in *International Monthly*, October, 1900.

Our neighbouring learned societies and museums, geographical, geological and the rest, are thus avowedly and consciously so many winter shelters in which respective groups of regional surveyors tell their tales and compare their observations, in which they meet to compare their generalisations from their own observations made in the field with those made by others. So it must increasingly be for this youngest of societies. We may, we should, know best our Thames valley, our London basin, our London survey; but the progress of our science implies as increasingly varied and thorough an inquiry into rustic and civic regions and occupations and resultants throughout the whole world present and past, as does the corresponding world survey with our geologic neighbours.

I plead then for a sociological survey, rustic and civic, region by region, and insist in the first place upon the same itinerant field methods of notebook and camera, even for museum collections and the rest, as those of the natural sciences. The dreary manuals which have too long discredited those sciences in our schools, are now giving place to a new and fascinating literature of first-hand nature study. Similarly, those too abstract manuals of civics which are at present employed in schools* must be replaced by concrete and regional ones, their abstract counsels of political or personal perfection thus also giving place to a corresponding regional idealism which may then be supplemented from other regions as far as needs demand and circumstances allow.

C.—GEOGRAPHICAL DETERMINISM AND ITS DIFFICULTIES.

To interpret then our tangle of ideas, both of the city and its citizens, let us now bring more fully to our transverse valley sections, and to each occupation separately, the geographical view - point which we have found of service to elucidate the development of towns and cities upon its longi-

* For a fuller review of these, compare the writer's "City Development," in *Contemporary Review*, October, 1904.

tudinal slope. But this is neither more nor less than the method of Montesquieu, whose classic "Esprit des Lois" anticipates and initiates so much of that of later writers—Ritter, Buckle, Taine, or Le Play. Once more then let their common, or rather their resultant, doctrine be stated in terms expressing the latest of these more fully than the first. Given the region, its character determines the nature of the fundamental occupation, and this in turn essentially determines the type of family. The nature and method of the occupation must normally determine the mode of its organisation, *e.g.*, the rise and character of a specialised directive class, and the nature of these occupational chiefs as contrasted with the people and with each other. Similarly, the types of family tend to develop their appropriate types of institutions, *e.g.*, for justice, guidance, and of course notably in response to social environment as regards defence or attack.

Thus at this point in fact we seem to be pressing upon the student of sociology the essential argument of geographical and evolutionary determinism, in fact inviting him to adopt a view, indeed to commit himself to a method, which may be not only foreign to his habits, but repugnant to his whole view of life and history. And if able advocacy of this determinist view of society for at least the past five generations has not carried general conviction, why raise so controversial a suggestion, in the guise too of a method professing to harmonise all comers? Yet this is advisedly done; and as no one will deny some civic importance to geographical factors, let patience be granted to examine this aspect of the city's map and shield, and to get from it what it can teach, under the present assurance to the philosophic and idealist critic that his view of other factors, higher and deeper, as supreme in human life, and therefore in city making, will not be forgotten, nor excluded from consideration when we come to them. All that is really insisted upon here is that if anything of naturalistic method of evolutionary conception is to be permitted at all, we must obviously proceed from this simple towards the more complex, and so begin with it here and now.

It is the appropriate slope or steppe, the needful rainfall, that conditions the growth of grass, this which conditions the presence of herds or flocks, and these again which determine the very existence of shepherds. These granted then, not only do the pastoral arts and crafts arise, but the patriarchal type and family develop, and this not only with their hospitality and other virtues, with their nomadic tendencies, at any rate, their unfixed land-tenure, very different from the peasant's, but their slow and skilful

diplomacy (till the pasture is bared or grown again, as the negotiator's interests incline). The patriarch in his venerable age, the caravaner in his nomadic and exploring youth, his disciplined maturity, thus naturally develop as different types of chief and leader; and it is therefore not until this stage, when all is ready for the entry of Abraham or Job, of Mohammed the camel-driver, or Paul the tent-maker, that any real controversy can arise between the determinist and his opponent, between the democratic and the great-man theories of history, towards which these respectively incline.* And at that stage, may not the controversy stimulate a fruitful analysis? After all, what is the claim of free-will but to select among the factors afforded by a given set of circumstances? And the utmost stretch of determinism to which geography and civics may lead us obviously cannot prove the negative of this. But whether the psychologic origins of new ideals be internal to the mind of genius, or imparted by some external source, is a matter obviously beyond the scope of either the geographer or the historian of civics to settle. Enough surely for both controversialists if we use such a means of tabulating facts as to beg the question for neither view; and still better if we can present the case of each without injustice to either, nay, to each with its clearness increased by the sharp edge of contrast. If the geographical determinist thesis on one hand, and its ethical and psychological antithesis on the other, can thus clearly be defined and balanced, their working equilibrium is at hand, even should their complete synthesis remain beyond us.

D.—NEED OF ABSTRACT METHOD FOR NOTATION AND FOR INTERPRETATION.

Not only such general geographical studies, but such social interpretations as those above indicated have long been in progress: witness the labours of whole schools of historians and critics, among whom Montesquieu and his immediate following, or in more recent times Buckle and Taine, are but the most prominent; witness the works of geographers like Humboldt, Ritter, Reclus, or of developmental technologists like Boucher de Perthes and regional economists like Le Play. The main lines of a concrete and evolutionary sociology (or at

* A fuller study, upon this method, of the essential origins of pastoral evolution, and of its characteristic modern developments, will be found in the writer's "Flower of the Grass," in *The Evergreen*, Edinburgh and Westminster, 1896. See also "La Science Sociale," *passim*, especially in its earlier vols. or its number for Jan. 1905.

least *sociography*) have thus been laid down for us; but the task now before us, in our time, in such a society as this—and indeed in such a paper as the present one—is that of extracting from all this general teaching its essential scientific method, one everywhere latent and implicit, but nowhere fully explicit, or at least adequately systematised.

It is in fact only as we can agree upon some definite and orderly method of description that our existing literature of social surveys can be adequately compared or new ones co-operatively undertaken. Hence the importance of discussions of scientific method such as those which have so largely occupied our first volume. Yet, I submit, here lies the means of escaping from these too abstract (and consequently too static) presentments of the general methodology of social science into which sociologists are constantly falling; and to which must be largely ascribed the prevalent distaste for sociology so general in this would-be practical-minded community in which we find ourselves, as indeed also the comparative unattractiveness of our studies to the body of specialist scientific workers, not even excepting those within what we consider sociological fields.

The history of each science, be it mathematics or astronomy, botany, zoology or geology, shows us that it is not enough to have the intelligent observer, or even the interpretative thinker with his personally expressed doctrine. This must be clearly crystallised into a definite statement, method, proposition, "law" or theory, stated in colourless impersonal form before it is capable of acceptance and incorporation into the general body of science. But while astronomer and geologist and naturalist can and do describe both the observational results and their general conceptions in literary form, requiring from the ordinary reader but the patience to master a few unfamiliar terms and ideas, they also carry on their work by help of definite and orderly technical methods, descriptive and comparative, analytic and synthetic. These, as far as possible, have to be crystallised beyond their mere verbal statement into formulæ, into tabular and graphic presentments, and thus not only acquire greater clearness of statement, but become more and more active agencies of inquiry—in fact, become literal *thinking-machines*. But while the mathematician has his notations and his calculus, the geographer and geologist their maps, reliefs and sections, the naturalist his orderly classificatory methods, it has been the misfortune and delay of political economy, and no small cause of that "notorious discord and sterility" with which Comte reproached it, that

its cultivators have so commonly sought to dispense with the employment of any definite scientific notations; while even its avowed statisticians, in this country especially, have long resisted the consistent use of graphic methods.

I submit, therefore, for discussion, as even more urgent and pressing than that of the general and abstract methodology of the social sciences, the problem of elaborating a concrete descriptive method readily applicable to the study and comparison of human societies, to cities therefore especially. To do justice to this subject, not only the descriptive labours of anthropologists, but much of the literature of sociology would have to be gone through from the "Tableau Economique" of the Physiocratic School to the "Sociological Tables" of Mr. Spencer, and still more fruitfully to more recent writers. Among these, besides here recognising specially the work of Mr. Booth and its stimulus to younger investigators, I would acknowledge the helpful and suggestive impulse from the group of social geographers which has arisen from the initiative of Le Play,* and whose classification, especially in its later forms,† cannot but be of interest and value to everyone whose thought on social questions is not afloat upon the ocean of the abstract without chart or bearings.

Yet with all respect to each and all these classifications and methods, indeed with cordially acknowledged personal obligation and indebtedness to them from first to last, no one of these seems fully satisfactory for the present purpose; and it is therefore needful to go into the matter afresh for ourselves, though utilising these as fully as we can.

E.—THE CITY-COMPLEX AND ITS USUAL ANALYSIS.

In the everyday world, in the city as we find it, what is the working classification of ideas, the method of thought of its citizens? That the citizens no more think of themselves as using any particular sociological method than did M. Jourdain of talking prose does not really matter, save that it makes our observation, both of them and it, easier and more trustworthy.

They are speaking and thinking for the most part of

* *La Nomenclature Sociale* (Extrait de *La Revue*, "La Science Sociale," Dec. 1886) Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1887.

† Demoulin, *La Science Sociale d'après F. Le Play, 1882-1905; Classification Sociale*, "La Science Sociale," Jan. 1905.

People and of Affairs ; much less of places. In the category of People, we observe that individuals, self and others, and this in interest, perhaps even more than in interests, commonly take precedence of groups. Institutions and Government are, however, of general interest, the state being much more prominent than is the church ; the press, for many, acting as the modern substitute for the latter. In the world of Affairs, commerce takes precedence of industry, while sport runs hard upon both. War, largely viewed by its distant spectators as the most vivid form of sport, also bulks largely. Peace is not viewed as a positive ideal, but essentially as a passive state, at best, of non-war, more generally of latent war. Central among places are the bank, the market (in its financial forms before its material ones). Second to these stand the mines ; then the factories, etc. ; and around these the fixed or floating fortresses of defence. Of homes, that of the individual alone is seriously considered, at most those of his friends, his "set," his peers, but too rarely even of the street, much less the neighbourhood, at least for their own sake, as distinguished from their reaction upon individual and family status or comfort.

This set of views is obviously not easy of precise analysis or exact classification. In broad outline, however, a summary may be made, and even tabulated as follows :—

THE EVERYDAY TOWN AND ITS ACTIVITIES.

PEOPLE	AFFAIRS	PLACES
(a) INDIVIDUALS (Self and others).	(a) COMMERCE INDUSTRY, etc. SPORT.	(a) MARKET, BANK, etc. FACTORY, MINE, etc.
(b) GOVERNMENT(S) Temporal and Spiritual (State and Church).	(b) WAR and Peace (Latent War).	(b) FORT, FIELD, etc.

Next note how from the everyday world of action, there arises a corresponding thought-world also. This has,

of course, no less numerous and varied elements, with its resultant complex local colour; but a selection will suffice, of which the headings may be printed below those of the preceding scheme, to denote how to the objective elements there are subjective elements corresponding—literal reflections upon the pools of memory—the slowly flowing stream of tradition. Thus the extended diagram, its objective elements expressed in yet more general terms, may now be read anew (noting that mirror images are duly reversed).

	PEOPLE	AFFAIRS	PLACES
"TOWN"	(a) INDIVIDUALS	(a) OCCUPATIONS	(a) WORK-PLACES
	(b) INSTITUTIONS	(b) WAR	(b) WAR-PLACES
"SCHOOLS"	(b) HISTORY ("Constitutional")	(b) STATISTICS and HISTORY ("Military")	(b) GEOGRAPHY
	(a) BIOGRAPHY	(a) ECONOMICS	(a) TOPOGRAPHY

Here then we have that general relation of the town life and its "schools," alike of thought and of education, which must now be more fully investigated.

Such diagrammatic presentments, while of course primarily for the purpose of clear expression and comparison, are also frequently suggestive—by "inspection," as geometers say—of relations not previously noticed. In both ways, we may see more clearly how prevalent ideas and doctrines have arisen as "reflections upon" the life of action, and even account for their qualities and their defects—their partial truth or their corresponding inadequacy, according to our own appreciative or depreciative standpoint. Thus as regards "People," in the first column we see expressed briefly how to (a) the individual life, with the corresponding vivid interest in biography, corresponds the "great man theory" of history. Conversely with (b) alone is associated the insistence upon institutional developments as the main factor. Passing to the middle column, that of "Affairs," we may note in connection with (b) say the rise of statistics in association with the needs of war, a point connected with its too empiric character; or note again, a too common converse weakness of economic theory, its inadequate induc-

tive verification. Or finally, in the column of "Place," the long weakness of geography as an educational subject, yet its periodic renewal upon the field of war, is indicated. We might in fact continue such a comparison of the existing world of action and of ideas, into all the schools, those of thought and practice, no less than those of formal instruction; and thus we should more and more clearly unravel how their complexity and entanglement, their frequent oppositions and contradictions are related to the various and warring elements of the manifold "Town" life from which they derive and survive. Such a fuller discussion, however, would too long delay the immediate problem—that of understanding "Town" and its "School" in their origins and simplest relations.

F.—PROPOSED METHODOICAL ANALYSIS.

(1) THE TOWN.

More fully to understand this two-fold development of Town and School, we have first of all apparently to run counter to the preceding popular view, which is here, as in so many cases, the precise opposite of that reached from the side of science. This, as we have already so fully insisted, must set out with geography, thus literally *replacing* People and Affairs in our scheme above.

Starting then once more with the simple biological formula :

ENVIRONMENT - - - - CONDITIONS - - - - ORGANISM

this has but to be applied and defined by the social geographer to become

REGION - - - - OCCUPATION - - - - FAMILY-type and
Developments

which summarises precisely that doctrine of Montesquieu and his successors already insisted on. Again, in but slight variation from Le Play's simplest phrasing ("*Lieu, travail, famille*") we have

PLACE - - - - - WORK - - - - - FOLK

It is from this simple and initial social formula that we have now to work our way to a fuller understanding of Town and School.

Immediately, therefore, this must be traced upward towards its complexities. For Place, it is plain, is no mere topographic site. Work, conditioned as it primarily is by natural advantages, is thus really first of all *place-work*. Arises the field or garden, the port, the mine, the workshop, in fact the *work-place*, as we may simply generalise it; while, further, beside this arise the dwellings, the *folk-place*.

Nor are these by any means all the elements we are accustomed to lump together into Town. As we thus cannot avoid entering into the manifold complexities of town-life throughout the world and history, we must carry along with us the means of unravelling these; hence the value of this simple but precise nomenclature and its regular schematic use. Thus, while here keeping to simple words in everyday use, we may employ and combine them to analyse out our Town into its elements and their inter-relations with all due exactitude, instead of either leaving our common terms undefined, or arbitrarily defining them anew, as economists have alternately done—too literally losing or shirking essentials of Work in the above formula, and with these missing essentials of Folk and Place also.

Tabular and schematic presentments, however, such as those to which we are proceeding, are apt to be less simple and satisfactory to reader than to writer; and this even when in oral exposition the very same diagram has been not only welcomed as clear, but seen and felt to be convincing. The reason of this difficulty is that with the spoken exposition the audience sees the diagram grow upon the blackboard; whereas to produce anything of the same effect upon the page, it must be printed at several successive stages of development. Thus our initial formula,

PLACE - - - - - WORK - - - - - FOLK

readily develops into



This again naturally develops into a regular table, of which the

filling up of some of the squares has been already suggested above, and that of the remaining ones will be intelligible on inspection:—

PLACE FOLK ("Natives")	WORK-FOLK ("Producers")	FOLK
PLACE-WORK	WORK	FOLK-WORK
PLACE	WORK-PLACE	FOLK-PLACE

So complex is the idea of even the simplest Town—even in such a rustic germ as the "farm-town" of modern Scottish parlance, the *ton* of place-names without number.

The varying development of the Folk into social classes or castes might next be traced, and the influence and interaction of all the various factors of Place, Work, and Family tabulated. Suffice it here, however, for the present to note that such differentiation does take place, without entering into the classification and comparison of the protean types of patrician and plebeian throughout geography and history.

G.—ANALYSIS CONTINUED.—(2) THE SCHOOL.

Once and again we have noted how from the everyday life of action—the Town proper of our terminology—there arises the corresponding subjective world—the *Schools* of thought, which may express itself sooner or later in schools of education. The types of people, their kinds and styles of work, their whole environment, all become represented in the mind of the community, and these react upon the individuals, their activities, their place itself. Thus (the more plainly the more the community is a simple and an isolated one, but in appreciable measure everywhere and continually) there have obviously arisen local turns of thought and modes of speech, ranging from shades of accent and idiom to distinctive dialect or language. Similarly, there is a characteristic variety of occupational activity, a style of workmanship, a way of doing business. There are distinctive

manners and customs—there is, in short, a certain recognisable likeness, it may be an indefinably subtle or an unmistakably broad and general one, which may be traced in faces and costumes, in tongue and literature, in courtesy and in conflict, in business and in policy, in street and in house, from hovel to palace, from prison to cathedral. Thus it is that every folk comes to have its own ways, and every town its own school.

While the complex social medium has thus been acquiring its characteristic form and composition, a younger generation has been arising. In all ways and senses, Heredity is commonly more marked than variation—especially when, as in most places at most times, such great racial, occupational, environmental transformations occur as those of modern cities. In other words, the young folk present not only an individual continuity with their organic predecessors which is heredity proper, but with their social predecessors also. The elements of organic continuity, which we usually think of first of all as organic, though of course psychic also, are conveniently distinguished as the *inheritance*—a term in fact which the biologist seeks to deprive of its common economic and social senses altogether, leaving for these the term *heritage*, material or immaterial alike. This necessary distinction between the inheritance, bodily and mental, and the heritage, economic and social, obviously next requires further elaboration, and with this further precision of language also. For the present, let us leave the term heritage to the economist for the material wealth with which he is primarily concerned, and employ the term *tradition* for these immaterial and distinctively social elements we are here specially considering. This in fact is no new proposal, but really little more than an acceptance of ordinary usage. Broadly speaking, tradition is in the life of the community what memory is for its individual units. The younger generation, then, not only inherits an organic and a psychic diathesis; not only has transmitted to it the accumulations, instruments and land of its predecessors, but grows up in their tradition also. The importance of imitation in this process, a matter of common experience, has been given the fullest sociological prominence, by M. Tarde especially.* Thanks to these and other convergent lines of thought, we no longer consent to look at the acquirement of the social tradition as a matter requiring to be imposed upon reluctant youth almost entirely from without, and are learning anew as of old, with the simplest and the most developed peoples, the barbarians and the Greeks, to recognise and respect, and, if it may be, to nourish the process of self-instruction, viewed as normal accompaniment of each developing being throughout the phases of its

* Tarde, "L'Imitation Sociale," and other works.

organic life, the stages of its social life. Upon the many intermediate degrees of advance and decline, however, between these two extremes of civilisation, specific institutions for the instruction of youth arise, each in some way an artificial substitute, or at least a would-be accelerant, for the apprenticeship of imitation in the school of experience and the community's tradition, which we term a school in the restricted and pedagogic sense. This whole discussion, however, has been in order to explain and to justify the present use of the term "School" in that wide sense in which the historian of art or thought—the sociologist, in fact—has ever used the term, while yet covering the specialised pedagogic schools of all kinds also.

Once more, then, and in the fullest sense, every folk has its own tradition, every town its school.

We need not here discriminate these unique and characteristic elements to which the art-historians—say of Venice and of Florence, of Barbizon or Glasgow—specially attend, from those most widely distributed ones, in which the traditions and schools of all towns within the same civilisation broadly agree. Indeed, even the most widely distributed of these—say from Roman law to modern antiseptic surgery—arose as local schools before they became general ones.

Similarly for the general social tradition. The fundamental occupations and their division of labour, their differentiation in detail and their various interactions up to our own day, at first separately considered, are now seen to be closely correlated with the status of woman; while all these factors determine not only the mode of union of the parents, but their relation to the children, the constitution of the family, with which the mode of transmission of property is again thoroughly interwoven.

H.—TOWN AND SCHOOL COMPARED.

We may now summarise and tabulate our comparison of Town and School,* and on the schema (p. 75) it will be seen

* For the sake of brevity, an entire chapter has been omitted, discussing the manifold origins of distinct governing classes, whether arising from the Folk, or superimposed upon them from without, in short, of that contrast of what we may broadly call patricians and plebeians, which so constantly appears through history, and in the present also. These modes of origin are

“TOWN”

FOLK

WORK

PLACE

SURVEY

CRAFT-KNOWLEDGE

“SCHOOL”

CUSTOM

that each element of the second is printed in the position of a mirror-reflection of the first. This gives but the merest outline, which is ready, however, to be applied in various ways and filled up accordingly. A step towards this is made in the next and fuller version of the scheme (p. 77). It will be noted in this that the lower portion of the diagram, that of School, is more fully filled up than is the upper. This is partly for clearness, but partly also to suggest that main elements in the origins of natural sciences and geography, of economics and social science, are not always so clearly realised as they might be. The preceding diagram, elaborating that of Place, Work, Folk (p. 75), however, at once suggests these. Other features of the scheme will appear on inspection; and the reader will find it of interest and suggestiveness to prepare a blank schedule and fill it up for himself.

These two forms of the same diagram, the simple and the more developed, thus suggest comparison with the scheme previously outlined, that of People, Affairs, Places (p. 68), and is now more easily reconciled with this; the greater prominence popularly given to People and Affairs being expressed upon the present geographic and evolutionary scheme by the ascending position and more emphatic printing (or by viewing the diagram as a transparency from the opposite side of the leaf).

In the column of People, the deepening of custom into morals is indicated. Emphasis is also placed upon the development of law in connection with the rise of governing classes, and its tendency to dominate the standards previously taken as morals—in fact, that tendency of moral law to become static law, a process of which history is full.

In the present as in the past, we may also note upon the scheme the different lines of Place, Work and Folk on which respectively develop the natural sciences, the applied or

all in association respectively with Place, Work, and Family, or some of the various interactions of these. Origin and situation, migration, individual or general, with its conflict of races, may be indicated among the first group of factors; technical efficiency and its organising power among the second; individual qualities and family stocks among the third, as also military and administrative aptitude, and the institutional privileges which so readily arise from them. Nor need we here discuss the rise of institutions, so fully dealt with by sociological writers. Enough for the present then, if institutions and social classes be taken as we find them.

		<u>GOVERNING</u> <u>CLASSES</u> ↑ <u>FAMILY TYPES</u>
	<u>INDUSTRIES</u>	
<u>REGION</u> ↓ v	(WORK-PLACE)	(FOLK-PLACE) <u>(TOWN)</u>
↓ <u>SURVEY</u> !—LANDSCAPE ?—TERRITORY ↓ v	<u>(CRAFT-TRADITION)</u>	(“ <u>SCHOOL</u> ”) <u>(FOLK-LORE)</u>
↓ <u>[NATURAL SCIENCES]</u> ↓ v	<u>[APPLIED SCIENCES]</u>	<u>[SOCIAL SCIENCES]</u>
↓ v <u>GEOGRAPHY</u>	<u>ECONOMICS</u>	<u>CUSTOMS</u> <u>MORALS</u> & <u>LAWS</u>

technical sciences, and finally the social sciences, and the generalising of these respectively.

Thus, as we see the popular survey of regions, geography in its literal and initial sense, deepening into the various analyses of this and that aspect or element of the environment which we call the natural sciences—but which we might with advantage also recognise as what they really are, each a *geolysis*—so these sciences or geolyses, again, are tending to reunite into a higher geography considered as an account of the evolution of the cosmos.

Again, in the column of School, corresponding to Work, we have the evolution of craft knowledge into the applied sciences, an historic process which specialist men of science and their public are alike apt to overlook, but which is none the less vitally important. For we cannot really understand, say Pasteur, save primarily as a thinking peasant; or Lister and his antiseptic surgery better than as the shepherd, with his tar-box by his side; or Kelvin or any other electrician, as the thinking smith, and so on. The old story of geometry, as "*ars metrike*," and of its origin from land-surveying, for which the Egyptian hieroglyph is said to be that of "rope stretching," in fact, applies far more fully than most realise, and the history of every science, of course already thus partially written, will bear a far fuller application of this principle. In short, the self-taught man, who is ever the most fertile discoverer, is made in the true and fundamental school—that of experience.

The need of abbreviating the recapitulation of this, however, sooner or later develops the school in the pedagogic sense, and its many achievements, its many failures in accomplishing this, might here be more fully analysed.

Still more evident is this process in the column of Folk. From the mother's knee and the dame's school of the smallest folk-place, the townlet or hamlet, *ton* or home, up to the royal and priestly school of the law of ancient capitals, or from the "humanities" of a mediæval university to the "Ecole de Droit" of a modern metropolis, the series of essential evolutionary stages may be set down. Or in our everyday present,

the rise of schools of all kinds, primary, secondary, higher, up to the current movement towards university colleges, and from these to civic and regional universities, might again be traced. The municipalisation of education is thus in fact expressed, and so on.

Leaving the schools in the main to speak for themselves of their advancing and incipient uses, a word may be said upon the present lines.

As a first and obvious application of this mode of geographic study of cities appears the criticism, and, when possible, the amendment of the city's plan; the monotonous rectangularity of the American city, and the petty irregularity more common in our own, being alike uneconomic and inartistic because ungeographic, irrational because irregional. With the improvement of communications, the physicist's point of view thus introduced—that of the economy of the energies of the community—is only beginning; the economy of fuel, the limitation of smoke and fogs being symptoms of this and pointing to a more economic organisation of industrial activities generally. But this next carries with it the improved efficiency of the producers themselves, with whom, however, the standpoint changes from the mere economisation of physical energies to the higher economy of organic evolution. The convention of traditional economics, that the productive capacity of the actual labourer is the sole concern of his science, thus gives place to what is at once the original conception of economics and the evolutionist one, viz., that the success of industry is ultimately measured neither by its return in wealth of the capitalist nor in money wages of the labourer, nor even by both put together, but in the results of industry upon the concrete environment, the family budget, the home, and the corresponding state of development of the family—its deterioration or progress. The organisation of industrial groups or of representative institutions found conducive to the well-being and progress of these prime civic units, the families, may now be traced into its highest outcome in city government. The method of analysis and graphic statement thus outlined may be shown to be even capable of useful application towards the statement of the best

arguments of both progressive and moderate parties in city politics.

Passing from Politics to Culture, the needs of this also become clearer; each community developing a similar general series of culture institutions, from the simplest presentation of its geography, landscape and architecture, to the complex development of industrial, technical and scientific instruction; and for provision also for the institutions of custom and ethic in school, law, and church. Just as place, occupation, and family are intimately connected in the practical world, so their respective culture institutions must more and more be viewed as a whole. Civic improvers will find their ideals more realisable as they recognise the complex unity of the city as a social development of which all the departments of action and thought are in organic relation, be it of health or disease. The view of theoretic civics as concrete sociology, and of practical civics as applied sociology may be more simply expressed as the co-adjustment of social survey and social service, now becoming recognised as rational, indeed in many cities being begun.

I.—DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOOL, AND ITS REACTION UPON TOWN.

The reactions of the School upon the Town are observed in practice to be of very different values;—how are these differences to be explained?

From the very first the school is essentially one of memory, the impress of the town-life, even at its best and highest individual quality and impressiveness, as in the work of a great master, the observation and memory of which may long give his stamp to the work of his followers. The fading of this into dulness, yet the fixing of it as a convention, is familiar to all in arts and crafts, but is no less real in the general lapse of appreciation of environment. Most serious of all is the fixation of habit and custom, so that at length "custom lies upon us with a weight heavy as death, and deep

almost as life." This continual fixation of fashionable standards as moral ones is thus a prime explanation of each reformer's difficulty in making his moral standard the fashionable one, and also, when his doctrine has succeeded, of the loss of life and mummification of form which it so speedily undergoes.

Of conventional "education," considered as the memorisation of past records, however authoritative and classic, the decay is thus intelligible and plain, and the repetition of criticisms already adequately made need not therefore detain us here.

For this process is there no remedy? Science here offers herself—with senses open to observe, and intellect awake to interpret. Starting with Place, she explores and surveys it; from descriptive travel books at very various levels of accuracy, she works on to atlas and gazetteer, and beyond these to world-globe and "Geographie Universelle." With her charts and descriptions we are now more ready for a journey; with her maps and plans we may know our own place as never before; nay, rectify it, making the rough places plain and the crooked straight; even restoration may come within our powers.

Similarly as regards Work. Though mere empiric craft-mastery dies with the individual, and fails with his successors, may we not perpetuate the best of this? A museum of art treasures, a collection of the choicest examples of all times and lands, will surely raise us from our low level of mechanical toil; nay, with these carefully observed, copied, memorised, and duly examined upon, we shall be able to imitate them, to reproduce their excellencies, even to adapt them to our everyday work. To the art museum we have thus but to add a "School of Design," to have an output of more and less skilled copyists. The smooth and polished successes of this new dual institution, responding as they do to the mechanical elements of modern work and of the mechanical worker-mind, admitting also of ready multiplications as patterns, ensure the wide extension of the prevalent style of imitating past styles, designing patchwork of these; and even admit of its scientific reduction to a definite series of grades, which imitative youth may easily pass onwards from the age of rudest innocence to that of art-knowledge and certificated art-mastery. Our School of Design thus becomes a School of Art, at length a College, dominating the instruction of the nation, to the satisfaction not only of its promoters, but of the general public and their representatives, so that annual votes justly increase. Lurking discontent may now and then express itself, but is for practical purposes negligible.

The example of art accumulation and art instruction is thus naturally followed in other respects. For the commercial information of the public, varied representative exhibitions—primarily, therefore, international ones—naturally suggest themselves; while so soon as expansion of imperial and colonial interests comes upon the first plane, a corresponding permanent Exhibition is naturally instituted. But when thus advancing commercial instruction, we must also recognise the claims of industry in all its crafts and guilds, and in fact the technical instruction of the community generally. Hence the past, present, and promised rise of technical institutes upon increasing scales of completeness.

In the rise of such a truly encyclopædic system of schools, the university cannot permanently be forgotten. Since from the outset we have recognised the prime elements of the school in observation and memory, the testing of these by examinations—written, oral, and practical—however improvable in detail, must be fairly recognised; and the examining body or university has therefore to be adopted as the normal crown of our comprehensive educational system. Teaching, however, is found to be increasingly necessary, especially to examination; and for this the main field left open is in our last column, that of People. Their lore of the past, whether of sacred or classical learning, their history, literature, and criticism, are already actively promoted, or at any rate adequately endowed at older seats of learning; while the materials, resources, conditions and atmosphere are here of other kinds. Hence the accessibility of the new University of London to the study of sociology, as yet alone among its peers.

Hence, beside the great London, maritime, commercial and industrial, residential and governmental, there has been growing up, tardily indeed, as compared with smaller cities, yet now all the more massively and completely, a correspondingly comprehensive system of schools; so that the historic development of South Kensington within the last half century, from International Exhibitions of Work, Natural History Museums of Place onwards to its present and its contemplated magnitude, affords a striking exemplification of the present view and its classification, which is all the more satisfactory since this development has been a gradual accretion.

Enough then has been said to show that the rise of schools, their qualities and their defects, are all capable of treatment upon the present lines; but if so, may we not go farther, and ask by what means does thought and life cope with their defects, especially that fixation of memory, even at its best, that evil side of examination and the like, which we often call Chinese in the bad sense, but which we see arises so naturally everywhere?

J.—FROM "SCHOOL" TO "CLOISTER."

The preceding view is, as yet, too purely determinist. The due place of ideals, individual and corporate, in their reaction upon the function and the structure of the city, and even upon its material environment, has next to be recognised. For where the town merely makes and fixes its industry and makes its corresponding schools, where its habits and customs become its laws, even its morality, the community, as we have just seen, sinks into routine, and therefore decay. To prevent this a twofold process of thought is ever necessary, critical and constructive. What are these? On the one hand, a continual and critical selection among the ideas derived from experience, and the formulation of these as Ideals; and further, the organisation of these into a larger and larger whole of thought; in fact, a Synthesis of a new kind. This critical spirit it is which produced the prophets of Israel, the questioning of Socrates, and so on, to the journalistic and other criticism of life to-day. The corresponding constructive endeavour is now no mere School of traditional learning or of useful information. It is one of science in a new and reorganised sense; one of philosophy also, one of ideals above all.

As from the Schools of the Law, as over against these, arise the prophets, so from the technical and applied sciences, the descriptive natural sciences, should arise the scientific thinkers, reinterpreting each his field of knowledge and giving us the pure sciences—pure geometry henceforth contrasted with mere land surveying, morphology with mere anatomy, and so on; while instead of the mere concrete encyclopædia from Pliny or Gesner to Diderot or Chambers, vast subjective reorganisations of knowledge, philosophic systems, now appear. Similarly, the mere observations of the senses and their records in memory become transformed into the images of the poet, the imagery too of the artist, for art proper is only thus born. That mere imitation of nature, which so commonly in the graphic arts (though happily but rarely in music) has been mistaken for

art, thus modestly returns to its proper place—that of the iconography of descriptive science.

Thus from the Schools of all kinds of knowledge, past and present, we pass into the no less varied Cloisters of contemplation, meditation, imagination. With the historian we might explore the Cloisters of the past, built at one time from the current ideals of the Good, at another of the True, at another of the Beautiful; indeed, in widely varying measures and proportions, from all of these. How far each of these now expresses the present, how far it may yet serve the future, is obviously a question of questions, yet for that very reason one exceeding our present limits. Enough if in city life the historic place of what is here generalised under this antique name of Cloister be here recognised; and in some measure the actual need, the potential place be recognised also. Here is the need and use, beyond the fundamental claims of the material life of the Town, and the everyday sanity of the Schools, with all their observations and information, their commonsense and experience, their customs and conventions, even their morals and their law, for a deeper ethical insight than any rule or precedent can afford, for a fuller and freer intellectual outlook than that which has been derived from any technical experience or empiric skill, for an imagery which is no mere review of the phantasmagoria of the senses. In our age of the multiplication and expansion of towns, of their enrichment and their impoverishment, of the multiplication and enrichment of schools also, it is well for the sociologist to read from history, as he then may more fully see also around him that it is ever some fresh combination of these threefold products of the Cloister—ideal, theory, and imagery—emotional, intellectual, sensuous—which transforms the thought-world of its time.

The philosopher of old in his academic grove, his porch, the mediæval monk within his studious cloister's pale, are thus more akin to the modern scientific thinker than he commonly realises—perhaps because he is still, for the most part, of the solitary individualism of the hermit of the Thebaid, of Diogenes in his tub. Assuredly, they are less removed in essential psychology than their derived fraternities, their

respective novices and scholars, have often thought. It is thus no mere play of language which hands on from the one to the other the "travail de Bénédictin;" though even here the phrase is inadequate, savouring too much of the school, into which each cloister of every sort declines sooner or later, unless even worse befall.


The decay of the cloister, though thus on the one hand into and with the school, may also take place within itself, since imagination and ideal may be evil, and theory false. That examples of all these decays abound in the history of religion, of philosophy, of art also, is a commonplace needing no illustration. Nor should the modern investigator think his science or himself immune to the same or kindred germs in turn.

K.—THE CITY PROPER.

Now, "at long last," we are ready to enter the city proper. This is not merely the Town of place and work and folk, even were this at their economic best. It is not enough to add the School, even at its completest; nor the cloister, though with this a yet greater step towards the city proper is made. For though this is not itself the City, its ideals of human relations, its theory of the universe and man, its artistic expression and portrayal of all these, ever sooner or later react upon the general view and conduct of life. Hence the Academe of Plato and the Lyceum of Aristotle, the mediæval cloister and the modern Research Institute, have been so fertile, so creative in their influence upon the city's life, from which they seemed to be retired. Hence it is ever some new combination of the threefold product of the cloister—ideal, idea, and image—which transforms the world, which opens each new epoch. Each new revelation and vision, each system of thought, each new outburst of poetry and song, has moved the men of its age by no mere mechanical pressure of economic need or external force, by no mere scholastic instruction, but in a far subtler way, and into new and unexpected groupings, as the

sand upon Chladon's vibrating plate leaps into a new figure with each thrill of the violinist's bow.

Instead of simply developing our morals from custom, and therefore codifying them into law as in the school, they are now boldly criticised, as in part if not in whole, hindrances to a better state of things. As this becomes more and more clearly formulated as an ideal, its ethic transcendence of convention and law not only becomes clear, but the desire for its realisation becomes expressed. This may be with all degrees of clearness of reason and vividness of imagery, yet may remain long or altogether in the plane of literature, as has Plato's Republic or More's Utopia—standard and characteristic types of the cloister library as we may call it, one of inestimable value to the world in the past, and perhaps in our time needed as much as ever to help us to see somewhat beyond the output of the busy presses of town and school. Yet our ideal, our "Civitas Dei," "Civitas Solis," need not remain unrealised: it may be not only seriously planned towards realisation, as was Platonopolis of old, but bravely founded, as has been done in cases without number, from the ancient world to modern communities, by no means wholly unsuccessful. Though in our great industrial towns, our long settled regions, such new departures seem less easy, the principle remains valid—that it is in our ideal of polity and citizenship, and in our power of realising this, that the city proper has its conception and its birth. Again, instead of simply deriving our thought from experience, we now project our clarified thought into action and into education; so that from cloister of philosophy, and from its long novitiate of silence, there grows up the brotherhood of culture, the culture-city itself. Similarly in art, we no longer imitate nature, nor copy traditional designs. Art proper appears, shaping bronze and marble into images of the gods, and on a burnt and ruined hill-fort renewing the Parthenon. In general terms, instead of simply adjusting, as in the school, our mental picture to the outward facts, we reverse the process; and with a new art conception, be it good or bad, we transform the outward world, like wax under the seal. Thus from the



cloister and chapel of the musician, the studio-cell of the artist, the scriptorium of the poet, comes forth the architect, remodelling the city around his supreme material expression and home of its moral and material reorganisation, its renewed temporal and spiritual powers. Of this, the city proper, the Acropolis of Athens, the Temple of Jerusalem, the Capitol and Forum of Rome are classic and central examples, and in the mediæval city, pre-eminently the cathedral; though beside this we must not forget the town house and its belfry, the guild houses, the colleges, the great place, the fountains, the city cross, and if last, still best if good at all, the streets and courts and homes. Returning once more to the history of educational development, we have here a means of unravelling the apparently perplexing history of universities. For the university past or present has but its foundations in the school, with its local and its general tradition, whatever may be the accordance of these with well-ascertained fact, its true novitiate can only be afforded in the cloister of reflection and research, of interpretation and synthesis; while for its full development it needs the perpetual renewal of that generous social life—that inspiring intercourse “of picked adolescents and picked senescents”—which has marked the vital periods of every university worthy of the name.

In summary then, to the town has been added the school, with its advantages, its increasingly obvious limitations also, which it is for the cloister to remedy—even the advantages of the barrack finding a main element of its claim in this no less than in its professed training as regards citizenship. But here also it is for few to remain; albeit free for each to return at will. Ideals, to survive, must surely live, that is, be realised; hence for full life one needs “to meditate with the free solitary; yet to live secular, and serve mankind.”


L.—THE CITY COMPLETED: TOWN, SCHOOL, CLOISTER, AND CITY PROPER.

In course of this fourfold analysis, it is plain that we have reached the very converse—or at all events the comple-


<p>CITY</p> <p>ART</p>	<p>IMAGERY</p> <p>CLOISTER</p>
<p>CULTURE</p>	<p>IDEAS</p>
<p>POLITY</p>	<p>SOC. ECON. IDEALS ETHICS</p>
<p>FOLK</p>	<p>MORALS LAW</p>
<p>WORK</p>	<p>KNOWLEDGE</p>
<p>TOWN</p> <p>PLACE</p>	<p>SURVEY</p> <p>SCHOOL</p>

ment—of that geographical determinism with which we started, and that we have returned to a view corresponding to the popular one (of "People, Affairs, Places," p. 69), which we then set aside for the reasons given. The "great man theory" of history, at best less crudely stated, thus reappears; in short, to the initial thesis we have now the distinct antithesis. It is time, therefore, to bring these together towards the needed synthesis. Hence to the page (p. 77) on which was summarised the determinist view of Town and School, we now require the complementary statement upon page (p. 87) of Cloister and City proper. Nor must we be content, with too many controversialists hitherto, to keep in view only one at a time; but by folding back the pages of print between these two half-schemes, as the book lies open, to take in both together.

We may thus finally compress the essentials of this whole paper into a simple formula—



or most briefly—



—noting in every case the opposite direction of the arrows. The application of this formula to different types of town, such as those already indicated in the former instalment of this paper (Vol. I., p. 107) or in the present one, will not be found to present any insuperable difficulty. It must, however, be kept clearly in view that the city of each day and generation subsides or decays more or less completely into the mere town anew, as the cloister into the schools. The towns and cities of the world are thus classifiable in terms of their past development and present condition.

SUMMARY.

Condensing now this lengthily, yet compressed and abbreviated series of analyses into a single page of summary, we may briefly define the main aspects and departments of civics from the present point of view. First then, comes the study of civics as fundamentally (and ever anew) an orderly development—at once geographic, economic, and anthropologic in its nature—a survey of place, work, and folk; and these not merely or mainly as broken up into the fine dust of censuses and statistics, nor even of the three too separate sciences above named, but as a living unity, the human hive, the Town.

Corresponding to this objective and organic life we reorganise its fundamental subjective life. This is fundamentally, and ever partially, the record and reflex of the life of the hive, the Town; of all its general and particular environment and function, its family type and development; and, however overlaid by imported culture or by decayed ideals, it is fundamentally expressed in local knowledge, in craft tradition, in kinship and its associated kindness, in habits and customs, and their developments up to morals and law. Simple terms corresponding to place, work, and folk, are hard to find; say, however, till better be suggested, that in close relation to the maternal arms in which general social thought and its utmost pedagogic developments alike begin, it is place-lore, work-lear, and folk-love, which are the essentials of every

School.* That existing educational machineries may not adequately recognise these is not of course the question here.

These three terms, *lore*, *lear*, and *love* are thus well related to their respectively deepening levels of sense, intelligence and feeling; and their respective relation is thus more plain to the imagery, the theory, and the idealism above defined as the essentials of the Cloister. The psychology of the processes of poetic, philosophic and spiritual awakening and renewal is in these days being approached anew, both from the individual and social side, but cannot here be entered upon.

Finally and supremely arises the City proper—its individuality dependent upon the measure and form in which ideals are expressed and harmonised in social life and polity, ideas synthetised in culture, and beauty carried outwards from the study or chamber of the recluse into the world of art.

PRACTICAL CONCLUSION.

The investigation of the City thus tends towards the practice of citizenship. Thus social survey prepares for social service, as diagnosis towards treatment and hygiene; and these react fruitfully upon our knowledge and understanding anew. Beyond social observations, and the needed observatories for making them more adequately, we need social activities and the laboratories for preparing them, or at least the leavens of them; or, again, in happier phrase, at once simple and more synthetic, we need some shelter † into which to gather the best

* The use of *lore* as primarily empirical, and derived from the senses, is traditional; it is well therefore to restrict it to this, and to revive the old word *lear*, still understood in Scotland in these precise senses—intellectual, rational, yet traditional, occupational also.

† Without forgetting the many institutions and workers in almost all departments of the field of civics, the rise of definite surveys and of scientific groupings like this Society, without ignoring also the many admirable workers and institutions of social endeavour, and their progressive integration into Social Unions, Institutes of Service, and the like, I may be permitted to press for the need of uniting both types, the scientific and the practical, into a single one—a civic museum and active centre in one. Of this type, my own Outlook Tower at Edinburgh is, so far as I am aware, the earliest beginning; and, despite its rudimentary condition, may thus serve to suggest a type of institution which will be found of service alike to the sociologist and the citizen.

seed of past flowerings and in which to raise and tend the seedlings of coming summers. We need definitely to acquire such a centre of survey and service in each and every city—in a word, a Civicentre for sociologist and citizen.

M.—THE HISTORIC CITY-COMPLEX.

The criticism may have already arisen in the reader's mind that the "Town" and "School" of our analysis are by no means so simple as we have assumed them. Our surveys of antique towns ever disclose the material survivals, at least the vestiges, of the cloister or the acropolis of the past, of its cathedral or its forum. The processes of our industries, in what is now their daily artisan routine, include, repeat, condense what were yesterday or longer ago living inventions, each instinct with Promethean fire. The hackneyed ornament of our homes was once glowing with beauty, radiant or dark with symbolism. So it is for our everyday customs and institutions, and so for living languages; our own, perhaps, most of all. These, of course, are facts made familiar by investigators of all orders; from the scholar and antiquary of old, the historian and philologist of yesterday, to the geographer or the sociologist of our own time: witness Mr. Spencer's masterly treatment of their main results. How, then, shall we correlate this process of all things growing old with the analysis of cities above attempted? In other words, how shall we interpret the course of their historic evolution, their renewed growth and decay, progress and degeneracy, their present condition, crowded with residues of the past, with those potentialities which our outline discloses? This is the more necessary since this fourfold analysis applies in principle to all human groupings, from the simplest village to the Eternal City. To this, indeed, we have in principle already traced it, onwards from our primitive valley-section with its humble hamlets, its fundamental occupations.

Returning then to our main diagram, with its four-fold analysis of the City, so soon as we have completed this, and

carried its progress up to the level of city life proper, we must next turn over the leaf and begin a new page, with place and work and folk once more. This simplest of acts expresses with graphic significance the very process of history; for in closing our diagram page its "Cloister" has been folded down on the "School," our cathedral and forum, our "City" proper, upon the "Town." Thus it is that the ideals and the achievements of one day and generation and city are ever melting away, and passing out of sight of the next; so that to the joy or sorrow of the successors the new page seems well nigh bare, though ever there comes faintly through some image or at least blurred suggestion of the fading past. Hence each page of history is a palimpsest. Hence our modern town, even when yesterday but prairie, was no mere vacant site, but was at once enriched and encumbered by the surviving traditions of the past; so that even its new buildings are for the most part but vacant shells of past art, of which now only the student cares to trace the objective annals, much less penetrate to the inner history. So for the decayed Renaissance learning of our schools, for the most part so literally dead since the "Grammarians' Funeral"; and so, too, for the unthinking routines, the dead customs and conventions, and largely too the laws and rituals of our urban lives. Hence, then, it is that for the arrest and the decay of cities we have no need to go for our examples to the ancient East. These processes, like those of individual senility and death, are going on everywhere day by day.

Upon the new page, then, it is but a complexer "Town" and "School" anew: we have no continuing City. This too commonly has existed at its best but for the rare generation which created it, or little longer; though its historic glories, like those of sunset and of after-glow, may long shed radiance and glamour upon its town, and linger in the world's memory long after not only these have faded, but their very folk have vanished, their walls fallen, nay their very site been buried or forgotten. Upon all these degrees of dying, all these faint and fading steps between immortality and oblivion, we may arrange what we call our historic cities. Obviously in the

deeper and more living sense the city exists only in actualising itself; and thus to us it is that the ideal city lies ever in the future. Yet it is the very essence of this whole argument that an ideal city is latent in every town. Where shall we in these days find our cloistered retreats to think out such ideals as may be applicable in our time and circumstances; the needed kinetic ethics, the needed synthetic philosophy and science, the needed vision and imagery and expression of them all?

N.—THE EVILS OF THE CITY.

DISEASE, DEFECT, VICE AND CRIME.

I have spoken little of town evils, and much of town ideals, primarily for the reason that even to recognise, much less treat, the abnormal, we must know something of the normal course of evolution. Hence, the old and useful phrase by which physiology used to be known, that of "the institutes of medicine." Sociology has thus to become "the institutes of citizenship."

Often though philanthropists forget this, diagnosis should precede treatment. The evils of the city, by the very nature of our hypothesis, demand special survey, and this no less thoroughly than do the normal place and work and industry. It is only our most permanent intellectual impulse, that of seeking for unity, which excuses the cheap unitary explanations so often current; as, for instance, that social evils are mainly to be explained by intemperance, as for one school of reformers; by poverty or luxury, for a second and third; by Tammany or other form of party government, by socialism or by individualism for yet others; that they are due to dissent or to church, to ignorance or to the spread of science, and so on almost indefinitely—doubtless not without elements of truth in each!

Yet let me offer as yet another explanation of civic evils, this more general one—distinguished from the preceding by including them all and more—that not only is our "Town" in itself imperfect, but the other three elements we have been

characterising as school, cloister and city, are yet more imperfect, since disordered, decayed, or undeveloped anew. It is because of each and all of these imperfect realisations of our civic life, that the evils of life sink down, or flame out, into these complex eruptions of social evils with which our human aggregations are as yet cursed.

Hence, to those who are struggling with disease and pain, with ignorance and defect, with vice, and with crime, but for the most part too separately, it is time to say that all these four evils are capable of being viewed together, and largely even treated together. They are not unrelated, but correspond each as the negative to that fourfold presentment of ideals we have hitherto been raising. To this ideal unity of healthy town, with its practical and scientific schools of all kinds, with its meditative cloister of ethical and social idealism, of unified science and philosophy, of imagination and drama, all culminating in the polity, culture, and art which make a city proper, we have here the corresponding defects in detail.

The evils of existing city life are thus largely re-interpreted; and if so more efficiently combated; since the poverty, squalor and ugliness of our cities, their disease and their intemperance, their ignorance, dulness and mental defect, their vice and crime are thus capable not only of separate treatment but of an increasingly unified civic hygiene, and this in the widest sense, material and moral, economic and idealist, utilitarian and artistic. Even the most earnest and capable workers towards civic betterment in these many fields may gain at once in hope and in efficiency as they see their special interests and tasks converging into the conception of the city as an organic unity, and this not fixed and settled, nor even in process of progress or degeneration from causes beyond our ken, but as an orderly development which we may aid towards higher perfection, geographic and cultural alike.

Our modern town is thus in a very real sense, one not hopeless, but as hopeful as may be, a veritable purgatory; that is a struggle of lower and higher idealisms, amid the respective expressions and outcomes of these. Indeed, in our own present

cities, as they have come to be, is not each of us ever finding his own Inferno, or it may be his Paradise? Does he not see the dark fate of some, the striving and rising hope of others, the redemption also?

The supreme poetic utterance of the mediæval world is thus in great measure, as each thoughtful reader sees, an expression of impassioned citizenship, and this at one of the golden moments of the long history of city life. This expression—this exiled citizen's autobiographic thought-stream—is resumed at every level, from youthful home and local colour, from boyish love and hopes, from active citizenship and party struggle, to the transfiguration of all these. Hence these mystic visions, and these world ambitions, temporal and spiritual; hence this rise from cloistered faith and philosophy into many-sided culture; hence the transformation of all these, through intensest symbol-visions into enduring song.

Am I thus suggesting the *Divina Comedia* as a guide-book to cities? Without doubt, though not necessarily for beginners. Yet who can see Florence without this, though we may pack below it Baedeker and Murray? Or who, that can really read, can open a volume of Mr. Booth's severely statistical Survey of London, with all its studious reserve, its scientific repression, without seeing between its lines the Dantean circles; happy if he can sometimes read them upward as well as down?

O.—A CIVIC SYMBOL AND ITS MEANING.

But such books of the city, whether of the new and observant type, from Baedeker to Booth, or of the old and interpretative Dantean one, are too vast and varied to keep open before us. Even the preceding open page of diagram is complex enough with its two-fold, indeed four-fold city; and we are called back to our daily work in the first of these divisions, that of the everyday town. Since its subjective aspects of school and cloister may fade from memory, its higher aspect also, that of city proper, how can we retain this four-fold

analysis, and how test if it be true? Take then one final illustration; this time no mere logical skeleton, however simple or graphic, but an image more easily retained, because a concrete and artistic one, and moreover in terms of that form of life-labour and thought-notation—that of current coin—which, in our day especially, dominates this vastest of cities; and hence inherits for the region of its home and centre—“the Bank,” which has so thoroughly taken precedence of the town-house and cathedral, of the fortress and palace—the honoured name of “City.” The coinages of each time and place combine concrete and social use with statements of historic facts; and they add to both of these a wealth of emblematic suggestions: but that is to say, they express not only their town, and something of its *school*, but much of its thought also, its *cloister* in my present terminology.

So before me lies an old “bawbee” of my own home city. On one side stands the hammerman at his anvil, below him the motto of his guild, “*Non marte sed arte.*” Here then the industrial “Town” and its “School” express themselves plainly enough, and precisely as they have been above defined. But on the other side spreads the imperial double eagle; since Perth (*Bertha aurea*) had been the northmost of all Rome’s provincial capitals, her re-named “Victoria” accordingly, as the mediæval herald must proudly have remembered, so strengthened his associations with the Holy Roman Empire with something of that vague and shadowy historic dignity which the Scot was wont to value so much, and vaunt so high. On the eagle’s breast is a shield, tressured like the royal standard, since Perth was the national capital until the “King’s Tragedy” of 1457; but instead of the ruddy lion the shield bears the lamb with the banner of St. John, the city’s saint. This side, too, has its motto, and one befitting an old capital of King and Commons, both in continual strife with the feudal nobles, “*Pro Rege, Lege, et Grege.*” Here then, plain upon this apparent arbitrarily devised trifle, this petty provincial money-token, this poor bawbee, that is, this coin not only of the very humblest order, but proverbially sordid at that, we find clearly set down, long generations ago, the whole

four-fold analysis and synthesis of civic life we have been above labouring for. For what makes the industrial Town, what can better keep it than strenuous industry at its anvil? How better express its craft school, its local style and skill, its reaction too upon the town's life in peace and war, than by this Hal o' the Wynd by his forge? Nay, what better symbol than this hammer, this primitive tool and ever typical one, of the peaceful education of experience, from Prometheus to Kelvin, of the warlike, from Thor to modern cannon-forging? Turning now from Town and School to Cloister, to the life of secluded peace and meditation—from which, however, the practical issues of life are ever renewed—what plainer symbol, yet what more historic or more mystic one can we ask than this of the lamb with the banner? While of the contrasted yet complementary civic life of fullest, broadest action, what expression like the Roman eagle—the very eyes of keenness, and the spreading wings of power?

So rarely perfect then is this civic symbol, that I must not omit to mention that it has only come to my notice since the body of this paper, with its four-fold analysis of cities as above outlined, was essentially finished. Since it thus has not in any particular suggested the treatment of cities here advocated, it is the more interesting and encouraging as a confirmation of it. It is also to my mind plain that in this, as in many other of our apparent "advances in science," and doubtless those in social studies particularly, we are but learning to think things anew, long after our forefathers have lived them, even expressed them—and these in their ways no less clear and popular than can ever be ours. That we may also again live them is once more curiously expressed by the same symbol; for its re-appearance is due to its having been appropriately revived, in a fitting art form, that of the commemorative and prize medal of the local arts and crafts exhibition, held in the new Public Library, under civic auspices. Little scrutiny of this last sentence will be needed to see the four-fold completeness of the civic event which it describes.

For just as we have seen on the old coin the hammer-

man and his motto answer to the town and school; so now on its reissue do the renascent local arts and crafts, with their commemoration in this library. And as the greater motto, that of widest policy, corresponds to the cloister of reflection and resolve, so we note that this new impulse to civic betterment is associated with the new library—no mere school-house of memory, but also the open cloister of our day. Finally, note that this impulse is no longer merely one of æsthetic purpose, of “art for art’s sake,” nor its execution that of a cultured minority merely; it announces a re-union of this culture and art with the civic polity. What fitter occasion, then, for the striking of a medal, than this renewal of civic life, with municipal organisation and polity, art and culture, renascent in unison. That such events are nowadays far from exceptional is so true that we are in danger of losing sight of their significance. Yet it is amid such city developments that the future Pericles must arise.

We thus see that our analysis is no mere structural one, made post-mortem from civic history; but that it applies to the modern functioning of everyday life in an everyday city, so soon as this becomes touched anew towards cultural issues. Furthermore, it is thus plain that civic life not only has long ago anticipated and embodied our theories of it, but once more outruns them, expressing them far better than in words—in life and practice. In this way the reader who may most resent these unfamiliar methods of exposition, alternately by abstract diagram or concrete illustration—which may seem to him too remote from ordinary life and experience, perhaps too trivial—may now test the present theory of the city, or amend it, by means of the ample illustrations of the processes and results of social life which are provided by his daily newspaper, and these on well-nigh all its fields and levels.

Note finally that it is the eagle and lamb of temporal and spiritual idealism that form the “head” of this coin, the craftsman and anvil but the modest “tail.” The application is obvious.

Thus even numismatics revives from amid the fossil

sciences. For from this to our own common coinage, or notably to that of France, America, Switzerland, etc., the transition is easy, and still better to that of the noblest civic past, both classic and mediæval. Without pursuing this further here, my present point is gained, if we see, even in the everyday local details of work and people, the enduring stamp, the inextinguishable promise, of the flowering of our everyday industries and schools into worthier ideals than they at present express, and of the fruition of these in turn upon nobler heights of life and practice. It expresses the essential truth of the popular view of the city; that in terms of the formula—People Affairs Places—above referred to (page 69). It also explains the persistent vitality of this view, despite its frequent crudity, and lack of order in detail, in face of the more scientific treatment here at first employed, that in the elementary geographic order—Place . . . Work . . . People. For though this objective order be fundamental, it is the complementary subjective evolution which throughout history has ever become supreme; so that our scheme must combine the outward geographic presentment with the inward psychological one. This may be graphically expressed by changing the order of presentment from that used hitherto:—

Town	City	to	City	Town
School	Cloister		Cloister	School

P.—FORECAST OF CITY DEVELOPMENT. SPECIAL AND GENERAL.

The dual and four-fold development of the city, as above sketched, is by no means far advanced in most of our present towns or cities, which have obviously but scanty expression of the ideas shadowed forth for the modern equivalents of cloister and cathedral, of academe and acropolis. But this is to say that such towns, however large, populous, and rich according to conventional economic standards, are to that extent small and poor, indeed too often little better than cities by courtesy. Yet their further development, upon this

four-fold view of civic evolution, though in principle the same for each and all, has always been, and let us hope may always be, in large measure an individual (because regional) one. For if each human individuality be unique, how much more must that of every city?

In one concrete case, that of Dunfermline, I have already submitted definite suggestions towards the realisation of the civic Utopia, and even architectural designs towards its execution,* so that these may at any rate suffice to show how local study and adaptive design are needed for each individual city, indeed for every point of it. It is thus, and thus only, that we can hope to have a city development truly evolutionary, that is, one utilising the local features, advantages, and possibilities of place, occupation, and people. Of course, it is needful to supplement these by the example of other cities; but it is no less needful to avoid weighting down the local life with replicas of institutions, however excellent elsewhere, if really irregional here. With the re-awakening of regional life in our various centres, and of some comprehension of its conditions among our rulers, they will cease to establish, say, a school of mines in Piccadilly, or again one of engineering and the like in South Kensington. The magistrates of Edinburgh have long abandoned their old attempt to plant mulberries and naturalise silk culture upon their wind-swept Calton Hill; albeit this was a comparatively rational endeavour, since a population of Huguenot refugee silk-weavers had actually come upon their hands.

Similarly, it is plain that we must develop Oxford as Oxford, Edinburgh as Edinburgh, and so on with all other cities, great or small—York or Winchester, Westminster or London. And so with Chelsea or Hampstead, with Woolwich or Battersea. Has not the last of these grown from a mere outlying vestry, like so many others, into a centre of genuine vitality and interior progress, indeed of ever-widening interest and example; and all this in half a generation, apparently through the sagacious leadership—say, rather the devoted, the

* Cf. the writer's "City Development," Edinburgh and Westminster, 1904.

impassioned citizenship—of a single man? And does not his popular park at times come near giving us a vital indication of the needed modern analogue of cathedral and forum? Civic development is thus no mere external matter, either of “Haussmannising” its streets, or of machine-educating its people; the true progress of the city and its citizenship must alike grow and flower from within, albeit alive and open to every truly fertilising impulse from without.

Yet since national interests, international industry, commerce, science, and therefore progress are nowadays and increasingly so largely one, may we not in conclusion foresee something at least of the great lines of development which are common to cities, and generalise these as we are accustomed to do in history? Witness the Classical, Mediæval, and Renaissance types to which historic cities preponderatingly belong, and within which we group their varied individualities, as after all of comparative detail.

Here then it is time to recall the presentment of ancient, recent and contemporary evolution already outlined in the part of this paper previously read (Vol. I, p. 109), dealing with the historic survey of cities. We have now to face the question, then postponed, indeed left in interrogation-marks—that of seeking not indeed sharply to define the future order of things, yet in some measure to discern such elements of progress as may be already incipient in the existing order, if not yet largely manifest there. Such elements may be reasonably expected to grow in the near future, perhaps increasingly, and whatever be their rate of growth are surely worthy of our attention.

Contemporary science, with its retrospective inquiries into origins in the past, its everyday observation of the present, is apt practically to overlook that the highest criterion and achievement of science is not to decipher the past, nor record the present, not even to interpret both. It is to foresee: only thus can it subserve action, of which the present task ever lies towards the future, since it is for this that we have to provide. Why then should not Comte's famous aphorism—“*Voir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pourvoir,*” become applicable in our civic studies no less than in the general social and political fields to

which he applied it? In navigation or engineering, in agriculture or hygiene, prevision and provision alike are ever increasing; yet these are no mere combinations of the preliminary sciences and the fundamental occupations, but obviously contain very large social elements.

It is proverbially safe to prophesy when one knows; and it is but this safe prediction which we make every day of child or bud, where we can hardly fail to see the growing man, the coming flower. Yet do not most people practically forget that even now, in mid-winter, next summer's leaves are already waiting, nay, that they were conceived nine months ago? That they thus grow in small, commonly unnoticed beginnings, and lie in bud for a period twice as long as the summer of their adult and manifest life, is yet a fact, and one to which the social analogies are many and worth considering.

While recognising, then, the immense importance of the historic elements of our heritage, renaissance and mediæval, classic and earlier; recognising also the predominance of contemporary forces and ideas, industrial and liberal, imperial and bureaucratic, financial and journalistic, can we not seek also, hidden under all these leaves, for those of the still-but-developing bud, which next season must be so much more important than they are to-day? It is a commonplace, yet mainly of educational meetings, to note that the next generation is now at school; but how seldom do we recognise its pioneers, albeit already among our own contemporaries? At any rate we may see here and there that their leaven is already at work.

In this respect, cities greatly differ—one is far more initiative than another. In the previous paper (vol. I, p. 109), we saw how individuals, edifices, institutions, might represent all past phases; these, therefore, often predominate in different cities sufficiently to give its essential stamp. Why then should we not make a further survey and seek to see something of the cities of the future; though we may have to look for these in quarters where at first sight there may seem as yet scanty promise of flower?

To recall an instance employed above, probably every member of this Society is old enough to remember incredulous questionings of whether any good thing could come out of Battersea. Again, how few, even in America, much less than in Europe, a few years ago, foresaw the rapid growth of those culture-elements in St. Louis, of which the recent World-Exposition will not have been the only outcome?

Only a few years earlier, it was Chicago which, for New England no less than for the Old World, seemed but the byword of a hopelessly materialised community. So Birmingham or Glasgow has won its present high position among cities in comparatively recent times; so it may now be the turn of older cities, once far more eminent, like Newcastle or Dundee, to overtake and in turn, perhaps, outstrip them. But all this is still too general and needs further definition: let us attempt this, therefore, somewhat more fully, in the concrete case of Glasgow.

Q.—GLASGOW AS TYPICAL OF CIVIC TRANSITION—
FROM “PALEOTECHNIC” TO “NEOTECHNIC.”

My own appreciation of the significance of Glasgow was first really awakened over twenty years ago by William Morris, who in his vivid way pointed out to me how, despite the traditional culture-superiority of Edinburgh, Glasgow was not only the Scottish capital, but, in his view, in real progressiveness the leading and initiative city of the whole United Kingdom. And this for him was not merely or mainly in its municipal enterprise, then merely in its infancy—although he expressed this development in the phrase “In London, people talked socialism without living it; but in Glasgow, they were socialists without knowing it!” Despite all the ugliness which had so repelled Ruskin, the squalor which moved Matthew Arnold to the fiercest scorn in all his writings, Morris’s appreciation arose from his craftsman’s knowledge and respect for supreme craftsmanship. The great ships building upon the Clyde were for him “the greatest achievement of

humanity since the days of the cathedral-builders," nay, for him actually surpassing these, since calling forth an even more complex combination and "co-operation of all the material arts and sciences" into a mighty and organic whole; and correspondingly of all their respective workers also, this being for him of the very essence of his social ideal.

For these reasons he insisted, to my then surprise, that the social reorganisation he then so ardently hoped for "was coming faster upon the Clyde than upon the Thames": he explained as for him the one main reason for his then discouragement as to the progress of London that there East and West, North and South, are not only too remote each from the other, but in their occupations all much too specialised—there to finance, there to manufactures, or here to leisure, and so on; while on the Clyde industrial organisation and social progress could not but develop together, through the very nature of the essential and working unity of the ship.

Since Morris's day, a local art movement, of which he knew little, has risen to eminence, a foreign critic would say to pre-eminence, in this country at least. Since Ruskin's savage response to a Glasgow invitation to lecture—"first burn your city, and cleanse your river,"—a new generation of architects and hygienists have not a little transformed the one, and vigorous measures have been taken towards the purification of the other. That the city and university pre-eminently associated with the invention of the steam-engine, and consequently with the advent of the industrial revolution throughout the world, should, a century later, have produced a scarcely less pre-eminent leader of applied science towards the command of electricity is thus no isolated coincidence. And as political economy, which is ever the theory corresponding to our phase of industrial practice, had there some of its foremost pioneers, and later its classical exponent, Adam Smith himself, so once more there are signs at least of a corresponding wave of theoretic progress.

Students of primitive civilisation and industry have now long familiarised us with their reinterpretation of what was long known as the stone age, into two very distinct

periods, the earlier characterised by few and rough implements, roughly used by a rude people, the second by more varied tools, of better shape, and finer edge, often of exquisite material and polish. We know that these were wielded more skilfully, by a people of higher type, better bred and better nourished; and that these, albeit of less hunting and militant life, but of pacific agricultural skill, prevailed in every way in the struggle for existence; thanks thus not only to more advanced arts, but probably above all to the higher status of woman. This distinction of Paleolithic and Neolithic ages and men, has long passed into the terminology of sociological science, and even into current speech: is it too much then, similarly, to focus the largely analogous progress which is so observable in what we have been wont to generalise too crudely as the modern Industrial Age? All are agreed that the discoveries and inventions of this extraordinary period of history constitute an epoch of material advance only paralleled, if at all, in magnitude and significance by those of prehistory with its shadowy Promethean figures. Our own advance from a lower industrial civilisation towards a higher thus no less demands definite characterisation, and this may be broadly expressed as from an earlier or *Paleotechnic* phase, towards a later or more advanced *Neotechnic* one. If definition be needed, this may be broadly given as from a comparatively crude and wasteful technic age, characterised by coal, steam, and cheap machine products, and a corresponding *quantitative* ideal of "progress of wealth and population"—towards a finer civilisation, characterised by the wider command, yet greater economy of natural energies, by the predominance of electricity, and by the increasing victory of an ideal of *qualitative* progress, expressed in terms of skill and art, of hygiene and of education, of social polity, etc.

This Neotechnic phase, though itself as yet far from completely replacing the paleotechnic order which is still quantitatively predominant in most of our cities, begins itself to show signs of a higher stage of progress, as in the co-ordination of the many industries required for the building of a ship, or in the yet more recent developments which begin to renew for us the conception of the worthy construction of a city. As


the former period may be characterised by the predominance of the relatively unskilled workman and of the skilled, so this next incipient age by the development of the chief workman proper, the literal *architectos* or architect ; and by his companion the rustic improver, gardener and forester, farmer, irrigator, and their correspondingly evolving types of civil engineer.

To this phase then the term *Geotechnic* may fairly be applied. Into its corresponding theoretic and ideal developments we need not here enter, beyond noting that these are similarly of synthetic character ; on the concrete side the sciences unifying as geography, and on their more abstract side as the classification and philosophy of the sciences,—while both abstract and concrete movements of thought are becoming more and more thoroughly evolutionary in character.

But evolutionary theories, especially as they rise towards comprehensiveness, cannot permanently content themselves with origins, or with classifications merely, nor with concentrating on nature rather than on man. Nature furnishes after all but the stage for evolution in its highest terms ; of this man himself is the hero ; so that thus our Geotechnic phase, Synthetic age (call it what we will) in its turn gives birth to a further advance—that concerned with human evolution, above all, subordinating all things to him ; whereas in all these preceding industrial phases, even if decreasingly, “ things are in the saddle and ride mankind.” This age, now definitely evolutionist in policy, as the geotechnic was in theory and in environment we may term the *Eugenic*. For its theory, still less advanced, the term *Eupsychic* may complete our proposed nomenclature.

Thus then our conception of the opening future may be increasingly defined, since all these apparently predicted phases are already incipient among us, and are thus really matters of observed fact, of social embryology let us say ; in short, of city development.

In summary, then, the diagram of the former instalment of this paper (vol. I, p. 109)



has thus its interrogations filled up. Omitting the left-hand half, that generalised as Ancient and Recent in the above diagram, so as to give more space to the Contemporary and Incipient phases, these now stand as follows:—



To elaborate this farther would, of course, exceed my present limits; but I may be permitted to say that long use of this schematic outline, especially of course in more developed forms, has satisfied me of its usefulness alike in the study of current events and in the practical work of education and city betterment. I venture then to recommend it to others as worth trial.

R.—A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL—A CIVIC EXHIBITION.

How shall we more fully correlate our theoretic civics, *i.e.*, our observations of cities interpreted as above, with our moral ideas and our practical policy—*i.e.*, our Applied Civics. Our ideals have to be selected, our ideas defined, our plans matured; and the whole of these applied; that is realised, in polity, in culture, and in art. But if this be indeed the due correlation of civic survey and civic service, how may we now best promote the diffusion and the advancement of both? At this stage therefore, I venture to submit to the Society a practical proposal for its consideration and discussion; and if approved, I would fain hope for its recommendation to towns and cities, to organisations and to the public likely to be interested.

Here then is my proposal. Is not the time ripe for bringing together the movements of Civics and Eugenics, now here and indeed everywhere plainly nascent, and of setting these before the public of this country in some such large and concrete ways, as indeed, in the latter subject at least, have been so strongly desiderated by Mr. Galton? As regards Civics, such have been afforded to America during the summer of 1904 by the Municipal Section of the St. Louis Exhibition; in

Dresden also, at the recent Towns Exhibition ; and by kindred Exhibitions and Congresses in Paris and elsewhere.

All these have taken form since the Paris Exposition of 1900, with its important section of social economy and its many relevant special congresses. Among these may be specially mentioned here as of popular interest, and civic stimulus, the *Congrès de L'Art Public* ; the more since this also held an important Exhibition, to which many Continental cities sent instructive exhibits.

Other exhibitions might be mentioned ; so that the fact appears that in well-nigh every important and progressive country, save our own, the great questions of civics have already been fully opened, and vividly brought before their public, by these great contemporary museums with their associated congresses.

With our present Chairman, the Rt. Hon. Charles Booth, with Canon Barnett, Mr. Horsfall, and so many other eminent civic workers among us ; with our committee and its most organising of secretaries, might not a real impulse be given in this way by this Society towards civic education and action ?

Let me furthermore recall the two facts ; first, that in every important exhibition which has been held in this country or abroad, no exhibits have been more instructive and more popular than have been (1) the picturesque reconstructions of ancient cities, and the presentment of their city life, and (2) the corresponding surveys of the present conditions of town life, and of the resources and means of bettering them.

Even as a show then, I venture to submit that such a "Towneries" might readily be arranged to excel in interest, and surpass in usefulness, the excellent "Fisheries," "Healtheries," and other successful exhibitions in the record and recent memory of London. The advantages of such an exhibition are indeed too numerous for even an outline here ; but they may be easily thought out more and more fully. Indeed, I purposely abstain for the present from more concrete suggestion ; for the discussion of its elements, methods, plans, and scale will be found to raise the whole range of civic questions, and to set these in freshening lights.

At this time of social transition, when we all more or less feel the melting away of old divisions and parties, of old barriers of sects and schools, and the emergence of new possibilities, the continual appearance of new groupings of thought and action, such a Civic Exhibition would surely be specially valuable. In the interest, then, of the incipient renaissance of civic progress, I plead for a Civic Exhibition.*

Of such an exhibition, the very catalogue would be in principle that *Encyclopædia Civica*, into which, in the previous instalment of this paper (vol. 1, p. 118) I have sought to group the literature of civics. We should thus pass before us, in artistic expression, and therefore in universal appeal, the historic drama of the great civic past, the mingled present, the phantasmagoria and the tragi-comedy of both of these. We should then know more of the ideals potential for the future, and, it may be, help onward some of the Eutopias which are already struggling towards birth.

* Since the preceding paper was read, it is encouraging to note the practical beginnings of a movement towards a civic exhibition, appropriately arising, like so many other valuable contributions to civic betterment, from Toynbee Hall. The Cottages Exhibition initiated by Mr. St. Loe Strachey at Garden City, and of course also that admirable scheme itself, must also be mentioned as important forces in the directions of progress and propaganda advocated above.

DISCUSSION

The Chairman (THE RT. HON. CHARLES BOOTH) SAID :

I feel always the inspiring character of Professor Geddes' addresses. He seems to widen and deepen the point of view, and to widen and deepen one's own ideas, and enables us to hold them more firmly and better than one can do without the aid of the kind of insight Professor Geddes has given into the methods of his own mind. I believe that we all hold our conceptions by some sort of tenure. I am afraid I hold mine by columns and statistics much underlined—a horribly prosaic sort of arrangement on ruled paper. I remember a lady of my acquaintance who had a place for everything. The discovery of America was in the left-hand corner; the Papacy was in the middle; and for everything she had some local habitation in an imaginary world. Professor Geddes is far more ingenious than that, and it is most interesting and instructive and helpful to follow these charming diagrams which spring evidently from the method he himself uses in holding and forming his conceptions. That it is of the utmost value to have large conceptions, there can be no doubt—large conceptions both in time and place, large conceptions of all those various ideas to which he has called our attention. By some means or other we have to have them; and having got them, every individual, single fact has redoubled value. We put it in its place. So I hope that in our discussion, while we may develop each in his own way, the mental methods we pursue, we may bring forward anything that strikes us as germane, as a practical point of application to the life of the world, and especially anything having an application to the life of London. I would make my contribution to that with regard to a scheme that has been explained to me by its originator, Mrs. Barnett, the wife of Canon Barnett of Toynbee Hall. The idea concerns an open

space which has recently been secured in Hampstead. It is known to you all that a certain piece of ground belonging to the trustees of Eton College has been secured, which extends the open space of Hampstead Heath in such a way as to protect a great amount of beauty. The further proposal is to acquire an estate surrounding that open space which has now been secured for ever to the people, and to use this extension to make what is called a "garden suburb." It is a following out of the "garden-city" idea which is seizing hold of all our minds, and it seems to me an exceedingly practical adaptation of that idea. Where it comes in, in connection with the address we have just heard, is that the root idea is that it shall bring together all the good elements of civic life. It is not to be for one class, or one idea, but for all classes, and all ideas—a mixed population with all its needs thought for and provided for; and above everything, the beauty of those fields and those hills is not to be sacrificed, but to be used for the good of the suburb and the good of London. I hope that out of it will come an example that will be followed. That is a little contribution I wish to make to the discussion to-day, and if I can interest any one here in forwarding it, I shall be exceedingly glad.

MR. SWINNY SAID :

Towards the close of his lecture, Professor Geddes remarked that the cities of America inherited a great part of their civilisation from Greece and Rome and the Europe of the Middle Age. I believe that thought will lead us to consider the point whether this geographical survey should precede or follow a general historical survey. Now, if we consider that a river valley in England, with the towns in that valley, are part of the English nation, and that the English nation has shared in the general historical evolution of Western Europe, it would seem that the first simplification the question allows of is: What is there in the historical development of that city that is common to the whole of Western Europe, and what is peculiar to its position as an English city? And the second simplification that the problem allows of is to consider what part of the evolution of a particular city is due to its peculiar position in that river valley? So that it seems necessary first to get a general idea of the historical evolution of England and the West; and then you can proceed to consider what is due to the part played by the city in that evolution. Thus you have to consider not so much the city as a result of its immediate environment, but the effect of its environment in modifying the general course of civilisation as it affected that city.

DR. J. L. TAYLER,

referring to Professor Geddes' remarks on the working craftsman and the thinking craftsman, said he believed that in a country like England, where the prevailing tendencies of thought and action were of an essentially practical nature, many people who now felt contempt for higher mental ideals would alter their views, if this idea of the *causal* relationship between thinkers and workers could be driven home. If business men and women could be made to realise that in the higher regions of pure science there were always to be found some thinkers who belonged to the same craft or trade as they themselves, they would naturally tend to rely on these thinkers when dealing with problems that necessitate a wide mental outlook.

Moreover, the thought that students of great mental powers studied the objects with which working craftsmen were in daily contact, could not fail to deepen, refine and purify their more practical and, in some respects, grosser aims; while the knowledge that every science-study had an industrial as well as a scientific aspect would make the thinking craftsmen more alive to the needs of everyday existence.

Such conceptions, if spread through all classes of our community, would inevitably change the feeling of distrust of learning into one of healthful enthusiasm, and give in addition a unity and direction to our various life pursuits which might in time generate a true modern national spirit; for it is precisely this divorce of mental and physical, of theoretical and practical, class and individual effort—which such a thinking and working craft theory would rectify—that destroys our efficiency by creating an unreal chasm between refined and unrefined, learned and unlearned, where there should be only a progressive evolution from the lower to the higher, from the immediate practical to the ultimate ideal.

THE REV. DR. AVELING SAID :

There was one point that the lecturer made which, I think, might be a fit and fruitful subject for discussion. He said that we were the product of the city. To a great extent that is undoubtedly true; but, on the other hand, he advocated an improvement in the conditions of environment, to be brought about by our own endeavours. Therefore, the city can be shaped and made by us. What, then, is the exact value to be given to the seemingly contradictory doctrines that the individual is the product of the city and also that the city is the product of the citizen? The establishing of some fixed relation between—or the adjusting of the relations of—these two causes of social progress would be, I think, interesting to the philosopher, and useful to the economist. The problem is

without doubt a difficult one, but its solution would be of great value. I do not venture to offer any answer to the question I raise—I merely state it.

MR. A. W. STILL SAID :

We have been passing through a period in which the city has created a type of man so wholly absorbed in the promotion of his own individual interests that he tends almost entirely to forget the social obligations which ought to make the greatest appeal to him. We may take some hope from what Professor Geddes has said, that the time is coming when we shall bring the force of our own characters to bear on our environment, and endeavour to break away from conditions which have made us the slaves of environment. I know the lovely little garden city of Bourneville intimately, and some of the experiments in other quarters. But in the common expansion of cities, I have seen that as the people get away from one set of slums, they are creating new areas which will become as degraded and abominable as those which are left behind. It has always seemed to me that there is room for good work by some committee, or some body of men, who would be voluntary guardians of the city's well-being, who would make it their business to acquire all that knowledge which Professor Geddes has just put before us in terms so enchanting, and would use all the ability that they possess in order to lead the minds of the community towards the cultivation of the best and highest ideals in civic life. I do not think it need be regarded as impossible that, from an association of this kind, such a movement as I have mentioned should spring. I conceive the possibility of each group developing into a trust, capable of acting in the interests of the city in years to come, exercising a mighty influence, being relied upon for guidance, and administering great funds for the common good. If we could get in each of our populous centres a dozen thoroughly intelligent broad-minded men, capable of watching all the streams of tendency—all the developments of civic life, bringing their judgment to bear on its progress, and urging the public to move in the right direction, a great service might be rendered. At least once a year, these little groups of men might meet together at some general conference, and, by the exchange of their opinions and by the mutual helpfulness of intellectual intercourse, raise up and perfect civic ideals which would be a boon to this country. We suffer at present, I think, from the too great particularisation of our efforts. We get one man devoting himself exclusively to a blind asylum, another seeming to take no interest in anything but a deaf-and-dumb institute or the like, and yet another devoting himself to charity organisation. It is all excellent work, but the difficulty is to get broad, comprehensive views taken of the common good. To reduce poverty and to check physical degeneracy, there must be an effort continuously made to

raise the tone of the environment in which we live. The home and the city need to be made wholesome and beautiful, and the people need to be encouraged to enlarge their minds by contact with nature, and by the study of all that is elevating and that increases the sum of social responsibility.

MR. E. S. WEYMOUTH SAID:

He found it somewhat difficult to see what was to be the practical outcome of civics if studied in the way proposed. Would Professor Geddes consider it the duty of any Londoner, who wished to study sociology practically, to map out London, and also the surrounding districts, with special reference to the Thames River Basin, as appeared to be suggested in both Professor Geddes' papers? Looking at civics in its practical or ethical aspect, he was bound to confess that, though he had acquired a tolerable knowledge of the geography of the Thames Basin, he did not feel it helped him materially towards becoming a better citizen of London. Would Professor Geddes wish them to study, first, London with its wealth side by side with its squalor and filth, and then proceed to study another large town, where the same phenomena presented themselves? What gain would there be in that, proportionate to the labour entailed? In his own case, so disheartened had he felt by observing that all their efforts, public and private, for the improvement of their civic conditions seemed to end in raising considerably the rents of the ground-landlords of London, while leaving the bulk of the population engaged in a hard struggle for their existence, that he had for years past found it difficult to take much interest in municipal affairs, so long as the rates and taxes were—as it seemed to him—put upon the wrong shoulders. And for the study of civics, he had preferred to turn to those cities where efforts were being made to establish communal life on what seemed to him juster conditions. In 1897, he was struck with the title of an article in the "Daily Telegraph." It was headed, "The Land of Beauty, Society without Poverty, Life without Care." He found the article was a description of Durban in Natal. The writer attributed the prosperity of this town to the fact that the suburbs were kept in the hands of the community, instead of being handed over to private owners who would absorb all the unearned increment. Even if this eulogium betrayed exaggeration, still a student of civics might feel that the economic conditions of that town were worth studying. Similarly, in New Zealand, the adoption in 1891 of the tax on land values brought prosperity to the towns, and changed the tide of emigration from New Zealand into immigration. Again, at home, they had Bourneville, Port Sunlight, and that most interesting of all present-day experiments in this country, the Garden City, all of these being founded by men with ideals. He could not help feeling

that a student of civics, possessed of such a fair working knowledge of the city he lived in as most of them might reasonably lay claim to, would make more real progress by studying the success or failure of social experiments, than by entering on the very formidable task that seemed to be set before them by Professor Geddes. However, when they left abstract civics, as they had it portrayed to them in these papers, and turned to the architectural or the historical side of concrete civics, there should be no better guide than Professor Geddes, whose labours in Edinburgh, and whose projected schemes for the improvement of Dunfermline, were becoming widely known.

MR. TOMKINS (*of the London Trades Council*) SAID :

If before any person was allowed to serve on our different public bodies, he should be required to attend a course of lectures such as those given by Professor Geddes on civics, that would surely be a means of developing his social interests, and would tend to eliminate that self-interest which too often actuated public men. There was nothing more difficult than for workmen to-day to be able to take larger views. The workman's whole business was now so different from what it was in the days of the arts and crafts guilds of the Middle Ages; they now found him ground down into some little division of industry, and it was quite impossible for him to work in his own way. Thus he got narrow-minded, because concentrated on some minor process. He was kept at work with his nose to the mill the whole time, and it became too exhausting for him to try and take these larger views of life. He often thought of the amount of talent and energy and practical beauty which was wasted in our workshops to-day. Referring to the Garden-Cities of this country and the United States, Mr. Tomkins said the idea of getting great Trusts to use their money in a social spirit, and not merely to get the workers tied to their mills, was really something which opened out a vista of grand possibilities in the future; but if any movement was to be successful it would be necessary to teach the great masses of workers, and to create a real sound social public opinion amongst them.

PROFESSOR GEDDES' REPLY.

Professor Geddes, in replying to the discussion, said he entirely agreed with the point made by Mr. Swinny, and he should just like to correct what he had said in his lecture by reference to what he meant by a civic museum. In Edinburgh, he had in his museum a large room, with a geographical model

of the old town with its hill-fort, and so on; and he hung round this maps and diagrams of historical and geographical details. On the opposite side of the room, he had a symbol of the market-cross, which stood for the centre of its municipal life, of its ideals and independence of environment. Around it was grouped what represented the other side of the city; and here he might answer another point, and say that they could never settle the great philosophical controversy of determinism and free-will. They would always incline when young to the novel of circumstance, and later, to the novel of character, but they should always feel that life was a game of individual skill with interfering circumstances. These diagrams of his were only the page split. On the one side, he meant to push to the extreme the idea that the place makes us, and on the other side, that we make the place. By what process do men struggle towards the selection of their ideals? They find themselves within the grasp of their environment, their whole heritage of culture, of good and ill, the whole tradition of the past; but they must select certain elements of these—the elements that seem to them good, and so they might escape from the manner of the city. Pointing to a drawing of the old Scotch bawbee, Professor Geddes said it was not a very dignified symbol of the coinage of the world, but let them mark how it had on the one side the hammerman at his work, with his motto "*Beat deus artem*," and, on the other side, a larger legend, with the eagle of the empire and the lamb of Saint John.

To return to his civic museum: the room below the one he had described was the larger museum for Scotland, and in the room below that, again, the museum for England, Ireland and America, the whole English-speaking world—not the Empire only. And the whole stood on a museum and library representing that larger evolution of the occidental civilisation which showed them they were merely children of the past. Professor Geddes pleaded for museums in which every city displayed its own past and present, but related itself to the whole of Europe and the whole occident.

One or two practical questions of great importance had

been raised ; but, with all respect, he submitted that they could consider what was practical and practicable without requiring to go into the question of taxing land. That was a matter of political opinion. It was as if they were discussing the geology of coal, which they could do, without reference to coal royalties. Mr. Weymouth was with them on the subject of preserving old buildings ; and he thought there was a great deal to be learned, if Mr. Weymouth would descend the valley of the Thames once more. It was of great importance if he found a great city at the tidal limit. Going down the Thames and the Tay, they would find, at the last ford of one, the old Abbey of Westminster, and at the last ford of the other, the old Abbey of Scoon. The kings of England and Scotland were crowned there because these were the most important places—a point of great historic interest. As a matter of practical interest, he might mention that Scoon and Westminster alike passed out of supreme importance when bridges were built across the river below ; and he would next point out how just as Perth became of subordinate importance when the great Tay Bridge was built, so it became a tremendously important question to London, as it might in turn be much affected by the making of a great and a new bridge much further down the stream. This study of the descending river had real and practical, as well as historical importance. He had been about considerably in the great cities of the United States, and had been struck by the amount of good endeavour there. It was not, however, by denouncing Tammany that they could beat it, but by understanding it. They must understand the mechanism by which the Celtic chieftain ruled his clan, and they must deal with these methods by still other methods ; and they might often find it more satisfactory to re-moralise the chieftain than to destroy him.

Professor Geddes concluded by saying that he appreciated the admirable suggestion of Mr. Still towards the evolution of civic unions. He was sure Mr. Still had there an idea of great significance which might be developed.

THE SCHOOL IN ITS SOCIAL
RELATIONS

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THE SCHOOL IN SOME OF ITS RELATIONS TO SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND TO NATIONAL LIFE.

By Professor M. E. SADLER.

Abstract of paper read before the Sociological Society at a Meeting in the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Clare Market, W.C., on Tuesday, December 13th, 1904, Sir A. W. RÜCKER, D.C.L., F.R.S. (Principal of the University of London), in the Chair.

1. One great obstacle to the advance of educational science has lain in our too habitually thinking of schools as if school-work were an end in itself, and in our discussing school-problems too little in relation to their social context, and with too vague regard to the actual needs of the callings for which the different types of school ought definitely to prepare their pupils.

2. All true education has a double purpose, namely (1) the development of the moral personality, of the physical powers, and of the intellectual aptitudes of the individual; and (2) the fitting of the pupil skilfully to perform the duties of some definite calling, or type of calling, in life, and worthily to discharge with courage and composure of mind the tasks likely to devolve upon him or her as a member (a) of a family, (b) of a local community, whose claims are based upon physical neighbourhood, (c) of the nation, (d) of some

church or other ethical fellowship, based upon affinity of spiritual need but not necessarily coterminous with any one country.

3. But the trend of the individualistic doctrine in psychology, in economics and in ethics was to exaggerate the relative importance of that part of educational effort which aims especially at developing individual capacity, and at "giving every one his chance" by means of "the educational ladder," or by incitement to self-help. Again, the trend of the rationalistic movement in philosophy and ethics was yet further to exaggerate one element in this individualistic type of education, viz., the purely intellectual element, or the side of mere instruction. Against each of these exaggerations, influential sections of English opinion have always maintained a sturdy protest, and never an unavailing one. Against exaggerated individualism in educational aims, Anglicanism protested (rather confusedly, but stubbornly) on the one hand; and Robert Owen and the Socialists (with too little feeling for historical and spiritual continuity) protested on the other. Against exaggerated intellectualism in educational aims, S. T. Coleridge, Wordsworth, Tractarian Oxford, and the leaders of English higher secondary education protested on the one hand; and the great mass of shrewd English opinion, with its tough prejudice against mere book-learning, on the other. The result of this conflict of educational ideals, which persisted for more than a century, was not quite a deadlock in English educational development, but painfully obstructed advance, each stage of which was marked by more or less untidy and illogical compromise.

4. The key to the history of English educational struggles, from the middle of the seventeenth century almost down to the present time, lies in this conflict between two disparate ideals. The one ideal was rather narrowly limited to a fervent belief in the intellectual and, as its upholders thought, the resultant moral efficacy of secular instruction of a more or less literary character, given in publicly-organised day-schools. The other ideal maintained that "national education," in any worthy sense of the word, consists in the joint

and often secret operation of many kinds of influence, permeating the heart as well as the mind of the nation, and proceeding from historic institutions, spiritual traditions, ancient and familiar habits of life, intimacy with nature, social relationships, personal loyalties, economic activities, daring adventure and free discussion. Those who incline to the first of these two views have, more frequently than the best of their opponents, been unconsciously one-sided in their conception of what the whole nation ought to be made to think and how it ought to be made to behave. Those who have inclined to the second view have often been lacking in the pertinacity of argument which comes from rather narrow convictions, have been apt to ignore the darker sides of the existing social order, have underrated the value of good school teaching, and have often been unable to express in words, either to themselves or to other people, what they really felt.

5. The school of thought which attached undue value to mere verbal instruction given to large classes in elementary day-schools is now virtually bankrupt. On the other hand, the opposite school of thought finds that the formulated doctrines upon which it implicitly relied have lost their earlier look of certainty, and that the old social order has nearly dissolved away under the influences of the Industrial Revolution. Hence there has been a deliquescence of prejudice and of conviction on both sides.

6. The result is, for the time being, a readiness for joint action in educational affairs, which has no precedent in English history. This melting away of old educational prejudices has happened to coincide with three other important changes. The biologists have taught us to assign immense importance to the influences of environment upon the human organism. The effects of slum life in the "drift quarters" of great cities have shown themselves in perilous tendencies to physical and mental deterioration. And English political instinct, always sensitive to new dangers and opportunities, is driving us towards more stringent forms of collective organisation in industry, in commerce, and in social regulation.

Hence a movement in English educational thought (not without its counterpart even in individualistic America) towards modifications in our educational methods, with a view to social unification and increased collective efficiency. For example, there is spreading a conviction that the time has come for dealing with the residual deposit which consists of the physically and mentally deteriorate, especially in the great centres of the population. What is wanted is a resolve to attack the slum-problem under scientific guidance, on a well-considered plan, with the help of great resources, and with the thoroughness, the energy and the persistence which are displayed in great works of modern engineering. In such a plan the labours of school teachers and the educational influence of a new type of elementary school would play an important part.

But social "rescue-work," is only part of the problem which has to be faced in the organisation of English elementary education. Only a small proportion of the elementary schools have to deal with the slum problem. The great increase of economic well-being among the artisan population has brought with it a need for a superior kind of elementary school with smaller classes, highly trained teachers, well-equipped buildings and spacious play-grounds, supplemented by higher courses of continuative instruction. Thus, in respect of elementary as well as of secondary schools, there is every sign that our progress will be in the direction of greater differentiation of type.

7. Thus, the representatives of the various traditions of educational thought and practice are coming into greater agreement than heretofore as to the range and complexity of the problem to be faced. All alike lay more stress upon the social and corporate influences of education; upon the importance of the unconscious education which comes through the pressure of environment; upon the need for better food, better home surroundings, and more healthy life-conditions for the rising generation; and upon the value of those kinds of training which fit a child for the actual duties of life. But, on the other hand, as the power of individual initiative in danger or difficulty and in handling new economic opportunities is one

of the chief assets of a nation, it is felt to be essential that, while encouraging the corporate influences of school life, we should develop through our education individuality of character combined with self-control.

In English education, however, we are apt to ignore the value of the imagination, and to neglect the educational instruments which can stimulate and train it. We are prone to think that anybody is good enough for the work of school-teaching. Our schools are hampered by lack of funds to secure the necessary teaching power. We miss our opportunities of making the best of the critical early years of a child's education. A good deal of our secondary school work is sterilised by too much thought about examinations. There is often far too little connection between school lessons and the actual interests of life. What is wanted is a combination of the zeal and venturesomeness of American educational effort, and of German carefulness in methods of teaching, with the English insight into the necessity of manual and corporate training as elements in education.

8. During the past half-century, the signal achievement of the public elementary school in its best democratic form (a form which, through conflict of opposing ideals, has been rarely realised in England) has lain in its work of social liberation and of social encouragement. It has given new opportunities of self-realisation. Its economic service, at a period when individual buoyancy and initiative were especially needed, has been immense. But still greater has been its work in stimulating a belief in ideals among great multitudes of people who would otherwise have been in danger of falling into a state of intellectual indifference bordering on materialism. At a period of rapid intellectual and social transition, it has furnished new motives of action and new hopes for the future. It has helped forward those who were economically and morally strong enough to avail themselves of the new opportunities to which it has opened the door. It has scoured away many prejudices and social distinctions. It has cleared the ground for new foundations. But its work has been least successful among the morally weak and among those lacking

in vigour of personal initiative. The influence has been, first, assimilative, and then selective, but not in the highest sense socially co-ordinating.

9. But perception of its value in quickening the sense of new economic opportunity does not alone explain the modern belief in the virtues of public education freely open to the masses of the people. That belief may be traced back in part to an instinctive sense of need for something which may fill the place of those traditional and less conscious processes of social education now in swift decay. The critical movement in thought and the revolution in economic processes have profoundly shaken the old orders of ideas and, with them, the various established traditions of social conduct, which rested on them and had grown out of them. To the great majority of human beings, the firmest kind of education is that which results from the impalpable but steady influence of a stable social environment. The silent pressure of such an environment moulds the thoughts, shapes the purpose, upholds the will, and fixes the way of life. Such an environment embodies a long tradition, is venerable with precedent, is hallowed by unnumbered pieties, and is tough with habit. This, in its best forms, is the educational inheritance which the stress and changes of modern life have weathered away. The disappearance of the old order in its thousand different forms and implications was inevitable. And much of the great development of popular education, from the time of Pestalozzi onwards, has been due to an effort, often conscious, sometimes instinctive, to repair, if it be possible, the loss of this old upholding environment by the more deliberate efforts of the school. Thus, the relative importance of the school has grown, in part, through the decay of other forms of virtually educative tradition. If the aim of education is to prepare a child for the life he will have to live, increase of schools does not necessarily mean a proportional increase of education. What existed before may have been in a true sense education, though less intellectual in form and less organised in its presentation.

10. In spite of the growth of factory districts and of

great cities—a side of modern developments in which England bore the brunt of the first experience—we retained, alongside of all this tumultuous and disintegrating social change, great portions of the older social structure, which, though not untouched, exerted a strong educative and co-ordinating influence upon those who remained within its limits. Hence we had, side by side, two educational problems—one how to help to create, by means of a school system, a better psychological environment for those who were growing up in the new districts created by the industrial revolution; the other how to adapt to modern intellectual conditions the old social environment where that persisted. The chief difficulty of the first problem lay in finding principles of social unity and of ethical agreement upon which to build a new social discipline. The chief difficulty of the second problem lay in finding means to stimulate intellectual curiosity and independence, in circumstances which, by reason of their controlling power, were adverse to novelty of thought and to individual initiative. No systematic effort was made in England to deal with either of these problems. Each was, for the most part, handled with the methods and in the spirit really most appropriate to the needs of the other. The claims of social obedience were emphasised where intellectual stimulus was most required; the instruments of purely intellectual stimulus were thought sufficient where in fact corporate training was the greater need.

II. And now that the improvements in communication and the decay of the old agricultural society, together with the weakening of traditional beliefs, have reduced the whole problem to a greater appearance of similarity (an appearance which is in some respects illusory), three different influences are at work in English educational policy. First, there is the growing conviction that the social life of the nation should be organised as a unity on scientific lines, for reasons of economic productiveness and of defence. With this conviction goes the desire to consolidate the nation by the pressure of a highly organised and unified school system, as well as by other forms of social discipline. Secondly, there is a not less profound conviction that the best hopes for the future lie through the

development of alert individuality, of personal freedom and of intellectual initiative. With this conviction goes a preference for a very different form of educational organisation, namely, for one which would curtail the responsibility of the central authority and of local authorities for the provision of schools and other cultural forms of social discipline, and which would rely in great measure upon individual enterprise in the establishment of schools and upon personal or parental decision as to making use of them. Thirdly, there are many who believe that the true unit for social and educational discipline will be found—not in the nation as a whole, nor in the individual acting alone, nor in the local community as geographically defined for various purposes of local government, but in homogeneous voluntary groups of like-thinking people, groups not necessarily coterminous with any local, provincial or national boundaries. With this belief goes a desire that, in their educational efforts, these groups, instead of being superseded or opposed by the state, should be encouraged by it, and be allowed their proportional share of the public funds to which they, in common with others, contribute.

12. These three convictions are, if each be pressed to its logical conclusions, in conflict. But, in the judgment of the writer, each (when moderately stated) represents a necessary part of the whole truth. He therefore submits that the sound line of policy in English national education is to allow sufficient scope, within the framework of national organisation, for group-effort and for private enterprise in education. But our most urgent need, at the stage at which we have now arrived, is to emphasise the national aspect of educational organisation; to make our schools less sectional in temper; and to encourage them to bear their part in unifying the national life. It is unlikely, however, that this purpose will be attained in England by an attempt to secure national unity through the enforced pressure of a homogeneous school system directed by a strong central authority. National unity is the outcome of a complex variety of causes, economic and psychological, and not the mechanical outcome of a school system. An educational system, to be effective, must be in harmony

with national sentiment, and English national sentiment has for centuries shown a strong preference for allowing great freedom in the utterance of personal conviction (and, therefore, for permitting great freedom in imparting such convictions through education), combined with an equally strong preference for a sufficient measure of social order, in order that the business of the nation may be effectively carried on. Logical principle is defied, so long as these two advantages are sufficiently secured. England, therefore, prefers an educational system which, upon a working basis of national unity, is, like the process of education itself, a combination of opposites. Its common-sense tells it that an education fostering arrogant individualism would be a public evil, but that as great a public evil would be an education which inculcated on all citizens passive obedience to some social or intellectual theory, imposed dogmatically by rulers who, however scientific, denied the right of criticism, of protest, and of practical dissent.

DISCUSSION

MR. SWINNY SAID :

I have been immensely interested in Professor Sadler's paper and found myself in agreement with a very large part of it, in fact with much the greater part. There are a few things of which I am still a little doubtful, and the thing I am most doubtful about, is the proposal to relegate slum children to special schools. Any proposal to separate the slum children during their whole school career from the more intelligent children seems to me the very worst service that could be done to them. We should be reproducing among the young life of the town, that state of affairs that we see now in our villages, where the more intelligent people tend to go away and the villages are very much duller than they were a hundred years ago, when men of character and intellect remained in their native places. I am also rather afraid that these schools, especially intended for slum children, would undergo various fluctuations in popular interest, and while at one time they would be a special hunting-ground for philanthropists, at other times they would be neglected and the education would become inferior. They would not have that continuous thought and attention which the general schools of the nation now have. I am quite in agreement with Professor Sadler in thinking there should be full allowance given to voluntary effort and voluntary schools, of course at the expense of the people who are trying these experiments. And when there are great disagreements, we ought to try and find what are the things we are all agreed upon and teach these, and make these the foundation of the schools.

MR. DAVID MAIR SAID :

It is usually held that much of the nineteenth century education is bad for the physique and not very good for morality, but for the intellect probably the majority hold that it is good on the whole, by reason of the mental discipline that it gives. Others think that by a better choice of subjects, we might combine this mental discipline with knowledge more

direct and useful. There are a few of us who go so far as to think that some parts at least of our customary education are fitted not to produce intellectual power but intellectual sterility. There was a recent report on board school education in Manchester, in which the views were to a certain extent in that direction. It may also be true to some extent of some of our most ancient universities. It is just possible that this fact may explain the difficulty of reform in high places.

Professor Sadler traced back the history of education for a few centuries. It will be useful to go back further, to the stages of barbarism and savagery which correspond in the history of the race to the infant in the development of the individual. This will enable us to go far towards understanding the child and to know how to adapt our teaching to his natural requirements. As a matter of fact, this method has already produced good results. Examples may easily be cited to show how the apparatus of savage or barbaric culture can be utilised in the education of the modern child, by introducing such apparatus at the appropriate stage of the curriculum. Take, for instance, the abacus. This instrument has played a great part in the culture history of the race. By its aid the race was enabled to take one of the hardest steps in mental evolution. The child in its individual development experiences, we have grounds for believing, similar difficulties to those which the race overcame by the use of the abacus or some similar apparatus. The ideal teacher, trained alike in individual and in racial psychology, would know by observation when the child was approaching what might be called the abacus stage. And it is at this stage that the ideal teacher would help the child over this particular difficulty, and start it on its normal higher development by gradually and insensibly leading on the child to reinvent and utilise for itself, some form of that apparatus, which had been the racial invention to overcome that particular obstacle to mental evolution. Putting the case generally it is this—that educational resources might be greatly enlarged if students of education could work in correlation with students of the history of civilisation, *i.e.*, with sociologists.

MR. KETTLE SAID :

Professor Sadler had by his personal impulse given a great impetus to education, and had made it more interesting to become a teacher than ever before, and that was a great practical gain in the progress of education. But in respect of the theory of education; we were still very backward. This was particularly so on the sociological side. The school was one amongst a whole set of institutions that constituted the social fabric. The correlation of the school with other social institutions, and more particularly political ones, was a department of sociology which seemed to have been almost totally neglected. The state and the school had to be traced

throughout history as two parallel sets of institutions. But often at any given moment, superficial appearances would lead one to suppose that the state and the school stood in total isolation from each other. Take, for instance, the position of affairs in England to-day. Perhaps nine-tenths of the national activity manifested itself in some form of mechanical industry. Turn from this prevailing industrial aspect of the nation to the schools, and what did we find there? From the sort of education that was being given to the children, no one could possibly infer a direct correlation between the scholastic and the economic aspects of national life. Then again it was obvious, on general sociological principles, that there must be some relationship between the educational system of the country, and characteristic national modes of recreation. But here again detailed observation seemed to suggest antagonism rather than harmony, between the educational and recreational aspects of national life. Another thing difficult of explanation was the apparent fact that the state schools were actually more conservative than other schools which were not in the same way accredited representatives of democracy. Living under these social anomalies, no wonder the teacher was depressed by the conflict of educational ideals. How could he reconcile the requirements of the state for the training of boys and girls to a wage-earning efficiency, and on the other hand to the requirements of educational theory, which urged him to turn out children who would be philosophers, thinkers or artists.

In spite of all the thinking that was being done, he did not believe they had any theory of education which could be called scientific. In other words, research in education was the thing wanted. It was useless to begin formulating schemes of education until they settled the question—what was the right way to train up a child? They did not know that, because there was no adequate research work being done in this country, although he believed valuable research work had been done in America and probably on the Continent. As a teacher, he confessed that he believed less and less in the power of environment as he grew older, and he thought the need for the moment was not to express opinions, but to go in for research.

PROFESSOR EARL BARNES SAID :

Some years ago, when on a pilgrimage to England to learn something of your educational ideas, I found myself in Professor Sadler's office seeking light and leading. In the course of conversation, Professor Sadler said "Mr. Barnes, who are the people who are leading the educational thought of England?" Immediately, intentionally, I named a half-dozen people—radical individualists. Mr. Sadler smiled sadly and said, "you misunderstand, these people are simply educating themselves in public." I am grateful to him for that phrase. All the people of my nation are educating themselves in public. We are extreme individualists. We are a

struggling mass of democracy, and so in the three or four minutes at my disposal, I will make as strong a plea as I can for extreme individualism. For while I owe to Professor Sadler many valuable suggestions, I still believe he is wrong in one great matter. He has done more than anyone else to advance the cause of English education, but I do not think he is wise in advocating a policy of educational adaptation to one definite national ideal. Why do I stand so strongly for extreme individualism? Because, in the first place, educational institutionalism always lags far behind movements among the people—it never leads. In matters of art, religion and other things, the school only takes up the idea and carries it along. Vital movements of the times begin elsewhere. We need then to throw the emphasis of all conscious effort upon strengthening initiative. The tendency of all schools is to crush out initiative. The consequence is that the school gradually establishes, and you yourselves gradually sink into, a state of inner self-sufficiency. That is the whole tendency of teaching all over the world, everywhere. In the next place we do not know what is best. You do not know what you want to make, and you do not know the nature of the material you have got to work upon. You select children of promise, and provide them with an educational ladder. But you do not adequately know or study the potentialities or possibilities of the individual boy or girl. In a society such as you have in England, it often happens that the individual most carefully trained up is in the wrong place. He is likely enough in the place wherein he was born; where he is, perhaps, a high administrative official of the empire, in reality he ought to be cleaning the streets. But—and this is much more important—another person, likely enough, is cleaning the streets, when he ought to be in charge of great imperial interests. In the last place, why am I so afraid of the nationalisation of the school, of bending the inner forces of the school to fit the national need? Because, wherever we have done so, we have always suffered serious damage. The mediæval church did it to the last degree. No institution is as great as life, but the meanest individual is as great as life. Nothing in all my country fills me with such terror as the growing tendency to extinction of the individual as the State develops. We are confronted with a condition of things where every individual will have to struggle for his life as in mediæval times. A powerful but small body of men in the United States, a mere handful of men who determine thought and leadership in politics, society, and industry, can carry any line of thought through the country. These few leaders dominate higher and secondary institutions, and these again dominate elementary education, and thus there is a great tendency to a stereotyped uniformity. But what we need is variety of type. And so it is that I have the greatest dread and fear of fitting, through conscious effort, the coming generation of children into a stereotyped mould imagined to be ideally adapted to the national need.

MR. ALFRED MOSELY SAID :

In reference to Professor Sadler's plea for slum children, surely no thinking man could go into the streets and see the waste products accumulated as the result of generations of so-called education, without feeling that here is a blot on our civilisation, and that it is time that the nation as a whole was aroused to its responsibilities. As to the causes of the multiplication of the slum type of child, there must doubtless be a measure of agreement before remedial action could be taken. That the cause was partly to be sought in the general social environment was admitted ; but it was no less certainly admitted that there was an educational factor. And it was by operating through this factor, that the line of least resistance seemed to be open. Born of degraded parents, and with their home practically in the gutter, the slum children must inevitably go to feed the submerged tenth, unless the educationist stepped in and rescued them from their degraded life and trained them in a different direction. It was true that in taking the children and forcibly separating them from their parents, they ran some risk of treading on the liberty of the subject ; but in the cases in view, that liberty would be better described as licence. In any case, they must face such a contingency in the interests of the child. In separating these slum children from the brighter children of the board schools, they would be committing a minor evil for the sake of a greater good. Congregating in special schools where they would be taught manual labour and its appropriate educational accompaniments, the slum children would miss the beneficial reaction from contact with more favoured children, but they would have a vastly greater chance of becoming useful citizens than if left to the almost inevitable degeneration of the extra-scholastic life of the urban slums. In solving these problems they would have to spend more money, above all, in providing more liberal salaries to teachers. It was essential that teachers should be given the means of living in some degree of reasonable comfort, and in a comparatively good social position. In the United States, the school teacher, provided he had character, culture and ability, was a welcome guest from the White House downwards ; and the sooner we realised in this country that the kind of finished product which is going to be turned out from the raw material—the children, depended largely on the kind of teachers we employed, we should the sooner choose the very best that money could provide.

The Chairman (SIR A. W. RÜCKER) SAID :

I should like to say a few words on the paper which has been to me of the very greatest interest. It has dealt with the side of education with which I have not had much to do. My own life has been almost exclusively

spent in dealing not with the foundations of education, but with university work. I have been struck in the course of the debate with the references which have been made to the two ideals of education—looking at it from the nationalist and individualist points of view. And in hearing the debate I have also listened with interest to the insistence of one speaker on the necessity for research in education. After all, the school and the university are a great workshop, which has to turn out a finished product. If a manufacturer undertakes research with a similar end in view, he begins with experiments on the laboratory scale—a small scale indeed. He will then go on to a semi-manufacturing scale. He deals first with grammes then kilogrammes, then tries the experiment on a large scale. Educational research has analogies to this process. Much that goes under that name may be called laboratory work. Then we come to the second stage when the educational experiment has to be tested on the semi-manufacturing scale. That is not tried in the ordinary schools of the country, but in certain more individual schools, or groups of schools under separate management. This second stage becomes practically impossible if all the schools are subjected to one curriculum. There should be every scope for variety. Agreement should be obtained, not by attempting to eliminate all we do not agree upon and keeping only to that which we agree upon, and which therefore interests us least of all, but we should have, as it were, a great laboratory of schools in which experiments can be tried and new methods tested and put aside if they fail. It cannot but be that I regard this question from my own point of view. Principals of Universities in England have not the same power, as in some other countries. It is not for us to ordain, but we have to do what we can with resources which are often very scanty, and to try to bring out, with these, something useful to the country. The universities should look upon themselves as the higher factors in a system which it is desirable to keep as plastic as may be. The University of London has taken up that position. It will not enter once more on the old vicious system under which, when the schools went wrong it was said to be the fault of the universities, and when the universities went wrong it was said to be the fault of the schools. We are determined to live and let live. We have determined that the schools with which we have to deal shall be as free as possible. And we have attempted to carry out that policy both in dealing with individual schools and in organising our system of examinations. As one who has almost exclusively had to do with higher and university education, I nevertheless believe that many great educational impulses must

come from below. It is in the school we ought to try the new ideas, and I therefore think it is extremely desirable that all the examinations which are imposed on schools from the outside should be as free as possible, not dominated by any single idea. We must not try to drill the educational world into one uniform regiment, nor even any one class of that world; but rather it must be our ideal that there should be a broad freedom given to the teacher to vary the course of studies for the individual, and thus induce that freedom which English education has too often wanted, and which, I feel sure, is one of the great needs of the future.

PROFESSOR SADLER'S REPLY.

Professor Sadler, in replying, said he did not think he had ever been to an educational meeting where the discussion was maintained at so uniformly high a level, and yet in which so many different points of view were represented. Perhaps Mr. Kettle was right, and he (the speaker) had started too many hares in his paper. His only defence was that they had had a good hunt. But at the same time, he thought it would be agreed that one of the things most necessary in the discussion of educational questions was a general point of view and a comprehensive outlook.

In regard to Mr. Kettle's question as to the interaction between the nation as a social whole and the school, investigation of that difficult subject had not gone far. But when it did get adequately studied, he was sure a fine field of observation would be afforded by the United States of America—where incidentally he would remark that Mr. Mosely's name was, in educational circles, a household word for the generous, public-spirited way he had advanced the interests of education by his Commission. There was no doubt that in the United States the schools had managed to produce a strong emotion of patriotism from one end of the country to the other. As another illustration of the interaction between education and life, he would mention the fact that, in some of the States of the Middle West, the excellent teaching of colour work was distinctly producing an artistic interest

among the people. But when we came to consider our own country, the question of educational and social interaction was one of transcendent difficulty. The complexity of the problem was great indeed, for our own country, in spite of its strong sense of unity, was not so much a nation as a patchwork counterpane. And here he thought the very heart of the subject had been touched by Professor Barnes in the splendid speech he had made. In spirit he had carried them all away with him, but he did not agree with his practical conclusions—for this reason, that they could not wholly leave education to private initiative. They had to draw upon public funds, and consequently they must have some kind of public control and public supervision. It seemed to him that the truth lay between the extreme nationalist, who, in the interest of national unity, would obliterate dissident individual enterprise or dissident group-effort, and the extreme individualist, who practically denied the necessity of the centralising and steadying power of the public authority of the State.



MAGIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

THE INFLUENCE OF MAGIC ON SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS.

BY EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

Read before a Meeting of the Sociological Society, at Caxton Hall,
Westminster, on March 22nd, 1905, the Right Hon. JAMES BRYCE,
M.P., in the Chair.

That religion has exercised a very great influence on the social relations of mankind is a fact familiar to every one. On the other hand, so far as I know, the social importance of magic has never been fully realised. Before dealing with this subject it may be well to define magic, as also to point out the difference between magic and religion.

At the lowest stages of culture known to us, as well as at higher stages, men distinguish between two classes of phenomena—natural and supernatural; between phenomena with which they are familiar and, in consequence, ascribe to “natural” causes, and other phenomena which seem to them unfamiliar, mysterious, and which they therefore ascribe to “supernatural” causes. We meet with the germ of such a distinction even in the lower animal world. The horse may fear the whip, but the whip does not make him shy; on the other hand he shies when he sees an umbrella opened before

him, or a paper moving on the ground. The whip is well known to the horse, whereas the moving paper or umbrella is strange and uncanny; it is to the horse something supernatural. Dogs, also, have a sense of the uncanny when something apparently uncaused happens. Professor Romanes frightened a dog by attaching a fine thread to a bone and surreptitiously drawing it from the animal, giving to the bone the appearance of self-movement, and the same dog was frightened by soap-bubbles.* Children are apt to be terrified by the strange and irregular behaviour of a feather as it glides along the floor or lifts itself into the air.†

But primitive people not only distinguish between the natural and the supernatural; they make yet a further distinction. They practically distinguish between two different kinds of supernatural energy or force, just as they distinguish between two different kinds of natural energy or force. In the world of the supernatural, as in the natural world, there are two kinds of energy: mechanical power and will-power. For instance, the supernatural power inherent in a tabooed object is mechanical power; contact with it communicates the taboo infection without the aid of any superhuman will. The same is originally the case with a curse. The baneful energy lies in the curse itself; it is a kind of supernatural miasma which injures or destroys anybody to whom it cleaves. On the other hand, gods and supernatural beings, generally, are endowed with supernatural will-power; their supernaturalness consists in the first place just in the supernaturalness of their will. By their will they can bring about wonderful events. Religion may be defined as a belief in and a respectful attitude towards an assumed mysterious will-power on which man feels himself dependent, and the original object of religious worship was no doubt to influence that power. Supernatural mechanical power, on the other hand, is applied in magic. Whilst the religious worshipper makes an appeal to a supernatural will, the magician utilises supernatural

* Romanes, "Animal Intelligence," p. 455 sq.

† Sully, "Studies of Childhood," p. 205 sq.

mechanical power, magic energy, as we may call it, without making any such appeal at all.*

I shall now proceed to show that magic has in various points influenced the notions of social rights and duties, and that the religious sanction itself in many cases has a magic origin.

The belief in magic has greatly increased the parents' power over their children. The curses and blessings of parents are commonly regarded as particularly efficacious. Among the Nandi in Central Africa, "if a son refuses to obey his father in any serious matter, the father solemnly strikes the son with his fur mantle. This is equivalent to a most serious curse, and is supposed to be fatal to the son unless he obtains forgiveness, which he can only do by sacrificing a goat before his father."† Among the Mpongwe "there is nothing which a young person so much deprecates as the curse of an aged person, and

* The word "religion" itself, however, far from suggesting any such distinction, seems on the contrary to confound religion with magic. *Religio* is probably related to *religare*, which means "to tie." It is commonly assumed that the relationship between these words implies that in religion man was supposed to be tied by his god. But I venture to believe that the connection between *religio* and *religare* allows of another and more natural interpretation, namely, that it was not the man who was tied by the god, but the god who was tied by the man. The Romans were much more addicted to magic than to true religion, they wanted to compel their gods rather than to be compelled by them. That the idea of tying the god is very familiar to people at a certain stage of civilisation may be illustrated by some cases which I have noticed among the Berbers of Morocco. When a native of the tribe Massa in Southern Morocco is in distress, he will go to the tomb of Lalla Rahma Yusef, one of the great saints of his tribe, and knot the leaf of some palmetto growing near her grave, saying, "I tied you here, O Lalla Rahma Yusef, and I shall not release you unless you release me from the toils in which I am at present." In the Great Atlas Mountains I visited a place where the great saint Mûlai 'Abd-ul-Kâder has a heap of stones dedicated to him; the place is holy because the saint is supposed to have been sitting there once when he was alive, and in consequence to have left behind a particle of his holiness. A great number of rags were tied to a pole stuck in the cairn, and when I asked the people for an explanation of this, the answer was that the petitioners generally fasten a strip of their clothes to the pole muttering some words like these: "O saint, behold! I promised you an offering, and I shall not release (literally, open) you until you attend to my business." If his wish is fulfilled, the petitioner goes back to the place, offers the sacrifice which he promised, and unties the knot which he made. He had tied the saint, and kept him tied until the saint helped him. This is what we would call magic, but the Romans would probably have called it *religio*. That *religio*, however, from having originally a magic significance, has come to be used in the sense which we attribute to the term "religion," is not difficult to explain. Men make use of magic energy not only in their relations to their fellow-men, but in relations to their gods; and the same classes of actions that form the religious cult, such as prayer and sacrifice, are also used as magic means of compelling the god.

† Johnston, "Uganda Protectorate," ii., 879.

especially that of a revered father.”* The Barea and Kunáma in Eastern Africa are convinced that any undertaking which has not the blessing of the old people will fail, that every curse uttered by them must be destructive.† Among the Bogos nobody takes an employment or gives it up, nobody engages in a business or contracts a marriage, before he has received the blessing of his father or his master.‡ Among the Herero, “when a chief feels his dissolution approaching, he calls his sons to the bedside, and gives them his benediction, which consists solely in wishing them an abundance of the good things of this world.”§ According to a Moorish saying, “if the saints curse you the parents will cure you, but if the parents curse you the saints will not cure you;” in other words, the curse of a parent is even more potent than that of a saint. The ancient Hebrews believed that parents, and especially a father, could by their blessings or curses determine the fate of their children;|| indeed, we have reason to assume that the reward which in the fifth commandment is held out to respectful children was originally a result of parental blessings. We still meet with the original idea in Ecclesiasticus, where it is said:—“Honour thy father and mother both in word and deed, that a blessing may come upon thee from them. For the blessing of the father establisheth the houses of children; but the curse of a mother rooteth out foundations.”¶ Among various other ancient nations long life was promised as a reward for filial obedience, in all probability for a similar reason.** The notion that the parents’ blessings beget prosperity, and that their curses bring ruin, also prevailed in

* Wilson, “Western Africa,” p. 393.

† Munzinger, “Ostrafrikanische Studien,” p. 475.

‡ Idem, “Ueber die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos,” p. 90 sq.

§ Andersson, “Lake Ngami,” p. 228.

|| Genesis, ix., 25 sqq.; xxvii., 4, 19, 23, 25, 27 sqq.; xlviii., 9, 14 sqq.; xlix., 4, 7 sqq. Judges, xvii., 2. Cf. Cheyne, “Blessings and Cursings,” in “Encyclopædia Biblica,” i., 592; Nowack, “Blessing and Cursing,” in “Jewish Encyclopedia,” iii., 244.

¶ Ecclesiasticus, iii., 8 sq. Cf. *ibid.*, iii., 16.

** “Dhammapada,” 1c9. “Precepts of Ptah-Hotep,” 39 (translated by Virey, in “Records of the Past,” New Series, vol. iii.), referring to the ancient Egyptians; Wiedemann, “Religion of the Ancient Egyptians,” p. 253. Clavigero, “History of Mexico,” i., 332; Torquemada, “Monarchia Indiana,” ii., 493 (Aztecs).

Greece. Plato says in his "Laws":—"It is clear that the gods listen to the imprecations of parents, for the curses of parents are, as they ought to be, mighty against their children as no others are. And shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially dishonoured by his or her children, are heard by the gods in accordance with nature; and that if a parent is honoured by them, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, and that they do not minister to his request?"* According to Greek ideas, parents had their Erinyes who avenged their wrongs, and there can be little doubt that their Erinyes originally were only personifications of their curses.† But in this, as in other similar cases, the fulfilment of the curse or the blessing came afterwards to be looked upon as an act of divine justice. According to Plato, "Nemesis, the messenger of justice," watches over unbecoming words uttered to a parent;‡ and Hesiod says that if anybody reproaches an aged father or mother, "Zeus himself is wroth, and at last, in requital for wrong deeds, lays on him a bitter penalty."§ It also seems to be beyond all doubt that the *divi parentum* of the Romans were nothing but personified curses. For it is said, "If a son beat his parent and he cry out, the son shall be devoted to the parental gods for destruction."|| In aristocratic families in Russia children used to stand in mortal fear of their fathers' curses;¶ and the country people still believe that a marriage without the parents' approval will call down the wrath of Heaven on the heads of the young couple.** Some of the Southern Slavs maintain that if a son does not fulfil the last will of his father, the soul of the father will curse

* Plato, "Leges," xi., 930 sq. Cf. *ibid.* iv., 717.

† See Iliad, xxi., 412 sq.; Sophocles, "Edipus Coloneus," 1299, 1434; von Lasaulx, "Der Fluch bei Griechen und Römern," p. 8; Müller, "Dissertations on the Eumenides," p. 155 sqq.; Rohde, "Paralipomena," in "Rheinisches Museum für Philologie," 1895, p. 7.

‡ Plato, "Leges," iv., 717.

§ Hesiod, "Opera et dies," 331 sqq. (329 sqq.)

|| Servius Tullius, in Bruns, "Fontes Juris Romani antiqui," p. 14, and Festus, "De verborum significatione," ver. Plorare: "Si parentem puer verberit, ast olle plorassit, puer divi parentum sacer esto." Cf. Leist, "Alt-arisches Jus Civile, i., 184.

¶ I am indebted to Prince Kropotkin for this statement.

** Kovalewsky, "Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia," p. 37.

him from the grave.* The Servians say, "Without reverence for old men there is no salvation."†

The belief in the efficacy of curses and blessings is rooted in the close association between the wish, more particularly the spoken wish, and the idea of its fulfilment. The wish is looked upon in the light of energy which may be transferred—by material contact, or by the eye, or by means of speech—to the person concerned, and then becomes a realised fact. Yet this process is not taken quite as a matter of course; there is always some mystery about it. Hence the words of a holy man, a magician or priest, are considered more efficacious than those of ordinary mortals. Some of the Jewish Rabbis maintained that a curse uttered by a scholar is unfailling in its effect, even if undeserved.‡ In Muhammedan countries the curses of saints or shereefs are particularly feared. According to the Laws of Manu, a Brâhmana "may punish his foes by his own power alone," speech being his weapon.§ One reason why the curses and blessings of parents are supposed to possess such an extraordinary power is no doubt the mystery of old age and the nearness of death. It is not parents only, but old people generally, that are held capable of giving due effect to their good and evil wishes, and this capacity is believed to increase when life is drawing to its close. The Herero "know really no blessing save that conferred by the father on his death-bed."|| According to old Teutonic ideas, the curse of a dying person was the strongest of all curses.¶ A similar notion prevailed amongst the ancient Arabs; ** and among the Hebrews the father's mystic privilege of determining the weal or woe of his children was particularly obvious when his days were manifestly numbered.†† But, at the same time, parental benedictions and imprecations possess a potency of their own.

* Krauss, "Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven," p. 119.

† Maine, "Early Law and Custom," p. 243.

‡ Makkoth, fol. 11 A. Berakhoth, fol. 56 A.

§ "Laws of Manu," xi., 32 sq.

|| Ratzel, "History of Mankind," ii., 468.

¶ Grimm, "Teutonic Mythology," iv., 1690.

** Welhausen, "Reste arabischen Heidentums," pp. 139, 191.

†† Cheyne, in "Encyclopædia Biblica," i., 592.

owing to the parents' superior position in the family and the respect in which they are naturally held. The influence which such a superiority has upon the efficacy of curses is brought out by various facts. The Greek maintained that the Erinyes avenged wrongs done by younger members of a family to elder ones, even brothers and sisters, but not *vice versa*.* The Arabs of Morocco say that the curse of a husband is equally potent as that of a father. The Tonga Islanders believe that curses have no effect if the party who curses is considerably lower in rank than the party cursed.† Moreover, when the father was invested with sacerdotal functions—as was the case among the ancient nations of culture—his blessings and curses would for that reason also be efficacious in an exceptional degree.‡

If curses and blessings originally were believed to possess a purely magical power, independent of any superhuman will, how is it that they afterwards assumed the character of an appeal to a god, and that the punishments or rewards which at first were the consequences of the curses or blessings themselves came to be regarded as punishments or rewards sent by the deity? I take the explanation to be this. A curse can bring about the result desired only by possessing supernatural energy, and such energy is inherent in certain mystic formulas or spells and in the invocations of a spirit or god, quite independently of the person who utters it. The name of a supernatural being is brought in simply to give the curse that mystic efficacy which the plain word lacks; the will of the invoked being is not considered at all. Thus both in the Old Testament and in the Talmud § there are traces of the ancient idea that the name of the Lord might be used with advantage in any curse however undeserved. But with the deepening of the religious sentiment this idea had to be given up. A righteous and mighty god cannot agree to be a mere tool in the hand of

* Iliad, xv., 204: "Thou knowest how the Erinyes do always follow to aid the elder-born." Cf. Müller, "Dissertations on the Eumenides," p. 155 sq.

† Mariner, "Account of the Tonga Islanders," ii., 238.

‡ Cf. Nowack, in "Jewish Encyclopedia," iii., 243 sq.

§ Makkoth, fol. 11 A. Berakthoth, foll. 19 A, 56 A.

a wicked curser. Hence the curse comes to be looked upon in the light of a prayer, which is not fulfilled if undeserved; as is said in the Proverbs, "The curse causeless shall not come." * And the same is the case with the blessing. Whilst in ancient days Jacob could take away his brother's blessing by deceit, † the efficacy of a blessing was later on limited by moral considerations. ‡ The Psalmist declares that only the offspring of the righteous can be blessed; § and according to the Apostolic Constitutions, "although a widow who eateth and is filled from the wicked, pray for them, she shall not be heard." || Now, when a god is regularly invoked in connection with some particular mode of conduct, the idea may grow up that he rewards or punishes it even independently of any human invocation. Moreover, curses may themselves be personified as supernatural beings, as in the case of the Greek Erinyes; or the magic energy inherent in a powerful blessing or curse may become an attribute of the chief god, owing to the tendency of such a god to attract almost any supernatural force which is in harmony with his general nature.

A similar fusion of magic and religion partly accounts for the fact that religious significance has so commonly been attributed to the duty of charity. ¶ By niggardliness a person may expose himself to supernatural dangers, whereas liberality may entail supernatural reward. In Morocco nobody would like to eat in the presence of other people without sharing his meal with them, otherwise they might poison his food by looking at it with an evil eye. So also, if anybody shows a

* Proverbs, xxvi., 2.

† Genesis, xxvii., 23 sqq.

‡ Cf. Cheyne, "Blessings and Curses," in "Encyclopædia Biblica," i., 592.

§ Psalms, xxxvii., 26.

|| "Constitutiones Apostolicæ," iv., 6. Cf. Jeremiah, vii., 16.

¶ The chief cause, however, of the extraordinary stress which the higher religions put on the duty of charity seems to lie in the connection between almsgiving and sacrifice. When food is offered as a tribute to a god, the god is supposed to enjoy its spiritual part only, whilst the substance of it is left behind and is eaten by the poor. And when the offering is continued in ceremonial survival in spite of the growing conviction that, after all, the deity does not need and cannot profit by it, the poor become the natural heirs of the god, and the almsgiver inherits the merit of the sacrificer. The chief virtue of the act, then, lies in the self-abnegation of the donor, and its efficacy is measured by the "sacrifice" which it costs him.

great liking for a thing belonging to you, wanting, for instance, to buy your gun or your horse, it is best to let him have it, since otherwise an accident is likely to happen to the object of his desire.* But baneful energy, what the Moors call *l-bas*, is transferable not only by the eye, but by the voice. The poor and the needy have thus in their hands a powerful weapon and means of retaliation, the curse. The ancient Greeks believed that the beggar had his Erinyes,† his avenging demon, which was obviously only a personification of his curse. It is said in the Proverbs, "He that giveth unto the poor shall not lack: but he that hideth his eyes shall have many a curse."‡ The same idea is expressed in Ecclesiasticus:—"Turn not away thine eye from the needy, and give him none occasion to curse thee: for if he curse thee in the bitterness of his soul, his prayer shall be heard of him that made him. . . . A prayer out of a poor man's mouth reacheth to the ears of God, and his judgment cometh speedily."§ According to the Zoroastrian Yasts, the poor man who follows the good law, when wronged and deprived of his rights, invokes Mithra for help, with hands uplifted.|| Mr. Chapman states that, "though the Damaras are, generally speaking, great gluttons, they would not think of eating in the presence of any of their tribe without sharing their meal with all comers, for fear of being visited by a curse from their 'Omu-kuru' [or deity], and becoming impoverished."¶ There is all reason to suppose that in this case the curse of the deity was originally the curse, or evil wish, of an angry man.

A poor man is able not only to punish the uncharitable by means of his curses, but to reward the generous giver by means of his blessings. During my residence among the Andjra tribe in the mountains of Northern Morocco, our village was

* Similar beliefs prevail in modern Egypt (Klunzinger, "Upper Egypt," p. 391).

† "Odyssey," xvii., 475.

‡ Proverbs, xxviii., 27.

§ Ecclesiasticus, iv., 5 sq.; xxi., 5. Cf. Deuteronomy, xv., 9. Rabbi Johanan says that almsgiving "saves man from sudden, unnatural death" (Kohler, in "Jewish Encyclopedia," i., 435). Cf. Proverbs, x., 2.

|| "Yasts," x., 84.

¶ Chapman, "Travels in the Interior of South Africa," i., 341.

visited by a band of ambulant scribes who went from house to house, receiving presents and invoking blessings in return; and, far from grudging the expense, some of the villagers told me that this was a profitable bargain, since they would be tenfold repaid for their gifts through the blessings of the scribes. A town Moor who starts for a journey to the country, generally likes to give a coin to one of the beggars who are sitting near the gate, so as to receive his blessings. It is said in Ecclesiasticus:—"Stretch thine hand unto the poor, that thy blessing may be perfected. A gift hath grace in the sight of every man living."* Whilst he that withholdeth corn shall be cursed by the people, "blessing shall be upon the head of him that selleth it."†

In no other respect is the influence of magic on social relationships more striking than in the case of the stranger's position in early society. Under ordinary circumstances, a stranger is there looked upon as an enemy to be killed. Even in ancient Greece and Rome and among the Teutonic peoples in former days the stranger had originally no rights. The Latin word *hostis* was at first used to denote a foreigner,‡ and the German "elender," which means a wretch, has acquired its present meaning from the connotation of the older word, which meant an "outlandish" man. Even in the latter Middle Ages, all Europe tacitly agreed that foreigners had been created on purpose to be robbed. It is not surprising, then, to find that savages are hostile to foreigners. It is much more surprising that the same stranger who generally has no rights whatever is welcomed with special marks of honour when he comes as a guest. The best seat is then assigned to him; the best food at the host's disposal is set before him; he takes precedence over all the members of the household; he enjoys extraordinary privileges. Among many uncivilised peoples it is customary for a man to offer even his wife, or one of his wives, to the stranger for the time

* Ecclesiasticus, vii., 32. Cf. Proverbs, xxii., 9.

† Proverbs, xi., 26.

‡ Cicero, "De officiis," i., 12.

he remains his guest.* The Bedouins of Nejd have a saying that "the guest while in the house is its lord;" † and in the Institutes of Vishnu we read that, as the Brâhmanas are lords over all other castes, and as a husband is lord over his wives, so the guest is the lord of his host. ‡ Indeed, custom may require that hospitality should be shown even to an enemy. Among the Aeneze Bedouins, § and in Afghanistan || a refugee is safe though he has fled to the house of his deadly foe. We read in the Hitopadesa:—"On even an enemy, arrived at the house, becoming hospitality should be bestowed; the tree does not withdraw its sheltering shadow from the wood-cutter. . . . The guest is everyone's superior." ¶ The old Norsemen considered it a duty to treat a guest hospitably, though it came out that he had killed the brother of his host. ** It is true that the duty of hospitality is only of short duration. The Anglo-Saxon rule was, "Two nights a guest, the third night one of the household," that is, a slave. †† The Southern Slavs declare that "a guest and a fish smell on the third day." ††† The Moors say that "the hospitality of the Prophet lasts for three days;" the first night he is entertained most lavishly, for then, but only then, he is "the guest of God." When I arrived at some governor's castle in the Great Atlas Mountains, one or several sheep were generally given to me the first evening; the following day my host was less liberal; and the third day I found it was best for me to leave. But as long as the duty of hospitality lasts it is exceedingly stringent, being enforced not only by custom, but very frequently by religion as well.

Thus, among the doctrines held up for acceptance by the religious instructors of the Iroquois there was the following

* Westermarck, "History of Human Marriage," p. 73 sqq.

† Palgrave, "Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia," i., 345.

‡ "Institutes of Vishnu," lxxvii., 31.

§ Burckhardt, "Notes on the Bedouins and Wahâbys," p. 87.

|| Elphinstone, "Kingdom of Caubul," i., 296.

¶ "Hitopadesa," Mitralâbhâ, 60, 62.

** Grimm, "Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer," p. 400. Weinhold, "Altnordisches Leben,"

p. 441.

†† Quoted in "Leges Edwardi Confessoris," 23. Cf. "Laws of Cnut," ii., 28; "Laws of Hlothhære and Eadric," 15; "Leges Henrici, I.," viii., 5.

††† Krauss, op. cit., p. 658.

precept:—"If a stranger wander about your abode, welcome him to your home, be hospitable towards him, speak to him with kind words, and forget not always to mention the Great Spirit."* The Kalmucks believe that want of hospitality will be punished by angry gods.† The Kandhs say that the first duty which the gods have imposed upon man is that of hospitality; and "persons guilty of the neglect of established observances are punished by the divine wrath, either during their current lives, or when they afterwards return to animate other bodies," the penalties being death, poverty, disease, the loss of children, or any other form of calamity.‡ In the sacred books of India hospitality is repeatedly spoken of as a most important duty, the discharge of which will be amply rewarded. "The inhospitable man," the Vedic singer tells us, "acquires food in vain. I speak the truth—it verily is his death. . . . He who eats alone is nothing but a sinner."§ "He who does not feed these five, the gods, his guests, those whom he is bound to maintain, the manes, and himself, lives not, though he breathes."|| According to the Vishnu Purána, a person who neglects a poor and friendless stranger in want of hospitality goes to hell.¶ On the other hand, by honouring guests a householder obtains the highest reward.** "He who entertains guests for one night obtains earthly happiness, a second night gains the middle air, a third heavenly bliss, a fourth the world of unsurpassable bliss; many nights procure endless worlds. That has been declared in the Veda."†† It is said in the Mahabharata that "he who gives food freely to a fatigued wayfarer, whom he has never seen before, obtains great virtuous merit."‡‡ According to Hesiod, Zeus himself is wroth with him who does evil to a suppliant or a guest, and at last,

* Morgan, "League of the Iroquois," p. 172.

† Bergmann, "Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalmücken," ii., 281 sq.

‡ Macpherson, "Religious Opinions and Observances of the Khonds," in "Jour. Roy. Asiatic Soc.," vii., 196.

§ "Rig-Veda," x., 117. 6.

|| "Laws of Manu," iii., 72. Cf. "Institutes of Vishnu," lxvii., 45.

¶ "Vishnu Purána," p. 305.

** "Institutes of Vishnu," lxvii., 28, 32.

†† "Apastamba," ii., 3. 7. 16.

‡‡ "Mahabharata," Vana Parva, ii., 61, pt. v., p. 5.

in requital for his deed, lays on him a bitter penalty.* Plato says:—"In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God, than wrongs done to citizens. . . . He who is most able is the genius and the god of the stranger, who follows in the train of Zeus, the god of strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed, whether against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliants is the greatest."† Similar opinions prevailed in ancient Rome. *Jus hospitii*, whilst forming no part of the civil law, belonged to *fas*; the stranger, who enjoyed no legal protection, was, as a guest, protected by custom and religion.‡ The *dii hospitales* and Jupiter were on guard over him;§ hence the duties towards a guest were even more stringent than those towards a relative.|| Cæsar¶ and Tacitus** attest that the Teutons considered it impious to injure a guest or to exclude any human being from the shelter of their roof. The God of Israel was a preserver of strangers.†† In the Talmud hospitality is described as "the most important part of divine worship,"‡‡ as being equivalent to the duty of honouring father and mother,§§ as even more meritorious than frequenting the synagogue.|||| Muhammedanism likewise regards hospitality as a religious duty.¶¶ "Whoever," said the

* Hesiod, "Opera et dies," 331 sq. (333 sq.).

† Plato, "Leges," v., 729 sq.

‡ Servius, "In Virgilio Æneidos," iii., 55: "Fas omne; et cognationis, et juris hospitii." von Jhering, "Geist des römischen Rechts," i., 227. Leist, "Altarisches Jus Civile," i., 103, 358 sq.

§ Servius, "In Virgilio Æneidos," i., 736. Livy, "Historiæ Romanæ," xxxix., 51. Tacitus, "Annales," xv., 52. Plautus, "Pœnuli," v., l. 25.

|| Gellius, "Noctes Atticæ," v. 13. 5: "In officiis apud majores ita observatum est, primum tutelæ, deinde hospiti, deinde clienti, tum cognato, postea affini."

¶ Cæsar, "De bello gallico," vi., 23.

** Tacitus, "Germania," 21.

†† Psalms, cxlvi., 9.

‡‡ Deutsch, "Literary Remains," p. 57.

§§ Kiddushin, fol. 39 B, quoted by Hershon, "Treasures of the Talmud," p. 145.

|||| Sabbath, fol. 127 A, quoted by Katz, "Der wahre Talmudjude," p. 103.

¶¶ "Koran," iv., 40 sqq.

Prophet, "believes in God and the day of resurrection, must respect his guest." * But the idea that a guest enjoys divine protection prevailed among the Arabs long before the times of Muhammed. †

That a stranger, who under other circumstances is treated as an inferior being or a foe, liable to be robbed and killed with impunity, should enjoy such extraordinary privileges as a guest, is certainly one of the most curious contrasts which present themselves to a student of the moral ideas of mankind. It may be asked, why should he be received at all? Of course, he stands in need of protection and support, but why should those who do not know him care for that?

One answer is that his helpless condition may excite pity; facts seem to prove that even among savages the altruistic feelings, however narrow, can be stirred by the sight of a suffering and harmless stranger. Another answer is that the host himself may expect to reap benefit from his act. And there can be little doubt that the rules of hospitality are in the main based on egoistic considerations. It has been justly observed that in uncivilised countries, where there is no public accommodation for travellers, "hospitality is so necessary, and so much required by the mutual convenience of all parties, as to detract greatly from its merit as a moral quality." ‡ When the stranger belongs to a community with which a reciprocity of intercourse prevails, it is prudent to give him a hearty reception; he who is the host to-day may be the guest to-morrow. Moreover, the stranger is a bearer of news and tidings, and as such may be a welcome guest where communication between different places is slow and rare. § During my wanderings in the remote forests of Northern Finland I was constantly welcomed with the phrase, "What news?" But the stranger may be supposed to bring with him something which is valued even more highly, namely, good luck or blessings.

* Lane, "Arabian Society in the Middle Ages," p. 142.

† Wellhausen, "Reste arabischen Heidentums," p. 223 sq.

‡ Winterbottom, "Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone," i., 214.

§ Cf. Wright, "Domestic Manners and Sentiments in England during the Middle Ages," p. 329.

During the first days of my stay at Demnat, in the Great Atlas, the natives, in spite of their hostility towards Europeans, said they were quite pleased with my coming to see them, because I had brought with me rain and an increase of the import of victuals, which just before my arrival had been very scarce. So, too, whilst residing among the Andjra mountaineers in the North of Morocco, I was said to be a person with "propitious ankles," because, since I settled down among them, the village where I stayed was frequently visited by Shereefs—presumed descendants of the Prophet Muhammed—who are always highly valued guests on account of the *baraka*, or holiness, with which they are supposed in a smaller or greater degree to be endowed. The stranger may be a source of good fortune either involuntarily, as a bearer of luck, or through his good wishes; and there is every reason to hope that he will, if treated hospitably, return the kindness of his host with a blessing. According to the old traveller d'Arvieux, strangers who come to an Arab village are received by the Shēikh with some such words as these:—"You are welcome; praised be God that you are in good health; your arrival draws down the blessing of heaven upon us; the house and all that is in it is yours, you are masters of it."* It is said in one of the sacred books of India that through a Brâhmana guest the people obtain rain, and food through rain, hence they know that "the hospitable reception of a guest is a ceremony averting evil."† When we read in the Laws of Manu that "the hospitable reception of guests procures wealth, fame, long life, and heavenly bliss,"‡ it is also reasonable to suppose that this supernatural reward is a result of blessings invoked on the host. In the 'Suppliants' of Aeschylus the Chorus sings:—"Let us utter for the Argives blessings in requital of their blessings. And may Zeus of Strangers watch to their fulfilment the rewards that issue from a stranger's tongue, that they reach their perfect goal."§ We can now understand the

* d'Arvieux, "Travels in Arabia the Desart," p. 131 sq.

† "Vasishtha," xi., 13.

‡ "Laws of Manu," iii., 106.

§ Aeschylus, "Supplikes," 632 sqq.

eagerness with which guests are sought for. When a guest enters the hut of a Kalmuck, "the host, the hostess, and everybody in the hut, rejoice at the arrival of the stranger as at an unexpected fortune."* Among the Arabs of Sinai, "if a stranger be seen from afar coming towards the camp, he is the guest for that night of the first person who descries him, and who, whether a grown man or a child, exclaims, 'There comes my guest.' Such a person has a right to entertain the guest that night. Serious quarrels happen on these occasions; and the Arabs often have recourse to their great oath—'By the divorce (from my wife) I swear that I shall entertain the guest;' upon which all opposition ceases."† It is also very usual in the East to eat before the gate of the house where travellers pass, and every stranger of respectable appearance is invariably requested to sit down and partake of the repast.‡ Among the Maoris, "no sooner does a stranger appear in sight, than he is welcomed with the usual cry of 'Come hither! come hither!' from numerous voices, and is immediately invited to eat of such provisions as the place affords."§

If efficacy is ascribed to the blessings of even an ordinary man, the blessings of a stranger are naturally supposed to be still more powerful. For the unknown stranger, like everything unknown and everything strange, arouses a feeling of mysterious awe in superstitious minds. The Ainos say, "Do not treat strangers slightly, for you never know whom you are entertaining."|| According to the Hitopadesa, "a guest consists of all the deities."¶ It is significant that in the writings of ancient India, Greece, and Rome, guests are mentioned next after gods as due objects of regard.** Thus Aeschylus speaks

* Bergmann, *op. cit.*, ii., 282.

† Burckhardt, "Bedouins and Wahábys," p. 198.

‡ *Idem*, "Arabic Proverbs," p. 218. Chassebœuf de Volney, "Travels through Syria and Egypt," i., 413.

§ Yate, "Account of New Zealand," p. 100. Cf. Turner, "Nineteen Years in Polynesia," p. 325 (Samoans); Sproat, "Scenes and Studies of Savage Life," p. 57 (Ahts).

|| Batchelor, "Ainu and their Folk-Lore," p. 259.

¶ "Hitopadesa," *Mitralâbhâ*, 65.

** "Anugîtâ," 3, 31 ("Sacred Books of the East," viii., 243, 361). Gellius, "Noctes Atticæ," v., 13. 5.

of a man's "impious conduct to a god, or a stranger, or to his parents dear." * According to Homeric notions, "the gods, in the likeness of strangers from far countries, put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the cities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of men." † The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews writes, "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares." ‡

The visiting stranger, however, is regarded not only as a potential benefactor, but as a potential source of evil. He may bring with himself disease or ill-luck. He is commonly believed to be versed in magic; § and the evil wishes and curses of a stranger are greatly feared, owing partly to his quasi-supernatural character, partly to the close contact in which he comes with the host and his belongings.

Among the African Herero "no curse is regarded as heavier than that which one who has been inhospitably treated would hurl at those who have driven him from the hearth." || According to Greek ideas, guests and suppliants had their Erinyes ¶—personifications of their curses; and it would be difficult to attribute any other meaning to "the genius (*δαίμων*) and the god of the stranger, who follow in the train of Zeus," spoken of by Plato, and to the Roman *dii hospitales*, in their capacity of avengers of injuries done to guests. It is no doubt the same notion that the Chorus in the 'Suppliants' of Aeschylus expresses, in a modified form, when singing:—"Grievous is the wrath of Zeus Petitionary. . . . I must needs hold in awe the wrath of Zeus Petitionary, for that is the supremest on earth." ** Apastamba's Aphorisms contain a sūtra the object of which is to show the absolute necessity of feeding a guest, owing to the fact that, "if offended, he might burn the house with the flames of his anger" ††; for "a guest comes

* Aeschylus, "Eumenides," 270 sq.

† "Odyssey," xvii., 485 sqq.

‡ Hebrews, xiii., 2.

§ Frazer, "Golden Bough," i., 298 sqq.

|| Ratzel, "History of Mankind," ii., 480.

¶ Plato, "Epistolæ," viii., 357. Apollonius Rhodius, "Argonautica," iv., 1042 sq.

** Aeschylus, "Supplices," 349, 489.

†† "Sacred Books of the East," ii., 114, n. 3.

to the house resembling a burning fire,"* "a guest rules over the world of Indra."† According to the Institutes of Vishnu, "one who has arrived as a guest and is obliged to turn home disappointed in his expectations, takes away from the man to whose house he has come his religious merit, and throws his own guilt upon him";‡ and the same idea is found in other ancient books of India.§ That a dissatisfied guest, or a Brâhmana,|| thus takes with him the spiritual merit of his churlish host, allows of a quite literal interpretation. In Morocco, a Shereef is generally unwilling to let a stranger kiss his hand, for fear lest the stranger should extract from him his *baraka*, or holiness; and the Shereefs of Wazzan are reputed to rob other Shereefs, who visit them, of their holiness, should the latter leave behind any remainder of their meals, even though it be only a bone.

The efficacy of a wish or a curse depends not only upon the potency which it possesses from the beginning, owing to certain qualities in the person from whom it originates, but also on the vehicle by which it is conducted—just as the strength of an electric shock depends both on the original intensity of the current and on the condition of the conductor. As particularly efficient conductors are regarded blood, bodily contact, food, and drink. In Morocco, the duties of a host are closely connected with the institution of *l-'ar*, one of the most sacred customs of that country. If a person desires to compel another to help him, or to forgive him, or, generally, to grant some request, he makes *l-'ar* for him. He kills a sheep or a goat or only a chicken at the threshold of his house, or at the entrance of his tent; or he grasps with his hands either the person whom he invokes, or that person's child, or the horse which he is riding; or he touches him with his turban or a fold of his dress. In short, he establishes some kind of contact with the other person, to serve as a conductor of his wishes and

* "Apastamba," ii., 3. 6. 3.

† "Laws of Manu," iv., 182.

‡ "Institutes of Vishnu," lvii., 33.

§ "Vasishtha," viii., 6. "Laws of Manu," ii., 100. "Hitopadesa," Mitralâbhâ, 64.

|| "Vasishtha," viii., 6. "Laws of Manu," iii., 100.

of his conditional curses. It is universally believed, that if the person so appealed to does not grant the request, his own welfare is at stake, and that the danger is particularly great if an animal has been killed at his door, and he steps over the blood or only catches a glimpse of it. As appears from the expression, "This is *l-'ar* for you if you do not do this or that," the blood, or the direct bodily contact, is supposed to transfer to the other person a conditional curse:—If you do not help me, then you will die, or your children will die, or some other evil will happen to you. So also the owner of a house or a tent to which a person has fled for refuge must, in his own interest, assist the fugitive, who is in his *'ar*; for, by being in his dwelling, the refugee is in close contact with him. Again, the restraint which a common meal lays on those who partake of it is conspicuous in the usual practice of sealing a compact of friendship by eating together at the tomb of some saint. The true meaning of this is made perfectly clear by the phrase that "the food will repay" him who breaks the compact. The sacredness of the place adds to the efficacy of the imprecation, but its vehicle, the real punisher, is the eaten food, because it embodies a conditional curse.

Now the idea underlying these customs is certainly not restricted to Morocco. Blood is very commonly used as a conductor of conditional curses; for instance, one object of the practice of sacrifice is to transfer an imprecation to the god by means of the blood of the victim. Bodily contact is another common means of communicating curses; and this accounts for many remarkable cases of compulsory hospitality and protection which have been noticed in different quarters of the world. In Fiji "the same native who within a few yards of his house would murder a coming or departing guest for sake of a knife or a hatchet, will defend him, at the risk of his own life as soon as he has passed his threshold."* If an Ossetian receives into his house a stranger whom he afterwards discovers to be a man to whom he owes blood-revenge, this makes no difference in his hospitality; but when the guest takes his leave,

* Wilkes, "U. S. Exploring Expedition," iii., 77.

the host accompanies him to the boundary of the village, and on parting from him exclaims, "Henceforth beware!"* Among the Kandhs, if a man can make his way by any means into the house of his enemy he cannot be touched, even though his life has been forfeited to his involuntary host by the law of blood-revenge. † In none of these cases is an explanation given of the extraordinary privilege granted to the stranger; but it seems highly probable that it has the same origin as the exactly similar custom prevalent among the Moors. In other words, as soon as the stranger has come in touch with a person by entering his house, he is thought to be able to transmit to that person and his family and his belongings any evil wishes he pleases. So, also, in the East any stranger may place himself under the protection of an Arab by merely touching his tent or his tent-ropes, ‡ and after this is done "it would be reckoned a disgraceful meanness, an indelible shame, to satisfy even a just vengeance at the expense of hospitality." § "Amongst the Shammar," says Layard, "if a man can seize the end of a string or thread, the other end of which is held by his enemy, he immediately becomes his Dakheel [or *protégé*]. If he touch the canvas of a tent, or can even throw his mace towards it, he is the Dakheel of its owner. If he can spit upon a man or touch any article belonging to him with his teeth, he is Dakhal, unless of course, in case of theft, it be the person who caught him. . . . The Shammar never plunder a caravan within sight of their encampment, for as long as a stranger can see their tents they consider him their Dakheel." || But one of the Bedouin tribes described by Lady Anne and Mr. Blunt, whilst ready to rob the stranger who comes to their tents, "count their hospitality as beginning only from the moment

* von Haxthausen, "Transcaucasia," p. 412.

† Macpherson, "Memorials of Service in India," p. 66.

‡ Robertson Smith, "Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia," p. 48. Blunt, "Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates," ii., 211.

§ Chassebœuf de Volney, *op. cit.*, i., 412.

|| Layard, "Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh," p. 317 sq. Burckhardt says ("Bedouins and Wahábys," p. 72) that one of the most common oaths in the domestic life of the Bedouins is "to take hold with one hand of the *wasat*, or middle tent-pole, and to swear 'by the life of this tent and its owners.'"

of his eating with them.”* All Bedouins regard the eating of “salt” together as a bond of mutual friendship, and there are tribes who—quite in accordance with the Moorish principle, “the food will repay you”—require to renew this bond every twenty-four hours, or after two nights and the day between them, since otherwise, as they say, “the salt is not in their stomachs,”† and can therefore no longer punish the person who breaks the contract. The “salt” which gives a claim to protection consists in eating even the smallest portion of food belonging to the protector.‡ The Sultan Saladin did not allow the crusader Renaud de Chatillon, when brought before him as a prisoner, to quench his thirst in his tent, for, had he drunk water there, the enemy would have been justified in regarding his life as safe.§ We find a similar custom among the Omaha Indians: “should an enemy appear in the lodge and receive a mouthful of food or water, or put the pipe in his mouth, he cannot be injured by any member of the tribe, as he is bound for the time being by the ties of hospitality, and they are compelled to protect him and send him home in safety.”|| In these and similar cases, where there is no common meal, the guest may nevertheless transmit to his host a curse by the exceedingly close contact established between him and the food or drink or tobacco of the host, according to the principle of *pars pro toto*. This is an idea very familiar to the primitive mind. It lies, for instance, at the bottom of the common belief that a person may bewitch his enemy by getting hold of some of his spittle or some leavings of his food—a belief which has led to the custom of guests carrying away with them all they are unable to eat of the food which is placed before them, out of dread lest the residue of their meal should be eaten by somebody

* Blunt, *op. cit.*, ii., 211.

† Burton, “Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah,” ii., 112. Doughty, “Arabia Deserta,” i., 228.

‡ Burckhardt, “Bedouins and Wahábys,” p. 187. Quatremère, “Mémoire sur les asiles chez les Arabes,” in “Mémoires de l’Institut de France, Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres,” xv., pt. ii., 346 sq.

§ Quatremère, *loc. cit.*, p. 346.

|| Dorsey, “Omaha Sociology,” in “Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.,” iii., 271.

else.* The magic wire may conduct imprecations in either direction. In Morocco, if a person gives to another some food or drink, it is considered dangerous, not only for the recipient to receive it without saying, "In the name of God," but also for the giver to give it without uttering the same formula, by way of precaution.†

The stranger thus being looked upon as a more or less dangerous individual, it is natural that those who are exposed to the danger should do what they can to avert it. With this end in view certain ceremonies are often performed immediately on his arrival. Many such reception ceremonies have been described by Dr. Frazer,‡ but I shall add a few others which for us are of particular interest as fresh illustrations, it seems, of the principle of transference in connection with hospitality. I am told by a native that among some of the nomadic Arabs of Morocco, as soon as a stranger appears in the village, some water, or, if he be a person of distinction, some milk, is presented to him. Should he refuse to partake of it, he is not allowed to go freely about, but has to stay in the village mosque. On asking for an explanation of the custom, I was told that it is a precaution against the stranger; should he steal or otherwise misbehave himself, the drink would cause his knees to swell so that he could not escape. In other words, he has drunk a conditional curse.§ The Arabs of a tribe in Nejd "welcome" a guest by pouring on his head a cup of melted butter,|| the South African Herero greet him with a vessel of

* Shortland, "Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders," pp. 86, 97. Cf. Ellis, "Tour through Hawaii," p. 347.

† Isaac also blessed his son by eating of *his* venison (Genesis, xxvii., 4, 19, 24). The subject of hospitality has been incidentally dealt with by Mr. Crawley in his interesting book, "The Mystic Rose" (p. 239 sqq.; cf., also, p. 124 sqq.). I must leave the reader to decide how far the theory I am here advocating, which mainly rests upon my researches in Morocco, coincides with his. All through his book Mr. Crawley lays much emphasis on the principle of transference; but, if I understand him rightly, he also regards commensality as involving a supposed "exchange of personality" between the host and the guest, in consequence of which "injury done to B by A is equivalent to injury done by A to himself" (p. 237). To this opinion I cannot subscribe; so far as I see, the mutual obligations arising from eating together are fundamentally based on the idea that the common meal serves as a conductor of conditional imprecations.

‡ Frazer, "Golden Bough," i., 299 sqq.

§ Cf. the "trial of jealousy" in Numbers, v., 11 sqq., particularly verse 22: "This water that causeth the curse shall go into thy bowels, to make thy belly to swell, and thy thigh to rot."

|| Burckhardt "Bedouins and Wahábys," p. 102.

milk.* Sir S. W. Baker describes a reception custom practised by the Arabs on the Abyssinian frontier, which is exactly similar to one form of *l-'ar* of the Moors:—"The usual welcome upon the arrival of a traveller, who is well received in an Arab camp, is the sacrifice of a fat sheep, that should be slaughtered at the door of his hut or tent, so that the blood flows to the threshold."† Reception sacrifices also occur among the Shulis,‡ in Liberia,§ and in Afghanistan.|| Among the Indians of North America, again, it is a common rule that a dish of food should be placed before the new-comer immediately on his arrival, that he should taste of it even though he has just arisen from a feast, and that no word should be spoken to him or no question put to him until he has partaken of the food.¶ Among the Omahas "the master of the house is evidently ill at ease until the food is prepared for eating; he will request his squaws to expedite it, and will even stir the fire himself."** Among many peoples it is considered necessary that the host should give food to his guest before he eats himself. This is a rule on which much stress is laid in the literature of ancient India.†† A Brâhmana never takes food "without having offered it duly to gods and guests."‡‡ "He who eats before his guest consumes the food, the prosperity, the issue, the cattle, the merit which his family acquired by sacrifices and charitable works."§§ It is probable that this punishment has something to do with the evil eye of the neglected guest, for the idea of eating the evil wishes of others was evidently quite familiar to the ancient Hindus. It is said in Apastamba's Aphorisms:—"A guest who is at enmity with his host shall not eat his food, nor shall he

* Ratzel, *op. cit.*, ii., 480.

† Baker, "Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia," p. 94.

‡ "Emin Pasha in Central Africa," p. 107.

§ Trumbull, "Threshold Covenant," p. 9.

|| Frazer, "Golden Bough," i., 303.

¶ Lafitau, "Moeurs des sauvages américains," ii., 88. James, "Expedition to the Rocky Mountains," i., 321 sq. Morgan, "League of the Iroquois," p. 328. Sproat, *op. cit.*, p. 57 (Ahts.).

** James, *op. cit.*, i., 322.

†† "Gautama," v., 25.

‡‡ "Mahabharata," Shanti Parva, clxxxix., 2 sq., pt. xxviii., sq., p. 281.

§§ "Apastamba," ii., 3. 7. 3.

eat the food of a host who hates him or accuses him of a crime, or of one who is suspected of a crime. For it is declared in the Veda that he who eats the food of such a person eats his guilt."* In the Tonga Islands, "at meals strangers or foreigners are always shewn a preference, and females are helped before men of the same rank"—according to our informant, "because they are the weaker sex and require attention."† As to the correctness of this explanation, however, I have some doubts; the Moors, also, at their feasts, allow the women to eat first, and one reason they give for this custom is that otherwise the hungry women might injure the men with their evil eyes. In Hawaii the host and his family do not at all partake of the entertainment with which a passing visitor is generally provided on arriving among them;‡ and that their abstinence is due to superstitious fear is all the more probable as, among the same people, it is the custom for the guest invariably to carry away with him all that remains of the entertainment.§

Among the precautions taken against the visiting stranger kind and respectful treatment is particularly of great importance. No traveller among an Arabic-speaking people can fail to notice the contrast between the lavish welcome and the plain leave-taking. The profuse greetings mean that the stranger will be treated as a friend and not as an enemy; and it is particularly desirable to secure his goodwill in the beginning, since the first glance of an evil eye is always held to be the most dangerous. We can now realise that the extreme regard shown to a guest, and the preference given to him in every matter, must, in a large measure, be due to fear of his anger, as well as to hope of his blessings. Even the peculiar custom which requires a host to lend his wife to a guest becomes more intelligible when we consider the supposed danger of the stranger's evil eye, as also the benefits which

* *Ibid.*, ii., 3. 6. 19 sq. Cf. Proverbs, xxiii., 6: "Eat not the bread of him that hath an evil eye."

† *Mariner*, *op. cit.*, ii., 154.

‡ *Ellis*, "Tour through Hawaii," p. 347.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

may be supposed to result from his love.* We can also see the reason why the duty of hospitality is of so short duration. Growing familiarity with the stranger naturally tends to dispel the superstitious dread which he inspired at first, and this, combined with the feeling that it is unfair of him to live at his host's expense longer than necessity requires, seems to account for the rapid decline of his extraordinary privileges and his title to hospitable treatment.

Connected with the custom of hospitality is, in some cases at least, the right of sanctuary—a right which prevails among peoples at very different stages of civilisation. It has been attributed to various causes. Obviously erroneous is the suggestion that places of refuge were established with a view to protecting unwilful offenders from punishment and revenge.† The restriction of the privilege of asylum to cases of accidental injuries is not at all general, and where it occurs it is obviously an innovation. Nor can we agree with those who maintain that this privilege was intended to give time for the first heat of resentment to pass over before the injured party could seek redress.‡ Neither the sense of justice nor any considerations of social utility could have given rise to an institution which, on the whole, was a source of the grossest injustice and a license to crime. The right of asylum has further been represented as a “testimony to the power of certain places to transmit their virtues to

* Egede informs us (“Description of Greenland,” p. 140) that the native women in Greenland thought themselves fortunate if an *Angekokk*, or “prophet,” honoured them with his caresses, and that some husbands even paid him for having intercourse with their wives, since they believed that the child of such a holy man could not but be happier and better than others. According to Herodotus (i., 199) every Babylonian woman was obliged once in her life to go and sit down in the precincts of Aphrodite, and there consort with a stranger; and several allusions in cuneiform literature to the sacred prostitution carried on at Babylonian temples confirm Herodotus' statement in general (Jeremias, “*Izdubar-Nimrod*,” p. 59 sq.; Jastrow, “*Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*,” p. 475 sq.). That the act was intended to ensure fertility in the woman seems probable not only from the circumstance that it was performed at the temple of the goddess of fecundity, but from the words which the stranger is said to have uttered when he threw the silver coin into her lap:—“The goddess *Mylitta* prosper thee.” Some similar belief may be held in regard to intercourse with a stranger who comes as a guest, though I can adduce no direct evidence for my supposition.

† Powell, “*Outlines of Sociology*,” in “*Saturday Lectures*,” p. 82.

‡ Pardessus, “*Loi Salique*,” p. 656. Nordström, “*Bidrag till den svenska samhällsförfattningens historia*,” ii., 401.

him who enters upon them.”* But we have no evidence whatever that the fugitive is supposed to partake of the sanctity of the place which shelters him. In Morocco, where the right of sanctuary is held extremely sacred, persons permanently attached to mosques or the shrines of saints are generally regarded as more or less holy, but this is never the case with casual visitors or suppliants; hence it is not for fear of the refugee that his pursuer refrains from laying hands on him. Professor Robertson Smith has stated part of the truth in saying that “the assertion of a man’s undoubted rights as against a fugitive at the sanctuary is regarded as an encroachment on its holiness.”† There is an almost instinctive fear of disturbing the peace in a holy place. If it is improper to commit any act of violence in the house of another man,‡ it is naturally considered no less offensive, but infinitely more dangerous, to do so in the homestead of a supernatural being. But this is only one aspect of the matter; another, equally important, still calls for an explanation. Why should the god or saint himself be so anxious to protect the criminal who has sought refuge in his sanctuary? Why does he not deliver him up to justice through his earthly representative? In Morocco, the descendants of the saint or his manager (*mkaddam*) can only by persuasion and by promising to mediate between the suppliant and his pursuer induce the former to leave the place. The saint is in exactly the same position as a man to whose house a person has fled for refuge. Among various

* Granger, “Worship of the Romans,” p. 223.

† Robertson Smith, “Religion of the Semites,” p. 148.

‡ Among the Barea and Kunáma a murderer who is able to flee into another person’s house cannot be seized, and it is considered a point of honour for the community to help him to escape abroad (Munzinger, “Ostafrikanische Studien,” p. 503). In the Pelew Islands “no enemy may be killed in a house, especially not in the presence of the host” (Kubary, in “Journal des Museum Godeffroy,” iv., 25). In Europe the privilege of asylum went hand in hand with the sanctity of the homestead (Wilda, “Strafrecht der Germanen,” pp. 242, 243, 538, 543; Nordström, op. cit., ii., 435), and the breach of a man’s peace was an offence which was proportioned to his rank. Whilst every man was entitled to peace in his own house, the great man’s peace was of more importance than the common man’s, the king’s peace was above all, and in the spiritual order the peace of the Church commanded yet greater reverence (Pollock, in “Law Quarterly,” i., 40 sq.).

peoples the house of the chief or king,* or of the priest or high-priest,† is an asylum for criminals; nobody dares to attack a man who is sheltered by so mighty a personage, and from what has been said above it is also evident why the chief or priest is anxious to protect him. By being in close contact with his host, the suppliant is able to transfer to him a dangerous curse. Sometimes a criminal can in a similar way be a danger to the king even from a distance, and must in consequence be pardoned. In Madagascar, according to Ellis, a criminal escaped punishment if he could obtain sight of the sovereign, whether before or after conviction.‡ On the Slave Coast "criminals who are doomed to death are always gagged, because if a man should speak to the king he must be pardoned."§ In Ashanti, if a criminal should succeed in swearing on the king's life, he must be pardoned, because such an oath is believed to involve danger to the king; hence knives are driven through the cheeks from opposite sides, over the tongue, to prevent him from speaking.|| So also among the Romans, according to an old Jewish writer, a person condemned to death was gagged to prevent him cursing the king.¶ Now, as a refugee may, by his curse, compel a chief or priest, or even his deadly enemy, to protect him, so he may in a similar manner constrain a god or saint as soon as he has entered his sanctuary. According to Moorish ideas, he is then in the 'ar of the saint, and the saint is bound to protect him just

* Lewin, "Hill Tracts of Chittagong," p. 100 (Kukis). Junghuhn, "Die Battaländer auf Sumatra," ii., 329 (Macassars and Bugis of Celebes). Turner, "Nineteen Years in Polynesia," p. 334 (Samoans). Jung, quoted by Kohler, "Recht der Marshallinsulaner," in "Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss.," xiv., 447 (natives of Nauru in the Marshall Group). Merker, quoted by Kohler, "Banturecht in Ostafrika," in "Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss.," xv., 55 (Wachagga). Rautanen, in Steinmetz, "Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien," p. 342 (Ondonga). Harmon, "Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America," p. 297 (Tacullies).

† Junghuhn, op. cit. ii., 329 (Macassars and Bugis of Celebes). Macdonald, "Religion and Myth," p. 177 (Kroomen).

‡ Ellis, "History of Madagascar," i., 376.

§ Ellis, "Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast," p. 224.

|| Ibid., p. 224.

¶ Quoted by Levias, in "Jewish Encyclopedia," iv., 390.

as a host is bound to protect his guest. It is not only men that have to fear the curses of dissatisfied suppliants. Aeschylus puts the following words into the mouth of Apollo, when declaring his intention to assist Orestes:—"Terrible both among men *and gods* is the wrath of a refugee, when one abandons him with intent."*

* Aeschylus, "Eumenides," 232 sqq.

DISCUSSION

SIR EDWARD BRABROOK (who had taken the Chair after Mr. Bryce's departure) SAID:

I observe that Dr. Westermarck has taken the same view which Mr. Frazer takes in the second edition of his "Golden Bough," on the essential difference that there is between magic and religion. I gather from his concluding remarks that he does not adopt the somewhat strange extension of that view which Mr. Frazer took when he put science on a similar footing to magic in relation to religion. In the first edition of that great work, Mr. Frazer held that magic was a kind of inferior part of religion, and I am almost disposed to think that his arguments in the first edition were stronger than those that converted him to the other view. In the many instances cited by Dr. Westermarck, one finds that the magical idea very soon turns almost imperceptibly to the idea of invocation; and that the idea of religion contains other elements than that of invocation. There is the ethical element which is particularly strong in regard to many magical ceremonies, invented by those who thought that it was well that persons should believe in such matters, and that such belief would incline them to take a definite line of action. For instance, in the matter of entertaining strangers, I am inclined to think that those who penned those doctrines had some idea that unless there was some sort of supernatural motive given to individuals, there would be no hospitality exercised, and the evils of anarchy and confusion and warfare would arise. There has been always, I suppose, a number of persons, even in the most savage races, who have endeavoured to impart to their ideas a particular sanctity and impressiveness by persuading themselves and others that a supernatural sanction attached to their doctrines, and from such doctrines we get both magical and religious ritual developed in due course.

MR. HOBHOUSE SAID :

I should like to thank Dr. Westermarck for the extremely lucid way in which he has put his ideas on this subject—ideas which those who have most studied the subject will most welcome for their originality and suggestiveness. I was particularly struck with his explanation of hospitality and the position of the beggar, and although there is, as I think Dr. Westermarck will agree, something of the hypothetical in this, the hypothesis is at least suggestive.

In regard to the question of the relation between magic and religion, the difficulty we have in discussing the subject is that we are almost certain to fall into what Professor James calls the psychological fallacy. We have to begin by drawing distinctions ourselves, and the difficulty is to state these distinctions without imputing them with the same clearness to primitive men. But magic and religion in primitive thought exist precisely because primitive man is not a clear-headed thinker. The conception of the soul as a vapour, a transferable thing, a thing which, as Miss Kingsley describes, the doctor will get in a box and blow into his patient's nostrils, the conception of disease as a stone or other solid object that you can put into or take out of a man, such conceptions arise from the confusion of categories between person and function, thing and relation, substance and attribute, etc. Savage man has no adequate notion of the distinction between these different things. When we come in upon his thoughts and investigate them from outside we can quite clearly and correctly state them in such terms as Dr. Westermarck's, but we are not to suppose that the distinction is drawn by primitive man himself. Thus we may distinguish the forces we call magical as those which are treated as acting in a manner which we should call mechanical ; while the phenomena of religion involve some sort of spirit. But these distinctions do not exist for primitive men with any clearness. We could not get an Australian or North American to explain that that was what he meant by the difference. He has not got the conception of the mechanical or of its antithesis to the spiritual. It is only we who, with very great difficulty, by analysing and comparing primitive customs arrive at the explanation, *ex post facto*.

The confused character of primitive thought being borne in mind, we shall be prepared to understand that there will be a sliding from one conception to another with great facility, and the whole question of the relations between magic and religion then becomes easier to handle. What is at one moment magical may seem at another to come into the category of religion. What may seem at one time a magical power acting by mechanical methods, such a thing as a curse or a blessing, may at another moment turn out after all to be something very closely akin to a spirit, and unless we are prepared for transformations of that kind, we shall not be able to understand primitive thought. Thus the Erinyes of the beggar was, we are told, originally the curse uttered by the beggar. By the time it

reached Homer it is a spirit. The influence, again, which a spirit exerts may be separated from the spirit and may even be personified itself in turn. You may remember the well-known bas-relief of Aphrodite persuading Helen to elope with Menelaus. Aphrodite is the impersonation of love. Yes, but she has become a goddess and she exercises persuasion; and Persuasion itself has become a goddess in turn and is seated in the relief, I think somewhere above Helen's head. There is absolutely no end to the possibilities of turning the stages of a process into tangible influences and these again into spirits or gods. In fact we can imagine the process of impersonation as being carried out by gradations. Thus the influences may become something tangible, acting by mechanical methods. This we call a magical conception. From this again they may pass into something definitely of the nature of a spirit, and that is the beginning of a religious conception. We may therefore readily expect to find magic and religion much intermingled in early thought, and it is difficult and perhaps hopeless to say which is the earlier. We know that most of the phenomena which Dr. Westermarck dealt with are already under the influence of religion at an early stage. He spoke, for instance, of Greek hospitality. Now we know that from the beginning of Greek literature, the rights of hospitality are under the protection of Zeus. So again, in the case of the Roman child, whether or not the curse or the spirit of the parents or ancestor was the more primitive conception we can hardly decide. In the actual form in which history presents it, it is the *divi parentum* to which the law appeals, to spirits not to curses. Undoubtedly the spirit in the form of a vengeful ghost has an influence on conduct in some of the very lowest stages of development. We may think for example of the Australian tribe who on returning from a warlike expedition, take steps to drive away the ghosts of those whom they have slain, throwing their spears at them, if I remember rightly, and so setting free the actual manslayers. Sometimes, again, a homicide is washed down or fumigated, and it is very difficult to say whether he is being cleansed of spiritual or magical influences. On the whole, then, I do not think we can say definitely that magic precedes religion as the sanction for certain kinds of conduct. Spirits whose business it is to watch over the moral order are, I doubt not, later; but angry spirits, spirits that revenge themselves, or the fear of whom will affect conduct, appear to belong to the lowest stages that we know.

MR. ADOLPH SMITH SAID :

It is difficult when we see the great array of fact brought before us by Dr. Westermarck, when we remember that the belief in magic has extended as far back as history goes, to think there is nothing in it. And assuredly modern science is showing us, that after all there is a great deal of truth, not of supernatural truth, but of natural truth, in what roughly speaking is called magic. Dr. Westermarck has spoken of the parental

curse. Here is a scientific example of the parental curse. I take it from the records of a Paris hospital. There comes a young woman. She says her leg is paralysed. Ordinary symptoms of paralysis are not recognised, but she cannot move her leg. This young woman is hypnotised and suggestion is made. She is awakened and found to be no longer paralysed. She walks away and is apparently cured. A week or fortnight later her arm is paralysed. She is hypnotised again and goes home rejoicing. A few weeks later her hand or neck goes wrong. Thereupon, the doctors begin to think that this is a normal state. When she is hypnotised she is questioned and made to relate her past history. It turns out that this young woman is a daughter of a village sorcerer. When she fell in love with a young man and went off and left her father, her father cursed them. And the daughter, impressed with her father's power as a sorcerer, knowing the many acts of witchcraft which he had performed, goes away with her father's curse upon her, and the feeling that something would happen to her and thereupon she falls ill. Then said the doctors, we have got to do with a case of witchcraft or magic. Thereupon this girl was hypnotised and asked to give a description of the appearance of her father, and it was discovered that there was in the hospital a bottlewasher of like physical appearance with her father. He was got up to personate the father. The girl gets into a fright. The doctors interfere. The supposed father relents and removes the curse, and then the girl is awakened cured, and after that she never returned to the hospital. Well, now, that opens a great problem, as to how far magic acts through auto-suggestion. In the example I have placed before you, one would say that this girl suffered wholly through auto-suggestion. But is there not something more than that? It is possibly the case that a person can produce these phenomena upon themselves, but is it possible for a person by telepathy or demoniac force to produce them on some other person? Is the human mind of one individual capable of influencing some other individual, so that the beggar's wish can affect you by his thought. Magic is, I think, a fact, a purely natural fact. It is not supernatural—it is an aspect of psychic reaction between one man and another.

DR. WESTERMARCK'S REPLY.

Dr. Westermarck, replying to a vote of thanks, said it was obvious that in a short paper he could only give an outline of so vast a subject as he had dealt with, and this was especially so in respect of the relation between magic and religion. What he had given in his paper was really conclusions at which he had arrived from many more facts than he could present in the paper.

SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS

ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS.

By Professor HÖFFDING.

Read before the Sociological Society at a Meeting in the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), on the 11th November, 1904, Mr. L. T. HOBHOUSE in the chair.

1. The task of Sociology is to study social life in all its manifold forms of manifestation. Ethical ideals and ethical endeavours, therefore, are objects of sociological research. They are working factors in social development, while they are themselves effects and symptoms of social condition, results of social development.

They have their roots in the inner world of individuals, but this inner world itself is not indifferent for sociology, which traces the interaction of individuals and society in all its finest ramifications. The inner world does not develop itself independently of the outer. Social conditions determine directly or indirectly that which the individual conscience adopts as ideal or as true. Very often the character and the direction of ethical life is determined by physiological or social heredity. And even the fact that individual initiative is at work sets no definite limit to sociological research, any more than biology gives up the right to investigate the organic variations which are the prerequisites of all natural selection.

From this point of view, sociology is a more comprehensive science than ethics, which is a more special and limited science. Sociology stands in a similar relation to ethics as does psychology. Ethical ideals and endeavours are not only sociological, but also psychological phenomena; they are, therefore, objects for psychology as well as for sociology, and psychology is, in its turn, a more comprehensive science than ethics.

2. Sociology is not only more comprehensive than ethics, it is also a necessary foundation for ethics. The ethically right must be sociologically possible, must be consistent with the conditions and laws of social development. Ethics is not a system of castles in the air, but a doctrine of the means and ways for developing human life, individual and social, to greater richness and to greater harmony. Ethics ought, then, to be founded on a study of the nature and the conditions of the actual social development. Only with the help of this study can new values be discovered and old values maintained.

Since ethics is dependent on sociology, it follows that it cannot be the same at all times, but must vary as its historical foundation varies under different historical conditions. Ideals and motives, aims and means, must be different. The historical development may lead to ethical turning-points or to ethical dilemmas, even though it is following its own natural laws without any breach of continuity. There may be ethical discontinuity, though there is sociological continuity. I will give some examples:—

Very often ethical development consists in this only, that what has been done involuntarily, or even unconsciously, under the influence of social heredity, is afterwards done with clear consciousness or as a result of deliberate choice. Aristotle says that involuntary working precedes voluntary and conscious working. It is, he says, by playing on the zither that we become good players, and it is by acting justly that we become just: in this way the young are through education and tuition introduced to ways of acting and thinking, which later on can be followed out with consciousness and free

choice. When the time of involuntary imitation and exercise is over, it remains to be seen whether the same direction will be followed with full consciousness. But even if the young generation breaks off and adopts quite other ideals and endeavours, yet the first direction remains of great influence, both directly, as an element, and indirectly through an effect of contrast. The sociological continuity is not broken, though new ideals and aims are acknowledged. The Aristotelian principle (so I name the law here spoken of) shows us a deeper connection, while from an ethical point of view there only seems to be disharmony and opposition.

But social development may also in a more positive way be the condition for ethical development. A thing which at first only had value as a means, may later on acquire immediate value—value as an end in itself. Social conditions make certain actions necessary, which the individual would not undertake if they were not favourable to his own interests; for instance, he must respect the liberty of others, if he will have his own liberty respected. But later on he may adopt as his immediate end the liberty of all. There is here going on what I will call a subjective transformation of value. What is value at first as a means has become value as an end. An objective transformation of value is going on when an end is so closely connected with the whole order of things that it cannot be isolated. The original end may then become a means to the acknowledgment of greater and higher ends, and perhaps it may itself be swallowed up by them. The new ends may be connected with the original ends either by similarity or by a causal relation, or by mere propinquity.

This concatenation of means with ends and of ends with other ends is, in a great measure, due to the social life and its institutions. By means of these, the individual who wills something is drawn into a great process through which a whole series of transformations may arise. When such a transformation has taken place, ethical ideals and aims are not the same as before. New ethical formations have been produced through the continual social processes. It is the task of

sociology to show us the conditions to which these transformations are due, and it is the task of ethics to give form to the new ideals and discover the near paths. Ethics has to develop the consequences of the new standpoint. All ethics has, so far, an empirical character. Every step of evolution has its own ethics, and the ethics of one period cannot be deduced from that of the preceding one without knowledge of the whole intermediate social and physical evolution.

The relation of sociology to ethics is here again similar to the relation of psychology to ethics. The ethically right must be psychologically possible, and there may be psychological continuity, though from an ethical point of view it must be admitted that a new movement has been initiated.

3. Though ethics is more specialised than sociology, and though it is in essential points dependent on sociology, yet it is an independent science. This independency manifests itself in the fact that social data, the results of historical development, are the objects for ethical valuation. In ethics, these data and results are examined in their relation to an ideal, a standard, and their value depends on their harmonic or inharmonic relation to this ideal. The main difficulty of all ethics consists in the establishment of the ideal which is to give the standard of valuation. The great struggle between ethical systems concerns this establishment. Ethics has here problems which sociology as such—as a purely descriptive and causal science—does not know. Sociology looks backward to discover the course and the laws of social evolution. Sociology comes after reality. A social process must be to a certain degree finished before its law can be determined. We may say of sociology what Hegel has said, unjustly, of philosophy in general, that the bird of Athene first begins its flight in the twilight, when the labours and the struggles of the day are over. But in ethical thought the goddess herself appears on the field of battle. She does not forget what her bird has told her of the struggles and labours of former times, but she applies this knowledge in waging her war with the wisdom which becomes her divinity.

Historical data are the foundation on which ethical

development is based. But in what manner and in what direction is this development, this conscious continuation of history, to proceed? That is the question. Here individual stands up against individual, individual against society, society against individual, and society against society. We have here all the four sorts of war which Grotius long ago distinguished. Ethical valuation must always be the work of individuals who start from certain definite social and mental presuppositions. How then can a universal ideal be formed, and how can a universal standard be set up? Here we have the real sting of the ethical problem. It is the greatest war in history, which here is carried on in the quiet world of thought. This war has also interest for the sociologist; but he is here only a spectator. The moral philosopher takes his place in the battle itself. The sociologist examines what is going on, and how it is going on; but the moral philosopher asks on which side the highest value is to be found, and how we can get a standard to test this value. The moral philosopher can as little set himself above sociological laws as the agriculturalist can set himself above chemical laws. But as the agriculturalist can make use of chemical laws in order to make the earth produce the profit he looks for, so the moral philosopher asks how we can make use of the sociological laws in order to produce ethically valuable results.

The independency of ethics manifests itself in the selection of ends and means within the manifold possibilities which sociology presents. The farther we advance on our way from sociology to ethics, the more the field of possibilities becomes narrowed. There are more possibilities in the marble block than the sculptor can actualise.

The relation of sociology to ethics is here again similar to the relation of psychology to ethics. Psychological possibilities present to ethics the same problem as was presented to it by the sociological possibilities. In both respects the great art is to find the differentiating principle.

4. Not only is there a difference between sociology and ethics, but there may be a sharp contrast between them, and it is important to lay stress on this contrast; the contrast

between valuation on the one side, description and explanation on the other side.

If we efface the distinction between the sociological and the ethical point of view, we are led either to regard the results of development as such as ideally right, or to suppose that the ideally right as such must have an existence. In the first case we abate the ethical claim; in the second we give an idealistic misinterpretation of the real. In the first place sociology masters ethics, in the second ethics masters sociology.

But this contrast can be acknowledged and maintained without forgetting how intimately sociology and ethics are connected. Sociology leads us on to ethics by the application of the comparative method. The comparison of social forms or social states naturally leads us to characterise some as "higher," others as "lower." This is a valuation; hence a certain standard is necessarily presupposed. We call a form of society higher than another if it, more than this other, makes it possible to attain two ends at once, namely, the free and rich development of individual peculiarities and differences, and the realisation of unity and totality in social life. From a sociological point of view, a society is the higher the more different forms and directions it manifests, if at the same time the society as such increases in solidarity and concentration. In sociology, as in biology, the standard is this: the intimate connection of differentiation and concentration. This has led to a comparison between society and an organism, and great scientific profit has been expected from this comparison.

This analogy is certainly of great importance. There is a similarity in the standard presupposed when we call organisms higher or lower, and we may call societies higher and lower. Every science, whose objects present both unity and multiplicity, must, in its comparisons, make use of such a standard as sociology and biology exhibit. So is it, for instance, also with psychology. We call a personal life "high" if it exhibits at once a richness of endeavour, emotion and ideas, and a firm and concentrated character; we call it "low" if it is poor and incoherent. The task of biology, psychology and sociology is only description and explanation

of facts. Comparison and comparative methods are here only methodological means. If comparison presupposes a standard, and if a standard can be constructed as an ideal, so that beings or species are called higher or lower according to their relation to an ideal end, this teleological manner of view is only a working hypothesis. We understand organic, psychical and social life better, if we ask what a perfect form of life should presuppose.

But in ethics this manner of view has not merely methodological value. Here the standards and the ideals have also a positive and practical significance. The most intimate connection between unity and multiplicity in the life of the single individual, and in the life of society, is in ethics an end which ought to be reached; and it is the task of ethics to find means and ways which can make an approximation to this end possible. The highest aim of social ethics would be an empire of humanity in which there is the greatest possible multiplicity in the development of personal life and, even by this very means, the greatest intimate union of personal beings. If the single individual, in developing itself in its own peculiar way, gives the best possible contribution to the whole life of society, and if, on the other side, society is organised in such a manner that a full and free development is possible for all individuals, then we are approaching to the ethical ideal. Ethical imperatives are only logical and psychological consequences of the acknowledgment of this ideal.

The so-called social problem is also an ethical problem, and this gives it its own particular sting. A social problem arises when multiplicity—by progressing division of labour, for instance—prevails in such a degree that individuals are isolated and subjected to a one-sided and mechanical development, or when concentration prevails to such a degree that the free development of individuals is checked. There would not be any sting in this problem if our ideal did not claim that every man shall be treated not only as a means, or as a part of a machine, but also always as an end in himself. If this ethical principle is not presupposed, social factors may cer-

tainly be very interesting objects for science, but such science will be sociology, not ethics. There may be a great intellectual interest in watching how inharmonious states develop, and what effects they produce; but this interest is not an ethical interest, though it may be of great importance from an ethical point of view that there is such an interest.

5. I have already said that the difference between ethics and sociology cannot be said to consist in the fact that ethics has for its object the development of single individuals, sociology that of society. There is nothing in the life of individuals which may not be of interest for sociology; and on the other hand, ethics is not only individual, but also social. But it cannot be denied that the point of view of ethics causes it to accentuate—in a higher degree than sociology has occasion to do—that which is going on in the inner world of individual consciousness. Even if a system of ethics maintains the social point of view, the point of view of society or species, as the foundation on which it builds in valuing human acts and institutions, it cannot forget that society and species consist of individuals, and that the welfare of society or species is the welfare of these individuals. Only in the consciousness of individuals can the value of life be experienced. The concepts of society and of species do not therefore lose their importance in ethics. The importance of these concepts is similar to the importance of the conception of potential energy in physics. They connote conditions and possibilities for the unfolding of human life, which are vaster and more comprehensive than the horizon of any individual—forms and germs of life by which many generations can profit. They contain the heredity of the past, organised results of the experiences of former generations, and at the same time dispositions and possibilities for the future. They are that which persists and continues, in opposition to the shifting interests of single individuals, groups and generations. These potential values can only be actualised when they are appropriated and worked out by particular individuals.

Not all ethical theories give this point of view its full right. For Hegel, the main point was what he called “the

ethical substance" which works itself out in the different forms and stages of society, most typically in the state. In comparison with this social substance, the existence of the single individual is indifferent. The perfection of the individuals is to live and breathe in the great whole of society; but for Hegel the essential in the ethical world is something which transcends the consciousness of any single individual. Though Wilhelm Wundt accentuates the importance of individual will more than Hegel, a similar view is found in his ethics. For Wundt, "the total will," *die gesammte Wille*, which manifests itself in the existence of society, is the mightiest of all facts. It is imperishable, and it is always right. The single individuals are perishable; with all their endeavour and all their capacity for happiness, they are only drops in the ocean!

Such theories overvalue potentiality at the expense of actuality. It is true that actuality always lives on potentiality, and that individuals live and work in virtue of social conditions. But that potentiality exists is only known from the fact that it can be transformed into actuality, and on this depends its value. The value of what Hegel calls "social substance" or what Wundt calls "total will" consists in its power to support and nourish a rich personal life in great groups of individuals; and only through the study of what is going on in each group is the construction of this concept possible.

For Wundt and Hegel, sociology and ethics are ultimately identical—a consequence of the absolute subordination of the individual point of view to the social. The same may be said of Auguste Comte in the first period of his philosophising. In his "Cours de Philosophie Positive," he did not regard ethics as an independent science which has its special place in the series of the sciences; ethical ideas are here to be found partly in the biological, partly in the sociological chapters of his work. But in Comte's later time he regarded ethics as an independent science, the seventh and last in the series of the fundamental sciences. The principle on which Comte arranged the sciences in a series was, that the following

science shall be always more concrete in its object and more inductive in its method than the preceding one. When, then, in his later work he puts ethics after sociology, he presupposes that ethics is the more concrete and inductive science of the two. Now Comte's reason for this view is, that in sociology the individual motives and tendencies neutralise one and another—it is the average results which are of sociological importance; but in ethics the character and the *tendency* of the inner life, and the individual realities in their multiplicity, have the first place.

I do not myself believe that Comte deduced all the consequences of the position which he finally assigned to ethics, nor that he gave a complete concept of the relation between the individual and the social points of view in ethics; but he points in the right direction. It is the strength, but it is also the weakness of ethics, that it is the most concrete of all sciences. It stands almost at the boundary between science and art.

To conduct life ethically is the greatest of all art. And, like all art, it develops itself spontaneously. All that theory can do at first is to learn from this spontaneous development, to find its moving forces, and to formulate the thoughts which it presupposes. Later on the art can be exercised with greater consciousness, and there can be an interaction between thought and life. And such an interaction cannot be established if ethics does not—the differences in point of view and in methods notwithstanding—remain in indebtedness both to sociology and to psychology.

DISCUSSION

The Chairman (MR. L. T. HOBHOUSE), in opening the discussion, said :

At previous meetings we have had some discussion of the relation of sociology to other sciences, and particularly to biology. The questions then raised were, I think, simple as compared with that which Professor Höfding has handled with such care and elaboration, and so much judgment. It is hardly to be supposed that we should all agree on a subject bristling with so many difficulties, and approachable from so many points of view, but we can recognise in the paper a very valuable contribution to a difficult subject. It may be said by some people that there ought not to be so much difficulty. It may be said that the two points of view—the sociological and the ethical—are fundamentally opposed to one another; that sociology has to do with what is and has been, and that ethics has to do with what ought to be; and it does not require much experience of life to know that what ought to be is very seldom the same as what is. But while these things may be very distinct, nevertheless, in the actual treatment of the social sciences, there is a constant tendency to make that very confusion. I take, for instance, the sad history of economics, in which for seventy years past there has been a constant question as to how far ethical questions ought to be introduced. We get constant protests from economists, that they are only telling us what are the consequences of certain events—the effects produced by certain conditions—that they are not wishing to express any moral judgment on these effects. But, such is human frailty, they have never been able to refrain from preaching tacitly, even if they were not preaching consciously. It is impossible to avoid, in the teaching of a social subject, the use of eulogistic or dyslogistic terms. To take a

very simple instance, you will recollect that some economists in explaining the genesis of interest referred it to the wages of abstinence, which a person received as a reward for accumulating his capital. You can understand at once that critics of that view pounced upon the conception of "wages" and "abstinence," and said you are in effect giving a moral justification for the nature of interest which, according to your own account, should be entirely absent from your mind. And, on the whole, I think the criticism on that point may have been justified. In any case, the illustration may serve to show how difficult it is to keep from ethical judgments in dealing with sociological questions. Surely, it is far better we should be conscious of this difficulty, and take questions of ethics into account openly—instead of doing it unconsciously—and apportion to them the share which we deliberately judge they ought to have.

There is a further point. Ethics ought legitimately to come into sociology at a certain stage. For if we treat sociology as an investigation into human development, the supreme question will be, what is the tendency of that development? Is there a lower and a higher in it? Is evolution a process making for the betterment, perfection and happiness of mankind, or a mere grinding out of the mechanical mill of existence of forms of life, one no better than another, the outcome of blind forces, and destitute of any characteristics which can fill us with hope for the future of society? That question is always before us. It must always be in the back of our minds, if not in the front of our minds. But before we can answer or even ask this question in a scientific spirit, we must know what we mean by higher and lower; and for this purpose we must have a philosophically thought-out standard of value, as a test by which we can appraise the different stages of evolution. In that sense, then, I fully agree with the view in Professor Höffding's paper that ethics is necessary to sociology.

I equally agree with the converse truth that sociology is necessary to ethics, in other words, that you cannot as a moral philosopher philosophise in the air. I remember many years ago being derided by a friend for studying certain branches of physical science as a preliminary to the study of philosophy. My friend's view was that a philosopher was a man who sat down at a table with a pencil and a piece of paper, and forthwith wrote out what must be. He was to work it all out in the inside of his head and say that it must be so. But working on that method you have not really got in touch with the actual facts of human life. You must know that the things you ought to do are the things you

can do. It is no use telling people they ought all to be eight feet high. While you might preach that with great enthusiasm, no one could make himself one inch the higher. But there have been moral and social ideals preached with great earnestness which have not much more relation to his experience and the capacities of mankind than the ideal of adding a cubit to the human stature. The ideal then must not stand out of relation to experience. On the contrary, we ought not only to have the ordinary experiences of our own individual life to go upon when we think out questions of value, but we ought to have the whole wealth of that experience which sociology can lay before us. The richer the experience which the philosopher has before him, the more likely are his reflections to correspond to reality and give workable results.

I have only one word of comment to make on Professor Höffding's paper. I am not quite sure as to whether it is a word of criticism or not. I gather that he would agree with me that ethics, though closely related to sociology, is nevertheless independent of sociology. It is not to be regarded as a department of that science; but even in regard to the use of the term science in ethics, I think some cavil might be made. We may deal with ethical questions on scientific grounds, but ethics I take to be of the nature of philosophy—an inquiry into ideals and what ought to be. Such an inquiry must have the richest possible experience as its basis. At the same time, it is different from a science in this way, that it examines the principles which the sciences assume. Such science works with principles which it does not test and of which it is not always even fully conscious. The object of philosophy is to dig out their principles and hold them up to the light, and it is only when this is done that we get that seasoned standard of value which we desire. I should therefore distinguish philosophy from science, and hold ethics a branch of philosophy. With that exception, I think I am in general agreement with the interesting and valuable paper to which we have just listened.

DR, J. H. BRIDGES SAID :

Let me first express my great gratitude to Professor Höffding for his most luminous and valuable paper. Many of the thoughts it contains will be common to many of us; some will be new to some of us. On the whole, I should wish to express my concurrence with very much of the paper, so far as I have been able to follow it. With regard to the question that has

been raised as to what there is in common between ethics and sociology, it would seem on the face of it that the idea of regarding ethics separately from sociology would be like an attempt to write a treatise on algebra in which arithmetic would have no place. The two are inseparable. The simplest definition of ethics is—a consideration of the way in which the individual reacts upon his social surroundings. Every individual finds existing around him a social standard which he may either fall short of, or with which he may accurately comply, or which finally he may surpass. In the first case, he is regarded as an average man, with neither blame nor praise. In the second, he incurs blame. And in the third, he will, ultimately, be regarded with praise. Ethics therefore presupposes a social organism by and through which the individual lives and grows, on which he acts, or may act, beneficially, adding something that was not there before. He has a certain margin of free action upon that society. This is true whatever type of social life we may choose to consider. Suppose a savage in the most primitive condition; or suppose in the second place an inhabitant of a mediæval town with a town to defend, with a guild to stand by, and a church to which he owes obedience. Or suppose, in the third place, a member of an ideal republic, such as we may picture to ourselves as existing in the future, living in the time when the world will have peace. In all these three cases, the standard of ethics is widely different. In each there are definite rules of life; and in each there is a free margin of action—the domain of free human conduct, the domain of character. Ethics therefore presupposes sociology. Side by side with the judgment of conduct, must go judgment of the social organism in which conduct takes place. There is a correspondence—though not always easy to disentangle—between the ethical system and the social system. The ethical system of primitive man corresponds in its larger features with the system of tribal organisation. The ethical system of fully developed man, as we picture him to ourselves in the future, implies membership of a family, implies a community of families forming a nation, implies a community of nations holding peaceful intercourse under the supreme community of a progressive humanity. We best see the connection between ethics and sociology by taking imperfect types of sociology, and all types hitherto have been obviously extremely imperfect. So long as humanity is divided against itself (to use Mr. Spencer's language), we have two systems of contradictory ethics—the ethics of enmity and the ethics of amity. From the times of the Stoics and the early Christians, that is for 2000 years, we have had these two standards of right and wrong before us. Thou shalt hate thine enemy; thou shalt love thine enemy. These are the two codes—the Sermon on the Mount, and the code taught to all our school-boys at public schools, and advocated in most of our newspapers. This implies a fundamental imperfection in our sociology. Tolstoi accentuates the divergence of these two codes in the strongest

possible manner, by holding out as the highest ethical virtue the duty of absolutely refusing to fight for your country. In any case, this divergence of the two standards indicates radical imperfection in our social system, the gradual removal of which would appear to be the principal constituent of Progress in any true sense of that word. One of the most pressing problems of ethics would seem to be the concentration of such action of the individual on the society to which he belongs as shall tend to this result. In other words, our large department of ethics would seem to consist in efforts to bring about the peaceful intercourse of nations by steadfast resistance to what is commonly known as Imperialism.

Coming to the concluding part of Professor Höffding's discourse, I wish to express my concurrence in his view that ethics lies on the borderland between art and science. Each step of ethical progress is a reaction of the individual on the social environment around him. It implies a free spontaneous action. It implies something creative, something inspired; as when the Hebrew prophets in the eighth century before Christ rose above the narrow ritual of their tribal god to a vision of justice and pity. Ethical inspiration, as I conceive it, must always be guided by the laws of sociology—must be in accordance with them; but must always transcend them, just as the genius of the musical composer transcends the laws of counterpoint, while recognising their validity.

We come here to the region of the thought which Sociology and Ethics occupy in common. The study of the formation of character, the inquiry how social institutions act on the individual, the whole department of inherited attributes known to us as Eugenics, the whole business of the education of the man or woman from birth, or from before birth, till old age; this is at once the highest branch of sociology, and may be taken as a point of departure for ethics. At any rate, it is matter for scientific treatment. When we come to the reaction of the individual on society, we find ourselves in a different region. Science is not dumb here; but it has less to say to us than imagination inspired by love. To follow with due humility in the track of Dante's pilgrimage, we might say that Virgil recedes into the background and Beatrice becomes the guide. Ethics cannot dispense with science; it will need it more and more. But in its highest sense, the conduct of life is not a science, but an art. It is not a problem, but a poem.

DR. WESTERMARCK SAID :

It is with the greatest interest I have listened to Professor Höffding's admirable paper; and if I have anything to add for my own part, the reason is that the terms sociology and ethics allow of different interpretations. Some writers apply the word sociology to the widest generalisations

of social phenomena ; whereas, according to others, the scientific treatment of any social phenomenon falls within the scope of sociology. To this latter opinion I thoroughly subscribe. I define sociology as the science of social phenomena ; and by a social phenomenon I understand a mode of conduct which is related to an association of individuals—either joint acts of associates, or conduct towards an associate or associates. What then is ethics? I believe that ethics, as a science, can only be the study of the moral consciousness as a fact. Normative ethics, which lays down rules for conduct, is not a science. The aim of every science is to discover some truth, and an ethical norm can be neither true nor false. It has been said that moral principles cannot be proved, because they are first principles used to demonstrate everything else ; but I believe that the real cause for the impossibility of proving moral principles is that all ethical concepts are ultimately based on emotions of either approval or disapproval. The concepts of wrongness, rightness, duty, justice, goodness, virtue, merit, and so forth, refer to generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth a moral emotion. It may be true or not that a given mode of conduct has a tendency to evoke in us a certain emotion, but the contents of an emotion fall entirely outside the category of truth. Now, moral feelings and ideas express themselves through the medium of conduct which has reference to associates ; in other words, the modes of conduct which form the subject-matter of sociology are to a large extent expressions of feelings and ideas which form the subject-matter of scientific ethics. The science of ethics is therefore practically a part of sociology. It deals with the feelings and ideas underlying certain modes of conduct, whilst sociology deals with the modes of conduct which spring from those feelings and ideas. The relation between sociology and normative ethics is of course a very different one. As normative ethics is no science at all, it cannot form part of sociology, which is a science. However, in laying down its rules for conduct, normative ethics must consider the results at which sociology has arrived ; but this point has already been so admirably treated by Professor Höffding, that I have nothing to add. Another question is how far normative ethics should exercise an influence on sociology. I think that this influence ought to be as small as possible. The sociologist must never forget that his business is, not to pass moral judgments on social facts, but to study those facts as they are.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATION

FROM H. OSMAN NEWLAND.

The relation of Sociology to Ethics must depend upon our conception of the functions of each of those sciences. Apart from those who deny the claims of one or both to be placed in the category of the sciences, we have to recognise that there remains considerable divergence of opinion as to their particular functions, a divergence which this paper and the discussion it provokes should bridge, if not dispel.

If sociology be—as I understand it—that science which is to co-ordinate all the sciences, and deduce from the various investigations of each new laws which shall be applicable to every known form of human society, then, the relation of ethics to sociology is clear, viz. : that of the part to the whole. The one is a branch of the other. If, however, we are to regard ethics as something more than the art of improving individual character—such I conceive to be its purpose—if, in short, we distinguish it from sociology by contrasting the two as the science of *what ought to be* and the science of *what is*, then the relation between them is by no means so certain. The field of sociology is limited; and ethics, although it may claim to be a science distinct from, or in advance or in continuation of sociology, is likely to become once more the handmaiden of metaphysics.

Limit sociology as we may, under such circumstances there remains at least one broad distinction which separates the ethicist and the sociologist. To the former, the stagnant or peculiar community, the depraved, the unsound, or the unusual (I use the word in preference to “unnatural”) individual, exist but for the purpose of pointing a moral. Only by the most extraordinary device could these be given a place in the society *which ought to be*; and, in the art of improving individual character, it is best that they should remain an unknown, or at least a neglected quantity. To the sociologist, however, the evil and the unusual in individuals and in societies are just as interesting and quite as fruitful a study as the normal and good. Sociology cannot afford to neglect the most insignificant, fanciful, or extravagant form of society; nor must it scorn to examine the most abnormal or reprehensible form of conduct which ethics spurns and

psychology too often fears to investigate. This is the certain function of sociology and its relation to ethics, if it be merely the science of *what is*. If, however, it be the science of sciences, the greatest part of this work will be done by pathology and psychology, inspired by the new co-ordinator; and the sociologist *per se* will have but to examine the evidence and conclusions of the specialists, apart from all ethical, religious, or sentimental bias, with a view to establish solely the scientific relations which such forms of conduct or society bear to social utilities or social possibilities.

PROFESSOR HÖFFDING'S REPLY.

Professor Höffding, in reply, said :—I give my thanks to the gentlemen who have expressed themselves so kindly on my paper. It is a very difficult question, that of the relation between ethics and sociology. It is many-sided. It is not quite easy to find a rather short expression to characterise it. Among the remarks put forth here, there is one which I regard as a most important one. It is the question of ethics as a science. It came from the Chairman in this form—Is ethics philosophy or science? It came insistently in Dr. Westermarck's remarks. He would conceive ethics only as a department of sociology. I have not in my paper given my whole conception of ethical principles, or a scientific foundation for them. We have no one ethical system to which we can refer and say—This is true ethics, or those acts are not ethical. We have no science of ethics in the same sense as we have a science of mathematics or physics. There are still discussions going on as to how we come to the first principles in ethics. Dr. Westermarck said that all science is about facts, about something which exists and which we try to describe and explain, but I cannot see that there should be anything unscientific in an essay to develop the sequences of certain ideals, or aims, or motives, when these ideals, or aims, or motives are psychological and historical realities. That there are different ideals and aims at work, is a difficulty, not only for my view, but also for Dr. Westermarck's. I should think that Dr. Westermarck would find himself in some difficulty if he says—

This is a moral consciousness. There are many moral consciousnesses at different times and at the same time. In our own time there are very different and opposing moral consciousnesses. We have an example in the differences between Tolstoi and his antagonists. Can a sociologist take one single form, one special determined form and say—This is the true moral consciousness? Here the problem comes in again. It is not to be put aside, and on this point there will always be a certain independency for ethics. There was a question about teleology, which, so far as I understood it, was this: How can we say that the teleological point of view has another importance in ethics than in sociology? I touched on the point in my paper because it is a very good means of casting light on the relation between sociology and ethics. Sociology is a science which only describes and explains facts. It ought therefore to follow the same methods as natural science, and sociology, as such, cannot know anything about aims, and ends, and ideals. If a sociologist makes use of an end, or an aim, he does so only methodologically. If the biologist supposes there are certain aims which an organism shall serve, that is a method for scientific study; but biology cannot tell us why organisms are in the world. In ethics we begin with aims and ends as psychological realities. There are aims after which we are striving, and if in their pursuit we attain a certain knowledge of means and ways, we cannot, without contradicting ourselves, abstain from following the rules of action in doing, thinking, and feeling, which are consequences of this knowledge. Socrates, the founder of ethics, applied this method.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

SOME GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

By Dr. J. H. BRIDGES.

Read before a meeting of the Sociological Society held at the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Clare Market, W.C., on Thursday, 11th May, 1905, Mr. L. T. HOBHOUSE in the Chair.

My purpose in introducing this subject is not that I should bring it before you as a set of complete dogmas; on the contrary, I wish to bring it before this Society as an object of study, for which there is a mass, not merely of detailed information, but of principles which are not yet fully worked out, and which will progress exactly in the same way as those of the other sciences, physical or biological, in the course of the next hundred or two hundred years. I use the expression "Philosophy of History" as the equivalent of the expression social dynamic, as opposed to social static. And I begin, for the sake of clearness, by quoting Stuart Mill's definition of these two branches of research, as given in the tenth chapter of the sixth book of his "System of Logic" (p. 501, 3rd ed.)—"Social dynamics is the theory of society considered in a state of progressive movement, while social statics is the theory of the consensus . . . as existing among the different parts of the social organism; in other words, the theory of

the mutual actions and reactions of contemporaneous social phenomena; making provisionally, as far as possible, abstraction for scientific purposes of the fundamental movement which is at all times gradually modifying the whole of them."

Though for the purposes of abstract theory these two aspects of sociology must be looked at separately, yet they have in practice to be used in combination. "We have to combine," I again quote from Mill, "the statical view of social phenomena with the dynamical, considering not only the progressive changes of the different elements, but the contemporaneous condition of each, and thus obtain empirically the law of correspondence not only between the simultaneous states, but between the simultaneous changes of those elements."

He thus proceeds to point out that we are much helped in this difficult process of observation and comparison by the fact that there is one element in the complex existence of social man pre-eminent over all others as the prime agent of the social movements. That element is the state of the speculative faculties of mankind, including their beliefs concerning themselves and the world by which they are surrounded. To speak of man's speculative faculties as the most influential agent of social movement seems at first sight a paradox. Of all the functions of the brain, the intellectual functions are intrinsically the feeblest. Speculative processes appear to hold a very secondary place in the lives of the mass of mankind. Affections, practical activities, fill a far larger place in each man's individual life; are more continuous and more strenuous. Yet the paradox is soon resolved. Though men may not desire knowledge yet they desire the gain, fame, comfort and power which knowledge may bring. And passing from individual to collective life, the case is much stronger. Men are united by common convictions and beliefs. Thinking together, they act together; acting together, they are stirred by the same emotions. The word of command issuing from a single source spreads from general to officer, from officer to men; and thus determines the explosion of gigantic social forces. So it is that in a philosophy of history we have to consider, first of all, the changes in the opinions and modes of thinking of society.

Mill admits, of course, as every one must admit, that the speculative element does not stand alone as the initiator of social change. There is action and reaction. But on the whole, at each successive period, he thinks it may be shown that the social change was mainly an emanation, not from the practical life of the period, but from the previous state of belief and thought. The order of human progression in all respects will mainly, or at least very largely, depend on the order of progression in the intellectual convictions of mankind, that is on the law of the successive transformations of human opinion.

Supposing this to be granted, the question remains: Can this law be determined?

Mill gives a qualified approval to Comte's well-known law of the stages through which all our conceptions tend to pass; observing that it has that "high degree of scientific evidence which is derived from the concurrence of the indications of history with the probabilities derived from the constitution of the human mind." He further remarks that it sheds a flood of light upon the whole course of history, by connecting these three states, and the modifications of each of them with the correlative condition of the social phenomena. Briefly stated, the law is that man's views of the world in which he lives begin with anthropomorphic fictions and end with scientific laws; begin with explanations of external nature, or of such parts of it as interest him, based on attribution to it of the passions and affections of which he is conscious within himself, and end ultimately by studying the natural order according to which the processes of the world go on. Of the various intermediate stages of this evolution we need not speak at present. Nor need we discuss whether the first insight into this law was due to Vico, to Hume, or to Turgot. It is enough that overwhelming evidence has been accumulating in its favour since the time when Mill wrote of it.

I have spoken of the distinction between social static and social dynamic. We must bear in mind that the second, though it has to be looked at and studied separately, is yet entirely dependent on the first. Progress is the development

of order. Each of these two departments of the science brings into prominence special methods of its own. Much has been said of the importance of classification as a method of sociological research. Our secretary has already called attention to an important paper by Steinmetz in the third volume of Durkheim's *Année Sociologique*, in which many systems of classifying human societies are set forth. The vast subject of anthropology, for instance, restricting this word in accordance with present usage to the study of primitive man, can but be studied in this way. Such classification, proceeding on the plan of grouping objects according to their natural affinities, is like that of the botanist or zoologist, in two, or indeed three dimensions.

I allude to it only for the purpose of emphasising the point that social dynamic—the philosophy of history—studying filiation; that is to say, the mode in which each generation follows from the preceding has to follow a somewhat different course. Studying continuity, we have to limit ourselves to the field where a continuous historic record is to be found.

At first sight it might seem that there were several such fields, and that much might be gained by comparing them. There is the history of India, the history of China, the history of Egypt, of Babylon and Assyria; these last now in the very act of revelation by the researches of the last half century. No member of a sociological society can seek to underestimate the far-reaching significance of these and similar researches. As affecting our judgment of the initial stages of historical evolution, they are of the greatest moment. Nevertheless, to the problem immediately before us, the study of social continuity, they can only be of subsidiary importance. For in these cases either there are vast breaks in the record; or else from various causes, some assignable source at present unknown, the development has been arrested; or if not arrested, has been so slow that the stage reached is not comparable with the most advanced stages of Western civilisation. This last case is well illustrated by China.

Our principal attention, I do not say as sociologists, but as students of that department of sociology entitled

Philosophy of History, has thus to be concentrated on the recorded history of Western civilisation during the past twenty-five centuries. We have to trace the line of this civilisation in direct descent, the *orthogenic* line—to employ a word of which our chairman has made admirable use. We may follow that line downwards in the order of time, from older to more recent; or, on the other hand, beginning with what we know best, our own time, and analysing its elements, we may trace them upwards so far as may be possible. Both processes will be necessary. But in either case our first endeavour must be to grasp the series as a whole, or so large a portion of it as we may; postponing for the present minute examination of the parts. This seems to most historians a paradox, and a very distasteful paradox; especially at the present time when division of labour in all departments, and not least in historic studies, has been carried farther than ever. It would ill become a student of the philosophy of history to underrate historical specialities. Nor is it needful to enlarge on the exceedingly obvious truism that without history there can be no philosophy of history. History needs no defence. Apart from philosophy of any kind, the dramatic splendour of the record, the clash of vivid personalities, the tragedy of human life that it unfolds will always carry history far beyond the need of apologists. It has been the source of the best poetry in the past. It will give rise to yet nobler poetry in the future.

But to return to our graver theme. Without depreciating specialities, it may be pointed out that there is room for a new speciality in the study of history, which is to bring the specialities together, and range them, so far as this can be done, in a continuous sequence. It is as though a geographer should turn to the globe, instead of discussing the map of any particular country. When Eratosthenes of Alexandria was studying the spherical nature of the Earth, and all that followed from it, he would not have been helped much by a student of geography who offered information as to mountain ranges and river valleys. For his purpose a mountain range was a negligible quantity that encumbered his thought; yet

Eratosthenes had no disregard for geography: he was one of its principal founders.

Let us take a provisional glance at this historical series, as I am now conceiving it. Beginning then with our own era, we trace it back through Revolution, through Reformation, through feudal institutions, barbarian invasions, Roman conquests, to a time antecedent to the Greek communities of the Mediterranean coasts, when rival theocratic monarchies, Assyrian, Persian, Egyptian, came into hostile conflict. Passing beyond these, we come to social states more or less akin to the barbaric or savage communities of our own time as we see them in Africa or Australasia. What we gain from this first rapid glance is this: we find initial stages common to a great number of communities, the state known roughly as fetichism, common to all. We find some form of theocratic civilisation, a government of kings or priests, or of both, shared by very many. From this common stock issues a stream, peculiar to Western Europe, which we may speak of as the stream of modern civilisation, beginning with the Greeks, continuing with the Romans, prolonged through the middle ages to our own times; ever growing wider and deeper, and tending, as we now see, to embrace the whole planet.

Now it has been objected to this view of the subject that since Western civilisation, as presented in the history of the last two millenniums, is one and not many, it cannot form the subject of scientific investigation. Science seeks for unity in the midst of variety, endeavours to grasp general facts as a means of colligating special facts. "Comte," it has been said (I quote from Messrs. Durkheim and Fauconnet's paper in the first volume of our Transactions) "did not admit a plurality of social types. According to him, there existed only a single society, that is human association considered generally; and the particular states merely represent the different moments in the history of the single society. Sociology thus occupied a strange position among the sciences, since it had for its subject a being unique of its kind."

Let us admit at once that the objection, so far as it goes, is valid. Western civilisation, taken as a whole, is a unique

phenomenon. It took place once, it will not, so far as we can foresee, be repeated. Yet, even so, it presents itself to us as a series of sixty or seventy generations, each term being in strict affiliation to the term preceding. It is at least conceivable that the law of this series may be discovered, that the final term towards which it converges, may be assigned. In biology it is possible to concentrate attention on a single organism, and to compare the various stages of its life-history from the earliest embryonic form to adolescence, adult life and old age. Not more than this, but not less, need be claimed for the history of Western civilisation to entitle it to be considered as the subject of scientific investigation. The solar system was studied scientifically many centuries before there was a suspicion of the existence of more solar systems than one.

A very little consideration is enough to show that no other mode of proceeding is really applicable to the matter in hand. What in a word is the problem before us? It is to examine the process by which men have passed from a social state guided by early forms of belief, fetichistic or theological, to a state guided by modern forms of belief, commonly spoken of as scientific or positive; to see what has remained stable, and what has been changed during this transition; how far the disturbances which have occurred during the process were inevitable; how far wise intervention may modify them in the case of retarded nations.

This being the special business before us, it would seem obvious that we must begin by directing attention to the region where alone the phenomena which we are to investigate are to be found: that is to say, the history of those nations who have passed from primitive stages to the most advanced stages. Whatever light may hereafter be thrown on our problem by the study of nations like India or China who have accomplished a smaller portion of this advance, we cannot in the first instance take account of these. Our attention must be focussed on the final stage of progress, and on the connection of this final stage with the first beginnings. The process of recorded history of the most advanced nations is in fact the story of the transition from theocracy to sociocracy; that is to

say, from a social state in which men's lives were governed by the will of superhuman agencies, whether these were inseparable from visible material objects (fetichism), or were unseen powers governing various departments of nature (polytheism), to a state in which scientific inquiry into the world and society laid bare the laws by obedience to which man is at last rendered capable of modifying human life.

We learn from social statics that there is a certain harmony or consensus between the various aspects of the social organism as seen in each stage of its evolution. Side by side with the law of intellectual change, we have to consider the law of practical change; the transition from the state in which war is the dominant occupation of mankind to the final state of peaceful industry. The large organised communities that we find established in Egypt or West Asia, when recorded history begins, were the result of long internecine war followed by conquest; that conquest being welded together by a highly developed priesthood. The local and tribal gods were not uprooted; they were slowly effaced by the splendour of the god of the victorious city. Marduk became the chief god of Babylonia, not merely of Babylon; Asshur the chief god of the Assyrian power, not merely of Nineveh. So it is that we are compelled to recognise that war, ending in conquest and accompanied by slavery, has proved to be one of the most potent engines of civilisation. This brings us face to face with one of the most fundamental and characteristic features of dynamic sociology—I mean its relative character. To condemn war as a social curse in the twentieth century after Christ, and to appreciate its immense civilising value in the twentieth century before Christ; to respect Julius Cæsar and to condemn Napoleon, is an elementary lesson in sociology which professed students of the science have not always very well learnt. Here as elsewhere we have to make it clear that *relative* does not mean *arbitrary*. Change governed by caprice or chance is one thing; change in accordance with a fixed law is quite another. Be this as it may, we shall make but little progress in understanding history (and a philosophy of history, as I understand it, means much the same thing as understanding history)

unless we realise that war, at a certain stage of the world's history, was one of the chief promoters of civilisation. In its earliest and rudest forms it was a school of character; of courage, caution and endurance; when prosecuted on a larger scale, it became a school of discipline and obedience. It kept every faculty on the strain, it stimulated all the arts—metal-lurgy, for instance, the arts of constructing and besieging fortresses, of wielding and applying mechanical forces. The anthropologist will tell us that the bowstring was one of the first, perhaps the very first of our musical instruments. But above all there was the effect of war upon social life; its potent stimulus to social cohesion. By war large groups of men were brought to work together in harmonious co-operation.

With war went slavery as its inevitable complement. Here an even greater demand is made on our recognition of the relative spirit, so essential to sociological judgment. We have to let our minds dwell, not exclusively on the state of free labour that ultimately succeeded to slavery, but rather on the state of things that went before it, when death and cannibalism awaited the vanquished. We have to look on slavery as the necessary forerunner of free industry, as the necessary training-school in which the otherwise incurable indolence of the savage and his repugnance to continuous labour are finally overcome. We have to look also at its alleviations—at the share allotted to it, often a large share, in the moral affections connected with domestic life. For the slave was after all a member of the family.

Yet another shade must be added to the picture. In these primitive theocracies it was usually the case that professions of all kinds were hereditary: the son followed the calling of his father; hence the establishment of caste. The reasons for it were obvious enough, and their force has by no means wholly disappeared. Apprenticeship, whether in politics or in shoemaking, is by no means the worst training in the practical pursuits of life. Every one knows of medical families that have continued their profession for generations. In ancient days there was no scientific teaching, and that for the best of reasons—there was no science. The arts of life had

to be learnt by practical apprenticeship or not at all. And as each art in these ancient polytheisms was under the tutelage of a special deity, jealous of any change as deities are apt to be, it is easy to conceive that the institution of caste became, if not irksome to the individual, a fatal bar to wholesome social evolution.

Here then, in ancient theocracy, we have a social state combining many institutions offensive to the modern mind—kings by divine right, priestly guilds regulating the details of life, the whole system based on war, slavery, and caste. To complete the picture, we must remember that there was no separation, as was the case in our own middle ages, between the kingly and the priestly power. This we shall see to be a very fundamental point when we come to the mediæval transition. The ordinary view of Western Catholicism is wholly vitiated by misunderstanding it. At any rate, in *this*, ancient theocracies, church and state, were in the strictest sense *one* and indivisible.

And yet with all their compressive and repressive forces at work, we have to recognise that in these theocratic polytheisms the foundations of the most precious of human possessions, social morality, were laid down, maintained, and carried forward to our own time. A hundred years ago we knew little about them. We had read Herodotus and the Hebrew Bible. We had seen pictures of Indian and Egyptian temples; we had listened for what they were worth to the Spanish stories of Mexican and Peruvian monarchies. And this was nearly all. Now very large portions of the veil have been lifted. Comte used to lament the necessity of taking Moses as the sole historical type of theocracy. It is but yesterday that we have learnt of the great Babylonian theocrat Hammurabi, whose code is far more elaborate, and far more accurately preserved, than that of Moses, and much more than a thousand years older. We have the Egyptian Book of the Dead, with the trial of the Spirits in the Hall of Truth; we have countless psalms of praise and psalms of penitence to Assyrian gods and goddesses. Above all, India has at last become intelligible to us. Postponing for the moment the

question as to how far, and at what period, the tribal god of Israel began to supply signs of an exceptionally high moral standard, no one can reject the evidence of affinity in these older polytheistic religions—in their glorification of supreme power, in their cries for succour in distress, in their recognition of justice and mercy—with readings from the Hebrew Bible which for many centuries have echoed through our churches.

Whatever the merits of theocracy, it very obviously did not solve the problem of reconciling personal freedom with social cohesion. Not merely did theocracy not solve the problem, but it became intolerably repressive of any attempts to solve it. To think freely, to disseminate any knowledge that would lead to a change of customs, would have been to invite the fate of Prometheus who stole fire from heaven for the benefit of mankind. It may be that some such thought as this lay in the heart of Æschylus when he composed his mighty drama.

How was the ancient order to be made compatible with progress while preserving what was essential to its existence? That was the problem presented to such a man as Pythagoras, five hundred years before Christ. It has remained the problem for the five-and-twenty centuries that have followed. It is the essential problem for us at the present time. The only difference is that its solution, or some approach to it, becomes every day more urgent. Modern history, if we look well into it, did not begin with the Revolution, nor yet with the Reformation or the Renaissance; nor even with the rise of the Catholic Church: it began with the Greeks.

The initial steps of freedom and progress could hardly be expected from the case-hardened and worn-out civilisations of Egypt, Assyria, or Babylonia. But it was otherwise with smaller polytheistic communities, of whom there were very many throughout the West Asiatic and Mediterranean world. In these the theocratic condition, the uncontested dominion of an organised state-priesthood, had not been reached. They were, more or less, in the stage of development which, as Indian scholars tell us, the Aryan invaders had attained when they had occupied the valleys of the Indus, and had

not yet settled in the richer regions of the Ganges and the Jumna.

It is easy to exaggerate the influence of climate, soil, physical geography. Montesquieu and his followers have done this; so I venture to think have a more recent school of sociologists, that of M. LePlay. On the other hand, it is an equally mischievous error to ignore such influences, and especially in the earlier stages of a nation's history. We are not now considering the concrete case of any one nation, but the abstract conditions under which the emancipation of the Western world from theocratic fetters took place. Take tribes at the state of evolution I have spoken of, when the warrior caste was not yet dominated by the priest caste, when the Rig-Vedas were spoken or sung, and the other Vedic scriptures had not as yet been elaborated, and plunge them into another kind of environment from that of Northern India—regions of temperate climate in which land and sea were intimately mixed—and you have at least many of the required conditions for progressive polytheistic communities like those of the Mediterranean coasts in the second millennium before the Christian era. It would be easy to dilate on those physiographic conditions in much greater detail, were this the time for doing so; and to point out how the physical structure of the Grecian mainland and coasts were adapted to Greek history, that of Italy to the history of Rome. Many writers on the philosophy of history have done this; Comte has done so in the 53rd chapter of his *Positive Philosophy* with a warning, however, that in the present state of our knowledge such speculations were perhaps premature. I take this opportunity of advising students of Comte to read this chapter, and indeed most other chapters of the sociological part of his work in the original, and not in Miss Martineau's very imperfect abbreviation.

In any case, the problem now before us is not the explanation of the concrete facts of Greek and Roman history, but to set forth, if we can, in a very general and abstract way the conditions under which that unique thing, Western Civilisation, arose. I have already explained that uniqueness is not necessarily a bar to scientific treatment.

We begin modern history, as we have said, with the Greeks and Romans. We pass, that is to say, from theocratic polytheism to progressive or military polytheism. The issue from the fetters of theocracy begins with communities animated by nature worship and god-worship, but not as yet hardened into sacerdotalism, with activities stirred by warlike conflict—in fact, resembling in very many ways the Aryan invaders of India at the early stages of their Indian life. We have to imagine such communities placed in conditions favourable to change, favourable to the predominance of the warrior caste over the priestly, and yet not favourable to rapid and easy conquest.

We see two such communities, or rather groups of communities, bearing evidence in language and beliefs of some, though not complete, community of stock—one achieving astounding intellectual greatness, the other accomplishing political results hardly less astounding, and of equal, perhaps of even greater, importance. We see Greek culture and Roman government intimately interfused, and issuing in the establishment of a vast peaceful empire based on slavery; otherwise well governed, with many centres of culture, extremely tolerant, fusing the various polytheisms of the incorporated nations into a common state-system. We see the meeting of Hebrew prophets and Greek thinkers giving rise to a new spiritual power, fundamentally differing from any that had appeared before—in that it was wholly disconnected from the state, often hostile to it, always transcending its boundaries; and that it made its appeal to the inward emotions of men rather than to their outward actions. We see the structure of Roman empire threatened, and at last partially ruined, by the invasion of barbaric races of very varying degrees of social evolution. In the struggle between those that had partially assimilated Roman civilisation and inherited its traditions against those that were wholly alien to it, the state of society called Catholic Feudalism arose. The spiritualising and moralising influence of the Catholic Hierarchy combined with the nobler characteristics of all defensive war to generate a new type of character, of whom Theodoric, Charlemagne, Alfred, the Cid, Godfrey,

and St. Louis may be taken as examples. Mediæval Catholicism measured its forces against the rival force of Islam ; with the result that an armed truce was established which has lasted till the present day, with little hope of victory to either side. Each hoped to become the universal religion, and each failed. In the fourteenth century the decline of the Papal powers began, with the exile of the Popes to Avignon, the long schism that followed, the stormy and discordant councils of Constance and Pisa. In the sixteenth century, the assault upon the Catholic system became systematic, and after the thirty years' war it became clear that even in Western Europe it was not to exercise uncontested sway. The peace of Westphalia divided the West into Protestant and Catholic. The revolutions of the eighteenth century raised the question whether any form of theology was to receive public recognition from the state. In the United States, in the self-governing colonies of the British Empire, and in the Republic of Mexico, that question appears to be divided. In the French Republic, where the question was first raised, the answer is being given at the present moment. So far as the state is concerned, theological doctrine has no existence. Every citizen is free to hold his own form of belief.

The point on which I have been insisting all this time is that the history of Western civilisation during the last twenty-five centuries is a passage from theocracy to sociocracy—from a social state in which the dominant principle is the government of mankind by unseen and arbitrary powers, in whose hands we are as clay in the hands of the potter—to a social state in which, however various individual beliefs may be, the governing considerations in public life are not theological and mystical, but scientific and human. There were positive beliefs in the earliest ages of the world ; there was never a god of weight, as Adam Smith remarked ; and so there will be—such at least is my conviction—theological beliefs in a very distant future. But the question for the sociologist is—Of what nation at each period are the dominant, the governing beliefs, those which determine the collective action of mankind ?

In this rapid review of twenty-five centuries, representing the transit from theocracy to sociocracy, one objection meets us at the outset. Is there, it will be asked, any true continuity between Græco-Roman and modern history? Was not the progressive movement of civilisation arrested for the thousand years between the fourth century of our era and the fourteenth? Is Vico's theory of history, that the world moves in cycles, after all the true theory? That it moves with oscillations is too painfully apparent to us, as the years and the decades move on; but is there on the whole what may be called an orthogenic line of evolution, a trajectory which, if not a straight line, is yet not a closed curve? In a word, did Western civilisation come to an end with the fall of the Roman Empire and begin again with the Renaissance? The student of the philosophy of history, at whatever point of view he may stand, is forced to form for himself some explanation, some *theory*, as the French would call it, of the middle age in the history of Western civilisation.

The theory which appears to me most intelligible is as follows, stated in the fewest words.

Greece and Rome developed each one side of our three-fold nature—intellect and the arts of speech in one case, practical activity in the other—in so exceptional and exclusive a way as to need special and long continued efforts to restore the balance, and promote the culture of the inward life—the life of affections, impulses, emotions; in other words, the culture of the heart.

In art, in philosophy, in science, the Greeks did great things, of which it is not needful to say more than one word here. The eternal worth to humanity of such work as was done by Homer, Æschylus, Phidias, Aristotle, Archimedes, and Hipparchus has not even now been adequately recognised: for full recognition it awaits the moment when the obscurantist superstition of "compulsory gush" has been finally uprooted from our schools and colleges. But the Greeks, except during two brief moments of their history, were not politically great, were indeed often politically contemptible; and in the second century B.C., subjection to Rome, as advised by the great

Polybius, was their sole means of salvation from barbarism. The Greeks had to manage their public life with but small assistance from their greatest men. Fine literary culture was theirs; but literary culture, as the history of the Italian Renaissance shows, is the flimsiest of all foundations of national greatness. It may be even, as in the case of Nero and Alexander Borgia and their surroundings, a special agent of corruption.

Turn now to Rome. It is not needful for our present purpose to consult the great specialists on Roman history. There is an almost complete consensus as to the type of character resulting from the succession of generations in her long history. Shakespeare, Corneille, Bossuet, Mommsen, have described it for us. Nowhere is it so powerfully painted as in the 6th canto of the *Paradise* of Dante, where the whole story of Rome from its foundation to the establishment of the empire is told in forty lines. First over the area of a small English county, then over the Italian peninsula, finally over the Mediterranean coasts and the lands of Western Europe, this dominion was established. Peace came to the world—peace with universal toleration and widespread culture and refinement.

We have then in Greece and Rome an astounding development of two sides of our nature, intellect and practical activity, with no corresponding culture of the heart. The Greek religion in those latter days was what Renan calls it—a toy-religion, in which no one pretended to believe. The Roman religion was bound up with Roman patriotism, but it consisted of formal precise ceremonies, very much like the Shinto religion of Japan. And as Japan, early in her history, modified Shintoism by the more human faith of Buddha; so Roman men and women took refuge in the passionate and fervid theocracies of the Eastern world. Of these there were more than one. As Professor Dill has recently shown us in his remarkable work on Roman Society from Nero to the Antonines, there was the worship of Mithra traceable in the track of the Roman soldiers from Africa to Hadrian's wall; there was the cult of Isis and Serapis. Finally, there was the

theocracy of Judea, with its long line of prophets, culminating in the man who was at once a Hebrew prophet and a Roman citizen; from which, with the help of Platonist, Pythagorean and Stoic, issued the Christian church. The struggle between these elements was for a long time more doubtful than is commonly thought. The fittest survived—as the fittest, in one sense of that word, always survives. In this case, and it is not always so, the fittest was the noblest and purest; though the victory was not without grievous pain and irreparable loss.

Looked at from this point of view, we shall find that the middle age was far from being the period of stagnation and retrogradation that is supposed by many. Granted that the work to be done was to create a moral environment in which men should be trained, as Aristotle had urged, from infancy to control baser passions, and should breathe an atmosphere of love and reverence, the Catholic church achieved in what are called the dark ages a large measure of success. A spiritual power wholly independent of the state forming opinion and moulding character, but quite disconnected, in principle at least, from temporal power, arose for the first time in the world's history. Mediæval attempts to teach were not what we should now think advanced; but before the middle ages there was no teaching at all except for the cultivated few. The Greeks and Romans had no teaching for the masses of their slaves. Apart from the church catechisms, the early Benedictine monasteries formed a vast system of industrial schools. And when we look at the vast sphere opened in the middle ages to the spiritual activities of women; when we remember that in the middle ages the greatest of all social revolutions was effected—the passage from servile to free labour—and when we think of the effects of this emancipation on arts, commerce, and industry centuries before the days of the Reformation and the Renaissance, we shall be slow to endorse the view that Western Europe retrograded in the so-called dark ages.

The truth is, that monotheism as compared with polytheism was in the highest degree stimulating to intellect. I am not speaking of its moral but of its mental action. It

raised new and terrible problems, which may be summed up in one, the origin of evil. But for that very reason it stimulated thought in ways unknown before. From Origen and Augustine in the 3rd century, to Scotus Erigena in the 9th; from Erigena to Abailard and the pre-Arabian schoolmen, from these to the great schoolmen of the 13th century—Aquinas, Albert, Roger Bacon—stirred by the influx, through Arabs and Jews, of Greek philosophy and science, we have proof enough that the intellectual stagnation attributed to these dark ages has been grossly exaggerated. They illustrate more than any other time the metaphysical stage in Comte's law of social evolution. The metaphysics of the schoolmen directed to the defence of the established doctrine were in the end active agents of its decay.

Of the downfall of the mediæval system, partly seen, partly foreseen, by Dante, something has been said already. It began with the disruption of the Papacy nearly two centuries before Luther; it was carried on through reformations and revolutions to our own day, and it is not yet ended. It is of more importance to recognise the germs of the new order to which mankind is tending, the sociocratic order resting on scientific convictions embracing the highest interests of mankind, and reached by methods which all mankind may accept and approve.

Here again we have to remind ourselves that modern history begins with the Greeks. The newest thing that Greece gave the world—I do not say the greatest—was neither her poetry nor her metaphysical philosophy. In these she was boundlessly superior to other ancient nations; still, other nations, India for instance, had vast collections of poetry, and a long series of metaphysical thinkers. Her most original achievement was the detachment of abstract science in its humblest form—mathematics—from the concrete mass of empirical knowledge to which the old theocracies had been limited.

History, as commonly taught, does not include the history of science; or at best devotes to it here and there a casual paragraph. Even then it is apt to be looked on as a

specialty peculiar to some particular country. We are only now beginning to look on great scientific discoveries as great sociological events to be ranged in their proper place, the evolution of man's destiny. From Thales and Pythagoras to Eudaxus, from Eudaxus to Archimedes, from Archimedes to Hipparchus and Ptolemy, the chain of discovery in geometry and mathematical astronomy is complete. Held fast and extended by the Arab schools of Bagdad and Cordova, from the eighth century to the twelfth, it was handed on by them to the best Western intellect of the thirteenth century—men like Grossteste, Roger Bacon, Leonard of Pisa, and Jordan, the second General of the Dominican order. It is this continuity that gives its great sociological value to the history of science, a subject unappreciated as yet in British universities. Yet it should never be forgotten that in the great renovation and enlargement of geometrical method initiated by Descartes in the seventeenth century, to which mathematics owes its value as an instrument of physical research, Descartes began by taking up a problem which Pappus, a Greek geometer of the second century A.D., had left unsolved. Between the astronomy of Hipparchus and Ptolemy and the astronomy of Copernicus there was, mathematically speaking, no such chasm as is popularly supposed. The language of Ptolemy is still used in our observatories. Of the economic value of such abstract researches as those of the Greek geometers it is not needful to say much. A tribute is rendered to them every time a sailor uses his navigation tables to find his place at sea. What is more essential to our present purpose is to note the obvious fact that during the last five or six centuries, and most markedly during the last hundred years, the range of phenomena amenable to scientific treatment has been steadily and rapidly increasing. Let us glance for an instant at the salient facts. Galileo's death coincides with the birth of Newton; within the century and a half covered by these two lives the foundations, and much of the superstructure, of the science which still bears the name of physics had been laid. Before the end of the 18th century, Lavoisier, with many others, had created scientific chemistry, and had made it for the first time

possible, not indeed to explain life, but to form an intelligible theory as to what constituted life. Early in the 19th century, biology under Bichat, Lamarck and others, detached itself from the common trunk of knowledge, and became recognised as a distinct science. In the generation that followed, Anguste Comte, issuing of course from a long series of labourers in the same field—among whom Vico, Turgot, Kant, Condorcet, may be named—drew the outlines of the science to the prosecution of which this society is devoted—the science of social structure and movement.

We have thus before us Comte's well-known series of the abstract sciences ranged in accordance with the diminishing generality and increasing complexity of the facts dealt with. This is not the time to discuss it in detail. For my present purpose, I will assume it as given, and will regard it as condensed into a series of three terms: Cosmology, Biology, Sociology—the second term dependent on the first, and including animal psychology; the third dependent on the second, and including the study of human nature as modified by the historic process.

Now there is a "mathematical millennium" (I use an expression of the late Dean Milman) towards which Comte has been, strangely enough, blamed by one set of his opponents for aspiring. It consists in regarding the third of these terms as nothing but a deduction from the second, the second as nothing but a deduction from the first. It is, I say, strange that Comte should be accused of this tendency, considering that a great part of his life was occupied with strenuous resistance to it. Its result, when pushed too far, is to blind men's eyes to the truths which are specially characteristic of each science, and concentrate attention exclusively on the truths which are deducible from the preceding science. In a word, the statue is sacrificed to the pedestal; or to use another illustration, the study of the plant is limited to the study of its cotyledons.

Instances of this aberration abound in the history of science, and often in connection with scientific discovery of the highest importance. Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood is an example. Attention was for a long time con-

centrated, and not unnaturally, on the mechanical forces impelling the blood through its course, and the subtler phenomena of life were disregarded. It is true that these subtler and more complicated facts—the series of chemical metabolisms, the reaction of nerve cells on nutrition, and of higher nerve centres on lower—were not known, or at least not scientifically handled in Harvey's time; but wise physicians had instinctively and empirically taken account of them; and this wise empiricism was for a long time after Harvey's discovery often disregarded, with bad results sometimes for medical art. Instances of the same kind abound in the history of biology during the last century.

And so we find it in sociology, both in the relation of the science as a whole to the science of biology, on which it is immediately founded, and in the relations of the parts of the science that relate to simpler social states to those that are higher, in the sense of relating to more complex social states. Altruism is not to be explained in terms of egoism, any more than in terms of chemical metabolism. The higher facts stand on the lower as a temple on its foundations, or as a tree rising from its roots; but they are not mere deductions or corollaries from them. But there is the less need to labour this point, as it is so admirably illustrated in one of the chapters of our Chairman's recent book on Democracy and Reaction. The error in question is that to which Comte gave the name of Materialism, extending the common usage of the word to every case in which deductions from the lower sciences tend to occupy an undue place in the cultivation of the higher, and thus discourage the inductions on which the progress of the higher must principally depend. There is, of course, an opposite error to which by the same kind of extended use the word Spiritualism may be applied. The higher science dis severed from its connection with the lower is the stem of the plant cut off from the root; it perishes from inanition.

On social science thus conceived, holding an even path between materialism and spiritualism, the sociocracy towards which we are tending, and which indeed we have already begun to enter, must rest as its foundation. The passage from

theocracy to sociocracy, from the ancient order as depicted in the code of Hammurabi to the new order now in process of establishment around us, is, I take it, the central fact in the philosophy of history.

The history of Western civilisation is a sequence of social states, each of them following from the one preceding, each giving birth to a successor, but also each knit together by its own consensus, its own passions, affections, customs, thoughts, prejudices, social ties of every kind. Choose from the seventy-five past generations any two you please, you will find the permanent elements of humanity in each of them; some kind of government, some form of religion, some condition of family life, some phase of collective activity. To study the consensus of these various aspects is the aim of social statics. The present paper is an invitation to this society to study the laws of change, of social movement, in other words, social dynamic. I have called attention to the altered mode of conceiving man's relations to the world and to society which follow from the slow and gradual substitution of scientific law for arbitrary decisions of superhuman powers. What theocracy has been we know. We revere its results, and yet rejoice to have escaped its bondage. What the sociocracy is to which we are now tending, we are less clearly aware. Dimly we see it to be a state in which holders of every theological creed, or of none, can take an equal share; that its foundations will rest on scientific examination of the laws of social concord and of social progress; and that the superstructure will be a fabric of justice, freedom and mutual service, towards the full achievement of which continual approaches will be made.

DISCUSSION

MR. L. T. HOBHOUSE (speaking from the Chair before the reading of the paper), said:

I think we may congratulate ourselves, both on the fact that we are going to tackle the subject of the Philosophy of History this evening, and upon the reader of the paper, whose services we have secured to help us in this arduous endeavour.

With the subject before us this evening, we really approach the central citadel of sociology. Some of the subjects we have dealt with hitherto have been concerned rather with the outworks of the science—side issues, which do not bear on the fundamental question of the origin, nature, development and future of society. It is that question we have directly to approach this evening—whether a scientific treatment of the problems raised by this question is possible, and what advances have already been made. The history of thought on the subject is peculiar. In the early days of modern social theory, the most influential schools were not historical in their method. Hobbes and Locke treated sociological questions rather by reasoning from metaphysical theories of the laws of nature, the social contract, and so forth; and deduced from these theories certain conclusions as to the laws of conduct and the institutions of society. It was not until the actual shock of the attempt to put this method into practice as a basis for the reorganisation of society in the French Revolution, not until the theory collided with facts, that another method came to be preferred. It is true that far back in the eighteenth century, you already had men who said that the right way of approaching the science of society was by investigating the history of society. At the same time it was not the dominant method till the beginning of last century. After the French Revolution, when people began to realise

how difficult it was to square theory with fact, and how often it turns out, when you have experience, that what you have proved true is actually false, the serious study of the historical method became the dominant fact in the intellectual world. In Germany, France, and England, at different times, but all practically within the first half of the nineteenth century, you had great sociological theories of history put forward. You had the great attempt of Hegel in connection with his peculiar theory of dialectic. That attempt was metaphysical in its origin. It was not so much a generalisation from historical facts, as an attempt to illustrate a metaphysical principle by showing how it worked out in the actual progress of society. Then, again, in England you had the very bold attempt of Buckle to amass a vast amount of historical erudition, to reduce it to order, and deduce certain laws of the progress of society. And in France, you had the still greater scheme of Comte, which was not only a scheme of history but a scheme of science, theory and practice, and ultimately even a religion, which not a few people adopted—a scheme for the regulation of life and conduct, as well as a theory of how human society had originated and grown up. What is strange is that this epoch—in which in different lands, under different conditions, you had a number of great men evolving vast theories of history, derived from the intimate detailed study of historical facts—passed away without apparently leaving any permanent result in the world of thought. Its work fell into discredit, and little attempt was made to carry it further, to correct its errors, or to provide something better. The very impulse which led men towards a philosophy of history seemed to die away. That fact you must take in connection with other movements in social affairs, and in the science of history. We have in the period which followed; the second half of the nineteenth century, the rise and predominance of specialism. We have the fact that knowledge is pursued in detail. It is so broken up, on the one hand, and amassed into such enormous heaps on the other, and this in every direction, that it has been apparently impossible for any human mind to grasp it in its entirety. This development has made it infinitely difficult for us to organise knowledge, to grasp and systematise it, so as to bring out of it any intelligible result. The stream of thought is thus, as it were, choked, as the result of specialism. That is one result; but do not suppose that because of that, people cease to theorise on social matters. What has happened is that the dwelling-place of social philosophy has become

swept and garnished. The thinkers have quitted the home of social philosophy, discouraged and disappointed, but into this home have come all the seven devils of sciolism. You have people prepared to dogmatise on social affairs from no knowledge at all, or from a little reflection on the popular literature of the day, or, finally, you have the attempt to deal with the science of society as if it were a department of the science of biology. The object of the Sociological Society is to protest against that method of treatment, by insisting on the historical study of social phenomena. Man comes under the general scheme of biology in so far as he is a living animal, and certain laws of biology are interesting to the student of affairs. But man is a peculiar animal. He is sometimes called a rational animal, though he might with equal point be called the irrational animal, since he is the only animal that voluntarily does what is opposed to his interests. To endeavour to predict the course of human evolution on the strength of analogies drawn from the animal and vegetable kingdom is to omit the dominant fact that distinguishes the human from the animal world. It is a mistake which was pointed out by Comte; it is one which is still constantly repeated. The corrective to this method of teaching is to resume the historical study of social affairs, which has been checked by the tendencies I have mentioned during the last half century. If true, he asked whether it is humanly possible to deal with scientific fulness and accuracy with the vast accumulations of fact which fill the history books. But the reply is that much of the detail is quite unessential for our purposes.

What we have to do is to discover the essential life of society, as it flows on in one continual stream through the period of recorded time. Through that period we have a continuous movement of human affairs. It must be possible to investigate that movement, to see whether there is a current in any direction, or in changing directions, so that we may form a probable opinion as to the whence and the whither, as to how it comes about, and whither it is flowing. I think we may congratulate ourselves that we have Dr. Bridges to introduce us to the subject to-night. We know that he, as a disciple and student of Comte, has devoted his life to the study of these subjects, of which he has acquired a vast body of well-ordered knowledge. We may agree or disagree with some of his judgments, and with the values he puts on certain facts, but of two things I am quite certain—that we shall hear from him a very clear exposition of his own view, and, whatever his judgment may be, we shall have to weigh and take it into account before we finally form our own.

Professor GARVIE SAID :

Let me just in one word say with what intense interest I have listened to this address, and the interest was not the less because it was accompanied very largely by disagreement. Let me say that I approach this subject from a different standpoint from that of the lecturer, but I shall not indicate any undue bias or prejudice because my standpoint is different. I keep altogether out of my remarks the theological aspects of the subject that have been introduced, on which the greatest difference between us would emerge. My first point is—it seems to me that it would be very desirable that the Sociological Society should not follow the example of the lecturer in confusing philosophy and science. It is desirable we should have a sociological science in its two branches of statics and dynamics; and the earlier part of the paper was one which should be of quite exceptional value to this Society. I think we must recognise that society must be looked at as at rest and in movement. May I use a modern illustration? I am not proposing to go into the Fiscal Problem, but in that problem it is important to apply not social statics only, but social dynamics as well. Some people think that Adam Smith expressed economic laws applicable for all places, for all times. If that were correct, there would be only the static view of political economy; but there is a larger view, the dynamic view—the idea that Smith's "Wealth of Nations" expressed the economic conditions only of one particular age. Whether free trade be right or wrong (my sympathies are with free trade), it seems to me that it is not to be defended by appealing to the fact that Smith, the greatest representative of political economy, advocated free trade, because the conditions might so have changed that another policy might be the desirable one under the existing conditions. So that in the study of social science, especially in its practical applications, we must give full recognition to this fact—that first there are the varied relations of a society at a particular stage of its development to be studied, and then we have to study the successive stages of social development. But, it seems to me, that is not the Philosophy of History. To affiliate one generation with another in the conditions of one age, to discover the effects of an antecedent age, is a distinctly scientific task; and that is a task of immeasurable value to this Society and every Sociological Society. There is no safe application of sociological principles except in the light of history, and we cannot understand the conditions of to-day in relation to those of to-morrow, unless we compare those of to-day with those of yesterday. I am heart and soul with the lecturer in the conviction that we must pay as much attention to social dynamic as to social static. We ought, however, to distinguish from social science, social philosophy. Such considerations as have been presented to us so brilliantly, with so wide a knowledge, this evening,

cannot, I think, be called strictly science ; because we have not only facts, but an interpretation of facts, suggested, not only by the facts, but by certain judgments of the value and the meaning of these facts. I am, in some degree, familiar with most of the facts that were brought before us in this paper, but the meaning I should find in many of these facts, and the worth I should assign to these facts, would be very different from that offered by Dr. Bridges. Is it not too large a generalisation to say that the history of Western civilisation can be described as an advance from theocracy to sociocracy ? I do not think that this is science. Science has not put forward any adequate evidence for this statement. It is too wide a generalisation. I think the philosophy of history has this justification, that it may present generalisations which are not to be regarded as rigid conclusions from science, but which merely suggest questions to enable us to get a better explanation of the facts. May I just call attention to one other point ? It is this, that the attempt to find out a law of intellectual change is bound to lead us astray, because we cannot dis sever intellectual change from the whole complex nature of man. It seems to me that Comte's law of the three stages is an illustration of the danger of separating man's intellectual interests from his affections and passions. I do not think the savage in his religion was very much concerned with affording any satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of nature. His interest was predominantly a practical interest ; and, as recent psychology has satisfactorily shown, the practical, the emotional, the volitional, is a more important element than the merely intellectual. This is an imperfect indication of the grounds on which I think that we should pause before we accept the conclusions so learnedly and ably put before us. Let us devote ourselves to a close minute study of existing social conditions, not only in their mutual relations, but also in relation to the conditions that preceded them. May I say how heartily grateful I am for the intellectual stimulus I have received from hearing this paper ?

MR. J. M. ROBERTSON SAID :

I should like first to join my congratulations to those of the chairman on the nature of the paper which we have heard to-night, because I think, that as he put it, we have come to-night for the first time to real sociology. Our discussions have hitherto run to methodology, on the one hand, and to subsidiary issues on the other ; whereas Dr. Bridges has brought the Society to its proper work. I think perhaps there was a little survival of methodology in the paper ; and the interesting criticism of Dr. Garvie perhaps illustrated the danger of the return to methodology. Among mechanicians, I believe there is a growing feeling that the contrast drawn between statics and dynamics is not at bottom scientific, but in any case

the terms are used by Dr. Bridges and Dr. Garvie in quite different senses, and thus the disputants never really meet.

Dr. Bridges' survey of the subject was so learned and so compact that it is quite impossible to put one's criticism in a schematic form. I would associate myself with the criticism of Dr. Garvie to the extent of saying with him, that you cannot form a sound philosophic theory of progress as a process of change of opinion; you cannot properly represent it as a mere intellectual progression. But I respectfully suggest that the main criticism to be passed on the paper is something like the criticism to be passed on Comte's position—that it is still, to some extent, at the metaphysical standpoint. We have not yet arrived at the positive position. In particular we have had very little of the study of economic forces, the play of which is fully one half of sociology. I would suggest that that study would tend to reduce to unity certain disparate elements in Dr. Bridges' conclusions. It seems to me, for instance, that theocracy is a slightly misleading term. Theocracy so-called is strictly a hierocracy; but the ideas of hierocracy and theocracy are reduced to one when you think of them as the exploitation of fear. I do not think, further, that there has been any such general progression as Dr. Bridges alleges. In some of the most primitive societies you find pure sociocracy; and in all stages of history, I think, there must have been some sociocracy along with theocracy. The practical difference is one of organisation of priesthood. In Dr. Bridges' paper Greek civilisation is regarded as an escape from theocracy. I should say there had never been theocracy among the Greeks except in a limited sense. Elsewhere there was a certain combination of the influence of the priest and of the influence of the king. These were both exploitations of human fear. We have the doctrine of divine right in our own theory of monarchy; and every autocracy has appealed to the sense of fear. Fear of the king and fear of the priest are at bottom social phenomena of the same kind.

When Dr. Bridges described the Christian Church as a development of the spiritual power, quite independently of the State, I would again venture to call in question the proposition. The alliance of church and state in old Babylonia and Egypt was very much the same thing as in mediæval Christendom. Strictly speaking, there were in Christendom two organisations, the Greek Church in Eastern Europe and the Catholic Church in the West, but these churches were of the same kind. Now, there was a church and state organisation in the Roman Empire before Christianity arose, viz., the cult and worship of the emperor; and the cause of the adoption of the Christian Church as a state church was precisely this, that it was so clearly fitted to become part of the machinery of the state. It became in fact the right hand of the state; and the whole spread of Christianity in Northern Europe was by way of the church lending itself to the purposes of the king. It enabled the king to govern better, that is, more coercively, than he did before. Again, when we come

to the conception of the Spiritual Power, there always was a Spiritual Power and always a tendency to dissent. The Stoics, in the Greek and Roman world, were like the prophets in the Hebrew world. There was a sort of moral criticism, or school, or cult, apart from the recognised religion.

One more point on which I venture to dissent, is the proposition Dr. Bridges put forward that Julius Cæsar was a force for good, and that Napoleon was a force for evil—a reiteration of a teaching of Comte. We are to curse Napoleon and bless Julius Cæsar. I venture to think, if we take a dispassionate view of the case and do any blessing or cursing at all—and perhaps we had better not—it must be the other way about. What was the work of Julius Cæsar? A breaking down of the possibility of free civilisation in Rome—a perfectly fatal movement towards Imperialism. You cannot hold Julius Cæsar up as having erected a beneficent form of civilisation. Napoleon certainly was no better in point of ideal and intention, but he broke down a whole series of rotten systems in Europe; and after he passed away, a far healthier political system arose. Following Julius Cæsar, there was a destruction of political freedom, of the vital factor of self-government. If we are to do any blessing and cursing of these old and modern emperors, I am not going to assent to any process by which you put a golden crown on the head of Julius Cæsar and a crown of thorns on the head of Napoleon. I think we must apply another set of tests, and I suggest that the utilitarian test would save us from such a verdict as has here been given. The real question is the social result. While it is in a sense true, as Dr. Bridges has said, that war tends to knit societies together, it tends to destroy civilisation. If you reckon up the fact of seventeen buried strata of civilisation on the Palatine Hill in Rome, you will see that merely to insist on the value of war as knitting society together, is to state only one half of the case. It has been stated that cannibalism once saved the human race at a juncture at which the race was in danger of dying out from want of food. The theory is that by taking to eating their fellows, the vigorous minority contrived at once to survive and to lessen the pressure upon the margin of subsistence. That may be perfectly true, but does it yield you any moral significance at all? Again, the first rise of the early ape towards manhood is a rise in mastery of the arts of destruction. It was in struggling for life that he developed a bigger brain than he had before. But that fact yields no justification for any doctrine of the value of militarism to civilised man. Dr. Bridges' way of repeating the ordinary formula, I fear, tends to keep in countenance people who use that formula to-day. These people do not actually say, the more wars we have the better; but they lead us in that direction. Again, Dr. Bridges told us that in the Roman world there had been a distinct progression from the theological to the positivist view of life, and that after that there was a plunging back into the theological view of things. That retrogression, I would suggest, ought to be explained

in terms of the social and political causation. I suggest that when in any community you have destroyed all forms of corporate life, and free government or self-government, there are bound to arise new forms of association, of which the early Christian Churches were instances. You have the same thing to-day in China, and in Russia, in anarchic and revolutionary societies. I seem, however, to be dissenting from Dr. Bridges all along; whereas I wish to express my admiration of the form and purpose of his paper and to associate myself with him as one who believes in the study of social causation.

MR. G. M. TREVELYAN SAID:

It would be possible to discuss at great length the phenomena of history in relation to Dr. Bridges' formula—the decline of the theocratic element in government; for instance, one might ask whether the element of theology was really as preponderating a motive for political action as it appeared to be in days when king and priest were one—whether the Rex was not really at heart more king than priest, and whether in our own day theological considerations, or at least the fact of attachment to certain theological parties, is not really the predominating motive in political action with the majority of the electorate and the greater number of the politicians in France, Germany, Italy and England.

Another element which should, I think, have played a great part in the excellent analysis made by Dr. Bridges, is the difference of race. Many changes, both of loss and gain, which we are accustomed to attribute either to Christianity or to the automatic effect of the movement of time, may really have been due to the introduction of the northern races into the set of privileged phenomena which we know as "the world's history." Also, I think the effect of Christianity was socially to depress the position of women lower than it had been under later Roman law; by making the priesthood predominant and excluding them from it as something half unclean, it militated against the more generous Teutonic notions of women, which are now coming up again.

But I am inclined to go to a more fundamental point, and to ask whether sociology will not be more hampered than helped if it takes any one formula as its philosophy of history, as, for instance, this one, so ably worked out by Dr. Bridges, of the alleged decline of the theocracy in government. The objection to starting with a philosophy of history is twofold. First, that to have a philosophy of history you must have a philosophy; and what two members of any active-minded sociological society will have the same philosophy? Secondly, that even if we were agreed on a philosophy of history (and historical research will not go far to give us one, though it may help to criticise and expand

our conceptions of the life of man), even if we were agreed on a philosophy of history, it would have to be much more all-embracing than the consideration of a single set of phenomena like the alleged decline of the theocratic element in government. For instance, the decline, or it may be the rise, or the variation from time to time, and place and place, of the theological element in the mind of the private individual, is far more important than its rise or decline in government. Again, the quality of the theology is a subject of study still more interesting than its quantity. But why put sociology into any such merely theological formula? Why not put it into the formula of the position and treatment of women; or the economic condition of the masses; or the intellectual qualities of the mass of the population; or economic development; or scientific and literary development; or the deepening of spiritual life; or the history of war; or the progress of the cause of peace; or the formation of great states; or the rise, decline, and partial recovery of the principle of mutual aid among the masses of the population; or the history of the æsthetic sense; or the history of the quality of personal relations, based on an inquiry whether personal relations have become deeper as well as more subtle, and whether they are completely different in their quality in different ages and races, or fundamentally the same for all mankind, with only individual differences? I have now mentioned off-hand over a dozen points of view from which sociology might be studied, and would undertake to go on writing down other such points of view for an hour on end. Any of these, if properly studied, would cover sides of human experience as important as the degree of theocratic influence in government. But to study sociology or history from any one of these points of view, to the exclusion of the others, would, to my mind, be not only too narrow, but would prevent us from arriving at right conclusions even as to the one object of study. For human affairs are so extraordinarily complex. On the other hand, I do heartily agree that historical facts should be selected and commented on by an individual interested mainly in one or half-a-dozen points of view. History must be thought about from some standpoint, and the cant of pure impartiality in history is only equalled by the cant of historical facts having value except as food for thought and speculation. I therefore welcome such a paper as Dr. Bridges', not because it is *the* point of view, but because it is *a* point of view. Of these there are as many as there are intellects really capable of thought. As there are not very many of the latter, the number of points of view from which history can be examined appears to be limited. But potentially it is infinite.

MR. H. GORDON JONES SAID :

The paper which has been read this evening seems to me to touch on many points which were dealt with at a former meeting of this Society. I

refer of course to the discussion on the relation between sociology on the one hand, and the special social sciences on the other hand. I say that, because we are to-night concerned with the consideration of what really constitutes the most important part of sociology—namely, the Theory of Human Progress. Now, it appears to me that our view of this matter must necessarily depend very largely upon the way in which we regard the previous question, as to what constitutes the subject-matter of sociology proper. If you look upon sociology as merely the consensus of the special social sciences, such as anthropology, economics, etc., then, in that case, the philosophy of history resolves itself, to a large extent, into a series of special studies of social organisms, with their various institutions and corresponding functions, at different epochs and in different countries. In that case we should have, as it were, a collection of monographs on the different forms of social organism which have existed in the past, and many of which still survive. We should have, it seems to me, what we may call the natural history of those social organisms, just as in botany or zoology we have the special description of certain plants or animals.

Now, in the case of organised beings, if you abstract from them those general features which are common to all plants and animals, you arrive at certain general characteristics which are exhibited by all living forms, such as the properties of growth, of reproduction, of sensibility, and so forth. In that way you arrive at the abstract science of biology. In precisely the same way, if in studying social phenomena, we abstract the general features which the different forms of human society possess in common from the concrete examples round us, we get an abstract science of sociology, as distinct from the special social sciences, which deal with certain special phases of the subject, or with certain special forms of social organisms. If this view of the matter is the correct one, then subjects like anthropology and economics form no part of sociology proper. They merely give us the data of the science of sociology, they are the concrete branches of the inquiry, and out of them the abstract science of sociology is formed. That was practically the view of the subject taken by Comte, and it has the support of many of the ablest sociologists of to-day. I would especially mention the American sociologist, Mr. Lester Ward, as having advocated this view with admirable clearness. Such a view seems to me indispensable if we are to have a genuine science of society. Of course, the scientific method is fully available in the special social sciences, but you can only arrive at general principles, at the scientific laws of society, by a process of abstraction applied to the concrete cases you meet with. So that sociology is an abstract science, concerned with social generalisations; and these generalisations are derived from the concrete data furnished by the special social sciences. Hence, of course, Comte's division of the science into social statics and dynamics. Now, granted that social dynamics is concerned with the evolution or development of a science from its lowest to

its highest form, the question is—what are the laws of social development? As Dr. Bridges has shown, in order to discover these laws, we must study the most highly developed social organism known to us, and confine our attention mainly to it, the study of other organisms being regarded as of only subsidiary value, as merely throwing additional light upon the main problem. Hence Comte rightly sought for the laws of social development in the growth of European civilisation. And he showed how that civilisation is the natural result of certain simple factors, the society as a whole displaying much the same characteristic as the individual does, only on a much larger scale. Hence at any given time we should expect to find that the character of the civilisation depends mainly upon the prevalent theories as to the nature of surrounding phenomena.

To my mind, Comte's law of the Three Stages does explain fully the gradual change which has taken place in men's attitude towards these phenomena. It has been said that this law is not enough, that it needs to be supplemented by a conception of scientific law applied to every branch of social science. I quite agree with that, but do not see that Comte's law is in any way invalidated by the criticism. Comte himself never held that this law or the other dynamical laws which he formulated would explain everything in social dynamics. He held, and I think justly, that it was the central law of the evolution of the general human mind, and, since the mental factor is here the supreme one, his law is necessarily of paramount importance. It corresponds indeed, in great measure, to the law of gravitation in astronomy.

After Comte, the greatest name in this subject is that of Spencer. I think that Herbert Spencer did very valuable work by showing, so fully as he did, that the general evolution of civilised society from a primitive condition could be very exactly described as a process of increasing differentiation with accompanying integration. In this way he assimilated the evolution of society with the development of the individual, in the biological sense of the word. The result was that the three main forms of evolution—the cosmical, biological, and sociological—were all brought into line with each other. But the law of evolution which Spencer so successfully applied to social phenomena needs to be supplemented by the historical factor of Filiation, as expounded by Comte.

I say it needs to be supplemented, because there is one all-important difference between cosmical and biological evolution, on the one hand, and social evolution on the other hand. In the former case, you have *unconscious* differentiation and integration going on, and the organism itself has no control over the process. In the other case, you have the same kind of process carried out in a *conscious* manner, and that makes all the difference.

Now, Comte's exposition of the historical method—the method of Filiation—combined with the law of the Three Stages gives us the needed explanation of the difference between the two kinds of evolution. Comte,

that is, explained how and why human civilisation took a certain definite course, and so he gives us what Spencer never attempted—a scientific explanation of all the great historical epochs. In another respect also, I think Comte is far superior to Spencer on points of sociological method. As you know, Spencer opposed Comte's view that the various forms of society were merely to be regarded as stages in the evolution of a single normal type. Now, of course we must recognise that there are generic and specific differences to be found in human societies, but that appears to me to be a question of ethnology rather than of sociology. For instance, in botany and zoology, we group the various organisms into distinct genera and species; whereas in biology one ignores those distinctions, and simply studies the general manifestations of life which are common to all genera and species. In just the same way, in sociology, the differences due to race recede into the background, for the important thing here is—the way in which one generation transmits its intellectual acquirements to its successors. The method of Filiation is the distinguishing mark of social phenomena, and it is a method not confined to any one race of men.

If social dynamics is the science of social evolution, if it is an explanation of the way in which the play of social forces has brought about the rise of social structures and institutions, and an explanation of the constant changes in those structures which result in human progress—then I would say that Comte is the only writer who can be said to have solved the main problems of the subject, as they occur in the history of European civilisation.

In conclusion, I would urge upon the members of this society the great importance of obtaining agreement amongst the students of social science as to the fundamental principles of the subject. Until we are agreed upon these principles, we shall, I fear, do little more than mark time, and shall make very little progress. For that reason, I welcome such discussions as the present one, for they go to the root of the matter. As long as there are several different schools of sociology, the science must of necessity suffer, because of the want of unity and harmony amongst its followers. In the older sciences, in physics and chemistry for example, there is an agreement upon the basic principles of those sciences. Now, that is the state of things which we, the students of the youngest of the fundamental sciences, have to work and strive for.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS

FROM MR. F. CARRELL.

If we consider human acts since the commencement of Western written history, we shall find that one of the main factors of social dynamics has always been the economic. With the exception of a period of the early middle ages, when religion was truly dominant, and the occasional subsequent phases of religious exaltation, social development has always taken place around the central effort of individuals and peoples, primarily to obtain sustenance, and secondarily to acquire property as a source of happiness. Each time that religion interfered with material interests it was set aside: witness the struggle for property at different times between church and kings—that between Henry II. and Thomas à Becket; between Philippe le Bel and Boniface VIII.; of the dispossession of the Papal States, and abrogation of the Concordat in France to-day. Religion did not invent morality, but sanctioned and crystallised its most expedient forms. Morality, being a necessary condition of human existence, would have been evolved without the aid of religion. The most important acts of history were determined by sustentative considerations. Lavisse and Rambaud in their *Historie Générale*, treating of the French Revolution, remark “la question de subsistance se trouve à l’origine de presque toutes les agitations qui contrarièrent ou préoccupèrent le cours de la Révolution.” Private and public morals have always been largely influenced by the facts of possession or non-possession. In the effort for sustenance concessions have ever been demanded from the possessors by the non-possessors, and the social well-being of communities has been considerably increased or diminished according as the concessions have or have not been obtained. The *ultima ratio* of social movement has always been the increase of well-being for the greatest number by the distribution of the pleasurable means which the earth affords. The slow rate of the distribution may be partly accounted for by the enormous difficulty presented by the inequality of individual capacity, and throughout history this difficulty has been manifest. The retardation of the social advance has also been largely due to the antinomy which exists between the conduct necessary to obtain sustenance (and especially superfluous sustenance) for self, and that needful for the constitution of a physically and

mentally efficient society. Sociology, it seems to me, should aim at a classification and advocacy of the conduct which leads to a reconciliation of the two interests, the interest of the individual and the interest of the race.

If, as Dr. Bridges concludes, the sociocracy towards which we are tending rests ultimately on the extension of the positive spirit from the simpler and more general facts of the world to the facts of social and moral life, that sociocracy, I think, must take largely into consideration the great factors of right and wrong contained in the manipulation of the world's wealth.

FROM DR. DESCH.

The paper seems to me to contain a most valuable statement of the scope of practicable studies in social dynamics. The aim of sociologists must be ultimately to reduce social phenomena to laws which shall be valid for the whole human race, and the proposed limitation of the problem to the rise and progress of Western civilisation may at first sight appear to be inconsistent with that aim. In this respect, social statics and social dynamics seem to me to stand on a somewhat different footing. In social statics, the conditions of equilibrium in society are studied, and it is necessary that many different types of equilibrium should be investigated and compared, in order that valid generalisations may be reached. The data required are furnished in part by written history and in part by anthropology.

In social dynamics, on the other hand, the filiation of a long series of successive states has to be studied, and for this purpose the data afforded by Western civilisation, in the sense in which the term is used by Dr. Bridges, are the only available ones. For not only can races without a written history afford no material for such a dynamical study, but even the Oriental civilisations must be excluded from its scope, from the difficulty to the Western mind of entering into the intellectual development of the East. For such a study we shall probably have to wait for the rise of a school of positive sociologists in Asia. But as each generalisation is established, the search for others will thereby be facilitated, and the knowledge required in the study of Western institutions will make the extension of sociological laws to the whole planet merely a question of time.

FROM PROFESSOR J. K. INGRAM

(Late of Trinity College, Dublin).

The meaning now usually attached to the phrase "Philosophy of History" marks a considerable advance in prevailing ideas respecting

sociology. By that name was once habitually designated a congeries of vague precepts, political and moral, deduced from history very much in accordance with individual fancy. Bolingbroke's sentence, "History is philosophy teaching with examples," was often quoted; and isolated acts or policies in the past were directly appealed to as sources for our guidance in the present—the fact being that no social situation ever reproduces itself, and therefore mere imitation of the past cannot direct conduct where the conditions are necessarily different. Biography may stimulate healthy sympathies; but history cannot be safely or usefully studied from that point of view; it must be regarded, not as a mass of examples, but as a series of preparations—stages in a gradual development; and when we aim at practical results, policy must depend on the stage of evolution to which it is intended to apply.

This fact of evolution it is which dictates the necessary division of sociology into social statics and social dynamics. And for a truly scientific treatment the latter—the theory of movement—must be subordinated to, and founded on, the theory of order. But Comte, in his "Positive Philosophy," having to create sociology, with remarkable sagacity insisted mainly on the dynamical theory, as being alone decisive of the question whether social phenomena are regulated by natural law. He therefore, to use his own words, proposed to himself in that work to exhibit in the march of an unbroken sequence the collective destinies of mankind, which had previously been regarded as beyond the reach of explanation and dependent on arbitrary wills, divine or human. He only required for that purpose the more obvious statical laws which since the time of Aristotle had been sufficiently recognised. On the other hand, in his greater work, the "Positive Politics," his aim being to construct in strictly scientific form the theory of society, he gave to social statics its just position as the basis of his treatment of social dynamics—making the latter the study of the development from fundamental germs of the system of life most truly in harmony with the nature and situation of our race. Thus arises the possibility of prevision in sociology; and practical politics, in accordance with the aspiration of Condorcet, is founded on history.

Dr. Bridges sets out the successive stages of this progress. The most important determinant of these stages lies in the fact that mankind has continuously modified its views respecting the order of the world. Some have tried to represent the successive phases of humanity as results of the different material conditions in which man successively exists; but it is the intellect, stimulated no doubt by our practical needs, which determines the nature of the movement. Hence, it may be remarked, human history becomes more than anything else a history of religion.

Dr. Bridges, in giving an outline of social dynamics, has omitted the first stage in the movement—that, namely, of fetishism, the universally spontaneous religion of nature. This omission is, I think, not to be regretted,

because in sociological discussion attention is generally too much directed to the very early phenomena of society, with respect to which we have not anything like complete documentary data; and the progress of the world in the historic periods is habitually little considered, while obscure subjects, such as totemism, exogamy, and the like, obtain a disproportionate prominence. Still, fetishism must always be supposed as lying at the beginning of the social movement; and the historian, though he may not study it directly, must keep it in view, as Grote acknowledged in his *History of Greece*. From this primary and instinctive belief, which assimilates the world to man, the human race passes commonly through astrolatry to theologism—the governing wills which produce phenomena being no longer conceived as seated in the bodies which exhibit them, but exercised by beings distinct from the bodies. It is at this point, which coincides with the first large growth of abstract thought, that Dr. Bridges takes up the movement. Polytheism is the earliest form of theology, and under favouring circumstances produces the theocratic system of life. As a result of the recognition of gods arises the full institution of the priesthood, which had existed only in germ under astrolatry, the wills of the divinities having to be explained, and the homage of the worshipper presented, by an accomplished expert. Theocracy, to which society everywhere tended at a certain stage, but which was fully evolved only in special cases, was succeeded by systems which were essentially Western, and made important contributions to the education of mankind—Greece in the intellectual order, Rome in the political, and then the Catholic-Feudal organisation, which aimed at disciplining through feeling the theoretical and practical forces already developed, and really performed that office, though imperfectly. Then came the modern revolution with Protestantism, Deism, and the French crisis, and almost immediately after the last of these, the birth of positivism, which ultimately rose into the religion of humanity.

It will be seen that I accept the scheme of social dynamics which has been described by Dr. Bridges. This long evolution must, of course, be closely studied in its several stages. The sociologist must exhibit their respective characters, and show how each originated from its predecessor. But it is never to be forgotten that the value of history lies in its entirety, not in the view it presents of any one or more of the successive periods which have been enumerated. The historical question is—How did we come to be what we are? the political question—What should now be our collective action? and we cannot have a satisfactory answer to either without a survey of the whole progression. The past forms, in fact, the initiation of humanity, which has now arrived at an intelligent consciousness of her destiny, and can henceforth systematise her conduct so as to bring it into full conformity with the order of the world to which she is subject, whilst it is her endless task to improve it.

FROM PRINCIPAL JEVONS

(*Of the University of Durham*).

History implies sequences. The generalisation of which Dr. Bridges speaks implies similarity in the sequences. Similarity in the sequences implies some similarity in the agents and their circumstances. But the difficulty of detecting the similarity recognises that there are differences, and admits them to be great.

Supposing, however, we got over the difficulty and detected and generalised the similarity of the sequences (*e.g.*, as in the statement that monarchy tends to pass into oligarchy, and oligarchy into democracy), in what sense would a collection of such generalisations form philosophy of history? Might not the resultant knowledge be more properly designated science? For it would consist of statements of what tends to happen, *e.g.*, that all societies tend to move in the same direction.

But Dr. Bridges takes Western civilisation as unique, traces its development, and suggests, we may infer from what it has done something that it never yet has done. From this point of view, then, philosophy of history escapes from being science: it is not because any society has known sociocracy that Dr. Bridges suggests we are going to have it, but because he thinks he sees it coming. Philosophy of history then is the art of forecasting the future of history, or the history of the future.

The trouble is that no forecast, of sufficient magnitude or importance to claim to be philosophy of history, is likely to be verified in the life-time of the maker.

Next, is the state of things we forecast bound to come inevitably? or is coming dependent on circumstances which this generation has it in its power to bring about or to prevent, as it chooses? In fact, is sociocracy an ideal which may be realised, if we work for it; or have we no choice whether we will work for it or against it? If the latter, then we as agents need not bother about it. If the former, then we can feel no certainty that it must come; we can only say we mean it to come. Of course, we may judge its chance of realisation, and say we not only mean it to come, but believe that it will. That is a forecast (involving faith) which may or may not be correct. But in what sense is making forecasts philosophy of history?

Perhaps the philosophy of history is rather concerned with the value of the ideals which have, consciously or unconsciously, been pursued by societies than with the time and space relations of the steps which have been taken to realise those ideals, or with the forecasts of the future which have been made by those who have the faith to pursue their ideal.

DR. BRIDGES' REPLY.

With regard to the danger, indicated by Professor Garvie, of confounding philosophy and science, I would point out that, in the subject now before us, they tend inevitably to fuse together. Social dynamic, dealing with the whole destiny of man's past and future, aims inevitably at those comprehensive and general views of life which constitute philosophy, in the positive sense of the word, as distinct from science; while rigidly adhering to scientific method in testing those views. The passage from theocracy to sociocracy during the two thousand years of Western history, from Greece to our own time, is said to be too large a generalisation. Undoubtedly it is one that must be tested by close inspection of the facts. Such inspection will show, as I believe, a continuous tendency to render our social life less amenable to supernatural influences, and more amenable to human influences, under the guidance of Greek science, Roman law, and modern industry.

Mr. Robertson challenges my conclusions on too many points to admit of full discussion of our differences in the brief space available for a reply. He is perhaps right in his remark that I have not laid sufficient stress on the part which economic forces have played in the development of society. He is, I venture to think, mistaken in failing to appreciate the contrast between the Christian Church of Western Europe, between the tenth and thirteenth centuries, and the theocracies of ancient days, as a power independent of and often antagonistic to the state, a contrast so strongly emphasised in the *De Monarchia* of Dante. The Stoics of Greece and Rome, and the prophets of Judea, offered, as Mr. Robertson rightly says, a forecast of this independent spiritual power. As to Julius Cæsar and Napoleon, I can but think that Mr. Robertson has failed to grasp the great needs of the Western world when Cæsar's career began. It was to save civilisation from barbaric invasion, and to incorporate hostile and warring states into a peaceful society; abolishing at the same time the tyrannous rule of a corrupt aristocracy. By his conquest of Gaul and

his victory over Pompey, Cæsar established civilised and peaceful government in the West for four centuries, and thus prepared the way for the progress of modern Europe. In every respect Napoleon's career was the reverse of this. It was at once destructive and retrogressive. The progress connected with it was due solely to the revolutionary statesmen of the Convention, whose work he was not able entirely to undo.

Mr. Trevelyan abandons all hope of a philosophy of history. To have a philosophy of history, he observes, we must have a philosophy; and what two members of any active sociological society can be expected to have the same philosophy? This seems rather a despairing view to take. Perhaps the establishment of a philosophy of history would itself be a large step towards the acceptance of a sound philosophy. His fundamental objection, however, is that I am wrong in making the alleged decline of the theocratic element in government paramount to all other considerations. He mentions many other classes of social facts which in his opinion are equally entitled to be regarded as measures of social progress, as for instance the position of women, the degree of popular education, the development of science and art, the progress towards a state of peace, and many others. I entirely concur with Mr. Trevelyan as to the importance of these classes of social phenomena, as well as of many others that might be named. Taken together, they constitute the province with which the science of sociology has to deal. But I submit that it is a matter of paramount importance to decide upon the point of view from which these various phenomena should be studied. One standpoint, that of the ancient world, is to regard them as arranged by divine command in a particular way: that is the standpoint of Hammurabi and of the books of Moses. Another standpoint is that which leads us to examine which arrangement of them will provide the most perfect development of man and society: that is the standpoint of sociocracy.

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

THE PLACE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN A CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGES.

By Mr. J. S. STUART-GLENNIE.

Communicated to a Meeting of the Sociological Society, held on April 7, 1905, at the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Clare Market, W.C., Professor GEDDES in the Chair.

Utinam, quemadmodum universi mundi facies in conspectum venit, ita philosophiæ tota nobis posset occurrere simillimum mundo spectaculum.—SENECA, Epist. lxxxix.

§ I. Opinions expressed in various papers and recorded discussions in the Society's first published volume encourage me to hope that a systematic classification of knowledges, with special reference to the interrelations of the social sciences and their relations to the other sciences, may not be unwelcome. For I submit that the longer and deeper one's consideration of what are vaguely called the Social Sciences, the more impossible it will be found to give any satisfactory clearness to the special aims of these sciences respectively, and their interrelations, without assigning them definite places in a general Classification of the Sciences. That undoubtedly is a very serious task. For all the greater classifications hitherto of systematised knowledges differ as related to what are essentially, whatever their pretensions, either materialistic or idealistic theories of causation. A solution, therefore, of the problem of the reconciliation of these hitherto antagonistic philosophies lies at the root of any now adequate and verifiable general classification of the sciences. But in the last of the three papers now offered it will be pointed out that the historical antagonism between materialism and idealism dates only from the sixth century B.C., and has been but the working-out of a completer theory of causation, by means of the usual differentiating

process of all evolution (III., § 11). The reconciliation of that antagonism, and therewith the possibility of a truer theory of causation, and hence more adequate theory of evolution, will, I venture to say, be fundamentally a verifiable theory of Mind and Matter as—not separable entities, but mutually implying properties of Substance; or, more definitely, a verifiable conception and definition of *Atoms*, as having at once psychical and physical properties. How far the writer's hypothesis as to Atoms is verifiable, it would be irrelevant here to consider. But as the classification of the sciences, which is here set forth, is based on that hypothesis, it must be briefly stated and illustrated.

§ 2. I have defined *Atoms* as *mutually determining Centres of correlatively integrating and differentiating Efforts acting through radiating Pressures*. Effort, defined as the force which is manifested in Reaction, Conation and Volition, is conceived as arising from a Sentientcy which has two ultimate forms—Unease due to internal, and Unease due to external, conditions—and the idea of Effort thus becomes the basis of a general psychological theory. Further, the term Pressure being used to include every kind of force which acts between bodies—whether possessed of elastic, electric, or vitalistic properties—the idea of Pressure becomes the basis of a correlative general mechanical theory. Or, one may use the term “energy” instead of pressure, defining it in the usual way as “capacity of doing work;” and, in this case, effort would be defined as “capacity of directing work.” But in illustration of this hypothesis I can here only say that, if the deductions therefrom are found verifiable, it will afford the basis of a theory at once of Solidarity and Individuality. For mutual determination implies mutual attraction, or approach of bodies to each other; and what the law of that mutual approach is, Newton discovered. No less may this hypothesis be the basis of a theory of individuality, infinitely varied in its character and degree of complexity. For, on this hypothesis, Heredity will appear to be internally determined by that direction of Effort to Self-conservation which arises from sense of disturbed internal conditions; and Variation, to be similarly

determined by that direction of Effort to Self-differentiation which arises from sense of changed external conditions. In the very notion, indeed, of mutual determination, both the self-conservation and the self-differentiation of bodies is implied, and likewise definite relations between these two forms of activity. And I venture, therefore, to hope that these definite conceptions, both of the internal, psychological or psychical element, and of the external, mechanical or physical element, and of their correlation, may contribute in some degree to the discovery of the most socially important of all laws yet undisclosed, the Laws of Heredity and of Variation.*

§ 3. To proceed now to that question of Classification which we have here especially to deal with. Three sets of facts—Motion, Metamorphosis, and Socialisation, and three stages of effort, the Reactional, the Conational, and the Volitional—must be distinguished. And systematised knowledges of these sets of facts and stages of effort constitute three Kingdoms of Sciences, which may be named respectively the Kinetical, the Evolutional, and the Ethical. Each of these *kingdoms* is divis-

* Whatever may be the fate of this hypothesis as to Substance, its elaboration has been the work of a lifetime. Its first stage was signalled by my "Proposal of a General Mechanical Theory," founded on the conception of Atoms as mutually determining centres of pressure. This paper was read under the presidency of the late Sir W. R. Hamilton, of Quarterion fame, in the Mathematical Section of the British Association at its Aberdeen meeting, September, 1859. Its ideas were subsequently developed in the January, April, May, and July numbers of the *Philosophical Magazine*, 1861. And I submit that this hypothesis of mutually-determining centres of pressure is now verified by the facts which have led to the conception of *Atoms* as electrons; and that the conception of *Inertia*, which it implies, seems to be also in essential accordance with the electro-magnetic theory of that fundamental property of matter. "The principle of Inertia," I wrote (*Phil. Mag.*, April, 1861, p. 276), "is the fundamental scientific principle of non-spontaneity, or the impossibility of a motion undetermined by a change in the previously existing relations of the body. The inertia of a body or molecule is simply the relation between its pressure and that of the bodies acting upon it. . . . It appears, therefore, to betray some obscurity of thought to speak of '*intrinsic or absolute inertia*.'" See Buchner's "Elektronentheorie," Wind's "Electronen en Materie," and *Nature*, 22nd June and 5th Oct., 1905. The long middle stage of the elaboration of this hypothesis may be found more particularly marked in my "New Philosophy of History," 1873. As for its later stages, the specialisation of research in England made it for long impossible to find publication in any scientific periodical for an hypothesis and theory which touched at once on physical, psychological and biological problems. At last, however, a paper on this hypothesis, written last year, was published in this year's April number of *Mind*; but without my being favoured with a proof, or opportunity of correcting it as I should otherwise have done. It is, however, now admitted that with Sentientcy there is ever motion. And with Janet ("L'Automatisme psychologique," p. 481), I ask whether with motion there is not ever some degree or mode of Sentientcy?

ible into three *orders* of sciences. For, in the investigation of motion, of metamorphosis and of socialisation, we may consider either Forms, or Causes, or Means—means of increasing power through knowledge—may, in other words, consider either formal and abstract, or causal and concrete, or practical and technical relations. Each of these *orders* of relations will be found to give us at least three *classes* of sciences. But the systematic arrangement of the sciences of more limited scope constituting each of these classes is beyond both the purpose of this paper and the ability of its author.

§4. Considering, then, first, the cardinal science of Motion, or kingdom of the kinetical sciences, we find it divisible into the following orders, and each of these into the following classes, of sciences. The first order of kinetical sciences, that of the formal or abstract relations of Motion, is Mathematics; and these relations, as relations of Position—Discontinuous, Continuous, and Ordered—form respectively the contents of three classes of sciences—Arithmetic, Algebraic, and Tactic.* The second order of kinetical sciences, that of the causal or concrete relations of Motion, may be named Energetics †; and the determining conditions of the three forms of motion—Translation, ‡ Transformation, and Assimilation—constitute the contents respectively of its three classes of sciences—Mechanics, Physics § and Organics. Lastly the third order of

* This is the classification of the mathematical sciences, set forth in my "New Philosophy of History," 1873 (pp. 102, 103, 104 and 125). But I have had no opportunity of duly studying the many important works on mathematics published since then, such as Russell's "Principles," Newcomb's "Modern Mathematical Thought," Veronese's "Grundzüge der Geometrie von mehreren Dimensionen," etc. And if I had had such an opportunity, that old classification would probably have been considerably modified, and certainly, at all events, the name given to the third class of these sciences.

† The term "energetics" was introduced by Rankine to signify "a science whose subjects are material bodies and physical phenomena in general" (*Edin. Phil. Journ.*, N.S., 1855, p. 125); and in my papers in the *Philosophical Magazine*, 1861, I used it to denote "the general theory of mechanical forces," or as I otherwise expressed it, "the theory of mechanical as distinguished from biological forces."

‡ The term "translation" is here (as in the above referred to classification) used to include rotation, and compound translation and rotation. See Poinso, "Théorie nouvelle de la Rotation des Corps," p. 13.

§ In accordance with my original "Proposal of a General Mechanical Theory of Physics and Chemics" (*British Association Transactions*, 1859), as likewise with the increasing tendency that may now, at last, be remarked to fusion of physical and chemical methods, I would use the

kinetical sciences, that of the practical or technical relations of Motion—a general science, not yet, so far as I am aware, named—may perhaps be not unfitly termed Ergatechnics* ; and these practical relations, as relations of Operation—Mechanical, Physical, and Cultural—form respectively the contents of three classes of sciences, for which perhaps I may further coin the names—Méchanotechnic,† Dynamechnic,‡ and Biototechnic.§ But, more clearly than to the ear, all the above may be conveyed to the eye, by such a tabular presentment as the following.

THE CARDINAL SCIENCE OF MOTION, OR THE KINGDOM OF THE KINETICAL SCIENCES.

ORDER I.—Formal relations of Position, discontinuous, continuous, and ordered define and classify	ORDER II.—Causal relations of Motion, translational, transformational, and assimilational define and classify	ORDER III.—Practical relations of Operation, mechanical, physical, and cultural define and classify
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MATHEMATICS.

ENERGETICS.

ERGATECHNICS.

Class (I) ARITHMETIC.
 „ (II) ALGEBRAIC.
 „ (III) TACTIC (?).

Class (I) MECHANICS.
 „ (II) PHYSICS.
 „ (III) ORGANICS.

Class (I) MECHANOTECHNIC.
 „ (II) DYNAMOTECHNIC.
 „ (III) BIOTOTECHNIC.

§ 5. We proceed next to the classification of the cardinal science of Metamorphosis, the central or evolutionary kingdom of the sciences. We found that the formal or abstract relations of motion might be defined as relations of Position, discontinuous, continuous, and ordered ; and it has already (§ 3) been suggested that the formal or abstract relations of Metamorphosis may be defined as relations of Effort—Reactional, Conational, and Volitional. The science of these relations would be, in effect, a new evolutionary psychology, and may be fitly,

term “physics” to connote *molecular mechanics* generally, and hence as inclusive of chemics. “Mechanics,” in its special signification, is the science of the motions of masses, solid, liquid or gaseous—or *molar mechanics*. In “organics” both these departments of energetics are combined ; and as to the relation of organics to biology, see below § 9.

* From *Ἔργα-τέχναι* = Industry-arts.

† From *Μηχανή-τέχνη* = Machine-craft.

‡ From *Δύναμις-τέχνη* = (Power or) Engine-craft.

§ From *Βίωσις-τέχνη* = Life-craft (including, besides the agricultural sciences, hygienic and therapeutic).

perhaps, termed Orectics,* while its constituent sciences, defined by the mechanical, instinctive, and rational stages of effort above distinguished, may be named respectively Alogistic,† Methodic,‡ and Logistic.§ The causal or concrete relations of Metamorphosis define the second order of evolutionary sciences, to which may be given the general name, Metamorphics; and these relations being distinguishable as Stellar, Vitalistic, and Humanital, the constituent sciences of metamorphics are Kosmology, Biology, and Anthropology. Finally, the practical or technical relations of Metamorphosis may be defined as relations of Origination—Geographic, Biotographic, and Ethnographic—the subjects respectively of the sub-sciences of a new general science which may be, perhaps, not inaptly termed Demiourgics.|| For through the Demiourgic Sciences, Man—changing still more than he has yet done the *Antlitz der Erde* to suit his convenience; exterminating harmful and creating useful species, and reacting in sternly disciplinary, but beneficently educative, fashion, on his own births—will become the true Demiourgos. A tabular form will again present all this more clearly, and it will also facilitate comparison and appreciation of the correspondence between the departments of the three kingdoms of the sciences—the kinetical, the evolutionary, and (that to the classification of which we presently proceed) the ethical kingdom.

* From "Ορεξις, propulsion, desire. "Orectic" is a term already used in British philosophy—by Lord Monboddo ("Antient Metaphysics," vol. i, p. 110) and also by myself ("New Philosophy of History," p. 120). But in neither case had the term the general sense which I would now attach to it as the name of the general science of evolutionary psychology—the general science of what Aristotelians might call "orective faculties," Germans "bestrebungsvermögen," or the late Sir W. Hamilton might have called "exertive faculties."

† From ἀλόγιστος, unreasoning.

‡ From μέθοδος (μέτα δόξος), the way after or method. The conational efforts of plants and animals are neither simply reactions nor, still less, volitions; but are, for the most part, blind strivings which, on happening to be successful in procuring ease, are repeated and thus become inherited *methods* of action or instincts. Compare such facts as those set forth in Jennings' "Contributions to the Study of the Behaviour of Lower Organisms," or *Nature*, May 4, 1905, p. 3.

§ From λογιστικός, skilled in reasoning. This will include the three logics which, in my classification of 1873, I distinguished by the names epagogic, dialectic, and synthetic. But it has still to be applied to the word-formations and word-orders of languages.

|| From δημιουργικός, of, or belonging to a δημιουργός (δημιος ἔργον) a workman, fabricator, or maker. In Gnostic Philosophy δημιουργός came to signify the Maker of the World.

THE CARDINAL SCIENCE OF METAMORPHOSIS, OR THE KINGDOM OF THE EVOLUTIONAL SCIENCES.

ORDER I.—Formal relations of Effort, reactional, conational, and volitional define and classify

ORDER II.—Causal relations of Metamorphosis, stellar, vitalistic, and humanital define and classify

ORDER III.—Practical relations of Origination, geographic, biographic, and ethnographic define and classify

ORECTICS.

METAMORPHICS.

DEMIOURGICS.

Class (I) ALOGISTIC.
 „ (II) METHODIC.
 „ (III) LOGISTIC.

Class (I) KOSMOLOGY.
 „ (II) BIOLOGY.
 „ (III) ANTHROPOLOGY.

Class (I) GEOMETABOLIC.*
 „ (II) BIOTOMETABOLIC.
 „ (III) ANTHROPOMETABOLIC.

§ 6. The cardinal science of Socialisation, or kingdom of the ethical sciences, differs from the two other cardinal sciences, or kingdoms of the sciences, in dealing, not with what has been, is, and may be, but with what should be; yet it is in the most intimate manner connected with the kinetical and evolutionary kingdoms of the sciences, and particularly with the highest class of the latter sciences—anthropology—inasmuch as its conclusions as to what should be are deduced from generalisations as to what has been, is, and may be. The first order of ethical sciences, that of the formal or abstract relations of Socialisation is Æsthetics; and these relations, as relations of Beauty distinguishable as Visual, Acoustic, and Actional, form respectively the contents of three classes of sciences—Theamatic † (treating of beauty in form, colour, and construction); Music (treating of beauty in rhythm, melody, and harmony), and Dramatic ‡ (treating of beauty in movement, personation, and plot). The second order of ethical sciences, that of the causal or concrete relations of a just Socialisation may be termed Dikaiosynics, § and the conditions—proprietary, familial, and political—under which, as revealed by the anthropological sciences, justice may be realised, form

* From μεταβολή, a change or changing (μεταβάλλω, to change).

† From θέαμα, a sight, spectacle (θεάομαι, to view or gaze at).

‡ From δράμα, a deed or act (δράω, to do).

§ From δικαιοσύνη, justice.

the contents of three classes of sciences—Economics,* Deontics,† and Juridics.‡ Finally, the third order of ethical sciences, that of the practical or technical relations of Socialisation, as relations of Education, may be, perhaps, not inappropriately named Kalliagogics;§ and education, being conceived, as first clearly by Plato, as comprehending the whole of life, and being distinguishable therefore as scholastical, communal, and directional, three classes of educational sciences are suggested which may be named respectively Paidagogic,|| Politagogic,¶ and Archontagogic.** With the tabular presentments of the kinetical, and the evolutional, we may now compare this of the ethical, kingdom of the sciences.

THE CARDINAL SCIENCE OF SOCIALISATION, OR THE
KINGDOM OF THE ETHICAL SCIENCES.

ORDER I. — Formal relations of Beauty, visual, acoustic, and actional define and classify	ORDER II.—Causal relations of Socialisation, proprietarial, familial, and political define and classify	ORDER III.—Practical relations of Education, scholastical, communal, and directional define and classify
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ÆSTHETICS.

DIKAIOSYNICS.

KALLIAGOGICS.

Class (I) THEAMATIC.
 „ (II) MUSIC.
 „ (III) DRAMATIC.

Class (I) ECONOMICS.
 „ (II) DEONTICS.
 „ (III) JURIDICS.

Class (I) PAIDAGOGIC.
 „ (II) POLITAGOGIC.
 „ (III) ARCHONTAGOGIC.

§ 7. Reflecting on the kingdoms of the sciences, as in the three foregoing paragraphs set forth in their respective orders and classes, it will, I trust, be first of all evident that the tale of the sciences is not only lengthened by certain necessary complements, but that its components are connected by the most intimate and reciprocally implying relations; and further,

* From *δικος*, and *νόμος* = house-law.

† From *δέον*, that which is right. Compare Bentham's "Deontology," vol. i, p. 21.

‡ "Juridics"—to be distinguished, as the science of political laws as they ought to be, from jurisprudence, the science of political laws as they are.

§ From *ἀγωγή*, leading, training, educating, and the prefix *καλλι* (*καλός*), fair.

|| From *παῖς*, a boy or girl.

¶ From *πολίτης*, a citizen or fellow-citizen. As to its relation to "civics" see below, § 9, note.*

** From *ἄρχων*, a ruler, or magistrate.

what here more immediately concerns us, that the sciences are presented as *all of them* either indirectly or directly social sciences. For must not the practical or technical sciences of *operation* (ergatechnics), *origination* (demiourgics), and *education* (kalliagogics) be recognised as social sciences? But, if so, then must not the sciences, on the development of which these practical sciences are so closely dependent, be recognised as, indirectly at least, social sciences—the causal or concrete sciences of energetics, metamorphics, and dikaiosynics, nay, also, the formal or abstract sciences of mathematics, orectics, and æsthetics? And, if the kinetical, evolutionary, and ethical kingdoms of sciences be compared with respect to their social contents and value, must they not be recognised as syntheses of sciences which, from being but preparatorily, like the first, become like the second, to a much larger degree, and finally, like the third, altogether social sciences? And thus, if the fundamental characteristic of this classification of the sciences is an hypothesis as to atoms which it is hoped will be found to reconcile at length the antagonism between idealism and materialism, its most evident feature should be its linking together of all the sciences by practical aims at increasing in all directions man's power in order to—in the great words of Bacon—*utilitatis et amplitudinis humanæ fundamenta moliri*.*

§ 8. But if such is the place of the social sciences in this classification of knowledges, what or where, it may be asked, is the place of Sociology? I trust that I may be borne with if I defend that exclusion of it from the list of sciences which may have been remarked in the above classification. And for this reason. In accordance with a general characteristic of evolution the scientific conception of man's history, for which the term "sociology" stands, was at first undifferentiated. In the words of Mr. Branford himself, the equally keen and learned defender of the term "sociology," the general conception of the science includes two purposes: "The first of these is a speculative one—the understanding and interpreting of the unfolding process or drama of social evolution. . . . The

* *Instaur. Mag. Pref.*, Works (Ellis and Spedding), v. i., p. 132.

second purpose is practical—the utilisation of our knowledge, gathered and unified from its manifold sources for the directing, as far as may be, and in part controlling, of these evolutionary processes” (p. 15). As elsewhere stated in the first volume of our Society’s Papers, the sociological evolutionist is “concerned primarily with origins, but ultimately and supremely with ideals” (p. 134). The affirmation that such entirely different occupations and purposes are indicated by the term “sociology” is verified in detail by the extreme heterogeneousness of the “sociological” literature classified by the editors of the *Année Sociologique*, and found also explicitly or implicitly in the quoted classifications of other leading periodicals of sociology (pp. 13, 14). I venture to submit that the generality of the application of this word “sociology” is now its condemnation as a scientific term. Yet, notwithstanding its barbaric mongrelism, it may still desirably live, not only to serve, in Mr. Branford’s words, “the vague purposes of popular usage” (p. 10), but that definitely twofold purpose of our Sociological Society which he has so admirably defined in the terms above cited.

§9. Such two purposes, however, as those defined by Mr. Branford as characterising sociology must surely be held to differentiate it at once into two sciences belonging certainly to intimately connected, but yet to quite different, kingdoms—the evolutionary and ethical. We have three vast evolutionary spectacles presented to us—the evolution of the kosmos, including, of course, that of our planet; the evolution of life, in all the infinite variety of earth’s offspring, with which we may, perhaps, in the future, be able to compare its forms on other stars; and the evolution of man—a yet other order of infinities in the variety of its phenomena and consequent subjects of study. And as kosmology is the accepted name of the first, and biology of the second of the great evolutionary sciences, it seems to me, I confess, little short of perversity to give to the third and greatest of these sciences any other name than anthropology. Organics, the most complex and highest of the sub-sciences of energetics, deals with the structures and functions of all the higher forms of life, including its human

forms in their kinetical, rather than, as does biology, in their evolutionary aspect. But the evolutionary science of biology, as I conceive it, hands over to another and still higher science, those brothers or cousins of the great anthropoids who appear to have sprung, like them, from a Gibbon or Hylobatian stock, but the anterior sutures of whose skulls did, because of an inherent capacity of cerebral growth, *not* close early as in the case of kindred distinguished as anthropoid. From this capacity, and its physical consequence or correlate, came the ability to make use of articulate language, hence to think, and hence to become truly man, Ἄνθρωπος. And surely, therefore, the science of the evolution of this wonderful new being should be termed anthropology in accordance with the generally accepted meaning of the term as denoting "the study of man in a wide and all-embracing sense" rather than, as I regret to find it called by Professor Geddes, "sociology."*

§ 10. The habits and customs, morals and social institutions of animals are treated of in departments of biology, and so, in departments of anthropology, are similar phenomena in the various races, and at the various stages of the development, of man. But with man the thinker, a question arises unknown to his elder brethren, the lower animals. It is a question as to habits and customs, morals and social institutions, not as they have been or are, but as they should be in order to satisfy man's ideal of justice. As we have seen, there is in the undifferentiated popular conception of sociology, a notion, more or less clear, of such a utilisation of knowledge as may ameliorate social conditions. But in a far more definite and systematic manner will this idea be realised when sociology, as popularly conceived, has differentiated into an evolutionary science, an anthropology, aiming at and discovering the laws of man's history, and an ethical science, a dikaiosynics, as I have termed it, aiming at and discovering the conditions of just institutions. Such a science will derive its views as to

* "Viewed as science," Professor Geddes says, "civics is that branch of sociology which deals with cities" (*Sociological Papers*, vol. i, p. 111). I should say that thus viewed it is a branch of anthropology (or anthropography?). So far as civics is practically connected with training in citizenship it would belong to politagogic (above, § 6 note 9).

justice from the facts revealed by anthropology as to man's nature and history, and will therefore base its suggested regulations on corollaries from the facts thus revealed. These facts will certainly modify, if not revolutionise, many current conceptions—that, for instance, as to equality—and hence, as to what *is* justice. For, if the capacities of human races and sexes differ, then duties differ, and with duties rights. And only in the institutional recognition of complementary differences both in races and in sexes will justice be realised.

§ 11. The second title of Plato's greatest dialogue was significant: "The Republic," or "Concerning Justice." But it is only through such knowledge as was inaccessible to Plato, but is, at length, in the way of becoming accessible to us, that an approximation may, perhaps, be made to that realisation of justice of which Plato dreamt. For however interesting imaginary utopias may be, from Plato's to Mr. Wells's, the only true guide to the realisation of Plato's dream must be discovered Laws of History. Only in surveying the facts of the past and present with which the evolutionary sciences, and especially anthropology, deal, can laws be discovered indicative of the forces tending, in greater or less degree, to determine future conditions, and giving, therefore, the means of control and direction. Founded on the kinetical, as are the evolutionary sciences; on these again, as we have seen, are founded the ethical sciences. The evolutionary sciences are thus the centre of the whole movement. Nay, more, the evolutionary sciences—as constituting a cardinal science of metamorphosis of which the theory is verifiably completed only by the solution, at length, of the fundamental problem which has divided idealists and materialists—may be regarded as in their formal and causal divisions, orectics and metamorphics—a verifiable, a scientific metaphysics. And thus the whole system of the sciences, in the classification of them above proposed, may be seen to be but a system of disciplines of which each fulfils an appointed task contributory to the realisation, not only of Plato's dream, but of the dream, I trust, of our Sociological Society—the creation of a World-State the embodiment of Justice.

II.

THE GENERAL HISTORICAL LAWS, THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL BASES OF A SCIENCE OF SOCIALISATION.

By Mr. J. S. STUART-GLENNIE.

Historia testis temporum, lux veritatis, vitæ memoria, magistra vitæ, nuntia vetustatis.—CICERO, *Orat.*, lib. ii., c. 2.

1. But suppose that the intimate connection of the evolutional with the ethical sciences has been so far shown in the foregoing paper, on the place of the social sciences in a classification of knowledges there remains the question, as to what the bonds of connection definitely are which unite sociology as an evolutional, with sociology as an ethical, science? I reply that these bonds are those general historical Laws of Racial Evolution, of Intellectual Development, and of Social Progress which a fully developed anthropology will be at length able verifiably to set forth; and from which the corollaries will be drawn that will be the bases of an ethical sociology, a new science of socialisation of which the central department may be termed *dikaiosynics*, or the science of justice. The gaps in our ethnological and economic knowledge appear as yet to be too great to justify definite theories as to the first and third of these hitherto undiscovered laws. But it is otherwise, as I venture to think, with respect to the central law. And relying on the law of correlation suggested by Vico—the master-idea, as it was called by Comte, of universal social interconnection—we may feel confident that, if the law of intellectual development is discovered, we shall not only gain

at once a general conception, at least, of what the character will be of the laws of racial evolution and economic progress, but be thus guided towards their discovery.

2. The very question, however, as to whether a verifiable law of historical intellectual development is discoverable should, if duly weighed, suspend interest in most of the philosophical, and in all the theological, questions of the day till some definite answer is found for so penetrating a query. Theological and philosophical questions are concerned with certain notions of the causes of change. But even in our apparently ultimate notions of the causes of change, there may be a change. And till opinions can be shown to be in accordance with the discovered historical law of that change, what objective authority is there that can attest their truth? Setting about, therefore, the discovery of such a law, the preliminary investigations necessary will soon be manifest. The first must be an investigation of the conditions of change, from the simplest phenomena of motion upwards, which have led to the modern scientific conception of causation. And the investigation next in importance will be into primitive conceptions of Nature, or, in more abstract terms, of the causes of events. The scientific, and relatively ultimate, conception of Nature will be found to differ from the relatively primitive conception, still discoverable in folklore. We shall have thus before us the two extreme historical forms of the conception of causation. And we must then proceed to that long course of research through which may haply be discovered the law of the change from the earlier to the later notion of the causes of change.

3. Within my present limits, only the results of successive investigations can be stated, and only general references given to works in which verifying facts are detailed. The result of research towards the clearer definition of the scientific conception of causation was generalised in the following terms: ("The New Philosophy of History," 1873) *Every existent determines, and is determined by, co-existents.* And the scientific conception of causation was thus defined as essentially a conception of reciprocal action or mutual determination. Long retarded by current notions with respect to primitive conceptions of

Nature, and especially by those set forth by Professor Tylor under the name of "animism," and by Mr. Spencer in his "ghost theory," I entered at last on an original investigation of the subject. This I did in first making a two-volumed collection of Greek folkpoesy, in all its various classes; and then exhaustively analysing this collection and comparing results with conclusions derived more particularly from Keltic folkpoesy. The general result was that in primitive Folk-conceptions of Nature—so far as they can be witnessed to by the oldest folkpoesies of which the languages can be thoroughly mastered—the notion of reciprocal action was no less prominent than in latest Culture-conceptions. This conclusion from the collection and analysis of folkpoesies has been corroborated by the similar conclusion of Dr. Frazer from his collection and analysis of folk-customs ("The Golden Bough"). And I venture to think that it forms an immense advance towards true conceptions of intellectual development.

4. But, while congratulating myself on the immense corroboration given by Dr. Frazer's masterly researches in folk-custom to the general conclusion as to primitive conceptions set forth in my commentaries on Greek folkpoesy, the differences that separate our respective theories are very great.* These differences in our conclusions are, first, with respect to the history of science; secondly, with respect to the history of religion; and thirdly, with respect to the general movement of intellectual development, and the future of religion. But, considering the very narrow limits within which I am in this paper confined, and my desire to raise illuminating discussion on what I think questions of the highest importance, I shall merely state briefly my own conclusions with reference more particularly to the different conclusions of Dr. Frazer on the points above named. For us, as sociologists, the chief interest of anthropology lies in its affording us scientific bases for ethical reconstruction. And sufficiently evident must be the very direct and important bearing of the historical questions

* These I first more fully and definitely pointed out in a paper on "Magic, Religion, and Science," read at the Glasgow meeting of the British Association, 1901, and reported at considerable length in the *Times*, 21st September, 1901.

above indicated on sociology regarded as an ethical science.

5. First, then, as to the history of Science. With reference to that primitive stage of conceptions of Nature which Dr. Frazer briefly indicates as that of Magic, while I prefer to call it that of Panzoism, he thus writes:—"Its fundamental conception is identical with that of modern science; underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of Nature. The magician does not doubt . . . that the performance of the proper ceremony accompanied by the appropriate spell will inevitably be attended by the desired results . . . he supplicates no higher power, he sues the favour of no fickle and wayward being; he abases himself before no awful deity . . . thus the analogy between the magical and the scientific conceptions of the world is close." With all this I entirely agree, and, though more briefly, I have expressed an identical conclusion. Both magic and science conceive things as acting and reacting on each other, and both, therefore, offer to man the power of controlling events through knowledge of the ways in which things do act and react on each other. But there is an essential difference between the conception of reciprocal action in magic and the conception of it in science; a difference which Dr. Frazer has nowhere, I believe, stated; yet a difference which, if observed, gives quite a new conception of the history of science. Both recognise transformation as the result of reciprocal action. But for the magician this transformation may be unlimited, and is at least altogether indefinite. The man of science, on the contrary, knows that in every transformation there is an equivalence of loss and gain. And we have thus already a glimpse at least of the Law of Historical Intellectual Development. *It is the law of the advance from a quantitatively undetermined, to a quantitatively determined, conception of reciprocal action, or mutual determination.*

6. Secondly, as to the history of Religion. Dr. Frazer, deriving it directly from magic, thus writes:—"In magic man depends on his own strength to meet the difficulties and dangers that beset him on every side. He believes in a certain established order of Nature, on which he can surely count, and

which he can manipulate for his own ends. When he discovers his mistake, when he recognises sadly that both the order of Nature which he had assumed, and the control which he had believed himself to exercise over it, were purely imaginary, he ceases to rely on his own intelligence and his own unaided efforts, and throws himself humbly on the mercy of certain great invisible beings behind the veil of Nature, to whom he now ascribes all those far-reaching powers which he once arrogated to himself. Thus in the acuter minds, magic is gradually superseded by religion, which explains the succession of natural phenomena as regulated by the will, the passion, or caprice of spiritual beings, like man in kind though vastly superior to him in power."

7. In the case of individual magicians, "conversions" of this sort may not improbably have occasionally occurred. That anything of the sort occurred at any dateable epoch on such a large scale as to verify this hypothesis as a theory of the development of religion out of magic, Dr. Frazer himself does not affirm. And it is by reference to two amply verifiable historical facts that I would chiefly explain the origin of religion in the sense in which Dr. Frazer uses the term in the passage just quoted. The first of these facts is that, side by side with actual objects there existed in primitive, as indeed there exists also in modern, conceptions of Nature, fictional objects. Actual objects, whether by us termed animate or inanimate, are all, as both folkpoesy and folk-custom show, conceived as responsively Sentient Powers. Fictional objects are such as are the creation of the imagination under emotional impressions excited by remarkable things, persons, or events. The creation of such fictional objects goes on to this day, in the case particularly of every poet. There is only this difference: the modern poet does not project his creations into an invisible world where he believes that they actually exist; in other words, he distinguishes subjective and objective, and this distinction is not usually made in the earliest stages of intellectual development. But the beings thus created by the folk-imagination under strong emotional impressions are *not* in the earliest, or as I term it panzoist, stage conceived as super-

natural beings. I have therefore called them simply Supernal Beings. And in corroboration of this distinction I quote from Dr. Frazer: "It is true that magic often deals with spirits . . . but whenever it does so . . . it constrains or coerces, instead of conciliating or propitiating them as religion would do."

8. But how came these supernal to be developed into the supernatural beings of religion, defined as by Dr. Frazer, namely, as "propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man, and believed to direct and control the course of Nature and of human life?" The answer will be found in what recent research, and particularly Assyriological and Egyptological research, has shown to have been the actual conditions of the origin of civilisation, and the solution, therefore, of the great problem of the origin of progressive societies. Before, however, stating these conditions, I may summarily characterise the chief theories hitherto of the origin of civilisation. First, (1) there was the *family-origin* theory of Plato and Aristotle. After the long night of the Christian "dark ages," there was (2) the sixteenth century *conquest-origin* theory of Bodin; next, (3) the seventeenth and eighteenth century *contract-origin* theories of Hooker, Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke, etc., to Rousseau; then (4) the contemporary *savage-origin* theories of Professor Tylor, Lord Avebury, and Mr. Spencer. And there is now offered (5) that generalisation of the results of the above indicated recent researches which I have stated as a theory of the Conflict of Higher and Lower Races, and which, in contradistinction to the theories of the origin of civilisation above characterised, may be called a *colonist-origin* theory.* Let me point out how the facts generalised in this theory would naturally develop the supernal beings of panzoism into the supernatural beings of polytheism.

9. Of the primary conditions of the origin of civilisation, we have tolerably full knowledge only in the case of those civilisations of Chaldea and of Egypt, from which perhaps all other civilisations have been directly or indirectly derived.

* See generally the essays in my editions of "Greek Folkpoesy"; on "Matriarchy," in "The Women and Folklore of Turkey"; and in the *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 1887; of the *Congresses of Orientalists*, 1891 and 1892; and of the *Folklore Congress*, 1891, etc.

And from the native traditions published in Greek, as one of the consequences of the conquest of Alexander the Great, by the learned priests and historians, the Chaldean Berossos, and the Egyptian Manetho, verified as these traditions have been by recent research, it appears certain that the main primary condition of the origin of civilisation was the settlement of Colonists of a Higher Fair Race among Aborigines of a Lower Dark Race. But is it not evident that the very success of the higher race in acquiring influence over the lower race, and compelling them to work under direction, would break up their native customs, and hence weaken or destroy the sanctions of their native morality? How, then, were these sanctions to be replaced, and the domination of the higher race assured, save by more effective fears than the small number of the immigrants could excite? Do we not, in our own colonisings and civilisings, follow something of the same method still as the Chaldean and Egyptian initiators of civilisation some ten thousand years ago? Account must, indeed, be taken of very many causes if one would explain the origin of any of the great religions of civilisation. But it can hardly, I think, be doubted that one very potent cause of the development of homely supernal, into stately supernatural, beings, worshipped in elaborate and grandly spectacular rites was the need, the very practical and pressing need of cultivating every germ of the emotions of reverence, awe, and fear, in order to the due subordination and discipline of the lower races.

10. Owing to this due discipline of the lower races as workers, capital was accumulated, leisure was obtained by the higher race, and the economic conditions were created of that intellectual development which now began. Having regard to all these facts I have defined civilisation in these terms. *Civilisation is such a relation between higher and lower races (or, at a later period, classes of the same race) as results in enforced organisation of food-production and -distribution, followed by such economic conditions as make possible the planning and execution of great public works, the invention and development of phonetic writing, and the initiation of intellectual development generally.* But as civilised and progressive societies

began, they maintained themselves, through the conflict not only of races (or classes), but of ideas. Assyriological and Egyptological researches are more and more adding to our knowledge of the development of the earlier religions through the conflict between the primitive magical, or panzoist, and the new supernaturalist conception of Nature. The successive stages in this development cannot be, as yet, clearly distinguished. But one great epoch can be signalled—that which I was, I believe, the first, thirty-two years ago (“New Philosophy of History,” 1873), to point out as having occurred in the sixth (or fifth-sixth) century B.C. in all the countries of civilisation from the Hoangho to the Tiber. There arose then, as revolts against the old religions of outward observance or custom, new religions of inward purification or conscience—in China, Confucianism; in India, Buddhism; in Persia, Zoroastrianism; in Syria, Yahvehism (as a religion of the people rather than merely of the prophets), and changes of a similar character in the religions also of Egypt, of Greece, and of Italy.

11. But the new religions of Further Asia—though so far like the new religions of Hither Asia and Europe, that they were, in their initiation at least, religions of conscience rather than of custom—were yet clearly distinguishable from the Western religions in one very important point. They retained in a much greater degree the fundamental conception of Panzoism, the conception of immanence of power in Nature itself. The new religions, on the other hand, of Western Asia and Europe, the Yahvehism of the sixth century B.C.; the Christianity of half a millennium later; and the Islamism after another half millennium, were, for the first time, supernatural religions, not in their popular forms only, but in their essential principle, the conception, not of a Power immanent in, but of a Creator independent of, Nature. But in the same sixth century B.C. in which supernaturalism thus, under the influence of the intellectually lower Semitic race, began first to acquire its historical influence in the West, that Greek philosophy and science arose of which the inmost principle was the inherency of power in Nature itself, and hence, law as opposed to miracle. As Aristotle, with Baconian wit, expressed it,

“Nature is not episodic in its phenomena like a bad tragedy” (“Metaph.,” xiii, 3).

12. I have not here space even to name the great epochs of the conflict in the west of nearly two millenniums and a half between Semitic Supernaturalism and Aryan Naturalism. For I have still, with reference to Dr. Frazer's definition of religion and conception of intellectual development, to set forth the very different conclusions to which I have myself been led. “By religion,” he says, “I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life. And,” he continues, “in this sense it will readily be perceived that religion is opposed in principle both to magic and to science.” I submit that, taking a wider and more general view of the facts, religion must be defined as connoting both a species of individual ideal and a system of social observances. This species of ideal cannot, I think, be defined, with due and verifiable comprehensiveness, otherwise than as—*an ideal of conduct derived from some general conception of the environments of existence*. Thus defined in its individual reference, religion may, in its social reference, be thus further defined—*the observances in which environment-conceptions, determined in their forms by physical and social conditions, are authoritatively expressed*. For in all stages of human society, there is a more or less definite ideal of conduct, and system of observances; the former doctrinally determined by, and the latter ritually expressing, conceptions of the environments of existence. Of these environments, the notion of “powers superior to man that have to be propitiated,” is, after all, but a conception. Other conceptions may be no less essentially religious in both their individual and social effects. And defining religion by reference, not to what is only a form of conceiving the environments of existence, but to such conceptions generally, I submit that, instead of being destroyed, it will be immeasurably exalted by science.

13. With Dr. Frazer's definition of religion is naturally closely connected his conception of intellectual development. He has come to the conclusion that the law of intellectual development, or expressing it in his own words, “that the

movement of the higher thought, so far as we can trace it, has on the whole, been from magic, through religion, to science." As has been seen, I submit that it can be historically shown that "the movement of the higher thought has been," not "through religion," but through increasing and more accurate knowledge, from the unquantified conception of reciprocal action distinctive of magic, to the quantified conception of it distinctive of science. But the results of last century's researches enable one thus rather to state the Law of Historical Intellectual Development.

I. Man's primitive consciousness of nature seems to be characterised by two correlative sets of conceptions occasioned respectively by (1) sensations and (2) emotions. The former are intuitions of objects (whether by us distinguished as animate or inanimate) as Sentient Powers; and the latter are creations of Supernal (not as yet supernatural) Beings expressing the impressions made (1) by nature (2) by tradition, and (3) by events. And as both Sentient Powers and Supernal Beings are conceived as exerting, and acted on by, quantitatively undetermined influences, the primitive consciousness of nature may be defined as one of quantitatively undetermined universal interaction, and distinguished as Panzoism.

II. Intellectual development, independent of further increased size of the cerebrum, originated as a result of those conflicts of higher and lower races, in which civilisation originated (about perhaps 8000 B.C.) and has proceeded by means of the conflicts of ideas derived from these conflicts of races. Not as yet, perhaps, are the earlier stages of these conflicts more definitely characterisable than as developments of the antagonisms latent in primitive Panzoism, and progressively manifest in the history of the Nature-religions, or Naturianism. But that latest Stage, initiated by the New Religions, and New Philosophies of the Sixth Century B.C., and their concomitant changes, may be more particularly characterised as marked, in the West especially, by the now definite differentiation and determined conflict of Naturalist and Supernaturalist conceptions.

III. And, so far as can be inferred from man's primitive conceptions of nature, and from the results of the ages of conflict characteristic of the transitional æon of intellectual development,

the future stage to which these conflicts seem to have led up, will be marked by the victory of a more adequate Naturalism, or rather Kosmianism, distinguished by verifiable Conceptions of quantitatively determined, instead of, as primitively, quantitatively undetermined, Universal Interaction; by recognition of the fictional character of Supernatural Ideals and Sanctions; and by acceptance of such only as are verifiable deductions from Man's Psychology and History.

III.

THE APPLICATION OF GENERAL HISTORICAL LAWS TO CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.

By Mr. J. S. STUART-GLENNIE.

Mirique sunt orbis et quasi circumitus in rebus publicis commutationum et vicissitudinum; quos cum cognosse sapientis est tum veroprospicere impendentes in gubernanda republica, moderantem cursum, atque in sua potestate retinentem, magni cujusdam civis et divini pœne est viri.—CICERO, De Rep., i, 29.

§ I. But can a law so general as that just stated of historical intellectual development—a law so abstract as a *law of change in our notions of the causes of change*—can such a law be practically applied to the interpretation of contemporary events? As has been seen in our first paper, the whole aim of our classification of the sciences has been facilitation of the acquisition of knowledge of Nature and of Man in order, not only to a truer world-consciousness, but to a better ordering of human society. But can so general and abstract an historical law as that just stated as the main anthropological basis of sociology as an ethical science practically enlighten us with respect to, for instance, the historical character of the greatest of contemporary events—the Russo-Japanese War—with respect to the forces and tendencies brought into action by this great European-Asian conflict, and with respect to the policy it is desirable to pursue in order to retain in our power, and moderate the course of, these world-embracing forces and tendencies? I venture to say that the law of intellectual development which I have suggested can—though possibly stated in a better form, and especially when more fully verified—thus enlighten us; yet only on one condition. This condition is similar to that which made possible the interpretation of the facts of

the planetary orbits by Newton's law of universal gravitation. These facts had first to be accurately ascertained, and then formally stated in such periodic laws as were those of Kepler. To seek to apply so general a law as that of intellectual development to the interpretation of current crude notions about contemporary events would be like what would have been an attempt to apply such a law as Newton's to the unscientifically observed planetary phenomena. And we must first attempt to do for our crude notions about human movements what Tycho Brahe and then Kepler did for the previously prevailing crude notions about planetary motions. Is anything of the kind possible?

§ 2. An essential part of the discovery of the law of intellectual development was the deduction of such an historical differentiation as was verified in the discovery of that great Asian-European movement which I have called the Moral Revolution of the sixth century B.C. Immediately following on this came consideration of the two thousand five hundred years since then as a single historical age and an attempt to discover a periodic law in the succession of its European-Asian phenomena. And after thirty-two years of European researches more and more clearly verifying the periodic law of this age, which I first suggested in 1869* and more fully in 1873,† I think I may venture to say that for man's history also a Keplerian law has been discovered, not only amply verifiable as an empirical, but capable of conversion into a rational, law by derivation from facts still more general. This periodic law—forming, as it does, a general framework for all special histories both Asian and European since the sixth century B.C.‡—may be thus formulated. *The age of approximately two millenniums and a half initiated by the Asian-European revolution of*

* "Arthurian Localities," Introduction, pp. 2 and 3.

† "The New Philosophy of History," pp. 223, etc. "If we consider as one great historical age the two thousand four hundred years extending from the sixth century before, to our own nineteenth century after, Christ . . . we shall find it fall naturally into five periods of about five centuries each." And these I then proceeded to characterise.

‡ I have, in various essays, shown how the greater events of special histories so different as those, for instance, of Scotland, of the Republic of Ragusa, and of the Greek language, synchronise with the greater events of general history.

the fifth-sixth century B.C. (say 550-450) is naturally divisible into five periods, of about five hundred years each, by great epochs of Asian-European revolution and interaction, of which the constructive forces have reached their culmination and undergone a destructive decline previous to the approach of the next revolutionary epoch. It is this periodic law which, definitely connecting the contemporary European-Asian war with the five great European-Asian conflicts which have preceded it since the opening of the present age, two thousand five hundred years ago, enables us, as will in the sequel be seen, to apply even so general a law as that enunciated in the foregoing paper to these contemporary movements. For in verifying this periodic law it will, I think, be found that the different character and results in Asia and Europe respectively of the so far similar revolutionary movements in both regions in the fifth-sixth century B.C. have been the bases of the conflicts, not of armies only, but of ideas, which have since then periodically marked the historical relations of Europe and Asia. And *not*, therefore, in insisting on what the late Professor Freeman, and his disciples, Mr. Bryce and Professor Bury, call "the fact that the old Roman Empire did not cease to exist until the year 1453,"* a "fact" which innumerable inscriptions out of the more than 200,000 of the "Corpus" disprove; but only in tracing events since that fifth-sixth century to the revolutionary movements of that great epoch, and to the Asian-European conflicts naturally arising from the different results of these movements in Asia and in Europe respectively can the unity of the history of civilisation for the last two thousand five hundred years be verifiably demonstrated, and its future, with any reasonable confidence, foretold.

§ 3. But when I first drew attention, more than a generation ago, to the extraordinary synchronisms of events which, throughout the wide region from the Hoangho to the Tiber, constituted the Asian-European revolution of the fifth-sixth century B.C.—Confucianism in China, Buddhism in India, Zoroastrianism in Persia, Yahvehism in Judea, and the variously changed worships of Egypt, of Greece, and of Rome—not only

* See Bury, "Later Roman Empire." Preface.

were my dates questioned, but, when these were found indisputable, doubt was thrown on the significance of the synchronistic character of the events by attributing them, though not religious only, but economic and political, to merely accidental coincidence. And this was, indeed, as natural as it was futile, considering the almost undisputed reign at that time of the theory of spontaneous and sporadic origins of civilisation from homogeneous communities of savages. Proceeding, however, to the examination of that theory, and finally working out what I have distinguished as the colonist-origin theory of civilisation, the synchronisms which had long to myself seemed inexplicable took at length another aspect. For if, as seemed established by great classes of facts, civilisation originated in the conflict, peaceable rather than warlike, of higher fair and lower dark races, at an approximately dateable epoch, and at such ascertained twin-centres as Chaldea and Egypt; and if it was, from these centres, traceably spread by commerce and colonisation, east and west; then—seeing that a century means about three generations of such racial conflict as, by our fundamental theory, is in its results, the chief biological cause of the rise, and hence also of the fall, of civilisations—we can, in some degree, understand how similar changes in derivative civilisations should be approximately synchronous. Nor can we, I think, but recognise biological analogies in this colonist-origin theory of the birth of progressive societies in the conflict of two complementarily different races, the one with more of initiating, the other with more of elaborating, capacity; nor decline to see also biological analogies in such a periodic law as that above stated, a law of revolutionary epochs opening periods marked by culminating sub-epochs, followed by decline and disintegration till the approach of a new reconstructive epoch.

§ 4. I cannot, however, venture as yet to state the periodic law of the age initiated in the sixth century B.C. in more exact phraseology than that which I have above used. Not only because the law of racial evolution—as important an element in collective, as bodily evolution is in individual, history—is still obscure; but also because one can, as yet, but roughly indicate the date of the initiation of this age in terms of that

Christian chronology which we owe to the little monk of the sixth century B.C., Dionysius Exiguus, Denis le Petit. In order to its more exact determination a far more remote date must be determined—the date of the origin of civilisation. That now means for us the certainly approximately ascertainable date of the origin of enforced and progressive social organisation in those Euphratean and Nilotic valleys from which all subsequent civilisations would appear to have directly or indirectly derived their chief sources. There can, however, I think, be no question among those who believe in a unity of history more adequately conceived than by Professor Freeman, and hence, in such a science of history as he had no notion of, that all civilised peoples will ultimately have a common chronology. Such a common chronology will be founded on whatever date—8000 B.C. or some other—may be settled on as most closely approximating to that of the origin of civilisation, in the sense above defined (II, §10). The fixing of this earlier date would, of course, affect that fixed on as the date of that Asian-European revolution which closed the ages of the truly ancient, and initiated what, relatively thereto, are modern civilisations. Even when, however, this later date is more exactly fixed the periodic law above stated in general terms will hardly, considering the multitude of determining elements—not only intellectual, but also racial, and economic—be found at once very simple and exactly expressible. But though the connected series of greater and lesser revolutionary epochs indicated by this periodic law may not be found capable of mathematical expression, I venture to think that, even in its present general form, it should be found illuminating.

§ 5. Note, then, the five great half-millennial epochs of Asian-European conflicts which have preceded that of which Japan and Russia have been the protagonists, and which, as having preceded, should throw light upon that sixth epoch of conflict of which we have witnessed the preliminary scenes. The first, or fifth-sixth century B.C. epoch—confining to the West my characterisation here of the Asian-European epochs—the epoch of Cyrus the Great, and his immediate successors, opened the Græco-Roman Classical half-millennium that culmi-

nated in the world-conquest of Alexander, and that other world-conquest, far greater and more permanent, of Aristotle. The second, that of Julius and Augustus Cæsar, and the Græco-Judean religion of Christianity, opened the Imperial Roman half-millennium that culminated in the establishment of this new religion by Constantine. The third, or sixth-seventh century B.C. epoch, that of Mohammed and the first conquests of Islam, opened the Mediæval half-millennium of the brilliant Byzantine Empire* and the barbarous western anarchy only temporarily abated by Charlemagne. The fourth, that of the Asiatic conquests of the Turks as the new champions of Islam, and of the first crusade (1096) taking up their challenge, opened the Feudal half-millennium that culminated in all the greater works of Scholastic Philosophy, Chivalric Romance, and Gothic Architecture.† The fifth (or sixteenth century) epoch of Asian-European conflict, that in which the victory of Hither Asia under the Turks was practically acquiesced in—her victory, not only in destroying all the Asiatic kingdoms of the crusaders, but in establishing her religion and civilisation in Europe itself—opened the modern Industrial half-millennium of discovered access to, and attack on, Further Asia. Not flattering either to European pride or Christian faith was the result of this fifth great Asian-European conflict—the repulse by Hither Asia of the crusades eight times renewed, and the substitution of the Crescent for the Cross in an Asiatic Europe enslaved for five hundred years.

§ 6. And now, from the standpoint of a periodic law embracing all the great half-millennial conflicts that have preceded that sixth great Asian-European conflict opened by the Russo-Japanese war, such as these are the facts we observe.

* Those interested in the question as to the use of the term "Byzantine" I would refer to my essay on "Greek Folkspeech," sect. i., "The Past Development of Greek," pp. 428-441, appended to vol. i of the third edition of "Greek Folkpoesy," 1896.

† "Le XIe siècle avait été témoin, en philosophie, en poésie, en architecture, d'une renaissance comme l'humanité en compte peu dans ses longs souvenirs. Le XIIe et XIIIe siècle avait développé ce germe fécond, le XIVe et le XVe siècle en avaient vu la décadence," Renan, "L'Art du Moyen Age et les Causes de sa Décadence," in the "Rev. des Deux Mondes," t. xl, p. 203. But the movement of rebirth, culmination, and decay which Renan thus so long ago (1862) pointed out in this half millennium (1000-1500) can, I think, be with equal clearness demonstrated in all the half-millennium periods of the age initiated in the fifth-sixth century B.C.

First, at opposite extremities of the Asian continent, European and Further-Asian civilisations, the earlier origins of which are traceable in part at least to the same ultimate Chaldean sources, while their later origins, and especially their moral and religious origins, must be dated from the same great Asian-European revolution of two thousand five hundred years ago. Secondly, an isolated, and, save for raids on each by Central Asian hordes, unconnected development of each of these great and varied, but ever contrasted Asian and European civilisations for more than two thousand years previously to our sixteenth century. Thirdly, since that century, commercial relations and increased knowledge, but also with successful European encroachments, a rising tide of fanatical hatred of "foreign devils," which, however regrettable, is sign at least of such vigorous national life as might be expected in so deeply-rooted civilisations. Fourthly, such a cynical use of Christian missions, by most European Powers deliberately supported, and by all unscrupulously used, for political ends; such a moral degeneration, rather than elevation, of commerce by Christian traders; and such atrocities of rapine and of rape by Christian armies* as—condemned as all these scandals are by the precepts common to the Christian and Chinese sacred books, though five hundred years earlier by the latter than by the former—make submission to Christian Powers, as morally their superiors, impossible. And, fifthly, after long and sullen submission to the only European superiority recognised—material superiority in warlike weapons, discipline, and strategy—not only the self-education of a champion-people of their race in all the warlike arts by which this Further Asian, has been humiliated by European, civilisation, but such a demonstration of their mastery of these arts in conflict even with the biggest of their European bullies as cannot but increase a thousandfold the enthusiasm of their evangelism of education and revolt in such organisations as that of the Tung-wen-houi. From such his-

* Herr Kunert, for instance, one of the editors of *Vorwärts* and a member of the Reichstag, produced on his recent trial a number of witnesses who testified to such atrocities by German soldiers. Not, however, because he had stated what was not true but because of his alleged intention to libel the German army, he has been sentenced at Halle to three months imprisonment. And as his statements could not be refuted he has appealed to a higher Court.

torical and contemporary facts as these we cannot, I think, but conclude that it has been, and is, in the drift of things that the Japanese, with all the peoples of Further Asia in race, language, and religion akin to them, will sooner or later, consciously or unconsciously, separately or unitedly, be fighting for a new and freely determined development of their native Asiatic religions and civilisations.*

§ 7. Thus as, long years ago, I predicted from this periodic law, there has occurred in this twentieth century another of those great European-Asian conflicts which, at intervals of approximately half a millennium, have marked the age since the upbreak of the truly ancient civilisations in the sixth century B.C. What more can be predicted from this law? First, that, as from every one of the five past great epochs of European-Asian war a new social world has arisen and been during the subsequent half-millennium elaborated; and as, further, the concomitants and consequences of these wars have been of an increasingly revolutionary character, we may reasonably expect, as the outcome of this war, nothing less than a new Europe as well as a new Asia. Secondly, that, powerfuller as are now the dynastic, economic, and religious interests menaced by efforts at the creation of a new social world than were these interests at previous revolutionary epochs, greater also will be the general European and—as the European “Great Powers” are all world-powers—world-wide war of opposition to the creation of such a new social order. And, thirdly, that, as every one of these great half-millennial epochs has been marked by revolutionary religious changes determined doubtless by, but also determining, economic and political changes—similarly marked by such changes, and by what has been their invariable result, a wider unification of mankind—similarly marked by revolutionary religious changes and their more

* With respect to the ignorant contempt with which the so-called “yellow races” have been and are even still spoken of, I may note that I have distinguished human races into two species—the hyperborean, or fair, and equatorian, or dark; and the fair races into the so-called yellow, white, and red races of Asia, Europe, and America respectively; and I have pointed out that *all* these fair races, on coming into contact with lower races, have been initiators of civilisation. See, for instance, my note on “The Ethnology of the White Races,” in “Greek Folkpoesy,” vol. i, 1896.

world-unifying results will be the contemporary epoch of this twentieth century. But while this periodic law may predict such changes, it is for another and higher law to predict the essential character of these religious changes. Such a higher law is that of historical intellectual development above stated (II, § 13); and this paper will conclude with some considerations on the probability of the near approach of such a Future Stage of intellectual development and religious belief as that characterised in the third clause of that higher Law.

§ 8. First, however, note the facts verifying that prediction of a new Europe as well as a new Asia which seems authorised by this periodic law, and which, more than a quarter of a century ago, I ventured to illustrate in a politico-ethnographical map.* We shall find that with the free development and unification of Further Asia is intimately connected the free development and unification of Europe. And one fact alone should deprive this statement of a paradoxical character. That fact is, that the Powers most opposed—perhaps one might say alone seriously opposed—to the free development and ultimate federation of the States of Further Asia are those most opposed likewise to the free development of the European Nationalities and to the formation of States and Federations of States determined, not by dynastic interests, but by such natural conditions as combined geographical and ethnographical, religious, economic, and historic relations. The Powers that, by their common opposition to national development in Europe, no less than in Further Asia, link together the destinies of Further Asia and of Asia's European promontory are, I need hardly say, Russia, Germany and Austria, and especially the two former. What are all the nationalist struggles under the four European empires—those just named, and that of Turkey—but evidences of forces tending to the upbreak of these empires through the formation of States at least as much in accordance

* See "Europe and Asia: Discussions of the Eastern Question in Travels through Independent, Turkish, and Austrian Illyria," Chapman and Hall, 1879. In this work I was, I believe, the first to treat the Eastern Question—then currently discussed as a question of bitter Turcophile or Russophile partisanship—"as the question of a readjustment of the relations of Europe and Asia to each other, and of both to Africa—a readjustment involving that of the States of Europe to each other and of the States of Asia." (Preface.)

with natural divisions in Eastern, as are already the States of Western, Europe? And the weakening of the chief of these despotic empires by its Further-Asian foe has already roused the oppressed Nationalities not only of South-Eastern but of North-Eastern Europe, Russia itself, to renewed efforts at emancipation. There is thus undoubtedly truth in the phrase, "The Yellow Peril," but it is a menace, not to the European peoples, but to the European despotisms.

§ 9. These will, however, die hard. And vaguely as has hitherto loomed on the political horizon a general European, and therefore world-wide, war, its fatality will assume very definite outlines if we consider the probable consequences of the already achieved results of this sixth European-Asian conflict. Defeated in Further Asia by Japan, and encountered on the British Indian Frontier not only by a re-organised Army, but by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the aims of Russian Foreign Policy will be redirected to the realisation of Pan-Slavic dreams of unification. The Tsardom, however, will probably first be transformed or overthrown. For Russia will probably begin the new European Revolution as France began the last, more than a century ago. Sooner or later these Russian National aims will come into conflict with German Imperial ambitions. And the way will thus be prepared for that general Nationalist and Socialist Revolution which will create the United States of Europe. It would be out of place here to go further into these political forecasts. But, in the meantime, may no dynastic connections with despotic dynasties fetter British sympathies with, and so far as possible aid of, struggling European Nationalities; and may our Far-Eastern Alliance have its due complement in a North-Western Alliance—an alliance with our nearest Continental kindred, the Scandinavians and the Dutch, both connoted by the old Latin writers under the name *Saxones*, and in race and language far more closely connected with us, Kelto-Saxons or Kelto-Northmen as we are, than with the Slavo-Germans of the Empire.

§ 10. But by far the most important of all the predictions which we may found on this periodic law is that of revolutionary religious changes, which will be again, as they

have been at all the previous great epochs of European-Asian conflict, the very core, heart and soul of the new progressive movement, and moral cause of a wider unification of mankind than ever previously achieved. Such was evidently the character and the result of the Buddhism of the first Asian-European epoch; of the Christianity of the second, and of the Islamism of the third of these epochs; and if we consider the new proselytising movements of, or derived from, each of these great religions at the fourth and fifth epochs of European-Asian conflict, we shall find these half-millennial periods also marked by wider and wider unifications. Effective in this direction were material causes; but so they will again be. In the new and ever-developing physical means of rapid transport and communication, and new and ever-developing physical means of discovering and exchanging the treasures of earth's wealth, material forces already exist making possible such a larger unification of mankind as has never previously existed, or been even approached. And do there not also already exist—though undoubtedly along with the opposing enthusiasms which make a general war inevitable—the beginnings, to say the least, of religious changes of the most revolutionary character, and such as will supply the moral forces the duly unifying action of which has been made possible by the material forces just indicated? Note, first, the ever advancing disintegration, not merely by scientific theories, but by the whole atmosphere of modern life, of the Christian theological theory of the origin and history of the kosmos, and of man, its highest offspring on this planet. Secondly, note the similarly advancing disintegration by European science among the more educated, and among the uneducated by Christian missions, of all the greater Asiatic religions, except Islamism; while, at the same time, the enthusiastic patriotism, the result of Asiatic success in the European-Asian conflict, will certainly drive rather to the reformation of native, than to the adoption of foreign, religions. And note, thirdly, such an increasingly synthetic character in scientific theories, whether of Nature or of Man, as promise to make of them, not the dissolvents merely of the old ideals, but the very bases of a new ideal, a New Religion of which the

contemporary religions, duly reformed, or transformed, will be but sects. In order, however, to understand the intellectual character of the age to which our epoch belongs, and hence truly to foresee its outcome, we must, as already said, have recourse to a higher law than that which has simply enabled us to set in order our historical facts.

§ 11. It is the two later stages of the law of historical intellectual development, stated in my second paper, which at once explain the essential character of, and are themselves verified by, the facts set in order by our periodic law. As I wrote in 1873, with reference to the age since the sixth century B.C., "we shall, I think, find its various phenomena with wonderful clearness generalised as a manifold differentiation working up to such an integration as will, in the variously outwrought conception of mutual determination, mark that third age of humanity, towards the opening of which, in the establishment of new syntheses, philosophical, religious and social, we should seem to be approaching."* Among the greater of the differentiations dating from the sixth century B.C., or subsequent centuries, may be named the differentiation of European from Asiatic civilisation; the differentiation of philosophy from religion; the differentiation of culture-religions into theisms (those of Europe and Hither Asia) and pantheisms or atheisms (Central and Further Asia); the differentiation in the West particularly, of a theistic culture-religion from a panzoistic folk-religion,† and the differentiation of philosophies into idealisms and materialisms. The history of intellectual development during these past two thousand five hundred years, and particularly in the succession of these differentiated philosophies, has been no mere futile see-saw, but has, notwithstanding all its backslidings, especially during the Christian "dark ages," worked out at length the scientific conception of mutual determination or reciprocal action—a conception which I have above (II, § 3) expressed in the formula, *Every existent determines, and is determined by, co-existents.*

* "The New Philosophy of History," p. 223.

† See my essays on "The Survival of Paganism," in the second and third editions of "Greek Folkpoesy."

The fundamental implication of this conception is that of inherency of power in Nature itself. This implication there is also both in the panzoism of folk-religions and the pantheism of culture-religions. The fundamental conceptions, therefore, of science find no such antagonism in the Eastern pantheistic and atheistic religions as they have found, and of the most remorselessly persecuting character, in Western Christianity. Hence the triumph of scientific conceptions might appear to be the certain result of the present epoch of Asian-European conflict. But considerable as our knowledge is of intellectual development, great is still our ignorance as to racial evolution, the result of the perennial conflict of higher and lower races and sexes. This being so, we have no assurance that, as in the fall of the Roman Empire and the triumph of Christianity, there will not again be a victory of all lower elements. The very possibility, however, of this, and the triumph of one of the many feminine Spiritisms now competing for popular favour, should rouse men to a manlier earnestness of scientific thought and social purpose. And the law of the correlation of phenomena might then assure us that the conception of mutual determination, worked out in a philosophical, would speedily be worked out also in a religious* and in a social synthesis.

J. S. STUART-GLENNIE.

* With reference to such a religious synthesis, I may, perhaps, be permitted to quote the conclusion of my lecture on "The Law of Historical Intellectual Development," under the auspices of the "Ecole Internationale de l'Exposition," Paris, September, 1900. "But if such a Law as I have stated should indeed be found verifiable, would not the intellectual history of mankind appear as a sublime though tragic struggle, through vicissitudes the most terrible, yet a struggle ever onwards to a true world-consciousness? Should, however, this be admitted, then, may we not regard this struggle as not so much ours as the struggle of the Kosmos itself to ever truer self-consciousness? Would not such a view so transform all our ideas of Nature and of Life as to create a New Ideal, a New Religion, and a New Art no more opposed to, but inspired by Science? In a higher way than even by recognising with Laplace man's 'propre grandeur dans l'extreme petitesse de la base qui lui a servi pour mesurer les cieux,' may we not now console ourselves for the loss of the false aggrandisement given by theological notions? For if, in beholding the starry day of the Universe, we feel ourselves to be but infinitesimal microbes, may we not console ourselves with the thought of our capacity of attaining, as parts of that Kosmos, an ever more approximately true World-consciousness, and therewith of becoming ever more duly conscious of its and our infinity and eternity?"—*The International Monthly*, April, 1901, pp. 462-3.

DISCUSSION

Professor GEDDES, speaking from the Chair, before the reading of the paper, said: I very much regret to intimate Mr. Glennie's personal excuses to the Society and the meeting. He intended to travel from Switzerland, where he is at present, to read his papers, but health and weather have prevented him.

In his absence I may say a few words towards introducing these papers. Need I remind you of that sociological division, one of the master thoughts of Comte, and which I take to be essential to the whole conception of the science, that every society worth the name must possess something both of a temporal and of a spiritual power; and that as we always find chiefs and people of the temporal order, whatever we call them, barons and serfs it may be at one period, capitalists and labourers at another, but always organisers and operatives—so in the spiritual order there are two well characterised classes, one essentially characterised by a preponderance of the intellectual activities, and the other by the preponderance of the emotional and sympathetic life. These two classes Comte called broadly "thinkers" and "workers," without of course insisting that there was any absolute separation of mind or function, much less of sex, between these two classes. A kindred division, more expressive also in some ways, dates from the Middle Ages, that of its clergy into "regulars and seculars," the former the monks or nuns in their cloister of meditation, and on the other hand the active priesthood, in the immediate service of the parish or diocese. The modern world knows well its chiefs and people, its organisers and labourers, who carry on the colossal temporal activities of the time. It knows, too, its seculars,—its journalists and politicians, its popularisers and expositors of the sciences. But it necessarily knows little of the regulars who form the more essential, because deeper element of the spiritual power; in our day most characteristically represented by the

original investigator, the student, the thinker, the devotee of pure science or of philosophy, secluded as he almost invariably must be. It is to this rare but invaluable type, that Mr. Stuart-Glennie has essentially belonged, that of the thinker, concerned only secondarily with the application of his thought (although, like the monk, who often took secular orders), he does pass into the consideration of practical affairs as in his third paper.

Again, since every individual is a sociological phenomenon to be investigated and interpreted, and this primarily as regards origin, where exactly are we to place Mr. Stuart-Glennie? I would remind you of that considerable development, not merely of economics, but indeed essentially of sociological thought, which characterised the later 18th century in Scotland; for in this, Adam Smith and David Hume were but the two foremost men of genius amid a goodly symposium of speculative activity, in which names like Huchinson and Ferguson, Kames and Monboddo, and others, are familiar to every student. These notable groups of sociological thinkers were largely in connection with the then active university centres of Glasgow and Edinburgh, but in the next generations, especially the second of the nineteenth century, a kindred activity appeared further north, in the small but intensively intellectual province of Aberdeen, from which there came not only philosophic men of science like Robert Brown, the applied logician whose services towards establishing the natural system of classification earns him from Humboldt the title of *facile princeps botanicorum*, like Lyell too, and Brewster, but pure logicians like James Mill, whose yet more gifted son represented the Aberdonian education in its extract form. Of this second group, the best known has lately passed away in the person of Professor Bain, whose influence has been so important, especially in this University of London. It is to this second group of philosophical and sociological thinkers that Mr. Stuart-Glennie largely belongs, both by tradition and education, and like them, he unites speculative vigour with concrete scientific and social interests—but in his case peculiarly deepened by historical culture and reflection, and verified by travel in many lands.

The initial problem, both for Comte and Spencer, was that of the classification of the sciences, the organisation of all the manifold details of the encyclopædia of human knowledge into an orderly and intelligible scheme; and this great problem, which Comte put in the very forefront of his thought, and which Spencer has so vigorously handled in his own way, is now to-night re-stated for us by Mr. Stuart-Glennie. In this connection

let me remind all who are interested in this great problem, that it has lately been brought anew before the English reading public in a learned and comprehensive volume, by another veteran thinker belonging in some respects to the same group, Professor Flint, of Edinburgh, whose history of the "Philosophy of History" is doubtless well known to many of us, and whose new volume, entitled "Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum," is a history of all the main attempts to present the sciences in terms of rational unity. In this easily accessible volume, you have for the first time, in English at least, a careful and scholarly summary of all the classifications of the sciences, which have appeared from the Greek to modern times; and following upon this we have to-night a paper which continues this same discussion, and which is thus the latest contribution to this important theme. It is true that this subject has fallen out of sight to some extent between those epistemological discussions so attractive to students of philosophy and the more prevalent concentration upon tit-bits of detail from the smallest encyclopædias of that name up to larger ones. But in all of these alike, knowledge has but an alphabetical arrangement; hence the problem of a rational classification of the sciences is one which must come before us once and again. Are we to stand by any one of the existing classifications of the sciences, or are we to amend this? That is the question Mr. Glennie is here bringing before us.

On the subject of his second paper, that of the relation of sociology to ethics, we have a problem at once attractive and practical, indeed urgent and claimant in its interest. Science is of course but in the indicative mood, ethics is essentially in the imperative; and the relation of imperative to indicative is the one which comes up in every moment of life, since it is not sufficient to know; we seek to know that we may act. This relation of knowing and doing has also been considered in the first paper, that on the Classification of the Sciences.

Finally we come to Mr. Glennie's boldest attempt, that of the relation of history to contemporary affairs. Generally speaking, the philosopher of history is more at home in the interpretation of the coming and going of older civilisations; and he does not generally venture on interpretations of the present time. It already makes no small demand upon our intellectual powers and courage, to rise from the common view of history as annals to the philosophic view, that of history as a great world-process of evolution, in which, despite the multifarious variety and complexity of its details, a general tendency is intelligible, and a

general course, therefore, is capable of being laid down. Whether we agree or differ with Mr. Stuart-Glennie as to the interpretation which he offers, I think the fundamental conception of his paper is one worthy of the fullest acceptance among us. It is surely inconceivable that the vast streams of events around us can be but of local or temporary interest, that this stupendous war, for example, can be understood by merely noticing the movements of armies, or the tremendous victories or defeats as seen from either side. The war itself must be included within some greater process, of the larger world-order. The "Law of Generations" has once and again been brought before the student of history, the conception, that is, as a wise pope put it, that "every generation of men is characterised by a different manner of thinking," and if of thinking, so also of acting. The view that history, whether of the past or present, can be largely mapped out in terms of generational and half-generational waves, three, therefore, and six to the century, is one which others, as well as Mr. Glennie, have argued for, so presenting to us the dates which so confused our studious years with their multifarious and unintelligible detail, as essentially the nodal and sub-nodal points in an orderly succession of generations. As the most familiar example of this (I do not say the most chronologically precise) take the outset of the Christian era—the years 1 and 33 and 66—the first the traditional year of the birth of Christ; the next, that assigned to the events on which the Christian religion turns; the next, that of the destruction of Jerusalem. It is a most instructive exercise, but one into which I cannot enter here, to trace these onwards to our own times; but it must here suffice to note that not only have half-generational waves been largely marked out, but larger rhythms have been from time to time suggested. Is it not even necessary, as at any rate a working hypothesis of research, to suspect them? In the vast and complex harmony of astronomic movements, we distinguish larger cycles, as well as smaller ones. May there not then be a greater historic generation than that of the individual generation? May there not be groups of cycles of generations? This then is the speculative hypothesis with which Mr. Stuart-Glennie is grappling; and I think it must be recognised that he has raised a question of the deepest interest to sociologists no less than to historians.

Mr. SWINNY SAID :

In the very interesting papers we have had read either in whole or in part, there are many things I agree with and also a great number I disagree with, and in the small time at my disposal I must rather deal with points of disagreement. Before doing so, I will say that like Mr. Stuart-Glennie, though I have arrived at it through a different process of reasoning, I am anxious to see the free development of the nations of Eastern Asia. On that point I quite agree with him. As to the first paper, I am sorry to say I find myself unable to grasp this complicated scheme of the classification of the Sciences; and therefore, I go on to the second. I do not at all agree that there should be two separate sciences, one apparently for sociology as the interpretation of history, and one for sociology, as a guide to future action. In every science there is the interpretation of phenonema, and a forecast of the future; that is so, not only in sociology, but in chemistry and biology. And if it be said, that here you have the ethical consideration but what you want is to have an ethical system, I reply that there is a separate science of ethics, which is founded no doubt on the science of sociology, but also in a lesser degree on the results of previous sciences, and especially of the science of biology. So that it seems unnecessary to introduce that division into the science of sociology. Well, then, we come to another point. Mr. Stuart-Glennie says that Comte's law of the three stages is unverifiable. If he had said it was untrue that would be a rather different matter. Is there no way of verifying the fact, that a particular science passes through these three stages that Comte lays down. The obvious way to decide that is to consider the history of that science, and if the law were not found to hold, the law would not be unverifiable, it would be untrue. But if it were shewn that the science did pass through these stages, it would be seen that the law held. That is what Comte did with the various sciences, and after him Buckle did the same, and came to the same conclusion as Comte. I am not now dealing with the importance of the law. Let me take one science, the science of sociology, and see whether, in dealing with social phenonema human thought has passed through these three stages. Well I think it can hardly be denied that for a considerable time the social organisation of mankind was attributed to various beings of which there is no scientific proof or disproof, and which ultimately came to be considered as one deity; to that deity were attributed the changes that take place in society. And again, at the present time, as is shown by the foundation of the Sociological Society, it is considered on the contrary that society develops according to fixed laws that can be ascertained. And it is also evident that between these two views there is an intermediate stage represented by many theories, but of which one very prominent one was the theory of the social contract, of which there was no historical proof, but which was assumed from the supposed nature of man and the way things must have come about in the early stages of man's history, and that that answers

to this intermediate stage of which Comte spoke. There you find the three stages. Why should it be said then that the law is unverifiable when every other science can be examined in the same way. It should be remembered that according to Comte this was the spontaneous evolution of human thought. The evolution of the far east has not been spontaneous, having been lately affected by contact with western nations in a more advanced stage of development. Well, I pass to the third paper which we had in full. The idea of the great effect on European civilisation of the interaction between Asia and Europe is not peculiar to Mr. Stuart-Glennie, and was of course put forward long before his time. But when Mr. Stuart-Glennie goes on to say that these interactions have taken place at periods approximately the same, that would seem to imply that the development of society has gone on at approximately the same rate, whereas it has been going on more quickly during the last few centuries than during any centuries that preceded. Mr. Stuart-Glennie seems to neglect the natural evolution of European society when once it has started on the career of modern science. He can hardly say that the continuous progress of modern science has been due to continual interactions with Asia. And he confuses the earlier effects on the civilisation of Europe, where they were direct, with such interactions as arose through the occupation of Egypt and Western Asia and South Eastern Europe by the Turks in the 15th-16th centuries. The effect of that was for the time to deprive Europe of any direct influence on Asia, and it was in order to resume communication with Asia that the people of Europe made their expeditions to America and ultimately to India. That no doubt had a great effect on European civilisation, but it can hardly be said that the results from the discovery of America—our perceiving the greatness of the world which gave us confidence, and showed us how much greater we were than the old world which knew nothing of these vast regions—that fact cannot be attributed to the action of Asia, but to circumstances that arose from our being cut off from Asia for a time; it was not due to the influence of Asia, but to the cessation of that influence; again our being able to penetrate into Asia by a different route was due, not simply and solely to the occupation of Egypt by the Turks and the closing of the old route, but to our industry and science having reached such a point in Europe at that time that we were able to undertake those great voyages for the purpose—to the career of navigation which had begun in Portugal long before the stoppage of the route to Asia by the Turks. So that in choosing these periods of 500 years or so, causes and effects of a very different character seem to have been compared and assimilated by Mr. Stuart-Glennie without any reason.

Mr. W. H. BEVERIDGE SAID:

In criticising any law, I do not think it is necessary to prove that it is untrue. It is enough to prove that it is either untrue or unimportant,

and about most general laws such as this law of the 500 years, it seems quite easy to prove that they are either untrue or unimportant. And that is what Mr. Swinny was showing us; these various 500 year period interactions appear not to have any important points of similarity. I cannot imagine how it is possible to compare the contest between the Russians and Japanese with the contest between the Persians and the Greeks. Which is the civilised and which is the uncivilised power in the case of the Russians and the Japanese? Again, is it true to attribute the change that came over the world in 500 A.D. to Islamism? I should have thought it was more due to the general movement of the people to the north of Europe where Islam did not go and never has been. The more one thinks of it the less one is inclined to attribute any importance whatever to the similarity of these interactions. You can only call them vaguely interactions between the East and West, and that is much too vague. There is a further point that this law gives us no explanation of some of the events, which in our history are far more important than these interactions. It gives us no account whatever of one or two things happening at the end of the eighteenth century, such as the birth of the United States or the French Revolution. Mr. Stuart-Glennie says the consideration of this law might be a practical guide to politics. What I want to suggest is, that in considering practical politics it is necessary to consider facts like the United States of America, very much more than this law. This law does not in fact give us any guiding principle whatever.

I suppose that the value that would be attributed to this law is that it is for sociology what Bode's law is for astronomy, a law which does not work out accurately, but it is suggestive. According to Bode's law, a certain comparatively simple mathematical series gives the proportionate distances of the planets. It does not work out in the least accurately, but there is a certain suggestiveness about it; and, before the Asteroids were discovered in the blank space between Mars and Jupiter, it did actually suggest that a planet ought to be found there. I suppose there is sufficient suggestiveness in Mr. Stuart-Glennie's period to make us see the history of a nation as a history of generations. There may be sets of ten or fifteen generations producing a revolution. It is unfortunate that Mr. Stuart-Glennie is not here. All the speeches, my own among them, have been so definitely critical that one wishes somebody would get up and explain the value that may be in this law.

MR. BRANFORD SAID :

That though Mr. Stuart-Glennie's papers covered an encyclopædic range, the discussion of them had almost wholly turned on his postulation of a law of synchronisms; and this was natural, for they, as sociologists, might regard Mr. Stuart-Glennie's doctrine as culminating in his historical

generalisations. Whether or not it might be possible to establish the validity of Mr. Stuart-Glennie's law of a half-millennial periodicity, yet it was at any rate certain that it would be a most valuable exercise for the sociologist, to test the validity of that generalisation, by using it as a working formula in a survey of the whole field of recorded history. The validity of a law was of course only adequately tested by prediction, but putting aside that possibility here, the sociologist would at least discover what value there might be in Mr. Stuart-Glennie's generalisation, if he tried how far the main phenomena of history might be fitted into Mr. Stuart-Glennie's frame-work. The sociologist was differentiated from the specialised historian in many ways, but above all by the generality and by the comparativeness of his survey; in other words, by his never losing sight of the world point of view necessary for an adequate comparison and understanding of the different fields and sections into which history had become divided by the accidents of politics or conventions of historical specialists. Now he could imagine no more useful preliminary exercise for the student who wished to pass from historical specialism into sociology, than an endeavour to utilise Mr. Stuart-Glennie's formula in a comparative and synthetic survey of world history. Let the student who was willing to do this, make a series of tabular statements, or charts, on the space-for-time method. Let him start at the time, say, six or seven hundred years immediately preceding the Christian era, and work onwards to the present time. Let him select the great happenings in politics and religion, in art and literature, in industry and science, and let him put these down country by country, one below the other in a vertical series. The data should be so arranged that on reading the record of the chart longitudinally one would perceive an outline of the history of each country, while if one read the chart vertically, one would get by inspection, a rough idea of the various world synchronisms in thought and action. He might say that he (the speaker) had himself utilised Mr. Stuart-Glennie's formula in the preparation of a chart of this kind, and the number of similar happenings that, roughly speaking, culminated and synchronised round about each half-millennial period, had certainly astonished him. Anyhow, he was convinced that any student who tried such an exercise as this in the comparative and synthetic treatment of history, which was really a necessary preliminary to sociology, would be well rewarded for his pains. He was glad to be able to take this opportunity of making acknowledgement to Mr. Stuart-Glennie for the many fertile and stimulating ideas he had derived from a study, extending for many years back, of Mr. Stuart-Glennie's encyclopædic writings, and more especially those in sociology and in philosophy.

The CHAIRMAN SAID :

I think I must, as far as possible, concentrate my remarks upon one of Mr. Stuart-Glennie's points of view, which has been sharply attacked, but with which I sympathise more than have many speakers. It is surely no mere coincidence, but one of profound significance, that such world-shaping events as the establishment of the Jewish Law, the birth of Greek philosophy, the coming of Buddha, and the teaching of Confucius should be broadly synchronous. Such a range of historical survey we very rarely attain, and Mr. Stuart-Glennie does us great service by making us feel the importance of this period, and by unifying our perspectives of it. Again he insists, and surely justly, upon the exceptional importance of the period with which our era commences. He insists on the next great period as being that of the collapse of Rome and of the rise of Islam; and then again on the next period as associated with the Crusades, that colossal strife of Europe with Asia which inaugurated a new era for Europe, but which prepared the breakdown of the Byzantine civilisation. The date of its overwhelming by the Turks is that which Gibbon and most other historians have insisted on as that of the close of mediæval history and the beginning of modern, as in fact, from their point of view, marking a generation-cycle.

Mr. Stuart-Glennie is, therefore, in more general correspondence with the historians than his critics might appear to me to have recognised, but the merit of his statement lies in its breadth and boldness, its insistence upon the ever renewed inter-connection of East and West. He insists on the existence of larger wave-crests, at intervals of approximately eighteen generations, without at all prejudicing the fact that there is open to investigation on one hand the possibility of some yet vaster cycle, and on the other the more limited periods, *e.g.*, since the discovery of America. Again, that this Russo-Japanese conflict must needs be one of stupendous world-consequences, is surely beginning to be felt by all.

In passing in these past days from one house to another of the most sharply opposed views in politics, I have been interested to hear the discussion in each and all turning upon the influences already so plainly felt of this conflict upon our own thought and of their bearing upon the life and character of Western peoples. I need not enter on the details of such a vast question; what is to the point here is that, as groups usually so completely antithetic, we should be discussing the same problem at all. In

conclusion, then, to have some conception of grouping our historic periods is of great value. We have before us the accumulations of many annalist historians, and surely it is now no longer premature to seek to group their facts and to interpret them. Mr. Beveridge's comparison is a happy one. It will be agreed, I trust, that Mr. Stuart-Glennie's vigorous raising of the question does a needed service.

Passing now to the second paper, and exchanging my standpoint of a general support to that of a detailed criticism, let me confess that I have failed to follow, or at least to see sufficiently sharp the distinction between Mr. Stuart-Glennie's two stages, with a vicious parenthesis, and Comte's "three stages," "theological, metaphysical, and positive."

They seem to me a good deal akin, especially if instead of these terms of Comte's, we substitute those proposed by John Stuart Mill, as clearer and less controversial ones—that of volitional, abstractional and scientific phases. I should like, therefore, to ask Mr. Stuart-Glennie to explain himself more fully here.

It remains only to express our indebtedness to Mr. Stuart-Glennie for what all must recognise as peculiarly comprehensive and suggestive papers.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATION

FROM DR. McDOUGALL

(Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford).

Mr. Stuart-Glennie's three papers should be welcomed, if for no other reason, because they serve to remind us, in this age of specialisation, of the need for minds that will not shrink from the attempt to group the whole of knowledge in one co-ordinated scheme, and because they remind us that a satisfactory treatment of the social sciences must be based upon some acceptable solution of some of the most fundamental problems of science. The author's contribution to this necessary foundation, his conception of atoms as mutually determining centres of effort, seems to supply what has been hitherto the most conspicuous defect of the panpsychistic doctrines set forth of late years by so many writers. But while recognising the importance of this conception as the foundation stone of the doctrine of panpsychism, I cannot but wish that Mr. Stuart-Glennie had attempted to define more clearly his attitude to two problems which, on the acceptance of any such doctrine, at once confront us, and which, as it seems to me, are of vital importance for sociology, namely the problem of the scope of, and the relations between, teleological and mechanical explanations, and the problem of psychical individuality. It may be that this conception of the atom is reconcilable with the view that the evolution of our world was, in its earlier stages, predominantly mechanical and that, as psychical life attained to higher levels of complexity, the teleological factor, effort stimulated by and directed by feeling, feeling in relation to events foreseen, has played an increasingly important rôle, which tends to culminate in the self-conscious efforts of society to direct the course of individual and social evolution. But this is one of the points that we would like to see treated at length by the author.

The problem of individuality, which is intimately bound up with the former problem, seems to me to present grave difficulties for any doctrine of panpsychism. The failure to cope satisfactorily with this problem was the gravest defect of Fechner's exposition of the doctrine, as it is also of the exposition of Professor Paulsen, perhaps now its leading

exponent in Germany. The difficulty may be baldly stated as follows: if each atom is a centre of effort, how does the human brain, made up of many million atoms, become also a centre of effort? How are we to conceive the unification of the many atomic efforts to yield this unitary resultant, the volitional effort of the human individual, by which, as we would fain believe, the course of history is determined? What is the medium of composition? Is it a pontifical atom whose efforts are determined by those of all the rest? Is there a hierarchy of atoms and of cells? Modern anatomy and physiology have failed to discover any indications of the existence of such a supreme monad in the brain. That is the difficulty by which I find myself held back from accepting as a working hypothesis Mr. Stuart-Glennie's, or any other, panpsychistic doctrine.

In regard to the second paper, one can but register the opinion that, in the enunciation of the law of intellectual development, the author has indeed laid his finger upon that slow process which has been the principal factor in the evolution of society, namely, the gradual improvement in man's conceptions of causation. As to that other illuminating idea, embodied in the second paper, the contention that the conjunction of superior and inferior races of men in the same geographical areas, has provided conditions eminently favourable to the progress of civilisation, it may be objected that the author carries it too far in asserting that it was "the main primary condition of the origin of civilisation." For surely those higher races must have undergone a very considerable degree of social evolution in order to have achieved their superiority to those whom they afterwards conquered and subjected to their rule, and to have arrived at those religious conceptions which, in the view of the author, they imposed upon those inferior races.

MR. STUART-GLENNIE'S REPLY.

I.—THE FUNDAMENTAL THEORY OF MIND AND MATTER.

§ I. I congratulate myself on Dr. McDougall's beginning his critical communication with reminding us "that a satisfactory treatment of the social sciences must be based upon some acceptable solution of some of the most fundamental problems of science." I shall thus, I trust, be excused for prefacing papers on what must be the core of sociology, a law of historical intellectual development,* by a paper on the place of the social sciences in a classification of knowledge, based on a fundamental theory of mind and matter. But a theory of mind and matter is, in other words, a theory of causation. What are the roots of the theory at once of causation and of mind and matter here set forth? As a Scotsman, I naturally found my speculations and researches on, and connect them with, the European development of Hume's theory of causation, and his therewith connected conception of a "System of the Sciences," and theory of intellectual development, or, as he called it, "Natural History of Religion."

Now, Hume, reducing causation to but a uniform sequence of antecedent and consequent,† destroyed the notion of cause as the power, virtue, or quality of a being or object, and hence, as we may now see, prepared the way for the new master-conception of reciprocity or reciprocal action. Cause, as Hume interpreted it, Mill affirmed to mean the "invariable antecedent."‡ But I agree with Stirling that this is a misrepresentation of Hume's doctrine, and that "Hume, in custom, argued, *in effect*, for the variability of

* But no less important though, as I have said in my second paper (§1), more difficult to discover are the laws of racial evolution, and social (or economic) progress.

† A cause was defined by Hume, "an object followed by another whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other." *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding. Philosophical Works*, vol. iv., p. 90.

‡ *System of Logic*, vol. i., p. 377.

causality.”* It was the speculations of Hume that urged the Scottish-descended Kant to his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. But it was the variability which Hume insinuated into causality, by resting its supposed necessity on custom, that Kant contested, and with the result of implicitly, at least, transforming it into reciprocity. This conception was still further, and explicitly, developed by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. And the speciality of the way in which Hegel, generalising the categories of Kant, presents the conception of reciprocity, consists essentially in its dynamical or historical form, and hence, in a Law of Thought—that law which the Hegelian theory of the *Begriff* in fact is, and which Hegel has summarily indicated, if not formally stated, in such affirmations as this: *Das speculative Denken . . . hat eigenthümliche Formen, deren allgemeine der Begriff ist; and Die logischen Formen . . . sind, als Formen des Begriffs, der lebendige Geist der Wirklichen.* †

The conception of causation as reciprocity thus developed into a Law of Thought, as result of investigation of mental phenomena, had to be complemented, as it seemed to me, by a Law of Existence as result of investigation of material phenomena. This I undertook, founding especially on Faraday's "Experimental Researches in Electricity," and Maxwell's mathematical treatment of Faraday's "Lines of Force." The first general result was my theory of *Atoms as mutually determining centres of lines of pressure*. This theory later researches, and those especially with respect, and subsequent, to the discovery of radium, have, I submit, so far more and more clearly confirmed, while correcting by showing the need of a more comprehensive conception. And the final result was a generalisation of this theory of atoms in a law of existence, thus

* *Annotations to Schwegler, History of Philosophy*, p. 455.

† *Encyklopædie Die Logik*, Werke, 6, vi., s. 15 and s. 319. In the *New Philosophy of History*, pp. 180-189, I have referred in chronological order to the various later statements of a similar generalisation by Boole, *Laws of Thought*, pp. 50-51, and 410-411; Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 333-4; Neale, *Analogy of Thought and Nature*, pp. 35, 87, and 122; Hodgson, *Time and Space*, pp. 383, 400, and 539; and Taine, *De l'Intelligence*, ii., pp. 463, 490, and 492. And these generalisations I have further compared with the Scottish School's distinctive doctrine of the relativity of thought.

formulated—*Every existent determines, and is determined by, co-existents.*

§ 2. The more comprehensive conception of atoms ultimately arrived at was defined in these terms—*Atoms are mutually determining centres of correlatively integrating and differentiating efforts acting through radiating pressures.* And it will be now seen that such a definition integrates the conception of reciprocity as a law of thought, or more generally as a law of effort, unconscious and conscious, with the conception of reciprocity as a law of existence. But Dr. McDougall calls this a “doctrine of panpsychism,” and he thinks that “in the acceptance of any such doctrine, two problems at once confront us which are of vital importance for sociology—namely, the problem of the scope of, and the relations between teleological and mechanical explanations, and the problem of psychical individuality;” and the latter problem especially seems to him “to present grave difficulties for any panpsychistic doctrine.” Any objection stated by Dr. McDougall demands very serious consideration. But I would fain hope that, if I am able in the very restricted space here at my disposal, to make my hypothesis as to mind and matter clear, he will find that it is not open to the objections that can be urged against “panpsychistic theories” generally, and those of Fechner and Paulsen to which he more particularly refers—if, indeed, it can properly be treated as a “panpsychistic doctrine” at all.

The fundamental idea is that of Substance as made up of mutually determining, or acting and reacting, parts. But this idea of mutual determination, of reciprocity or reciprocal action, evidently implies that the parts of substance are not only centres of action, but that the form and quality of each part depends on the relation between it and its co-existents. Hence, in direct opposition to the absolutist conception of the atom current in the middle of last century, was the entirely relative conception of the atom which I suggested in 1859, and which has been brilliantly verified in the newly discovered facts of the transformation even of elementary bodies. But whence this activity of existents, this

capacity of changing, and being changed by co-existents? In the conception of atoms as centres of pressure, matter is generalised into pressure; and the causes of motion into differential relations of pressure. But what and whence the force that keeps the atom, nay, each one of the corpuscles of which it is constituted, together? What answer can be returned to such a question save by assuming that every centre of pressure is a centre of some mode or germ at least of what later appears as sentientcy, and hence that it is a centre also of effort? Nay, are not the conceptions at once of sentientcy, of effort, and of pressure implied in the conception of reciprocal action or mutual determination? Nay, more. Is there not implied in this conception that of effort as both integrative and differentiative? For how otherwise could each centre of pressure both resist and accommodate itself to change? And yet what is this but such a law of effort, both unconscious and conscious, as Hegel suggested in his theory of the *Begriff*?

Thus mind is in its germ generalised into centres of some dim form of sentientcy, and consequent or rather correlative integrative and differentiative effort; and we have seen that matter is generalised into centres of radiant pressures. But as pressure could evidently not exist without effort, neither as evidently could effort without pressure. Each implies the other. The opposition between mind and matter as entities capable of independent existence is thus abolished. And to express this point of view in a word, I would call atoms, defined as above, not electrons, but bioticons.*

§3. "To say that all this *order* in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately from design is," as Hume pointed out, "begging the question; nor," as he added, "can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, *a priori*, both that *order* is from its nature inseparably attached to thought, and that *it can never of itself and from original unknown principles belong to matter.*" † But though to Hume unknown, it is to him, in his sapping and mining of the theological notion

* βιωτικός, ἡ, ὅν (βίωω, to live) fit for life, lively, of or pertaining to life.

† *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Phil. Works*, vol. ii., p. 485.

of cause, that the discovery, or rather rediscovery, of this "original principle" is primarily due. The principle that shows *order* to be inherent in the very constitution of things, and to belong to the very nature of the Kosmos, is that in which the new conception of causation as reciprocal action or mutual determination has been variously stated, and formulated more particularly in my Law of Existence. My hypothesis of atoms as bioticons is suggested as but a means of applying the new conception of causation and law of existence to phenomena classified in a "system of the sciences," and rising from the simplest phenomena of motion to the most complex of socialisation. And I may add that the classification I have set forth has been guided, as Hume would have had it, by such "principles of human nature" as were at least implicit in his *Inquiry* and *Treatise*.*

But may not the effort, unconscious of aim, and arising but from an unease, the dim germ of what later becomes sentientcy—may not this element or aspect of the bioticon be called the "soul"? I think not. The distinctive feature of scientific thought is its differentiating precision. Just as the external forms of complexes of bioticons are given different names—átoms, molecules, cells, organisms, star-systems, etc.—so the internal forces of these complexes should be given different names, and the term "soul" should be reserved for but the highest of those more developed forces which co-exist with the more developed forms of organisms. Bichat distinguished between the vegetal and animal lives co-existing in the higher organisms; and in man I would further distinguish what may be termed the noetical † life. Only to this noetic life—that system of efforts derived from, and influenced by, the ideas and emotions of the past and present social life of man—would I give the name of "soul." Nor is this by any means a mere nominal distinction. It was—though, of course,

* "In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete *system of the sciences* built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security." *Treatise of Human Nature. Phil. Works*, vol. i., p. 8.

† Νοητικός, from *νω*, to discern, think, purpose.

in germinal connection with the past—an altogether new form of effort and life that arose with civilisation, and the intellectual development then made possible. How then can my theory be called “panpsychistic”? It distinguishes the conditions and characters of efforts as precisely as it does the conditions and characters of the bodies that respectively manifest them, and refuses the term “soul” to any but a certain highest and unique class of efforts. But what view is then to be taken of the alternative academic theories of “psychophysical” (not to be confused with psychoneural) parallelism and psychophysical interaction? The notion of either involves a separability of mind from its organs which I altogether deny, save, of course, in the case of the noetic life. And yet, though the ideas and character of a man survive the organs that made them possible, they survive only as taken up by the organs of his successors in whom his ideas and character may be figuratively said to be reincarnated. Thus the terms soul and body, as ordinarily used, mean for me our lives, vegetal, animal, and noetical, and their respective and inseparable organs. Hence, what interact in an organism I hold to be, not its lives and their organs, but higher and lower organs which, like the bioticons of which they are composed, are centres both of effort and of pressure. And though the interaction between the organs of the noetical life and those of the vegetal and the animal life may still in ordinary language—hardly can it, in strict accordance with this theory, be spoken of as a conflict between soul and body.

If, then, the hypothesis as to mind and matter here set forth cannot be truly qualified as a “panpsychistic doctrine,” Dr. McDougall’s objections to it as such a doctrine fall to the ground. Yet his chief difficulty must be more directly met. “If,” he asks, “each atom is a centre of effort, how does the human brain, made up of many million atoms, become also a centre of effort?” But, I ask, in reply, how can the cohesion of the corpuscles of an atom be explained without supposing each of them a centre of effort; and how does the atom, made up of many million corpuscles, become also, as it does, a centre of effort? How, indeed, generally, are units, whether elements

or compounds of elements, to be conceived without the supposition of such integrative and differentiative effort as is, in fact, implied in the fundamental conception of reciprocal action or mutual determination? *

II.—THE LAW OF HISTORICAL INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT.

§4. I shall preface my reply to the Comtist attack on the historical law with the statement of which my second paper concludes by noting a remarkable admission, and still more remarkable omission, in Dr. Bridges' article on "Comte's Positive Philosophy," in the December number of the *Positivist Review* (p. 280). "It must," he says, "be obvious to every reader of the first half of the third volume of the *Philosophie* that the work done since that volume was written, by such men as Faraday, Helmholtz, Maxwell, Lord Kelvin, Heinrich Hertz, and many others that might be named, involves nothing less than a complete recasting of the group of sciences known as physics." Dr. Bridges maintains, however, that "such a recast would not involve any change in the fundamental principles of Comte's philosophy." I should say, on the contrary, that our new physical knowledge is leading—as in my first paper I have briefly indicated—to new views of

* It is only fair to my friend, Dr. McDougall, with whom I have so often had the advantage of discussing the question here raised, and to whom I have been obliged to reply in so summary a fashion, to state, in his own words, his position with reference to it as indicated in the conclusion of his admirable little primer of *Physiological Psychology*. "The soul then is the ground of unity of psychical process, of individual consciousness. Is it anything more? . . . Are we to conceive souls as homogeneous and alike wherever they may be, or has each soul its specific characters? If so, do these characters change and develop with experience, or is all experience embodied in the nervous system alone? Does the soul come into existence at the moment of conception or of birth, or does it exist before the union of those two tiny specks of protoplasm from which each mortal body and marvellous brain arise? Does it come, as so many have believed, trailing clouds of glory or of shame? Does it play a part in directing the growth of that tiny germ, or does that material germ contain within itself alone the thousand delicate peculiarities of form and function that mark each child as the offspring of both parents? Lastly, does it continue to exist when the brain has ceased to live, and, if so, does it retain its individuality and all or anything of that which we call personality? These are questions that . . . can only be answered by the discovery of new empirical evidence. The physiological psychologist above all men must proclaim a sceptical agnosticism, not that spurious agnosticism which says, We shall not and cannot know, but that nobler agnosticism which says, We do not know; let us try to find out."

what is, not only for Comte's philosophy, but for all philosophies, the most fundamental of questions—that with respect to the true conception of mind and matter, and their correlation.

But passing on from this, I must point out that, while Dr. Bridges thus frankly admits the immense advance since Comte's time in our physical knowledge, he entirely omits any allusion even to the still greater advance in our sociological knowledge during the eighty-three years, the three generations almost, since Comte's statement of what he so complacently and frequently refers to as "la grande loi philosophique que j'ai découverte en 1822." And the insistence of Dr. Bridges, and apparently also of Professor Ingram,* on the adequacy and verifiability still of Comte's sociological law becomes yet more remarkable when we find (1) that Comte's characterisation of the primitive stage of man's conception of nature accords with but the knowledge of 1760, as set forth by De Brosses,† rather than with the knowledge even of 1822; (2) that his characterisation of both the primitive and the ultimate stage does not essentially differ from Hume's of more than a hundred and fifty years ago (1751-7); ‡ and (3) that, profound as is the modification of both these characterisations of Hume's, which is necessitated by our new sociological knowledge, that knowledge makes altogether impossible any such characterising as Comte's of that middle or transitional stage which Hume, with a wise

* *Sociological Papers*, vol. I., p. 235. "What is now, in my judgment, most wanted is a real study of Comte, who . . . is not as yet at all adequately appreciated."

† *Culte de dieux fétiches, ou parallèle de l'ancienne Religion de l'Égypte, avec la Religion actuelle de Nigritie*, 1760.

‡ Man's primitive conception of causation, he says, "deifies every part of the universe, and conceives all the conspicuous productions of nature to be themselves so many real divinities," and the ultimate stage of our conception of causation he characterises as maintaining a "deliberate doubt" respecting all causes beyond those which are found in "the steady inviolable laws by which everything is surely governed." *Natural History of Religion. Phil. Works*, vol. iv., pp. 458 and 513; and *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, vol. ii., p. 480, written about the same time (1750) as Turgot's discourse at the Sorbonne *Sur les Progrès Successifs de l'Esprit humain*, though not published until after Hume's death. But the very titles of these books have been somewhat unfairly—to use no stronger term—left unmentioned by Comte and his disciples, and that, even when acknowledging the great philosophic merits of Hume. See *Philosophie Positive*, t. ii., p. 442; Littré, *A. Comte et la Philosophie Positive*, première partie, chaps. iii., iv., and v.; and Papillon, *David Hume, Précurseur d'Auguste Comte*, in the Comtist periodical, *La Philosophie Positive*, t. iii., pp. 292-308.

and truly scientific suspense of judgment, considering the inadequacy of historical knowledge in his time, refrained from characterising.

Only too loyally have Comte's disciples adhered to their master's "hygiène cérébrale," and not allowed themselves, even when, like Dr. Bridges, acquainted with, to be disturbed by, those splendid results of modern research which it seems to me treason to truth, if loyalty to Comte, not duly to study and take account of before insisting on the adequacy and verifiability still of his alleged "grande loi philosophique." And having had the pleasure of reading a proof of Dr. Bridges' learned and suggestive contribution to this volume, I would fain be allowed to ask him to consider, or reconsider, with reference to Comte's statement of the law of historical intellectual development, those great classes of facts which have led me to a new, and, as I think, more verifiable, statement of each of the three clauses of that law; and with reference especially to those facts of the history of civilisation with which Dr. Bridges appears so well acquainted, I would ask—Can it, in view of these facts, be maintained that Comte's characterisation of the transitional stage is in any degree adequate or defensible, save as perhaps the best that could have been suggested at the date of Comte's "discovery" of his alleged law (1822)?

§ 5. For the law of historical intellectual development which I have stated was not only, on its first provisional statement more than thirty years ago,* but has, in all its later and fuller statements—as at the last Paris Exposition (Sept., 1900), before an audience composed partly of Comtists (Ecole Internationale de l'Exposition)—been put forward simply as, in its three clauses, a co-ordination of generalisations of three great sets of recently discovered facts—discoveries with respect to (1) Primitive Conceptions of Causation; (2) the Origins of Civilisation, the Conflicts of Races and the Conflicts of Ideas; and (3) the latest, if not ultimate, conception of Causation. It may well be that my generalisations of the facts comprised in these three great classes, constantly being added to as they

* *New Philosophy of History* (1873), p. 191.

are, may be not only more concisely, but more correctly stated ; but I submit that, whether the law of historical intellectual development which I have suggested, or what Comte dogmatically presented as a "grande loi philosophique," more nearly approximates to a true description of historical facts, is a question, judgment on which must be pronounced—not by those who are ignorant of, or ignore, the immense recent increase of our sociological knowledge ; but by those who, like myself, have spent a life-time in sociological research.

As to the facts I have generalised—just as an outcrop of Archaian rocks in recent strata may give us knowledge of immensely remote geological conditions, so folk-poesy and folk-custom—and incomparably more truly than missionary or other travellers' opinions as to savage beliefs—may enlighten us with respect to primitive conceptions of nature. And it is to folk-poesy and folk-custom, interpreted by modern psychology, that I appeal in support of the generalisations of the first clause of the law of intellectual development. Of the second clause, these are implicitly or explicitly the chief affirmations—(1) that intellectual development, independent of any such further brain-enlargement as had previously caused such development, began only with the progressive social organisation which we call civilisation ; (2) that this had a definitely local and approximately dateable origin in Chaldea and Egypt about, say, 8000 B.C. ; (3) that its main condition was a conflict of higher fair and lower dark races ;* (4) that the conditions of the conflict of races developed a conflict of ideas ; and (5) that this conflict has been a slow and extraordinarily varied working out of the antagonisms latent in primitive conceptions ; yet not a merely futile conflict, but one the long æon of which constituted in all its ages—from that which began in the eighth or ninth millennium B.C. to that present age which may be

* Dr. McDougall remarks, "Surely those higher races must have undergone a very considerable degree of social evolution in order to have achieved their superiority to those whom they afterwards conquered and subjected to their rule." I think that it was only necessary that they should have those ruling capacities which the higher fair races have always shown, and show to this day, in their relations with the lower dark races. And the earliest known civilisations originated precisely at the point of junction of the fair hyperborean and dark equatorial races (or species ?) of mankind.

dated from the sixth century B.C.—a vast and complex transition to a generally truer conception of causation, and hence to greater power over nature. Thus the transitional stage which Hume wisely forbore, and Comte rashly ventured to characterise, is now presented as an æon of such conflicts as it would be as grotesque to qualify, like Comte, as “metaphysical,” as to date, as he does, from the *quatorzième siècle* of the Christian era. And the appeal here against Comte is to all that recently accumulated mass of Ethnographical, Assyriological, and Egyptological discoveries of which he could not, and his disciples will not, take account. The third clause of the law presents the latest, if not ultimate, conception of causation as, with clear definiteness, connected with the primitive conception; and as, in the complexity of its integration of the differentiations of the Transitional Æon, illustrating that general law of thought which Dr. Stirling has called “The Secret of Hegel.” And in support of this clause, I appeal (1) to the physical facts which have been generalised in the scientific conception of causation as a reciprocal action of equivalent gain and loss; (2) to the folklore facts that show the primitive conception to be one of unquantified reciprocal action; and (3) to the logical facts which more particularly led to, and the general psychological and physical facts which have corroborated, while correcting, Hegel’s theory of the *Begriff*.

Professor Geddes, in concluding the discussion on my papers, professed himself unable clearly to see the distinction between the stages of historical intellectual development which I have defined and Comte’s “theological, metaphysical and positive” stages, and especially if, instead of these terms of Comte’s, we substitute those of “volitional, abstractional and scientific” proposed by John Stuart Mill. Professor Geddes added that he “should like to ask me to explain myself more fully here;” and this I trust that, restricted as my space has been, I have sufficiently done to make at least these points clear. First, my standpoint is wholly different, not only philosophically, but historically from Comte’s: philosophically, it is a theory of causation very different (as indicated in my first paper) from Comte’s, the crudeness of which Mr. Mill himself was

among the first to point out*; and historically, it is a standpoint no less different in taking such a survey of intellectual development as only the results of research since Comte's time have made possible. Secondly, I define and contrast, yet connect, the primitive and ultimate conceptions of causation—the panzoist and kosmianist stages, as I call them—in, as I submit, a more definite and more verifiable way than Comte—namely, as the former an unquantified intuition, and the latter a quantified conception of universal interaction. And thirdly, dating the commencement of the great Transitional Æon from the origin of civilisation instead of, as Comte did, from the fourteenth century, B.C., I define it by no such epithets as either “metaphysical” or “abstractional,” but as a succession of ages of Conflicts of Ideas developing the antagonisms latent in primitive or panzoist conceptions of sentient powers and supernal beings, and working up, through these conflicts of ideas, more and more definitely distinguishable as naturalist and supernaturalist, to those more verifiable conceptions which may be regarded as relatively ultimate, and designated kosmianist.

§ 6. With respect, however, to the discoveries generalised in the three clauses of my suggested law of intellectual stages, my Comtist critics say nothing. They can but repeat the old arguments in defence of Comte's law current forty or fifty years ago, and before those discoveries, not physical only, but sociological, were even dreamt of. And in reply to my affirmation that Comte's law of the three stages is, as a general law of intellectual development, both inadequate in view of our new historical knowledge and unverifiable, the President of the London Positivist Society can only reaffirm that sociology, for instance, has in fact passed through Comte's three stages, and prove this by referring to the attribution of social organisation, first, to gods, or a god; then to such hypothetical, or, as he would say, “metaphysical” agencies as a social contract; and then to fixed laws that can be ascertained.

* “He (Comte) sees no difference between such generalisations as Kepler's laws and such as the theory of gravitation. He fails to perceive the real distinction between laws of phenomena and those of the action of causes; the former exemplified by the succession of day and night, the latter by the earth's rotation which causes it.” *System of Logic*, vol. i., pp. 380-1.

But how did scientific thinking originate? And what was the germ from which gods were developed? The facts I have generalised in the first clause of the law I have stated appear to show that scientific thinking originated in a primitive intuition of universal interaction, and that the germ from which gods were developed were the supernals, the creation of primitive poetry. But how from such origins came the sciences to be developed? And how the religions? In the second clause of the new law of intellectual stages, I have indicated the answers to these questions in generalising the facts leading to a new theory of the origin of civilisation, and of intellectual development as thereon consequent. But again, how is the primitive panzoist conception to be distinguished from, yet connected with, the scientific conception of reciprocal action? And how are the panzoist to be distinguished from, yet connected with, the kosmianist creations of supernal beings? The inferences from the facts referred to in the third clause of the law stated distinguish panzoist from kosmian conceptions of reciprocal action as the former unquantified, the latter quantified; and distinguish the supernal beings created by panzoist from those created by kosmianist poetry, as the former unrecognisedly and the latter recognisedly subjective merely; and the law of the passage from the former to the latter set of conceptions and creations is verified in the conflicts of the transitional æon of civilisation.

In rejoinder, therefore, to the President of the London Positivist Society, I submit that if the later results of sociological research afford verifiable answers to such questions, wholly inadequate and out of date is a law of historical intellectual development which, like Comte's of nearly a hundred years ago, does not, and could not then with any chance of verification, touch any one of these deep-reaching questions. And I venture further to submit that, though presented as a "grande loi philosophique," and though, as an elaboration of Hume's theory of the "natural history of religion," it has been admirably serviceable as a co-ordinating hypothesis; Comte's law of the three stages is not now of any value, even as an empirical law. For theology was never a stage, though it has

been a co-existent, and, in irritating by its incredibilities, a stimulant, of scientific thought; to qualify as "metaphysical" the transitional æon, of 10,000 years that must now be recognised would be manifestly absurd; and, in the development of the sciences, the result of the conflict between naturalism and supernaturalism, the necessary stage of the creation of hypotheses, less and less crude and unverifiable as knowledge has increased, would be more correctly termed the hypothetical, than the "metaphysical," stage.

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ORIGIN OF THE SOCIETY.

A conference was held in London, in June, 1903, to consider whether the opportunity was suitable for the formation of a Society to promote sociological studies. The conference was attended by about 56 representatives of various departments of social investigation—economic, anthropological, historical, psychological, ethical, &c.—of philosophy, of education, and of practical social interests. It was unanimously resolved to proceed with the formation of a Sociological Society, and a large General Committee was appointed to carry out the necessary preliminary requirements. At a General Meeting in November, 1903, the Society was duly constituted and the present Council elected, with the Right Hon. James Bryce as first President of the Society. Four Meetings of the Society were held in the Spring and Summer Terms of 1904, for papers and discussions—these being included in the first volume of "SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS" (MacMillan, 1905).

SCOPE AND AIMS OF THE SOCIETY.

The aims of the Sociological Society are scientific, educational, and practical. It seeks to promote investigation, and to advance education in the social sciences in their various aspects and applications.

Its field covers the whole phenomena of society. The origin and development, the decay and extinction of societies, their structure and classification, their internal functions and interaction have to be observed and compared; and all this with increasing precision and completeness. The many standpoints from which social phenomena may be considered have thus all to be utilised. In this way the Society affords the common ground on which workers from all fields and schools may profitably meet—geographer and naturalist, anthropologist and archæologist, historian and philologist, psychologist and moralist, all contributing their results towards a fuller Social Philosophy, including the natural and civil history of man, his achievements and his ideals.

This conception of social evolution involves a clearer valuation of the conditions and forces which respectively hinder or help development, which make towards degeneration or towards progress. The physician and the alienist, the criminologist and the jurist, have here again their common meeting-ground with hygienist and educationist, with philanthropist, social reformer and politician, with journalist and cleric.

Such mutual understanding among different workers must obviously tend to promote a clearer delimitation of respective fields, and a mutual suggestiveness towards methods of cultivation also—in other words, an extending division of labour, an increasing co-operation. But these fields are the aspects or subdivisions of sociology, both pure and applied; these

methods, with their corresponding nomenclature and notations, have to be compared and unified, to furnish the methods of sociology.

The place of sociology among the sciences thus comes more clearly into view; and the growing body of organised social knowledge may thus claim its place; not only in the scheme of the logician and the synthesis of the philosopher, but in the education of the liberal professions and in the councils of the practical world.

PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIETY.

The Society prosecutes its work by means customary to a learned society—Meetings for Papers and Discussions, the collection of relevant periodical and book Literature, and by Publications.

It has been suggested that an endeavour should be made to hold meetings for papers and discussion in joint conference with those societies which deal with special aspects of social phenomena.

LIBRARY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The great output of specifically sociological literature which has characterised the past two or three decades—more particularly on the Continent and in America—is not adequately represented even in the largest libraries in this country. There does not seem to be any institution in this country where a student of sociology can at present consult a complete file of the leading journals of sociology. To collect and maintain for reference an adequate library of sociological books and periodicals is one of the pressing duties before the Society.

PROMOTION OF SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES.

While many foreign Universities have established Chairs and Lectureships in Sociology, the subject as such had, previous to the formation of the Society, been unrepresented in the Universities of this country. One of its founders (Mr. J. Martin White) placed at the disposal of London University a fund for the initiation of sociological teaching in the University. Under this scheme, research work is being carried on, and courses of lectures have been given—by Professor Geddes (“Civics”), Dr. Westermarck (“Social Institutions”), and Dr. Haddon (“Anthropology”). Mr. L. T. Hobhouse has also given in the University of London a course of lectures (“Comparative Ethics”), to which all members of the Society resident in the metropolitan district were invited to attend free of charge.

Various attempts have been made to apply systematically to the development of sociology those organised instruments of research (Observatory, Laboratory, Museum, etc.) which have so effectively aided the

progress of the physical and natural sciences. It is one of the objects of the Sociological Society to investigate such initiatives as those of the Musée Social in Paris, the Institut de Sociologie in Brussels, the Outlook Tower in Edinburgh, and the Laboratory of Sociology in Palermo. The Society proposes to examine into the effectiveness of such apparatus and institutions for Research, and, if advisable, advocate and encourage the development of these and the promotion of similar initiatives elsewhere.

LIBRARY AND PUBLISHING FUND.

The efficient working of the Society depends in large measure upon its general ability to raise considerable funds in addition to the ordinary subscription of members. In order to raise the money urgently required for the purchase of books and periodicals, and for the issue of a Journal, an appeal is made for special subscriptions, donations and gifts.

This country is alone amongst the leading nations in having no scientific journal devoted exclusively to sociological studies. Such journals, however, can hardly be expected to be self-supporting, and the issue of such a periodical at first involves a considerable, though it is to be hoped, diminishing outlay.

Should funds permit, the Society will also undertake other publications. There are, for instance, not a few foreign sociological works of the first importance urgently demanding translation.

While the Society aims at being self-supporting, its necessarily heavy initial capital outlays, its low subscription, and yet, in all likelihood, its limited membership, compel an appeal to the generosity of individual members to supplement their subscription by an initial donation, or by an addition to their annual subscription. Leaving ordinary expenditure to be met by the annual subscriptions, there is still required a capital sum, estimated at about £5,000, for the efficient establishment of the Society, including the collection of a Reference Library. Towards this capital fund the Society has already received numerous donations in cash and books.

CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP.

Membership of the Society is open to all who are interested in the promotion of the scientific study of social phenomena.

The rate of subscription has been fixed at £1 1s. (26 francs, \$5, 21 marks) per annum.

The payment for life membership is £10 10s. (260 francs, \$50, 210 marks).

Libraries and other Corporate Bodies are admissible as members.

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